

PERSONNEL FILES

INDIVIDUAL

WORCESTER, F. W.

February 20th, 1944

FROM : Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, USNR
TO : *Chief Phil. Regional Section, AIRB*
~~The Adjutant General, GHQ, CWP~~
SUBJECT : Delay in Reporting to GHQ

1. Lt. Col. Abcede of Negros instructed me to report to you immediately after my arrival in Australia.
2. I am now confined in U. S. Navy Mobile Hospital No. 9 and present indications are that I shall not be released for a period of three weeks or more.
3. Report on the 7th Military District is attached, hereto, for your information.
4. I shall report to you in person as soon as it is possible for me to do so.

F. L. Worcester
Lt. Comdr. USNR



In the Field
Free Negros
Jan. 10th, 1944

REPORT ON 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT
Early Guerilla Activities in Negros



From the time of the surrender of our forces in Negros up to the end of July 1942 the general situation was ~~not only~~ ^{and very} confused but was dangerous in that some of the disbanded soldiers joined forces with the lawless element of the civilian population in a campaign of looting and extortion, in the course of which quite a number of people were killed. This resulted in the formation of certain small groups which were in the first instance primarily concerned with the protection of their own areas from further depredations, and the idea of using these troops in guerilla operations against the Japanese followed in the natural course of events.

In Negros Oriental there were four independent groups of this nature which were led by Lt. B. Viloría who had come up from Mindanao, Ridad and Jornales who were Silliman students, and a Sgt. David Cirilio of The Philippine Constabulary. The advantages of getting these people together being obvious, Mr. Roy Bell of the Silliman Institute, on July 31st, called Lt. Viloría to the camp which he had established at Malabo, and plans with this end in view were discussed. It was felt that if the new organization was to prosper, the services of a senior officer would be required, and word was subsequently sent to Lt. Col. Ausejo. He came to Malabo on October 14th, agreed to take over, and the formal organization of guerilla forces in Negros Oriental began at that time.

In northern Negros Capt. Mata, who had not surrendered, began at an early date to gather the men of the batallion which he had commanded, and in Negros Occidental Capt. Abcede was doing exactly the same thing with the members of his own batallion.

As a general rule command of the early guerilla organizations was determined not on the basis of rank, but by a combination of the two factors of personal leadership and the number of rifles which any given individual could round up.

On both points Capt. Abcede was out in front in Negros. He soon had, between five and six hundred rifles under his command; he first engaged the Japanese at Buenavista on August 3rd, 1942; and his active operations against the enemy have continued up to the present time. Capt. Mata ran him a close second, while Lt. Col. Ausejo's organization was handicapped by lack of arms and never compared in strength with the other two.

Command of 7th Military District: The expanding guerilla ^{organizations} ~~units~~ of Lt. Col. Peralta and Col. Fertig met in Negros and Peralta emerged with Abcede and Mata as a part of his 4th Philippine Corps, while Fertig absorbed Ausejo's organization. Each one wanted the whole of the island of Negros or failing that, to have his man designated as commanding officer of the 7th District. This situation was met by giving temporary command to Maj. Villamore; presumably he supported Abcede as his successor; ^{and} in July 1943 Abcede was made acting District Commander; ~~and he has now been confirmed as District Commander.~~

Present Military Organization in Negros. The former dividing line which followed provincial boundaries has been abandoned, and the three original organizations have been combined to form the 72nd Division, which is composed of the 74th Inf. Reg in the north, the 76th in central Negros and the 75th in the south. The Division Commander is Lt. Col. Mata and regimental commanders are Majors Baclagon, Bornales and Dominado. The former two are P. M. A. graduates.

D. H. Q. Staff. Lt. Col. Abcede has as members of his staff Maj. B. N. Vilorio who is serving as Adjutant General and G-1; Maj. R. R. Reyes, G-2; Lt. Col. P. A. Ausejo, G-3; Maj. B. Hollero, G-4; and Capt L. Masias, Judge Advocate.

No Chief of Staff or Executive officer has as yet been designated.

I have met all of the above officers with the exception of Maj. Reyes, and am ~~most~~ favorably impressed with them.

It is evident that Abcede has surrounded himself with the ablest officers whom he could find. Also he consults with them and is not afraid to delegate authority to them, ~~The~~ result being that he has a staff which functions normally, and he has found no necessity to try to build up a one man show.

Division Inspector. An inspector is kept in the field, and staff officers are likewise required to make periodic inspection trips.

Strength. The authorized strength of the 7th District is 1,000 officers and 12,000 men. Actual strength as of Nov. 30th 1943 was 786 officers and 8,082 men.

As contrasted with the one division in Negros having 8,868 officers and men, an approximately equal number of men in Mindanao emerged as four divisions after organization had been completed.

Armament. The armament of the 72nd Division consists of something over 1,400 rifles and two machine guns.





Military Policies. Abcede does not labor under the delusion which is somewhat too common among Filipino officers and is reflected in the saying, "Just give us the arms and WE will drive the Japs out." He is well aware of the limitations of his own organization and says, perfectly clearly, that the Japanese can do anything they want in Negros if they decide to bring sufficient force to bear to carry out their plans.

The mistake made in Panay, Cebu and Mindanao in the matter of attacking strong enemy positions ~~has~~ not been committed in Negros.

In general the policy is one of seeking the proper balance between a sufficient amount of action to keep up the morale of officers, men and loyal civilians - and over - aggressiveness which might force the enemy to strong retaliatory measures.

Offensive action is confined to sniping, ambushing and sabotage, while in defense the policy is one of resistance, dispersal if necessary, and quick re-assembly.

In the latter connection Abcede, who is not without a sense of humor says, "This is a hit and run war. The Japs hit and we run." He can afford this little joke since his own bravery is beyond question, and since the record shows that the hit and run game has been much more expensive for the enemy than for his own forces.

Measures Taken To Protect Present Organization. 1) Dispersal of DHQ Offices; District Headquarters is back in the mountains at a distance from the coast which it requires a fast courier six hours to cover. No civilians may enter this area, and the number of officers who may do so is strictly limited. Station WBA is near headquarters. This location has been used since November, and a move to ~~an~~ entirely different district will probably be made in the near future.

The G-1 and G-3 CP's are beyond the end of the provincial road in southwestern Negros. The G-4 office is four hours further up the coast, while the G-2 section is in an entirely different area. In each instance there is a completely prepared reserve location back in the mountains to which an immediate move will be made in the event of an attack.

2. Warning Service, has received the attention which it merits under the conditions at present prevailing in Negros, and the speed and efficiency with which it ordinarily operates has been demonstrated to me on several occasions.

3. Secrecy Discipline. With the no pro-Jap element in certain areas running as high as 70%, and with an estimated 40% of the total population of Negros under enemy control to a greater or lesser degree, the situation with reference to enemy



agents is really bad and presents a serious problem. The BC's who are being brought into the province in increasing numbers furnish a further complicating factor, and the necessity for using large numbers of civilians at harvest time makes the entry of enemy agents an easy matter.

Under these circumstances special measures for the security of information have been called for, and they have been carried to a point where place names have been changed and practically all officers travel under aliases.

Col. Abcede is well aware of the fact that one of the defects of his own people is a tendency to talk too much and, while the greatest emphasis has been placed on secrecy discipline, he is not yet satisfied with the results achieved.

4. Food Reserves. Actually the greater part of the organization in the 7th District is maintaining itself in the mountains or at inland points where only limited amounts of food are produced, and the only portion of the coast really remaining under the control of our forces is that in southwestern Negros. The food problem therefore presented itself at an early stage of the game, and it has been one difficult of solution particularly since normal imports of grain from Mindanao have been cut off.

Abcede's goal has been a ~~six~~ ^{month}'s reserve for his entire force.

When the Japanese occupied Tolong in the early part of December just prior to the beginning of the rice harvest in that area, that appeared to be a very serious matter. Fortunately they left after a few days and some 3,000 civilians were at once put into the fields. Though the enemy has frightened them off twice by having ships come in as though preparing for a landing, the harvest will soon be completed, and this will place the goal within sight.

The transportation alone of a sufficient amount of ~~grain~~ ^{policy} to feed 8,000 men for six months (say 50,000 cavanos) is no small problem and if that is solved and the grain is safely stored, a job of the utmost importance will have been completed.

In the measures taken to protect his central organization, in the matter of building up a large food reserve, and in the disposition of his forces, Abcede's policies have been dictated by sound common sense and he has placed himself in a strong position.

In recent months enemy garrisons strength in Negros has averaged around 3,000 men, and the fact that this figure has on two occasions been increased to 5,000 or more has not disturbed Abcede or caused him serious inconvenience. A materially



larger force will be required and a well planned and costly ~~campaign~~ ^{mountain} campaign will be necessary before any serious damage is done to his organization.

Development of Intelligence Service. Much emphasis has been placed on this point in the 7th District and there are at the present time 22 officers and 272 enlisted men on duty in the district intelligence organization.

Agents have been placed in all important enemy occupied areas and towns.

Watcher stations have been set up at ^{Hinobanan, Silay} Llinoboan, Lilas and Cadiz, and a crew is now putting in a new station at Sojoton Pt.

Close and friendly cooperation with the AIB has at all times been maintained.

G-2 periodic Reports, which are comprehensive and well prepared, give some indication of the results achieved.

Counter-espionage activities seem neither very strong nor effective, and the weakness arises from the fact that the District has progressed perhaps a trifle too far from early guerilla measures, and has been leaning over backwards in the matter of the treatment accorded to suspects. In view of the very large number of enemy agents who are paid all the way from P1 per day for ignorant "peones" up to a reported P50 to P100 daily for top operatives, the penalty for being caught, which at present consists in a tour in an internment camp followed by a trial in which there is a good chance for acquittal, does not seem to be a sufficient deterrent.

Radio Communications. My understanding is that no radio equipment for the 7th District has been sent from Australia. If that is correct the communication system which has been worked out is creditable.

