

PERSONNEL FILES

INDIVIDUAL

FERTIG, WENDELL W.



DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5

FERTIG, Wendell W., Colonel, O-254976.

Subject: Officer Evaluation Report.

This officer rendered most distinguished service during the war following the surrender of Corregidor when he organized and directed the guerrilla movement on the island of Mindanao. In the course of this work he exhibited great personal courage, marked administrative ability, and outstanding qualities of leadership. He aided immeasurably in developing and sustaining the guerrilla movement and laying the basis for our return to the Philippines. I cannot too highly recommend his selection for commission in the Regular Army.

COURTESY WHITNEY,  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army.



BASIC: Ltr, Hq I Corps to CG, 8th A, file 201.61 - F, subj, "Efficiency Ratings," dtd 22 Apr 45, w/1 Ind.

AG 201-Fertig, Wendell W. 2nd Ind.  
(22 Apr 45)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, A.P.O. 500, 10 May 1945.

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, A.P.O. 501. (Attention: Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, 0398227, United States Army)

Request compliance with paragraph 1b and 2 of basic communication, and reply direct to writer of basic communication, who has been advised of this reference.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

N. R. WALKER,  
Lt Col, A.G.D.,  
Asst Adjutant General.

AG 201-Fertig, Wendell W. 2nd Ind.  
(22 Apr 45)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, AFHQ, 6-3 P.Z. Section, APO 500, 25 June 1945

TO: Headquarters I Corps, APO 910

1. In compliance with basic request efficiency ratings as requested in paragraph 1a and 1b are herewith noted:

1a - No information  
1b - Superior

2. No professional efficiency report was rendered for Colonel Wendell W. Fertig for the current year.

3. It ~~is~~ would be highly desirable to have the I Corps render a special efficiency report on Colonel Fertig.

For Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney:

LEE A. WILSON  
Major, Air Corps  
Executive Officer

C.W.

Chief of Staff

17 June 1945

1. I am informed that Colonel Fertig is about to depart for leave in the United States. I understand that this leave has been approved by General Eichelberger but that Colonel Fertig feels it is not proper for him to come to Manila prior to his departure without specific authority from the C in C.

2. I believe it would be a shame for Colonel Fertig to return to the United States without an opportunity to call upon the C in C and I recommend that he be authorized to visit Manila for that purpose prior to his departure.

C.W.



HEADQUARTERS TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

Office of the Commanding Officer  
APO 159

13 June 1945

Brigadier General Courtney Whitney  
USAFFE, APO 501

Dear Courtney:

Charlie Smith was down over night when he took Sultan sa Raman to Manila. Seems you might be able to find some reason for coming down for a visit. The Lake country is beautiful, altho a little damp just at present. We would be glad to have you spend a few days with us when you can spare the time.

Rosenquist is being sent to Manila to clear some of my G-2 accountability and will probably call on you while he is there. He can tell you the highlights of our problems, we still have them, altho they may not compare in size with yours in Manila, and little has been done to alleviate them. I know the terrific size of the job remaining to be done, but at this time, I think you can sympathize with me. More than three years, of being hunted, little for relaxation; but spurred on with the thought that before too long, I could go home. Then to find that eight months after the landing of American troops in Leyte, the end is still far in the future. We have fought long and hard; recognition, a little newspaper publicity perhaps, but nothing that shows on the record. I do not mean this personally, but the gallant men who helped create the finest guerrilla organization in the islands are still the unsung and undecorated heroes.

Put it down to tiredness, or just general boredom. My promise of 45 days TDY in the States comes just in time. I know that afterward, there is still work to be done; but the tools may be shaped by that time, and the task be easier, the long period of indecision may be past.

As I mentioned, Rosenquist can give the details and general information. Since I doubt that I will see you before I go home, I thought that I would say "hasta la vista", until I return.

Sincerely yours,



*Wendell W. Fertig*  
WENDELL W. FERTIG

TC

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES  
HEADQUARTERS Tenth Military District  
C P Z

1 January 1945

Subject: Mrs Chester Peters - Expatriation

To : O-in-C, 3MFA (Att: 45 of 2, 3-1)

This will introduce Mrs Chester Peters, reported to be the legitimate wife of Chester Peters, American citizen, whose home address is Box 245 Route 1, Bethell Washington, and who was repatriated by submarine from Mindanao on 2 December 1943. Mrs Peters desires to join her husband in the United States and it is believed she has letters to that effect, where through channels in Leyte the necessary verification of this fact may be obtained.

EE

*Arthur W. ...*  
Colonel, AUS,  
Commanding



*Civil Affairs*

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES  
HEADQUARTERS TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT  
C P Z

3 January 1945


Mr Marcelo Belandres,  
Actg Fiscal,  
Province of Davao.

Dear Sir:

It has been reported that there are numerous cases involving civilians in your province, which have not been investigated. Your appropriate action is requested. In addition to the normal function of your office, investigation and development of definite evidence against collaborationists and puppets would be in conformity with the policy enunciated by President Osmeña.

Copy of this letter will be furnished the Civil Affairs Officer, GHQ USAFFE.

Very respectfully,

  
WENDELL A. FERTIG,  
Colonel, AUS  
Commanding.



36

21 December 1944

Dear Wendell:

Herewith is a communication from an Abaca Mission now here from the United States which is self-explanatory. Please investigate the matter presented with the view to giving the information desired as soon as practical. Your action in this regard should however be governed by the military situation and considerations of security.

Was glad to receive Wheeler's excellent report on your communication system and took considerable pride in sending same up through the Chief Signal Officer as an example of "guerilla efficiency". Think it plowed rough shod over U.S. Army standards of related activities.

Your letters by Rosenquist are being given full consideration and have been placed before the General where as far as I am concerned all things meriting his personal attention go and all final action springs.

Tell your Americans to keep their chins up a while longer to be in this thing to the finish. There is not the ghost of a chance that any sent back now would ever return.

Am endeavoring to work out your supply problems but, as you know, they must fit somewhere in the broad over-all picture. Already there have been many ready to crucify me for pushing infinitely more stuff in to you than to anyone else - but there are three men to whom such sniping makes little difference - General MacArthur, General Sutherland and Courtney Whitney. So we will carry on the right course as we see it.

