REPORT
OF THE
COMMANDING GENERAL
EIGHTH U. S. ARMY
ON THE
LEYTE-SAMAR OPERATION
(Including Clearance of the Visayan Passages)
26 DECEMBER 1944 - 8 MAY 1945
REPORT
of the
COMMANDING GENERAL
Eighth U.S. Army

LEYTE-SAMAR OPERATION
(Including Clearance of the Visayan Passages)

26 DECEMBER 1944 - 8 MAY 1945
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Lieutenant General R. L. Eichelberger
Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army
INTRODUCTION

On 20 October 1944 at 1000-I, elements of the United States Sixth Army, Third and Seventh Fleets, and Far Eastern Air Force, with additional support from Australian air and naval units, made landings at four points on the eastern shore of LEYTE ISLAND in the VISAYAN GROUP of the PHILIPPINES. Beachheads were established at SAN RICARDO (three miles south of TACLOBAN), PALO, SAN JOSE, and DULAG on LEYTE, and on PANAON ISLAND which dominates the PANAON STRAITS at the southern end of LEYTE.

Virtually the entire eastern coast of LEYTE was seized on D-day against light opposition, except in the vicinity of PALO, where stiff resistance was encountered. The beachheads were rapidly extended to depths of three and a half miles and TACLOBAN AIRDROME was captured. There was light enemy air opposition to our ground operations as our forces continued their drive to the west coast.

Within two months the X and XXIV Corps forces operating under the Sixth Army had swept completely across LEYTE, killing many Japanese enroute and driving the remainder into large pockets throughout the ORMOC, PALOMPN and ABIJAO sector on the west coast. In the meantime, the area from SAN JUANICO STRAITS to CATBALOGAN on southern SAMAR had been secured.

Organized enemy resistance was declared officially broken on 26 December, and General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, directed that the Eighth Army assume control of combat units in the LEYTE-SAMAR area and complete the destruction of all remaining hostile forces in addition to preparing troops for future operations of the Sixth Army.

Although the sixty-seven day period from 20 October to 26 December 1944 had netted a total of 55,344 Japanese killed and
prisoners of war, the islands of LEYTE and SAMAR were far from cleared of the enemy. The Sixth Army intelligence estimates on 26 December 1944 indicated about 5000 enemy occupying LEYTE and SAMAR, whereas Eighth Army estimates accounted for more than 25,000 Japanese on LEYTE with scattered groups on SAMAR. The bulk of these were concentrated in northwest LEYTE, west of Highway No. 2 and north of PALOMPON, with another sizeable force located in the hills south of LAKE DANAQ. It was obvious that an extended period of mopping-up would be required for their final liquidation.

Meanwhile, as the LEYTE-SAMAR Operation progressed, on 5 February 1945, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur directed the Eighth Army to clear the sea lanes through the VISAYAS in order to develop a short protected overwater supply route.

PART ONE of this report deals with the Eighth Army operations on LEYTE-SAMAR from 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945 and is divided into three phases:

(1) XXIV Corps activities from 26 December 1944 to 15 February 1945.

(2) X Corps activities from 26 December 1944 to 24 February 1945.

(3) Eighth Army Area Command operations from 24 February 1945 to 8 May 1945.

PART TWO covers the amphibious operations conducted by the Eighth Army in securing the island groups extending from the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE on the west to the BALICUATROS (SAN BERNAR-DINO STRAITS) on the east.
Organization Chart of Major Combat Units
LEYTE-SAMAR Operation
(Including Clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES)
26 December 1944 - 8 May 1945

Eighth U.S. Army
Lt Gen R. L. Eichelberger

Eighth Army Area Command
Maj Gen Frederick A. Irving

Americal Division
Maj Gen William E. Arnold
132d RCT
164th RCT
182d RCT

XXIV Corps
Maj Gen John R. Hodge

7th Inf Div
Maj Gen Archibald V. Arnold
17th RCT
32d RCT
184th RCT

77th Inf Div
Maj Gen A. D. Bruce
305th RCT
306th RCT
307th RCT

96th Inf Div
Maj Gen James L. Bradley
381st RCT
382d RCT
383d RCT

11th A/B Div
Maj Gen Joseph M. Swing
511th Foht RCT
187th Gli RCT
188th Gli RCT

X Corps
Maj Gen Franklin G. Sibert

1st Cav Div
Maj. Gen Verne D. Mudge
1st Cav Brig
5th Cav Regt
12th Cav Regt
2d Cav Brig
7th Cav Regt
8th Cav Regt

24th Inf Div
Maj Gen Roscoe B. Woodruff
19th RCT
21st RCT
34th RCT

32d Inf Div
Maj Gen William H. Gille
126th RCT
127th RCT
128th RCT

38th Inf Div
Maj Gen Henry L. C. Jones
149th RCT
151st RCT
152d RCT

112th RCT
Brig Gen Julian W. Cunningham
ORIENTATION MAP "A"

LEGEND

- **AREAS SECURED BY 31 JAN '45**
- **ISLANDS ASTRIE VISAYAN OVERWATED ROUTE**
- **MOPPING UP COMPLETED 8 MAY '45**

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
PART ONE

LEYTE–SAMAR OPERATION
PART ONE: LEYTE-SANAR OPERATION

I. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1. XXIV Corps Phase.

Eighth Army Field Order No. 8, dated 20 December 1944, directed the XXIV Corps to continue the destruction of Japanese wherever found and to be prepared to conduct overland or amphibious shore-to-shore operations to seize enemy supply points, bases and ports of entry. Major units under its control included the 77th Infantry Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and the 96th Infantry Division.

In accordance with its assigned mission, the 77th Division, between 26 and 31 December 1944, completed a coordinated attack to secure the PALOMPON-LIBUNGAO road. Extremely stubborn resistance was encountered all along this road, but by 31 December organized opposition was virtually smashed when elements of the 305th Infantry, advancing from the east, effected a juncture with other 77th Division units driving from the west.

During the first week of January, the X Corps was relieved of its combat missions on LEYTE by the XXIV Corps to enable the X Corps troops to conduct training and staging of units for future operations.

Meanwhile the 11th Airborne Division had been engaged in mopping up a force located in almost inaccessible positions on the southern slopes of MT. MAJUNAG. This force, which occupied deep "spider-holes" and mutually supporting pillboxes on knife-edged ridges, was destroyed only after much difficult hand-to-hand fighting.

On the east side of LEYTE the 96th Division was engaged in extensive patrol activity, constantly probing through the mountains and driving the scattered Japanese remnants to the west. The Division completed relief of all elements of the
11th Airborne Division by 14 January 1945, expanded north, and relieved the X Corps of all tactical responsibility east of the mountains with the exception of a staging area along the PINAMOPOAN-CARIGARA-JARO road. At this time two infantry battalions were sent to SAMAR to relieve the X Corps elements there.

The 7th Division, which had taken over the entire west coastal area south of the line PALOMPN-VALENCIA, sent out as many as forty combat patrols daily to hunt down and destroy thousands of Japanese stragglers wandering throughout the area. These patrols eventually located two large enemy concentrations in well protected positions on MT. MAAGONOC and MT. ABUNUG. According to reports of prisoners of war, these Japanese planned to attack the ORMOC area, but, under constant pressure from our artillery fire, they abandoned this plan and began to withdraw northward. Later they split up in small bands of twenty to 200 and withdrew westward across Highway No. 2 to the west coast.

During this withdrawal period the Japanese showed little aggressive spirit but fought fanatically when cornered. As successive delaying positions were reduced, enemy resistance deteriorated. Small groups continued to hold out in isolated strong points but other enemy groups roamed the area in search of food. Forward observers accompanied our combat patrols throughout and assisted materially in placing effective artillery concentrations on fleeing Japanese bands. Time fire in particular proved to have a devastating effect.

On 15 January a battalion of the 305th Infantry (77th Division) at VILLABA drove off a coordinated, all-day infantry-artillery attack by the Japanese, inflicting heavy casualties on them. Subsequent patrolling in the VILLABA area located a strong enemy concentration in the mountains to the
ENEMY-STRENGTH & DISPOSITION
25 DECEMBER 1944

CAMESTES ISLANDS
southeast. The 77th Division, by a coordinated converging, three-way thrust, destroyed this Japanese pocket during the period 27 January to 3 February 1945.

Meanwhile, on 15 January, a reinforced battalion of the 184th Infantry landed on PONSON ISLAND, easternmost island of the CAMOTES. The landing was unopposed and the island was quickly overrun without resistance. However, native reports of Japanese atrocities against civilians on the CAMOTES GROUP were confirmed and evidence and photos obtained. The Japanese had evacuated the island, probably as a result of our 155mm gun-fire which had been pounding PONSON ISLAND for more than a month prior to the landing.

Three days later the same battalion embarked on another island-hopping venture and landed on PORO ISLAND. A Japanese force located in excellent positions near PORO town resisted desperately but was eventually exterminated. PACIJAN ISLAND was promptly combed by combat patrols but no hostile forces were found. Having secured the islands the task force turned their defense over to local guerrillas on 31 January 1945 and returned to LETTE.

By 12 February all elements of the XXIV Corps on the west coast had been relieved by units of the Americal Division operating under the X Corps. Units on eastern LETTE and SAMAR were subsequently relieved and by 15 February the XXIV Corps had moved into staging areas.

2. X Corps Phase

Activity in the X Corps sector from 26 December 1944 to 4 January 1945 consisted chiefly of the continued advance of the 1st Cavalry and the 32d and 24th Infantry Divisions against scattered to moderately strong enemy resistance.

By 8 January, mopping-up had progressed so satisfactorily that the X Corps troops had completed withdrawal to staging areas in preparation for the Mike-I Operation (LUZON). Meanwhile the 21st Infantry (24th Division) closed on MINDORO on 4 January in support of that operation. The 19th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division had been in action in MINDORO since 15 December 1944.
On 17 January 1945 the Eighth Army Headquarters published Field Order No. 16 which directed the X Corps to relieve the XXIV Corps of its mission on LEYTE and SAMAR upon the arrival of the Americal Division.

As of 24 January, following the arrival of advance elements of the Americal Division, the X Corps was relieved of responsibility for training and equipping the 1st Cavalry and the 32d Divisions. On that date these two units departed for LUZON and their control reverted to the Eighth Army but was relinquished to the Sixth Army when they reached the LUZON objective area.

With the arrival of the Americal Division, the X Corps began the relief of units of the XXIV Corps from tactical missions on LEYTE. In addition, one infantry battalion was designated to relieve the elements in control of SAMAR as of 1 February. Upon arrival at staging areas in CAPOOCAN and TUNGA, the Americal Division was directed to move the first unloaded regimental combat team to the ORMOC valley by 5 February and relieve the 77th Division in that sector.

Although no appreciable organized resistance was reported in the ORMOC valley area at the time this relief began, information obtained from prisoners of war and captured documents indicated that several thousand Japanese, in small groups, remained on LEYTE and were attempting to reach the hills southeast of VILLABA. It was expected that from that point they hoped to be evacuated by surface craft or submarine.

The Commanding General, Americal Division, planned a three-pronged pincer drive designed to squeeze the Japanese into one small pocket east of VILLABA. With their escape routes cut off the enemy would face ultimate annihilation while any remaining isolated groups east of the ORMOC-LIMON road would be reduced by guerrilla action or eventual starvation.

As the 132d Infantry Regiment advanced from the north, the 182d from the east, and the 164th from the south, only scattered and weak resistance was encountered. On 23 February the advance of two battalions of the 164th Infantry was delayed by a potent well-equipped
and heavily-entrenched force in carefully prepared defensive installa-
tions near ABIJAO.

