

EVACUEE REPORTS:

VILLAMOR,

JESUS A.

VILLAMOR

PRELIMINARY

INTERROGATION

OF

15 NOVEMBER 1943

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

15 November 1943

-- PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF MAJOR VILLAMOR RE INFORMATION PHILIPPINES --

Following information regarding conditions in the Philippines was furnished by Major Villamor, upon being interrogated by various staff officers of G.H.Q., S.W.P.A., 11 November 1943, 8th floor Conference Room, A.M.P. Building, Brisbane, Australia:

P R E S E N T

Brig. Gen. Fellers (6-3)
Capt. Temple (USN)
Col. Whittmore (6-4)
Lt. Col. Burns (MC)
Maj. McVittie
Maj. Villamor
Capt. Magruder
Lt. Williams

Major Villamor was sent to Negros, leaving Brisbane 27 December 1942, on a mission as observer in the Philippines for G.H.Q., to report on the enemy and the various guerrilla organizations then in contact with G.H.Q. and any others whose existence was not known at the time. Major Villamor returned to Australia at the orders of the C-in-C, arriving Brisbane 9 November 1943. This conference was designed to give officers concerned some idea of the information obtained by Major Villamor while in the Philippines.

Major Villamor: A vast majority of my statements and reports will be based on Luzon and Visayas alone in the Philippines. I left coverage of Mindanao to Commander Parsons. These are my agents' reports (referring to various documents on the desk). I don't know if any of you remember Lieut. Colonel Manzano. He was with General Casey as his Chief of Staff. He is now one of my agents right in Manila, and he has sent me this particular report about the Japanese forces in Luzon. It covers ground forces, air forces, transportation, fuel, communications, intelligence service, the spirit of the people towards the Japanese, prisoners of war, his own estimate of the situation, plus a last minute report on conditions in Manila. This fellow Manzano is probably one of the most intelligent agents I have and his reports are based on military principles. He understands what we want.

Maj. McVittie: What part of Luzon does that cover?

Maj. Villamor: He covers the Manila area and most of Northern Luzon.

Maj. McVittie: You have had various agents up there or just one?

Maj. Villamor: Perhaps it might be best that I explain the system I tried to establish. To begin with when I left here we already had contact with some guerrilla forces in Panay. We did not trust any of the guerrillas, as we did not know exactly how they stood. We landed out on Negros and tried to avoid both the Japanese and the guerrilla forces, but we later made contact and established an intelligence net, independent of the intelligence nets of the guerrilla outfits in the various islands. I started out by getting a few men. It is very difficult to get trained men there. It took me on the average of two months to train each man so that I could depend on any reports that were sent me. A lot of intelligence reports from the guerrilla outfits look good on paper, but when you start checking up the various items, you find out there is a



DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LER OF
20 AUG. 75

lot of confusion and rumors. I brought out some samples of those reports and you can give suggestions as to how the guerrilla system can be improved. I tried to establish a net based on the cell system whereby I would only have a handful of men under me and each of them would have a handful of men under him who would not know the man on top, then each one of those would have a handful of men who would not know anyone of the men other than the one immediately superior to him.

Gen.Fellers: Did you have a system whereby a man has a dual identity - I mean by that if he is doing a certain business there and happens to be caught, can he prove he is a certain individual that is in good standing?

Maj.Villamor: Well, I leave things like that entirely up to the individual. I make no effort to tell them what to do, what to say, etc.

Gen.Fellers: But is that being done?

Maj.Villamor: Yes, sir. We established a Manila office that was in the same building where the Japanese Intelligence had an office - where their agents used to report. We established an office here for the simple reason that the agents wanted to get in as close to the Japs as possible, where they thought they'd be least suspected. For instance, this report I have here was carried out of this office in the back of the pocket of the agent. He tried to make it as open as possible rather than hiding it in one of his shoes or amongst his clothing. When these agents of mine talk in the streets, the first thing they do is to agree on the story they're going to tell in case they're caught. The Japanese make a practice if they see three, four or even two people together talking or that they suspect of talking, not grabbing them immediately, but letting them go on speaking and then arresting each one separately; then they question each and ask what they were talking about. If there's any slip in the story, they place them in custody.

Gen.Fellers: Where is this office in Manila?

Maj.Villamor: Right opposite Crystal Arcade.

Maj.McVittie: Is that the center of all of your Manila activities?

Maj.Villamor: That's only one of them.

Gen.Fellers: When you were there, did you have freedom throughout the day time? Did you mix with the people in Manila?

Maj.Villamor: I wasn't able to meet any people right in Manila. Because I was easily recognized, I avoided going there.

Gen.Fellers: Did you stay in the town or in the country?

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG 75

Maj.Villamor: Well, sometimes in town and sometimes in the hills. Whenever the Japanese started to prepare an offensive, I would get out into the hills. The difficulty of checking the movements of the Japanese troops in Luzon is due to the fact that the Japanese make a practice of moving their troops about so much. In one particular day, you might have a certain increase in troops, then within the next few days, less than a handful of troops will be there. This happens all over the islands. The Japanese usually billet their troops in private homes in the towns.

Maj.McVittie: Do you have any indication of what type of troops they are, garrison or combat?

(Major Villamor read an answer to this question from Col. Manzano's report, indicating troops possibly largely garrison).



Gen.Fellers: Is there any chance that the Philippine Constabulary will try to fight our troops when we go in there?

Maj.Villamor: We have had so-called clashes with the Constabulary, but the PC have been rather sympathetic to the cause. When firing, for instance, they, particularly those from Bataan and Corregidor, fire over our heads. There is no question in my mind of the loyalty of those people.

Maj.McVittie: What is the strength of the PC?

Maj.Villamor: When I left, there were about 10,000; however, they plan to increase them to about 50,000 as a police force to maintain peace and order.

Gen.Fellers: Do they fully equip them?

Maj.Villamor: They only equip them with our rifles, the old Enfields, and they only give some of the soldiers five to twenty rounds of ammunition.

Gen.Fellers: Who is at the head of them?

Maj.Villamor: General Francisco.

Gen.Fellers: Do they trust him?

Maj.Villamor: We don't and the Filipinos don't trust him.

Gen.Fellers: I would be inclined to trust him.

Maj.Villamor: It seems he did a little more than what was expected of him. He has written a lot of personal letters. Secundo is running a camp at Los Baños, a sort of rejuvenation school and concentration camp.

Gen.Fellers: Do the Japanese trust him?

Maj.Villamor: I couldn't say whether they trust him or not.

Gen.Fellers: How about the attitude of the Filipinos towards Secundo?

Maj.Villamor: Negligible - they don't feel anything towards him.

Maj.McVittie: We will want to go over these reports.

Maj.Villamor: I should like to enclose all these with my report so there can be a relationship.

Maj.McVittie: You plan to cover everything you brought out?

Maj.Villamor: Yes, sir.

Maj.McVittie: Have you any captured Japanese documents?

Maj.Villamor: Just a few here. I was able to get some charts and other documents from a ship stranded near Bohol, but unfortunately I was supposed to be picked up on Mindanao. I missed the rendezvous, but the Bohol agent got there. The stuff is still there with one of the District Commanders.

Capt.Magruder: Why is it that we get so few captured documents?

Maj.Villamor: Because it is so difficult to get them. The Japanese make it a practice to carry away their dead and we are in no position to stick around after an ambush.

57



Capt. Magruder: You mentioned that they billet troops in private homes, what would be the chance of some of the civilians getting these captured documents?

Maj. Villamor: They'd be very scared. Don't misunderstand me about the billeting of the troops, they don't billet two or three men in one home, they take the whole house over and billet anywhere from 10 to 20 men there.

Capt. Magruder: Then there is very little contact between the civilians and the Japanese?

Maj. Villamor: As far as contact between the Japanese and civilians is concerned, the Japanese do go around and try to meet all sorts of people, but for a civilian to get any information out of them, it is pretty difficult. They seem to be pretty well trained in secrecy discipline. The ones that are not don't know much anyway. The officers are very well trained.

Gen. Fellers: Is there considerable shipping in Manila?

Maj. Villamor: There doesn't seem to be so much lately, and one thing we noticed is that although the Japanese attempted to get all kinds of scrap, or most anything they wanted, these are all piled up at the ports. They haven't been able as yet to ship them out.

Gen. Fellers: When they do load a ship there in Manila, do they use Filipino labor?

Maj. Villamor: Yes, sir.

Gen. Fellers: What would be the possibility of dropping some incendiaries in the ships about this size (approx 6 inches) to set the ships on fire?

Maj. Villamor: Yes, sir, that could be done, but we'd have to do those things with trained men.

Gen. Fellers: They have these small incendiaries that look something like a notebook, and you drop them anywhere and in about an hour or 75 minutes later, it becomes a ball of fire and burns for about 15 minutes. They would not be able to trace that if a man were able to drop one of these in a ship.

Maj. Villamor: We could do that, sir.

(Major McVittie then explained that so far the guerrillas have refrained from that sort of action, pointing out that their principal aim is to preserve their forces from attack).

(Major Villamor then read from Colonel Manzano's report regarding shipping)

Gen. Fellers: Are they building ships up there now?

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

Maj. Villamor: Yes, sir, quite a few of them - using Filipino labor.

Capt. Temple: Are they utilizing the Cavite navy yards there?

Maj. Villamor: Cavite is being used as a repair base and they are building ships in the small slipways.

Lt. Williams: Do they use the depot at Sangley Point?

Maj. Villamor: They have cleared that and it is believed they are going to construct a landing field nearby.



Gen.Fellers: How many aircraft do you people estimate to be on Luzon?

Maj.Villamor: At Clark Field, it is estimated, at least at the time of writing, there are about 60 planes of all types; there are less planes at other fields. Probably in all of Luzon, there's approximately 150-200 planes.

Capt.Temple: Can you give the types of those?

Maj.Villamor: Most all types are believed to be there. The agent that saw them said he saw a small fighter, very small and very fast; that's the way it was described, and that he noticed some little things sticking out from the wings; but all types are known to be there.

Capt.Temple: Do they keep any destroyers or submarines regularly operating out of Manila?

Maj.Villamor: We don't know if they are actually based there, but some are known to have been there and left, but whether there is a task force based there or not, we could not definitely say.

Capt.Temple: Where do they base the submarines now?

Maj.Villamor: I have no idea where the submarines are based.

Capt.Temple: In other words, they don't use the Philippines as a naval base at all, only a transit base?

Maj.Villamor: Apparently not. It's more for transit traffic or meeting place for convoys, etc.

Lt.Williams: Do you know anything about the dry dock being refloated?

Maj.Villamor: Yes, I have a photo of it.

Capt.Temple: Where is it located?

Maj.Villamor: It was brought down towards Cavite.

Capt.Temple: Have you it here with you?

Maj.Villamor: No, sir, I don't have it here with me.

Lt.Williams: Could they use any photographic equipment up there and have them send the photographs down?

Maj.Villamor: Very difficult. I mean the Japanese are always looking out for anyone running around up there with cameras and things like that.

Capt.Temple: Have they made any enlargement of the facilities at Cavite.

Maj.Villamor: I could not say, except from what this man reports here (reads-- indicating existing facilities repaired). This is about all we know of their harbor facilities there.

Capt.Temple: Are they using the Los Baños radio station?

Maj.Villamor: No mention of it is made here (referring to report).

Maj.McVittie: Is that the only report you have from Manila with you?

Maj.Villamor: No, sir, I have others with me.

Maj.McVittie: But that is the one you consider reliable?

25



Maj.Villamor: Yes, sir. I consider it my No. 1 report. This is on general affairs in Manila and vicinity and it covers nearly everything.

Maj.McVittie: It would be very interesting if you could tell us a little bit about your idea of what is going to happen to our forces in Negros. Are the Japs going to continue to retain an organization there in order to make a real drive against our forces there?

Maj.Villamor: I could not definitely state. I do not know very well the Japanese intentions there. All I could see was that the Japanese intend to clean up the guerrillas in Visayas; they will attempt to do that.

Maj.McVittie: Do you think they could do it in Visayas?

Maj.Villamor: I could almost say they can do it. They can disrupt the guerrilla organization, because there have been several occasions when the Japanese started campaigns and they drove the guerrillas back so much that the guerrillas were at the point of breaking up and for some reason or another, the Japanese never followed through. I believe if the Japs make a determined effort, they can certainly break it up.

Maj.McVittie: Is there anything we can do to help these fellows avoid that?

Maj.Villamor: Well, there are several things that ----.

Maj.McVittie (interposing): We can send in some supplies, but will that itself help the organization to continue in operation?

Maj.Villamor: Personally, I'm not sure what the ideas of GHQ are.

Maj.McVittie: The ideas are this, to send in supplies, as much as we can.

Maj.Villamor: But, that is, I don't know whether GHQ wants them to continue the guerrilla activities or if they want to carry on intelligence work.

Maj.McVittie: In preference to the second, against the time when we want to go in there.

Maj.Villamor: That is what I believe and a statement should be issued that you don't want any great guerrilla activities during this period.

Maj.McVittie: Is there some doubt as to what we want?

Maj.Villamor: It isn't a question of doubt, but they believe that carrying on of guerrilla activities and ambushes, etc. are more vital than the maintenance of an intelligence net. They do know you want them to maintain their organizations and establish an intelligence net, but at the same time, they seem to want to hit the Japs and surround their garrisons and any time they start coming out. This is causing the Japs to hit back, sometimes pretty hard, almost to the point where the guerrillas will have to break up. I think that if they do break up, it's going to take a long time to reorganize.

Lt.Williams: Is there anything we can do to convince the guerrillas that they should not continue as at present?

Maj.Villamor: A good, strong order would do it.

Maj.McVittie: Tell me this, do these ambushes help the morale of the guerrilla forces? In other words, if they were not permitted to pull these ambushes, do you believe they would be able to hold them together as a unit? Don't you have to have something like that to stir them up?

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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS E.O. 11652
20 AUG 75

Maj. Villamor: That's true. These District Commanders will tell you that we aren't doing any ambushing except what is necessary. Actually, they're doing it everytime the Japs come out. I don't believe in this sort of action. The only time they should hit the Japs are when they get in your area, when they're going to get you, when it's a matter of life and death. In one instance, around September 1st, Peralta and Abcede had an agreement which said, "We are going to hit the Jap beginning September 1st. Everytime they come out of their garrisons, hit them". That's just inviting retaliation. From the wires we got, they are really beginning to get hit again on Panay. I'm afraid it might disrupt the organization. In the beginning of October, they operated in East Panay and disrupted the guerrillas there. Peralta sent me a wire and said that it was going to take at least three months to reorganize.