The first set in Negros which succeeded in contacting The United States was damaged at the time Headquarters at Malab^a was burned. It was moved to the Zamboanguita area but has not as yet been put back into commission.

Subsequently the A.I.B. turned over to Abcede one of its sets which is now at station WBA, and furnishes the only equipment with ^{which} Abcede can reach Australia directly.

Locally made sets have been placed in operation close to three of the watcher stations.

For internal communications locally built sets are at Division HQ which also serves the 74th Regt.; at the Regimental HQ of the 75th and 76th; and there is also one station in the East Negros ^{sector} ~~section~~. The District Commander is therefore in constant touch with his division and regimental commanders, and he also makes contact twice daily with the A.I.B. station EDA.



The defects of the present communications set-up are:

1. If station WBA is knocked out the only means of communicating with KAZ would be through EDA.
2. There is a shortage of batteries and two of the locally built sets will ~~soon~~ be off the air.
3. No alcohol is being manufactured from Tuba and there will be an acute fuel shortage unless this situation is corrected.
4. Abcede is unwilling simply to remain at his headquarters and does a lot of moving around, the result being that he is sometimes out of radio contact for days at a time. He should have a really good portable set to carry along with him on his inspection trips.
5. There is no watcher station at the southern end of Negros. Also unless Col. Fertig put in a station without my knowledge, there is none across the way in Mindanao, and this means that the Strait between the two, which is quite an important waterway, is not kept under proper observation.

A map of Negros showing present and proposed radio stations is enclosed. Memorandum covering radio equipment and supplies, representing the maximum for which the 7th District hopes, is likewise enclosed.

Pay Scale and Allowances

④ Officers: All officers receive exactly the same pay and allowances. Base pay is P75 per month, and there is an allowance of P25 per month for legal wife (if living); P15 for the first child; P10 for the second child; P5 for the third; and P5 for each succeeding child. Actual travelling expense is allowed. The food allowance for both officers and men is .40 per day.

⑤ NCOs and EM. Tabulation of pay and allowances for non-coms and enlisted men follows:

	Monthly Pay	Allowances for wife and children.
Master Sgt.	P40	P15 - 8 - 3 - 2
1st Sgt.	30	12 - 8 - 3 - 2
Corp.	20	8 - 3 - 2 - 1
Pvt 1st Class	17	8 - 3 - 2 - 1
Pvt 2nd Class	15	8 - 3 - 2 - 1

No Expansion of Present Force Contemplated. Abcede is not at the present time planning any increase in the size of his force.

Men contracting malaria are sent to their homes when that is possible, since in the large majority of cases no treatment of any sort can be given, and without treatment they are useless in the field. The training of replacements must therefore continue.



American EM in 7th MD. Seven American enlisted men escaped from the Japanese at Bacolod, and others who drifted in from different islands brought the total number in Negros to eleven. One recent arrival from Panay has not joined up, but the remaining ten are on duty with our forces.

The policy followed with reference to these men has been a sensible one and has worked out satisfactorily. All of them were made sergeants and were first given not desk jobs but duty with Troops. After being kept under observation for a period of four months, four were commissioned and the two most promising of these are now attached to DHQ as liaison officers. The remaining two officers and six sergeants are with combat units in the north.

Lt. Col. Abcede seems well pleased with this group as a whole and says that certain individuals have rendered exceptionally good service.

As for the men, the three whom I have met are most appreciative of the treatment which they have received from senior officers. All three likewise report having had difficulties with individuals among the junior Filipino officers. One would like to get out of this country when it is possible to do so, one is undecided on this point; and one is definite in his statement that he would prefer to remain in Negros and see the show through here. All three have malaria.

General Service School. There is no lack of manpower for replacements in the present guerilla organization, or for expansion if that action is decided upon at some later date, but there is a shortage of properly trained officers.

With a view to improving this condition a general service school providing a six weeks course for twenty officers, twenty applicants for commissions, and twenty enlisted men was placed in operation in April 1943.

While there are several PMA graduates on duty in Negros these men are needed in the field, and Abcede would like very much to have four American officers for instructors in this school.

Rotation of Officers and Men. In recent months practically all of the fighting has been in the north section and, with a view to keeping up the tone of the organization as a whole, the policy of rotating officers and men in combat zones is being followed.

Records. The statement that the records at the 7th District are in general in excellent condition will be borne out by the detailed reports forwarded to GHQ.

It has been necessary in the past to burn some records as on the occasion when the Japanese attacked HQ at Malabo, but none have been compromised.

Records are not allowed to accumulate in the offices where current files only are maintained, but are transferred as promptly as possible to a hidden storehouse where they are placed in bamboo tubes.

A guard detail of one officer and three men is maintained at this building.

Morale. The problem in the 7th District at the present time is not to build up fighting spirit, but to keep ill-advised offensive action in check. The morale of both officers and men is good.

Health Conditions. Malaria is presenting an increasingly serious problem and it is estimated that 40% of the men in the 76th Regiment are now infected. Conditions in the 74th and 75th are less bad, but this is obviously a matter which requires careful attention.

In view of the extent of the malarial districts in the mountains of Negros, effective control measures are out of the question, and there is no present prospect of being able to equip the men with mosquito nets.

At the base hospital at Bunawan experiments are being conducted with dita bark which has now been successfully reduced to pill form, but the most effective dosage for the various different types of malaria has not yet been worked out and treatment with dita extracts which has proved effective in some cases, will doubtless remain on a hit or miss basis.

Abcede side-stepped my inquiry as to what priority he had given to his requests for quinine, and it was only recently that I discovered, to my great surprise, that no medicines have been sent to the 7th District during the six months which have passed since Abcede was designated as acting District Commander.

The incidence of malaria is now so high as to weaken Abcede's forces to a serious extent, and the minimum initial requirements would be for a sufficient amount of quinine (both in pill form and in solution for intravenous injections), atabrine, and salvarsan to treat 2000 cases.

Civil Government. Maj. Villamore and Abcede were responsible for the appointment of Montelibano as governor of Negros. Montelibano was formerly mayor of Bacolod and resigned from that position because of differences of opinion with President Quezon. He is a strong man ~~who in the past has been unwilling to accept dictation from the politicians,~~ and he has a large following.

Because of the difficulties of communication, Negros has been divided into 7 districts, and deputy governors for each district have been appointed by Montelibano.

In all areas under the control of our forces town mayors, consejales and Tenientes de Barrio are discharging their duties in a manner which has been on the





whole satisfactory.

The court of first instance is not functioning, but J. P. courts are in operation.

Relations with Civilians. The necessity of retaining the cooperation of the civilians in "Free Negros" is both understood and fully appreciated, and relations between the army and the civil population are on the whole satisfactory. Governor Montelibano has been particularly helpful in maintaining this relationship.

Morale of Civilians. After the panic which attended the Japanese attack on Misamis Occidental, it came as a surprise to see the people of Zamboauguita moving out in an orderly and almost leisurely fashion where an enemy force was moving towards the town and was burning ^{barracks} ~~barracks~~ only five kilometers away. The answer was that these people all had places to which they could go; they had brought to town with them only the barest necessities which could easily be moved; and they trusted the warning service to get them started in time. While the morale of the people in Free Negros is good, there are special factors which will contribute towards its decline in the months to come.

Aside from the intensive Japanese propoganda campaign and the growing discouragement of the people who have not seen so much as one American ship or plane for a period of twenty months, the Japanese are using in Negros three additional weapons which are not available to them in all parts of the Philippines. They are:

1. Food. The importation of rice and the control of crops in the occupied areas has placed the Japanese in a position where they can offer food to people who are growing increasingly hungry and who are troubled by inflation which in certain areas has carried the price of rice up to P50 to P75 per cavan.
2. Terror. In Panay the Japanese instituted a reign of terror in Guimaras and the southeastern portion of the island in which an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 civilians - men, women and children were killed, and it seems quite possible that a similar policy will be pursued here. The declaration of a "bandit zone" contained a clear statement that the properties of civilians remaining in specified areas would be confiscated, and the people themselves would be simply killed off. In view of what is known already to have happened in Panay this terror propoganda has been quite successful, and will be much more so if it is actually put into effect.



3. Quinine. The Japanese have been quick to realize the value of quinine as a propoganda weapon, and to use it. The results are that civilians who are infected with malaria can take the chance of dying in the mountains, or move into enemy controlled areas where they know they they can get all the quinine they need at minimum prices.

The answer is that taking all things into consideration the civilians in Free Negros are really in a hard position, and it is only reasonable to suppose that so long as the present general situation continues, they will go over to the Japanese side in increasing numbers.

Mountain Campaign. The problem set forth in the preceeding paragraph is one of Abcede's troubles since the loss of civilian support would be fatal, - and strong enemy offensive action may soon be another.

The campaign to clear the guerillas out of the mountains was originally scheduled to begin on Dec. 1st, 1943. Beginning at that time several banios were burned; Zamboanguita, Siaton and Tolong were occupied; and then the Japanese, having met nothing in the way of opposition, withdrew.

Jan. 1st, 1944 was the next date set for the big push, then Jan 10th, and finally Feb. 1st.

It is reported that General Kanoh has arrived from Manila to take charge of the mountain campaign; the occupation of Sipala⁴ and very recently again of Siaton has given greater control of the southwest coast; and plane and patrol activity is⁵ increasing.

If the mountain campaign materializes and is prosecuted vigorously by a strong force the only thing which can save Abcede's organization will be the reserve of food which he has built up, - and that will last for a period not exceeding six months.

Currency. Emergency currency is being issued under the jurisdiction of the Negros Emergency Currency Board of which Montelibano is chairman, and the provincial Treasurer and provincial Auditor are members.

As in Mindanao there is an extreme shortage of bills of small denomination resulting from the fact that there is an insufficient supply of suitable paper, and this is a matter of great inconvenience.

