

PERSONAL FILES

PHILIPPINE REGIONAL
SECTION

RE-ACTIVATION

G-3 SECTION G.H.Q.
ROUTING SLIP



Asst C of S G-3	
Maj Gen Chamberlin	Req & Training
Executive	Col Tench
Col Rehm	Lt Col Boland
Adm Officer	Maj Hawes
Maj Port	Maj Specht
Operations <i>W. L. M. L.</i>	Capt Carrington
Brig Gen Chambers	Historian
Col Wheeler	Col Niederpruem
Capt Phleger	Maj Bail
Col Bowen	Lt Smith
Lt Col Macherey	Drafting
Lt Col Curtis	M/Sgt Hoover
Lt Col Rathbone	Chief Clerk
Maj Loughran	W/O Hallinan
Maj Sherrard	-----
Maj Steele	-----
Maj Anderson	For:
Capt Bowman	Approval
Planning	Comment
Brig White	Concur
Col Peyton	Info
Col Fanning	Nec Action
Capt Johnson	Signature
Capt Tarbuck	Ret Adm
Col Larr	Note Ret
Col Kreuter	Dispatch
Col Whitson	Summary
Col Matthews	Journal
Col Sandberg	Your File
Lt Col Fuller	File Adm
Maj Latoszewski	
Capt Oviatt	

1. See S.G.'s comments.
2. After you have seen G-2, please
discuss with me. W.L.


G-3 SECTION G.H.Q.
ROUTING SLIP

MP

Asst C of S G-3	
Maj Gen S J Chamberlin	Req & Training
Executive	Col C T Tench
Col G A Rehm	Lt Col F H Boland
Adm Officer	Maj E C Hawes
Maj H W Port	Maj R L Specht
Operations	Capt M Carrington
Brig Gen W E Chambers <i>W. E. C.</i>	Lt E M Fitzpatrick
Col H C McLean <i>H. C. M.</i>	Historian
Col H B Wheeler	Col W J Niederpruem
Capt C C Phleger	Maj H V Bail
Col J E Bowen	Lt R R Smith
Lt Col E J Macherey	Drafting
Lt Col K I Curtis	M/Sgt R T Hoover
Lt Col J V Rathbone	Chief Clerk
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Maj D G Sherrard	
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Col W S Matthews	Dispatch
Col J M Sandberg	Summary
Cmdr R W Allen	Journal
Lt Col E H Dunham	Your File
Maj E J Latoszewski	File Adm
Capt K E Oviatt	



Ret G-3
remarks,
discuss with G-2



14

~~SECRET~~
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

Date: 25 May/44

From:

G-2

To:

G-3

(Att: Col. McLean)

1. In connection with the re-allocation of duties formerly charged to PRS, it is important that provision be made to assure the flow of all intelligence information to G-2 and that intelligence direction of personnel in the field be a G-2 responsibility. To this end, the following procedure is recommended.

2. G-2 will be responsible for directives to new parties and intelligence direction of parties and organizations in the field. This will include selection of personnel and dispatch of parties to specific localities. AIB facilities and stores will be used as required.

3. All documents, including mail, received from the Philippines shall be delivered immediately upon arrival to G-2 GHQ for processing as follows:

a. All mail, after any intelligence examination deemed necessary, will be delivered to USAFFE for censorship and dispatch.

b. All documents in the Japanese language will be delivered without delay to ATIS for appropriate action.

c. All other documents will be recorded and necessary intelligence extracted. Documents in which other staff sections have a primary interest will be released to those staff sections with an appropriate record to that effect. The intent of the provision is to maintain a central record and, as far as appropriate, a central custodianship of all documents arrived.

d. The procedure outlined for documents in the preceding paragraphs will, in effect, create a miniature A.G. Record Section for documents within G-2, which can be used as a central reference source for all Philippine information.

4. U.S. Army Signal Corps radio traffic between GHQ and the Philippines is now conducted under provisions of GHQ Staff Memo No. 27 of 5 Sept. '43 as amended 3 Dec. 43. This specifies that copies of all incoming and outgoing messages shall be delivered to G-2. A similar arrangement exists with respect to messages through Naval channels. In order to maintain a central record this practice should be continued, with such copies being distributed to other Staff Sections, as is deemed expedient. The Signal Corps message center should direct the action copy to the appropriate staff section based on somewhat the following classifications:

Intelligence reports and correspondence re intell. activities - G-2
Guerrilla personnel problems - - - - - G-1
Civil administration and currency - - - - - G-1

~~SECRET~~

*Should be administered by
the Sig Corps through AG.*



~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

mm

From:

To:

Date:

Loyalties of individuals or groups - - - - - G-2
Guerrilla organization and operations - - - - - G-3
Submarine Transport Movements - - - - - G-4
Supply - - - - - G-4
Propaganda - - - - - G-1

Messages to the PI will be accepted by the Signal Corps Message Center only when properly authenticated by the Chiefs of the appropriate staff sections.

CAV/nrb

C.A.W.
C.A.W.

Information Copies:
Lt. Col. Mellnik, PI.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

1. On the date of inactivation of the PHILIPPINE REGIONAL SECTION, the staff sections of GHQ will assume responsibilities for activities of that section in accordance with the contents of STAFF Officers' Field Manual 101-5.