Maj. McVittie: Do you think we ought to send a message and remind him of our orders?

Maj. Villamor: Yes. I should think the wording of the message is important; not thoroughly cutting out activity, but to maintaining only what is absolutely necessary.

Maj. McVittie: Do you think it is absolutely necessary for us to define what "necessary" is?

Maj. Villamor: I think it is. Their idea is that they want to show you here just what kind of an outfit they have; that they are still fighting. They just don't want to sit down. They want to show you that any guns or ammunition which are sent to them are being used.

Maj. McVittie: Do you think it would be a good idea to send a senior officer up there?

Maj. Villamor: I don't believe there is any need for it because he won't be able to move around up there anyway and he will be handicapped. I think you can do it from here and you do have direct communication with each District Commander.

Maj. McVittie: It's a little bit hard sometimes to get your ideas and for us to give you our ideas, whereas if you had somebody to go up there and talk to them, perhaps things could be straightened out. Would it be any good to their morale to see a senior American officer up there?

Maj. Villamor: I don't know. I believe, sir, just speaking from what I actually know of those people there, it's a matter of pride with them now and under the most difficult conditions, they have whipped their men into an outfit that would dare the Japs. To send someone there now -----.

Maj. McVittie (interposing): I don't mean permanently, just on sort of an inspection tour?

Maj. Villamor: Even then, I'd say that to begin with it would be very difficult for the man to do it, because I have attempted doing it myself. It was easier for me as I'm a Filipino and could pass through much better than an American could. And the fact is that they might feel that gradually they're going to be pushed back and all their efforts will be wasted.

Maj. McVittie: They need some assurance that we are not going to push them off?

Maj. Villamor: They feel when the right time comes, when the forces land there, that their work will be done.

Maj. McVittie: Then to send a man now, you think is a little too early?

87 Maj. Villamor: Yes, sir.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI
20 AUG. 75



Maj. McVittie: Is there any need of any particular type of personnel from here up in the Visayas?

Maj. Villamor: How do you mean?

Maj. McVittie: Would it be helpful if we send mechanics, radio operators, or doctors there?

Maj. Villamor: I'd say priority would be on technical men.

Lt. Williams: Can we send mechanics there to help out on different gadgets there?

Maj. Villamor: There aren't many gadgets there, nothing to fool around with, no fuel for such things, that would not be quite necessary, but I believe a Japanese interpreter on each island, in each district, is an excellent idea.

Maj. McVittie: How about doctors?

Maj. Villamor: No, they have sufficient doctors there.

Maj. McVittie: Medical supplies?

Maj. Villamor: Medical supplies, of course, are badly needed. What you have sent is just a drop in the bucket. In fact, I'd place that as No. 1 priority over ammunition.

Maj. McVittie: What types of medicine are needed?

Maj. Villamor: I have that listed on one of the reports.

Maj. McVittie: Do you think it is going to be increasingly difficult to move things in there?

Maj. Villamor: After the Japs start operations, it's going to be difficult, but if the Japs do not operate and maintain their little operations, it isn't very difficult. We cannot stop them from these operations. If they want to patrol a certain area, they just get in there and do it. If it is a little patrol, we ambush it. If their sailboats are plying around, it means that submarines going there would be handicapped.

Maj. McVittie: What are the facilities in Visayas for handling very large shipments of submarine freight?

Maj. Villamor: There have been enough of batelles there. We have a sufficient number of those to handle at least 100 tons.

Maj. McVittie: Would it attract attention?

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 02
20 AUG. 75

Maj. Villamor: We have them scattered at various places and they sail to the spot at the pre-arranged time.

Maj. McVittie: Do you have any feeling that the Japanese have known beforehand of any of these submarines being there?

Maj. Villamor: In one particular case, I'd almost say yes.

Maj. McVittie: Do you have any idea how they found out?

Maj. Villamor: My biggest fear is that there was a leak from here, from the passengers that were aboard the submarine, somehow or other. It may not have been intentionally, but from their talks, well, I specifically refer to that party that went to Negros last July. The leader of that party I know. He talks a little too much. He's a good friend of mine, but he is not a man for that business.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 02
20 AUG. 75





DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75

Maj. McVittie: Where is he now?

Maj. Villamor: I had recommended that he not continue on this mission, but since they said let him go, he went. He actually got into Bacolod on his way to Manila; from there, I lost track of him.

Maj. McVittie: You don't believe there has been any breaking of our radio codes?

Maj. Villamor: I don't think so. There's no indication that they have broken our codes.

Maj. McVittie: This particular case you mention, it is your opinion this man talked down here before he started.

Maj. Villamor: Yes, sir.

Maj. McVittie: He didn't have much time, did he?

Maj. Villamor: He got to Perth; his friends gave him a farewell party there. I found out later that many people in Washington knew he was going.

Maj. McVittie: What indication was there to you on the island that the enemy knew he was coming?

Maj. Villamor: That morning there happened to be a destroyer right off the point of pick-up; it stayed there for about a half hour. Also, an airplane went out and circled around there and went out to sea, stayed about 45 minutes and went back. That was most unusual. Several other times, planes went out to sea and came back, but that destroyer's presence was most unusual. In ten months that I have been there, that was the first and only time I saw a warship in that area. The next day, the Japs hit all along the coast and even penetrated our security area. The submarine happened to be lucky. Of course, it might have been a coincidence. Less than 24 hours' time before I contacted the boat, I told the C.O. of the Division, C-4 and the C.O. of the district. There could not be any possible way that the information could have gotten to the enemy at that time. The nearest enemy garrison was about three days and nights away.

Col. Burns: How about the communication center, they knew the ship was coming up?

Maj. Villamor: There could not have been any leak because I personally handled all messages from here and I burned everything; never kept any files.

Col. Burns: Before you came out on this present trip, there was a lot of activity along the coast?

Maj. Villamor: Not in my area, they were further north.

Col. Burns: According to those messages, they were within two or three miles of your pick-up point?

Maj. Villamor: No, sir, they landed about 25 miles north, but the next day, they moved south. They were actually out to get the C.P. near there.

Maj. McVittie: What about the time you started over to Mindanao?

Maj. Villamor: I believe there might be a leak, although I'm not certain of it. You noticed that I sent a wire that I wanted Fertig informed of my coming. I had communication and codes with him, but these codes were used by the district and so there would be a lot of clerks that would be involved in any messages of this sort. I wired here to tell Fertig that I was coming, to keep it as secret as possible. Fertig wired me back direct. I told him, as I told you here in GHQ, that I was going to land at the original point in Mindanao. Fertig was informed of that and he sent out some officers and soldiers to meet me at that point, but I found out about ten days after the trip that all along the coast down to where I was

supposed to land, all the towns were ready for me; they all said they were going to throw parties for me. I figured there might be a leak somewhere. It might have been a coincidence. I have no idea. The trouble is that the security discipline on Mindanao is not as great as you might think. There is a lot of confidence placed on people, and whether or not they deliberately turn the information over, I do not know. The trouble is that they just trust people too much. I don't say that is the definite cause, but it might be possible causes for leaks.

(Major Villamor then stated he had been on Negros more than on the other islands. However, he had reports from the different islands from the various men, and that he would pass the reports on to GHQ).

The conference adjourned at 10:20 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



VILLAMOR

REPORT

15 JANUARY -
20 OCTOBER 1943

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The following report is based on personal observations of the writer and information gathered from various sources. It covers the period between 15 January 1943 to 20 October 1943. The report almost wholly refers to the conditions in Luzon and the Visayan Islands. Many portions are direct quotations of agents' reports which have been checked and found accurate.

Jesus A. Villamor
JESUS A. VILLAMOR
Major, Air Corps.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG 75
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I. - ENEMY

GROUND FORCES.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OL
20 AUG. 75

A. Luzon.

1. Strength and disposition.
2. Equipment and supplies.
3. Morale, physical condition, efficiency.
4. Activities.

B. Visayas.

1. Strength and disposition.
2. Equipment and supplies.
3. Morale, state of training.
4. Activities.

C. Transportation.

D. Fuel.

E. Communication.

AIR FORCES.

A. Luzon and Visayas.

1. Airfields.
2. Aircraft.
3. Air defense.

NAVAL FORCES.

A. Luzon and Visayas.

1. Bases and docks.
2. Vessels in Philippine waters.
3. Mine fields.
4. Activities.

THE CONSTABULARY.

1. Organization.
2. Equipment, supplies and arms.
3. Morale.
4. Activities.
5. Loyalty.

NOTE FOR EVALUATION.

PART II. - FRIENDLY FORCES

1. Organization.
2. Strength and dispositions.
3. Resources.
4. Morale and state of training.
5. Activities.
6. Problems.
7. Recommendations.
8. Personal views on Guerilla Leaders.

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PART III. - CIVIL AFFAIRS
(Occupied areas)

1. Political.

- a. The leaders.
- b. The People.
- c. Morale.
- d. Loyalty.
- e. Independence.

2. Economic.

- a. General.
- b. Commerce and Industry.
- c. Finance.

3. Education.

4. Religion.

5. Social.

PART IV. - CIVIL AFFAIRS
(Unoccupied areas)

1. Political.

- a. General
- b. The leaders.
- c. The people.
- d. Morale.
- e. Problems.
- f. Recommendations.

PART V. - INTELLIGENCE NETS

1. Enemy.

2. Friendly.

PART VI. - MISCELLANEOUS

1. Communications.

2. Prisoners of war and American internees.

3. Situation of Foreigners in the Philippines.

4. Conclusion.

5. Annexes.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

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PART I.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

PART I.

E N E M Y

Ground Forces.

Air Forces.

Naval Forces.

The Constabulary.

Notes for Evaluation.

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I. GROUND FORCES (ENEMY)

CLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

A. LUZON.

1. Strength and Dispositions.

a. Due to the continuous movement of troops in Luzon, the arrival and departure of casualties, and the lack of an organization devoted mainly to the gathering of information, no accurate estimate can be made of the strength of the Japanese Forces in that Island. From reports received from travelers and residents of the different provinces, it is believed that the strength of the permanent garrison stationed in Luzon is about 70,000 and certainly not more than 100,000. Recently, however, there was the reported arrival (unconfirmed) of some 260,000 troops which were supposedly landed in Puro Peninsula, La Union the early part of August and which were immediately dispatched to the Cagayan Valley. The commander of this unit was reported to be Lt. General AOIKI SEITCHI.

b. Troops are widely scattered and stationed normally in towns and cities. Most of our old Army camps are garrisoned with only caretaking detachments. McKinley is, in addition, being used as a home for the sick, wounded and convalescents and also to house casualties. Stotsenberg (including Clark Field) and Dau apparently have strong garrisons. Those stationed in towns and cities normally occupy school buildings and large private residences as barracks. The garrisons in different towns vary in strength from one squad to about 2,000 men. The Manila garrison is subject to great fluctuations in number but the permanent establishment is not believed to be over 10,000 although a great number, estimated over 10,000 arrived in the City on August 28.

c. The following important centers are known to have between 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers: Legaspi, Naga, Lucena, Sta Cruz (Laguna), San Fernando (Pampanga and La Union), Cabanatuan. Five thousand troops are reported in Stotsenberg and Clark Field and 2,000 in Dau. Corregidor is reported to be garrisoned by only 150 Army and 50 Navy men.

d. The combat troops consist mainly of riflemen with a few artillery, cavalry and tanks. Most of the garrisons are composed exclusively of riflemen. There is a regiment of Cavalry at Sta Cruz (Laguna) and some field artillery in San Fernando (La Union). The presence of artillery is

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20 AUG. 75

Lucena has been reported. Few tanks are seen in Manila, four are reported in Lipa and four in Nasugbu.

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20 AUG. 75

g. Depots in Manila are:

1. Port area: large stock of motors, artillery pieces, ammunition and supplies.
2. Muelle de la Industria: All warehouses from Ynchausti to Farola filled with supplies.
3. Phil. Refining Area: Warehouses on Cristobal street filled with arms, ammunition and supplies. Single track rail connects this area with Paco Railroad Station.
4. San Boda College: Seven warehouses filled with supplies. Single track rail across Mendiola Street.
5. Phil. Trade School: Used for the repair of arms and mechanical implements.
6. Pinaglabanan (San Juan): Small arms depot.
7. Warehouses beyond the Manila Gas Corp.: Bomb depot.

2. Equipment and supplies.

a. The amount of equipment and supplies brought by the Japanese to Luzon and still remaining there is negligible. A great quantity of this equipment has been loaded in boats and left the Island. On the other hand, they have practically stripped the country of everything that may be of use to maintain and operate their military establishments.

b. Practically all construction and mining materials, tools and machinery available in Luzon are now in their possession. Some remain here for their use, large quantities have been shipped out. They acquire possession of goods by outright confiscation or purchase, whichever they find more expedient. In the case of purchase, the price paid for (in occupation notes of course) is of little concern to them. The price of a keg of nails for instance, is now over \$1000.00. Thousands of people are engaged in the "buy and sell" business, the final destination of all goods being the Japanese Army. Japanese have been especially active in salvage operations. Damaged buildings have been torn down and the materials salvaged for new constructions. Corregidor has been a good hunting ground for machinery, scrap iron and various kinds of supplies; these have been loaded



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

43

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in ships for unknown destinations. The silver coins dumped in the channel between Corregidor and Ceballe have been the object of frantic efforts to salvage on the part of the Japs, but due to the crude methods used it is doubtful if all of them have been retrieved although a quantity is known to have been salvaged.

c. In spite of the huge quantities of equipment and supplies obtained in the Philippines, all Japanese construction projects are behind schedule. This state of affairs finds its cause in the following difficulties:

- (1) Practically no replacement from outside sources.
(Shortage of these items or shortage of bottoms)
- (2) Insufficiency of fuel available (see report on "fuel")
- (3) Disruption of production in Luzon.

d. In the matter of food and clothing, the Japanese enjoy here an enviable position. The people in Luzon are suffering from lack of these vital necessities, but the Japs, thanks to the effective control system established by them, are not only properly fed and clothed but have been able to export food and clothing to their people residing in Japan and Formosa.

