

PERSONAL FILES

OPERATIONAL AND

STRATEGIC VALUE

OF

RADIO STATIONS

[1944]

SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS  
&  
MINDANAO


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

APRIL 16, 1944

MILES  
0 25 50 100 150

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC VALUE OF RADIO STATIONS


Evaluation - Excellent Results	1	○
Good Results	2	○
Fair Results	3	○
Very Poor Results	4	○




~~SECRET~~

### SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS & MINDANAO


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
  
April 16, 1944



#### OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC VALUE OF RADIO STATIONS

Evaluation -	<u>Excellent Results</u>	
ARC -	26 Sightings	
MACA -	98 Sightings. Reports for three other stations.	
RBC -	18 Sightings	
REG -	12 Sightings	
RSL -	41 Sightings	
TAB -	12 Sightings	
VIM -	79 Sightings	
WAQ -	59 Sightings	
PGA -	14 Sightings	

DECLASSIFIED PER ACS LTR 08



~~SECRET~~

SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS  
&  
MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

April 16, 1944


0 25 50 100 150  
MILES

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC VALUE OF RADIO STATIONS

Evaluation - GOOD

- MAA - Important location. Reports thru MACA
- MAB - Important and dangerous location. Reports thru MACA
- MBG - Reports consistently. Total of 5 sightings.
- MER - Reports consistently. Total of 4 sightings.
- MBY - Reports consistently. Total of 4 sightings.
- RIA - In operation a short time. Total of 4 sightings.
- TUT - Important location. Reports thru MACA
- WAJ - Important location. Recently in operation.
- WPI - A borderline station.
- WPP - A borderline station. Has potential value.

DISCLASSIFIED PER ACS LTR 08  
20 AUG 75



~~SECRET~~

SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS  
&  
MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

APRIL 16, 1944


0 25 50 100 150  
MILES

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC VALUE OF RADIO STATIONS

Evaluation - Pair Results 

- CDE - Reports no sightings
- ERT - Seldom reports sightings but functions as relay station.
- POQ - Reports direct to KAZ - Seldom reports to FERTIO. Total of 5 sightings.
- HV5 - Seldom reports.
- MBA - Reports regularly but only one sighting.
- MBP - Reports regularly but only one sighting.
- MBN - Reports regularly but no sightings.
- MBX - Reports regularly but no sightings.
- TAR - Reports regularly but no sightings.
- TUF - Reports regularly but only 2 sightings.
- TUX - Reports regularly but no sightings.
- UAN - Reports regularly but no sightings.
- WAP - Reports regularly but no sightings.
- WAC - Reports regularly but no sightings recently.

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20 AUG 75



MACARTHUR  
ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS  
&  
MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

APRIL 16, 1944


MILES  
0 25 50 100 150

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC VALUE OF RADIO STATIONS

Evaluation - Very poor results ○


- CH - Poor location. Fails to Report. One Sighting
- MBC - Good location but fails to report. No Sightings
- TAC - Good Location but fails to report. One Sighting
- TUM - Good location but fails to report. No sighting
- WAA - Good location but fails to report. No sighting
- WAL - Good location but fails to report as consistently as sister station WAQ. Total of 4 sightings
- WAM - Poor location. Fails to report. No sightings
- WAP - Good location but reported only one sighting.
- YAP - Good location. One report and one sighting

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20 AUG 75




# MINDANAO 10TH MILITARY DISTRICT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff



- - - - - PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
- 1ST & 2ND CLASS ROADS
- - - - - MAIN TRAILS



O- Reported No Sightings-O  
 D- Destroyed - D  
 U- Contacted but no report U  
 M- Moving - M  
 T- Travelling Station-T  
 TF- Technical Failure-TF  
 RS- Radio Silence for Reason-RS  
 R- Relay Station-R  
 AC- Alternate Call Letter-AC  
 C- Contacted-C

RATING (PROBIL)  
 1- Excellent Results  
 2- Good  
 3- Fair  
 4- Poor  
 NR- No Rating