Abcede has no responsibility for currency issued beyond the amount required for his own organization, and it is understood this is at present limited to a maximum of ₱1,000,000 per month.

The Japanese have recently put out bills which for the first time have borne serial numbers, but these bills are freely exchanged for the emergency currency certificates on a basis of $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1.



Capture of Americans. On Nov 24th, the Japanese raided Maj. Bell's camp and while he and the members of his family were so fortunate as to be able to escape, Rev. and Mrs. Alvin Scott and their son Lawrence were captured.

In a second raid on Nov. 27th, Dr. and Mrs. James Chapman, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Glunz, Mrs. Jean Lowry and her young son Billy were taken.

Early reports from intelligence agents in ^{Dumaguete} Tuwagete were to the effect that these people were being held in one of the buildings of the ^S Lilliman Institute, and that they had not been maltreated by the Japanese.

Industrial and Agricultural Exploitation. Prior to the surrender nothing effective seems to have been done by our forces in Negros in the matter of disabling manufacturing plants and destroying stocks which would be useful to the enemy, and the result is that this island has turned out to be of more value to the Japanese than many of the others.

Sugar Centrals. The manufacture of sugar is not possible since there has been no replanting of the cane fields, and the ^h Hacienderos are growing only enough for seed purposes for use at such time as a new start can be made.

There are, however, large stocks of sugar on hand, the greater part of which has fallen into the hands of the Japanese. Figures as to total exports are not available, but it is known that even now 200,000 piculs have been concentrated at Bais alone.

Alcohol is being manufactured from sugar at the Talisay Milling Co., and at the Manapla, Lopez and ^B Bais ^{Centrals}. 500,000 liters are known to have been shipped thus far, and this is only a small part of what can be made before existing stocks of sugar are exhausted.

The cellulose factory in The Tabacelera ^a Control at Bais is likewise in operation.

Mines. The Japanese have had the ^m ~~Mangahese Mine~~ on Siquijor Island in production for some months.
mangahese mine

They have now occupied Sipalay on the southwest coast of Negros and are making an investigation at the ^{San} ~~San~~ Remigio copper mine. This is, however, an undeveloped property and it seems improbable that they will be able to do anything with it.

Sawmills. In Mindanao the writer called the attention of Lt. Col. Humber and of Gen. Fort to the fact that the manager of the Kolombugan Lumber Co. was unwilling to take any action in the matter of ~~the~~ destruction of the mill and stocks of lumber on hand exceeding 10,000,000 b.f., and that no preparations with this end in view had

been made by the army. Gen. Fort issued the necessary instructions to Capt. (later Lt. Col.) Morgan, and at the proper time a thorough job was done.

In Negros no one seems to have been sufficiently interested to have similar preparations made at Fabrica, and the Insular Lumber Co. mill, together with stocks on hand doubtless exceeding those at Kolombugan, fell into the hands of the Japanese undamaged. The building of launches and small boats was at once begun, and the mill was kept in operation up to Sept. 1943 at which time it was sabotaged by company employees.

Cotton. In spite of propoganda, crop loans, and guarantees against loss the cotton production program in Negros has thus far been a failure. This has been due to lack of interest on the part of the ~~hacienderos~~ hacienderos and to elimatic conditions which are somewhat unfavorable. The only planting of any importance has been done at La Carlota.

Copra. is purchased at a price of P7.50 per M kilos for resecada, and is being milled at Cebu.

Rice. The Japanese are buying all the rice which they can get their hands on in areas under their direct control, and this gives them an added hold over the people since they can subsequently withhold rice from those who are not "cooperating" to their satisfaction, or give it out free to those whom they wish to attract.

In Free Negros rice is simply stolen by their foraging patrols when that proves possible, while in intermediate zones our agents openly compete with theirs for the purchase of the disposable surplus.

Food Situation. In order to meet the food requirements of the army, the original plan was that the army would call upon the civil government for the food which it needed, and the government in turn would take the responsibility of obtaining it from the people. Since this arrangement proved cumpersome and unsatisfactory it was discarded, and the army is now going directly to the people for its requirements.

At present the army is taking 30% of the ~~disposable surplus of~~ corn and 50% of rice grown in areas under its control at prices which are fixed by the army but are maintained at reasonable levels. It is specifically provided that a sufficient amount of grain must be left with the producer for seed purposes and to meet the requirements of his own family.

In the past these percentages have sometimes been exceeded; while there has been no well grounded complaint as to prices, payment has been slow; and a sufficient amount of grain has not always been left with the farmer. Special efforts have been



(X) Future Deliveries of Supplies.

The suggestion has been made to Abcede that in radio memoranda returning to the delivery of supplies, contact points be referred to by number rather than by name, and that as a further precaution the days of the month be reversed, the 31st returning to the first day of each month, the 30th to the second day, etc.

Memorandum in this connection is attached as enclosure # 3.

Cops of this memorandum has been furnished to Abcede.

This arrangement is, of course, subject to your approval.





made to correct these mistakes, and the purchase of the rice produced in December and January was well handled. That does not, however, solve the principal problem which arises from the fact that military activities have curtailed production, and the imports which have been necessary even in normal times have been cut off.

The rice paddies in southern Negros are not irrigated and produce only one crop per year. The corn crop due in February will be short because of excessive rainfall, and no more food of any importance can be expected until July.

While no one has starved in Negros as yet, a large percentage of the people are undernourished and famine conditions will prevail in certain areas by May and June.

The efforts of the civil government and of the army to get the people to plant camotes, cassava and other root crops have to a large extent failed primarily since this new departure is contrary to "costumbre".

The plain answer is that Negros is not at the present time producing enough food to feed its own people, and unless this situation is corrected the results will be extremely serious.

Insert here paragraph marked "X"
Philippine Army Air Corps Unit (A.I.B.). When Lt. Col. Edwin Andrews heard of my arrival in Negros, he at once issued to me a courteous invitation to pay him a visit at what I understood to be Philippine Army Air Corps H. ^{#3} Q. Lt. Col. Andrews did not, at that time, know that my connection with the 10th District had been terminated, and he was well aware of the fact that my views did not coincide with his on certain phases of the Pindatan matter. The invitation was one which I was pleased to accept, and it was not until after my arrival that I found the P. A. A. designation to be a blind, and that the organization was actually a branch of the A.I.B.

It would have been a matter of great interest to me to check over A.I.B. files but, being without authority to make such an examination, no such proposal was made and it has, in consequence, been necessary for me to form my opinions of A.I.B. operations on the basis of external indications rather than on the much sounder one of actual performance.

The camp serving as the present base of operations is one-half hour's walk from the beach. There is at this camp a small "Dutch" transmitter and receiver which maintains contact with KAZ, WBA, and EDAI. EDA-1

The main station is three hours ~~at~~ further back in the mountains, and a third reserve location has been prepared.



The A.I.B. has a radio station of its own in north Negros, and three sets are in operation on other islands.

I have met the large majority of the twenty-four principal agents, and they constitute the best group of young Filipinos which I have seen since the war began.

In view of the type of men employed, the specialized training which they received under Maj. Villamore, and the scope of their operations, I am quite willing to venture the opinion that this branch of the A.I.B. is the best source of intelligence information which you have in the Philippines today.

Lt. Col. Andrews has cooperated with me in every way possible under existing conditions, and it has been advantageous to me to be able to check with him and with his agents not only specific points but particularly certain generalities (army relations with civilians, with civil government, morale etc.) appearing in this report.

Andrews has asked if I thought him correct in forwarding reports from agents just as they are received, and without comment, and the suggestion has been made to him that he also prepare monthly reports reviewing important developments during the period under review and containing his evaluation of the data submitted by agents.

No copies of radio communications with GHQ are retained except for those containing specific authorization in financial matters.

It would greatly facilitate the work of the A.I.B., and likewise of Abcede's intelligence agents, if the funds ^{required for use in enemy occupied territory} necessary for their operations could be furnished either in Japanese currency or in Philippine bills of large denomination.

Andrews has special qualifications for the position which he now holds in that he is a ^ahandwriting expert, and has had previous training in intelligence work. His opinion of Abcede is very high, and he is cooperating to the fullest possible extent with him.

Independent Units. The only two independent units which have been operating on Negros are those led by a civilian named Margarito Gemillan, known locally as "Puring", and by "Maj. General" Gabriel R. Gador.

"Puring's" unit which is armed with three machine guns, a few automatic weapons, and an estimated 75 rifles has not as yet shown any disposition to join Abcede's forces, and personal grudges have developed between members of this band and our troops in adjoining areas. "Puring" has, up to the present time, been unwilling to



shift his small force to other territory, and the friction which now exists would make its absorption into the 72nd Division difficult. "Puring" is, however, running very short of ammunition and this fact should furnish a satisfactory solution of this problem. If that does not prove to be the case, the difficulty is not in any event of material importance in view of the small size of the force, and "Puring's" inability to expand it. The present policy is to ignore this band, but not to permit interference of any sort from it.

While Lt. Col. Gador's organization has also been a small one, that problem has been much more serious in that it has involved the ranking P.A. officer who has been making any pretext of resistance to the Japanese.

Gador remained in the mountains after the surrender and displayed no interest in early guerilla activities in Negros. In September, however, he began to gather a group of men, and to evolve rather large ideas. Having heard that Lt. Col. Fertig, whom he ranked, had made himself a Brigadier General, he followed the advice of his G-2, Luis Dionaldo, took for himself the rank of Major General and, on January 27th, 1943 issued General Order No. 1 assuming command of all USAFFE forces in the Philippines. At that time he controlled less than thirty rifles.