3. Morale, physical conditions and efficiency.

a. Undoubtedly, the morale of the Japanese soldier is high. He believes in the justice of their cause and is sure of their victory in this war. Some among the few intelligent and open minded group are beginning to realize that victory is not within their grasp yet. They have been heard to remark that this war "will last one hundred years" which is certainly quite a concession on their part.

b. The physical appearance of the troops stationed in Luzon is excellent. They are well built, of better than average height and look well fed and well groomed. Transient casuals coming from Japan and proceeding to the front (?) do not measure up to the physical standard of the soldiers stationed in Luzon. They are younger, weaker and smaller. One agent reports seeing a whole battalion of these soldiers and not one of them was over five feet in height.

c. The Filipinos have a low opinion of the mental capacity of the Japanese. Their experts and advisers stationed in the Islands do not possess the technical knowledge of the men they are supposed to tutor. They are

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 04
20 AUG. 75



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slow in grasping the situation after all facts have been presented to them and as a consequence, they delay in making decisions and once these are made, they are not logical. This is exemplified by a very recent incident when several Manila Society Girls (including Misses PILAR CAMPUS and ALICE FERIA) were arrested for disturbing the peace during one of those "demonstrations of gratitude." When questioned by the police as to who they believed would win the war, these girls answered that "at the rate America is going, who else could win the war." It did not take long before they were released. This low efficiency is a cause of wonder to many considering the high accomplishments of these people.

4. Activities.

a. The Japanese troops in Luzon are carrying on no other activity than those normally assigned to an army of occupation. To accomplish this mission they make a showy display of their strength and execute acts of intimidation and reprisal.

b. Troops are scattered in many small garrisons, so that the Japanese soldier can be seen all over the country. They are moved around a great deal to give the impression of larger strength than they actually have. Airplanes, when flying over populated areas, come down to very low altitudes so that the people can see and hear them.

c. In cooperation with the constabulary, they conduct patrol activities, but normally return to the barracks before dusk except in very rare instances when they raid guerilla strongholds. When not on patrol missions, they are given leave to wander all over town during the daytime and streets, stores, bars, restaurants, markets, etc., become full of Japs in uniform. Their behavior is that of conquerors dealing with despised people.

d. In dealing with suspects, they are sadistically cruel. They make daily displays of their brutality. The military police is greatly dreaded. The acts of torture to which a large number of people have been subjected at Fort Santiago can hardly be believed. The Japanese many times follow the policy of punishing whole communities for the unlawful acts of an individual or a group of individuals. Whole towns are even bombed for being suspected of giving assistance to guerillas. At present they are placing the male population of some towns under arrest for as long as two weeks to obtain information or firearms. Mauban and Lubang (to obtain

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR CM
20 AUG. 75

53

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names of the leaders of the Home Guard), Pagsanjan and Los Banos (to require the surrender of firearms), Tisong (to obtain the surrender of a guerrilla leader), Lipa (for reasons unknown) and so many other places have been or are being the subject of this treatment. In Lubang, two women were shot for attempting to deliver food to their husbands who had been arrested. The tale of brutality and cruelty is an unending one.



B. VISAYAS.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OM
20 AUG. 75

1. Strength and disposition. }
2. Equipment and supplies. }

a. For a detailed report on the strength, disposition, equipment and supplies of enemy troops in the Visayas, see the G-2 reports from each island which are being submitted separately.

b. Briefly the enemy has confined himself to the occupation and control of strategic and commercially important centers.

c. As in Luzon, the combat troops consist mainly of riflemen with some artillery pieces, cavalry units and light tanks and armored cars.

3. Morale and state of training.

a. The same comments apply to enemy troops in the Visayas as were given regarding those in Luzon.

b. The state of training of the permanent garrisons is excellent. Discipline is strictly enforced and training is continually going on. Air raids alerts for instance, are conducted whenever the sound of an airplane is heard. Lately (about the end of September) gas drills were introduced in their training although it is not known yet whether this was done for purely military reasons or merely to lend support to their latest propaganda whereby they have threatened the people in unoccupied areas with gas.

4. Activities.

a. In addition to activities normally associated with armies of occupation, more extensive patrol activities are conducted by these troops than those in Luzon. Penetration into friendly security areas are not infrequent and these are particularly pronounced whenever there are a large number of troops assigned to their various garrisons for "practical exercises." Troops often march and deploy during bright moonlight hours and launch their attacks shortly before daybreak. When attacks involve the use of sea borne troops, these are usually carried out by use of barges

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20 AUG. 75



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20 AUG. 75

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from transports which are often accompanied by several launches and, at times, escorted by one or more airplanes. However, when surprise landings are desired involving the use of a considerably smaller number of troops native sailboats are used. Sometimes the element of surprise is achieved in these amphibious operations by landing troops several miles away from the point of attack and approaching on foot with lighted torches along the beach, such in the manner of fishermen. In Cebu this was successfully accomplished resulting in the capture of Bvt. Lt. Col. JANDALEN.

b. On land the enemy employs all sorts of tricks in an attempt to fool the guerillas. These tricks range all the way from disguising soldiers as women planting or harvesting rice, to traveling in private cars or trucks with civilians in an attempt to pass thru certain areas uncollected. The Japs have made it a practice to bring back their dead from every encounter and they have also made it a habit to tie or chain to each individual soldier his weapons, presumably to make it that much more difficult for the guerillas to obtain the same.

c. Their treatment of captured guerillas and civilians depend on the "policy" presently in force. Should the attraction policy be on, such captured persons are treated warily, given medicines, food and clothing and, in the case of guerillas, given a brief "rejuvenation" training and finally released. On the other hand, should the surrender-or-else policy be in effect, absolutely no mercy is shown. People, including women and children, are shot as soon as they start running away from the sight of any Japanese soldier. Guerillas, if captured alive, are tortured to death and if already found dead, are beheaded.

C. TRANSPORTATION.

1. The Japanese have done an excellent job of repairing the bridges destroyed by our forces. With the exception of the Kannon road to Baguio which is sometimes closed to traffic due to some temporary bridges being washed out during the rainy season, all roads are now open to traffic.

2. The Japanese have all the vehicles necessary to take care of all their transportation needs. In addition to the cars and trucks belonging to ~~USAFPE~~ which fall into their hands, they have confiscated practically all enemy alien owned vehicles and have purchased a large number of those privately owned.

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3. On the other hand, due principally to the difficulty in obtaining the necessary permit and fuel, there are very few vehicles privately operated. Motor traffic on highways and cities is very thin. Motor bus lines which used to operate fleets of buses to service the different provinces are now out of existence. A one-bus-service is available between some towns. The same is true with freight trucks. In Manila, only the government, some high officials, a few prominent individuals and a number of doctors have motor transportation. Recently, the number of doctors in possession of permits to operate cars have been reduced from 100 to about 70.

4. All railroad bridges in Luzon have been repaired and traffic is now almost normal. Due to the difficulty of travel and transportation on highways, the railroad is carrying the main burden in transporting freight and personnel from and to different points of the Island. Since Army needs take first priority and the rolling stock available has been somewhat depleted, the railroad is unable to meet the most urgent transportation requirements of the country.

D. FUEL.

1. The fuel situation seems to be critical and is adversely affecting the Japanese activities and operations in the rear areas.

2. Aviation gas. Little is known on the quantity stored by the Japs in the Islands. There are rumors of large underground storage built by the Japanese and filled to capacity but each case reported, when investigated by a more reliable agent, turned out to be a hoax. However, one agent reports that three of the oil tanks in Pandacan (Manila Gas Corp.) are in use. Two of these tanks were left undamaged by the USAFFE, and one slightly damaged has since been repaired. The gas sent to Nielson and Nichols Fields in tank trucks or in drums are obtained from these tanks. Large supplies of gasoline are also reported stored in Puro (San Fernando, La Union) where, in the words of a Japanese employee to an agent, they have "enough gas for one year."

3. Alcohol. As a substitute for gasoline, alcohol is the fuel normally used for motors. Many cars and trucks are charcoal fed. Alcohol is obtained locally from distilleries operating in Luzon and Visayas. The output for the month of July this year of the distilleries in Luzon are as follows:



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20 AUG. 75

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Del Carmen	(Pampanga)	616,000 liters
Canlubang	(Luzon)	472,000 liters
Tarlac		340,000 liters
Nasugbu	(Batangas)	210,000 liters
La Tondena	(Manila)	241,000 liters
Calumpit	(Bulacan)	140,000 liters
Paniqui	(Tarlac)	110,000 liters
Bamban	(Tarlac)	101,000 liters
Mans-oog	(Pangasinan)	<u>95,000 liters</u>
Total		2,325,000 liters

To obtain a clear picture of the insufficiency of the output of distilleries to take care of the normal needs of alcohol as well as the difficulty encountered in the production of this fuel, the following measures taken to decrease consumption and assist production are enumerated:

- a. Many permits to operate motor vehicles have been revoked.
- b. Monthly allowance of alcohol for vehicles (not Army) has been reduced (average, 100 liters monthly).
- c. Issue of alcohol limited to 5 liters per day per vehicle.
- d. Alcohol is now being obtained from confiscated sugar issued to distilleries in spite of shortage of sugar in the country. In Luzon, one sack of brown sugar now costs ₱200.00.

4. Diesel, Bunker, Coconut and Lubricating oils. All reports tend to show that with the possible exception of bunker oil, shortage is being felt in all fine and lubricating oils. One agent reports that the motor ship he is on (operated under the Army) uses a combination of bunker oil, coconut oil and refined petroleum as fuel, while the lubricating oil issued is of varied quality and consistency without regards to the needs of the motor parts. He understands that Japanese motor vessels also use a combination of diesel and coconut oils. The railroad is using firewood in the freight trains and coconut oil (probably mixed with other oils) for their passenger trains. The result on the efficiency of the machines and engines is exactly what should be expected. Not only the efficiency is greatly lowered but machines and engines develop troubles which put them out of commission periodically.

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20 AUG. 75



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5. Coal. Shortage of this fuel is affecting the operation of utilities and factories. The Manila Gas Corporation has been forced to put a quota on the consumption of gas by their customers. This quota is between 10% to 30% less than the normal consumption. The B.T.U. of the gas produced by this corporation is about 50% less than before the war. The Gas Company has no reserve of coal left and unless shipments from Japan are received, it may have to discontinue service in the near future. The Rizal Cement Factory has sufficient coal to operate at full capacity for about three months. It recently sent coal to the Cebu Cement Factory sufficient for one month's operation. This company had to discontinue operation before due to lack of fuel.

E. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Mail. Post Offices in the more important cities and towns have been gradually reopened. However, inadequacy of transportation available and mail censorship cause some delay in the delivery of the mail.

2. Telephone and Telegraph. Both the local telephone service in Manila, that of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone to outlying cities and towns and the insular telegraph are functioning. These services are very unsatisfactory due mainly to shortage of materials for repairs of lines. The high prices paid for all electric equipment and supplies has been a great temptation for thieves to steal wiring, bulbs, etc. causing disruption in the light, telephone and telegraph services.

3. Radio. The Japanese are known to be operating several listening stations in Manila, the most important one being that located in Sananillo Bldg., Escolta. There is also a report stating that the Union College Building is now the communications center of the Japanese in Manila. Most of the personnel working in radio stations are Filipinos. Some Philippine Army Signal Corps Officers and many enlisted men have been compelled to work for them. A plan of the R.C.A. station at Cubao (Near Camp Murphy) is attached. Following is a list of known radio stations in Manila or vicinity:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OE
20 AUG. 75



82

- 9 -

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RADIO STATIONS IN OR NEAR MANILA

<u>STATION</u> Receiving or Transmitting)	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PERSON.</u>	<u>GUARDS</u>	<u>OPERATED</u> <u>BY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Receiving Station	F. del Rosario, Passay	1 Jap. 3 Pil.	Const. Patrol only	Broadcstg. Corp.	2 entrances 1 at F. Harrison; 1 at De- wey Blvd.
Trans. Station (Formerly RCA)	Central Blvd. Cubao, Manila Hghts.	1 Jap. 15 Pil.	Military Sqd. 7 Men	"	Guards w/ 2 MGs; cal. 50 See Sketch.
New Rec'g Station.	Brixton Hill Sta. Mesa	Varied	None	"	Under con- struction.
Trans. Station (Formerly Bu. of Posts)	Passay	1 Jap. 4 Pil.	None	Communica- tion Bu. (Denshi Kyo ku)	Near RR tracks.
Receiving Station	Perenaque (Formerly Mackay Trans. Station)	varied	None	"	Under con- struction.
New Trans- mitting Station	Balintawak	Varied	Unknown	"	Exact loca- tion unknown Approx. be- fore reach- ing former KZIB.
Trans. Station	Caloocan (Manila Golf Course)	5 Jap 15 Pil.	None	Int. Com. Co. (Kikusai Denki)	Still under construction but 6 trans. ready in op- eration.
Receiving Station	Alabang (Formerly Mackay Rec'g Station)	Varied	None	"	Under con- struction.
Transmitting Station	Central Blvd. Cubao, Manila Heights (Former Excelsor Motion picture studio.	Approx. 15 Japs.	Military 10 men.	Weather Bu. and Military.	Several trans- mitters oper- ating. Roof w/camouflage paint. See Sketch



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20 AUG. 75

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— JAPANESE FORCES (ENEMY)



A. LUZON AND VISAYAS.

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20 AUG. 75

1. Airfields.

a. The following airfields are known to be actively operated by the Japanese: Clark Field, Zeblan Field, Neilson Airport, Nichols Field, Sta Barbara and Lahug Field. Many others are in the process of construction or are undergoing improvements. This is the case with Tuguegarao, Naguilian, Pasig, Lipa, Lucena, Naga, Legaspi, Bacolod and Dumaguete. There is a report of a huge field in operation in Puerto Princess, Palawan, but no confirmation has been received of this information.

b. Little information has been gathered on Clark Field although reports indicate that runways have been extended and that planes are hidden under nearby trees. Like in all their other bases, the number of planes vary greatly but that it averages about 60 planes of all types. Lately, however, there has been consistent reports of air activity in the north, where flights of 70 or more planes are often seen. Apparently, however, Clark field is the main base.

c. The same lack of detailed information applies to Zeblan Field. The runways have been extended and are reported paved. Detailed information, however, is available on Nichols Field and Nielson Airport. For such details see attached drawings.

d. It may reasonably be assumed that the air strength in the Philippines is not very large, but their preparations show that they are getting all facilities ready to take care of future needs if and when expansion of their air force in the Islands become necessary. The fields are apparently being used as jump off places for planes coming from Japan on their way to the junk piles of Wewak, Rabaul and other points in the SWPA.