Sincerely,

*CW*

P.S. In re your recommendations for purple heart awards, the General believes that the question of awards should be left until the respective areas come within the perimeter of our operations. This policy is governed largely by considerations affecting the evaluation of such recommendations from all areas. You will of course realize the necessity for the application throughout of a uniform policy in these matters.

AC





~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
ADVANCE ECHELON  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

APO 501  
20 December 1944

FROM : F.E.A. Abaca Mission, Hq, Adv Ech, USAFFE, Civil Affairs  
Section, Telephone No. 338, R. J. Paisley.

TO : Colonel Courtney Whitney.

SUBJECT: Information desired relative to Davao Area effective future  
Manila Fiber (Abaca) procurement.

1. The War Production Board, upon request of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy, have authorized and directed the Foreign Economic Administration (U.S.C.C.) to procure Manila fiber (abaca) for war purposes. The above mentioned Abaca mission, designated by the F.E.A., has been directed to survey the situation in the Philippines, authorized to buy any available fiber on hand, and otherwise carry out the purposes of the W.P.B. directive.
2. Approximately fifty percent (50%) of the total abaca produced in the Philippines came from the Davao, Mindanao area. Of this production, approximately sixty-five (65) percent was produced within twenty (20) miles of Davao City.
3. The abaca fiber produced, in the immediate vicinity of Davao City, was relatively superior, for cordage purposes, to that produced formerly in other areas of the Philippines. Procurement, in these other areas, involves efforts to improve qualities.
4. Therefore, the procurement of abaca in Davao, Mindanao, is of extreme importance.
5. Due to the different methods of stripping the fiber employed in the Davao area and also because of the concentrated production in that area, the problems involved are different from other areas. Considerable machinery, transportation, etc., must be planned in advance. The procurement of some of this material is under way and the balance is being planned. The Army has directed that some of this equipment be on the West Coast of the United States by 1 January 1945 for shipment.
6. It is desirable that as much pertinent information as possible

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Ltr, F.E.A. Abaca Mission, Hq, Adv Ech, USAFFE, Civil Affairs Section,  
Telephone No. 338, Subject: "Information desired relative to Davao Area  
effective future Manila Fiber (Abaca) procurement", dtd 20 Dec 44.

be obtained immediately to plan the equipment, material, etc., required.

7. Therefore, it is requested that as much information as possible be obtained regarding the following and reported to the mission. Confine answers to (1) Davao City area (twenty miles radius) and (2) the Davao Gulf area.

a. Current condition of the abaca fields? Have they been kept clean and in shape for continuous harvest?

b. Have the abaca fields been harvested during the past three years? Volume of production 1942-43-44?

c. Are any carabao available for field work and transportation from fields to stripping centrals or units? This might be measured in number available now, compared to pre-war.

d. Information as to number of Hagotan or Universal stripping machines (one-spindle and two-spindle--be specific) available and condition of same?

e. Information as to number of gasoline engines for operating stripping machines, and condition of same.

f. Information as to the availability and condition of presses (balers)?

g. Information as to electric or other power used to operate presses (balers)?

h. Information as to condition of warehouses?

i. Are there any stocks of (a) baled or (b) loose abaca fiber in the area? Is there any abaca fiber hid out in the hills by natives? If so, how much and condition of same.

j. Information as to the availability and condition of scales (platform or beam steelyards) for weighing the fiber?

k. Is there any saw mill, capable of getting out sawed lumber, available?

l. Information as to the roads in this specific area? If roads are not now passable, how soon after reoccupation will they be? Give complete report as possible, because this will materially affect type of transportation (land or water) for fiber to be provided.

8. In addition to the above, information has been received as to Manila fiber (abaca) now available in North Mindanao. How much is

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Ltr, F.E.A. Abaca Mission, Hq, Adv Ech, USAFFE, Civil Affairs Section,  
Telephone No. 338, Subject: "Information desired relative to Davao Area  
effective future Manila Fiber (Abaca) procurement", dtd 20 Dec 44.

available? In what form—loose, baled, etc.? What are the possibilities  
of arranging shipment to some port of export, prior to reoccupation?

9. Also, are there any P. I. Government Fiber Inspectors located  
in Mindanao? Give by (1) Davao City area, (2) balance Davao, and (3)  
other Provinces. Give number of men, names if possible, so their  
importance and experience can be weighed.

10. Any reports should be made available to the Mission immediately  
and, if the Mission has departed from the Philippines, cable or wireless  
reports should be made through the War Department to the F.E.A.,  
Washington, Attention: "Crowley for Harmel"; and copies should be made  
available to any U.S.C.C. representative remaining in the Philippines.  
This will probably be Mr. Samuel Fraser.

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-3-  
~~SECRET~~

3 December 1944

General Douglas MacArthur  
Commander-in-Chief, SWPA

*To Col. McKinney  
Mack*

Dear General MacArthur:

Your return to Leyte was welcome and yet disappointing, for we had hoped that you would choose Mindanao for the first landing. We hoped, but knew that it would not be, for your policy has been to land where you were not expected. The Jap expected you in Mindanao.

We will continue to fight in the same manner as throughout the past long months, but will place more emphasis on aggressive action within the limit of our capabilities. Adequate supplies will increase those capabilities many times. The use of surface craft should quicken supply service to most areas. Only areas such as Northern Bukidnon, Central Cotabato and that adjacent to the City of Zamboanga will require supplies by air if we are to increase or even maintain our pressure on the enemy.

Very possibly by the time this letter reaches Leyte, you will have moved again in another giant stride that will eventually bring your forces to the Home Islands of Japan. Each advance will leave us further behind. We believe and hope that you will not forget us; and, that when the final scores are in, the Tenth Military District will be given the rewards which it deserves.

In closing, allow an amateur to express his admiration for the brilliant strategy employed in the Pacific Campaign. The results accomplished with the forces available for your use have made military history.

Sincerely yours,



*Handwritten signature*  
WENDELL W. BENTLEY  
(Colonel, CE)

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Omit      20/7/44

30 July, 1944      Gal  
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Dear Courtney:-

Your letter of 12 May just arrived and I will answer at once. It is my hope that we may have a mail contact in the near future.

