

RG-16: WHITNEY PAPERS

PERSONAL FILES

GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES

- MINDORO, 1944



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
CHECK SHEET

Guerrilla activities Mindoro



(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-3 Opns, Philippine Sub-Division

To: General Chamberlin

Date: 19 December 1944

1. We have never recognized any guerilla movement on MINDORO and have discouraged its development as inimical to the security of the use of MINDORO as a base for secret communications and intelligence agencies.

2. PERALTA has for some time maintained a segment of his communications and intelligence net under Major JURADO (Naval Academy graduate) former chief of the Philippine off shore patrol. JURADO had with him for the protection of his activity an armed company from PERALTA's command. This force was in constant conflict with the force of Major RUFFY, Constabulary Officer, which finally resulted in JURADO's death.

3. We have never recognized RUFFY's force nor PERALTA's command jurisdiction over MINDORO. The implication of any such recognition should now be scrupulously avoided as among the MINDORO guerillas there are few army personnel; there has been no requirement for guerilla protection of the people (enemy garrisons having always been small) and the guerilla movement for the most part has been motivated by the desire of a few to live on the people. When our detachment under Major PHILLIPS was hard pressed by the enemy the so-called guerillas on MINDORO proved a burden rather than a help.

4. Recommend that General EDDLEMAN be replied to substantially as follows:

"THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAS NEITHER GIVEN COLONEL PERALTA COMMAND JURISDICTION OVER MINDORO NOR HAS HE RECOGNIZE THE RUFFY OR ANY OTHER GUERRILLA FACTION ON THE ISLAND. HIS POLICY CONSISTENTLY HAS BEEN TO DISCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT ON MINDORO AS THE ENEMY HAS SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST THEREIN AND HE DESIRED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF THE AREA AS A BASE FOR SECRET COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. LIEUTENANT GEORGE ROWE, U.S.N.R. UNDER GENERAL DUNCKEL'S COMMAND, HAS BEEN FOR THE PAST FOUR MONTHS DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF GHQ ON THE ISLAND AND HAS HAD WITH HIM A DETACHMENT OF TWENTYFIVE MEN TAKEN IN FOR THE PURPOSE. IT IS SUGGESTED GENERAL DUNCKEL CALL UPON LIEUTENANT ROWE FOR THE SELECTION OF GUIDES FOR CIVIL EMPLOYMENT TO SERVE THE REQUIREMENTS INDICATED".

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
G-3 Section

18 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Operations Division (Colonel Whitney)

1. SIXTH Army (General Eddleman) advises that General Dunkel desires to know which Guerilla faction is in control in the occupied area of MINDORO, Peralta or Ruffy.
2. Request he be given immediate information as he is badly in need of a trusted Guerilla Commander to immediately get patrols on all known roads.

S. J. CHAMBERLIN
Major General, G.S.C.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
G-3 Section

18 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Operations Division (Colonel Whitney)

1. SIXTH ARMY (General Eichelman) advises that General Banerjee desires to know which guerrilla faction is in control in the occupied area of KINOHNO, Tarsia or Bully.

2. Request be given immediate information as to which faction in need of a trusted guerrilla commander to immediately get patrols on all known roads.

W. J. CHAMBERLAIN
Major General, U.S.A.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

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SECRET

TO: CG SIXTH ARMY (ATTENTION: GENERAL EDDLEMAN)

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REFERENCE YOUR REQUEST TO GENERAL CHAMBERLIN FOR INFORMATION AS TO GUERRILLA LEADER IN CONTROL MINDORO PD THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAS NEITHER GIVEN COLONEL PERALTA COMMAND JURISDICTION OVER MINDORO NOR HAS HE RECOGNIZED THE RUFFY OR ANY OTHER GUERRILLA FACTON ON THE ISLAND. HIS POLICY CONSISTENTLY HAS BEEN TO DISCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT ON MINDORO AS THE ENEMY HAS SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST THEREIN AND HE DESIRED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF THE AREA AS A BASE FOR SECRET COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. LIEUTENANT GEORGE ROWE, U.S.N.R. UNDER GENERAL DUNCKEL'S COMMAND, HAS BEEN FOR THE PAST FOUR MONTHS DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF GHQ ON THE ISLAND AND HAS HAD WITH HIM A DETACHMENT OF TWENTY FIVE MEN TAKEN IN FOR THE PURPOSE. IT IS SUGGESTED GENERAL DUNCKEL CALL UPON LIEUTENANT ROWE FOR THE SELECTION OF GUIDES FOR CIVIL EMPLOYMENT TO SERVE THE REQUIREMENTS INDICATED.