2. Aircraft.

a. All known types of Japanese aircraft have been observed in the Philippine skies.

b. There is nothing to indicate, however, that the Japanese are conducting periodical operational patrols from Philippine bases. My own personal observations have led me to the belief that such patrols are only conducted when it is known or suspected that one or more of our patrol crafts are in a given area and also when convoys are to pass through certain

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"dangerous" areas. Reports of patrol craft leaving bases at certain hours and returning "after two hours" are pure guesswork. I have had regular pilots observe the aerial activities of the enemy and their reports have always been that no definite schedules are observed and that it is extremely difficult for them to determine which plane or planes left at what time and where to. One thing significant, however, which may possibly indicate that the Japanese have not lowered their training standards, is the fact that there has never been any reports of crashes from any of the fields for months prior to my departure.

3. Air Defense.

a. It has been noted that the anti-aircraft guns reported in or near the airfields are very small in number. Other anti-aircraft batteries reported installed are those located in Paranaque beach opposite the Los Tamarau Club consisting of 4 - 3" guns, without sights, and manned by untrained Filipino personnel and some guns scattered in Malacanan Park, San Beda College, Far Eastern University, and the roof of the Marco Polo Hotel. Reports also show the presence of two 3" and two 37 mm guns in Corregidor.

b. From the information received, it appears that the Japanese are practically without effective defense from the ground against air raids. As this situation is almost unbelievable, it is probably safer and wiser to assume that the enemy has been smart and successful enough in keeping his preparations along this line in great secrecy, and that therefore, attacking forces should not be too naive in concluding the situation is what it appears to be.

c. Attempts are being conducted to locate radar and RDF installations as well as details about fighter command and plotting rooms if any.

III. NAVAL FORCES.

A. LUZON AND VISAYAS.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



1. Bases and Docks.

a. Cavite has been reported to be completely repaired and in full use. (see attached sketch). Dewey dry dock has been refloated and is now also in use. The same holds true for the Farshaw docks and the repair facilities in Engineer Island. All piers in the Manila area are in good condition with Nos. 1, 5 and 7 in use by the Army and No. 3 exclusive for the Navy. Cebu's docks are also reported in operation.

2. Vessels in Philippine Waters.

a. It is not known whether or not any task forces are permanently



assigned to the Philippines.

b. There is only one vessel in operation between Manila, Iloilo, Zamboanga and Cebu. Most of the inter-island traffic is by "bateles" (overgrown life boats with sails) which are sometimes towed by launches.

g. The following information was recently obtained on the whereabouts of ships formerly operating in Philippine waters:

SS. Dn. Jose	Damaged - afloat in harbor.
SS. Sagoland	Under water in bay - probably to be salvaged.
SS. Bohol	" " " " " " " "
SS. Samal	" " " " " " " "
SS. Viscaya	Stranded off Tondo - " " " "
SS. Mayon	Probably salvaged already (N. Mindanao).
SS. Casiana	" " " (Off Corregidor).
SS. Karlaon	" " " " " "
SS. Apo	" " " " " "
MS. Carmen	" " " " " "
MS. Palawan	Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.
MS. Anakan	" " " " " " " "
MS. Princess of Cebu ..	" " " " " " " "
SS. Comp. Filipinas ..	" " " " " " " "
SS. Lopus	" " " " " " " "
SS. Cetus	" " " " " " " "
SS. Latouche	" " " " " " " "
SS. Pas	" " " " " " " "
SS. Luzon	" " " " " " " "
MS. Princess of Negros	" " in actual coastwise service for Army & Navy
MS. Kolambagan	" " " " " " " "
MS. Esteban Riu	" " " " " " " "
MS. La Florecita	" " " " " " " "
MS. Santa Teresita	" " " " " " " "
SS. Dos Hermanos	" " " " " " " "
SS. Zamboanga	" " " " " " " "
SS. Dn. Juan O.	" " " " " " " "
SS. Escalante	" " " " " " " "
SS. Ntra. Sra. de la Paz	" " " " " " " "

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12

SS. Ntra. Sra. De Guia-Salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & Navy.							
MS. Ventura	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
MS. Bessie Ann	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SS. TANGOG	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SS. Pelayo	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SS. Palagy	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SS. Pathfinder	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SS. Tanon	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Tug Baga ex Gen. Weeks	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Tug MS. Trabajador ..	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SS. Dredger	In Service - dredging bay.						
SS. Bisayas	At Earnshaws - under repairs.						
SS. Arayat	At Earnshaws - " "						
SS. Mauban	At Cavite - " "						
SS. Magallanes	At Cavite - " "						

Vessels reported lost: SS. Montanez, Ntra. Sra. del Rosario, Bicol, Romblon and Banahao.

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g. Approximately 90% of harbor launches have been salvaged and in use. About 50% of lighters, barges, bancas, cascos etc. have been refloated and in use. Lost materials are rapidly being replaced from new slipways. In Manila for instance, on 15 August 43, four wooden ships (about 200 tons) were put to service although under sail only as no motors were available. About 18 launches (approximately 50 ft.) are also awaiting motors.

3. Mine Fields.

a. No definite information is available to indicate the presence of mine fields in any area. For one thing it has been observed that all ships enter and leave Manila Bay by the North channel only and ships travel to and from the Bay unescorted and minus the services of port pilots.

b. There is no information regarding any sorties conducted by mine sweepers. However, the Japanese have, on more than one occasion, cautioned the general public about mines which "have broken loose from their moorings". These mines are claimed to have been those planted by the American forces prior to the fall of the Philippines. At least one ship has been known to have been sunk by such a mine. This was in Larena, Island of Siquijor. Others have been reported by different sources but no definite information is available.

82

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4. Activities:

a. Sangley Point, in Cavite, is reported being prepared for airport facilities.

b. There are indications that the Japanese are using "hospital ships" for other purposes than the transportation of the wounded. There has been two reports (the former SS. Seattle Maru and the SS. Aki Maru) whereby these supposed hospital ships were loaded with war supplies from local piers.

c. (1) During the past few months, there has been an increased tendency of the enemy to use native sailboats. These sailboats are generally of the Moro "Vinta" and "Pangos" types although some Visayan type sailboats and "batales" have been seen. Moro vintas are fast (15 knots with a good wind), slim in appearance and are easily distinguishable by their large square sails. They are mainly used for passenger traffic. Moro pangos are broader than vintas, slower and are used principally for cargo. The same type sails are used although pangos have collapsible masts which are brought down with the sails during a calm. Visayan type sailboats have triangular sails and are used both for cargo and passenger traffic. Like in vintas and pangos, outriggers are standard. They average six to eight knots with a good wind. Batales are overgrown life boats used for cargo and passenger traffic too. They have no outriggers but have large triangular sails. The larger batales sometimes have twin sails.

(2) These boats are used by the enemy in their attempts at "surprise" attacks. Another possible use is for spotting friendly patrol craft. This is likely as these sailboats have been seen to go and stay out at sea for certain lengths of time. The Japanese are not known to have any "coast watchers" organization.

(3) In this connection it might be well to mention that probably 80% of the sailboats seen in Philippine waters are friendly. Of the remaining twenty, 5% will be enemy and 15% doubtful as these will be boats which are not actively with the enemy but have dealings with them in that they call on enemy controlled ports. No mathematical accuracy, however, is claimed for the above estimate.

d. Routes.

(1) Main shipping routes seem to be from either China or

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20 AUG. 75

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Formosa to Manila, thence:

- (a) Direct to Balikpapan, Borneo,
- (b) Thru Verde Island Passage - Ticao Pass - San Bernardino Strait - Palau - (?),
- (c) Verde Island Passage - Ticao - Camotes Sea - Cebu - Cenigao Channel - Surigao Strait - SWPA,
- (d) Verde Island Passage - Ticao Pass - Camotes Sea - Cebu - Bohol Strait - Mindanao Sea - Sulu Sea - (?),
- (e) Verde Island Passage - Tablas Strait - Cuyo East Pass - Sulu Sea - Mindanao Sea - Surigao Strait - SWPA,
- (f) Verde Island Passage - Tablas Strait - Cuyo East Pass - Sulu Sea - (?).

(2) Cebu seems to be handling more traffic now than in the past. This traffic ranges all the way from 10,000 ton tankers down to barges.

(3) No naval vessels heavier than light cruisers have been reported in Philippine waters except in a few instances where an aircraft carrier and one or more battleships (?) were reported in Manila Bay.

a. Patrols.

(1) Patrols are conducted by vessels of a Sugar Charlie class or smaller. In some areas, fast motor boats are used and in many places, fishing trawlers are used for the dual purpose of fishing and patrol. The larger patrol craft are armed with three inch guns while smaller ones carry one pounders or .50 cal. or .30 cal. machine guns. Even sailboats are armed with .30 cal. machine guns and automatic rifles.

(2) Since the main purpose of these patrols is to cut inter-island traffic, the areas generally patrolled are the channels between islands.

IV. THE CONSTABULARY

1. Organization.

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a. The force now counts with some 10,000 members and its present chief is General FRANCISCO. Membership consists mainly of civilian volunteers and some released prisoners of war. They are stationed in many localities in small detachments.

2. Equipment, supplies and arms.

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a. The organization is poorly equipped and armed. They are furnished with clothing, given food allowance and paid about the same as the old constabulary. They are armed with the old enfield rifles and issued a small amount of ammunition which averages ten rounds per man.

3. Morale.

a. Very low. Some surrendered prisoners joined the force under compulsion. The great majority of the men are in the organization just to make a living. None enjoy the service and practically all are aware of the feeling of suspicion and distrust towards them both by the people and the Japanese.

4. Activities.

a. Those connected with the maintenance of peace and order. The conduct of their patrols vary with the policies of their immediate commanders and the presence of Japanese "supervisors". Some actively engage in activities detrimental to our forces. Others merely make a pretense of attempting to establish peace and order.

5. Loyalty.

a. It is extremely doubtful if any appreciable number of them could be made to take the side of Japan when and if American and Japanese forces clash again in the Philippines. Some may take a neutral course of action but the vast majority will side with the Americans if the opportunity presents itself to do so.

b. Actually, some units and commanders are already pledged to join the expected American expeditionary forces. Others have come to some sort of an agreement with the guerrillas. On the other hand, some detachments, pending actual operations by American forces, are determined to carry on their mission of maintaining "peace and order" even if by doing so they come into grips with pro-American groups.

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NOTES FOR EVALUATION OF REPORT ON THE ENEMY:

I. (Ground Forces)

- A. 1. a. Total strength is an estimate based on data obtained from various sources; some accurate, some recent and some out-of-date. It may be off as much as 50%. Data on soldiers landed recently, unconfirmed but fairly reliable.
- b. True. Conditions in towns and cities common knowledge. That in old Army camps reported by Philippine Scouts working therein. Estimate on Manila can be considered a guess.
- c. That of larger towns checked from various sources. That of Stotsenburg and Dau, although source appears good, may be exaggerated. That of Corregidor believed accurate.
- d. When definite statements are made, they have been checked.
- e. Checked.
2. a. Reliable.
- b. Common knowledge. Data on Army posts from reliable Army personnel working therein. Same on salvage of coins.
- c. Reliable report by engineers engaged in projects.
- d. Common knowledge.
3. a. Common knowledge.
- b. Personal observation of chief agent.
- c. Common knowledge.
4. a. Obvious and common knowledge.
- b. Common knowledge.
- c. Common knowledge.
- d. Common knowledge. Reports on towns from eyewitnesses closely related to chief agent.
- B. 1. and 2.
- a. Submitted by various units.
- b. Common knowledge.
- c. Common knowledge.
3. a. Common knowledge.
- b. Common knowledge. Report on gas drills checked from various sources.

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4. a. Common knowledge and personal observation of writer.
b. Common knowledge.
g. Common knowledge.

- C. 1. Common knowledge.
2. Common knowledge.
3. Common knowledge.
4. Common knowledge.

- D. 1. Common knowledge.
2. Information from civil engineer formerly with U.S.G.M. Friend of chief agent.
3. Common knowledge and official data.
4. Common knowledge and official data.
5. Common knowledge. Data on Rizal Cement Factory furnished by high official of the Nat'l. Development Co.

- E. 1. Common Knowledge.
2. Common knowledge.
3. Data furnished by Filipino radio engineer connected with radio station in Manila Heights. Reliable.

II. (Air Forces)

- A. 1. a. Checked from reports received.
b. Reports on Clark Field gathered by agent from laborers. That on air activity in the north from various sources.
c. That on Zeblen Field gathered from laborers. Drawing of Nielson by reliable men. Errors may be due to his lack of qualifications. Drawing on Nichols very reliable.
d. Conclusions of writer.
2. a. From reports received.
b. Conclusions of writer.
3. a. Common knowledge.
b. Conclusion of writer.
g. Reason is obvious.

III. (Naval Forces)

- A. 1. a. Entirely reliable.
2. a. No reports received to indicate presence of such a force.

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- b. Common knowledge.
- c. From ship officers and shipyard officials actually engaged in operations.
- d. Same as above.
- 3. a. Common knowledge.
- b. Common knowledge. Information on ship sinking in Lerena from eyewitnesses.
- 4. a. Reliable.
- b. Reliable.
- c. Personal observations of writer and common knowledge.
- d. From reports on shipping movements.
- e. Personal observations of writer and common knowledge.

IV. (The Constabulary)

- 1. a. Common knowledge.
- 2. a. Common knowledge.
- 3. a. Conclusion of writer and personal knowledge.
- 4. a. Common knowledge.
- 5. a. Conclusion of writer and common knowledge.
- b. Conclusion of writer and common knowledge.

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PART II.

PART II.

FRIENDLY FORCES

Organization.

Strength and dispositions.

Resources.

Morale and state of training.

Activities.

Problems.

Recommendations.

Personal views on Guerilla Leaders.



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FRIENDLY FORCES

I. ORGANIZATION

1. The organization of guerilla units in the Philippines cannot be justly attributed to any single man or group of men. Rather it was more the inevitable result of the Japanese policy of hurrying up the Japanizing of the Filipinos. This fatal policy of the Japanese, and the equally greivous corollary of literally beating the not too eager people into wholehearted cooperation did not accomplish the expected. Thus it was that it did not take long before defiance of enemy occupation and control. Many of these who first bore arms against the enemy after the fall were unsurrendered soldiers. Many others were civilians who for purely patriotic or personal reasons took it upon themselves to defy the enemy. At the outset, however, and in some places even to this date, conditions brought about by this flare up of renewed resistance were almost chaotic. Gradually, however, the more stable minds began to assert themselves and along towards the period of July - August of 1942, things began to take shape in the formation of military groups under recognized leaders.