There is no lack of appreciation of the General's personal interest in this area. The mills of the Gods grind slow; and we become impatient. Unfortunately, we cannot see into the reasons why things are delayed. We lose sight of the size of the enterprise, while becoming absorbed in our own small efforts. Assure the General that our efforts are for him personally, as well as the debt we owe our own country.

A In answering Chick's long letter, I detailed some of our problems. The most serious has been communications. The service at KAZ has been terrible for weeks. I don't know what happened, but the change occurred all at once. I am afraid that I have alienated the entire Signal Corps. To have valuable information wait for two or three days after being encoded was heartbreaking. It did more to drive morale down than anything that could have happened. The use of disinterested operating personnel; and also poorly trained, appeared to be responsible for the difficulty. Just as we were finally ready to blow up completely, the station attitude changed on the 29th. New operators, good service, constant guarding of emergency frequencies has given us hope the last two days.

During all this time, we have handled many flashes with the Navy. A short call brought an answer, and the shipping flashes were expedited without trouble. Yet, we could not handle a smaller volume of traffic with our own army net. I do hope the improvement is permanent.

With this mail, I am including two more parts of my manuscript. After some consideration, I believe that the title; "Guerrillero" is better than Tulisaffe. Among many of the people "Tulisaffe" were the "bad" Usaffe. Any suggestions that you might offer will be welcomed.

It is my desire to send the portions South as soon as completed. We live a very precarious life here, and might lose everything at one time. Re-writing could be undertaken later.

The quality of paper used in typing is poor, but the best available. Our shipment in March





Col Courtney Whitney.

*omit*  
was badly soaked with printer's ink. Typewriters are in bad shape. The new ones, which were sent last time, are all in Western Mindanao. We shall struggle along with what we have for the present.

Sam Wilson left for the Western Mindanao and has completed half the journey. Due to intensive sea patrols, and occupation of much of the sea coast, we are forced to travel overland. The rainy season is in full swing in Bukidnon, which makes travel difficult.

Captain Rosenquist arrived with some late news from the South. We were pleased to learn that things are progressing according to schedule.

The strain is beginning to tell, but I will be all right for a few months more. I believe it is the constant strain of awaiting the enemy's next effort, and knowing that we do not have the resources to beat him, if he really desires to run us out of a particular area. Fortunately to date, the Jap has never placed us sufficiently high on his priority list to continue his efforts over a long period of time.

The people are much interested in the Rehabilitation Committee, but are skeptical for they do not desire their immediate Independence. They feel that Rehabilitation will be price they will have to accept for their Independence. The feeling that they need a strong protector has grown among the masses. The politicians continue to insist that Independence is the final goal, but even they do not believe the time is right. The faith of the people in the big men of the country has been badly shaken by their collaboration with the enemy. The Puppets are these men whom we thought represented the highest type of Filipino. Their feet were clay with a vengeance. (Note that one sentence is not clear. I intended to say that the people feel that in order to gain full benefit from the plans for rehabilitation, they must agree to accept complete Independence.)

I have no idea of plans for rehabilitation but they will have to include a public works program. That should concentrate on highway building. Given an excellent highway system in Mindanao, this island can add enough ~~water~~ land to make the Islands completely self-supporting in rice and corn. Another thought: We should insist that we will replace destroyed factories, lumber mills and such, rather than pay the owners cash, which can then be taken out of the country. Much money could be spent here, and yet there would be less invested

in industry than before the war. I know of one particular British company that hopes to collect their payments for the destruction of their plant. Instead of rebuilding here in the islands, they will move the entire operation to their concession in Borneo.

The problems involved in banking and finance are unbelievable. I suppose that the work done in Europe will form the basis for action here. The Japs have forced people to pay off their loans to the banks in their worthless paper money. In turn the banks had to accept fiat currency in payment of loans made in good pesos.

Another angle. Certain Filipinos are very willing to loan money to the people in Santa Tomas. Interest is reasonable, but the loans in Jap War Notes are simply shown as Philippine Pesos. Thus they expect to be repaid in real currency, which is now worth eight times the value of the Jap War Notes. For instance, Col Manzano borrowed P2000.00 to carry on some military intelligence work. In the space of a month, the War Notes had depreciated until they were worth only ~~thirty~~ three centavos in real currency.

*and*  
Just sounding off again. I close with the fervent wish that I may see you personally in the not distant future. Should our army bring more pressure to bear on the enemy in Mindanao, I am sure they will lose interest in the Guerrilleros.

Sincerely yours

*Wendell*  
Wendell W Fertig.

To: Colonel Courtney Whitney  
AIB APO 500



ES

11 May 1944

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO :** Colonel Wendell W. Fertig  
**FROM :** Colonel Courtney Whitney

1. Attached is a WANT LIST of items which are needed to complete our files of publications from the Philippines. It is requested that as many as possible of these publications be collected for transmission to this Headquarters as they are secured.

2. In addition to the publications noted in the WANT LIST, any of the documents of the Philippine Executive Commission, the Republic of the Philippines and new or additional publications appearing in Manila or elsewhere are desired. For instance, an intercepted Japanese broadcast recently noted the monthly publication in Manila of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, a file of which would be of value here.

3. As publications are received from the Philippines revised copies of the WANT LIST will be furnished you.

COURTNEY WHITNEY  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Philippine Regional Section



ES



TO PERS  
18 May

~~SECRET~~

A.P.O. 500.  
6 May 1944.

AS 062.9 (6 May 44)B

SUBJECT: Gridded Photographs.

TO : Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, Philippine Islands.

1. The inclosed gridded photographs confine themselves mainly to airfields on Mindanao, with occasional photos of cities, towns, etc., which may contain enemy installations and targets susceptible to bombing. These photographs are the best now available. As more photographs become available, and if the present ones prove their worth, they will be gridded and dispatched to the 10th Military District Headquarters.

2. The photographic grid is purely arbitrary and has no relation to any existing map. The "X" axis is lettered with 10 subdivisions between letters and the "Y" grid is numbered, with 10 subdivisions between numbers.

3. Each gridded photograph referring to Mindanao will be numbered consecutively as M1, M2, M3, etc. "M" refers to Mindanao.

4. The gridded photos will be used to report intelligence data by radio and where necessary by annotating the photos and sending them to SUPA.