The forces in Negros Oriental under the command of Lt. Col. Ausejo had, in the meantime, joined Fertig's organization, and friction between Gador's men and Ausejo's soon developed. Lt. Col. Fertig was advised of this situation and Mr. Bell, who was then acting on his director of civil affairs, went to see Gador with the result that he was detained for five days and was publicly ridiculed. At that point the problem in so far as it concerned the 10th District was left to solve itself with the result that it became worse rather than better. Gador increased his following and surrounded himself with a large group of officers many of whom were, in the early stages, convinced of the justice of his claims. Couriers of Ausejo and Abcede were intercepted, officers and men were disarmed, and finally there were armed encounters involving the death of a limited number of men on both sides.

It would, of course, have been an easy matter simply to eliminate Gador at any time, and it is due only to the restraining influence first of Ausejo, later of Villamore, and finally of Abcede that this was not done.

After his appointment as acting district commander, Villamore tried to draw Gador into the organization, and made him his executive officer. Shortly thereafter the Japanese landed at Tolong, which was nearly one hundred kilometers away from the place where DHQ was then located, and Gador promptly took off in the middle of



the night, and returned to his own area. He was relieved of his duties.

Subsequently, abuses of the civilian population in the Tanjay region and the growing realization on the part of Gador's officers that they had perhaps been misled, brought about a decline in his power and popularity. Some officers shifted their allegiance to Abcede, and were, in consequence, threatened with the death penalty for desertion. This did not have the desired effect, and more came over.

With this indication of growing weakness, Abcede began to strengthen his forces in the vicinity of the territory controlled by Gador, and this had the effect which had been hoped for.

On Dec. 7th advice reached DHQ that Gador, accompanied by three officers only, had left Negros by banca enroute to Cebu. There was no armed encounter, and not a shot was fired.

^{many} of Gador's men have now come over, bringing their rifles with them, and his officers ^{are} reporting to DHQ with the hope of being taken into Abcede's organization.

The Gador problem has therefore finally been settled, and the solution seems the best one which could possibly have been found.

Lt. Col. Morgan's Trip to Visayas. In June 1943 Lt. Col. Morgan, who had with him a group of fifty or more armed men, landed on the island of Siquijor. After looking the situation over he issued general orders promoting Maj. Benito Cunanan, the C.O. of the 4th Provisional Battalion, 75th Inf., 7th M. D. to the rank of Lt. Colonel.

Morgan next issued special orders designating Cunanan as Commanding Officer of the 8th Military District.

Both orders were signed "By Command of Brigadier General W. W. Fertig".

With this small matter disposed of, Morgan proceeded to Negros where he announced that he planned to make a tour of the inland to acquaint himself with the local situation with a view to settling command problems in the 7th district. This he was not permitted to do and, prior to his departing for Mindanao, he was required by Villamore to revoke the orders issued to Cunanan.

Internal Difficulties - Contract between 10th and 7th Districts. Since being designated as commanding officer of the 10th District, Col. Fertig has had trouble of a rather serious nature with Lt. Col. McLish, a division commander, who has maintained a large degree of independence which has brought about confusion on numerous occasions; with Maj. Pindatun who requested that his regiment be released

and permitted to operate independently; and with Maj. (now Lt. Col.) Andrews who requested transfer to Negros. Maj. Limena, a regimental commander, led a mutiny lasting over four months. Maj. Jaldon, a regimental commander, made a truce with the Japanese without authorization from headquarters. Maj. Cabili, the former assemblyman for Lanao, has become very antagonistic, and his assistance in Lanao hence cannot be counted upon. Col. Fertig's Adjutant General has been placed on inactive duty; his Deputy Chief of Staff requested release from his duties, which request was granted; and his Chief of Staff, over whom no real control of any sort had ever been maintained, finally attempted a palace revolution.



While the 7th District is much smaller than the 10th in point of size, there is little difference in the number of men in the military establishments of the two.

Since being designated as acting commander of the 7th District, Lt. Col. Abcede has had no similar difficulties with any of the senior officers serving under him with the exception of a Maj. MacLenahan. This officer has become openly Anti-Filipino and should in my opinion be gotten out of the country. Abcede made no complaint against him, and the criticism of his actions and attitude came from other sources including reputable American residents of Negros.

Relations between the 7th and other Districts. In the past Abcede and Peralta have worked quite closely together. That is no longer true since radio contact with Panay was lost in October and there is no communication between the two Districts at the present time. As a matter of fact very little is known as to present conditions in the 6th District, but it is believed that Peralta's organization has been rather badly knocked about. If that proves to be the case, the results may not be entirely bad since Peralta was getting quite "important" even as far as Abcede was concerned. At such time as he has completed his re-organization and resumed his normal contacts, he can again expect to get good cooperation from Abcede if he wants it.

8th. Fenton always pursued a very independent course of action, was secretive as to his operations, and did not apparently desire contacts of any sort outside of Cebu.

Since Cushing has succeeded to the command, this situation has been completely changed and Cebu and Negros are now working closely together. Intelligence information is exchanged almost daily, and there is a tentative agreement that if the Japanese succeed in placing Cushing in a hopeless position, instead of disbanding his men and going out of action, he will if possible, shift his base of operations to



Negros and carry on the fight here.

In view of the great difficulty which Abcede has had in building up a food reserve for his own organization, his offer to take care of Cushing and his men in any emergency which may arise is extremely generous and serves as an excellent illustration of the type of cooperation which should obtain between all ~~of~~ Districts - but often does not. The 10th is a case in point.

10th. Banca Traffic. Without advice to Abcede, Col. Fertig closed down all banca traffic between Mindanao and Negros. This was done presumably with the intention of controlling the entry of enemy operatives. The result has been a serious food shortage in the Zamboanguita area, which has never been self sustaining in the matter of food, and has depended upon imports from northwestern Mindanao. By the latter part of November 1943 the food reserve for the troops stationed at Zamboanguita had been completely exhausted, and civilians were paying as much as ₱1 per ganta for corn though fifty miles away there was a large exportable surplus which was selling locally at one fifth of that price. With the headquarters of the 10th District transferred to Agusan, and with no forces of any importance operating around Dipolog and Katipanan, there would seem to be no good reason for continuing such drastic control of transportation, and the recommendation was made to Abcede that he refer this matter to Col. Fertig by radio, and request at least a temporary lifting of present restrictions. The outcome is not known.

Morgan. The actions of Lt. Col. Morgan on the occasion of his visit to Negros did not contribute to a better understanding between the 7th and 10th Districts.

Andrews. Prior to the departure of Maj. Villamore for the south, Col. Fertig frequently requested information from the A.I.B., and also used its station for relaying traffic to Ingeniero in Bohol. When he discovered that Andrews had been left in charge of this organization, there was a noticeable change in both the number and tone of his communications, - and they have now stopped entirely.

Abcede. is aware of the fact that Fertig opposed his appointment as district commander, but he understands that it was only natural under the circumstances for him to back Ausejo. Abcede is, however, resentful of the unwillingness to let bygones be bygones, and of the fact that unpleasant statements concerning both him and his district continue to emanate from Mindanao.

Villamore. Very definite anti-Villamore propoganda was put out in Mindanao and both the nature and the source of the propoganda are known to me. An agent of the A.I.B. picked up these stories not in Mindanao but from officers returning



to Bohol from the 10th District, and made a report upon this matter. Villamore was, quite naturally, offended and this has doubtless influenced his attitude towards the 10th District.

The answer is that relations between the 10th and 7th Districts are not satisfactory and, to the best of my knowledge, the fault in that matter does not rest with the 7th.

Radio contact with the 10th District was lost on Dec. 23rd. It is not known if Col. Fertig's stations are off the air, or if the contact is one which he feels it is not worth his while to maintain.

Inter District Politics. Since his designation as commanding officer of the 10th District, Col. Fertig has not confined his attention to Mindanao, but has continued to interest himself in the Visayas.

In the recent past Inginero and Cangleon have been designated as area commanders for Bohol and Leyte respectively. Since both of these officers had been backed by Fertig, it may be presumed that they will remain in his camp.

Col. Fertig has not, however, been equally successful in other quarters, and the result has been a campaign the purpose of which is sufficiently obvious. Derogatory statements have been made concerning Fenton, Cushing and the 8th District; Villamore, Abcede and the 7th; and Peralta and the 6th.

The most recent occasion on which propoganda of this nature is reported to have been put out was at meetings in Agusan during November¹⁹⁴³ attended by Fertig, Inginero, Cangleon, and Assemblyman Lopez and Gov. Abellano of Cebu.

Over a period of months enough discreditable statements have found their way back to the people concerned to arouse open resentment, and the result has been a division in the districts with Mindanao, Leyte and Bohol ranged against Cebu, Negros and Panay.

This may appear to be a matter of small moment, but when Cushing is fighting with his back to the wall in Cebu and is hindered rather than helped by Inginero who is at the same time boasting about the supplies which he has received, - and when Abcede, who may be facing a major campaign, has never received ammunition or even medicines during the six months which have passed since he was made acting district commander, it is not unnatural that both men should worry for fear the campaign of misrepresentation has been carried beyond the Philippines, and has been in some measure successful.

Major Cushing. It has come as a most unusual experience to hear the ranking



officers of one district expressing open admiration of work done elsewhere, and it has been a pleasure to find that in Negros Maj. Cushing is very highly thought of.

While the feeling here is that the general policy pursued in both the 6th and 8th Districts was over-aggressive and hence forced the Japanese to take decisive action which has proved damaging in both cases, this does not alter the fact that the fighting spirit and the military accomplishments of the troops in the 8th District are much admired.

The co-command in Cebu worked out in such a way that Fenton remained at his headquarters and handled all administrative details while Cushing spent almost his entire time in the field.

It is generally conceded that Cushing must be credited with accounting for more Japanese than any other commander of guerilla forces in this country.

No one seems to blame Cushing for the excessive number of executions in Cebu, and the belief held by Filipinos in general is that responsibility for this mistake rests exclusively with Fenton.

Fenton, who was quite probably mentally unbalanced, was killed by his own men in September. His organization had already been put practically out of action and Cushing was in Negros at the time. He remained here for over two months during which time he was seriously ill with malaria and with a series of abscesses, and then returned to Cebu.