Meanwhile, with the northern exits blocked by the 132d Infantry,
the three regiments closed the trap around the bulk of the remaining
Japanese in the VILLABA—SULPA—HIBULANG and JINAGMATAN area. Our forces
were now in position to eliminate this last enemy stronghold, as opera-
tional activities were turned over to the Eighth Army Area Command.
This final action is covered under the Eighth Army Area Command activi-
ties.

During this period the X Corps, in addition, conducted mopping-up
operations on SAMAR and launched a series of amphibious assaults on
islands in the SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS with the object of securing that
overwater passage. On 28 January a task force consisting of one rein-
forced battalion of the 182d Infantry (under X Corps control) relieved
elements of the XXIV Corps at CATABALOGAN on SAMAR. They were augmented
by a battalion of the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment and assigned the
mission of eliminating all Japanese on SAMAR and clearing the southern
exits of the SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS. The remaining battalions of the
1st Filipino Regiment were assigned security and defensive missions on
the east coast of LEYTE and southeastern SAMAR.

On 19 February, in accordance with their assigned mission, the
task force (1st Battalion, 182d Infantry reinforced, with one company
of the Filipino Regiment attached) made simultaneous landings at ALLEN
on the northwestern tip of SAMAR and on CAPUL ISLAND off the northwest
coast of SAMAR.

Both landings were virtually unopposed. The subsequent moderate
resistance encountered was quickly repulsed and the towns of ALLEN and
CAPUL were secured. The Filipino company was given the mission of
garrisoning the village at CAPUL and operating patrols between CATARMAN
and ALLEN on SAMAR.

On 20 February a landing was attempted at BIRI town on BIRI ISLAND
by one company of the 182d Infantry but our Landing Craft, Mechanized
were unable to reach the landing beach over hidden coral reefs. Some
accurate small arms and mortar fire was encountered. In the afternoon of the same day, our forces withdrew to the south and landed on MACARITE ISLAND. They crossed the narrow channel between MACARITE and BIRI ISLAND, landed unopposed on the latter and advanced north against slight opposition. The town of BIRI was quickly overrun and by 23 February the entire island was secured.

As of 24 February, the 1st Battalion reinforced, of the 182d Infantry, had cleared all Japanese from the northwest tip of SAMAR and opened the highway between ALLEN and CATARMAN to motor traffic. A small garrison was established in the latter town and the CATARMAN airstrip (suitable for Liaison-4 and Liaison-5 planes) was placed in operation.

3. Eighth Army Area Command Phase.

On 24 February 1945, in accordance with the Eighth Army Field Order No. 16, the Eighth Army Area Command assumed responsibility for the final cleaning-up operations on LEYTE and SAMAR. This included control of the Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment previously under the X Corps.

Hundreds of Japanese were killed almost daily as the Americal Division continued its nut-cracker squeeze on the Japanese in the VILLABA area and aggressive combat patrolling along the LIMON–LONOY highway. Most noteworthy occurrence of the day the Eighth Army Area Command took over was the firing of thirty-eight battalion concentrations on enemy machine gun emplacements and assembly areas in the VILLABA sector.

On several occasions our perimeter defenses at ABIJAO and MARUNUT were subjected to night attacks by groups of Japanese armed with demolition charges in an attempt to destroy our 105mm self-propelled howitzers (M-7s). All attacks, however, were repulsed with almost negligible loss to us.

On 7 March two battalions of the 182d Infantry advanced on the asphalt mines about 1500 yards southeast of BALITI. Three days later the Americal Division, less the 164th Regimental Combat Team, was relieved of its assigned missions and responsibilities on LEYTE and SAMAR. The 164th Regimental Combat Team under the Eighth Army
FINAL MOP-UP ON LEYTE
BY AMERICAL DIVISION
24 FEB 45

ESTIMATED 6000 TROOPS REMAINING IN SCATTERED GROUP CONCENTRATIONS AS SHOWN
Area Command remained to clean up LEYTE while the 132d and 182d moved into CAPOOCAN to stage for the Victor-II Operation on CEBU ISLAND.

The 164th Regimental Combat Team continued mopping up in the SILAD BAY and BALITI asphalt mine areas. Meanwhile the 108th Regimental Combat Team from the 40th Division arrived at ORMOC from LUZON on 13 March and one week later began relieving elements of the 164th Infantry. The 164th Infantry was committed to action in the Victor-II Operation on 11 April 1945. By 23 March, relief had been completed and from this date to 8 May the 108th Infantry combed the areas around VILLABA, PALOMPON and ABIJAO destroying scattered remnants of the enemy.

II. CASUALTIES

1. Enemy: Enemy casualties during this four and one-half month period from 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945 were 24,294 killed and found dead, and 439 captured, a staggering total considering the original concept that this was purely a mopping-up operation. Following is a breakdown of Japanese casualties by periods showing numbers killed and captured during each of the three phases under different controlling units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Prisoners of War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The XXIV Corps</td>
<td>26 Dec - 10 Feb</td>
<td>13,756</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The X Corps</td>
<td>26 Dec - 24 Feb</td>
<td>3,953</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Eighth Army Area Command</td>
<td>24 Feb - 8 May</td>
<td>4,688</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Troops</td>
<td>26 Dec - 8 May</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total.......................... | 24,294     | 439

2. U. S. our casualties for the period 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945 were relatively minor in comparison with the above figures. The LEYTE-SAMAR Operations cost us 432 killed in action, 1852 wounded in action, and twenty-two missing in action.

III. COMMENTS

1. Motor Torpedo Boat Cooperation: The cooperation of Motor Torpedo boats throughout all operations on the western half of LEYTE provided invaluable support to elements of the XXIV Corps.
PT Squadrons located at ORMOC conducted continuous nightly sorties, sinking over 200 Japanese barges and over 200 other miscellaneous craft loaded with reinforcements, equipment, and supplies. The eagerness of the crews to close with the enemy and furnish aid to our ground troops was outstanding throughout.

2. **Enemy Air Activities:** Although enemy air activity caused some damage during part of this period, it never seriously hampered our operations. The most damaging single raid, an early morning attack on ORMOC on 3 January, resulted in ninety-six casualties from anti-personnel cluster bombs.

3. **Breakdown of Enemy Organization:** Despite the fact that with the capture of PALOMPON on 25 December, organized Japanese resistance was officially declared broken, enemy strength exceeded 25,000 on LEXTE and SAMAR. With but two exceptions, however, there was no indication of any centralized control or organization. By maintaining the offensive through aggressive patrolling our forces frustrated any chance the enemy might have had of reassembling or reorganizing.

4. **Enemy Tactics:** Enemy tactics followed a consistent pattern throughout this period. He offered stubborn resistance until his defensive positions were reduced at which time he withdrew in small groups to new defensive locations. With each withdrawal Japanese resistance became more and more isolated and scattered.

IV. **LESSONS LEARNED**

1. **Combat Patrolling:** Combat patrolling must be properly coordinated, aggressive, and continuous. In this operation, it assisted materially in reducing large pockets of enemy until they were of no military consequence.

2. **Artillery Support:** In a mopping-up operation of this nature, the use of forward observers with patrols in order to coordinate artillery fire in support of missions assigned, proved very effective. It is believed that the number of Japanese killed by our artillery fire greatly exceeded that destroyed by infantry action. All artillery fire was observed fire placed on known targets delivered in short,
3. Use of Armor: Wherever the terrain permits, armored vehicles used in small groups with infantry support can be an invaluable aid in reducing Japanese pillboxes and strong points. However, they must be protected and their fires directed at specific targets.

4. Encirclement of Enemy: Every effort must be exerted to entrap and immobilize enemy forces by surrounding them and preventing their escape to new defensive positions, especially where the terrain favors delaying tactics. Failure to accomplish this results in unnecessary delay and expenditure of effort in running down the enemy.

5. Aerial Reconnaissance in Support of Ground Patrols: Excellent use can be made of the L-4 plane in locating targets, orienting patrol leaders and actually selecting routes for patrols. Reconnaissance of the terrain, which might take hours on the ground, can be accomplished by the patrol leader in a few minutes from the air.

a. As the patrol advances on its mission, an infantry aerial observer, using the artillery radio, can furnish the ground troops with information of the terrain ahead and to the flanks, and can indicate the best routes of advance.

b. The effective use of liaison planes for this purpose was demonstrated by patrols of the First Battalion, 17th Infantry (7th Division), when they combed the area east of LAKE DANA0 to the PANILAHAN RIVER gorge, from 12-23 January 1945. This close cooperation between aerial observer and ground patrols enabled the battalion to kill 228 Japanese at low cost to our forces. During this action, over 1100 unburied Japanese bodies were found (some of which showed evidences of cannibalism).
PART TWO

CLEARANCE OF THE VISAYAN PASSAGES
PART TWO: CLEARANCE OF THE VISAYAN PASSAGES

I. GENERAL:

This section covers the series of amphibius operations conducted by the Eighth Army units in clearing the SAN BERNARDINO-VERDE ISLAND PASSAGES and island groups south of LUZON astride the over-water supply route through the northern VISAYAS.

General Headquarters' Directive dated 10 February 1945 established the north-south boundary between the Sixth and the Eighth Army zones of action. On the north, the Sixth Army was to continue the liberation of LUZON plus the small island of LARICABAN bordering on BATANGAS BAY. The Eighth Army was charged with clearing all islands and territories to the south which included fully two-thirds of the land area of the PHILIPPINES, most of which was still dominated by the Japanese.

The specific missions assigned the Eighth Army forces included the seizure of a chain of island groups extending along a 325 mile over-water route from LUBANG ISLAND on the west to the BALICUATROS on the east. Island areas already under our control included MIN-DORO, KARINDUQUE and LEYTE-SAMAR which was undergoing final mopping-up.

Much credit during this period must be given the motor torpedo boat squadrons of the Seventh Fleet. By constant surveillance and day and night raids they disrupted enemy inter-island traffic and the evacuation of his forces by small craft north to LUZON. Destruction of the now isolated and immobilized Japanese in their island strongholds became the major task confronting our amphibious assault teams.

II. PLANS AND PREPARATION:

1. Clearance of SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS and VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

In his letter of 5 February on the course of the LUZON CAMPAIGN, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur directed that,
"Eighth Army institute operations at the earliest practicable
date to clear the northern coast of SÄ'AR and the islands in
the CAPE VERDE PASS.GE with the objective of securing the
southern exits to SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS and VERDE ISLAND
PAssAGE..."

Instructions contained in this letter stated that:

"the commanders Allied Naval and Allied Air Forces would sup­
port the operations...harmonizing local effort in accord with
various plans and requests of...Eighth Army."

On 10 February a radio message from the Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area, established the boundaries of the areas of
responsibility. The Eighth Army was charged with securing the is­
lands in SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS, TICAO, BURLAS, Hgregonde, VERDE,
LUBANG and adjacent islands. MARICABAN ISLAND was included in the
Sixth Army's zone of action to the north.

The original mission was further extended in this message to
include the seizure of islands along the SAN BERNARDINO-VERDE IS­
LAND steamer course to develop a short supply route through the
VISAYAS.

Following a series of staff conferences at the Eighth Army
Headquarters, Field Order No. 19 was published on 15 February, and
as amended on 18 February directed that:

(1) The X corps (command post on LEYTE) clear the northern
SÄ'AR area and islands in SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS.

(2) The Amerioal Division (command post on LEYTE) operating
directly under the Eighth Army control, clear the is­
lands of BURLAS and TICAO, following the completion of
the X Corps mission.

(3) The 24th Infantry Division (command post on MINDORO),
operating directly under the Eighth Army, clear the
islands in the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE and northwest of
MINDORO.

(4) As each objective area was cleared, the United States
forces were to be withdrawn and guerrilla troops employed
to garrison those areas.