DECLASSIFIED FOR ACS USE ON  
 20 JUL 88



STATION	NET	FEB 6	FEB 10	FEB 14	FEB 17	MAR 6	MAR 11	MAR 15	MAR 20	APR 3	APR 7	APR 11	APR 13
ARC		0	0		2	2	2	2	3	6	8	1	7
AUM						AC							
BAX											U	CHANGED TO W&N	
CDE									0	C	0		5
CH				1	TF		0		U	0	ERT	U	ERT
ERT					M			1					
FCQ						3	2	0					
HV5									U	U	0	U	2 4
ISRH		9	16	1									U
MAA		3				R	R	R	R	R	R	R	U
MAB						MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA
MACA		1	23	14	13	7	5	13	3	3	2	14	4
MBA		TF	0		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
MBC		0	0			0					0	1	0
MBF		0	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
MBG			0		1		0	0	0	0	3	1	2
MBN							0	0	0	0	0	2	0
MBR					1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
MBX		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MBY		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
MY		+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	U
PGA								0	0	0	6	8	11
REC		4		2	2	0	2	4	1	2	1	0	U <sup>+</sup>
REG		2		3	2	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	1
REL				4	0	6	2	13	10	U	3	3	6
RIA								0	0	0	2	2	3
TAB		0		1	2	3	2	0	1	0	1	2	3
TAC						1							
TAR		0	0	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C
TUF		1	0		1	C	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
TUK						0	0	0	0	0	0	0	U
TUM					0								
TUT			U	U		MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA	MACA
TUX		0	0		0	0	1	1	0	D	D	D	
UAN						0	C	0	0	0	0	0	C <sup>0</sup>
UAM		RS	RS	RS	RS	RS	RS	0	0	RS	RS	U	U
VIM		5	15	10	8	7	4	4	12	3	4	7	7
WAA						0							
WAB		0	0		0		0	0	0		ERT	ERT	
WAG		2		1	1	R	ERT	ERT	0	0	U	U	ERT
WAJ										1	3	4	0
WAL		1				2		ERT	1	0		ERT	ERT
WAM		R											
WAP		0		1	M	TF	ERT	ERT	0	0		0	0
WAQ				11	3	3		2	10	7	15	8	2
WPT				C	0	KAZ	0	0	U	U	2	U	U
WPP								2			1		
WAN												0	ERT
WGN													
YAF						1							

NEW STATIONS  
 ANA-1  
 KNS-1  
 WBA-0



DECLASSIFIED FOR ACS USE ON  
 20 JUL 88



PERSONAL

FILES

RADIO STATION K-A-Z

[1943-1945]

~~SECRET~~

*Raded*

*64*

24 JANUARY 1945

TO : COLONEL CHAFFEE

FROM : COLONEL WHITNEY

NR 16 24 JANUARY

IT IS DESIRED AS FAR AS FACILITIES WILL PERMIT THAT KAZ  
LEYTE RELAY HERE BY RADIO ALL PHILIPPINE TRAFFIC EXCEPT SERVICE  
MESSAGES PERTAINING TO PURELY TECHNICAL DETAILS.

*Lt M<sup>c</sup> Gormy please  
send all except technical  
and trivial*

TIME TYPED: 241303/Z

TOR : 240945/Z

H.N.

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20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG 75

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Office of the Chief Signal Officer

APO 500,  
31 December 1944.

NOTES AT CONFERENCE IN GENERAL CHAMBERS OFFICE AT 1400/1, 31 DECEMBER 1944

Officers present:

General Chambers  
Colonel Whitney  
Colonel Auchincloss  
Lt. Col. Rawolle (6th Army)  
Major Blanton (6th Army)  
Capt. Ferguson

1. It was understood and agreed that arrangements for the operation of guerilla nets in the forthcoming operation would be as follows:

a. KAZ, Leyte would continue to operate radio facilities on the guerilla nets exactly as at present.

b. In addition, KAZ, Leyte would operate two simplex circuits between KAZ, Leyte and KAZ, M-1.

2. KAZ, M-1 will be established ashore as soon after S-2 as possible.

a. KAZ, M-1 will establish two simplex channels to KAZ, Leyte.

~~b. Monitor two nets on Luzon net operated by 6th Army.~~

c. Be prepared to transmit on any one guerilla circuit.

3. Sixth Army will take over operational control of the guerilla nets in Luzon north of the line: Paluig Point, San Miguel, Santa Rosa, Salawag and Descada Point. Sixth Army area includes all points mentioned.