On Dec. 20th. Abcede broadcast orders for all members of the Cebu organization who were in Negros to rejoin their commander. Cushing court-martialed and executed Lt. Col. Estrella who had killed Fenton and siezed command, reorganized his force, went into action once more, and he is now being attacked heavily by the Japanese.

The feeling here is that Maj. Cushing deserves a citation as much as anyone who has been connected with querilla activities in The Philippines.

Major H. R. Bell. Maj. Bell furnished the leadership of the earliest guerilla activities in Negros Oriental; he was the first man in the district to establish radio contact with the United States, and also took ^{radio equipment} to Mindanao and placed in operation Col. Fertig's first ~~at~~; he next served as Director of Civil Affair for the province; and is now acting as chairman of The Research Board for the 7th District.

In these various capacities he has travelled all over the island of Negros, and has made one trip to Mindanao, and one to Cebu in the course of which his banca was shelled by a Japanese vessel.

On June 19th, 1943 Maj. Bell's camp was burned by an enemy patrol, and he had



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On June 19th, 1943 Maj. Bell's camp was burned by an enemy patrol, and he had



a narrow escape. On Nov. 24th, at a time when he was confined to his bed by Malaria, the Japanese burned his second camp, and on this occasion he was shot in the leg.

Maj. Bell commands the respect of all loyal elements on the Island, the work which he has done is widely known and appreciated, and the hope has been expressed in several different quarters that he will receive some special recognition for the service which he has rendered.

Ausejo. Lt. Col. Ausejo is about fourteen years ^{older} than Abcede and has had some twenty four years service. In the circumstances it was not an easy matter for him to step aside, but once the decision was reached to give command of the 7th District to Abcede, he accepted that situation without complaint, and he has not merely obeyed orders but has contributed his ~~full~~ share towards the satisfactory general situation which which obtains at this time.

Major Cruz. , or "Dr. Suylan" as he is known locally, expects soon to be returning to the United States.

His mission is believed to have been primarily to check on the present condition of President Quezon's political fences. It appears that he has found them in a state of disrepair, and his report will be that in any free and uncontrolled election after the war, Manuel Roxas would win in a walk.

He will also report, ~~respectfully~~, that the Filipinos are more interested in the return of our forces than in independence.

Montelibano. There has always been a certain amount of jealousy between the two provinces in Negros, and it would be difficult if not impossible to find any one man who could keep both of them entirely satisfied. In Montelibano's case some of the people in Negros Oriental feel that they are being neglected, but even though this is true it probably results primarily from the fact that the governor is fifteen days away in ~~the~~ point of time.

In any event the advantages of having one governor for the whole island seem to outweigh the disadvantages which would result from having two , and the great benefit in the present set up is found in the extent to which Montelibano and the provincial officials are cooperating with our forces.

As illustrations of this point, Montelibano has obtained over \$100,000 in Japanese currency for the use of Abcede's intelligence agents and the A.I.B.; he has likewise obtained quite a large amount of Japanese Quinine which was most urgently needed; he has reorganized the volunteer guards; working through loyal



puppet officials he has obtained food for our forces from areas under direct Japanese control; he has sought at all times to maintain good relations between the civil population and the army etc.

~~The result has been that~~ Montelibano's position in Negros ^{and reputation is becoming} ~~has become~~ similar to that of Confesor in Panay, but whereas there has been considerable friction between Confesor and Peralta, nothing of this sort has developed in the 7th District.

Villamore. Prior to my arrival in Negros I had been influenced by statements made concerning Villamore, and it has been necessary for me to revise my views on various points.

While my personal views are not of importance, facts are, and if issue cannot be taken with the following statements, the facts will speak for themselves:

1. Villamore was ~~primarily~~ responsible for the unification of ^{The} ~~our~~ forces in ^{of} ~~Negros.~~ ^{Mata} ~~Ausejo and Abcede~~
2. Villamore was partially responsible for the choice of Montelibano as Governor, and this has worked out most satisfactorily.
3. Villamore set up the local branch of the A.I.B. which has developed into one of the most important sources of intelligence information which you have in this country.
4. Villamore was ~~primarily~~ responsible for the designation of Abcede as District commander, and the wisdom of this choice has been proven ^{led} by the results achieved.

Abcede. Lt. Col. Abcede was born at Olongapo, and his father, who was working for the Navy as a machinist, died there in 1932. As a boy Abcede acted as a caddie on The Olongapo golf course, and later served as a mess attendant. He was early brought under American influence, and is ~~quite American~~ ^{quite "American" in many of his ideas and reactions.} ~~in his feelings.~~

Abcede is young, energetic and aggressive. He is a well trained and competent officer. He has surrounded himself with the ablest officers whom he could find. He organized his own force in the early days of guerilla activities, ^{led} let it himself, and in one capacity or another has been fighting the Japanese ever since.

He has kept himself quite free of "politics" and has the fullest cooperation from the commanding officer of Cebu, also from Gov. Montelibano and provincial officials, and from the A.I.B. ~~OS~~

He has travelled in every part of his district; keeps in close personal touch with his organization; commands the respect of his officers and men; and finally he

is a disciplinarian who deals directly and decisively with troubles as they arise.

It is thanks in large measure to these qualities that the 7th District, which has had its full share of troubles in the past, has emerged as a closely knit and well controlled military organization which, under increasingly heavy enemy pressure, has grown in strength and unity, and which, judged either as a military set-up or as a guerilla fighting unit, is, in my opinion, the soundest organization which you have in the Philippines today.

F. L. Worcester
Lt. Comdr. USNR.



UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

CPW-I
-000-

RADIO EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES

1. At least two (2) - Complete "DUTCH" transmitters with communications type receivers, gasoline-engine driven power plants, antennae, spare tubes and parts; similar to the equipment of WBA.
2. At least five (5)- Complete storage battery-powered transmitters with communications type receivers, batteries battery chargers, antennae, spare tubes, parts and battery testers, similar to the equipment of PAAC (Major VILLAMOR'S).
3. At least one (1) - Complete portable dry battery-powered transmitters with receivers, batteries, antennae, packs, spare tubes, batteries and parts for each Sub-Sector.

SIGNAL SUPPLIES

1. Any available quantity of -
 - a. Lineman's Pouch, leather
 - b. Lineman's Pliers, TL-
 - c. Lineman's Knife, TL-29
 - d. Message Center Clocks
 - e. Pocket watches
 - f. Flashlights, TL-122-A
 - g. Batteries, BA-30
 - h. Flashlight Bulbs, PR-6
 - i. Message Blank Books
 - j. Friction Tape, 3/4"
 - k. Rubber Tape, 3/4"
 - m. Sulphuric Acid
 - n. Assortment of metallized resistors; paper, mica and electrolytic condensers suitable for transmitter construction.
 - o. Assortment of metal tubes and sockets, like 6L6, 6P6, etc. suitable for making small portable transmitters.
2. At least one (1) - copy each of Signal Corps Manual, TM 2260-5 and JAMP
3. At least five (5)- Prismatic Compass with case
4. At least five (5)- Field Glass with case
5. At least one (1) - Set Tester and Tube Analyser
6. At least five (5)- Voltmeter, 0-3-150V., 0-3-15-30A., D.C.
7. At least five (5)- Sets, assorted socket wrenches, long-nosed pliers, screw-drivers, soldering iron and rosin-core solder.



JOSE C. SALAZAR
Major, CAC
7 MD SO

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Place names taken from Coast & Geodetic Survey Chart No. 4718 published
December, 1936 and re-issued June, 1939.

CONTACT POINTS

1. Bonbonon Pt.
2. Siaton Pt.
3. Giligaon Pt.
4. Moloconan
5. Manalongon
6. Nagbalaye
7. Tolong Viejo
8. Tolong
9. Cansilan Pt.
10. Basay
11. Balatong Pt.
12. Kulipapa
13. Boog Pt.
14. Asia
15. Jinobaan
16. Catmon Pt.
17. Camponanes Bay
18. Danjagan Is.

Also reverse days of the month beginning month with the 31st. Example
"Contact Point 10 May 27th" would refer to "Basay - May 5th".





In the Field
Free Negros
Jan. 10th, 1944.

REPORT ON 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT

Early Guerilla Activities in Negros. From the time of the surrender of our forces in Negros up to the end of July 1942 the general situation was not only confused and unsatisfactory in that some of the disbanded soldiers joined forces with the lawless element of the civilian population in a campaign of looting and extortion, in the course of which quite a number of people were killed. This resulted in the formation of certain small groups which were in the first instance primarily concerned with the protection of their own areas from further depredations, and the idea of using these troops in guerilla operations against the Japanese followed in the natural course of events.

In Negros Oriental there were four independent groups of this nature which were led by Lt. B. Vitoria who had come up from Mindanao, Ridad and Jornales who were Silliman students, and a Sgt. David Cirilio of the Philippine Constabulary. The advantages of getting these people together being obvious, Mr. Roy Bell of the Silliman Institute, on July 31st, called Lt. Vitoria to the camp which he had established at Malbo, and plans with this end in view were discussed. It was felt that if the new organization was to prosper, the services of a senior officer would be required, and word was subsequently sent to Lt. Col. Ausejo. He came to Malabo on October 14th, agreed to take over, and the formal organization of guerilla forces in Negros Oriental began at that time.

In northern Negros Capt. Mata, who had not surrendered, began at an early date to gather the men of the batallion which he had commanded, and in Negros Occidental Capt. Abcede was doing exactly the same thing with the members of his own batallion.

As a general rule command of the early guerilla organization was determined not on the basis of rank, but by a combination of the two factors of personal leadership and the number of rifles which any given individual could round up.

On both points Capt. Abcede was out in front in Negros. He soon had



probably results primarily from the fact that the governor is fifteen days away in point of time.