2. Clearance of the Southern Exits to SIBUYAN SEA and LUSONITE
PASS.

Plans to clear the island groups in the SIBUYAN SEA which
menaced the central VISAYAN route from the south, were contained
in the Eighth Army Field Order No. 22 dated 5 March and Field Order
No. 24 dated 9 March 1945.
The 24th Infantry Division in accordance with Field Order No. 22 was assigned the mission of clearing SIMUYAN, ROHILON, TABUS and adjacent islands to the north. The 10th of March was designated as the target date and elements of the 19th Infantry Regiment (not to exceed one reinforced battalion) were to be employed.

The mission of clearing JALSATI ISLAND in order to secure JALSATE PASS for friendly shipping was assigned to the Eighth Army Area Command by Field Order No. 24. Minimum elements of the 106th Regimental Combat Team (40th Infantry Division) were to be employed.

In planning these landings much consideration had to be given to the efficient utilization of available shipping particularly assault landing craft. Due to the limited number of this type in the Southwest Pacific Theater shuttling of assault echelons in two or more lifts was resorted to and proved highly effective.

III. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1. San Bernardino Straits:

Intelligence estimates during the month of February 1945 had indicated movements of enemy troops northward through upper SIMA and the island groups in the SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS. The objective of these transient elements appeared to be southern BICOL by over-water travel and then central and northern LUZON overland.

CAPUL ISLAND, reported to be garrisoned by 175-200 enemy troops contained the principal enemy installations covering the approaches to the straits. Some artillery emplacements containing 75mm guns and other calibers were reported. BIRI ISLAND estimates indicated a garrison of 100-300 Japanese while 400 enemy were reputed to be in TAMO town in northwest SIMA with other scattered groups to the east.

On 19 February at 1525, Company "A" (reinforced) of the 182d Infantry made an amphibious landing on the southern tip of CAPUL ISLAND against slight opposition, while Company "K", 1st Filipino Infantry advanced unopposed twelve miles north on Highway No. 1 from C.T.-BALOGAN in northwest SIMA. Concurrently, an unopposed landing was
made at ALLEN on the northwest coast of SAJR by elements of the 1st Battalion, 182d Infantry.

No serious difficulties were encountered by our forces as they continued mopping-up objective areas, and by 26 February the south side of SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS was cleared of all enemy installations from BUKKO POINT on the north coast of SAJR through the BALI-CUATROS ISLANDS and westward to CAPUL and NARANJO ISLANDS.

By 28 February the defense of BIRI and CAPUL ISLANDS, and of CATARMAN on the northwest coast of SAJR was turned over to the 1st Filipino Infantry. On 6 March the remainder of the northern SAJR area was deemed sufficiently cleared to allow the 1st Battalion, 182d Infantry to depart from ALLEN for LEYTE.

2. VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

Cumulative enemy intelligence had indicated a Japanese garrison of 100-200 troops on VERDE ISLAND, believed to be largely base and service personnel. However, some contacts with combat elements of the Japanese 8th Division were expected as earlier reports indicated their responsibility for the defense of the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE area. Principal enemy installations reported were a radio or radar station, and several artillery pieces (75mm) but no major defenses were presumed to be located in this area. Here, as on the islands in the SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS, the principal enemy capability was the harassment by troops displacing from the central PHILIPPINES toward LUZON. This potential stemmed from the location of the islands astride the enemy's overwater evacuation channels.

At 0001 on 25 February, elements of the 19th Infantry (24th Division) made a surprise night amphibious landing on VERDE ISLAND without opposition. The complete surprise effected by our night operation was well exemplified by the fact that no enemy reaction developed until nine hours later that same day. As the attack progressed three 75mm guns were captured at SAN AGUSTIN and seventeen Japanese were killed. Our forces sustained six casualties, all wounded in action. On 25 February the island was turned over to Filipino Guerrillas.
for mopping-up as our troops prepared to return to the SAN JOSE area.

On 1 March elements of Company "E", 21st Infantry, reinforced the VERDE ISLAND guerrillas as enemy resistance increased. A remaining Japanese 75mm gun was silenced and enemy materiel consisting of 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 500 grenades and two 75mm howitzers was captured. In addition, one 75mm howitzer and 300 rounds of ammunition were destroyed.

By 3 March VERDE ISLAND was considered sufficiently secured to allow all American forces to be withdrawn. Total enemy casualties during the action were eighty-two killed and three captured.

The LUBANG ISLAND GROUP, situated fifty-five miles west of VERDE ISLAND, at the western terminus of the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE was the next target for our amphibious assault teams. Reconnaissance patrols from the 24th Infantry Division on 20 February reported a Japanese garrison of 204 in the vicinity of TILIK town on the north coast. Fifty new arrivals were reported on the 22d. Except for a serviceable airfield in the vicinity of LUBANG town, few enemy installations were known to exist. However, several antiaircraft guns and other small caliber weapons had been observed, ostensibly used for local security of the airfield.

Following a naval bombardment on the morning of 1 March a successful amphibious landing was made. TILIK town, which had been practically destroyed by our bombardment, was occupied by the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry without opposition. During the occupation fourteen enemy suicide boats were captured (each one-man operated and carrying two depth charges). A motorized patrol drove west along the north coast and reached TUBAC without incident, as elements of the 1st Battalion moved south against light opposition on the Old Military road and captured a radio station and a 20mm gun.

During the period 1-15 March activity throughout the LUBANG GROUP consisted of mopping-up and patrolling. Patrols to AMILL and CAPUA ISLANDS and LOOC BAY on 6 March reported no contacts. Civilians reported GOLO ISLAND (southeast of LUBANG ISLAND) free of Jap-
anese. On 9 March Company "E", 19th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, the latter unit returning to MINDORO the same day. Company "E", 19th Infantry, returned to MINDORO 30 March and guerrilla forces took over LUBANG ISLAND. Casualty reports as of 15 March listed 230 Japanese killed and eight prisoners of war captured. Our casualties totaled eight killed and twenty-one wounded in action.


Buriás and Ticao Islands.

Previous intelligence on these two objective areas had indicated that Ticao Island was unoccupied by the enemy while Buriás contained a small garrison of approximately 100 Japanese, the majority of whom were located in NABASAGAN. No defenses, however, were known to exist on either island.

On 3 March 1945 Company "C", 132d Infantry, made an unopposed landing at San Fernando on Ticao Island and Buyo, Daplan, and San Jacinto towns were overrun without contact. An amphibious reconnaissance patrol from San Fernando to San Rafael (south tip of Ticao) on 5 March reported no opposition. Patrolling continued until 10 March without any enemy being encountered.

Companies "A" and "B", 132d Infantry, reinforced by elements of the 97th Infantry, Philippine Army, meanwhile made unopposed landings north of NABASAGAN on Buriás Island on 3 March. Company "A" advanced 1500 yards down the west coast following a naval bombardment by two Destroyer Escorts and Nabasagan town was secured by 1100 on 4 March against light resistance. This latter attack had been preceded by a naval bombardment by Destroyer Escorts and Landing Craft, Support.

As patrol action continued in the Illog Bay area, Guindulman, Cueva Point and San Pascual were secured without contact by 7 March and Busin Island (northwest of Buriás) was reported clear of enemy. In the vicinity of Claveria a group of eighteen Japanese were attacked by a "B" Company patrol, and eleven enemy were killed.
Nine rifles, two light machine guns and one knee mortar were captured.

The 1st Battalion, 132d Infantry (minus "C" Company) departed BURLAS ISLAND on 11 March as final mopping-up and control were turned over to elements of the 97th Infantry, Philippine Army. Reported enemy casualties totaled 103 killed and two captured.

**Islands in ROMBLON PROVINCE.**

Centrally located between the islands of MINDORO and MASbate, the next target for our amphibious assaults was a group of small islands comprising ROMBLON PROVINCE. Two of the larger in this group, TABLAS and SIBUYAN, had already been reported as clear of enemy. Current estimates, however, indicated a garrison of 150 Japanese on ROMBLON ISLAND and eighty enemy on SIBUYAN (north of TABLAS).

Enemy activity in this group had generally been limited to staging movements both north and south and observation of Allied shipping and air actions. No defensive installations had been reported in these areas nor was effective resistance anticipated. However, attempts by the enemy either to escape to neighboring areas or to effect a typical isolated small defense on available commanding terrain features were expected.

During the night of 11-12 March landings were effected on SIBUYA and ROMBLON ISLANDS without opposition. Company "C", 19th Infantry, after securing MAPULA on ROMBLON ISLAND, captured ROMBLON town against medium resistance as guerrilla forces overran TABLAS. SAHAYAN town was seized and a landing made at APUNAN on 15 March. By 5 April, enemy casualties had reached 139 killed and two prisoners of war captured against our seventeen killed in action as Company "C" prepared to return to MINDORO.

In the SIBUYA ISLAND landing, Company "B", 19th Infantry, secured ILLIHN without opposition and the towns of GOBO, CORCUELA and MAHABA were occupied without difficulty. Strong resistance was encountered north of CORCUELA on 15 March which resulted in the death of seventy Japanese (twenty-one of these committed suicide)
and the capture of five machine guns and some 75mm ammunition. Scattered contacts continued until 21 March. As of that date 118 enemy had been annihilated.

**MABSTE ISLAND.**

Estimates of enemy on the Island of MABSTE had indicated a Japanese garrison of 400 consisting mostly of survivors of ship sinkings in that vicinity. This enemy group was reported as generally disorganized, poorly armed and in poor physical condition.

Following a bombardment by gunboats on 29 March, a guerrilla force landed and secured MABSTE town as the enemy fled to the hills. Company "F", 108th Infantry, reinforced the landing on 3 April and the peninsula surrounding MABSTE town was secured against light opposition. Guerrillas captured eight Japanese as patrols advanced to the southeast and southwest with minor contacts. By 7 April, the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, landed while patrols of that unit reported killing fifteen of a group of enemy south of IDBO. DIOT southeast of MABSTE town and LOH to the southwest were reached without contact on 10 April.

During the remaining period to 8 May, efforts to contact and contain the remaining Japanese continued. Some resistance encountered in the vicinity of MT. BAGULIPAT was dispersed easily but it became increasingly difficult to maintain contacts as the enemy retreated in scattered groups deeper and deeper into the hills and jungle.

Our casualties for the period of operations on MABSTE were comparatively light with seven killed in action and eight wounded. Japanese losses to 4 May totaled 118 killed and fifteen captured. On 4 May the 42d Infantry, Philippine Army, took over the island and the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry returned to LEYTE. Isolated Japanese continued to be encountered and exterminated for some time thereafter.

**IV. LESSONS LEARNED**

1. **Ground and Naval Cooperation:** In order to insure the success of amphibious operations, close liaison, coordination and

- 29 -
CLEARANCE OF THE VISAYAN PASSAGES
19 FEB 45 - 8 MAY 45

MAP "G"
cooperation between land and naval forces is paramount. The assistance given us by our motor torpedo boat squadrons in protecting our amphibious elements enroute to objective areas and their constant surveillance by day and night patrolling of the many sea lanes, proved highly effective and contributed materially to the accomplishment of our missions. In addition these patrols prevented evacuation of the enemy to the north and all but eliminated inter-island traffic in supplies and reinforcements. Close liaison between task force commanders, Eighth Army Intelligence and motor torpedo boat commanders was maintained throughout.

2. Amphibious Night Assaults: The effectiveness of the surprise gained by our amphibious night landings was clearly demonstrated in these operations. This is exemplified in the VERDE ISLAND landing of 25 February 1945. This assault was made at 0010-1 and no enemy reaction developed until nine hours later. The use of these tactics, however, entails careful and detailed planning, thorough reconnaissance of the target area and its approaches plus the assignment of limited objectives only.