5. When reporting by radio an installation appearing in the area covered by the photo, cite the photo number first, such as M3. Assume the installation is a gun which is at the intersection of grid B and grid 8. This would be reported as gun (giving description of gun) at M3 8080. Always add the zero if the point falls on a main coordinate. If the gun is 4/10's of the way between grid B and C and 7/10's of the way between grids 8 and 9, it would be radiated as follows: Gun (giving description) at M3 8487. Always give photo number first. Do not break down distances to more than tenths between grids.

6. As these photos are pre-war, the enemy may have changed directions of runways, made extensions, built new structures, etc. All this should be reported, either by radio or by mail.

7. Radio advice as to the opinion of your Headquarters on the efficiency of this system of collecting intelligence is requested.

By command of General BHOARFNER

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30 AUG 83

SS



B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, A. G. S.,  
Adjutant General.

File  
CW

1 Encl:  
46 gridded photos (9 copy ea).

~~SECRET~~

2 copies  
March 31, 1944  
File  
cu

Dear Courtney:-

As I don't know what reception my off the record letters received, I shall confine this outbreak to comments on the present use of propaganda as put out by KGEI.

Cis Manzano, Lt COL., PS. arrived just recently from Manila. The views set forth here, altho my own, are confirmed by his observations plus those of Don Jesus Cuenco, whose report has already been forwarded.

The Filipino have lost all interest in Independence, with Jap or American brand. They are interested solely in the return of the Americans as rapidly as possible. The distress in which they are now living has given them pause to remember the pleasant times during American occupation. To look into the future without the safeguard of that continued benevolent policy is to feel that they have lost the war. The Filipino is an easy-going people but the war years have crystalized their beliefs. When the common tao speaks of Occidental Misamis USA, you begin to get the picture.

Originally I thought this feeling was local, and confined to the 10th MD. Mindanao is entirely different than Luzon and has always been treated and governed as a conquered province. But now I find that Manzano is even more forceful in his beliefs than I am.

One thing that has fostered this belief is the failure of the Quezon party to foster resistance against the enemy. Take a list of the Nationalista party and note that every big name thereon is an active collaborator with the enemy or is supporting them in some manner. I do not expect that they should support us at the risk of their necks, when the sacrifice would do no good, but to find them actively encouraging the pacification campaign, is to believe that they are neither loyal nor true Filipinos. The infection of Jap undercover domination of Philippine business had spread far. The infection is showing in the people who now cooperate most actively. Our vice President has had two sons killed by guerillas for their active aid to the enemy and the remaining two sons, Nick and Sergio Jr., are prescribed for their intense and active cooperation with the enemy in providing war materials for export.

When an administration spokesman declares that the President will grant immediate independence to the islands, the people, rich or poor, immediately believe that the Americans have decided it is not worth while to come back. They feel then that they might as well cooperate with the Jap now as to be forced to at a later date, if America is not going to remain in the Orient to protect the Philippines.



It is a broad problem, and if our country feels that we should leave the Orient, I can do nothing but agree. However, I know that such broadcasts hurt the morale of these people and consequently do absolutely no good. If by keeping silent on the issue we can accomplish our purpose, why wastevaluable time. KGEI has a wide coverage thruout the islands, but more and more we turn to the Australian and BBC to get news and straight information. The dialect programs are largely a waste of time. Most who have a radio understands and ~~is~~ proud to speak English.

A few nights ago, a new personality blossomed on the airways. Ray Cronin, former AP man in Manila, came out with a long statment that the common people in the Philippines desired independence. May I ask how a man who has been interneed under Japanese regulations for twenty one months can truly say that he has been able to sound the feelings of the common people. No, my opinion is that he is making the statment that will gain him the greatest favors with the OWI. It is time that the OWI learns that the Nazi technique of lies has failed. Then why imitate a failure?

Lastly, we should stress the fact that the Filipinos love and admire the Americans after forty years of domination. Can any other country in the world make that statment? Then why hid it? The handful of Americans who walk these islands today are the living proff of that love. A love which is sufficent to withstand temptation in the form of lifelong financial independence. Remember that every American, dead or alive, is worth ten thousand pesos. That amount is paid by the Japanese Military Administration. Yet there have been almost no betrayal by the Filipinos. By God, I am proud of our record in the Philippines.

Sincerely yours

*Wendell W. Fertig*  
Wendell W Fertig



Philippine Regional Section

7 March 1944

Memorandum for Colonel Fertig

Prior to his departure for the United States Mr. Peters discussed with me the matter of his wife whom he had left in the Philippines. I told him that if he addressed a letter on the subject to you I would forward it with a request for consideration.

I understand the full details of the matter from Chick Parsons and only bespeak your thoughtful attention to any action Peters may have requested of you in the accompanying letter.

C.J.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
 Mil. Int. Section, Gen. Staff

*2nd May 1944*

TO: <i>P. R. S.</i>	FOR:
Commander-in-Chief _____	Approval _____
Chief of Staff _____	Concurrence _____
Dep. Chief of Staff _____	Information <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
G-1 _____	Initials _____
G-2 _____	Issue Orders _____
G-3 _____	Nec action _____
G-4 _____	Signature _____
Adjutant General _____	Ret to G-2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
C/Engr Officer _____	File <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
C/Sig. Officer _____	Comment _____
Public relations _____	Circulate _____
Aides de camp _____	_____ <i>B</i>
Geog. Section _____	_____
Translator Sec. _____	_____
A.I.B. _____	_____
C.O.I.C. _____	_____
U.S.A.F.F.E. _____	_____



*file  
 CW*

**UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES**  
TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

IN THE FIELD  
24 February, 1944

SUBJECT: Printing paper - Emergency Currency.

TO : C-in-C, SWPA

Both Lt. Comdr Wilson and I have lodged protests about the quality of paper sent with the last shipment for printing emergency currency. Enclosed herewith are two specimen five-peso bills printed on the paper in question. These bills have never been circulated, and you will note that they are simply disintegrating. It is almost useless to print money on this type of paper, as it is destroyed within the first few days of circulation. The enemy has recently issued a very handsome and durable currency, and that is what we have to compete with. I feel sure that with our resources in Australia a more suitable type of paper can be provided than that upon which this money is printed.

*Wendell H. Fertig*  
WENDELL H. FERTIG  
Colonel, AUS  
Commanding

Encls.: As stated above.