In any event the advantages of having one governor for the whole island seem to outweigh the disadvantages which would result from having two, and the great benefit in the present set up is found in the extent to which Montelibano and the provincial officials are cooperating with our forces.

As illustrations of this point, Montelibano has obtained over P100,000 in Japanese currency for the use of Abcede's intelligence agents and the A.I.B.; he has likewise obtained quite a large amount of Japanese quinine which was most urgently needed; he has reorganized the volunteer guards; working through loyal puppet officials he has obtained food for our forces from areas under direct Japanese control; he has sought at all times to maintain good relations between the civil population and the army etc.

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F. L. Worcester
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October 6, 1943

Dear Chick:

*File
Worcester*

Your letter of August 17th which arrived yesterday afternoon came as a most pleasant surprise. I was greatly interested in all of the news which it contained, and was particularly pleased to learn that increasing assistance is to come this way since that will be helpful all the way around.

I note your official efforts on my behalf and hope that will work out to the satisfaction of all concerned, but in view of recent developments I am somewhat dubious on that point.

You know the situation at the time you left as well as I do, or perhaps better. I was waiting rather impatiently for the delivery of a radio set, and after installing it on the Sindangan side was next to take on the job in Leyte. The set did not come, but the Japs did. I dropped back from the coast and spent nineteen days behind Oasin and Jimenez hoping that you were an excellent prophet, and that I could stroll back to the bolai Ozamis rather than hike over the mountains, which looked damn high. When it became entirely evident that the Japs were going to stay for a while, I started for this side and found that the mountains were a lot higher than they looked. That was a hard trip.

You will remember you told me that the new radio sets had come in on the last Sub, which left Fertig over rather than under supplied. Under these circumstances, and with enemy occupation of this territory a fact rather than a matter of academic discussion, I felt very sure he would send equipment overland when it was possible to do so. Also I thought he planned to stay around Bonifacio, and with enemy forces occupying Dipolog, Croquieta, Misamis and Tukuran, that left the Sindangan area as perhaps the most logical place to bring in Subs. So I wrote Fertig that I was on my way over and would stand by for the radio equipment. Also, I outlined an idea for taking care of a Sub which might have been useful in an emergency, and then plodded along thinking what the original plan for putting a radio on this side would prove to have been a very good one.

The report of "an American from Bonifacio carrying boxes" turned out to be a false alarm. It was only Wendover and he had nothing for me, but his return gave me a chance to send both verbal and written messages to Fertig, which I did. That was at the end of July. As time passed I tried to keep Fertig posted by letter as to what was happening on this side, and some of it has been interesting.

As an example, the report which goes out tomorrow contains advice that on three occasions between Sept. 27th and Oct. 4th, Jap planes were after our Sub in this immediate vicinity, and they cut loose with depth charges twice. The last time the plane showed up less than twenty minutes after we heard the explosion of the torpedo. Of the Japs who came ashore, sixteen have been accounted for thus far.

On August 14th, Fertig addressed instructions, not to me but to DeVries, to take the motor driven generator to Bonifacio and turn over camp supplies to Roemer. I persuaded myself that letters and Wendover had gone astray, and that Fertig did not know at that time that I was here, since it was very difficult for me to believe that he would pull off as poor a play as that.

On September 22nd I had a letter from Wendover stating that he had passed on to Fertig the data from me after his arrival on August 6th. How much after was not clear from his letter.

On September 25th Fertig issued amended orders to DeVries, and in this instance I was furnished with a copy which reached me yesterday, October 5th. This is the first written communication I have had from his office since some time in June.

The answer, then, is that Fertig knows I am here; he has closed down the project through communications addressed to Lt DeVries, who has been serving under me, and has issued him new orders. No instructions of any sort have come to me.

Your conclusion on the basis of the facts as outlined would doubtless be the same as mine.

If (for reasons which may be perfectly sound) Fertig does not want on this side a watcher station which also could be used for rapid and confidential communication with his forces in this area, that is nothing for me to get provoked about since that is his business and not mine, but if I said I was not seriously put out by what looks to me like an intentional effort to leave me here high and dry, that would be less than the truth.



As for the Leyte proposition, I do not of course have the faintest idea what the situation is there at this time. As you know I was interested in taking that job on, and if I can still be of use in that quarter all I need is instructions to get going. Success in that quarter would, however, be dependent to an important extent on Fertig's cooperation, and it is for that reason I am leaving the next move up to him.

If the Leyte matter is, for any reason, now out Intelligence information from Cebu and Negros might be a useful thing to have unless more and better stuff is coming in than we used to get. There are also other quarters in which I could be of service, and certainly in times like these there should be enough work to keep everyone busy. I shall, therefore, hope in one way or another to contribute my share.

I am deeply indebted to you for sending news through to Slip and if I can, in the course of time actually get a letter from her, that will really be something.

Sincerely

Fritz

Glad to hear about Sam's promotion. That will please him very much.



October 12, 1943



My dear Chick:

Your letter of August 17th had been opened, put in a new envelope, and re-addressed - not in your hand. I have little doubt that Fertig read it, and my reply to you had to be guided in part by the fact that he would probably read that too. That made me exceedingly weary and it was only with the greatest difficulty that I was able to retain myself from raising things which would more properly come at a later date.

The situation as it now stands with Fertig is this: when he gets the letters sent in DeVries' care he will know I am perfectly well aware of the fact that I have been given a run-around. I have asked in an entirely respectful way that this matter be cleared up one way or the other, and have called his attention officially to the fact that he has left me without instructions. That is exactly the way I want it, and our whole future relationship will turn on the manner in which he meets this situation.

With things in this delicate state of balance, you have departed from the role which you described as that of "just a messenger boy", and have intervened in this affair in a manner which has made me more angry than I have been in a very long time. I Quote from your letter:

"I have talked to the Navy about you and Sam (Sam is Lt. Comdr.) and you have picked up as on duty with U. S. forces 10th Dist. It is important that you be on duty as otherwise your status probably would be 'inactive duty' which is something like demobilization. How did the Leyte idea shape up?"

With reference to the first sentence, you knew I was not on duty with Fertig's organization, you also knew I had no intention of rejoining it, and finally you yourself had suggested - and Fertig had approved - the job in Leyte, which is in the 9th district. The answer then, is simply that you gave the Navy information which you knew to be false.

As for the second sentence, it is not only a clear threat, but an exceedingly ugly one, and you are in effect saying, "rejoin Fertig's outfit or else". Since my reaction to pressure of this sort coming from you is very antagonistic, there is nothing you could have said or done which would contribute more effectively to an open and final break between Fertig and myself, and if that does come you can take quite a bit of credit for precipitating it.

And now, Chico, I am going to refresh your memory on a couple of points because I think that after your association with really important people, a little needling from just an ordinary person would not do you a bit of harm.

We shall begin in a very small way with the Oxamis family. The members of which had been more than kind to both you and me, and also to Fertig. In June I told you I thought they could get themselves comfortably settled in their evacuation camp, but you were quite of the opposite way of thinking. On June 26th they had to clear out of their house at night and, if you bothered to check up on your hosts during the three days which you spent in Jimenez after the Japs came, you are aware of the fact that they were in a small house occupied by no less than eighteen people, were sleeping on the floor, and actually were short of decent food to eat. The last I heard of them, on July 12th, they were neither happy nor particularly enthusiastic about the consideration which had been shown them by people who were supposed to know what was going on.

Carrying this same idea considerably farther, I thought steps should be taken to move people out of the towns and get them started on raising their own food. You were completely opposed to this plan which you thought would be very injurious to their morale, that being an idea which you had borrowed from Fertig. When the Japs came, the people took off in a hurry leaving most of their small worldly goods behind them. The towns were promptly looted by the Japs, and the "gonte" claim that in some places a much more expert and thorough job was done by our own troops. There was an immediate and rather acute food shortage, and the question as to which of the two policies would have been least injurious to the morale of the people has answered itself quite clearly. Check up on it sometime.

The next point concerns the capture of the Japanese attack on Misamis. From April on, my forecast was that when the Japanese attacked it would be in force and with the idea of trying to knock out the central organization of the 10th district. With some condensation you told me (in June) that your trips had given you an insight into the situation as a whole which I did not have; that I did not realize the true weakness

and lack of initiative of the Japanese; and that if, or when, they came it would be for nothing more than a demonstration in the way of a raid like those on Balingasge and Talakag, and would at the most involve nothing more than a little "town burning". The "raid" has lasted four months so far.

It, therefore, appears that in spite of the exceptional advantages which you had in formulating your opinions, your estimate of the situation was defective on a couple of fairly important points, but I do not doubt that it had been corrected by the time you reached Australia. Good clear hindsight has its uses.

At this point I have just remembered an entirely different matter which I wish to cover. Only shortly before you left for the South, I asked if you were taking along with you a copy of the special report on the military situation in Misamis as of April 8th. You replied you were not, and that interested me quite a lot since that document made clear a situation which was unusual, to say the least. The answer, as I worked it out in my rather slow moving mind, was one of two things; either you had decided to back Fertig so strongly that you did not want any damaging adverse criticism of his policies to get to GHQ; or that you wanted any findings of this nature (and their connection) to appear not in a report written by me, but in that ably compiled by Lt. Cmdr. C. Parsons, USNR. Did I do you an injustice, Chico? If so, it was only speculative one in my own mind, and my theories were not transmitted to anyone else.

And now, before going into the last point, I want to deal in a personal way with the subject of W. W. Fertig - his abilities and his limitations.

I think that Fertig is good as an organizer; he has demonstrated the fact that he is successful as a politician; he has an excellent mind for detail; and he has a pleasing and likeable personality. With these points in his favor plus a very sound idea (the unification of all guerilla forces in Mindanao) he proceeded to put his idea across. For that he deserves both recognition and credit, and I am glad he has received both things.