3. Use of Guerrilla Forces: In establishing the numbers and locations of enemy forces in target areas, considerable assistance was rendered by reports from guerrillas. Verification by ground reconnaissance in most instances proved the accuracy of locations, but it also disclosed a consistent tendency to exaggerate numbers. This exaggeration necessitated careful evaluation in order to insure the utilization of the minimum forces in reducing and securing enemy held island strongholds. Guerrillas also acted as guides, furnished reinforcements and were used to garrison localities after they had been taken. This economical use of guerrilla forces released our troops for other assaults thereby enabling us to increase the number and rapidity of our amphibious strikes.

V. SUMMARY

1. With operations on MASBATE ISLAND reduced to the minor mopping-up stage on 8 May 1945, the Eighth Army missions in the
northern VISAYAS had been accomplished. All islands astride the overwater route from the LUBANG GROUP to the BALICUATROS in SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS were now secure and the north coast of SAMAR had been cleared except for scattered enemy remnants.

2. It is interesting to note that as of this date, the Eighth Army forces had made a total of fifty-one amphibious landings. Ten of those had been made in clearing the overwater route through the VISAYAS while, of the grand total, sixteen involved landing task forces of battalion size or larger. The Eighth Army troops were rapidly becoming masters in the art of amphibious warfare. Much credit, however, must be given to those supporting elements behind the scenes who planned, staged, mounted and supplied these operations, thereby ensuring their ultimate success.
PART THREE

STAFF SECTION REPORTS
I. G-1 REPORT

1. Organization of G-1 Section: The G-1 Section, organized into four sub-sections, functioned for the LEYTE-SAMAR Operation and Clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES as outlined below:

   a. Personnel Sub-section: This group handled routine administrative matters and coordinated the activities of the other three sub-sections.

   b. Operations Sub-section: The Operations Sub-section prepared the appropriate paragraphs for Administrative Order No. 3 to accompany Field Order No. 11. In taking over this operation from Sixth Army, the Eighth Army administrative details were made to conform as closely as possible to the Sixth Army procedures so as to avert confusion in submission of reports and other administrative matters. This policy resulted in a smooth changeover.

   Replacements were provided for combat units in this operation as follows:

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   All major units submitted daily strength and casualty reports in addition to regular weekly G-1 Periodic Reports. Separate Eighth Army units submitted G-1 Periodic Reports.

   Attached (INCLUSURES 1, 2, and 3) are tabulations of battle and non-battle casualties for units participating in the LEYTE-SAMAR Operation and Clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES.

   c. Miscellaneous Sub-section: This sub-section furnished a stock of ribbons and decorations to meet the normal needs of this operation.

   d. Civil Affairs Sub-section: Seven Philippine Civil Affairs Units and one Naval Civil Affairs Unit were attached to the combat forces for the administration of civil affairs in SAMAR and LEYTE. In combat areas these units materially aided the military effort by preventing the civilian population from interfering with
the operations, by providing such emergency relief and medical care as the situation would permit, and by recruiting civilian laborers to assist in behind-the-line activities.

During the period approximately 5,000 tons of foodstuffs, clothing, and general supplies reached the civilian population through Philippine Civil Affairs Units. Eighty per cent of these supplies were sold through normal trade channels.

Philippine Civil Affairs Unit medical officers opened hospitals and dispensaries throughout the area. Through these installations approximately twenty-five tons of medical supplies were distributed.

In areas free from combat, acting public officials were appointed and assisted by Philippine Civil Affairs Units in the restoration of essential civil administration. Schools were reopened in all places where facilities were adequate. Civilians were encouraged to return to pre-war occupations.

2. Planning the Operation: On 0001-I, 26 December 1944, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, assumed control of the Sixth Army units in the LEYTE-SAMAR area. Units which passed to control of the Eighth Army continued their assigned missions.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned:

a. Adequate replacements should be furnished in sufficient time for them to become familiar with the officers and non-commissioned officers in the units to which they are assigned. This is necessary to maintain a maximum amount of efficiency and discipline and to keep casualties to a minimum among replacements.

b. The G-1 of the units concerned should be instructed in detail regarding procedures and forms for submitting daily and weekly statistical reports to insure accurate figures. Personal contact with the G-1s of the units engaged in the operations has proven invaluable in arriving at a common understanding of instructions issued and information required.

3 Inclosures:

No. 1 - Casualties for the Sixth and the Eighth Army periods of control.
No. 2 - Casualties for the Eighth Army period of control.

No. 3 - Casualties of Eighth Army troops during the Eighth Army period of control.
# LEYTE-SAMAR CASUALTIES MAJOR UNITS UNDER SIXTH AND EIGHTH ARMY CONTROL

(20 OCTOBER 1944 TO 8 MAY 1945)

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GRAND TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES 820 13399

GRAND TOTAL NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES 1122 13410
## CASUALTIES

**LEYTE - SAMAR EIGHTH ARMY PERIOD OF CONTROL**  
(26 DECEMBER 1944 TO 8 MAY 1945)  
8 May 1945

### TOTAL NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

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| Incl 2 |

### GRAND TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES

|                    | 152 | 2215 |

### GRAND TOTAL NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

|                    | 571 | 14767 |
## Battle and Non-Battle Casualties Eighth Army Troops

**26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945**

### Battle Casualties

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**NOTE:** Casualties for AAA Units Consolidated Under 32d AAA Brigade.

**NOTE:** Casualties for Armored Units Consolidated Under 20th Armored Group.

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**Incl 3**
II. G-2 REPORT

1. Planning Phase: G-2 planning by this headquarters for the operation consisted of placing various officers of the section on duty with the Sixth Army prior to transfer of control, and maintaining personal contacts and current files. One officer from the operations sub-section accompanied the Sixth Army during the landing and initial phases of the operation, working with their G-2 section until the Eighth Army assumed control. One officer and three agents of the 308th Counter Intelligence Corps, assigned to the Eighth Army, were placed on temporary duty with the counter intelligence corps detachment of the Sixth Army early in the operations. Similarly, an Eighth Army Photo-Interpretation team served with the Sixth Army for a period of three weeks prior to the change of command. These liaison arrangements were supplemented through personal contacts and through obtaining distribution of Sixth Army G-2 information.

2. Operational Phase:

a. General: Due to well-established liaison and the fact that this section had kept abreast of all developments, the transition to the Eighth Army control was accomplished smoothly. Activities of individual sub-sections during this phase are described below:

b. Topographic Sub-section: No new mapping or photographic projects were undertaken. Additional prints of previous photography were furnished, however, and uncontrolled mosaics were made up from photos furnished by the Americal Division.

c. Operations Sub-section: This subsection collected reports from subordinate units, disseminated combat intelligence, coordinated guerrilla intelligence with that received from other sources, and maintained close contact with our Naval and Air Forces.

d. Order of Battle Sub-section: Through captured documents, prisoner of war interrogations, and combat reports, this subsection operated continually to clarify the picture of the enemy strengths and dispositions.
e. Technical Intelligence Teams: These teams recovered captured enemy equipment. No new weapons were discovered.

f. Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment: When the Eighth Army took over, case files, pending investigations and records were transferred from the Sixth Army. During the ensuing period, counter-intelligence activities included the investigation and apprehension of collaborators, interviewing of evacuees for intelligence and counter-intelligence information and the conduct of security surveys, loyalty checks and special investigations.

g. Psychological Warfare Branch Sub-section: Although this group did not assume psychological warfare responsibility of the operation until 26 December 1944, it began functioning as a distribution and production agency on 8 December 1944. On this, the third anniversary of the war, the first issue of a planned weekly Japanese newspaper, printed in the PHILIPPINES, was delivered to the Japanese in the hills southwest of DAGAMI by artillery shells. This was also the first time that artillery was used for this purpose in the PHILIPPINES. The life of this paper was short since two weeks later General Headquarters began its production of a Japanese newspaper. A total of 2,295,200 leaflets were distributed during the operation, 155,850 having been distributed since 25 December 1944.

h. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATTIS): This detachment interrogated 423 prisoners and processed approximately 1,800 documents on this operation.

3. Lessons Learned:

a. The problem of assessing enemy numerical strength in an operation of this kind is extremely difficult. The Sixth Army, at the time of relinquishing control, estimated remaining enemy strength at between 5,000 and 8,000. During subsequent operations, as enemy casualties mounted and further identifications were made, it became increasingly clear that at the time the Eighth Army took over enemy strength had actually been approximately 26,000, located as shown on Map "C."
b. Adequate liaison prior to the change of control is invaluable in establishing and insuring continuity of operations.

c. The multiplicity of similar place names in the PHILIPPINES resulted in some difficulty in plotting reported information. It was found much more satisfactory to use map coordinates or direction and distance from unmistakable and prominent terrain features.

d. The use of locations of friendly forces is unsatisfactory as a reference point for reporting information of the enemy. For example, references such as "1,000 yards northeast of our positions" are of little value since it is extremely difficult in fluid operations for higher headquarters to keep abreast of the present positions of friendly units. In addition, especially where voice radio is used in the clear, the use of such references may enable the enemy to obtain the positions of our units by relocation.
III. G-3 REPORT

Report of G-3 activities and lessons learned is included in the narrative proper.

FIELD ARTILLERY REPORT

1. Organization of Artillery Sections: The Artillery Section was organized into five subsections and functioned as outlined below:

   a. The S-1 subsection handled administration and processed field artillery personnel for lower units.

   b. The S-2 subsection compiled artillery intelligence data, coordinated distribution of aerial photographs, and disseminated information through artillery channels.

   c. The S-3 subsection provided liaison with artillery units primarily by augmenting artillery staffs during critical phases of operations.

   Recommendations for employment of additional artillery were prepared, and logistical data computed.

   Provisions were made for the employment of 90mm antiaircraft guns as reinforcing artillery. A school was operated to train antiaircraft officers for this mission.

   In cooperation with the Ordnance Section, an educational program was conducted to familiarize both artillery and infantry units with the new variable time (VT) fuze by actual demonstrations.

   A plan for interchange of meteorological data was worked out in cooperation with Army Air Forces.

   d. The S-4 subsection processed supply activities pertaining to artillery units. Application of ammunition restrictions to various operational areas was coordinated, and estimates of future requirements were prepared.

   e. The Air Officer discharged primary staff responsibility for all Army Air Forces equipment and supplies issued to artillery units.

   The first planned program of distribution and stockage of liaison airplanes, equipment, and supplies in this theater was developed and put into practice.
Action was initiated which resulted in a plan for rotation of artillery pilots suffering from combat fatigue.

Removal of Air Force restrictions on use of 73-octane gasoline was obtained.

Air courier and reconnaissance service was provided for Eighth Army staff officers.

2. Summary of Lessons Learned.
   a. Additional artillery must be provided to support airborne units in independent sustained action.
   b. 90mm antiaircraft guns are invaluable in destroying heavy fortifications.
   c. A credit system of restricting ammunition expenditures should be incorporated in the plan for any operation.
   d. Liaison aircraft must be made available to an army headquarters for short-range transportation to otherwise inaccessible areas.
1. General:

a. On 26 December 1944, the date the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth Army in LEYTE and SAMAR, a signal operations battalion to handle headquarters communications had not arrived. Until 16 January 1945 when the 304th Signal Operation Battalion arrived it was necessary to use a provisional signal unit from the United States Services of Supply. An intensive training program was initiated during this period to increase the efficiency of the operating personnel.

b. Signal Corps operations on SAMAR were handled by the X Corps from 26 December 1944 until 24 February 1945, at which time the units on SAMAR passed to the control of the Eighth Army Area Command. Field Order No. 12, Headquarters Eighth Army, dated 14 February 1945, covered this change. All signal operations were carried out under Signal Operation Instructions, Items 1-3 to 1-20, inclusive.

c. Communication facilities were improved and expanded during the LEYTE Operation. It was during this period that the present radio, telephone, teletype, and code room installations were completed.

d. Signal Corps operations on LEYTE were handled by the X Corps and the XXIV Corps in their areas of responsibility.