2. It was this state of affairs insofar as friendly units in the Visayas were concerned that confronted me upon arrival in Negros in January, 1943. PERALTA then claimed (and for a fact had received orders to this effect) command of the IV Philippine Corps comprising all the Islands in the Visayas. Actually, however, with the exception of his own command in Panay, great dispute raged in the other islands regarding the authenticity of his claims and subsequent orders. In Negros, was GADOR who posed himself as the "most senior officer in the field" (which is not true, Col. GARMA, 10th Military District was the most senior) and who consistently cast doubts on PERALTA. There were also AUSEJO's and MERCADO's and various other "independent" units including a so-called "Puring Group" which was led by two brothers, one a former Private First Class in the Philippine Army and the other a driver and ex-convict) who believed that since they had voluntarily banded together to fight the enemy no one had any right to butt in and infringe on their independent rights. And prior to my arrival, there was NATA who had his own unit (one of the most powerful in Negros) and who at first did not see why he should take orders from ALCEDE who had already aligned himself with PERALTA. In Cebu were FENTON and CUSHING who as



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"co-commanders," strictly adhered to a hands-off policy as regards units in other islands. In Bohol was INGINIERO who had just settled his own problems in that island. In Leyte, KANGLEON and MIRANDA were just beginning to have their own troubles which has now reached the status of a minor civil war. Samar had its MERRITT, ARTECHE, SULCI and other leaders who had smaller though nonetheless strong units.

3. But this was not all. PERALTA, besides having his troubles as C.O. of the IV Philippine Corps, had a series of misunderstandings with FERTIG in Mindanao, who at the time was claiming command of all forces in the Visayas and Mindanao. AUSEJO had already aligned himself with FERTIG while ARCEDE, his neighbour in Negros, had recognized and submitted his unit to PERALTA. Meanwhile, GADOR, noticing that FERTIG had suddenly claimed to be a general, likewise boosted himself to a major general and claimed command of all forces in the Philippines.

4. So it went. Each major leader professing to high heaven nothing but cooperation and good will to other units but actually working and maneuvering for the control of the whole. At one time for instance, PERALTA had sent a number of liaison officers to FERTIG with instructions to place themselves at the latter's disposal. The officers sailed and the next thing PERALTA knew memorandums from Mindanao appeared carrying the "good news" that the entire IV Corps had been placed at the disposal of FERTIG and that all would be well now.

5. Because it was getting to be a vicious circle, and because there did not seem to be any hope for an immediate solution for the problems on hand, I had recommended that the IV Corps be dissolved and that command of various individuals be limited to their respective islands. This recommendation was subsequently acted upon with the modification that instead of having separate island commands, the military districts as outlined in the Philippine Army Organizational Plans were reconstituted as of mid-February, 1943. PERALTA was designated C.O., Sixth Military District, while FERTIG as C.O., Tenth Military District. The posts of Commanding Officer of other districts were left vacant pending clarification of the status of the various leaders and units in respective areas.

6. Meanwhile, MORGAN, who had been sent by FERTIG to help in the "reorganization" of other units outside Mindanao, had been appointing in

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20 AUG. 75



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20 AUG. 75

FERTIG's name, other district commanders with the inevitable result that greater confusion was created in the islands he visited. In Leyte, KANGLEON was designated by him as district commander. For the Eighth District he designated CUNANAN of SQUIJOR who had previously aligned himself with AUSEJO and who was later picked up in the district roster of the Seventh Military District when this latter district was organized. This was even more serious than previously believed as CUNANAN, drunk with newly acquired power, immediately put in motion his ideas of reorganization which mainly consisted of promoting all his sons, and appointing them to head the various sections of the "District Staff" and then promoting various officers and men from Cebu (who had sought refuge there when Cebu was severely hit by the enemy) and telling them to "go back and reorganize Cebu."

7. During this period, the organization of the Seventh District was gradually taking form slowly with my appointment as Acting District Commander. ACEDE and AUSEJO had unhesitatingly placed their respective commands at my disposal. MERCADO was at first a little hesitant, believing he could "bargain" for a better position than offered him. Later, however, he submitted his roster of troops and was then picked up by the district. GADOR, last remaining figure amongst the Negros leaders whom people believed (and bet) would never submit to my command, finally arrived late in June at my headquarters with great pomp and ceremony.

8. By mid-July, the reorganization of this district was well under way although GADOR presented certain difficulties by never submitting his roster of troops and continuously opposing all policies I had laid out to be followed. Not wishing to wreck what we had already achieved, I bore all this with patience, firm in the belief that now GADOR would get tired of opposing me.

9. In Cebu, trouble between FENTON and CUSHING, who had actually been operating satisfactorily during the early days of the guerillas, began to manifest itself until it got so that an open break finally resulted, beginning with CUSHING's travel to my place against FENTON's wish and ending in FENTON's arrest, trial and execution by his own officers and men. From all reports I have had about Cebu, it was apparent that the FENTON-CUSHING team was very much liked by all the people on that Island. It was not



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until FENTON began to get scandalously involved with women that his popularity began to decrease. This started about February of this year. CUSHING, on the other hand, whose popularity was somewhat dimmed by FENTON's due to the latter's more intimate knowledge of bombast and ballyhoo, now began to be regarded by the people as a better leader than previously thought. His popularity was greatly increased by the common knowledge of the fact that he personally used to lead the troops in most of their encounters with the enemy.

10. In Luzon, as much as or even greater confusion reigned. Most of the guerillas were scattered in groups without the benefit of able leadership. At present, what is probably one of the largest ones, is headed by a former bus driver named MARCOS VILLA AGUSTIN by whose nickname "MARKING" his unit is known. This unit is reported to have indiscriminately enlisted thousands of members and issued commissions up to the rank of colonel. Formerly, it stated in the headings of all its communications that it was "advised by Col. HUGH STRAUGHN," but one month before the capture of STRAUGHN, the name of the latter was reported changed to that of "Gen. W. W. FERTIG" in these headings. "Chief of the Intelligence Section" is Miss YAY PANILIO, former photo reporter of the D.M.H.M., "Intelligence Agent of the United States Army, Badge #67, Ft. William McKINLEY."

11. Another unit in existence in Luzon is that of "Col. E. P. JONES" which calls itself the "American-Filipino Forces in the Far East, Philippine IV Army Corps, East Central Luzon Guerilla Area."

There are various other units including those of NAKAR, VINZONS and of Governor ESCUDERO and Major LAPUZ, both of whom are operating in SORSOGON. There is also the "HUKBALAJAP," short for the Tagalog "HUKBONG PANGLABAN NG JAPAN" (Army to fight the Japs) under Prof. LAVA, formerly of the University of the Philippines. This latter organization is supposedly composed mostly of Communists from Pampanga. Practically every province has or had its own groups of guerillas, although only a few were active. Mixed with these were a large number of bandits who were roaming all over the Island under the guise of guerillas. As a whole, however, the organization of guerilla units in the various Islands comprising the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Districts, has now reached a state beyond initial expectations. This, despite the handicaps presented by inter-unit rivalries.

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deal can yet be accomplished, although such accomplishments should not be expected until a more definite policy can be laid out by higher headquarters regarding the status, rights, duties and limits of each individual command.

II. STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS

1. See attached map of each island in the Visayas for information on strengths and dispositions. No data can be furnished regarding strengths and dispositions of guerilla forces in Luzon because of the difficulty of obtaining the same, and the fact that organizations and activities in Luzon vary immensely from those in the Visayas.

III. RESOURCES

1. See attached reports from each guerilla force in various islands for detailed information on resources. The same comment as given above regarding forces in Luzon applies in this instance.

IV. MORALE AND STATE OF TRAINING

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

1. Like the civilians in all unoccupied areas, the morale of friendly troops appears on the surface to be high. Actually, it is built on a very shaky foundation which rocks dangerously and, at times, crumbles everytime the Japanese start a campaign in each particular area. Practically all friendly units are fairly well informed regarding the progress of the war in the Pacific and in Europe and they regard all this understandingly but this understanding often gives way to disappointment, then impatience, and finally despair whenever they are hard pressed by the enemy. Japanese propoganda discrediting General MacARTHUR and America's war effort has no effect on them, but the Japanese "attraction" policy, coupled with their propoganda regarding the futility of further resistance ("Have you ever seen an American plane or ship since the fall of the Philippines?") sometimes brings about the desired results. In some areas, sickness (mainly malaria) weakens the will to resist. It weakens some to such an extent as to induce them to surrender. Other reasons for low morale are lack of proper nourishment and at times hunger; constant worries over dear ones left behind; lack of medical supplies, arms and ammunition; realization that the war will last longer than they had expected; misunderstandings between friendly units; lack of recognition by GHQ; lack of money; and, of course, enemy activities.

11 2. The above general statements apply to the great majority of the troops I would classify under "potential strength." They do not, as a rule apply to the troops holding the rifles, particularly those who have been in

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20 AUG. 75



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the fighting since the very beginning and who consequently are considerably more seasoned than their comrades. These armed troops feel that should the worse come to worst, each still has his rifle to protect himself and his loved ones to the bitter end.

3. The state of training of the majority of the troops seem to vary from "poor" to "fair." A great number of officers and men have had no military experience. Staff and other functions including combat, are conducted by people who have never done anything of the sort before. The value of these troops as a combat team in coordination with allied operations in this region, I hold in doubt. Their chief value lies in

- a. Advantageous position to be able to disrupt enemy lines of communication and supply.
- b. A source of intelligence, if trained.

V. ACTIVITIES

1. Activities are now mainly limited to the perfection of organizations, training, ambushes, armed "demonstrations," intelligence and, in the case of some units in Luzon, attempts at the elimination of Quialings and suspected pro-Japanese elements. In some localities (Cebu is a noteworthy example) killing of suspects and supposed collaborators has reached a point as to make even the loyal people sick. Also in Cebu, and to a limited extent Pansy and Negros, ambushes often developed into pitched battles lasting for two or three days with the enemy finally employing field pieces and airplanes. Leaders in these localities refuse to admit that their forces were involved in anything but defensive measures. CUSHING, for instance, stoutly maintains that the fighting in which he and his troops were involved were not battles but merely a "series of ambushes."

2. The intelligence carried on by these forces is of a poor quality. This is due not to the lack of personnel willing to perform intelligence missions but to the lack of trained agents and staff officers and the lack of understanding of intelligence operations.

3. A good deal of this intelligence is conducted along combat lines and is performed by operatives (generally referred as "DI," after Division of Information agents of the Commonwealth Government). More often than not their activities are limited to producing passes before loyal people in both occupied and unoccupied areas and asking them for the "latest

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information" about the Japanese. Secrecy discipline is a thing unknown and secrets are often regarded as either too good to keep or not good enough so they might just as well be told. This fact is mentioned here not with the idea of discrediting the work performed by these men (who, after all, are risking their lives) but in an effort to point out the necessity for competent personnel to be properly trained now to conduct these operations. Otherwise, the enemy will learn more about us from our own operatives than we can about them.

VI. PROBLEMS

1. I make no effort here to outline in any order of priority the manifold problems of friendly forces because the problems are equally important, although some are more pressing in one area than in another. The fact remains that these problems require immediate solution. Failure to act on them can only result in a breakdown of morale, fighting strength, and the will-to-resist of our forces -- and possibly their complete collapse from which recovery will be well nigh impossible. These problems are:

- a. A definite statement as to the status of each guerilla force.
- b. Increased deliveries of medical supplies, arms and ammunition.
- c. Finances.
- d. Communications.
- e. Need of training in all phases of tasks assigned to guerillas, particularly intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. I cannot emphasize too strongly how much the recognition by GHQ near to the guerillas. Failure of several leaders to get this recognition has led to a general breakdown of morale and caused them to lose men by the hundreds. In Cebu, for instance, despite the fact that FENTON and CUSHING had a closely knit organization, the prospect of getting into a recognized unit caused many of their officers and men to leave for other areas, particularly when they believed there was no longer any hope that Cebu would be recognized in view of the scandalous activities of FENTON.

2. This eagerness to be in one of the recognized units is general in all areas. The longer recognition is delayed, the more the guerillas feel that GHQ has no interest in them. Eventually, they assume that their true status is nothing short of bandits with no hope of recognition now or

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20 AUG. 75



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later when our forces return. This question of recognition is one of the biggest causes for any feeling of hopelessness that seems apparent in some units.

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20 AUG. 75

3. I, therefore, strongly recommend that recognition be extended as early as possible to independent guerilla units in the Islands. Numerous difficulties will undoubtedly be encountered before this recognition can be extended to all units and there will be no way of surmounting most of these difficulties unless a more flexible and practical policy be adopted than that which presently exists as regards the recognition of guerilla units.

4. Rather than wait for the various units within a district to thrash out all their differences (which may be almost impossible to accomplish under the present circumstances) it appears to be better to first extend recognition to all conflicting parties and limit their control and activities to their respective areas of command. This early recognition will serve several purposes:

- a. It will be a tremendous boost to morale.
- b. It will facilitate the early solution of common problems.
- c. Afford better control and coordination of the activities of each unit by GHQ.

5. That such a step is best for morale cannot be questioned. I have seen how they will sacrifice anything for such recognition.

6. It will facilitate the early solution of common problems because it will automatically eliminate the fear of each leader that someone else will be appointed and recognized other than himself and, in this event, he and his followers might be "eliminated" by the newly designated head. These fears are present in the minds of all leaders, regardless of what they say and regardless of how much they talk about cooperation and willingness to "sacrifice for the common good."

7. It is possible, of course, to make the mistake of recognizing the wrong leader. To reduce the error to the minimum, the solution lies in having on the ground a personal representative of the C-in-C. A representative of the C-in-C in the field eliminates much of the feeling of distrust and suspicion that otherwise exists between leaders. At the same time, the "little people" the civilians, will feel that their grievances and their

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problems will always have a chance of being heard. Now their only recourse is through their leaders whose hands are often tied by military leaders who have established themselves by force of arms, who play power politics, and whose only "justice" is that which will keep them in power.

8. Playing up one leader against another is dangerous. Giving the impression that one has more faith or confidence in one leader than in others is worse. It is adding more fire to the already existing mutual distrust and misunderstanding.