On the other hand he can make no claim to competence from a strictly military viewpoint; no one who knows him could possibly call him a strong man; and either through desire or necessity he has tried to run the 10th district as a one man show which neither he, nor anyone else, could possibly do successfully.

The result has been a large, loosely integrated organization which was having its troubles even when the piping times of peace prevailed in Misamis.

That being the situation as I saw it, when you asked me what my recommendation for the future would be, it was that a hard boiled and really competent regular army officer who enjoyed General Mac Arthur's confidence be sent up from Australia either to take command of the whole show or at the very least, to assist Fertig. You interposed immediate objections saying that no officer with those qualifications would be willing to come here; that the able men wanted to stay in Australia where they had a chance of advancement; and finally that if such a proposal were made, what we would actually get would be Stevenol or someone like that, - one of the ex-Philippine residents who is hanging around with nothing much to do and is anxious to get back to the Islands. Perhaps you were entirely right, but if the little show here does not rate just one honest-to-god American officer, that seems rather discouraging.

I agree with you that the local talent, Fertig is the best man for the job he has built for himself. But if the guerilla organization in Mindanao is of any real importance with reference to future military plans, then I think that instead of banking on W. W. F., the political foundation which he has successfully laid should be used for a stronger and safer military structure than he is capable of erecting.

In other words it seems to me your idea has been "Take a chance on Fertig", while mine is "If the show is of any real interest, why take any chances which could be easily avoided?" Only time will tell which of us had the sounder idea on that particular point, and there will probably always be room for argument.

I shall say nothing about the present situation here beyond the fact that Anti-American feeling arising partly from obvious causes and partly, I imagine, from Morgan's propoganda is spreading among the Taos, and has gotten way over to this side. I hate to see that. Also, it is dangerous.

I do not (even at this time) have any interest in trying discredit Fertig, but there are two things in which I definitely am interested. The first is that since this is more of an American outfit than any of the other guerilla organizations, I have always wanted to see it a good one; and the second is that no matter how wobbly an outfit it is or who commands it, I certainly want to see it come through. It is for that reason I was particularly interested in what you had to say about increased help coming. I hope

that will prove to be something beyond just a few more Subs, because the people are now used to that idea, and they never know how many are coming in anyway. They need something more than that, and any different (and visible) sign of interest and assistance from the South would be tremendously helpful at this particular time. I personally would not mind catching a glimpse of "increased help" in the shape of a couple of officers from New Guinea, but I doubt if Fertig would be equally glad to see them. I think it more probable he would rather be alone with a radio set.

And now lets go back to March. When you unexpectedly showed up here I was delighted to see you in a personal way and, in an official way, gave you every assistance which I possibly could. All G-2 files were turned over to you and any information not appearing in those records which I thought might be useful to you was given verbally. That got you away to a nice start which, I believe you appreciated. It was in those very early days of your tour that you turned up that nice little Fertig-Smith deal in which Charley was doing your reporting to GHQ for you in a message in his private code beginning "Conditions here excellent" - and you will remember that when you finally decided to shift the message to your code and send it over your own signature, I recommended for your own protection a more conservative statement until you had satisfied yourself as to what conditions really were. Later when you had been able to gather your own information, I was always pleased to talk things over with you and compare viewpoints. And finally since I had known you off and on for the better part of twenty years and classed you under the heading of "Amigo", I felt free to talk frankly.

Personally, as a mark of your appreciation you were so kind as to offer to exert your "best efforts" on my behalf when you reached Australia. I thought that very nice and suggested, that when you got around to the good deeds, you remember Sam Wilson too.

While you may not believe it, the fact remains that I hate like hell to feel towards you as I do now.

Fritz



November 3rd, 1943

My Dear Chick:

The last piece of evidence which I wanted is now at hand, and I am leaving for Negros in the immediate future.

When I reach Negros it is not my intention to rush for a radio station, and there are in that connection two points which I wish to make clear.

The first is that I am not starting the big fight. And the second is that if you and Fertig want to carry it to GHQ in an effort either to force me into service in the 10th district, or to prejudice my reputation or standing in the Navy, then the fight is certainly on.

I realize that if it proves necessary to take on both of you at the same time, I shall be at a heavy initial disadvantage, but it will not be a permanent one.

I shall ask you to forward the enclosed letter addressed to my wife without reading it. If things develop in such a way that she becomes aware of the fact that I am involved in difficulties of some sort and the letter has not reached her, there, my boy, you and I will have a personal account as well as an official one to settle.

F. L. W.
Lt. Comdr. USNR

Bearing in mind the arrangements made by Fertig to take care of Paping Yap and the ex-governor, its all down on paper which will not, Chico be with me.

F. L. W.



10/15/43
Part of letter to Lt. Col. Parsons
in care of
Re: Vines - O.I. 72

Oct. 6th 1943



Dear Chick,

Your letter of Aug 17th which arrived yesterday afternoon came as a most pleasant surprise. I was greatly interested in all of the news which it contained, and was particularly pleased to learn that increasing assistance is to come this way since that will be helpful all the way around.

I note your official attitude on my behalf and hope that will work out to the satisfaction of all concerned, but in view of recent developments I am somewhat dubious on that point.

You know the situation at the time you left as well as I do, - or perhaps better. I was waiting rather impatiently for the delivery of a radio set, and after installing it on the Pindoupan side was next to take on the job in logic. The set did not come, but the Japs did. I dropped back from the coast and spent nineteen days behind



Oliver and Jimenez; hoping that you were an excellent prophet, and that I could stroll back to the Bahai Ozamis rather than hike over the mountains, - which looked damn high. When it became entirely evident that the Japs were going to stay for a while, I started for this side, - and found that the mountains were a lot higher than they looked. That was a hard trip.

You will remember you told me that these new radio sets had come in on the last sub, which left Fertig over rather than under supplied. Under these circumstances, and with enemy occupation of this territory, a fact rather than a matter of academic discussion, I felt very sure he would send equipment overland when it was possible to do so. Also, I thought he planned to stay around Bonifacio, and with enemy forces occupying Dipolog, Oroquieta, Misamis and



Turkey, that left the Sindangan area as perhaps the most logical place to bring in subs. So I wrote Fertig that I was on my way over and would stand by for the radio equipment. Also I outlined an idea for taking care of a sub which might have been useful in an emergency, and then plodded along thinking that the original plan for putting a radio on this side would prove to have been a very good one.

~~Wanderer~~ The report of "an American from Bonifacio carrying boxes" turned out to be a false alarm. It was only Wanderer and he had nothing for me, but his return gave me a chance to send both verbal and written messages to Fertig, which I did. That was at the end of July. As time passed I tried to keep Fertig posted by letter as to what was happening on this side, - and some of it has been interesting.



As an example, The report which goes out tomorrow, contains advice that on three occasions between Sept. 22nd and Oct. 4th Jap planes were after our subs in this immediate vicinity, and they cut loose with depth charges twice. The last time the plane showed up less than twenty minutes after we heard the explosion of the torpedo. Of the Japs who came ashore sixteen have been accounted for thus far.

On Aug. 14th Fontig addressed instructions, not to me but to DeVries, to take the motor driven generator to Bonifacio and turn over camp supplies to Roemer! I persuaded myself that letters, and Wanderer, had gone missing, and that Fontig did not know at that time that I was here; since it was very difficult for me to believe that he would pull off as poor a play as that.



On Sept. 22nd I had a letter from Wendover stating that he had passed on to Fortig the data from me after his arrival on Aug. 6th. How much of this was not clear from his letter.

On Sept. 25th Fortig issued amended orders to Perkins, and in this instance I was furnished with a copy which reached me yesterday - Oct. 5th. This is the first written communication I have had from his office since some time in June.

The answer, then, is that Fortig knows I am here; he has closed down the project through communications addressed to Lt. Perkins who has been serving under me, and has issued him new orders. No instructions of any sort have come to me.

Your conclusion on the basis of the facts as outlined would doubtless be the same as mine.



It (for reasons which may be perfectly sound) Fertig does not want on this side a ~~watch~~ station which also could be used for rapid and confidential communication with his forces in this area, that is nothing for me to get provoked about since that is his business and not mine. But if I said I was not seriously put out by what looks to be like an intentional effort to leave me here high and dry, that would be less than the truth.

As for the logistic proposition, I do not of course have the faintest idea what the situation is there at this time. As you know I was interested in taking that job on, and if I can still be of use in that quarter all I need is instructions to get going. Success in that quarter would, however, be dependent to an important extent ^{to} on Fertig's cooperation, and it is for that reason I am



leaving the next move up to him.

Of the latter matter is, for any reason, new out, intelligence information from Cuba and Mexico might be a useful thing to have unless more and better stuff is coming in than we used to get. There are also other questions in which I could be of service, and certainly in Times like these there should be enough work to keep everyone busy. I shall therefore, hope in one way or another, to contribute my share.

I am deeply indebted to you for sending news through to Slip and if I can, in the course of time, actually get a letter from her, that will really be something.

Sincerely,
Fritz.

Glad to hear about Sam's promotion. That will please him very much.

Orig. sent by E
Earl Cook on Nov. 72.

Oct. 12th 1943



My dear Chick,

Your letter of Sep. 17th had been opened, put in a new envelope, and readdressed, but in your hand. I have little doubt that Tentig read it, and my reply to you had to be guided in part by the fact that he would probably read that too. That made me exceedingly wary, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that I was able to restrain myself from saying things which would more properly come at a later date.

The situation as it now stands with Tentig is this: when he ^{gets} the letters sent in Rakins' care he will know I am perfectly well aware of the fact that I have been given a run around; I have asked in an entirely respectful way that this matter be cleared up one way or the other; and have called his attention officially to the fact that he has left me without instructions. That is exactly the way I want it, - and our whole future relationship will turn on the manner in which he meets this situation.