12 February 1944  
GHQ, APO 900

**SUBJECT: Allotment**

**TO : Colonel Wendell W. Fertig,  
Commanding Officer, 10th M.D.**

1. The following advice has been received for you from Col. R.S. CHENEY, War Bond Officer, USAFPC:

"A Class 'S' allotment form for yourself is being processed with a beginning date as requested, September, 1943. The allotment for Robert V. Hall was sent through without any commencement date. Rather than return this allotment and thus delay the Bond Purchasing Program for Pvt. Hall, we have made December, 1943, as the commencement month in his case. If this is incorrect and an earlier date is desired have him complete another 29-6 and forward it to us and we will see that the proper change is made in Chicago.

The cash order forms, received on 26 December, 1943, are being held temporarily in APO 900 until determination of a proper currency exchange routine. You will no doubt be advised directly by them. As soon as the forms with a check to cover are received by this office they will be forwarded by air mail to Washington."

2. The difficulty in respect to the cash purchase of bonds by you and your personnel is that regulations of the Treasury Department require that cash be deposited with the Department against the issuance of corresponding bonds. This difficulty does not, however, exist in connection with the class 'S' allotment referred to above, where the machinery is set up to process such transactions.

COURTESY WHITNEY,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Philippine Regional Section



WENDELL W. FERTIG, APO. 500.

FROM: W.B.O.  
HQ. USAFFE, APO. 501.

TO: Allied Intelligence Bureau,  
A.P.O. 500.

28 December, 1943.

1. Request that the following information be transmitted to Colonel W.W. Fertig:

A Class "B" Allotment form for yourself is being processed with a beginning date as requested, September, 1943. The Allotment for Robert V. Ball was sent through without any commencement date. Rather than return this Allotment and thus delay the Bond Purchasing Program for Pvt. Ball, we have made December, 1943 as the commencement month in his case. If this is incorrect and an earlier date is desired have him complete another 29-6 and forward it to us and we will see that the proper change is made in Chicago.

The cash order forms received on 26 December, 1943 are being held temporarily in APO 500 until determination of a proper currency exchange routine. You will no doubt be advised directly by them. As soon as the forms with a check to cover are received by this office they will be forwarded by air mail to Washington.

2. Request that a copy of your communication to Colonel Fertig covering this matter be returned to us for filing to complete our records.

R.S. CRESNEY,  
Colonel, Infantry,  
War Bond Officer.

From: FBS

To: W.B.O., USAFFE, APO 501

12 Feb 44

Complied with.

1 Incl:  
Ltr to Col. FERTIG



G. W.

A



From: D C/S

Thru: AG, GHQ  
To: Col. Whitney, AIB

9 Dec 43

1. Award of the D.S.C. to Colonel Fertig was announced in G.O. #47, c.s. this headquarters. It is understood unofficially that copies of the order have reached Colonel Fertig.

2. The records of this headquarters do not reveal that the D.S.C., which is available, was forwarded to the officer.

3. It is believed that delivery of the medal would have constructive effect on morale in the 10th M.D., and subject to availability of facilities for making delivery, this headquarters is able to furnish the D.S.C. for transmittal to Colonel Fertig.

From: PRS

To: D C/S, USAFFE  
Thru: AG, GHQ

19 Dec 43

1. The foregoing suggestion is a thoughtful one. However, inquiry discloses that Col. FERTIG has not announced the award of his decoration even to his close staff and prefers not to do so. He would, however, like to have the cross handed to his wife if this could be arranged through the War Department.

2. Her name and address is:

MRS. WENDELL W. FERTIG,  
GOLDEN, (1102 Cheyenne St.)  
COLORADO, U.S.A.

C. W.



**LEGIONAIRES  
In the Field  
PHILIPPINES**

November 11, 1943

**TO: Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, AUS  
CO, 10<sup>th</sup> MD, In the Field**

The Philippine Dept, American Legions, at a meeting held on Armistice Day, 11 November 43, Comrade Charles W. Hedges and Comrade Sam J. Wilson, past Dept Comdr, being the only available Legion Member, passed and unanimously approved the following resolutions:

"Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that the Philippine Dept, American Legions, extends to Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, AUS, CO, 10<sup>th</sup> MD, greetings and pledges 100% cooperation and support;

"Be it hereby further resolved that in appreciation of the extraordinary efforts of Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, AUS, in successfully organizing and commanding the 10<sup>th</sup> MD, Mindanao-Sulu Force, showing unusual ability and leadership, his records be made known to the National Dept of the American Legions and the Philippine Dept, American Legion."

  
SAM J. WILSON, PFC  
American Legion

COPY FURNISHED:  
American Legion, USA  
Colonel Courtney Whitney  
File



*20 files*

81

C O P Y

(CONFIDENTIAL)

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES  
HEADQUARTERS TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT  
IN THE FIELD

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75

1 July 1943

Gen. Hugh J. Casey  
APO 500, San Francisco



Dear Pat:

This letter, of very uncertain length, is distinctly personal in tone. It is being written hurriedly, and undoubtedly in fragments, but it is hoped that you will be able to obtain some information herefrom that will enable you to evaluate the situation in the island as it actually is.

Historically - I suppose Smith gave you an outline of the manner in which the present movement started. In order to orient the present conditions, I will repeat.

As you know, I left Corregidor by a PBV bomber on the night of April 29, and arrived at Lanao on the 30th. Fortunately, I met General Sharp in Dansalan, and went direct to Delmonte with him.

Engineering work had been very much neglected, as there were no engineer officers available, and no American civilian engineer had been hired or commissioned. I met Captain Sly who had been in charge of the Malabang airfield. It was decided that he should proceed down the Sayre Highway to place demolition charges to protect our troops who had retreated from Davao. I returned to Dansalan to complete the demolition of the Maria Cristina and Abaga roads at the rear of General Fort's position (these roads lead from Iligan to Dansalan).

Upon my arrival at Dansalan at 7 p.m. May 1st, utter confusion reigned. I utilized the services of Smith who had just arrived two days before, and Fr. Cervini, and American parish priest of Iligan, and my chauffeur in blocking the Maria Cristina road. Continuing on May 2, all bridges assigned to us were destroyed, but we could not destroy the piers at Iligan, nor the Abaga road, as a good portion of the dynamite failed to detonate. Our total supply of demolition materials consisted of 40 electric blasting caps and a dozen sticks of dynamite. All charges have been emplaced for 90 days.