9. The appointee as representative of the C-in-C for an area -- I now speak specifically of the Visayas -- must come from the SWPA. He must have a complete and absolute understanding with GHQ regarding all phases of his duties. He must have a mature judgment, experience in dealing with Filipinos of all classes, based on a knowledge of Filipino psychology as only a Filipino or one who was born in the Philippines and who has lived there all his life can have. He must have absolutely no feeling of superiority over Filipinos. He must be able to eat with them, live with them, and undergo all the hardships that they have to endure. He must understand their good points and their weaknesses as a people, and he must have an intimate knowledge of Filipino political, social and religious life. Lastly, and most important of all, he must have the absolute confidence of the C-in-C, because without it he would never be able to command the respect and enjoy the confidence of the guerilla leaders and of the people. All of these he must possess before any measure of success can be expected from him.

10. Considering all these points, I respectfully submit the names of

- a. General BASILIO VALDES,
- b. Colonel CARLOS P. ROMULO,
- c. Lieut. Col. JAIME VELOSQUEZ,
- d. Major J. R. McMICKING,

As officers who might be considered for this position. Of these four officers, Major McMICKING in my opinion is the one best qualified.

11. I do not recommend the sending of an American officer into the Visayas regardless of how capable. Because he is an American, people will always paint the better side of each picture, both as a matter of national pride and because they do not want to give the impression that there is anything which might impede or make his work more difficult. To the question "Why is this true?" I can only reply that it is, and one

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



Sept 20, 43

Gador to Cin C for despatch by Villamor

Descries banditism of Abcede men
and failure to give Gador any of
the arms sent. Villamor disregarded
recommendations of Gador thus causing
civil war

4 Aug 43. Gador to Abcede

Asked for cessation to fratricidal
strife. Expressed his willingness
to abide by any decision of Cin C
after he is appraised of facts of
case.

14 Jan 43 Lt Halkyard (AC) to Weyburn
stated what a good job Gador was
doing despite attacks by Mercado's
men who terrorized the country, asked
Weyburn help in stopping fratricidal
strife



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must appreciate Filipino psychology to understand. An American may judge when he has the facts, but in fairness to himself and to the Filipino people, no American should be made to obtain the facts in the field, as I am sure he will not be able to obtain all the facts necessary to reach a just and equitable decision on the problems involved.

12. I further recommend that great care be exercised so as not to discredit such a representative in the field. In my own case, a little detail like the handling of radio traffic made my position at one time rather difficult. In this instance, CUSHING had left a sick bed and crossed enemy territory to reach my headquarters. GHQ's order, however, directing him to proceed to FERTIG's headquarters came through ABCEDE who was then using my station for his traffic. Likewise, the request for ABELLANA to proceed to FERTIG's headquarters was not handled through me but FERTIG (who had to send a man by boat to deliver the message) although I had radio contact with ABELLANA in Bohol. This resulted in CUSHING and ABCEDE believing that I had been relieved and discredited.

13. It should be borne in mind that little, apparently insignificant things, can destroy prestige, and with the loss of prestige, control. The reasons for the instructions to send both CUSHING and ABELLANA to Mindanao should also have been sent because at the time neither CUSHING nor ABELLANA nor myself could understand why it was necessary to go to Mindanao to settle Cebu's problems. It contributed to CUSHING's suspicions that FERTIG was "maneuvering things so he can claim that Cebu's problems were not really solved by Cebu's leaders but by FERTIG," and "playing politics to satisfy his ambitions of eventually being designated commander of the guerillas in the Philippines."

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

14. For Luzon, I believe that the appointee should be one who is already there and who has been there from the very beginning. This is necessary because a newcomer would not be able to conduct himself in the easy and confident manner of one who has been living there under the present conditions. For another thing, he would not be able to count on the support or help of the units there because the organizations in existence are not operating like those in the Visayas. He must possess all the qualifications I have mentioned for the Visayan appointee, plus the added experience of contact and dealings with the enemy. In this respect, he will have to face problems differing vastly from those of the Visayan appointee.



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15. Bearing these points in mind, I submit for consideration the following names now available in Luzon and with whom I had established contact:

- a. Colonel Aleje VALDES
- b. Lieut. Col. Narciso MANZANO

Lieut. Col. MANZANO, C.E., Philippine Scouts, is well known to many members of GHQ and he is undoubtedly the better qualified of the two officers that I have mentioned.

16. With the appointment of these representatives of the C-in-C, problems could be much more quickly solved and, at the same time, GHQ will have in the Islands people in whom the C-in-C would have complete confidence. At the same time, the presence and existence of these representatives will leave the District Commanders free to attend to their particular fields of action. It will eliminate all grounds for their mutual distrust, now in existence and rapidly growing. Finally, it will serve as a guarantee to the "smaller units" and the civilians that their interests will always be protected and never jeopardized.

17. Medical supplies, particularly quinine, atabrine and other medicines to combat malaria, should be sent to all areas wherever feasible. Sulfa drugs should also be included in medical priorities as well as bandages, cotton and first aid kits. Such priorities should, likewise, include a proportional amount of dental supplies and vitamin concentrates. It is recommended that these medical packs be prepared here so that each package will contain a certain percentage of the whole. This will avoid the necessity of opening hermetically sealed packages and facilitate distribution to various areas.

18. Regarding arms and ammunition, priority should be given to .30 Cal. ammunition. Carbines and automatic rifles should be first in the arms list, followed by a certain number of tommyguns. It is vitally necessary to include a number of spare parts and cleaning material for each gun. To a limited extent shotgun and .22 Cal. ammunition should be included in each shipment to enable guerilla forces to subsist on birds and small game which are plentiful in most guerilla areas but which cannot now be had due to lack of ammunition.

19. There is a great need for a reorganization of the system of finances of the guerillas. At present, there is too much confusion

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20 AUG. 75



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resulting from the "legality" of the currency issued by unrecognized units. The refusal by certain recognized units to accept money issued by some unrecognized organizations is demoralizing to the people in the unrecognized area, a fact greatly affecting both the people and organizations concerned. An effort then should be made to standardize all currency in the free areas. The possibility of printing money here (properly stamped "Free Philippines" or the like) for distribution in all unoccupied areas should be given some thought. This is not only an excellent morale builder, but it will materially help most organizations who do not possess any printing presses or paper or ink. It might be mentioned in passing that the biggest need in the free areas is for change or notes in the smaller denominations.

20. Training in intelligence is very badly needed. It is recommended that this training be given here in the SWPA to various people now in the Islands. This practice should be more effective than sending out one or two trained men to each area to "instruct" the people therein. To begin with, training of this nature is extremely difficult in the field, particularly under the conditions some of the organizations are operating. In this connection, I have been asked about the advisability of sending one or more American instructors to each area. There is no doubt that many benefits can result from this move, but I believe it would be better to bring the students to the instructors than the instructors to the students. On one hand there will always be that element of doubt, --"Will these instructors be able to get along with the particular people with whom they are thrown?", "Will the impressions imparted be that these instructors have a 'superior' attitude that they are 'not teaching everything'?" The answers to these are vitally important because there are now a growing number of Filipinos who believe that the United States did not have absolute faith and confidence in the Filipino people, and that was the state of affairs they believe proved extremely detrimental to all. At the same time, Japanese propaganda has not helped the situation any. Should any mistakes be committed now due to the thoughtless acts of a few, there is no telling how much damage these will do. On the other hand, bringing the "students" here, will produce the effect that America still has faith in the Filipinos that America is vitally interested in the Filipino people and that America is deeply concerned over Philippine affairs and extremely desirous of

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20 AUG. 75



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helping out Filipinos even under the most unusual circumstances. In other words, the psychological effect is entirely different; on one side the results produced could either be helpful or damaging, on the other side, results are definitely bound in our favor. That is why I strongly recommend the periodical evacuation, for training purposes, of a few officers and their return to their respective areas.

21. a. Radio communications can be improved by the introduction of better sets than the ones generally used which are mostly homemade affairs.

b. Steps should be taken to deliver to various areas material suitable for making sails as, otherwise, particularly with the recent enemy attempt to destroy all means of transportation between the islands, there may come a time when inter-island transport will be virtually impossible. Should this occur, especially in certain areas where food is scarce and whose inhabitants depend on neighboring islands for the majority of their food supply, the consequences might be disastrous. If possible, a number of heavy duty outboard engines suitable for running on coconut oil should be sent to each area. The value of such engines is obvious.

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VIEWS ON GUERRILLA LEADERS

The following comments are my personal views of the various guerilla leaders. Where the views expressed are those of other people, they are indicated as such.

I. Abcede, Salvador (Negros)

a. Personally known to me. Young, aggressive and at times given to snappy judgment. However, he is never afraid to admit mistakes. A regular officer in the Philippine Army. Received his commission upon graduation from the University of the Philippines at the same time as PERALTA whom he outranks by some twenty files. Was at one time instructor in tactics in the Philippine Military Academy. Very loyal but is dead set against anyone showing a superior attitude. Feels bitterly against Colonel HILSMAN who believes acted cowardly. Is well liked by people in Negros.

b. PERALTA knows him very well and likes him.

c. AUSEJO thinks he is too young but capable.

d. GADOR dislikes him.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LIR OR
20 AUG. 75

e. CUSHING thinks he is "alright -- we should get along pretty well."

f. FERTIG (in a wire to PERALTA) says he is young and inexperienced but should make good as a District Commander.

g. MONTELIBANO (Governor of Negros) believes he is the "most logical successor" to me and he "knows and understands Negros' problems."

II. AUSEJO, Placido (Negros)

a. Personally known to me. An old Constabulary man with all the good and bad points of Constabulary officers. Disciplined, according-to-the-book-type. Likes to have neat, established places -- which is impossible for guerillas in the Visayas. Slow in grasping situations and making judgments. Lately showing signs of nervous breakdown.

b. ABCEDE thinks he is o.k. but slow.

c. GADOR dislikes him and cannot understand why an old P.C. man like him did not align with him instead of FERTIG.



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- d. Is well liked by the people (including Americans) in his previous area.

III. ARTECHE, Pedro (Samar)

- a. Not known to me except by reputation. Said to be unscrupulous and to have been involved in many shady deals. Former Senator.

IV. ASPILLA, Julian C. (Negros)

- a. Personally known to me. Former Constabulary officer discharged for physical disability before the war. Rose from ranks to the Constabulary Academy. Great gambler and his ill-health is directly attributed to night life. Picked up by GADOR to be his Chief of Staff. Incompetent but probably honest in his desire to be of service to the people. Lately had a series of disagreements with GADOR (over latter's refusal to submit to proper authorities) which culminated in his leaving GADOR.
- b. GADOR at first thought the world of him and recommended him to be a Division C.O.
- c. ARCEDE thinks he is incompetent but useful in bringing together under the district small isolated units (4 or 5 rifles each) in Oriental Negros.
- d. AUSEJO does not think much of him.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

V. BACLAGON, Uldarico (Negros).

- a. Not known to me except by reputation. Philippine Military Academy graduate. Very well liked by guerillas and civilians in North Negros where he is now a regimental commander. Takes active participation in fights and protects civilian's rights all the time.

VI. BAURA, Olegario (Cebu).

- a. Known to me. Not very bright but has lots of guts. Fighter and sentimentalist. Actually had tears in his eyes when he read President QUEZON's message to me and my reply.

- 08 b. CUSHING thinks very highly of him.

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VII. BORHALES, Abenir (Negros)

- a. Capable, aggressive and most loyal. Personally known to me. Well liked by people and guerillas. Now regimental commander in Central Negros. Philippine Military Academy graduate.

VIII. CUSHING, James (Cebu)

- a. Personally known to me. Miner. Possesses a dual personality -- one cold, hard and unforgiving; the other, soft, sentimental, almost childish. Part Mexican. Easily blows up but just as quickly repents. Cusses hard but is fond of quoting the "Good Book." Speaks English with a slight accent. Pronounces the suffix "ed" distinctly, as "attack-ed." Hates the Japs as much as he loves his "Cebu patriots" of whom he refers with tear filled eyes. Courageous. Leads men in combat. Lacks administrative ability. Regards civil government as not feasible. All Cebu is behind him. All the Japs in Cebu are after him.
- b. ABCEDE thinks he is a great fellow.

IX. DOMINADO, Rito (Negros)

- a. Young with plenty of guts. AUSEJO's best officer. Doesn't care too much for administration. Rather lead his men in fights. Graduate Silliman University. Good head and well liked by people and guerillas in his area. Now regimental commander in South Negros.
- b. ABCEDE likes him.
- c. AUSEJO thinks the world of him.
- d. GADOR dislikes him on general principles.

X. FERTIG, Wendell W. (Mindanao)

- a. Not known to me.
- b. CUSHING regards him suspiciously. Believes he is "maneuvering" for the eventual control of all guerillas. Dislikes him.
- c. ABCEDE thinks he is too ambitious and does not understand why FERTIG has to put his fingers in too many pies.
- d. PERALTA doubts his ability and intentions. Wonders if FERTIG really has the kind of a setup he lets people to believe he

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20 AUG. 75



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has. Once asked me if FERTIG is treating the MOROS well -- said he didn't think so.

g. GADOR -- "never heard of him before!"

XI. GADOR, Gabriel (Negros)

a. Overgrown boy scout. Likes to play general. Made himself a major general when FERTIG made himself a brigadier general. Old Constabulary officer. ROTC Commandant (For Eastern University) before the war. District Commander (7th) during the war but busted by General SHARP. Attached to General SANRP's staff until fall. Will make a pretty good politician. As a guerilla leader -- a flop!

b. ARCEDE thinks he is an old fogey who should know better.

c. AUSEJO ditto.

d. PERALTA ditto.

e. CUSHING thinks he is a humbug.

f. Many people think he is slightly mentally unbalanced. I agree.

XII. INGINIERO, Ismael (Bohol)

a. Personally known to me. A politician. Will side with anybody who can give him what he wants. Likes ballyhoo. Apparently well liked by the people and guerillas of Bohol.

XIII. JURADO, Enrique (Taal - Romblon).

a. Personally known to me. US Naval Academy graduate. Acting Chief Off Shore Patrol (Phil. Army) during war. Young, brave, with a good head.

XIV. KANGLEON, Ruperto (Leyte)

a. Not known to me except by name. Old Constabulary officer.

b. PERALTA in his wire to me says KANGLEON is crazy or too ambitious. Also that KANGLEON's actions in posing as an approved district commander is disgraceful.

XV. MATA, Ernesto (Negros)

a. Personally known to me. Very popular in North Negros. Phil. Mil. Academy graduate. Young, brave. Now C.O., 72nd Division, 7th Military District.

XVI. MIRANDA, Blas (Leyte)

a. Not known to me.



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20 AUG. 75

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XVII. MERRITT, P. (Samar)

a. Not known to me.