2. Safehand Service:

The Eighth Army assumed responsibility for Safehand Service to all ground force units on LEYTE. Cub airplane service was maintained to the X and the XXIV Corps.

3. Cryptographic Distribution:

Policies were established concerning the transfer of responsibility of cryptographic materials from the Sixth to the Eighth Army.

4. Philippine Guerrilla Radio Communication:

Radio communications with guerrilla forces on LEYTE and
SAMAR were taken over from the Sixth Army on 26 December 1944. On 24 February 1945, radio communications with guerrillas were taken over by the Eighth Army Area Command.

5. **Supply:**

At the time the Eighth Army took over subject operations Base K assumed the responsibility for supply and repairs; however, as of that date approximately sixty days after A-Day, the United States Services of Supply had not established an adequate supply of spare parts. As a result, units had in their possession considerable quantities of communication equipment which was unserviceable and had to be replaced when again staging.

6. **Lessons Learned:**

a. Spare radio equipment should be made available for immediate use in case of functional breakdowns.

b. The spare parts stock level must be maintained.

c. A continuous training program for all operations personnel is required.

d. Communication installations should be designed for efficient operation and ready expansion.

e. The high standards for the upkeep of communication equipment must be maintained.

f. The coordination of plans for wire installations with engineers will eliminate the unnecessary movement of lines caused by road widening and straightening.

g. Spare power facilities should be provided.

7. **Clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES:**

The operations involved in the clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES were carried out under the Eighth Army Signal Operations Instructions, Items 1-10 to 1-20, inclusive, which were in effect between 19 February and 8 May 1945. Because of the limited scope of these operations, no report is submitted.
IV. C-4 REPORT

1. Basis of Supply:

a. At 0001, 26 December 1944 logistical support of the LEYTE-SAMAR operation was assumed by this headquarters as control of these areas was turned over to the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

b. Army supply points, operated by corps and divisions, had already been established by the Sixth Army at PINAMAPOAN, CAIGARA, ABUYOG, AGOJO POINT, BAYBAY, SANTA RITA and ORMOC. Supplies were drawn from Base K which in turn operated under the United States Services of Supply.

c. The supply problem had become one largely of resupply for units conducting mopping-up operations in the LEYTE-SAMAR area and rehabilitation of units staging for the LUZON, MINDANAO and VISAYAN operations. This necessitated some tactical supply from Base K through army supply points.

d. The continuation of an army supply point was determined by the tactical situation and they were closed out as the units completed their missions and were mounted for other tasks. Due to the dispersion of troops and a lack of overland communication facilities it was found necessary for some units to operate more than one army supply point at a time until the troops could be withdrawn and the supply point closed.

e. The first major change came when units were withdrawn and mounted for the Mike-VI and for the Mike-VII operations. During the period, 13-16 January 1945, the X Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32d Infantry Division, and the 38th Infantry Division completed their missions and turned over their supply responsibilities to the XXIV Corps and the X Corps units.

f. Later the Americal Division was transferred to LEYTE from the Pacific Ocean Area and was assigned the supply mission previously handled by the XXIV Corps, the 7th Infantry Division, the 77th Infantry Division, and the 96th Infantry Division. These units then moved to the DULAG-ABUYOG area where they were resupplied.
and rehabilitated in preparation for the Iceberg operation.

a. As of 0001, 24 February 1945 the function of supply and logistical support for the area was taken over by the Eighth Army Area Command. The X Corps, the Americal Division, and the 1st Filipino Regiment were the only units operating supply points at this time. After the staging of the Victor-II and the Victor-V operations (in late March), the 108th Regimental Combat Team, of the 40th Infantry Division, and the 1st Filipino Regiment handled the army supply of the islands. At the time of the close of the operation, the 108th Regimental Combat Team had been mounted for action in the Victor-V area and all supply was being handled either directly by Base K or through supply points maintained on both LEYTE and SAMAR by the 1st Filipino Regiment. On SAMAR, supplies were transported to the Regiment at CALBAYOG and GUINAN from Base K. The Regiment then handled the breakdown and distributed the supplies to their many small outlying units through the use of Landing Craft, Mechanized.

2. Staging and Mounting:

a. Four major task forces were staged out of LEYTE. These were the Mike-I, the Mike-VI, the Mike VII, and the Iceberg task forces.

b. The units staged and mounted from LEYTE for the Mike-I operation consisted of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32d Infantry Division, together with various service units. At the time these units were actually engaged in combat with the enemy and had to be withdrawn, reequipped and concentrated for mounting. Only equipment available locally and that which could be flown in was delivered to units prior to departure.

c. The major supply problem for this headquarters developed when the Mike-VI and Mike-VII task forces were staged and mounted simultaneously. Twenty days time was allotted for mounting and staging the Mike-VI task force and thirty days for the Mike-VII task force. This short notice did not allow sufficient time to draw up detailed plans for the loading and movement of troops and supplies. Likewise, beaches and trucking facilities proved inadequate for handling the resultant heavy traffic.
d. Officers of the G-4 Section were required constantly to supervise the loading at the beaches and to help major units with packing, transportation, and loading problems. Emergency arrangements were made with Base K for the use of all the trucks which could be pressed into service from Base K units.

e. In spite of the difficulties encountered in loading out both task forces, work was completed on schedule and convoys were able to leave without a delay. A few trucks and some miscellaneous supplies were left behind for the rear echelon convoy.

f. Staging of the Iceberg task force was completed with practically no difficulty. Routine supply procedures proved adequate and all equipment not provided by the Pacific Ocean Area in time for the operation was obtained. As the operation was under Pacific Ocean Area control, close coordination with that headquarters was necessary and was maintained. The greatest difficulty encountered was the limited time allowed to unload supplies and equipment from Pacific Ocean Area ships and to reload our assault craft.

3. The Transportation Problem:

a. The fact that troops were stationed in widely dispersed portions of the island brought about a problem of transporting supplies to the units. The channel between LEYTE and SIBIR was too shallow for the larger type vessels necessitating circuitous routes for heavy shipping. Some supply points could not be reached by larger ships; therefore, Landing Craft, Mechanized, and Fast Supply boats soon became the principal means of water transportation from Base K.

b. Overland communications were in poor shape. Unimproved roads had been built before the invasion, but heavy military traffic had made them almost impassable. A vigorous program of road construction and improvement gradually rectified this condition.

c. The ABUYOC-BAYBAY road, a mountainous route across southern LEYTE, was patrolled in an effort to keep its poorer stretches open at all times. As an example, strict control was exercised while units moved from the ORMOC-VALENCIA sector to the DULUG-ABUYOC sector for the staging of the Iceberg operation.
d. The problem of moving supplies was further complicated by the presence of numerous outlying units, such as radar stations, which had few or no facilities of their own for receiving supplies. These units were ordinarily supplied by small boats. Emergency supply, in cases where speed was essential or condition of the terrain denied boat supply, was by air drop. Weekly and bi-monthly schedules of resupply went a long way toward a final solution of the problem.

4. Lessons Learned and Recommendations:

a. An important lesson learned from the King-II operation was the necessity for long term planning in preparing task forces. Even when allotted periods are limited, time should be allocated for the detailed planning necessary for moving units and their organizational equipment to the beaches. This planning need not all be done in an army headquarters, but it is its responsibility to see that corps and divisions accomplish it. Smaller units must have a plan of movement and loading which is coordinated with other units. These plans must be strictly adhered to.

b. Difficulty was encountered in the use of Landing Craft, Mechanized, in areas of open water in which a heavy current was found. In clearing the SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS, for example, it was found that the Landing Craft, Mechanized, had to be sent out in pairs and even then there were numerous breakdowns. Heavy seas also caused excessive wear on engines.

c. Because of transportation difficulties and the general supply situation, the proportion of emergency rations for the outlying units on SAMAR was raised from one-sixth to one-third. Small units were unable to move their kitchens forward because of non-existence of roads and were forced to depend on emergency rations.

d. A major problem which confronted this headquarters was that of determining the shortages of a unit while that unit was still engaged in combat. Wherever possible, units were relieved of combat
missions as soon as possible in order to aid them in conducting the necessary showdown inspections and to provide ample opportunity for resupply. Units which could not be withdrawn from their combat missions were forced to rely on property books and such showdown inspections as they could conduct as they were relieved. Although the keeping of company property books is suspended during combat, when limited time is available for staging an operation, units must maintain some form of record which will show the status of supplies and equipment at all times.
ENGINEER REPORT

1. General:

a. Effective 0001, 26 December 1944, in accordance
with Operation Instructions 81, General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area, dated 15 December 1944, the Sixth Army was relieved
of its mission on LEYTE, and the Eighth Army assumed control.

The following engineer units were engaged in the operation on
26 December 1944:

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<td>113th Engr C Grp</td>
<td>Col. James A. Cunningham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114th Engr C Grp</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Raymond H. Cooley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Engr C Bn</td>
<td>Lt. Col. L. L. Kingsbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110th Engr C Bn</td>
<td>Major A. C. Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132d Engr C Bn</td>
<td>Major Lawrence N. Bigelow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233d Engr C Bn</td>
<td>Major William H. Hargin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212d Engr C Bn</td>
<td>Major Orlan A. Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1445th Engr Serv Det (Mbl S/L Maint Unit) No officer</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Richard C. Marossey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Topographical Platoon</td>
<td>1st Lt. Fred H. Laier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The progressive relief of all units listed in the
above paragraph was accomplished during January and the first
part of February. By 15 February 1945 all the original engineer
units had been relieved and the necessary combat engineer missions
were continued by the 57th Engineer Combat Battalion (Americal
Division) commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph P. Driscoll, which had
entered the campaign on 25 January 1945.

c. Company C of the 115th Engineer Combat Battalion
(108th Regimental Combat Team) supported the mopping-up operations
from the time of departure of the 57th Engineer Combat Battalion,
on 23 March 1945, to the close of the campaign on 8 May 1945.
Throughout the campaign, the engineer effort on SAMAR was confined to close support of small infantry units.

2. **Construction:**

   a. On 28 December 1944, Field Order No. 11 was issued instructing the X Corps to withdraw from its area of responsibility and for the XXIV Corps to take over control of the X Corps area by 1 January 1945.

   b. In accordance with Field Order No. 16, dated 24 January 1945, the XXIV Corps, in turn, was relieved of its responsibilities by the X Corps as of 12 February 1945. Finally on 24 February 1945 the Eighth Army Area Command relieved the X Corps of its missions in the LEYTE-SAMAR area and continued in control for the remainder of the operation.

   c. The engineer mission during the campaign consisted of road construction and maintenance with no major construction projects. In this connection, the following remarks are made:

   (1) The most important factor in road construction and maintenance during the month of January was the decrease in rainfall in comparison to the abnormal rainfall encountered during the previous month. The X Corps Engineer stated on one occasion that three days of dry weather on the road from PINAMAPOAN to LIMON was equivalent to two battalion weeks of engineer effort.

   (2) Too little emphasis was placed on drainage during the initial phases of road maintenance, and prior to the date the Eighth Army took over. This resulted in complete failure of many roads when the use of heavy vehicles became necessary, and increased the maintenance requirements to such an extent that the engineers were unable to cope with the situation. An example is the road from CARIGARA to PINAMAPOAN which was entirely lost to the X Corps during the campaign. It is felt that if initial effort had been expended on drainage instead of trying to solve the situation temporarily by filling, this road would have been saved. The heavy equipment used for filling cut up the road worse than the regular traffic.