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TO: CG SIXTH ARMY (ATTENTION: GER GQOGENERAL EDELMAN)

REFERENCE YOUR REQUEST TO GENERAL CHAMBERLIN FOR INFORMATION AS TO GUERRILLA LEADER IN CONTROL MINDORO PD THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAS NEITHER GIVEN COLONEL ~~PERAT~~ PERALTA COMMAND JURISDICTION OVER MINDORO NOR HAS HE RECOGNIZED THE RUFFY OR ANY OTHER GUERRILLA FACTION ON THE ISLAND. HIS POLICY CONSISTENTLY HAS BEEN TO DISCOUAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT ON MINDORO AS THE ENEMY HAS SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST THERE IN AND HE DESIRED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF THE AREA AS A BASE FOR SECRET ~~OR~~ COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

~~LIETENH~~ LIUTENANT GEORGE ROWE, USNR UNDER GENERAL ~~DUNCK~~ DUNCKEL'S COMMAND, HAS BEEN FOR THE PAST FOR MONTHS DIRCT REPRESENTATIVE OF GHQ ON THE ISLAND AND HAS HD WITH HIM A DETACHMENT OF TWENTY FIVE MEN TAKEN IN FOR THE PURPOSE ~~AS~~ PD IT IS SUGGESTED GENERAL DUNCKEL CALL UPON LIETENAT ROWE FOR THE SELECTION OF GUIDES FOR CIVIL EMPLOYMENT TO SERVE THE RQUIREMENTS INICATED.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from this sheet)

File No.:

Subject:

From: LT ROWE

To: COLONEL

Date: 2 May 1944

PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING AN INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE OF MINDORO.



Reference your invitation and plan for re-establishing our Intelligence coverage.

It is my plan, with a party of trained Americans and Filipinos to furnish a complete radio, photographic, weather and general intelligence coverage of Mindoro and the waters adjacent, together with a comprehensive coverage of Manila and environs.

It is desired that this Intelligence Net be separate from all other nets now operating. However, members of the previous party which may still be on the Island can be absorbed, if you so desire.

RADIO

My general headquarters will be established at a point between Mounts Fechet and Patrick. By reason of a personal knowledge of the terrain mentioned I am convinced this position offers the best security. My main radio station will be at this point.

A sub-station will be established near the summit of Mount Halcon. In addition to being the C^u station for Verde Island passage it will also serve as a relay for my Luzon station.

The Luzon station will be situated on the plateau near Maragondon, Cavite Province. This station will report enemy activities in Manila Bay. It will also act as a contact point for the couriers of our Manila agents.

This station as well as the one on Mt Halcon will operate on a low powered "beam wireless" principle.

WEATHER STATIONS

These stations will be originally established in the three places mentioned. As it will be best to keep traffic at a minimum weather reports will be supplied only as requested.



PHOTOGRAPHY

It is my intention to make this phase of the Net a high priority, furnishing as nearly as possible, a complete photographic coverage of the enemy, his installations and activities.

The CW station at Mt Halcon will be equipped with a telescopic camera capable of covering all shipping in the Verde Island passage and coastal waters around northern Mindoro.

A studio type camera will be installed on the Maragondon plateau to photograph Corregidor and the surrounding areas daily.

Minature cameras would also be furnished our agents in Manila. Workable plans have been devised to photograph every enemy project in Manila.

Where ever possible photographs will be obtained to supplement our written reports thus enabling reviewing authority to achieve an accurate evaluation of the enemy's strength and disposition.

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE


Former friends and employees who I know I can trust will for the most part be used to gather intelligence in and around Manila. A courier system from Manila to our Luzon relay position will be established thus the Manila agents will not be required to jeopardize themselves by leaving Manila.

Workable pickup systems have been devised that will give our agents and couriers the maximum security.

Personal

Inasmuch as it is my intention to be thoroughly prepared for specialized work it is requested that I be relieved of my present duties and allowed to assemble a group of picked men to experiment with photography and beamed radio together with working out other contemplated plans prior to departure.




G. F. Rowe
Lt., USNR

*Guerrilla activities
Mindoro
Copy for Col. Whitney.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
ON THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT
IN MINDORO.



I joined the guerrillas of Mindoro in the early part of September of this year. I stayed there for two months and I traveled from north to south of Mindoro, specifically from the northwest town of Mamburao up to the southern town of Bongabong. I have met all the guerrilla leaders, who were at the time Lt. Col. Enrique Jurado, who was the Intelligence Officer of Col. Peralta, Commander of the Sixth Military District, Maj. Ramon Ruffy, who was the PC Commander before the war and who refused to surrender to the Japanese, and Capt. Esteban Belencio, who was a High School teacher before the war, but had some military training, and who had been called to the Army before the Japanese invaded the Philippines. There was, besides these three leaders, an American Intelligence Officer directly established by the SWPA in the person of Lt. Commander George Rowe.