2. In order to assure that all functions of the PHILIPPINE REGIONAL SECTION are undertaken by the appropriate staff sections, the following duties are specifically assigned:

G-1:

1. Relations with Commonwealth Government of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
2. Evacuation and care of evacuees from the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
3. Handling of mail.
4. Psychological Warfare
 - a. OWI
 - b. FELO
 - c. Allied Political Warfare Committee
5. Fiscal matters.
6. Current economic trends.
7. Rosters of Americans in Philippines
 - " " Filipinos showing loyalty or disloyalty.



G-2:

1. Intelligence Net in PHILIPPINES.
2. Translation of all captured documents. (ATIS)
3. Prepared weekly summary of PHILIPPINE Intelligence.
4. Reception of all information of intelligence on Jap situation in PHILIPPINES.
5. Distribution of information and intelligence concerning Japs in the PHILIPPINES.

G-2 (Cont'd)

6. Establishment and maintenance of Coast Watcher System in the PHILIPPINES.
7. Development of maps of PHILIPPINES.
8. Policy of map reproduction.
9. Distributing information bulletin to PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

G-3:

1. Maintenance of operations map.
2. Maintenance of G-3 Journal and message file.
3. Maintenance of file of character and capabilities of Guerilla Leaders.
4. Determination of priorities of personnel and supplies to be sent to PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and priorities of Military Districts to receive same.
5. Preparation of operations orders.
6. Study of sabotage capabilities and preparation of plans.
7. Study of combat capabilities and preparation of plans.
8. Study of guerilla airfield capabilities.
9. Maintenance of guerrilla order of battle.
10. Arms and Equipment:
 - a. Maintenance of records showing personnel and equipment sent into PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and due to be sent.



G-3(Cont'd)

- b. Maintenance of recommended list of personal equipment for personnel being sent into PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
11. Training of guerrillas and briefing of personnel being sent into PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
12. Procurement of supplies for guerrillas through G-4
13. Preparation of manual for handling of FILIPINOS.

G-4:

1. Procurement of supplies.
2. Delivery of supplies to PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER:

1. Operational control of message center and station KAZ.
2. Maintenance of communications net with PHILIPPINES.

SURGEON, GHQ:

1. Make recommendations for medical supplies to be sent into PHILIPPINES.
 - a. Per individual.
 - b. Per 100 men.

AG-USAFPE:

1. Maintenance of records of American prisoners in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
2. Maintenance of records of other Americans in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.



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7. Study of combat capabilities and preparation of plans.
8. Study of guerrilla airfield capabilities.
9. Maintenance of guerrilla order of battle.
10. Arms and Equipments
 - a. Maintenance of records showing personnel and equipment sent into PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and due to be sent.



G-3(Cont'd)

- b. Maintenance of recommended list of personal equipment for personnel being sent into PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
- 11. Training of guerrillas and briefing of personnel being sent into PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
- 12. Procurement of supplies for guerrillas through G-4
- 13. Preparation of manual for handling of FILIPINOS.

G-41

- 1. Procurement of supplies.
- 2. Delivery of supplies to PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER:

- 1. Operational control of message center and station KAZ.
- 2. Maintenance of communications net with PHILIPPINES.

SURGEON, GHQ:

- 1. Make recommendations for medical supplies to be sent into PHILIPPINES.
 - a. Per individual.
 - b. Per 100 men.

AG-USAFPS:

- 1. Maintenance of records of American prisoners in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
- 2. Maintenance of records of other Americans in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

3



28 May 1944

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING INTERNAL
PHILIPPINES: BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, PRIOR TO
AND SUBSEQUENT TO D-DAY.

1. On the date of inactivation of the PHILIPPINE REGIONAL SECTION, the staff sections of GHQ will assume responsibilities for activities of that section in accordance with the contents of Staff Officers' Field Manual 101-5.

G-1:

1. Relations with the Commonwealth Government of the PHILIPPINES.
 - a. Plans for its establishment in the immediate wake of the U.S. Forces in the Far East.
 - b. Details of Planning:
 - (1) Judicial
 - (2) Economic
 - (3) Fiscal
 - (4) Agriculture
2. Relief and Rehabilitation for the PHILIPPINES.
 - a. Study of basic food requirements, medicines, vitamins and hospitalization.
 - b. Textile requirements.
 - c. Study of requirement of equipment, Seeds, Fuel, raw materials.
 - d. Consultations with G-4 and Chief Surgeon on above subjects.
3. Fiscal matters.
4. Evacuation and care of evacuees from the Philippines.
5. Handling of mail.
6. Current economic and political trends.
 - a. Preparation of paragraph for G-2 Summary.
7. Camps for Japanese Prisoners after attack on the Philippines.
 - a. Plan for most useful employment of these prisoners.
8. Study Psychological weakness of Japanese for subsequent exploitation. In association with A.T.I.S.



9. Propaganda: Supervise activities of O.W.I. with reference to the Philippines.
 - a. Control broadcasts to the Philippines, so that general policy is complied with.
 - b. Control distribution of pamphlets and other material to the Philippines within prescribed tonnage.
10. Furnish copies of reports on the Philippines to G-2 and G-3, to keep them abreast of situation.