   (3) When it became necessary to abandon the road from CARIGARA to PINAMAPOAN, a beach road was built with a coral causeway usable only at low tide. The engineer effort should have been used in constructing a complete new all-weather road. This would have required a little more
time, but the road, when completed, could have been usable at all times with a minimum of maintenance. An engineer company augmented by heavy equipment, was required to keep the beach road open to low tide traffic.

(4) A need for more rock crushers than are normally issued to engineer battalions was apparent. At times it was necessary to use unsuitable bank run gravel. The large round rocks sank to the bottom of the road and the fines stayed on top adding to the muck that had been there previously. In the places where crushed river gravel was used, it was observed that less gravel was needed to produce a stabilized road base.

(5) With few exceptions, all bridges on LEYTE were one-track, causing traffic control to be used on all major roads. By the time the Eighth Army had assumed control, most Bailey Bridges had been replaced by timber bridges. One large bridge constructed by the XXIV Corps troops during the campaign is worthy of note. This bridge, a 432 foot, two-way, pile bridge over PAGBANGAN RIVER, north of BAYBAY, was completed in twenty days.

(6) Native labor was more satisfactory than in NEW GUINEA. This is due to better health, morale, and education of the Filipinos. Native labor could be more efficient, however, if soldiers in charge of parties would work through native foremen rather than instructing individual natives.

(7) Maintenance of engineer equipment, due to combat and terrain operating conditions, lack of trained maintenance and operating personnel, shortage of parts, and the ever lacking factor of unit command supervision was unsatisfactory in the majority of the organizations operating construction equipment.

(8) Water supply problems were limited to quality of water rather than quantity. Water was abundant in nearly every locality, but all water had to be considered contaminated. Amoeba and Schistosoma were found in most water sources. The most effective way found to destroy these organisms was to sink all wells at least ten feet and case them. The water was then flocked, filtered, and chlorinated until it had a chlorine residue of five parts per million.

(9) It was found that the number of men evacuated because of Schistosomiasis was much higher in engineer organizations than in other type units. This was due to engineer troops working in water during bridge construction and road drainage projects.

(10) Most of the Eighth Army Camp had been constructed by 26 December 1944, but it was
found necessary to improve areas for attached units. Thirty acres of land directly west of the Eighth Army Area were drained, and access roads were built. This area was later used by the 67th Engineer Topographic Company and the 304th Signal Battalion. Forty acres of land just north of the Eighth Army Area were drained, access roads built, and the area improved for use of the 76th Station Hospital. In this area, prefabricated buildings were erected for the mess halls and surgeries, and a water tank was erected. Equipment from the 104th Engineers was used to construct the Eighth Army liaison plane strip under the supervision of the army engineer section.

3. Supply:

a. The initial supply of engineer materials was planned and accomplished by the Sixth Army. It was based on a 30-day supply level within units plus a vast quantity of construction materials on Liberty ships for initiation of the construction of a major base. Requisitions had been submitted by the Sixth Army for forty-five days of resupply, after which resupply was to become a function of the United States Services of Supply.

b. Upon arrival of the Eighth Army at Leyte, but prior to assumption of responsibility for the operation, a serious road communication problem had existed for some time. Heavy rains had converted all roads into mires. The critical factor in supply became evacuation from congested beaches rather than shortage of lighterage. Engineer dumps set up during the first ten days of dry weather became completely inaccessible and were ultimately abandoned in favor of beach dumps. Forward transport to corps dumps was confined to coastwise overwater movement by landing craft. Transport forward from corps dumps could be accomplished only by alligators, amphibious tractors, and hand carry in the worst sectors. Critical engineer items were bridge timber, drift pins, sand bags, welding rod, nails, spare parts, and in some instances, water purification chemicals, although these items
were in the harbor in quantity. At one time only the following five types of supply were allowed to be discharged daily: rations, ammunition, motor transport and aviation fuels, medical supplies and bridge timber. Any tonnage capable of discharge over these requirements was discharged selectively on a priority basis. The overwater landing at ORMOC, combined with favorable weather, eased the communication problem.

c. Upon assumption of logistic support of the LEYTE operation by the Eighth Army, the critical engineer items were bridge timbers and drift pins for construction of bridges in the XXIV Corps area. Bridge timber was provided by Landing Craft, Tank, from discharges at TACLOBAN dock. Drift pins were never available in quantity but reinforcing steel rods were cut and used as a substitute. Spare parts were critical principally because the one parts platoon available spent the better part of two months building warehouses and bins.

d. Local engineer material available in quantity was limited to coconut palm logs which were used extensively in bridge construction. Some rock was available as road material, but most coral found was of such poor quality that it could not be used. Some cement, drift pins, and demolition supplies were captured near ORMOC, and were used by the 77th Division.

4. Maps and Intelligence:

a. General: Three weeks prior to the time that the Eighth Army took over a study was made by officers of this subsection with the parallel group in the Sixth Army, relative to the map and engineer intelligence situation on LEYTE. Following the date of the turnover, transfer of intelligence material was completed with minimum confusion.

b. Assumption of Control: Upon assumption of control the Maps and Intelligence subsection had control of all the Sixth Army stock of maps and engineer intelligence material. Revision of LEYTE 1:50,000 sheets was terminated shortly prior to the turn-
over date as there were no topographical units to take over the duties of the 69th and 671st Topographical Companies. At this time, the need for continued revision of maps was not of prime importance.

2. **Engineer Intelligence:** On 26 December 1944, the Sixth Army turned over to this subsection the road, bridge, and construction materials situation. A Sixth Army technical engineer intelligence pamphlet for the King-II operation, "Japanese Land Mines," was distributed through the Adjutant General's Section of the Eighth Army. After 26 December the XXIV Corps submitted regular reports and overlays on roads, bridges, water points, construction materials, and supply. During the short period before the X Corps began staging, a limited number of road and bridge reports were received. Reconnaissance by members of the Engineer Section checked and supplemented these reports.

5. **Amphibious Matters:** No elements of engineer special brigades were assigned to the Eighth Army for use in the LEYTE campaign. The 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, which passed to control of the Eighth Army on 10 January, was staged from LEYTE for the Mike-VII Operation.

6. **Comments:**

a. **Weather:** Excessive rainfall during the operation created a major engineer problem. The most important and most obvious necessity was drainage. In certain instances drainage was not emphasized continually, as it should have been under the existing circumstances. Dumps selected in haste had to be moved when mud halted the use of the approaches.

b. **Supply:** The critical shortage of spare parts for heavy engineer equipment continued during the operation. A new and potentially critical shortage of large size tires and tubes developed during the later stages of the operation. The poor road conditions brought on and tended to aggravate this shortage.
7. **Recommendations:**

   a. In planning an operation which may take place under abnormal weather conditions, sufficient prior information should be given the units concerned, in order that they may recognize the engineer principles involved in operating under those conditions.

   b. Engineer maintenance teams are necessary to visit individual units and insure that proper maintenance is being performed.

   c. Hip boots should be issued to troops in all cases where they must work in water. Unit commanders should insure that boots are being worn in order to minimize the effects of infected water.

   d. Proper quarry operations should be stressed in future operations and an adequate number of crushers should be provided for construction units.
The pile bridge constructed over the BINAHAN RIVER near DAGAMI was washed out by heavy rains in January 1945, which also destroyed the BITO RIVER beach pile bridge.
Some pile bridges did not wash out. This one at BAYBAY and

this on the DULAC-ABUYOG road in addition to many others

withstood the elements.
An undestroyed steel bridge between ABUYOG and BAIBAY and Bailey bridges were the only ones not affected by the floods.
Drainage became the major engineering problem during the January 1945 heavy rains. The existing highway No.1, (north of ABUYOG) had to be rebuilt to withstand heavy military traffic.
Native labor helped a little, but heavy construction equipment made the final road an excellent one.
Supplying materials for the roads and bridges were quarries at SALUG and other points on LEYTE, gravel pits along temporarily dry stream beds,
sawmills and,

all types of hand labor and heavy equipment.
The troops had had a wet landing upon arrival in LEYTE, but ramps were built while the fighting went on in order to provide our troops more convenient debarkation points.
QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. General:
   a. The Eighth Army assumed control of the LEYTE-SAMAR operation on 26 December 1944 at 0001-1.
   b. Current Eighth Army administrative orders prescribed that the Quartermaster maintain a ten (10) day level of Class I and III supplies at the following army supply points: PINAMOPOAN, CARIGARA, SANTA RITA, ORMOC, LLORENTE, AGOJO and ABUYOG. The responsibility for the establishment and operation of the supply points at PINAMOPOAN, CARIGARA and SANTA RITA was delegated to the Quartermaster of the X Corps, and the supply points at ORMOC, ABUYOG, LLORENTE and AGOJO were delegated to the XXIV Corps. Salvage received at the supply points was transshipped to Base K with exception of unserviceable items which were issued to Filipino forces according to their needs.
   c. The Quartermaster X Corps assumed responsibility for the XXIV Corps supply points upon release of the XXIV Corps per amended Field Order No. 16, dated 24 January 1945.
   d. The Eighth Army Area Command assumed responsibility for the X Corps supply points upon release of the X Corps per Field Order No. 13, dated 14 February.

2. Supply:
   a. All supply points provided required quartermaster supplies in sufficient quantities. Constant check and repeated inspections assured their efficient operation.
   b. An officer of this section visited caves in the VALENCIA area on 14 February 1945 to ascertain the practicability of recovering Japanese gasoline found in the area. However, due to the expense, labor, equipment, and risk involved it was found to be an unprofitable undertaking.
   c. On 7 April 1945, a visit was made to the PINAMOPOAN supply point to ascertain the status of evacuation of supplies and equipment. Civilians and casual guerrillas were helping themselves.
freely to ammunition and gasoline products. Civilians in that vicinity were informed of the danger of their children playing with munitions and were enjoined to prevent, as far as possible, the pilferage of supplies on hand pending removal by army personnel. A visit on 20 April to this supply point revealed Class III supplies and ammunition as still on hand due to the fact that Japanese troops were in that part of the island. Action was taken to make immediate evacuation, which was accomplished on 5 May 1945.