XVIII. RUFFY, Ramon (Mindoro)

a. Known to me casually. Old Constabulary officer. One of its forgotten men. Has been in Mindoro many years. Slow. Once, when I landed in Calapan with other planes in the field, which was only some two hundred yards from his office, he asked how I got there.

XIX. SOLIMAN, Marcos (Leyte)

a. Known to me. Former student officer in Randolph Field. Washed out after injury received in an automobile accident. Has a personal grudge against KANGLEON who he claims broke his work that neither of them would surrender to the Japs. Now Chief of Staff for MIRANDA. His personal attitude toward KANGLEON may make it difficult to settle the KANGLEON-MIRANDA dispute.

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PART III.

C I V I L A F F A I R S

(Occupied Areas)

Political.

Economic.

Education.

Religion.

Social.

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PART III.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS (OCCUPIED AREAS)

I. POLITICAL

(a) The Leaders.

1. The Filipino leaders who are cooperating with the Japanese are overwhelmingly and steadfastly loyal to the exiled government. This conclusion is the result of an impartial study of their attitude and sentiments. Only three show strong tendencies contraryward: LAUREL, AQUINO and GUINTO. There are a few others of the same color -- like PIO DURAN -- but they really have little influence and power and are not in a position to do harm in a big scale.

2. It is a matter of common knowledge that VARGAS, who was ordered to organize the Philippine Executive Commission by the G-in-C, Japanese Forces, was left by President QUEZON to take care of Manila in the event of its occupation by the enemy. The specific instructions given to him are not known. Most intelligent people (for that matter, almost all people with a modicum of common sense) understand his delicate position as well as that of the other commissioners who accepted the challenge of the crisis. But, letting alone public opinion, VARGAS is feeling secure in the knowledge that "The President and MacARTHUR and ROOSEVELT" understand, in his own words to an agent about three months ago.

3. The biggest mistake likely to be committed -- and is actually being committed -- is in judging these leaders by their speeches, which are mainly based on stereotyped formulas calculated to appeal to the vanity of the enemy. As a whole, the gist of the criticism against the Commission is that it has extended cooperation to the Japanese. But it is absurd to think that if the Commission did not cooperate the Japanese would not be able to get what they want, do as they please and impose their will on the people. The consequence of such an attitude by prominent and recognized Filipino leaders would have been disastrous. Certainly it would have been regarded as hostile and would have reflected on the people in that sense.

4. On the basis of actual deeds, the Commission has accomplished a great deal for the benefit of the people under the circumstances. By cooperating they have avoided direct control and administration by the military authorities of all vital and everyday matters affecting the people.

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By assuming responsibility for the acts of the people, they have tempered the rigors of martial law and have acted ably to the limit of their powers as attorneys representing and protecting the interests of the Filipinos. To the credit of the Commission may be mentioned the avoidance of famine; the extension of relief and aid to thousands of destitute, sick and needy; the release of Filipino prisoners of war, their hospitalization, rehabilitation and return to their homes; the obtainment of some funds for health and welfare measures; the distribution of foodstuff and other prime commodities; the release of bank deposits for people who had all their money in banks, including part of deposits in enemy banks; the fight to curb hoarding and profiteering; the uninterrupted operation of hospitals and other humanitarian agencies; etc. In short, they have succeeded through their cooperation which they have used as a means to an end to help the people in occupied areas survive defeat and rise again when the time comes.

5. Feeling is running high against LAUREL, AQUINO and GUINTO. LAUREL has recovered from the wounds inflicted by an assailant some time ago, but he may be the target of another attempt. AQUINO and GUINTO may also be accorded a similar honor. In some quarters, there is violent talk of giving all the leaders "the works." However, this is clearly against the will of the majority. Yet, the threat may materialize if some of their political or personal enemies should decide to claim vengeance or satisfaction in their elimination or downfall.

6. It is suggested that some way be devised to afford protection to all leaders, even if only to make them answer the charges against them, if any, to competent authorities and to forestall their falling victims to doubtful justice at the hands of unauthorized groups. The political assassinations that have been registered in Manila have produced no beneficial result. Should these continue, they might get entirely out of bounds and endanger many innocent people.

(b) The People.

1. The people in general look forward to the redemption of the Philippines. Government employees remain loyal to the exiled government. AS¹ Talk of big bonuses for government employees sharpen the anticipation of the humble government servant with regard to the return of the same government. The majority of these people are anxious to join even an active

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movement to help bring it about once given the signal by competent sources. The same feeling is common to those working in private Japanese firms, from employees to laborers. Of course, here, as in official bureaus, there are bootlickers, swindlers, and opportunists. Actually, they do not do any positive harm, being mostly desirous of securing personal profit thereby. They will probably be the first to turn against their employers at the first sign of a decisive change in the situation.

(c) Morale.

1. The morale of the people in occupied areas is fairly high. This is due to, (a) an awakened spirit of nationalism, (b) deep-rooted friendship for America, and (c) fear and hatred of the Japanese. Enemy propaganda has not produced the effects desired. This is because the propaganda meted out is so crude and so fantastically absurd that the people cannot help but see through them. This gives the people a most reasonable (to them) foundation for all sorts of opinions regarding the true progress of the war. Then again, the inability of the Japanese to curb (let alone stop) the influx of news that are favorable to the Allies, has served to maintain this fairly high morale. Despite restrictions regarding the possession and use of receiving sets, people still manage to hear and learn through the "bamboo telegraph" of the news as put out by KGEI. As far as the people are concerned this station is now on a par with the Bible insofar as the veracity of its news is concerned.

2. At present, there are many people in all occupied areas who are almost frantic lest the arrival of the Allied forces finds them with so much Japanese issued currency, which they feel will not be honored. This lack of desire to be left "holding the bag" is manifested by the people despite the threats of torture or even death itself for being found entertaining such a non-cooperative attitude as the casting of doubt on the value of the Japanese sponsored medium of exchange. The prevalent practice now is for people to get rid of their "savings" by buying old Philippine (invariably referred to as "genuine") or emergency bills at the ratio of 1.8 to 1 in favor of the Commonwealth notes. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the present situation (at least insofar as the emergency bills are concerned) is the opposite of what it was awhile back.

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20 AUG. 75

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3. One factor which adversely affects morale is the failure of the exiled government to define its exact status on certain matters of national interest. The independence question for instance, the civil government of unoccupied areas, the Constabulary, the rehabilitation program -- these and other vitally important points must be explained now. Otherwise the number of people who wonder whether after all the present state of affairs is not really for the best is bound to increase. When and if this increase takes place, then there will be great danger that morale will be so lowered as to turn the present understanding and patient attitude of many to one of downright hostility.

(d) Loyalty.

1. The loyalty of the vast majority of the leaders and people in occupied areas cannot now be questioned. America to them is still the symbol of democracy. Their idol, as always, is General MacARTHUR. President QUEZON's popularity, however, has materially declined. There are some who do not understand his departure at all, but the chief criticism directed at him is the fact that he brought with him people who could do so little for the country including one (Major SORIANO) whom many have associated in their minds with Fascist activities. Why he failed to bring the various members of his cabinet instead of a "bunch of mestizos" is a question the President will have to answer in every section of the country upon his return. The wisdom of evacuating even General VALDES and the various doctors is questioned by the people. ROXAS' popularity, on the other hand, has increased tremendously. The people's admiration and respect for him knows no bounds and it is generally conceded in all quarters that he will be "the next President." All his actions and statements are held up by the people as shining examples of devotion and loyalty to convictions and to a cause. Once, for instance, after attending an official conference (along with other members of the P.C.P.I.) with Premier TOZYO, he asked to be and was excused from a reception held in the Premier's honor which was to be held in the adjoining room. This act certainly captured the admiration of the people.



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(e) Independence.

SS 1. The independence (generally referred to as "Japanese style") recently granted to the Philippines is not taken seriously by the people or the Filipino leaders. To get up from his chair during such a solemn

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occasion as the administering of the oath to the speaker of the new Assembly, one of these political leaders merely lifted his leg over one of the low-backed chairs with which the assembly is provided. All the "demonstrations of gratitude by enthusiastic crowds" so often mentioned in Japanese propaganda broadcasts are never really the "popular rallies" they are claimed to be. Attendance to these is compulsory. That is all there is to it.

2. Like Burma, it is conceded that the Philippines will declare war against the Allies as soon as the Japanese feel it is high time to do so. It is felt however that the Japanese will not be so naive as to demand this declaration of war now. Rather they will probably wait for an occasion like the bombing of any point in the Philippines before requiring the "independent" government to declare war, on the ground that we have been attacked and are forced to defend our integrity. This would satisfy their passion for sophistic morality and make them once more not the aggressor but the aggrieved.

3. This independence is centered on a constitution drafted by the P.C.P.I. It is republican in form and identical in many respects with the Commonwealth Constitution. However, it differs with the latter in that the government is virtually a constitutional dictatorship. The president absolutely controls the Assembly as at least half of its members are his appointees; the Supreme Court must have a unanimous decision before a law can be declared unconstitutional; agreements entered into by the President regarding the utilization of national resources depend entirely on his sole discretion; inability of the Assembly to override a veto; are but a few of its most objectionable features.

II. ECONOMIC.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI
20 AUG. 75

(a) General.

1. The economic policy of Japan is simple; take all available materials necessary for the prosecution of their war effort. For this purpose all of our resources are taxed. Japanese companies which have opened branches in the Philippines are simply bleeding the country white. They are buying all machinery, industrial equipment, hardware, rubber goods, motor cars and trucks, etc. They have acquired virtual monopolies in every field. Transportation, however, is one problem that they have not yet solved.



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Hampered by lack of bottoms, the ARMY as well as these companies have not been able to ship except a fraction thereof of all the stocks they have amassed. Large piles of these, including minerals and scrap iron are still awaiting shipment in various parts of LUZON.

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20 AUG. 75

(b) Commerce and Industry.

1. The Japanese have adopted a very effective method of controlling the supply and distribution of prime commodities. Distribution of goods is through the District Neighborhood Association which issues all ration tickets.

2. Retail trade is in the hands of Filipinos and Chinese. A great number of people are engaged in the "buy and sell" business. Lately, however, due to the greatly diminishing stock, this has gradually changed to "loot and sell" Quite often the looting is done from Japanese Army warehouses.

3. All industries are directed towards the end of contributing the maximum to the Japanese war effort. Most of the mines in existence prior to the war are again in operation. At present, great efforts are being extended to produce alcohol from sugar and there is even some talk of producing Butanol in Makapla (Negros). There is also great demand for lumber. Production of the Insular Lumber Mill which during peacetime had a top production of 4,000,000 bd. ft. a day in three six hour shifts, was raised to half a million bd. ft. in an ordinary eight hour shift. The sabotage of certain valuable parts of the machinery, however, has reduced this to a top capacity of approximately 98,000 bd. ft. a day.

(c) Finance.

1. Inflation has caused an abnormal state of affairs. Prices are so high as to be prohibitive although monetary circulation is also high. Incomes are disproportionately small compared to the high cost of living. The result is unrest plus agitation.

2. Information has it that the exchange rate is \$10.00 for every yen. Actually there is nothing to stop the Japanese government from fixing such an arbitrary rate. It explains why Japanese civilians, who are poorly paid as a rule in their own coin, live luxuriously on their incomes which are increased many fold when converted into military notes.

3. Securities. The stock exchanges have been closed. Activity in the purchase and sale of shares of stock only exists between individuals.



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4. Insurance. Only five local companies together with Japanese firms having branch offices in the Philippines undertake all insurance business. So far this business has been confined to Manila. Seventy five percent of assessed value is all the risk accepted and the local and Japanese companies have formed an association between themselves reinsuring each other so as to spread the loss, if any. The arrangement is very satisfactory for local companies who do most of the business and premiums remain in the Philippines. Lately the Japanese companies began planning to see how they can horn in on the local companies' business.

III EDUCATION

1. Emphasis has been laid on vocational schools. In high schools the curriculum for boys stresses the trades, while for girls, domestic science. After using Tagalog as an opening wedge, the Japanese now have ceased to be interested in it and instead are exerting all efforts to compel the study of Nippongo. Higher education is discouraged with the exception of the sciences like medicine, engineering and pharmacy.

IV RELIGION

1. At first there was a tendency on the part of the Japanese to "lay off" religion. It might be said that they had attempted to win the confidence of the people by playing up to the church leaders as exemplified by the bringing over from Japan, Japanese priests and nuns, and by according church leaders similar honors accorded dignitaries of foreign powers. Once, however, the Japanese made a bold move by issuing a propaganda sheet wherein they attempted to point out that the living God (the Emperor) is the only one the Filipinos should honor as all the other Gods (Christ, Buddha, Confucius, etc.) are all dead. This fell so flat that the Japanese never attempted it again. Lately, they have shown signs of attempting to undermine the influence of the Catholic Church by:

- (a) Abolition of optional religious training in public schools. (since defeated as it is again granted by the new constitution).
- (b) Enactment of the Divorce Law.
- (c) Taxation of religious properties.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75

er 2. The Catholic Church as a general rule has managed to remain neutral in this conflict although quite often priests are "urged" by the Japanese to include some propaganda in their sermons. Devout laymen



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however, have shown increasing tendency to challenge the acts of the Japanese along religious lines. At the same time, the Jesuit organization (composed mainly of American Fathers) have recently been the target of Japanese reprisals. Nine Jesuit Fathers were reported being held in Fort Santiago sometime in September 43.

V. SOCIAL

1. The policy of the Japanese on this point is the complete eradication of everything Occidental. Particularly with school children, intensive training is conducted to inculcate in their minds that America has had no genuine affection for the Filipinos and that she has merely exploited the Philippines to her advantage.

2. In at least one instance, evidence of their attempt to inculcate racial hatred is seen. A notice displayed in the main entrance of the Manila Hotel and again in its famed "Bamboo Grill" reads: "No service whatsoever will be rendered to persons of Jewish blood."

3. Gambling, prostitution and other vices are not only tolerated but apparently encouraged. As a result it may truly be said that the morals of the people in occupied areas has now reached a very low level. Both in Japanese and Filipino firms, young girls, very often have to give their bodies to hold down their jobs. Prostitution is uncontrolled. Besides this, thousands of "geisha" girls have been "imported" supposedly for the exclusive use of the Japanese forces. As soon as they have "paid off their quota" however, these girls are sold to various established "agencies" (mainly Chinese) which then introduce these girls to the public. Venereal diseases are prevalent; diseases caused by malnutrition are common and, as a whole, the people give the impression of a generally run down condition.

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PART IV.

CIVIL AFFAIRS (Unoccupied Areas)

Political.