At the time I arrived in Mindoro, I noticed immediately a rivalry between these three Filipino guerrilla leaders. On the one hand there was Lt. Col. Enrique Jurado who, besides handling ~~is~~ intelligence work for Col. Peralta by virtue of the strategic location of Mindoro, was also endeavoring to be the military leader of Mindoro. In his capacity as intelligence officer he was doing, I understand, very good work; but his disadvantage was that he represented a different military district - the 6th - to which Mindoro did not belong. Mindoro was a part of the Fourth Military District which comprises, besides Mindoro, Marinduque, Cavite, Batangas, Tayabas and even Manila. Col. Jurado insisted that he be accepted as coordinator of all the guerrilla units of Mindoro. For a time it seems that Maj. Ruffy was agreeable to such an arrangement because, as he had not been recognized or given arms by Gen. MacArthur, he believed he could get sufficient help from Col. Peralta. But when he found out that there was not much help from that quarter, that Col. Jurado insisted on having direct control over all guerrilla units - instead of being a mere coordinator, - and that

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there were complaints that the men that Col. Jurado had brought from Tablas and Panay were not treating the civilians right, Maj. Ruffy started ignoring Col. Jurado, claiming that he and his guerrillas did not belong to the Sixth Military District but rather to the Fourth Military District. In this movement Maj. Ruffy and his men were supported by the people of Mindere, for the relations between Maj. Ruffy's men and the people were very cordial. Inasmuch as there was a little rivalry between Capt. Beloncio, the other guerrilla leader, and Maj. Ruffy, Capt. Beloncio decided to side with Col. Jurado. At the general meeting that was held in August of this year in the office of Lt. Com. George Rowe in Sablayan, it was agreed that officers and enlisted men could choose under whom they were willing to serve, either under Ruffy or Capt. Beloncio, who was a supporter of Col. Jurado. The vast majority of the officers and enlisted men transferred to Maj. Ruffy. Lt. Col. Jurado insisted that he should still be recognized as the superior officer and coordinator and he wanted to discipline Ruffy's men. He had sent for another subordinate of Maj. Ruffy who was Capt. Garcia, threatening that if he did not report to Col. Jurado something would happen to him. In September of this year Capt. Garcia had probably around 100 men in the neighborhood of the camp of Col. Jurado in Bongabong. He claimed that he was there to get rice for Lt. Com. Rowe. Then he found out - according to verbal statement to me - the abuses of certain men of Col. Jurado, and he disarmed them. This, together with the news that his father-in-law had been arrested by Ruffy's men, enraged Col. Jurado. Three armed encounters resulted; but the casualties were not many - I believe only one. In the last of the three encounters, Jurado's men were surprised and surrounded in a warehouse, and they were forced to flee, throwing their guns into the river. The result of these encounters were detrimental to Jurado's men, probably more than 100 were lost, half of which went to Ruffy's men. At this stage, I almost succeeded in effecting a peace settlement between these two factions. They knew that I had no local ambitions to foster; for I was an official of the Commonwealth. I acted merely as a liaison officer. It was agreed between Ruffy and Jurado, through my mediation, that peace would be declared with the understanding that the guns seized by Ruffy's men before the first encounter would be returned. I had letters from both leaders



agreeing to this proposal. But reinforcements from Capt. Belencio from the north came and Jurado was again encouraged to take a more drastic stand. He started building fox holes near his camp and said that he would prevent Garcia's men from passing on their way to Lt. Com. Rowe. I left the place considering that my mission, as a peace maker, was a failure and I wanted to go to George Rowe's Office in northern Mindoro determined to send a message to Gen. MacArthur or President Osmaña, suggesting that the solution to the problem was the appointment of an Island Commander, either Ruffy or Jurado or somebody else. Before I arrived at the Office of George Rowe, I heard already that a final encounter took place two days after I left, and that Jurado's men were surprised at breakfast and routed again and forced to cross the river, throwing away their guns. In this last encounter, Col. Jurado must have lost all the guns that had come to his rescue. His house was surrounded and he was asked to surrender; but instead he came down with a tommy gun and started a heated discussion with one of Ruffy's lieutenants. There was shooting heard afterwards, and he was killed.