4. Sixth Army will provide complete teletype circuit between KAZ, M-1 and 6th Army Headquarters in that area. Operation will be as follows:

a. KAZ, Leyte continue to receive intelligence from the guerilla nets and will pass to KAZ, M-1 such intelligence as directed by Philippine Section, G-3, GHQ. This information will be passed over the two simplex channels provided between KAZ, Leyte and KAZ, M-1.

~~SECRET~~

File in

~~SECRET~~

b. Sixth Army will pass to KAZ, M-1 over the teletype circuit provided any intelligence received over the nets which they control. KAZ, M-1 will pass this intelligence to KAZ, Leyte for immediate delivery to G-2, OHQ.

5. One officer from the 978th Signal Service Company will be provided on temporary duty with the 6th Army to assist them in the establishment of their new station.

NOTE:

Paragraph 3., a., (2) (b) Annex 5 (Communications) to Operations Instructions No. 73, dated 12 October 1944, should be amended to read as follows:

"The direction and control of the operation of the Philippine Forces in Luzon in its area of responsibility, as defined by Paragraph 3., a., (6), of this Operations Instructions, as amended."

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20 AUG 75.



~~SECRET~~

Radio

~~SECRET~~

G-3

Chief of Staff  
Thru: Chief Signal Officer

22 December 1944

1. Attention is invited to attached message 301 from ROWE which discloses the inability of the Task Force signal personnel to work into our communication net on MINDORO. Corrective action is being taken.
2. ROWE says that the Task Force operator is "amateurish" - what the latter says about ROWE's operator had possibly best be left out of print. Meanwhile, however, both operators are poles apart and the MINDORO communication system is rendered valueless at the time when it might be of greatest value.
3. This situation demonstrates what is inevitable to happen when army signal personnel go in cold on a guerilla net. It was avoided in LEYTE by the realistic continued use of KANGLEON's net control station with its same operating personnel. This was possible as KANGLEON's net control station was located in the vicinity of our landing and readily available for the purpose. In MINDORO, to the contrary, the landing was effected in the south while the net control station is located in the north. Hence the procedure followed in LEYTE was physically impossible to follow in MINDORO.
4. The LEYTE procedure is even less feasible in LUZON where we have several separate and distinct nets to contend with and all controls dispersed far in the interior.
5. The MINDORO situation should be accepted as a warning demanding immediate corrective planning insofar as LUZON is concerned. It would be a military reverse were we to lose the full advantage of the communication system developed behind the enemy's lines in LUZON. Its loss to us through unrealistic prior planning and dispositions would be indefensible.

S.J.C.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

Handwritten marks: a circled '2' and a circled '3' with a slash through the '2'.

Radio

~~TOP SECRET~~

G-3

Chief of Staff  
Thru: Chief Signal Officer

16 December 1944

1. On D-day for the M-1 operation we will have in the objective area an extensive and well coordinated communications system - - it is hoped one comparable to or better than that the enemy himself has behind his own lines. At least that is the objective.

2. This system has not been developed by experts along the technically refined lines with which Signal Corps personnel are experienced - - rather is it the product of the lay mind intent only upon driving to the sources of intelligence and getting the intelligence out on time to put it to practical use.

3. Experience has shown that successful operation of such a system is dependent upon the control of officers and men thoroughly indoctrinated over a long period of time with unconventional methods, shortcomings, idiosyncrasies and other peculiarities of the men heretofore responsible for the operation of its several segments.

4. Upon D-day for M-1 operation the control of this communications system will become the responsibility of the Army Commander under existing directive. The army however is not set up, by experience, to assume such responsibility and must be reinforced by competent officers and men thoroughly familiar with its operation - - otherwise the labors of many months will fail to provide a useful instrument at the time when it is most needed. Furthermore at the time of the commencement of the operation in reference we will have a number of radio units enroute overland to positions. The tying of these new stations into existing nets is a matter which requires most careful and experienced handling.

5. At that time, with Leyte, Samar, Mindoro and the M-1 objective area having passed to the control of Army Commanders, GHQ control (KAZ and cryptographic section) will be relieved of approximately 75% of the radio traffic with which it has in past been burdened. As a consequence a great number of its personnel heretofore employed in the control of Philippine radio traffic and thoroughly experienced therewith can be released for employment elsewhere.