G-2:

1. The Intelligence Net in the Philippines.
 - a. Maintenance.
 - b. Extension of Intelligence Net and selection of Location.
 - c. Selection of personnel in co-operation with G-1.
 - d. Training of personnel, and briefing of Intelligence Personnel before entering Philippines.
 - e. Equipment of Intelligence Parties in conjunction with G-4. AIB stores accessible.
2. Establishment and maintenance of Coast Watcher System in the Philippines. In co-operation with O.N.I.
 - a. Extension.
 - b. Selection and Training of Personnel.
3. Establishment of Weather Observation System in Philippines, in co-operation with the U.S. Navy and the 5th Air Force.
4. All documents in the Japanese language will be returned without delay to ATIS.
5. Reception of all information of intelligence on Jap situation in Philippines.
6. Interpretation and evaluation of messages from Philippines, bearing on Intelligence.
7. Recommend to C/S of action in all Intelligence matter from Philippines.
8. Prepared periodic summary of Philippine Intelligence



9. Distribution of information and intelligence concerning Japs in the Philippines.
10. Maintaining Map showing up to date disposition of Japanese Army in the Philippines.
11. Policy concerning reproduction of Philippine maps.
12. Procurement of maps, from U.S. of maps of the Philippines.
13. Maintenance of files pertaining to Intelligence in the Philippines.
14. Prepare Section on Intelligence for Monthly Report on Philippine situation to the War Department.

G-3:

1. Maintenance of operations map.
2. Maintenance of G-3 Journal and message file.
3. Maintenance of file of character and capabilities of Guerrilla Leaders.
4. Determination of priorities of personnel and supplies to be sent to the Philippines and priorities of Military Districts to receive same.
5. Preparation of operations orders.
6. Study of sabotage capabilities and preparation of plans.
7. Study of combat capabilities.
8. Study of plans for employment of guerrillas prior to and subsequent to D-Day.
9. Study of guerrilla airfield capabilities. (Subsequent to D-Day.)
10. Plan for extension of Airfield facilities in possession of Guerrillas.
11. Maintenance of guerrilla order of battle.
12. Study of and prescribing arms and equipment to be carried by individual Guerrillas.
13. Arms and Equipment:
 - a. Maintenance of records showing personnel and



- equipment sent into the Philippines and due to be sent.
- b. Maintenance of recommended list of personal equipment for personnel being sent into the Philippines.
 - c. Maintenance of charts showing at glance, relation of objective with procurement.
- 14. Training of guerillas and briefing of personnel, other than intelligence, being sent into the Philippines.
 - 15. Procurement of supplies for guerillas through G-4.
 - 16. Preparation of manual for handling Filipinos.
 - 17. Initiation of request for Personnel going to the Philippines.
 - 18. Inspection of Philippine Battalion, with purpose of making best use of its personnel.
 - 19. Planes for introduction and servicing of Artillery Observation Planes for intercommunication of various Guerilla organizations.
 - 20. Interpretation and recommendations of action on all messages and reports from Philippines, that pertain to operations, guerillas and Leaderships.
 - 21. Maintain file of matters pertaining to operations, etc.
 - 22. Preparation of section on Operations for Monthly Report to the War Department.
 - 23. Activation of new Territorial Commands from time to time.

G-4:

- 1. Procurement of supplies.
- 2. Loading of Submarine and aircraft.
- 3. Supervise percentage allotment different class of supplies.
- 4. Maintenance of records showing relationship of pro-



G-4 (Cont'd)

Par. 4 (cont'd)

curement with supply objective.

5. At request of G-3, procure and forward to the Philippines, sabotage materials.

SURGEON, GHQ

1. Make recommendations for medical supplies to be sent into the Philippines.
 - a. Per individual.
 - b. Per 100 men.
2. Study all reports and recommendations emanating from the Philippines, concerning the Medical Situation.
3. Prepare studies illustrated by maps showing areas of prevalence of certain diseases.
4. Recommend the medical equipment to be carried by each individual guerrilla.
5. Recommend expendable medical supplies and non-expendable equipment which should be provided for each unit, i.e. 100 men in service of guerrilla organization.
6. Insure that allotted percentage of tonnage in submarine is fully taken advantage of.
7. Be able to always show at a glance status of procurement with respect to medical objectives.
8. Advise G-1 on Medical Plans for rehabilitation of Civil population after D-Day.

AG-USAFFE:

1. Maintenance of records of American prisoners in the Philippines.
2. Maintenance of records of other Americans in the Philippines.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER:

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2. Maintenance of communications net with Philippines.



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9. Study of guerrilla airfield capabilities. Subsequent to D-Day.
10. Plan for extension of Airfield facilities in possession of Guerrillas.
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G-3 (Cont'd)

- equipment sent into the Philippines and due to be sent.
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PERSONAL FILES

PHILIPPINE

SITUATION,

1942

February 5, 1942

Dear Welden:

A few thoughts apropos our talk yesterday on the Philippine situation.

Legal Authority for U. S. Intervention.

The right of intervention was expressly reserved to the United States by the independence law and subsequently confirmed by the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth.

(a) The constitution formulated and drafted shall * * * contain provisions to the effect that, pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands -

(14) The United States may, by Presidential proclamation, exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and for the maintenance of the Government as provided in the constitution thereof, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty and for the discharge of Government obligations under and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. (48 U.S.C. 1232)

Our history records no parallel to the situation existing in the Philippines, i.e.