At 10 p.m. on the night of May 2, I was ordered back to Delmonte by General Sharp, leaving Smith to carry out the demolition of the Iligan piers. When I arrived at the cadre near Cagayan, the bridges were in flames, and the Japanese were shelling the area, although they have not effected a landing in the immediate vicinity. At the bridge, I was overtaken by the Motor Transport Company of the 81st Division which had been ordered to Malaybalay. With two trucks of this unit which had not deserted, we attempted to return to Iligan, but found the bridges burned behind us. We therefore returned to Onal, using the road leading to the chromite mines where all our automotive equipment was dispersed in the trees. We obtained pack carabacs and started for Malaybalay overland.

On May 10 we were in Alanib where we received the first news of the surrender of General Sharp in the morning of May 10. Since the surrender had been effected and General Fort was still resisting, we turned back to retrace our steps



to rejoin General Fort. We arrived at Dikilaan, 12 kilometers from Illigan, on June 1, where we were informed that General Fort had surrendered on 27 May. Twenty days have been required to travel 240 kilometers, because we could not obtain cargadors, as the people have evacuated. Food was also a problem for the same reason. We had completely skirted the Moro country due to reported hostility of the Moros who were killing retreating soldiers to obtain their arms.

For several reasons, Captain Hedges, a former civilian engineer who had been commissioned by General Fort and placed in command of the Motor Transport Company of the 81st Division, and I decided not to surrender. I felt that General Wainwright, and in turn, General Sharp, were not competent to order my surrender, since I was still functioning as your Assistant.

From the 1st of June until 20th August, Hedges and I remained in the vicinity of Abaga and Mowangan, Lanao. Having lived this length of time within 10 kilometers of the Japanese outposts we had lost our fear and respect for them. On August 20, we moved to Kolambagan, but a pit patrol of Japanese arrived two days later, so we moved south along the coast of Panguil Bay.

While in Lanao I had discussed the possibility of guerrilla activity with Captain William Tate (title assumed at that time), an American Negro-mestizo. Feeling the movement was premature, I advised him to contact Captain Morgan of Kolambagan who still had his Philippine Constabulary company intact.

My treatment in the hands of Filipino civilians had convinced me that aside from a percentage of traitors found in many parts, they were definitely pro-American, and expected our help.

On September 10, we heard that the Japanese garrison in Misamis have ordered the collection of all rifles, pistols and shotguns. Tate came down with a small group of men to obtain these arms before the Japanese could take them from the area. Morgan followed two days later. They met almost no resistance from the Japanese, and they were greeted as conquering heroes by the inhabitants.

On October 1st, Morgan and Tate returned to Lanao, at which time Morgan asked that I take command of the movement. In that 15 days period, he had found that he could not control the ambition of the various sector and area commanders. Any officer who had 12 rifles immediately appointed himself Major or Colonel. I realized that should this condition continue, intestine strife will result and the entire uprising result in a reign of terror for which the USAFFE would bear the stigma. It was decided that, in order to control these elements, I should assume the title of Brigadier General: this was done.

By the 1st of January, 1943, the provinces of Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga have been cleared, mestizo steps have been made in the organization of Lanao. The organization of Misamis Oriental was progressing, but hampered by the ambition of a recalcitrant PC officer. The unification of Bukidnon was held up for many months by the activity of a Cotabato Moro, Lt. Salipada Pendatun, whom I believe to have been greatly influenced by Major Edwin D. Andrews of the Philippine Army Air Corps. Andrews is an American mestizo, and an American citizen, but for the past 4 months, to my personal knowledge, he has been preaching the most rampant anti-Americanism.

It became evident that the Philippine Constabulary system of sectors,



subsectors and districts, which was at first attempted, could not be used, as every subsector commander immediately assumed dictatorial powers. This whole set up was abolished and the organization was directed along the lines of the Philippine Army Reserve Division. The provinces of Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga were named the 105th Division, and functioned under my direct control until March 1st. All of Lanao was designated as the 108th Division with Hedges in command.

The Moros would not function under any Filipino officer and the placing of an American commander in that area was absolutely imperative. The wisdom of that choice was shown by the fact that banditry and killings have been practically eliminated in Lanao during the first few months this year. This in spite of the fact that the Japanese were deliberately agitating the Moros to kill all concerned. In fact both Hedges and I have a price of \$20,000 and 15 rifles on our heads.

Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon were designated as the 109th Division. This to be commanded by Major Robert V. Bowler, brother of Colonel Bowler who was executive officer of the harbor defense in Corregidor. The province of Agusan and the province of Surigao were placed in the 110th Division to be commanded by Major E.E. McClish.

By the 1st of May, we had approximately 5,000 rifles under the command of various units, and civil government functioning in practically all areas not occupied by the Japanese, and had protected the civilians from looting and banditry. In addition to this, we had carried out ~~active~~ offensive action against the enemy, and had attacked Japanese patrols that go out of their fortified positions in sea coast towns. As the organization grew, it began to attract too much attention, and it was only a matter of time until we became large enough for the Japanese to come in force. It happened on the 26th June. Misamis was invaded by the Japanese using 3 transports, 3 launches, 1 destroyer and 5 planes. One transport, 2 large launches and 3 airplanes were used to attack Tukuran, Zamboanga. The invasion was made simultaneously at the two places.

I can state to date that the few remaining troops with us are far superior to the USAFFE. We have met and held the enemy at the beach when armed only with rifles and very limited ammunition. The landing force was equal in number to that which landed at Malabang and drove the 81st Division to the hills.

Our Big Difficulty is Lack: Officers, supplies, and most anything you can name. We are particularly short of ranking officers who have had any command experience.

I believe that I am the ranking American officer unsundered in the Philippines. I will admit that I am a good construction and mining ~~engineer~~ engineer but I make no claim to being a competent officer. There are too many holes in my education. But it is necessary to proceed as though I were the fountain of wisdom and knew all the answers.