6. To ensure that the full effectiveness of this communications system is sustained without loss or impairment from D-day forward, it is recommended that:

There be attached to the army upon the initiation of the M-1 operation the following select personnel who have heretofore conducted this operation:

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20 AUG. 75

-1-

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

G-3

Chief of Staff  
Thru: Chief Signal Officer

16 December 1944

OFFICERS:

Charles B. FERGUSON, Capt. S.C.	O-454881
Clinton B. McFARLAND, Lt. S.C.	O-1641561

ENLISTED MEN, CODE SECTION:

S/Sgt Loy W. CARTER	39679011
T/3 Seymour GINSBERG	32648872
Sgt Charles N. BARR	37257753
Pfc George F. RENT	11088398
Pvt Lester D. HAYMORE	39913447
Pvt Donald V. D. HIGGINS	17060313
Pvt Eugene J. HAWRISIO	36692254
Pvt Joseph E. PINO	18147536
Pvt John R. KUPENTZ	33575148
Pvt Gerald SCHMIDT	16157583

RADIO PERSONNEL:

T/4 Numeriano DAVIN	39536974
Sgt Anacleto BIADO	36607611
Sgt Alex A. NAGTALON	37204648
Cpl Roberto A. RANDAL	39129170
T/5 Sergio B. ESTAVILLO	39130647
Pfc Fred MADARIAGA	39459947

The above personnel are believed indispensable to the immediate success of the operation and the projected extension of the system. Their separation from station KAZ and the present cryptographic section would not prejudice the continued operations thereof under the sharply reduced volume of traffic thereafter to be expected.

7. This matter has been informally discussed with the Chief Signal Officer who is generally sympathetic to the proposition. He is reluctant, however, and probably rightfully so from a purely military standpoint, to relieve the Army Commander of any measure of responsibility with which he is normally charged or to have GHQ share such responsibility directly or indirectly.

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~



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20 AUG. 75

~~TOP SECRET~~

G-3

Chief of Staff  
Thru : Chief Signal Officer

16 December 1944

8. This however is a special case, probably without precedent in United States military history. An agency of GHQ has developed the system, operated it throughout and its personnel alone are able to get maximum efficiency from its operation. It would appear therefore that all personnel resources, reasonably available to GHQ, should be thrown in to support the army in the efficient execution of this task.

9. The Chief Signal Officer has pointed out that of the personnel above listed he will require the services of Captain Charles B. FERGUSON (present chief of our control operations) and others for the purpose of operating for the C in C an intercept station for Philippine traffic. The necessity for such interception is not clear nor is it clear how it could function efficiently without the full operating staff now constituting station KAZ and the cryptographic section.

S. J. C.

DECLASSIFIED PER AC'S ETC OF  
20 AUG. 75



~~TOP SECRET~~



KAZ

~~SECRET~~

13 NOVEMBER 1944

TO : P.I. MSG CENTER (ADV. ECH.)  
FROM : LT. MC GIVNEY

NR 1 12 NOVEMBER

LT. COL ERNST TO LT. HALE: ADVISED KAZ HOLLANDIA TO TRANSFER ALL STATIONS NET ONE AND NET TWO TO KAZ AS SOON AS CONTACTED AS PER QQQ NET ONE AND TWO FROM 5TD. ADVISE WHEN PREPARED TO ASSUME NET THREE AND NET FOUR. KAZ HOLLANDIA WILL STAND BY ON ALL NETS UNTIL ALL STATIONS CONTACT KAZ LEYTE.

REQUEST EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO ASSUME COMPLETE OPERATION AT LEYTE OVER AND ABOVE THAT NOW AT LEYTE, ENROUTE BY WATER AND AIR AND REQUESTED BY AIR IN YOUR NR ONE.

LT. HALE FROM LT. MC GIVNEY: EXPECT CHANGE OVER TO TAKE PLACE PROMPTLY BUT ANTICIPATE LATE STRAGGLERS SUCH AS P D Q, J W R, F 2 9. ADVISE M A C A (THRU W Q 1 8) TO GIVE US A BREAK AS WE HAVE SOME HOT TRAFFIC FOR THE RELAY, FOR THE BOYS UP NORTH. WILL ADVISE ETA TRANSMITTER SOONEST.