(a) Only a relatively small part of the territory may be said to be occupied by the enemy, hence there is no military occupation to the extent that would give it the right under International Law to establish its own military government over the whole,

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20 AUG. 75



(b) The recognized seat of the Commonwealth Government (Manila) is however occupied by the enemy and the Government itself is apparently no longer free to function as such.

(c) The intervention of the United States would be for the sole purpose of providing orderly government over territory and peoples over which it is the sovereign power, rather than over enemy territory, and to strengthen native resistance to the invasion.

As a consequence the intervention of the United States would be, as provided by the above quoted section of the Philippine independence law, "for the preservation of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and for the maintenance of the Government as provided by the constitution thereof, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty and for the discharge of Government obligations under and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution".

It would be designed to preserve and give strength to the normal processes of Government provided by the Philippine constitution—to encourage and so far as is possible protect the Commonwealth officials in the discharge of the functions of Government under the constitution—and at the same time it would provide the leadership, direction and authority necessary to secure the maximum defense effort.

From consideration of precedents involved, the propriety of the establishment of Military Government in the Philippines may be open to question. As a matter of fact, the action of the United States in the circumstances would, strictly speaking, involve neither the establishment of Military Government (which normally presupposes government by a military commander over occupied enemy territory), nor the exercise of martial law (which involves the complete suspension of civil process), but the former would more nearly come within the spirit of the quoted statutory reservation than would the latter. The system of "Military Government" finds little recognition elsewhere in the world and we ourselves define it solely by precedent which has varied with the changing situations under which such form of government has in the past been constituted. The Philippine situation involves a somewhat different set of factors than those which have previously existed but suggests no more efficient process to serve the purposes intended.

I pass these thoughts on in response to the question as to the propriety of the action I have recommended.

Sincerely yours,

01



THE PHILIPPINE SITUATION

Attached Memoranda and Related Papers

- Tab A Proposed Executive Proclamation
and Covering Memo dated 2/7/42
- Tab B Memo in re "Local Filipino Par-
ticipation in War" 1/7/42
- Tab C Memo 1/19/42 "Philippine Situation"
- Tab D Memo General Arnold 1/24/42 with
Reply Colonel Donovan 2/1/42
- Tab E Memo 2/4/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"
- Tab F Memo to Weldon Jones in re U. S.
Legal Position 2/5/42
- Tab G Memo 2/7/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"
- Tab H Memo 2/17/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"
- Tab I Memo 2/19/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"
- Tab J Memo 2/24/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"
- Tab K Memo 2/27/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"
- Tab L Memo 5/7/42 in re "The Philippine
Situation"

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for Dr. Hayden:

DECLASSIFIED PER AS LTR ON
20 AUG 73

Subject: The Philippine Situation.

A

1. Herewith is a draft of a proclamation which I believe substantially covers what the President should sign. While it provides somewhat of a novelty in Government, it is well within the letter and the spirit of the statutory and constitutional provisions for intervention. It sets up flexible machinery for exercise by the President of as much or as little of the function of the Government as may be required by the circumstances existing in each locality. It provides encouragement and leadership to the Filipino masses and properly instructs them in the manner in which official and private citizen alike is expected to respond to the issues of war with which he is unfortunately confronted. It contains no direct threats to those who may be treasonably inclined but from it may be drawn the clear implication of that inevitable day of reckoning for the transgressor which lies ahead. It reaffirms our existing Philippine policy and thus prevents the Japanese or Filipino collaborationists from propagandizing it as a blow to Philippine aspirations for political independence.

2. The proclamation is purposely so drawn that it definitely commits the President to no further action, but affords the basis for any further action which may be called for by the trend of coming events.

AS

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.



Incl.

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Tab A.

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a. Thus organized and directed, the suppression of the Philippine people would require many times the occupying forces now being utilized by Japan, thereby easing the pressure on other vital points in the Far Eastern theater.

b. To illustrate: In the Island of Mindanao the Japanese so far as is known have occupied only the city and Port of Davao. In this area there were twenty thousand odd Japanese "colonists" at the time of occupation, which rendered practically useless defense by our own small defending force. It is probable that, because the population is so largely Japanese, only a relatively small garrison is now maintained to hold the position. On the other hand, there are approximately 600,000 Moros inhabiting Mindanao--some of the bravest fighters in the world, as the members of our own occupying forces of 1899 - 1906 can attest--fighters whose Mohammedan religion sanctifies death in battle. Yet so far as is known, no effort has been made to organize this strong, potential opposition to the Japanese invasion on the Island of Mindanao; no direction, nor leadership has been given to such a population from which could be easily mustered an army of excellent mountain and jungle fighters that could only be subdued by a force many times its size. Not as far as is known has any direct or indirect appeal been made to the religious and temporal leaders of these people to organize such resistance to the invader.

c. By encouragement, direction and organization these people could be of inestimable aid in the development of our ultimate strategy--aid which might take the form of the preparation of jungle landing fields for our later use, sabotage and harassing movements against the enemy, with the ultimate objective of his elimination from the Islands, or the partial, if not complete, neutralization of Davao as an operating base against the Indies.

d. It will be said that we cannot provide modern equipment. This is probably true, though unfortunate, but should not control our decisions. Much can be done with the spirit, properly directed, of men fighting for their home lands--people, who for generations have been compelled to fight against superior weapons, and yet are so unconquerable that to within a few days of the outbreak of the present war they were still opposing the Philippine constabulary with their native weapons

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despite the superior weapons of the Filipinos. I dare to predict that under proper organization and direction, the Moros can, despite the lack of modern equipment, expel the Japanese from Mindanao, or make their stay so expensive as to completely neutralize the effect of their occupation.

g. I have used the Moro and Mindanao only by way of illustration, and yet the plan, if applied to all of the other suggested islands, would be equally workable even if to a somewhat less degree.

g. Furthermore, such action would give much needed stabilization and encouragement to the Filipinos throughout the Archipelago, and should ultimately sharply reduce the pressure on our Army in Luzon and the Indies.