There are two American brevet Majors and possibly ten other American commissioned officers. The same statements hold true for Philippine Army officers. The best disciplined in both categories surrendered as ordered. This left the Philippine Constabulary officers, of whom the kindest thing that can be said is that they were merely policeman. A large number of these officers are available either because they ran before the surrender or because they were on remote stations and had ample time to prepare an evacuation place prior to the surrender. Don't feel that my criticism of these P.C. Officers is based upon their activities prior to the surrender, but it is based eight months of guerrilla activity. They are self-seeking and unpatriotic and



unworthy of their rank, several being Majors due to the political mass promotion of PC officers.

The need for supplies is tremendous, and we have received a total of 8 tons. We can actually use that much quinine or atabrine, since malaria is rampant, and believe that civilian deaths will average 100 daily from that alone in the Tenth Military District.

Instructions were to undertake no offensive action against the enemy. This has been followed, but the enemy did not receive the same orders. Consequently, should we meet their offensive patrol with a passive withdrawal, control of the entire island would pass peacefully into the hands of the Japanese. Even limited skirmishes require the expenditure of a small amount of ammunition.

Clothing is non-existent, and the name of guerrilla fits well the ragged boys that are battling the Japanese. Among the rank and file of the soldiers, I must admit that patriotism exists. There is absolutely no other reason for their continued resistance to the enemy. It is the enemy whose policy has become one of appeasement toward the Filipinos.

The uprising in the Philippines took place simultaneously throughout the islands. It is the spontaneous eruption of resentment of the entire people, and not of a few mal-contented. This resulted in the definite cooperation between the civilians and the troops. However, it has been a serious problem to prevent the military from encroaching upon the rights of the civilians, since every soldier thinks that the property of any civilian is his for the taking. The same civilians have withstood this attitude without flinching, and have continued to support our troops which could not have existed without their support. They did this realizing that they will be subject to retaliation by the enemy at some future date. If one in the Philippines deserve a monument, it is these same civilians.

Both Parsons and Smith mentioned the fact that it was felt that I was attempting to grab the control of all units in the archipelago. This was not the case. Lt. Col. Peralta wrote me under date of 27 November, 1942, placing his entire organization under my command. This offer was accepted, but during the interval between the dispatch of his message and the arrival of my answer, approximately two months, he had established firm contact with SWP, and decided to remain independent. As previously stated my whole interest in the matter has been to attempt to coordinate our efforts and to preserve the good name of the USAFFE. The last has been most difficult, and I will give you the following as an example of what I mean.

Upon our arrival in Jimenez in October, I approached a Chinaman who had evacuated a considerable quantity of gasoline. In reply to my request that he surrender those to the Army, he remarked the Japanese had already "Usaffed" it, meaning that it had been taken without payment. Likewise, the common Visayan name given us by the Japanese is "Tulisaffe", or USAFFE thieves.

Our tactics are largely the outgrowth of experience. The Filipino soldiers will not face a frontal attack, particularly when supported by air. Therefore, our only method of meeting the enemy is by ambush. Judging by the result of the Spanish-American War, these same tactics almost whipped the United States Army of that date.



During the early days of the fighting, our troops did more running than damage. Gradually conditions changed, until every little skirmish takes a toll in Japanese killed. Gradually we eliminate the cowards, and build up a small group of seasoned guerilla fighters. It must be borne in mind that these men are guerrillas, and will not face a serious attack. They will resist, then run to a definite assembly point, reorganize and ambush again. I am giving this information in order for you to utilize it in any plans that may be forthcoming for the use of Filipino troops in combat against the Japanese. They are damned fine guerrilla fighters, but they never will be first class combat troops, as we do not have officers to lead them, and have absolutely no way of giving them the sound training necessary to make combat troops. I have much admiration for them, but I do not want that admiration to betray us with the same mistakes made during the few days in which we resisted, prior to the surrender.

Unless the enemy would bring a much stronger force against us than they have at the present time, I believe resistance can be maintained in any porportion of this island. However, the recent blow at Misamis Occidental has caused the evaucation of the mint, and we cannot possibly fight without money.

In general personalities have not been as serious as anticipated. However, the escape of ten prisoners from Davao has complicated the situation somewhat, since the escape was led by Lieut. Comdr Melvyn H. McCoy, who, to put it as pleasantly as possible, is a bit "stir-crazy." He must be watched upon his arrival in Australia, because he may do some very injudicious talking, and I am positive that he is no friend of mine. He refused to offer his services to this headquarters, and consequently has been ignored as much as possible. Major Steve Mellnik of your USAFFE staff is with him, but it is felt that he did not suffer as much from confinement. Capt Dyess, Commanding Officer of the 21st Pursuit Squadron in Bataan, shows little effects from his long confinement in the prison camps, and is full of pep and desire to get to Australia in order to bring back supplies to Mindanao by air.

It is extremely disappointing to be told that the delivery of supplies by air is impossible. Granted it is difficult, but I do not believe there are technical difficulties which could not be overcome if the desire were there.

More than 100 Americans are in Mindanao, and at least 90 of them are enlisted men who were abandoned by the Navy and Air Corps when the officers left. These boys have attempted to fit in and help as much as possible. But many could not be utilized due to lack of combat training and command experience. I had felt no qualms in recommending that none of these Americans be repatriated. Three have become serious psychopathic cases, of whom one committed suicide, one deliberately exposed himself to a strafing plane in an attempt to get hit, and the third has become hypocritical and demanding in the hysterical fashion. When it is considered that all of us here have lived for 18 months under very adverse conditions, more of these mental failures may be expected. In my own case, I have lived the entire time never more than 35 miles from the nearest Japanese outpost. This induces nervous tension undoubtedly become cumulative in its effects.

In any plans for the future reinforcement of this island, it must be remembered that action must be taken before too many months, or the civilians will succumb to the cumulative effects of Japanese propaganda, as they have done in Luzon. The will to resist will be undermined unless there is definite and concrete evidence that America is still in the war. This evidence can consist of a few bombs, or enough supplies to indicate definite intention to return.



A study of the map of the East Asia and adjacent islands impresses me with the fact that, should the Japanese fortify Mindanao, our progress to the north would be impeded for many months. If, on the other hand, a small holding force can be furnished here and supplied, they would be able to hold an advance base. I cannot enter into a tactical discussion concerning this problem, because it would be based upon suppositions, and not facts. It is realized that such a holding force might be sacrificed should the enemy decide to throw an overwhelming number of troops against such force. However, this is war and certain chances will have to be taken if we ever expect to win. We cannot expect the Japanese to continue holding these islands with the extremely meager garrison now here.