TOR:121600/Z  
TYPED:130555/Z  
GFB

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20 AUG. 75



KAZ

12 Nov 45.

Dear Colonel Whitney -

Colonel Brown sent these pictures up today - They look pretty good.

The outfit is moving 14 November for Hallandis. Major Claell has been here now for over a week, fixing up the Camp area and is beginning to look very nice.

General Chambers called me over in regard to the memo you sent him - An answer should be your way in a day or two. The matter is receiving careful attention.

My regards to all.

Wentworth



*Radio*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

APO 500 Rear Echelon  
12 November 1944

Dear Colonel Whitney:

Your memorandum to General Chambers is receiving prompt attention and the answer should reach you by 14 November. Since the Generals' memo will cover the points I won't bother to repeat them.

We are experiencing a great deal of difficulty trying to get MACA to pass our traffic North - have dispatched a radio informing Smith that primary duty of MACA is to relay traffic. Difficulty is also being encountered up at KAZ: The new operators know absolutely nothing with the result that few messages are being receipted for. I have taken the matter up with Colonel Fister and he promises immediate action.

So far we have had no word from Volckmann as to whether or not he clearly understands the signals. Navy says they will not clear vessel until we hear from him as they don't want the sub to experience the same thing the last one did. Have sent Volckmann three messages asking him to reply. Fault may lie with MACA not passing traffic. We have been working on this and hope to have MACA on the ball.

Hope that KAZ, Leyte will be operational as rapidly as possible. Looking forward to coming up.

*Lee A. Telesco*

Lee A. TELESKO  
Major, Air Corps

*Fub*  
*cu*



KAZ

7 November 1944

Dear Colonel Whitney:

KAZ and the Signal Message Center are moving to Leyte within the next two or three days. I am inclosing a copy of signal operational instructions which were prepared for the transfer of net control duties from station KAZ, Hollandia to KAZ, Leyte. Chief of Staff is desirous that KAZ become operational just as soon as it possibly can. I am sure that you feel the same way.

I have inclosed all of the messages which have come in today and have made comments on those which required action. Trust that these messages will be received much faster than previous ones.

We are all anxious to be with you and hope to see you within a very short time.

Colonel Brown and Company are due to arrive here in a week. They have a very nice camp site here, secluded from the rest and in one of the nicest places in this area. General Chambers and I looked over the site again today and the General was very pleased with the setup. General Chambers tells me that the 5217 will stage here at Hollandia for the movement to Leyte.

With best regards.

Lee



file  
CW

KAZ

6 November 1944

Dear Colonel Whitney:

KAZ is being immediately moved to the Leyte area along with two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the message center. According to the plan the 126th Radio Intercept (Major Brown) and a crew of twelve men and three officers of the message center will take over until such time that KAZ becomes operational in the Leyte area. Arrangements are now being made to move all personnel and equipment by air. The thing has been worked out very carefully and there will be no lag of time between the changes. The General has seen the plan and the Chief of Staff has approved the move. We will follow after KAZ becomes operational at Leyte.

All is well here. I trust you are receiving the messages. I have been sending up by courier - We include all personal mail which is on hand.

The boys send you their regards.

Lee

File  
CW



~~SECRET~~

Radio

20 JUNE 1944

TO : GHQ SWPA  
FROM : DUTCH SIGNAL OFFICER

NR 118 19 JUNE

F G Q CONTACTED DUTCH SIGNAL OFFICE PASSING THREE MSGS  
AFTER WHICH HE SAID "I WILL BE OFF AIR, WILL QRX YOU AT 1100  
AND 2100/Z. SO IF QTC FOR ME ANS UPNS." THREE MSGS FROM F G Q  
WILL BE PASSED AFTER CONTACT WITH DUTCH OFFICER.

(QRX - "I WILL CALL YOU AT")  
(QTC - "HOW MANY MESSAGES HAVE YOU TO SEND?")