4. The above is a very brief outline of what I have in mind. If sufficient interest in the general proposition can be aroused, the preparation of a detailed study would not be difficult. It should be pointed out and emphasized that the plan, at this stage, involves neither the movement of troops nor supplies, but is designed to insure that we have something to work with when we have the troops and supplies to move. It further would provide the means for a constant harassing movement against the enemy and operate to prevent the Filipinos from succumbing to a policy of cooperation with the Japanese. Success of the plan might strongly advance the chances for success of our basic strategy in the Far Eastern theater--on the other hand its failure would, at worst, mean the expenditure of a few officers.

Courtney Whitney,
Major, Air Corps.



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BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

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WHEREAS certain of the political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, on the Island of Luzon, including the City of Manila, seat of the Commonwealth Government, have been occupied by Japanese military forces; and

WHEREAS such occupation has interfered with and necessarily restricted the normal processes of civil government under the constitution and laws of the Philippine Commonwealth and is endangering through restraint of officials and agencies of government and disruption of communications, the duly constituted government thereof and its subordinate branches in the several Provinces, Municipalities and other political subdivisions; and

WHEREAS in paragraph 14, Section XI, Act of Congress of March 24, 1934 (Public No. 127 - 73rd Congress) and Section 15 of the Ordinance appended to the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, provision was expressly made for intervention by the United States for the preservation of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and for the maintenance of the Government as provided in the constitution thereof, and for the protection of life,

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property and individual liberty and for the discharge of government obligations under and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution; and

WHEREAS the full power of the United States is pledged to the early expulsion of the Japanese invader from the Philippine soil, the redemption of liberties which have been ruthlessly violated, the restoration of that peace, security and happiness with which the peoples of the Philippines have been blessed throughout the past four decades, and the orderly transition into complete political independence projected by law to become effective in the year 1946; and

WHEREAS in the fulfillment of such purposes and for the protection of the government of the Philippine Commonwealth and the preservation of individual liberties including the sacred right to government by constitutional process, I have determined that intervention, within the spirit of the statutory and constitutional provisions referred to, has become mandatory upon the United States:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in the discharge of the sovereign responsibilities of the United States to the peoples of the Philippine Commonwealth and in accordance with the statutory and constitutional provisions aforesaid, with the concurrence



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of the Honorable Manuel Queson, President of the Philippine Commonwealth, do hereby assume the prerogatives of Government over the territory and peoples of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

I direct that pending the expulsion of the Japanese invader from Philippine soil by the armed forces of the United States and of the Philippines, all duly elected, constituted or appointed Public Officials of the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the provincial, municipal and other political subdivisions thereof, continue in the discharge of their several offices until relieved by my order or under constitutional process; and I enjoin upon all such public officials the exercise of the utmost vigilance and painstaking care in the discharge of their responsibilities to the end that the lives, property and individual liberties of the Filipinos and other friendly nationals within their several jurisdictions may be adequately safeguarded, and that all public funds and other property committed to their custody may be accounted for as provided by law; and

I do enjoin upon all citizens of the Philippine Commonwealth, strict obedience to the laws in force and to all lawful orders from duly constituted authority; unswerving loyalty to the common cause in which the peoples of the United States and of the Philippines are joined; a calm but inflexible understanding that the ruthless and



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paramount purpose of the Japanese invader of Philippine soil is the enslavement of the Filipino people, with the consequent suppression of those fundamental liberties for the preservation of which free men are ever willing to fight, including the freedom of religious expression and the sanctity and inviolability of the home, upon both of which rests the strong foundation of Philippine culture; and a fixed determination for unrelenting resistance; and

I announce it as my purpose, pending the time that the President, other officials of the Commonwealth Government, the legislature and the appellate branches of the Judiciary are able to discharge their several governmental functions as provided by law, without restraint, to establish military departments throughout the Philippines which will be announced from time to time by Executive Order clearly delineating the jurisdiction of each such military department and the powers delegated by me to the military commander thereof. Such powers will be sufficiently broad to permit any necessary modification of the laws in force in order that constitutional process, insofar as is possible in the existing circumstances, may be preserved to the people, and individual rights and liberties protected; and

I do call upon all good citizens of the Philippines, as free men, to resolutely assist me in this solemn undertaking and to devote every ounce of strength and, if need be, every drop of blood, to the task before us, to the end

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that they may not only emerge triumphantly through the
grim tests which lie ahead, but that all other peoples
of the world will recognize in their determined and un-
conquerable resistance to aggression an undisputed capacity
for self-government.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this _____ day of _____
in the year of our Lord Nineteen hundred and
forty-two, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
sixty-sixth.



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January 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONAVAN:

Subject: Philippine Situation

Attached hereto is a proposal worked up by one of my officers for guerrilla warfare in the Philippines.