Referring to the supply situation, both quantity and regularity of delivery must be increased and maintained. Continued Japanese raiding parties have reduced the quantity of supplies available in this island. The Japanese have not brought a single item with them, but have insisted that their troops live off the country, while every bit of material that can be exported are sent to Japan. Therefore, as time elapses more and more supplies will be required to maintain the same level of meager existence. Medicine is of paramount importance, particularly quinine or atabrine. It is noted that quinine is exceedingly scarce, according to the magazines, but is believed that most types of malaria prevalent in the Philippines can be successfully treated with atabrine.

In spite of enemy action, work is continuing on two airfields which are still in our hands. These, in addition to the Bukidnon fields south of Malaybalay which we still control. Major Bowler has gone down into the area, and will be able to submit a factual report on conditions there, as we have radio set operating near Valencia. Comdr. Parsons made a personal inspection trip into that area, and can report on conditions of the fields.

Your personal letter is much appreciated. I took the liberty of giving your address to my wife in the hopes that she will be able to reach me more quickly that way than any other. Many thanks for your kind regards.

With best wishes for our mutual success,

Sincerely,  
(Sgd) Wendell  
W. W. FERTIG.  
Lieut. Col. (CE) Inf., AUS  
(Commanding)

As of this morning, the Japs have come up from the south and we may have to drop back toward the mountains in the center of the area.

We need help, visible help in sufficient quantities to do us some good. I realize the difficulties facing you mine still appear paramount to me.

Kircher and Lothrop are still on the Rock running utilities for the Japs. Bill Gay was in Catenatiran. No news of Manzano at a.l. Some of the commissioned civilians died at O'Donnell; Barney Clark, George Miller, Major Bruns, and some others.

Parsons and Smith will give you the complete story but do credit them with honest intentions. I don't believe they will exaggerate merely to impress. Unfortunately many of my reports etc were out off up North and are not available to go out.



January 11, 1943

SUBJECT: "Brigadier General" Fertig

TO : G-2

1. There is no doubt in my mind that the "Brigadier General" W.W. FERTIG referred to in recent communication ex WTY is really Lieut. Col. WENDELL W. FERTIG, (D-254796), Engr-Res.
2. Lt. Colonel FERTIG was an engineer officer on Bataan and was sent to Mindanao in April, 1942 to relieve Major Harold Eads, attached to General Sharp's command by permission of General H. H. George for airdrome construction. Major Eads subsequently came to Australia and Lieut. Colonel FERTIG took over in Mindanao. He is well known to General Casey.

ALLISON W. IHD, Major  
Deputy Controller,  
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG. 75



HW

\* - \*

ALBUM  
of  
SNAPSHOTS

TAKEN IN MINDANAO -- 1943


TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

\* - \*

Col. W. W. Fertig, Commanding




RG-16  
Whitney  
Box 11



**Conservation Resources**

**alpha cellulose / neutral pH / non-buffered / lignin free / sulfur free**



POST CARD  
CARTE POSTALE


K

L to R LCDR Samuel Wilson  
Maj Clyde Childress  
Col Fertig  
Lt Cdr Parsons  
May 1943

3



RG 16 Box 11 A-G  
Fertig





Colonel W. W. Fertig, C.O. 10th Military District



Col. Fertig, wearing ceremonial gift hat from Marine.

*withdrawn for display  
JH Oct 30, 1981*

Lt. Comdr. Samuel Wilson, Major Clyde Childress,  
Col. Fertig, Lt. Comdr. Parsons. May 1943.







110th Division Raiders under Capt. Wm. Nortz and 3 American Officers.




Guerilla Nurse. Aquino, N.C.



Typical Guerilla Nurse. Aquino, N.C.



CPI (Force HQ in the Field) Lanao




Adjutant General's Office (Lanao)



Mess Sergeant, with food "on foot".



Expert Auto. Rifleman, Lt. Crisanto Salvacion ---  
He, with Sgt. Jinea, has killed 11 Japs in combat.




Mess call at Advance Hq. (Note coconut shells used as seats).  
Necessity has brought out resourcefulness of the people.



Capt. Ricardo and Lt. Vicente Neri with new guns ---  
Typical Guerilla Officers.



Lt. Crisanto Salvacion & Sgt Jinea -- Guerilla experts, riflemen and masters at ambush. They have 11 enemy killings to their credit. (September 1943)




Launch Mora (Nita Maru) captured from Japs at Butuan, Misamis. Departing on trip to Samar and Leyte (C. Parsons) from Jimenez, Misamis.




Moro guerilla soldiers -- Lanao.



Delivery of Pres. Quezon's message at Dipolog.




Reading message of President Quezon at Dahinub.



Typical evacuation place outside of towns after Jap invasion.


Date \_\_\_\_\_

Subject \_\_\_\_\_





Typical evacuation residence in mountains for use  
by towns invaded by Japs.



Col. Mortera, C.O. 105th Division. Occ. Misamis  
Mountains behind Oroqueita.



Lt. Col. Mortera with Major Hanoy from Cebu. They  
are local guerilla leaders.



Lts. Estillore and Neri with an unexploded shell recovered in Floridel.



Staff Officers at FWD. C.P. of 105th Division.



Near C.P. Staff Officers and men. 105th Division.






First target practice with new weapons. 12 Sept 1945.



Guerilla Company "C" Dipolog. Famous for action against  
any. Typical guerilla soldiers -- barefooted, generally  
headed, two men per rifle, lacking in ammo. and personal effects.



Judge Sanguin's party for Col. Mortera. Such parties  
not uncommon in the mountain hide-outs of the civil populace.



Moro soldiers from Bubong, Lanao. (Note arms) with Lt. Col. Hedges  
4 June 1943.

Typical Moro leaders and Staff -- better equipped and clothed than  
usual Filipino Guerilla.



People of Sindangan celebrating fall of Salamaue.  
Note high Morale indicated in faces of people. These  
people were recently forced to evacuate from Sandangan  
to the mountains by enemy action, and are not worried.