3. Graves Registration:

It was not until 4 January 1945 that the Quartermaster, Eighth Army assumed responsibility for cemeteries and records on Leyte. During the period 7 - 15 February 1945, the following cemeteries were inspected and found unsatisfactory: Limon No. 1, Pinamopoan No. 1, and Dulag No. 1. However, Baybay No. 1, the 7th Infantry Division Cemetery, Valencia No. 1, Ipil No. 1, and the 77th Infantry Division Cemeteries were found to be very satisfactory. In general, the graves registration records were far below expected standards. There were many dead still unburied and many isolated burials which either had not been reported at all or had been incorrectly reported. Several factors contributed to this unsatisfactory condition:

a. Lack of sufficient graves registration personnel—eight divisions committed at one time with a total of only one graves registration company, less one section.

b. Lack of sufficient supplies—regulation crosses, Star of David markers, temporary markers, white paint and report of interment forms.

c. Difficult terrain: In order to locate the unburied dead and isolated graves, it was necessary to have combat patrols, familiar with the terrain, detailed to accompany the 1st Section, 4th Platoon of the 601st Quartermaster Graves Registration Company. Areas where fighting had taken place were then combed. Due to the rugged terrain, in many cases, it was impossible for this searching party to carry any necessary equipment to accomplish the mission. In many cases, also,
they were compelled to subsist on native vegetables and fruits. The following numbers of dead were recovered from isolated burial plots prior to the time that the cemeteries were turned over to Base K, United States Services of Supply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cemetery</th>
<th>Number of Burials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PINAMPOAN No. 1</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>23 February 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPIL No. 1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMP DOWNES No. 1</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>7 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAHOANG No. 1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANARAWAT No. 1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCK HILL No. 1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANONANG No. 1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURI No. 1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16 March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VALENZIA No. 1</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>4 April 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALOBECAN No. 1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7 April 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMON No. 1</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>11 April 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAYBAY No. 1</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>13 April 1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Burials: 1829

4. Mounting of Units:

a. Quartermaster units were staged and mounted from LEYTE for other operations as follows:

Mike-VII SUBIC BAY

Hq & Hq Det, 71st QM Bn
695th QM Trk Co
383d QM Trk Co
120th QM Bkry Co (-2 Plats)
191st QM Idry Plat
101st QM Graves Registration Plat (-1 Sec)
4186th QM Sv Co
190th QM Ldry Plat

Victor-III PUERTO PRINCESA - IWAHIG

182d QM Ldry Det (Type B)
4297th QM Gas Sup Co (- Det)
1 Plat (- 1 Sec) 3064th QM Graves Registration Co

Victor-I PANAY-NEGROS

3315th QM Trk Co (w/atchd 3336th QM Sv Det)
396th QM Reefer Det (M)

Victor-II CEBU

3521st QM Trk Co (w/atchd 3368th QM Sv Det)
1st Plat, 248th QM Dep Sup Co
410th QM Reefer Det (M)
4th Plat, 123d QM Bkry Co
354th QM Idry Plat (Hosp)
1st Sec, 1st Plat, 3875th QM Gas Sup Co
110th QM Graves Registration Plat (- 1 Sec)

Victor-V MABANG-PARANG-COTABATO

1st Plat, 234th QM Salvage Collecting Co
3d Sec, 110th QM Graves Registration Plat
b. To insure adequate training of personnel, and completeness of necessary equipment and personnel, inspections of the above units were held and close follow-ups maintained until the time of their departure.

c. In addition to mounting units for the above operations, officers of this section made frequent visits to the XXIV Corps, the 7th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisions relative to equipping and supplying them for the OKINAWA operation. Close follow-ups were made to assure timely supply and upon their departure, all quartermaster supplies were checked for completeness.

5. Clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES:

As the clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES consisted of a group of small operations carried out by designated task forces, this section took no separate action in regard to these operations.

6. Summary of Lessons Learned:

a. It is absolutely necessary for all echelons of command and particularly army headquarters to closely follow-up and stress proper burials, consolidation of isolated burials and processing of graves registration records from the very beginning of an operation.

b. Quartermaster truck companies employed in this operation were required to keep vehicles on constant dispatch to the extent that first and second echelon maintenance suffered and abnormal wear on vehicles resulted.

c. Quartermaster units mounting for future operations were not in many instances alerted in time to secure all items of equipment, particularly critical items which are available for issue to alerted units only.

7. Recommendations:

a. That one graves registration platoon be attached to each division during an operation.
b. That sufficient truck units be provided to meet hauling requirements and that specific instructions be issued directing that each vehicle in the unit be held in the motor park for maintenance at least once each week.
ORDNANCE REPORT

1. Introduction:

a. At the time that the forward echelon of the Eighth Army Headquarters moved to LEYTE, the bulk of the work of the Ordnance Section consisted of staging and mounting units in NEW GUINEA for the forthcoming Mike-I operation. This made it necessary to leave the majority of the section with the rear echelon. Included in the forward echelon, however, were sufficient officers from each major division of the Ordnance Section to supervise the ordnance phase of the LEYTE operation as soon as control of the campaign passed to this Headquarters. By the time that the forward echelon arrived at LEYTE, it was evident that tactical progress was such that the operation would not be turned over to the Eighth Army for some time. In order to utilize most advantageously the period between the arrival of the forward echelon and actual assumption of responsibility for the operation by the Eighth Army, a program was immediately instituted whereby every ordnance unit on the island was frequently visited by the ordnance officers of this Headquarters. Although these visits were necessarily on an informal basis, they enabled the Ordnance Section to gain a thorough understanding of the ordnance problem and to keep abreast of all developments that affected the ordnance situation as the operation progressed.

b. Concurrently with these visits, close liaison was maintained between officers of the section and their corresponding members of the Sixth Army Staff. Representatives of the supply and ammunition divisions were billeted with the Sixth Army Headquarters in order that they could familiarize themselves with the location and status of ordnance supplies and equipment on the island and en-route to the operational area.

2. Support of Combat Operations:

a. By the time that the Eighth Army assumed control of the operations, the unfavorable transportation and weather conditions which had severely hampered supply and maintenance during the earlier stages of
the campaign had somewhat improved. It was, however, largely due to
the intimate knowledge of the ordnance situation gained by this close
contact with ordnance units and the Ordnance Section of the Sixth Army
that service was effectively rendered during the period of the Eighth
Army's control.

b. Administrative Order No. 3, Headquarters Eighth Army,
dated 5 January 1945, directed that all units, other than ordnance
units, would obtain ordnance supplies through their supporting main­
tenance units. However, some troops were so located that they could
draw these supplies more expeditiously directly from nearby Base K
installations and permission to do so was granted in those cases.

3. Troops: During the period of Sixth Army control, all ord­
nance units in the operation were assigned or attached to the Sixth
Army or to its subordinate echelon, Army Service Command. General
Headquarters Operations Instructions No. 81, dated 15 December 1944,
which passed the LEYTE-SAMAR campaign to the control of the Eighth
Army, allotted a number of these units to United States Service of
Supply control for the operation of installations of Base K, which
was established at that time. The remaining ordnance units were at­
tached to the Eighth Army and distributed between Army and its re­
spective corps as follows:

**Eighth Army**
- 267th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)
- 355th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)

**X Corps**
- Hq & Hq Detachment, 246th Ordnance Battalion
- 636th Ordnance Ammunition Company
- 289th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 3198th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 109th Ordnance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal)
- 158th Ordnance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal)
- Detachment, 558th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Co (Tank)

**XXIV Corps**
- 632d Ordnance Ammunition Company
- 106th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 404th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 92d Ordnance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal)
4. Staging Activities:
   a. During the month of January, four divisions and numerous supporting combat and service units were staged out of Leyte for the Eighth Army Mike-VI and Mike-VII operations on Luzon and as reinforcements for the Sixth Army's Mike-I operation. Furnishing these units with the necessary ordnance supplies and equipment was accomplished without serious trouble, except for waterproofing kits, but the supplies drawn by these units resulted in drastic depletion of ordnance stocks on the island. In spite of extensive employment of air transportation and aggressive follow up action, the above mentioned units were not completely equipped with waterproofing materials. Sufficient quantities were obtained to waterproof the vehicles of the assault echelons and no difficulty was experienced in landing the vehicles and weapons of these units in the objective areas.
   
   b. The depletion of Leyte stocks proved a severe handicap in the next major ordnance activity. For the Leyte campaign, the XXIV Corps, consisting of three divisions and a large number of smaller units, was obtained from the Pacific Ocean Area under the Philbas agreement whereby, upon completion of their employment on Leyte, they would be equipped by the Southwest Pacific Area Command with thirty days' supply of Class II and IV ordnance and five units of fire for future operations under the Pacific Ocean Area Command. To do this, it was necessary to freeze all ordnance stocks on the island for the XXIV Corps units. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that several Pacific Ocean Area supply ships, which were scheduled to arrive in the area in time for the Corps staging, were delayed and did not arrive until after the departure of the XXIV Corps for the Iceberg operation.
   
   c. The XXIV Corps was directed to lift with an initial supply of five units of fire - based on the Pacific Ocean Area figure for a unit of fire and not on the figure used by the Southwest Pacific Area. Fortunately, sufficient ammunition was available in Base K stocks, or enroute or resupply ships scheduled for an early arrival. A difficult problem was encountered, however, in effecting
proper distribution of this ammunition. Only five weeks were avail-
able for placing this ammunition in the hands of the troops. Base K
stocks were scattered in ammunition dumps in various sections of the
island, and it was impossible, in many cases, to unload ammunition
ships in the areas where the ammunition was to be slotted for reload-
ing on amphibious shipping. Lighterage was extensively employed in
effecting this redistribution, supplemented by trucks when available.
An officer of the Ordnance Section was attached to the XXIV Corps
Headquarters with the mission of expediting the necessary flow of
ammunition. This officer subsequently received a commendation from
the Commanding General XXIV Corps for the service rendered. In spite
of the limited time available in which to effect the ammunition sup-
ply, it was finally accomplished with several days to spare, and the
Corps departed in excellent condition with reference to ammunition.

d. Due to the peculiarities of this theater, figures given
in the Standard Nomenclature Lists are not satisfactory as a basis
by which ordnance units can compute their automatic resupply require-
ments. Therefore the Eighth Army Ordnance Section, using data com-
piled from experience in previous operations, prepared necessary re-
quisitions for the XXIV Corps Ordnance units. Reports which have
since been received indicate that the requisitions thus prepared
provided adequate supplies for operational needs.

e. The supply of waterproofing kits on LEYTE was far be-
low the requirements of the corps. To properly equip these units
for an amphibious landing, all available kits that could be located
in NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIAN bases were moved forward by air and water
and the balance flown in from the United States. Another critical
situation developed in the supply of tires and tubes for engineer
equipment. Due to enemy action and the nature of the terrain, ex-
penditure of these items during the LEYTE campaign, exceeded the nor-
mal expectations. Close liaison with the United States Army Services of
Supply resulted in air shipment from NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIAN bases
of sufficient quantities to meet the requirements. During all this
activity, an officer of the Ordnance Section was stationed at INTERSEC, ORO BAY, NEW GUINEA to maintain close liaison between army and the United States Army Services of Supply New Guinea bases. His work in expediting the processing of ordnance requisitions and insuring prompt shipment of supplies obtained through these requisitions was largely responsible for the success in reequipping these units.

f. Upon departure of the XXIV Corps, the Pacific Ocean Area released to the Southwest Pacific Area several ordnance units which had accompanied the Corps to LEYTE, but which were not required for the coming Iceberg operation. Two of these, the 355th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA) and the 106th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company were attached to the Eighth Army and were of great value in staging and supporting subsequent operations conducted by this headquarters.

g. During the balance of the period covered in this report, a number of units were staged on LEYTE for the Eighth Army's Victor operations of the coming VISAYAN campaign. By that time, levels of class II and IV ordnance supplies had been replenished to the point that no difficulty was experienced in providing these units with the necessary ordnance supplies. Ammunition supply was critical throughout the theater, but by shipments from NEW GUINEA and LUZON bases all units lifted with the required quantities and types of ammunition.

5. Inspections:

a. During the entire period of operations on LEYTE, an aggressive inspection program was continually in effect whereby all ordnance units under control of this headquarters were visited by officers of the Ordnance Section at a minimum of once a week, and a very close check maintained on the quality of their work, extent of their load, status of supplies, as well as general administration. Also, contact teams from ordnance units, and ordnance officers from this headquarters, made periodic inspections of units other than ord-
nonce units to insure that first and second echelon maintenance was being maintained in accordance with the high levels required by the Eighth Army and to see that the ordnance support being rendered these units was satisfactory. The Eighth Army Ordnance Inspection Team spent approximately three weeks on the island inspecting units staging for the Victor operations. These inspections had the added advantage of giving the Ordnance Section advance indication of any troubles in maintenance or supply that might be developing, in order that corrective steps could be taken before a critical situation developed.

6. Clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES:

a. As the operations for the clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES involved only elements of the 24th Infantry Division and of the Americal Division, the ordnance phase of the campaign was conducted by the Division Ordnance Sections of the two divisions for their respective activities.

b. The troops involved in the numerous landings obtained the necessary ammunition, as prescribed by the division commanders, from their division dumps. Resupply to the divisions was provided by requisitions on United States Army Services of Supply, Base K.

c. Ordnance maintenance support during the actual period of combat was furnished by small contact teams from the organic ordnance light maintenance companies. The small numbers of men, vehicles, and weapons employed in each individual operation, and the brief duration of the action, did not warrant the services of ordnance troops other than those organic to the divisions. Ordnance materiel, which was damaged beyond the capabilities of the contact teams, was evacuated to LEYTE or HINDORO where it was repaired by the light maintenance companies of the divisions concerned or was further evacuated to the Eighth Army or United States Army Services of Supply installations.

7. Conclusions:

a. The most important fact learned from this operation was
the necessity for personnel from the ordnance section to spend con-
siderable time in the field, constantly checking the performance of
ordnance units and the status of maintenance and supply in other
units. It is impossible to carry out an effective and aggressive
ordnance program without these field contacts.

b. Close supervision of first and second echelon mainten-
ance among the units in the field must be maintained during the ac-
tive stages of the operation as well as when troops revert to a gar-
rison status. Troops are prone to neglect such maintenance during
an operation as they feel that they are too busy to perform such ac-
tion. However, it was observed that, with few exceptions, vehicles
were idle for the brief time required for essential preventive main-
tenance.

c. On a large operation such as this, the ordnance section
of army headquarters must know on which ships ordnance units are
loaded, when and where they will discharge, and arrangements must
be made to meet them at the beach and direct them to their assigned
areas. In the early days of this operation, much valuable time was
lost through units arriving and not knowing where they were to set
up for operation.

d. The ordnance section must keep an up-to-date situation
map showing all ordnance installations and must be able to furnish
necessary directions to ordnance units desiring to contact any com-
bat or service unit.

e. During staging activities, close liaison must be main-
tained by army ordnance with the units being staged and with the
supply bases. Personal follow-up action is essential to insure the
prompt delivery of supplies.
1. The following chemical units on LEYTE and SAMAR came under control of the Eighth Army on 26 December 1944:

- 85th Chemical Battalion
- 88th Chemical Battalion (- Co C and D)
- 91st Chemical Weapons Company
- 184th Chemical Composite Platoon
- 236th Chemical Service Platoon
- 272nd Chemical Service Platoon

2. Both mortar battalions were reorganized under the Table of Organization and Equipment 3-25, dated 29 September 1944, before leaving our control. All of these units, except the 184th Chemical Composite Platoon, were staged from LEYTE for other operations.

3. The main problem that arose when staging these units was supplying sufficient ammunition for the mortar units and spare parts for the service units. The XXIV Corps had been ordered to carry a complete stock of protective clothing. This could not be done, because it would have drastically depleted theater stocks.

4. During the campaign, the 184th Composite Platoon was divided among the three divisions of the XXIV Corps. This resulted in insufficient chemical service troops for all three. The shortage in the 77th Infantry Division was compensated for by using some infantrymen to augment the meager supply force.

5. Company "A" of the 88th Chemical Battalion operated with the 77th Infantry Division until the latter part of January. Two of its officers and three enlisted men were awarded silver stars for gallantry in action. Throughout the action the problem of selecting suitable firing positions was a serious one due to the soft ground. Firing from this type terrain resulted in bent elevating screws and broken locking forks. Very elaborate positions with log or rock foundations had to be prepared to prevent the mortars from sinking.

6. This Headquarters was notified by the United States Army Services of Supply that several lots of 4.2 inch high explosive ammunition were thought to be defective. Warnings were immediately dispatched to all units concerned; but no cases of premature bursts were reported.
7. Flamethrowers were used mainly in mopping up by-passed strong points, because the operators were unable to keep up with the more advanced elements on the difficult terrain encountered. White phosphorous grenades and thermite grenades were used to burn down nipa shacks suspected of harboring enemy.

8. By the middle of February, some chemical warfare training was being carried on by several units. The 7th Infantry Division conducted a two week flamethrower school using personnel from the 184th Composite Platoon as instructors; thereby demonstrating the versatility of these small service units.

9. The 66th Tank Battalion conducted a school for operators of tank-mounted flamethrowers. The battalion was equipped with periscope-mounted flamethrowers, improvised in the Pacific Ocean Area, which did not reduce the firepower of the tanks in any way. The demonstration of the weapon was impressive, but the range and accuracy were inferior to the Model 3-4-3 mechanized flamethrower which is interchangeable with the bow machine gun.

10. In March, the 80th Chemical Battalion arrived from the United States and the 180th Composite Platoon arrived from BOUGAVILLE. The battalion was organized under the new Table of Organization and Equipment almost immediately. The battalion was put into action in a very short time: Company "H" departed for the Victor-II operation; Company "J" for the Victor-I operation; and Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and "H" Company left for Victor-V. The 180th Composite Platoon also joined the Victor-V task force.

11. In April, two mobile training teams (defensive type) arrived on LEYTE and were used to train Eighth Army troops on the island.

12. It is recommended that in future operations chemical service Platoons be assigned on the basis of one per division, particularly when a chemical mortar unit is also attached to the division. Chemical mortar units should receive intensive training in preparation of mortar positions on soft or swampy ground. Medium tank battalions should be equipped with flamethrowers which will not reduce any of the other
armament on the tanks. The newly standardized Model 3-4-3 mechanized
flamethrower, which is interchangeable with the bow machine gun,
appears to be the best weapon of this type. If these flamethrowers can
be obtained in sufficient quantities, it is recommended that one be in-
stalled in each medium tank.
MEDICAL REPORT

1. General:

a. At the time the Eighth Army assumed control of the LEYTE-SAMAR area, the following non-divisional medical units were under direct control of this Headquarters:

400th Collecting Company, Separate
605th Clearing Company, Separate (- 1 Plat)
893d Clearing Company, Separate
5th Malaria Survey Unit
55th Malaria Control Unit
67th Malaria Control Unit
1st Field Hospital
30th Evacuation Hospital
36th Evacuation Hospital
58th Evacuation Hospital
76th Station Hospital
165th Station Hospital
227th Station Hospital

b. In addition, there were many non-divisional medical units attached to the X and the XXIV Corps. These consisted of collecting, clearing and ambulance companies, portable surgical hospitals and malaria control and survey units. Most of these units were actively engaged.

c. Concurrently with the operational control of the area, this Headquarters was assigned the responsibility for staging, equipping, and mounting units for the Sixth Army and, later, the Tenth Army operations. With the commitment of these units, the number of available medical units was reduced and a redeployment of those remaining was necessary to provide adequate medical support.

d. The organic medical service of the combat troops was often augmented by small non-divisional medical units to provide complete operative care and a few beds for holding patients prior to evacuation. Portable surgical hospitals with additional attached personnel proved adequate in several of the small island operations. In other areas, one platoon of a field hospital was sufficient. However, in all cases, the evacuation of emergency cases to fixed hospitals remained the principal medical problem.

e. On 8 May, at the conclusion of the LEYTE-SAMAR and VISAYAN PASSAGES operations, the following non-divisional medical units...
were under direct control of this Headquarters:

167th Evacuation Hospital
76th Station Hospital
58th Malaria Control Detachment

All other non-divisional medical units were under task force commanders in operational areas.

2. Hospitalization and Evacuation:

a. Concurrently with the assumption of the Eighth Army control of the Leyte-Samar operation, the Commanding General, United States Army Services of Supply, assumed control of Base K, thus relieving this Headquarters of the burden of fixed hospitalization. The responsibility for treatment of patients in mobile type hospitals and evacuation of patients from the forward areas to base hospitals remained part of the mission of this Headquarters. The evacuation policy in operational areas was normally on a 30-day basis; however, in many instances the influx of casualties was so great as to necessitate evacuation of patients requiring less than 30 days of hospitalization. In other instances, operations were completed in a relatively short time and all patients were evacuated.

b. As the Leyte operation proceeded and the fighting shifted into the hills and mountains west of the Ormoc valley and along the northwest coast of the island, the evacuation of casualties became correspondingly difficult. Due to the distances involved and the poor road net connecting these areas with fixed hospitals at Base K, air evacuation by C-47 and L-5B planes supplanted motor transport shuttling between Valencia in the west and Tacloban and Tanuan on the east coast. Fighting further up the west coast where no landing strips were available necessitated the use of flying boats. Assault craft were also frequently utilized in these isolated areas for the evacuation of the wounded.

c. On Samar and on the small islands in the Visayan Passages, water and air transport were the only two means of evacuation. Consequently, returning assault craft often brought back evacuees; however, flying boats were frequently used for emergency use and motor torpedo
boats also helped on occasion.

3. Professional Services:

a. For the first time in this theatre, the United States Army has encountered the disease Schistosomiasis (japonicum). LEYTE was found to be the main endemic focus in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. All cases (now over 500) were contracted in the fresh water streams and waters of eastern LEYTE. Though some of the cases resulted from swimming, the majority were the result of combat and engineer troops entering these waters as a tactical necessity. The highest incidence occurred among the engineer construction battalions which were engaged in building and replacing bridges. The greatest exposure occurred during late October and November 1944, these cases becoming symptomatic during December 1944 and January 1945. An intensive educational program was instituted at an early date to familiarize troops with the nature of the disease, its transmission and its prevention. Surveys were made among exposed units in an effort to diagnose latent cases. All cases were evacuated and concentrated in specified hospitals for intensive study and treatment.

b. An epidemic of infectious hepatitis occurred among troops on LEYTE and SAMAR beginning in early January, 1945, and continued to increase until the close of the period.

c. The usual miscellaneous tropical diseases were encountered, skin diseases, diarrheal diseases and worm infestations predominating. Scrub typhus was not a problem on LEYTE or SAMAR. Malaria was moderately endemic on SAMAR but proved to be almost non-existent on LEYTE except in localized areas in the foothills.

4. Conclusions:

a. In supporting numerous small operations with a limited number of medical units available, it is often necessary to break such units into component parts. Such a procedure is considered to be justified under these conditions.

b. The necessity for close liaison and cooperation between
the Navy, Air Corps, and Ground Forces to insure an uninterrupted flow of evacuees was amply demonstrated in this campaign. The promptness with which seriously wounded casualties were evacuated from operational areas was one of the outstanding features of the medical services rendered during these operations.
V. TRANSPORTATION REPORT

1. Summary of Activities

a. The Eighth Army Transportation Section, during the LEYTE-SAMAR and VISAYAN PASSAGES operations, functioned principally in coordinating routine overwater resupply operations to army supply points not serviced by the United States Army Services of Supply. This was accomplished through the use of United States Navy amphibious shipping and the United States Army Services of Supply Fast Supply ships.

b. Resupply through air drops was lighter than during the Sixth Army phase of the operation because of better lines of communication. The Thirteenth Air Force Cargo Resupply Squadron in cooperation with the Allied Air Forces made twenty-five air drops totaling sixty-two and one-half tons of emergency supplies.

2. Comments and Recommendations:

a. Since the LEYTE-SAMAR operation was taken over by the Eighth Army after it was well along, most of the transportation problems had been solved. However, in any phase of amphibious loading for assault or resupply, the following recommendations should be closely followed:

(1) If amphibious craft are used for resupply, continuous maintenance of the loading beach is necessary to expedite the loading of the craft.

(2) The supplies to be loaded should be slotted and sufficient trucks and equipment allotted to assist in loading; likewise, an adequate supply of labor should be on hand to expedite the process.
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