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20 AUG. 75

TIME DECODED 191715/Z



file  
uw

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27 MAY 1944

TO : GHQ SWPA

FROM : LT BAKER

MR 76 26 MAY

SUMMARY FOR TRAFFIC AND CONTACTS WITH M L X (FERTIG):

CONTACTED HIM AT 0600/Z GIVING HIM TESTS ON BOTH ANTENNAS AND VERY GOOD RESULTS, WE USING 12030 KCS FOR BOTH CONTACTS AND HE ON 13800 KCS. NIL TRAFFIC BOTH WAYS. 0030/Z RECEIVED QUEEN NRS 1-5/26 AND 1-10/26 AND 16/26 AND TOLD HIM WE'D SEE HIM LATER. 1400/Z RECEIVED 11-15/26 AND QUEEN NRS 6.7/26

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20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26 MAY 1944

TO : GHQ SWPA

FROM : BAKER

NR : 75 26 MAY

SUMMARY OF TRAFFIC FROM FERTIG

FERTIG

M L X BACK ON REGULAR DAY TIME SCHEDULE  
NOW, WITH 5 READABILITY AT 2400/Z  
PASSING NR 1/25 AND NR 1/25 TO P G  
VIA M L X, AND WILL CALL AGAIN AT  
0600/Z.

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20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

26 MAY 1944

TO : GBQ SWPA  
FROM : BASE SECTION ONE  
14735 25 MAY

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OR  
20 AUG. 75

PRECIS COMMERCIAL SCHEDULE:

PERALTA

MAY 24TH: AT 2200Z CONTACTED M L R  
BUT NIL TRAFFIC. MAY 25TH: AT  
0425Z CONTACTED M L R BUT NIL TRAFFIC.  
AT 1100Z CALLED M L R FOR 25 MINUTES  
BUT UNHEARD HIM.

SMITH

MAY 24TH: AT 2315Z CONTACTED M A C  
BUT NIL TRAFFIC. MAY 25TH: AT 1000Z  
CONTACTED M A C A BUT WITH NIL TRAFFIC.

ABCEDE

MAY 25TH: AT 0800Z CONTACTED W P I  
BUT NIL TRAFFIC. AT 1200Z CONTACTED  
W P I RECEIVING HIS NR 1/25.

NAVY - PERTH

MAY 25TH: AT 0010Z CONTACTED V I X O  
SENDING QUEEN MSG FROM M L X NR 1/25  
AND TRIED TO SEND HIM QUEEN MSGS  
1-8/24 BUT SAID HE ALREADY RECEIVED  
THEM.

SAN FRANCISCO

MAY 25TH: AT 0805Z CONTACTED K F S  
BUT NIL TRAFFIC. AT 1225Z CONTACTED  
K F S BUT NIL TRAFFIC.

INGINIERO

MAY 25TH: AT 0700Z CONTACTED V I M  
WITH NIL TRAFFIC AND SAID TO SEE HIM  
AT 1330Z. AT 1330Z V I M WAS UNHEARD.

FERTIG

MAY 25TH: AT 0900Z W A X CALLED US  
BUT NIL TRAFFIC, AND SAID TO SEE HIM  
AT 2400Z ON 13,800 KCS AND WE TRANSMIT  
TO HIM ON 12,030 KCS.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

MAY 28, 1943

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : W Z E

NR 271 MAY 27

EARNESTLY COMMEND YOUR ATTENTION TO BUILDING OF LARGE NUMBER OF GIANT CARGO AND TRANSPORT SUBMARINES FOR SUPPLY PURPOSES AND INVASION FLEET. IF VERTICAL ENVELOPEMENT WAS POSSIBLE IN CRETE, UNDERSEA ENVELOPEMENT IS POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINES. BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE THESE OF SURPRISE AND AVOIDANCE OF FRONTAL ASSAULT WHERE POSSIBLE. YOU SEEM COMMITTED TO KNOCKING OUT JAP NAVAL AND AIR POWER BEFORE YOU CAN GET THERE. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS IS NOTHING BUT FRONTAL ASSAULT ON STRONGEST ENEMY OBSTACLES WHICH YOUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN BLOODY AND LONG. BELIEVE TACTICAL PRINCIPLES ON USE OF PARACHUTE AND AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE ABOUT SAME AS UNDERSEA TROOPS.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OR  
20 AUG 75