It is forwarded for any use you may be able to make of it.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

4 Incls. Confidential
Memo. Gen. Arnold, 1/22/42
Memo. Col. Dunn, 1/19/42
Let. Col. Whitney, 1/16/42
Memo. C/S, G-3, 1/7/42

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 1, 1942

General H. H. Arnold
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

I have read the proposed plan of
Major Courtney Whitney on Guerilla Warfare
in the Philippines.

I note that the plan is lacking in
detail but I assume that the officer
would consider it operable even though our
forces should be driven out. If Major
Whitney would care to do so, I should like
to have him get in touch with Colonel Solborg
of our office, in order to discuss the proposal.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Donovan

William J. Donovan



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February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Colonel R. A. Dunn:

Subject: The Philippine Situation.

1. Information has just been received of the organization of a new Japanese inspired and controlled Government of the Philippines. The seriousness of this move, in its effect upon American sovereign rights, cannot be over-emphasized and is best reflected from some of the names of those who have thus apparently leaned themselves to collaboration with the Japanese invader. To illustrate:

Jorge Vargas - Formerly Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the cabinets of the Governors-General, and subsequent to the start of the Commonwealth Government, Secretary to President Manuel Quezon and "Minister without Portfolio".

Quintin Paredes - Former Secretary of Justice and long time Speaker of the Philippine Assembly.

Claro Recto - President of the Constitutional Convention, former Justice of the Supreme Court, lawyer, gifted writer, and eloquent speaker.

Jorge Bacobe - Religious leader and longtime Dean of the Law School, and for some years President of the University of the Philippines.

Benigno Aquino - Formerly Secretary of Agriculture.

Antonio De las Alas - Secretary of Finance and later of Agriculture and Commerce.

Jose P. Laurel - Lawyer, former Secretary of Justice and Justice of the Supreme Court, able writer and eloquent speaker. His son is a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy.



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Serafin Marabat - Former Director of the Budget.

Jose Jule - Former Secretary of Justice, Justice of the Supreme Court and Speaker of the Philippine Assembly.

2. The men listed have been carefully selected from various parts of the Philippine Archipelago, have for years been recognized as leaders of the Filipino people, and have as a result strong followings among the Filipino masses. While their loyalty to the United States has, as far as I know, never heretofore been directly questioned, a deep resentment toward Americans has been apparent in some, and loyalty to our cause, in the absence of full confidence in its success, would be a very poor gamble.

3. Whether the agreement to thus collaborate with the Japanese is dictated by fear and prompted by duress, or is a voluntary act of treason, one of course cannot say from the information at hand. It is clear, however, that the new Government is without constitutional or democratic sanction and is in open defiance of the sovereignty of the United States and of the Commonwealth constitution, which each individual mentioned is sworn to recognize, uphold and obey.

4. The danger of this situation lies in the strong influence it may exercise over the masses of Filipino people in the absence of suitable counter-measures by the United States, even if such counter-measures be limited to public repudiation of the authority of the new Government over territory and peoples under our sovereignty.

5. The Filipino people require instruction and leadership and if this be limited to such as they receive from this servant of Japanese creation and domination, it obviously follows that the latter will command a growing Filipino adherence. The situation thus created may readily set the United States back the forty-three years which have elapsed since our occupation of the Philippines, and compel us ultimately to conquer not only the Japanese invader of Philippine soil, but misguided Filipinos themselves at great additional cost in lives and treasure.

6. Furthermore, in the absence of constructive counter-measures by the United States, the appeal of the new Government may well operate to undermine the loyalty of Filipino members of General MacArthur's command on Bataan and in Corregidor, with a consequent weakening of his power of resistance against already difficult odds. Additionally it is but a short step from political collaboration to military collaboration, and while this thought may not be given serious consideration, such stranger things have happened in the course of the present war which we would do well to ponder.



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7. I cannot too strongly urge the necessity for immediate action by the United States to reaffirm and strengthen its sovereignty over the Philippines by the assumption of military control over all of its unoccupied areas through government by federal process under a system of Military Departments. The existing situation requires such a move, as only in that manner may a strong leadership by the United States be exerted to frustrate the efforts of the Japanese or Filipino traitors to dominate the will of the masses, pending the time for our direct military action.

Courtney Whitney,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.



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February 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM for General Arnold:

Subject: The Philippine Situation.



1. Upon receipt of Col. Donovan's letter of February 1st initialed by you, I called at his office yesterday and had a long talk with Dr. Hayden, former Vice-Governor of the Philippine Islands, Col. Donovan's assistant directly charged with the Far Eastern area. From Dr. Hayden I learned that Col. Donovan viewed with favor the general plan suggested by me in my memorandum to Col. Dunn of January 19th, later forwarded to him by you, and had twice communicated with General MacArthur to secure further information bearing upon the subject matter.

2. Dr. Hayden requested me to draft a proclamation for the President giving general effect to the plan of which attached is a copy, together with a copy of my memorandum to Dr. Hayden in transmittal. These documents are self-explanatory and obviate the necessity for burdensome detail in this memorandum.

2 Atts

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

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Tab H

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February 7, 1942

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MEMORANDUM FOR Col. R. A. Dunn:

Subject: The Philippine Situation.

1. Further on the above subject, the War Department confirmation that General Emilio Aguinaldo had succumbed to Japanese pressure and radioed a direct appeal to General MacArthur advising his surrender, is packed with unpleasant significance.