The guerrilla system inaugurated by Maj. Ruffy is an admirable one and is probably one of the most economical guerrilla systems in the entire Philippines. It is true that Col. Jurado spent money for his men in Mindoro out of the money taken from Panay. But the rest of the Mindoro guerrillas had been authorized to spend only ₱20,000.00 and very little of this money went to the salaries of the men. The guerrillas under Maj. Ruffy have not received any salary since the beginning. Maj. Ruffy's system is based on mutual help with the civilians. He kept peace and order and suppressed banditry. For the purposes of maintenance and transportation he organized food administrators, who were mostly the lieutenants of the barrios, in each barrio. The food administrators collected from the farmers 10% to 15% of their rice harvest for the guerrillas. These food administrators or barrio lieutenants also required the rig drivers to render one or two days of free rig ride a week for the guerrillas. They were also home guards, who acted as intelligence officers, runners and guards for the communities. I traveled back and forth in the region controlled by Maj. Ruffy's guerrillas. Whenever I reached a barrio or village I had only to ask for the



feed administrator, and this official would have food ready for me - or for any other guerrilla - in no time, for he had there rice he had collected as share of the guerrillas, and he also had a little money which he used to buy viands. Then he would advise that if I needed a rig, a rig driver who had his free duty for that day would be ready for me. If I wanted a guide, or laborer, to carry my baggage he would call a home guard who also acted for me as intelligence man to go and see if there was any Japanese in the vicinity. When I reached the next barrio, I repeated the same procedure and obtained similar services. If I went to a seacoast town free ride in a banca would be available. After a few nights of such travelling which did not cost me a centavo - where I met many other guerrilla leaders, officers and men, who were also travelling like I did, without costing them a single centavo - I often told myself that under such a system an army could exist on practically nothing a year. The people knew that the guerrilla existed not only to get after the Japanese, but also to act as the government of Mindoro. On many occasions, they became also the courts of justice and settled disputes drastically. The people were willing to pay the price and knew that had it not been for this guerrilla organization there would be disorder and banditry and all the evils incident to war. All the seventeen mayors of Mindoro, with the possible exception of two, had the sympathy of the guerrillas and were in fact working for the guerrillas.

Mindoro is one of the most ideal places for the conduct of guerrillas. Its terrain of low lands adjacent to thickly forested mountain ranges, its sparse population, its adequate rice production, its cattle and fish, added to the loyalty of the people are great assets for guerrilla activities. The result is that so far there is only one serious casualty - that was in the early part of the guerrilla when Lt. Hanks, EVO of the guerrilla unit was killed in an encounter. On the other hand the long stretches of thinly populated areas where the national roads go through are strategic places for ambush. The guerrillas claim that so far they have killed more

than a thousand Japanese. On the other hand the Japanese have killed probably less than 20 guerrillas although there must have been around a thousand civilians killed.

The two guerrilla leaders of Mindoro, Maj. Ruffy and Capt. Belencio have never surrendered to the Japanese. Their opposition to Japanese rule has been uninterrupted from the beginning.

At the time I left, November 1st, the problem of the guerrilla leadership in the province was simplified by the death of Lt. Col. Jurado and also by the presence of Lt. Com. George Rowe. There was only a small minority, the men of Capt. Belencio who, at the time I left had barely 25 armed men, while Maj. Ruffy had around 300. Both of them were training hundreds of new trainees. At that time there were hardly less than 300 Japanese in the entire island of Mindoro garrisoned in the following places: Calapan, Pinamalayan, Bengabong, San Jese and Palu-an.

Tacleban, 20 December 1944.



MAXIMO M. KALAW

Guerrilla
Mindora

AMMUNITION credited to Peralta in Mindoro

130,500 rds CARTRIDGE, Ball Cal .30 M2
360,000 rds CARTRIDGE, ball, Cal..45, M1917
600,000 Rds Cartridge, Carbine, Cal .30, M 1
105 Rds Shell, H.E., M 56, w/fuze PD, M 53, 81 mm mortar.



food administrator, and this official would have food ready for me - or for any other guerrilla - in no time, for he had there rice he had collected as share of the guerrillas, and he also had a little money which he used to buy viands. Then he would advise that if I needed a rig, a rig driver who had his free duty for that day would be ready for me. If I wanted a guide, or laborer, to carry my baggage he would call a home guard who also acted for me as intelligence man to go and see if there was any Japanese in the vicinity. When I reached the next barrico, I repeated the same procedure and obtained similar services. If I went to a seacoast town free ride in a banca would be available. After a few nights of such travelling which did not cost me a centavo - where I met many other guerrilla leaders, officers and men, who were also travelling like I did, without costing them a single centavo - I often told myself that under such a system an army could exist on practically nothing a year. The people knew that the guerrilla existed not only to get after the Japanese, but also to act as the government of Mindoro. On many occasions, they became also the courts of justice and settled disputes drastically. The people were willing to pay the price and knew that had it not been for this guerrilla organization there would be disorder and banditry and all the evils incident to war. All the seventeen mayors of Mindoro, with the possible exception of two, had the sympathy of the guerrillas and were in fact working for the guerrillas.

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.Tacloban, 20 December 1944.



MAXIMO M. KALAW