With things in this delicate state of balance, you have departed from the role which you described as that of "just a messenger bag," and have intervened in this affair in a manner which has made me ¹⁰ more angry than I have been in a very long time. - I quote from your letter,

"I have talked to the boys about you and Sam (Sam is Lt. Comdr.) and you have picked up an on duty with U.S. forces in the



10th Dist. It is important that you be on duty, as otherwise your status probably would be 'inactive duty' which is something like demobilization. How did the Lay's idea shape up?"

With reference to the first sentence, you know I was not on duty with Festig's organization; you also know I had no intention of resigning it; and finally, you yourself had suggested - and Festig had approved - the job in Lay's which is in the 3rd district. The answer then, is simply that you gave the heavy information which you know to be false.

As for the second sentence, it is not only a clear threat, but an exceedingly ugly one, and you are in effect saying, "Rejoin Festig's outfit - or else". Since my reaction to pressure of this sort coming from you is very antagonistic, there is nothing you could have said or done which would contribute more effectively to an open and final break between Festig and myself, - and if that does come you can take quite a bit of credit for precipitating it.

And now, Chica, I am going to refresh your memory on a couple of points because I think that after your association with really important people, ~~so~~ little ^(needling) ~~(hardly)~~ from just an ordinary person would not do you a bit of harm.

We shall begin in a very small way with the Ozemio family, the members of which had been more than kind to both you and me, - and
kind



was to Fertig. In June I told you I thought
 they should get themselves comfortably settled in
 their evacuation camp, but you were quite of the
 opposite way of thinking. On June 26th they had to
 clear out of their base at night and, if you
 bothered to check up on your lists during the
 three days which you spent in Limonez after the
 Japs came, you are aware of the fact that they
 were in a small house occupied by no less than
 eighteen people, were sleeping on the floor, and
 actually were short of decent food to eat. The last
 I heard of them - on July 12th - they were neither
 happy nor particularly enthusiastic about the
 consideration which had been shown them by people
 who were supposed to know what was going on.
 Carrying this same idea considerably farther,
 I thought steps should be taken to move people
 out of the towns and get them started on
 raising their own food. You were completely
 opposed to this plan which you thought would be
 very injurious to their morale, that being an idea
 which you had borrowed from Fertig. When the
 Japs came, the people took off in a hurry leaving
 most of their small worldly goods behind. These
 the towns were promptly looted by the Japs, and
 the "gangs" claim that in some places a much
 more expert and thorough job was done by our
 own troops. There was an immediate and
 rather acute food shortage, - and the question as
 to which of the two policies would have been



least injurious to the morals of the people has answered itself quite clearly, - Check up on it some time.

The next point concerns the nature of the Japanese attack on Misamis. Even April on, my forecast was that when the Japanese attacked it would be in force, and with the idea of trying to knock out the central organization of the 10th district. With some condescension you told me (in June) that your trips had given you an insight into the situation as a whole which I did not have; that I did not realize the true weakness and lack of initiative of the Japanese; and that if, or when, they came it would be for nothing more than a demonstration in the way of a raid like those on Balingasao and Talakap, and would at the most involve nothing more than a little town burning. The "raid" has lasted four months as far as Balingasao

It therefore appears that in spite of the exceptional advantages which you had in formulating your opinions, your estimate of the situation was defective on a couple of fairly important points, but I do not doubt that it had been corrected by the time you reached Australia. Good clear hindsight has it ~~corrected~~!

At this point I have just remembered an entirely different matter which I wish to cover. Only shortly before you left for the South, I asked if you were taking along with



you a copy of The Special Report on The Military
 Situation in Misamis Occ. as of April 8th. You
 replied you were not, and that interested me quite
 a lot since that document made clear a situation
 which was unusual, - To say the least. The answer,
 as I worked it out in my rather slow moving
 mind, was one of two things: either you had
 decided to back Fertig as strongly that you did
 not want any damaging adverse criticism of his
 policies to get to GHQ; or that you wanted any
 findings of this nature (and their correction) to
 appear not in a report written by me, but in
 that able compiled by Lt. Col. C. Parsons USNR.
 Did I do you an injustice, chief? If so, it
 was only a speculative one in my own mind, and
 my theories were not transmitted to anyone else.

And now, before going into the last
 point, I want to deal in a general way with
 the subject of W. W. Fertig, his abilities and
 his limitations.

I think that Fertig is good as an
 organizer; he has demonstrated the fact that
 he is successful as a politician; he has an
 excellent mind for detail; and he has a
 pleasing and likeable personality. With these
 points in his favor plus a very sound idea
 (The unification of all possible forces in
 Mindanao) he



proceeded to put his idea across. For that he deserves both recognition and credit, and I am glad he has received both things.

On the other hand he can make no claim to competence from a strictly military viewpoint; no one who knows him could possibly call him a strong man; and either through desire or nervousness(?) he has tried to run the 10th Military District as a one man show which neither he, nor anyone else, could possibly do successfully. The result has been a large, loosely integrated organization which was having its troubles even when the piping times of peace prevailed in Misamis.

That being the situation as I saw it, when you asked me what my recommendation for the future would be, it was that a hard boiled and really competent regular army officer who enjoyed Gen. MacArthur's confidence be sent up from Australia either to take command of the whole show or, at the very least, to assist Fertig. You interposed immediate objections saying that no officer with those qualifications would be willing to come here; that the able men wanted to stay in Australia where they had a chance of advancement; and finally, that if such a proposal were made, what we would actually get would be Ploveret or someone like that, — one of the ~~etc.~~ Philippine residents who is hanging around with nothing much to do and is anxious to get back to the Islands. Perhaps you were entirely right, but if the little show here does not rate just one honor-to-God American

② → In other words it seems to me your idea has been "take a chance on Fertig", while mine is "if the show is of any real interest, why take any chances which could be easily avoided?" - Only time will tell which of us had the sounder idea on that particular point, - and there will probably always be some officers that seems rather discouraging.

I agree with you that of the local talents, Fertig is the best man for the job he has built for himself. But if the guerrilla organization in mindance is of any real importance with reference to future military plans, then I think that instead of banking on W.C.F., the political foundation which he has successfully laid should be used for a stronger and safer military situation than he is capable of executing.

→ I shall say nothing about the present situation here beyond the fact that anti-American feeling arising partly from obvious causes and partly, I imagine, from Morgan's propaganda is spreading among the Tacs, and has gotten way over to this side. I hate to see that. Also, it is dangerous.

I do not (even at this time) have any interest in trying to discredit Fertig, but there are two things in which I definitely am interested. The first is that since this is more of an American outfit than any of the other guerrilla organizations, I have always wanted to see it a good one; and the second is that no matter how ^{wobbly} wobbly an outfit it is, so long as it is, I certainly want to see it come through. It is for that reason I was particularly interested in what you had to say about ²² ~~ward~~ ^{ward} help coming. I hope that will prove to be something beyond just a few more subs, because the people are now used to that idea, and they have shown how wrong an coming is anyway.



They need something more than that, and any different (and visible) sign of interest and assistance from the South would be tremendously helpful at this particular time. — I ^{personally} would not mind ^{increased help} "catching a glimpse of" a couple of officers from New Guinea, but I doubt if ~~sure that~~ Festig would be equally glad to see them. I think it more probable he would rather be alone, — with a radio set.

And now let's go back ~~to~~ to March. When you unexpectedly showed up here I was delighted to see you in a personal way and, in an official way, gave you every assistance which I possibly could. All C-2 files were turned over to you, and any information not appearing in those records which I thought might be useful to you was given verbally. That got you away to a nice flat which, I believe, you appreciated. It was in those very early days of your tour that you turned up that nice ^{little} Festig-Smith ^{deal} in which ^{Charles} Charles was doing your reporting ^{to S.H.R.} for you in a message in his private code beginning "Conditions here excellent" — and you will remember that when you finally decided to shift the message to your code and send it over your ^{own} signifier, I recommended ^(for your own protection) a more conservative statement until you had satisfied yourself as to what conditions really were. Later, when you had been able to gather your own information, I was always pleased to talk things over with you and compare viewpoints. And finally I had known you off and on for the better part of twenty years and ~~claimed~~ claimed you under the heading of "amigo", I felt free to talk frankly. And finally, when I had

Presumably, as a mark of your appreciation
 you were so kind as to offer to send your
 "best efforts" on my behalf when you reached
 Australia! I thought that was nice, and suggested
 that when you got around to the post desks, you
 remember Sam Wilson too.

While you may not believe it, the fact remains
 that I have like hell to feel towards you as I
 do now.

Griz.



Orig sent in card of
EM Earl Cook on Nov 7th

Nov. 7th 1942



My dear Chick,

The last piece of evidence which I wanted is now at hand, and I am leaving for Negros in the immediate future.

When I reach Negros it is not my intention to search for a radio station, and Queza are in that connection two points which I wish to make clear.

The first is that I am not starting the ~~big~~ fight. And the second is that it you or Fertig

2
want to carry it to GHQ in an
effort either to force me into service
in the 10th District, or to prejudice
my reputation or standing in the
Navy, then the fight is certainly on.

I realize that if it proves
necessary to take on both of you
at the same time, I shall be at a
heavy initial disadvantage, but it
will not be a permanent one.

I shall ask you to forward
the enclosed letter addressed to my
wife without reading it, if things
develop in such a way that she

3
business aware of the fact that I am
involved in difficulties of some sort
and the letter has not reached her,
There, my boy, you and I will have
a personal account as well as an
official one to settle.



G.L.W.
27. Condr. USNR.

13
Reserve in mind the arrangements made
by Galtie to take care of Papius' son and
the expenses, it's all down on paper.

When will not
which will not, since, I will be.

G.L.W.

FRS

G-2

17 March 1944

Herewith is a copy of Lieut. Comdr. Frederick L. WORCESTER's
report.

Incls
Rpt

C.W.



en

FRS

G-2

17 March 1944

Herewith is a copy of Lieut. Genr. Frederick L. WOODSTER's
report.

Incls
Rpt

G.W.



ef