Radio Station list 1  
 Philippines - 2nd Sheet

Smith

- WYZB -
- WAT - At Sindangan 08°20'N 123°00'E
- Z4V - Esperanza <sup>Agusan</sup> 08°40'N 125°38'E.
- { ERT  
 ( XBF - Net Central Station for Western Mindanao  
 & Emergency for WAT. At Bonifacio  
 08°02'N 123°37'E and also  
 using call sign: XBF as tips  
 know where former ERT located  
 Zalocogen, Agusan
- ✓ WAT.
- WAM -
- WAA 07°51'N 123°25'E Pagadian
- WAB 07°51'N 123°00'E Malangas
- WAG 08°15'N 123°43'E Lando
- WAL 07°12'N 122°14'E Zamboanga
- WAN 08°03'N 123°38'E Bonifacio
- WAP 08°23'N 123°55'E Baliuaga
- WAQ with 3BZ Zamboanga 07°04'N  
 122°10'E
- REQ Letak Cotabato 06°51'N - 124°05'E
- ARC Cebuian, Sevan 05°53'N - 125°32'E
- TAB Misamis Oriental 08°33'N - 124°33'E
- TAC Dalakay Bukidnon 08°09'N - 124°42'E
- TAX 08°17'N - 124°56'E
- ✓ TUF Sinayat 10°27'N - 125°38'E
- TUH HT9 in Leyte with TUT under  
 Smith  
 Leyte
- TUK



MBA	ATR4 Bituan, <sup>Agusan,</sup> 08°59'N - 125°36'E
MBC	Balingasag 08°43'N - 124°48'E
MBD	ATR4 Santa Fe, Agusan 08°37'N 125°40'E
MBE	Camiguin 09°14'N - 124°42'E
MBG	Los Arcos, Agusan 08°38'N 126°00'E
MBH	382 Lameya, Surigao 09°17'N 126°08'E
MBI	Los Nieves, Agusan 08°45'N 125°34'E
MBJ	09°34'N 125°44'E Higazint Surigao
MBK	Jago, Surigao 08°52'N - 126°21'E
MBL	
MBM	
MBN	
WPP	ATR4 Nacipit Pior 08°59'N 125°18'E
VIM	Bohol
WPI	7 <sup>th</sup> Mil. District
MAC	Pambujan
MAQ	



MWL ATR4 Moncayo, Davao 07°52 N  
126° 01 E

MBN HT6 Caraga, Davao 07°21 N  
126° 33 E

UAM Batangas - not lead in mouth

UAN 6<sup>th</sup> mil. District

REB Cotabato

TAR 7<sup>th</sup> mil District

REC 06° 01 N - 124° 37 E  
Kiamba, Cotabato

MWA Waloe, Agusan 08° 12 N  
125° 46 E

MWQ Bunawan, Agusan  
08° 10 E 125° 58 E

ISRM Mindoro

W48 Central Agusan  
08° 48 N - 125° 26 E



CH 08° 01 N 123° 50 E

W00 382 Kapalong, Davao 07° 53 N  
125° 41 E

PGA Cebu

RIA 6<sup>th</sup> Mil. Dist

WGN 7<sup>th</sup> Mil

CDE 6<sup>th</sup>

HV5 6<sup>th</sup>

T05 Loreto Agusan 08° 11 N  
125° 48 E





SECRET

DECLASSIFIED PER: 5115 CY 115 05  
20 AUG 75



NET 1


2301/Z - 1300/Z 8309 Kcs  
1301/Z - 2300/Z 5235 Kcs



NET 2


2301/Z - 1300/Z 8020 Kcs  
1301/Z - 2300/Z 6100 Kcs (Emergency)

24 Hour Guard for  
all stations on  
6540, 6900 Kcs



NET 3

2301/Z - 2300/Z - 6765 Kcs (Simplex)




NET 4


2301/Z - 1300/Z 5235 Kcs  
1301/Z - 2300/Z 5235 Kcs (Net 4, 1 combined)



























A  
STORY OF PROGRESS  
BY  
PRS



RADIO STATION

KAZ

WHEN PRS ASSUMED

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

7 FEBRUARY 1944







RADIO STATION

KAZ

WHEN PRS RELINQUISHED

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

5 JUNE 1944