2. I have known Aguinaldo well enough to be sure he would not make such an appeal unless he had considerable support from Philippine political circles, and it is equally obvious that in appealing to General MacArthur he had no idea of influencing the latter's decisions, but did so with the sole aim of undermining the loyalty of the Filipino element of his command, as well as of the masses throughout the Archipelago. It was thus a treasonable stab in the heart of American sovereignty and a political blow at President Quason, at one and the same time, when he reasoned that both the United States and the Commonwealth President were too much otherwise occupied to do anything about it.

3. Whether Aguinaldo was motivated by a conviction that the Japanese cause would prevail and a promise of support of the latter for his lifelong political ambitions, or merely saw the opportunity to even a long score he has had against President Quason, who some years ago caused his pension from the Philippine Government to be stopped in the course of a bitter political feud between the two, is of little consequence. The important and alarming significance to be drawn from this act of treason is that it

(a) lends confirmation to the Japanese claim that other prominent Filipino political leaders had agreed to collaborate in the formation of a new Government, and

(b) indicates the pressure which may be expected to be exerted upon the Filipino masses, looking to full Japanese collaboration--possibly resistance to continued American sovereignty even over areas of the Archipelago, which the enemy has not yet attempted to enter, and

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(c) suggests the possibility that, in the absence of effective counter-measures by the United States, those organizations of the Philippine Army still under arms throughout the Archipelago may be next subjected to strong pressure to strike the American flag and yield the entire territory to the Japanese invader.

4. The gravity of the situation in my opinion cannot be over-emphasized, and America has truly reached the crossroads of its decisions. Down one road lies strength, courage and decision, all adding up to what the orientals term "face", down the other, complacency, indecision and inaction, with a resultant loss of "face", which in the eyes of the oriental may not be regained even by military might.

5. I again urge that, pending the time we can throw our full military power into the breach, the United States may do much to counteract these disturbing influences by exerting to the full limit its moral influence over the Filipino people. This can best be done by assuming the direct governing responsibility in the manner I have heretofore recommended. Only by so doing may we fortify the Filipino spirit against the appeals of false leaders and arouse the masses to a determined effort to repel the invader with a resulting easing of the pressure on General MacArthur's gallant Army now defending the approaches to Manila Bay.

6. As we distributed millions of leaflets over occupied France to arouse the dormant spirit of the French people to renewed resistance, why should we at the same time ignore attempts to seduce our own nationals upon whom we depend to guard the approaches to our back door.

7. Furthermore, our staff now has long been engaged in a ponderous study to determine if, how and when the appeals of thousands of local able-bodied Filipinos to join the colors for service in the liberation of their homeland, may be accommodated. We deliberate long before reaching a decision upon so simple a proposition, and yet what a strong psychological influence would the formation of a division of Filipinos in the United States have upon the masses of their brethren in the Philippines at this time, and what strength such a force would give to the very first Philippine relief expedition we will ultimately dispatch. The Filipinos ponder such indecision and wonder.

8. It is of course elementary that it is of the utmost urgency that we hold as much of the Philippine Territory as possible, pending our ability to go in in force, and especially is that section thereof comprising the Island of Mindanao destined to play a most important



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part in the development of our Far Eastern Strategy, forming as it does the stepping stone to the northern provinces in our hands--the stepping stone to the Indies in the hands of the enemy.

9. Any success we may have in arousing authoritative sources to the dangers of the existing situation and the need for firm and determined action to counter such dangers will be a distinct service to our own Government and to the people of the Philippines as well.

Courtney Whitney,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

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February 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR General Arnold.

Subject: The Philippine Situation.



1. Colonel Donovan advises that the President has indicated his approval of the plan to strengthen the Philippine situation outlined in my memorandum to Colonel Dunn of January 19, 1942. He (Colonel Donovan), General McCoy and Dr. Hayden have all approved the proposed Presidential Proclamation later drafted by me, which is to be placed before the President by Colonel Donovan early this morning.

2. The thought suggests itself that if the President should lay the proposed Proclamation before the Cabinet, it might prove a cause for embarrassment to Secretary Stimson that he had no prior knowledge of the details thereof, despite the informal intervention of the Army Air Forces.

3. The propriety of advising the Secretary of War concerning the matter at this time is therefore suggested and a copy of all pertinent papers is attached for such purpose should you desire to do so.

Courtney Whitney,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

Att.

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Tab I

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Dr. J. R. Hayden:

Subject: The Philippine Situation.

1. Herewith are a few additional personal thoughts of mine in re the above.

2. Apart from considerations of sentiment, no realist will deny the strategical importance to us of the Philippines as an operating base for offensive action in the Far Eastern Theater--an operating base, the availability of which is happily not entirely dependant upon the ultimate success of the heroic struggle being waged by our forces in defense of the approaches to Manila Bay. Thus, if we discount the ability of our forces to indefinitely hold their positions against ever increasing enemy odds, which we must if our plans for fighting this war are to be based upon practical considerations, we still have two distinct advantages in our favor, if we make timely use of them, viz. terrain (the Archipelago being broken up into countless islands, a slow, difficult and costly amphibious invasion only is open to the enemy), and a large predominately loyal native population.

