

EVACUEE REPORTS:

SILLIMAN,

ROBERT B.

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION GENERAL STAFF

Philippine Evacuee Report # 174.

20 May 1944.

Subject: Beginning of Guerrilla Activity in the Dumaguete Area.

From : Robert E. Silliman.

.....

Name : Robert Benton Silliman
Born : 1902 at Ravenswood, West Virginia
Education : MA in History of Political Science, Lafayette College
PhD, University of Chicago.
Occupation : Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions - Head of
History Department, Silliman University, Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental.
In PI since : 1926.

Interrogated by G-2, GHQ SWPA

.....

Mr. Silliman has an analytical intelligence and the objective viewpoint of a trained historian and was Deputy Governor of Negros Oriental for some time prior to his evacuation to Australia. His information is considered reliable and accurate.

CHRONOLOGY

Jun to Sep 1942 : Springing up of small disorganized guerrilla bands.
Aug 1942 : Japanese intensified drive to obtain surrender of all ex-USAFVE soldiers.
5 Sep 1942 : Conference of guerrilla leaders for purpose of organization.
Selection of H. R. BELL as leader until a military leader could be found.
Oct 1942 : Assumption of command of Negros Oriental guerrilla forces by Major AUSEJO.
11 Oct 1942 : Battle of Looc.

Beginnings of the Guerrilla In August of 1942 the Japanese issued an order that all ex-USAFVE soldiers surrender their arms and ammunition. Those who did not do so were hunted down. In an effort to make the soldiers surrender, the Japanese pursued a policy of terrorism against the relatives.

While this policy of terrorism resulted in many of the soldiers surrendering it likewise was responsible for the creation of many guerrilla bands. Leaders of three different bands who were destined to become famous for their daring escapades were Victor JORNALES, Frederico RIDAD, and David CIRILO. These men recruited soldiers and civilians. Some were armed with rifles, shotguns, and bolos.

The activities of these bands consisted mostly of ambushing small patrols of Japanese, destroying bridges to prevent the movement of Japanese forces, and urging the people not to aid the Japanese any more than was absolutely necessary. By destroying the bridges the guerrillas were able to operate

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

In comparative safety without fear of being molested by Japanese armored trucks. In many different instances the guerrilla bands were able to surprise small groups of Japanese patrols and inflict heavy losses. Such activities were so effective that from August 1942 to the latter part of 1943, the Japanese were content to remain in their garrisons at Dumaguete and other coastal towns.

Even in the occupied territory the guerrilla bands were able to keep a close surveillance of the activities of the Japanese through the contacts that they had with certain of the municipal and provincial officials. On some occasions the officials were able to notify the guerrillas of the plans of the Japanese to penetrate into the interior in an effort to break up the guerrilla organizations. The guerrillas were nearly as desirous of punishing the Filipinos who became willing puppets of the Japanese as they were the Japanese themselves.

After October 1942, at which time Major P A AUSEJO took over the command of all the guerrilla forces in Southern Negros Oriental, the various bands were merged into one well unified organization. The towns of Siaton, Tolong, Zamboanguita, Dauin, Bacong, and Looe were cleared of Japanese as a result of the ambush tactics of the guerrillas, and as a result of the battle of Looe on 11 October 1942. Although the guerrillas were greatly outmanned and were at a distinct disadvantage in fire power, they were able to inflict great losses on the Japanese. Out of some 70 Japanese participating in the fight, 37 were killed. From this time on the Japanese were not free to enter any of the towns without the use of armored trucks and the benefit of great forces.

Guerrilla Commissions Commissions have been conferred on many men in the guerrilla bands by Major VILLAMOR, Major AUSEJO and other guerrilla leaders, and this matter will constitute a ticklish problem when the Allied forces occupy the Visayas. Many of the guerrilla officers and men are expecting full AUS recognition and pay after the war. The fact that they now think they are officers of the AUS and are drawing the pay called for by their rank is a large factor in keeping up their morale. They feel that they are doing a job not only for their country, but for the United States, and above all for General MacArthur. They also feel that each paper that they send to Australia goes directly to General MacArthur and is personally read by him.

There are too many persons in the Army service. The units have been built up on a definite T/O, and where a T/O calls for units which cannot be equipped or used, they are created anyway, frequently to handle the extra officers who are around. The combat efficiency of such units is not high.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION GENERAL STAFF

Philippine Evacuee Report #174b

23 May 1944

Subject: Food Conditions in Southern Negros Oriental

From : Robert B. Silliman

.....

Name : Robert Benton Silliman
Born : 1902 at Ravenswood, West Virginia
Education : MA in history and political science at Lafayette College.
Phd, University of Chicago.
Occupation: Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions - Head of History Department, Silliman University, Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
In PI since: 1926

Interrogated by G-2 GHQ SWPA

.....

Mr. Silliman has an analytical intelligence and the objective viewpoint of a trained historian, and was Deputy Governor of Negros Oriental for some time prior to his evacuation to Australia. His information is considered reliable and accurate.

Food Supplies Vegetables, as understood by Americans, are very scarce in the hills. In Negros the term usually refers to the leaf of the Kalamungay tree, very similar to the West Java locust. The leaf when cooked is not palatable, but is edible. It is usually stewed with other foods. Bananas constitute a large item on the bill of fare.

Conditions in the foothills and lowlands are much better. The common foodstuffs which are fairly abundant in these regions include native spinach, tomatoes, green beans, egg plant, squash, corn, papaya, avocado, mangoes, bananas, eggs, and fish.

The food in the hills north of Siaton, because these hills are mostly barren, is scarce. There is barely enough food to supply the local population, and none for outsiders. Starches consisting of rice, corn, cassaba, and camotes constitute the main diet of the people. Very little fish, flour or coconuts are available. Meat consists mostly of wild pigs and some goats, and is preserved by drying in the sun in small cubes. Hardly any fruits are available.

The Tolong coastal area has an excellent food supply and has been little molested by the Japanese. There is a good rainfall, which makes for easy production of food and reserves of food have been stored in the hills.

The Tanjay-Bais area was formerly a good area for food, but guerrilla strife and Japanese patrols destroyed the crops and discouraged people from planting more than was needed for their own existence. This area is now hardly self-sufficient. The guerrillas have been trying to encourage the people to plant larger crops.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG 75

4

DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5

-1-

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

The entire coastal land from Tanjay to San Carlos has a good rainfall and formerly was a productive area in the growing of foodstuffs. However, Japanese patrols have scared people from the lowlands and this has resulted in a decrease in the planting of crops. There is now hardly enough food production to sustain the local population.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG 1968

8

~~SECRET~~