3. Again, if we discount the ability of our forces to indefinitely hold their positions in the existing circumstances, examination of the purposes to be served by their continued resistance is in order. Foremost among such purposes, apart from the general principle of making positions as costly to the enemy as possible, it has been said that theirs has been a "delaying action", through the engagement of large enemy forces, to permit, first, the strengthening of the defenses of Singapore before that stronghold fell to the enemy, thereafter to permit the strengthening of the defenses of Java and India. However, as enemy military operations shift to points increasingly remote from the Philippines the beneficial effect of any such "delaying action" upon our defense of such new points must be regarded of diminishing importance.

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4. In so far as our general position in the Philippine Theater is concerned, there are, however, two distinct purposes served by our continued resistance on Batan, which are given insufficient emphasis, viz. (1) our prestige, particularly in the Philippines, is maintained and (2) we are ourselves afforded time to otherwise strengthen our position in other parts of the Archipelago. As time, however, is rapidly running against us, the situation calls for immediate decisions and decisive action lest, through indecision and delay, advantages are lost to us which might otherwise be preserved and the time provided by the gallant action of our forces on Batan prove futile. Furthermore, as the time thus provided is at heavy cost in lives among the forces doggedly holding our positions on Batan, its full utilization to strengthen our positions elsewhere, with possible easing of enemy pressure on such forces, becomes an obligation upon us which may not be lightly ignored.

5. Discounting further the present possibility of sending to the Philippines ground, sea and air reinforcements, there are readily available to us measures which may be taken to materially strengthen our positions and correspondingly weaken those of the enemy. To such end I feel very strongly that we can and should immediately:

a. assume aggressive political leadership over the Filipino people patterned along the lines we have heretofore discussed at length; and

b. withdraw from Batan a group of general officers with suitable staffs (American and Filipino) for assignment to various strategical island centers to represent the President in so far as is necessary in the administration of civil affairs, organize and direct native resistance, reestablish as far as practicable inter-island communications, develop services of information, and prepare interior and beach facilities for our landing operations; and

c. select and prepare new site for Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East and 16th Naval District, on the Island of Mindanao for the use of the Commanding General and Commander respectively thereof, should transfer of such headquarters and evacuation of such officials and their staffs from Batan Peninsula or Corregidor become advisable; and

d. concentrate on the Island of Mindanao such useful military equipment and stores as may be determined upon and which may be delivered under



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existing conditions) and

g. prepare vigorous military and naval action to supplement the above measures at the earliest opportunity.

6. The propriety for the withdrawal of General MacArthur and other officers from Batnan and the possible eventual transfer of the Headquarters, U.S.A.F.F.E. to Mindanao will only be questioned by those who permit idealism to best sound judgment. This is a war in which victory shall only rest upon practical considerations, and to leave General MacArthur and other able officers and men who might otherwise be withdrawn for utilization in the organization and direction of operations elsewhere, on Batnan or at Corregidor, beyond the time that victory or successful evacuation is reasonably assured, would but play directly into the hands of the enemy, and assuredly will not be seriously considered. The officers and men who have engaged the enemy on Luzon Island are seasoned and well schooled in enemy tactics, and as a consequence, would be of invaluable military aid elsewhere, when their services are no longer necessary to the defense of present positions.

7. Glorious as will the defense of the approaches to Manila Bay be recorded on the pages of American history, it after all represents but one campaign in a series of campaigns of equal or greater importance yet to be fought in a war we have but just begun to fight. I am sure that we may well rely upon the proposition that it will be upon cold realistic fact alone that our military policy in the conduct of the war will be shaped—that upon such a proposition we may rest our case for full and timely utilization of every advantage remaining to us in the Philippine Theater.

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Courtney Whitney,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.



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February 27, 1942

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MEMORANDUM FOR Dr. J. R. Hayden:

Subject: The Philippine Situation.



1. Further in reference to my memorandum to you of February 24th on the above subject, should item a under paragraph 5 be approved, but hesitancy be shown in the approval of the other phases of the suggested program at this time, I suggest the following immediate actions:

a. Select an officer to proceed by long range bomber from Batavia, or some other suitable point on the Island of Java, to the Island of Mindanao.

b. The officer selected to be accompanied by three Filipinos (More, Visayan and Tagalog, if possible) besides the crew, to call upon the leaders of the several provinces and peoples of the Island, deliver the proclamation of the President, letters, etc., make known the President's instructions and generally size up the situation prevailing; after that to

c. Proceed north, stopping at such other major Island centers as possible with a view to accomplishing the same general purposes, thereafter reporting at Corregidor to General MacArthur, giving the latter such information on the area south of Ison as had been obtained, and assisting, in the light of actual conditions found to exist, in working out the details of the projected plan as it may be finally approved by the President.

2. Such a mission with careful planning has more than a reasonable chance for success, and would provide a sound means for initiating immediate action looking toward the strengthening of our general position in the Philippines.

Courtney Whitney,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

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Tab K

PERSONAL FILES


PHOTOGRAPHS

MINDANAO

TENTH MILITARY
DISTRICT

1943

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
COLONEL W. W. FERTIG.



MAJOR LAURETTO
Davao Leader



MAJOR LAURETTO
Davao Leader




AGUSAN RIVER SCENE

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


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Jap fishing boat captured at Leyte. (Jurika)



Jap fishing boat recently captured by Kangleon's men. (Jurika)



Launch & launch at Cabodbaran awaiting sub, with supplies.



Launch & bamboo rafts on Agusan river.

MACARTHUR
ARCHIVES

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




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