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20 AUG. 75

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CIVIL AFFAIRS (UNOCCUPIED AREAS)

I. Political.

A. General.

1. There has been great attempts by the guerillas to reestablish the civil government in all unoccupied areas. I know of only one exception in the Visayas where the guerilla leaders have come out openly as saying that the reestablishment of the civil government in their area is not feasible. This is in Cebu. Civil authorities, however, (at least the incumbent Governor and some minor officials) agree with this opinion expressed by the guerilla leaders. Principal reason given is that local conditions make it extremely difficult if not impossible to maintain a government in hiding.

2. In all other areas, the civil government has been reestablished and in some places, its reorganization has reached the same high level as achieved by the military forces.

B. The Leaders.

1. It is reasonable to assume that the leaders are 100% loyal to the exiled government and to President QUEZON in particular. Many leaders regard the puppets understandingly although this understanding does not include LAUREL AND AQUINO. Some question VARGAS' loyalty while others believe that all those extending cooperation to the Japanese should be condemned as their actions and activities are detrimental to the people in unoccupied areas.

2. Their relationship with guerilla leaders is cordial. But certainly it is not the pleasant anything-you-want-is-o.k.-by-me type that it may be represented to be. True, cooperation is extended at all times, but there are many instances where cooperation is obtained only after the particulars involved are noted down on paper or on the minds of people for "future use." Their disagreements are not generally with the top military leaders but with some of the lower ranking ones who have been so used to the law of the west type of justice meted out during the early days of the guerillas that they cannot see why true justice and constitutional rights must be respected even during these unusual times.



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20 AUG. 75

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C. The People.

1. The people are 100% behind the exiled government and its representatives in their respective territories. They regard these civil authorities as their champions against the few unjust, unreasonable elements in the guerillas. And they regard the guerillas as their champions against the Japanese.

2. Their loyalty has manifested itself in forms other than words. They have toiled and sacrificed for the guerillas. I am sure that without their efforts and the support and cooperation they have given to the guerillas, there would not now be any guerillas. The things that the people have done, the sacrifices they have endured and the contributions that they have made will undoubtedly go down in Philippine history as one of the most compelling chapters in the story of Filipino participation in this war.

D. Morale.

1. Immediately after the fall of the Philippines morale in unoccupied areas reached a new low. People were bewildered, disappointed, frightened and desperate. Gradually, however, they overcame this and as the guerillas began to grow stronger, morale rose proportionately. To a great extent, however, this increasingly high morale was based on wishful thinking ("they will be back in a few months") and complacency resulting from the apparently successful resistance offered by the guerillas. As a result, it did not take long before it started to drop again. Propaganda (both Japanese and guerilla) led many to believe that by certain dates our forces would be back and when those dates came and passed and no Allies arrived, morale received another heavy blow from which recovery became increasingly more difficult.

2. At present, morale is probably at its lowest although superficially it is very high. The people are now scared to death of the Japanese and are gradually losing faith in the guerillas' ability to resist. They are tired of the abuses committed on them by some of the guerillas leaders. They realize that their efforts and sacrifices during the early months of the guerillas (when they literally worked themselves to the bone) did not bring the Allies any closer. They are war weary, sick of body and soul, bewildered by the present trend of events, skeptical of early Allied arrival in the Philippines and, most important of all, fearful of the threatened Japanese "extermination" policy.

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3. Quite a few are now entering occupied areas feeling that no one can justly accuse them of being Japanese sympathizers considering their loyalty so often demonstrated in the past. They believe that everyone will understand that they are doing this only to spare their families from brutal slaughter in the hands of the enemy who has threatened to use gas in all areas declared "bandit zones" effective 1 December 1943.

E. Problems.

1. The main problems of the people in unoccupied areas are:

a. Morale.

b. Statement as to their standing in comparison with people in occupied areas.

c. Medical supplies.

d. Finances.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75



F. Recommendations.

1. Something must be done now for the improvement of morale. For one thing, a vigorous, well-planned propaganda campaign should be immediately undertaken. The Japanese threat to use gas should be countered. The people must be made to see on the basis of cold facts why it is imperative that they hold on. Promises, unless they can be supported by facts and figures, must be reduced to the minimum. General statements discrediting the Japanese ("the independence just granted is just a farce!") should play no part in this propaganda campaign.

2. Pains should be taken so that no item in such propaganda should boomerang into us. To illustrate. Sometime ago, a message from President QUEZON was addressed to me asking me to "tell them" (the people) various things which he wanted conveyed. I did. But I did not realize that an identical message was sent to FERTIG. As a result, when people saw both messages, they right away felt that once again they were being dished out stereotyped propaganda.

3. Undoubtedly, the best and most irrefutable propaganda that the Allies can now use in the Philippines is the airplane. This will give lie to the main Japanese propaganda and blow to smithereens their entire propaganda machine. I have been told by countless people from all walks of life and from all places in the Philippines that nothing except invasion can equal the propaganda value of the sight of an American airplane in Philippine skies today. I agree with this one-hundred percent. Even were the airplanes

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to drop nothing -- the mere sight of it and the star on its wings will give the people tangible things to boost their morale and renew their faith in the American pledge to redeem the Philippines.

4. A statement by the exiled government as to the true standing of the leaders and the people in comparison with those in occupied areas will go a long way in dispelling any doubts or suspicions in their minds. As it is, there are not a few who wonder whether they are getting the attention they deserve. Just as many feel insecure about the future -- believing that they will be lost in the deluge of problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation wherein they suspect too much attention will be paid those now in occupied areas and too little for those now carrying on the work of the Commonwealth.

5. Financial aid should be extended to all unoccupied areas. People have gladly given their all in the past, but the point has now been reached where they can no longer give without actually suffering hunger, sickness and death.

6. At the same time, medical supplies in sufficient quantities to enable distribution to the people too, should be sent to the Philippines. In some areas, people are dying by the hundreds and this situation cannot keep up much longer.

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PART V.

INTELLIGENCE NETS.

Enemy.

Friendly.



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PART V.

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INTELLIGENCE NETS

I. ENEMY

1. The Japanese intelligence service obtains information through the following:

- a. Former Japanese residents.
- b. Paid informers.
- c. Cooperationists and sympathizers.
- d. People forced to be informers through threats.
- e. District Neighborhood Associations.

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2. Because of their acquaintance with many persons through previous business and friendly associations, former Japanese residents are very valuable to the Japanese authorities. These people are able to keep them informed of the feelings of the Filipinos. Information given by them also enables the Japanese intelligence service in directing their activities towards the proper channels and in selecting the right Filipino personnel to assist in such activities.

3. Persons working as spies for pay are drawn from among the scum of the community. Swindlers, pimps, whores, racketeers, crooks, ex-convicts and the like constitute this group which, from all reports, appear to be a large one. They are normally headed by notorious characters, often by ex-secret service men of bad record and reputation. They are dangerous because they seem to be very well paid, are very active and have no scruples in the methods they use to accomplish their purpose. Many succeed in joining anti-Japanese organizations, take active part in their doings and thus are able to turn over complete information on them.

4. Jap sympathizers are not as dangerous as cooperationists. The former are few in number; their identities and attitudes are known and, although misguided, are, on the average honest and sincere. The cooperationist, in order to get in the good graces of his Japanese friends, often drop here and there during conversations with them, casual remarks on anti-Japanese activities or on people conducting such activities. A number of such inconsequential remarks are all the enemy needs to conduct a more thorough investigation through his underlings.

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5. It is a known fact that almost every person who has been confined in Fort Santiago has been asked by the Japanese to act as informers for them. Acceptance of the offer means release from confinement; refusal represents prolonged confinement, torture or death. It is obvious that the majority will accept the offer. Many probably do it with mental reservations, believing that they can fool the Japanese by not doing effective spy work once they are out of prison. But the fact remains that the threat of confinement, torture or death still hangs over their heads if they show no activity or industry in the task assigned to them.

6. District Neighborhood Associations have proven to be one of the most effective sources of information for the Japanese. It is probable that these associations have been mainly created for intelligence purposes rather than to facilitate the administrative control of the country. The details behind the organization of these associations are available in official journals hence they will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that they have undoubtedly been worth all the bother and efforts put into them by the Japanese.

II. FRIENDLY

1. Friendly intelligence activities are limited to those conducted by the respective C-2 units of each guerilla force and to some extent, the intelligence net I have established as per original instructions of the A. I. B.

2. No friendly intelligence service can compare in efficiency with that of the enemy. This is due to a lack of the following:

- a. Competent personnel.
- b. Training.
- c. Finances.
- d. Definition of the status of agents.

3. Despite the great number of officers, enlisted men and civilians available to the guerilla forces, there is a very pronounced lack of personnel competent enough to direct or perform intelligence missions along the correct lines. As stated before in previous paragraphs referring to activities of friendly forces, more often than not, these operations are limited to showing passes to various people in occupied areas and asking



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for the latest information about the enemy. Quite often too, the evaluation of information thus gathered is based on wishful thinking rather than a proper appreciation of facts. For example; agents report that Japanese soldiers run to shelters everytime air planes are heard. Interpretation of this is usually given as that the Japs are scared to death and that they feel raids may come most any hour and that their morale is very low.

4. Training is very badly needed. At present, training of the operatives of most guerilla units is limited to a few days. Sometimes, such operatives do not even receive this. They are just called in, given passes and told to "go there and find out _____."

5. The extent of activities of operations are limited by the amount of finances available to them. As a result many golden opportunities are lost wherever agents find themselves short of finances in the middle of a mission.

6. The definition of the status of agents is a must for a thorough and successful accomplishment of missions. This is particularly desirable in the case of civilian agents or released prisoners of war. These persons are risking not only their lives but those of families and friends as well. Practically all of these people are acting in their present capacities of agents only because they want to do something that would contribute in "the fight against the enemy." But it is only fair and reasonable that they be given some form of official recognition so that their efforts and sacrifices (which at times may result in death) in these thankless jobs will not leave them or their families destitute and forgotten.

7. Recommendations.

a. It is strongly recommended that a number of people from various districts be evacuated periodically for an intensive training in intelligence operations. It is also very strongly recommended that the A.I.B. maintain an intelligence net in the Philippines entirely independent of all guerilla units. This is recommended because the organization and operations peculiar to the guerilla intelligence units make them particularly susceptible of being compromised, and once compromised, their value is then reduced to nil. On the other hand, a net established and operated by an agency directly under the control of G.H.Q. has considerably greater chances of success in maintaining contacts with the right people in occupied areas who are

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



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for the most part doubtful of such contacts as established by guerrilla units.

b. It is also necessary that G.H.Q. define the status of agents and provide them with whatever funds are necessary for the successful accomplishment of a mission.

c. A separate report is being submitted on the net I have established under the Allied Intelligence Bureau.

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PART VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

Communications.

Prisoners of war and

American Internees.

Situation of Foreigners in

the Philippines.

Conclusion.

Annexes.



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PART VI.

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COMMUNICATION

1. The problem of radio communications resolves itself into the question of power supply and the simplicity of construction of the sets themselves. To permit easy and rapid transportation over difficult terrain, sets must be as compact and as rugged as possible. In this connection, it might be mentioned that of all sets used by my party, the NEI set was the one that suited conditions best. The set developed by the U.S. Army Signal Corps especially for the "Planet" party was too bulky and not rugged enough and, therefore, it suffered from breakdowns on the several occasions it had to be moved. Allowance must, of course, be made for the fact that this particular set was constructed only during the last few days prior to our departure.

2. The 3BZ set, more recently received proved a great deal more practicable than the Signal Corps set and in some respects proved to be the best suited of the three (NEI, SC and 3BZ) although it still could not compare with the NEI set in the ruggedness of its construction. On the other hand, the ATR-4A set (received at the same time as the 3BZ) proved very satisfactory for local traffic. All other sets, by the way, have been tried and used in contacting Australia.

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20 AUG. 75

3. It is necessary that power units be as compact and as simple as possible. Enough spare parts to take care of any type of breakdown should be sent with each unit. Since there is hardly a drop of gasoline available in the Islands now, it is necessary that engines run on gasoline be converted here for possible use with coconut oil. A great number of radio parts (condensers, resistors, tubes, etc.) should be sent with each shipment not only for repair purposes but to enable local engineers to construct sets for local traffic.

4. Waterproofing is indispensable. This should be extended to all items including such things as dry batteries. A certain amount of soldering equipment and supplies should be sent too, as well as soldering lead used in radio construction and repair. Radio tools and testers are needed too.

5. It is not advisable to send too many crystals of the same frequency as this will have a tendency to jam the airplanes making schedules more complicated.

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6. Cipher system. All units are presently using the double transposition cipher system. A complete file of these systems (including those between the various districts) is being submitted separately.



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PRISONERS OF WAR AND AMERICAN INTERNEES

A. Prisoners of war.

1. At present only Americans and a few captured or surrendered Filipino guerilla members are kept in concentration camps. Filipinos captured in Batan and Corregidor have been released after over 29,000 had died during concentration.

2. American prisoners are distributed as follows:

Cabanatuan	6002
Davao	941
O'Donnell	5000
Other camps	2870
Japan	1898
Manchuria	1400
Formosa	367

Following is the death record among the American war prisoners:

Cabanatuan	2711
O'Donnell	1,559
other camps (Luzon)	274

B. Internees.

1. There are about 5,000 in Sto. Tomas University and 800 in Los Banos.

2. They receive better treatment and are given better food than the prisoners of war.

3. A move to transfer all internees to Los Banos has apparently been abandoned for the present time.

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SITUATION OF FOREIGNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES

I. Chinese.

a. A report on the situation of the Chinese in the Philippines is being submitted as an annex to this. The report was prepared by a Chinese youth, a college graduate, of several years residence in the Philippines. It is accurate and reliable.

II. Spaniards.

a. The Spaniards in the occupied areas did not fare as well as most of them had expected. The Japanese refused to give them any privileges other than those extended to the nationals of other countries. However, no reports of maltreatment have been received except in cases where the Spaniards themselves "asked for it."

b. In unoccupied areas, the Spaniards were extremely hard hit. Because the people (especially the lower elements) associated all Spaniards with Fascist activities, no Spaniard was safe from attack. Many were killed while many others who had previously sought refuge in the hills from the Japanese, now sought refuge in Japanese held towns leaving their farms and properties to be taken over or looted by the people. Unquestionably, after the return of our forces, there will be many complaints and accusations made by the Spanish elements.

III. Italians and Germans.

a. The nationals of these two Axis partners did not receive the benefits expected from the Japanese entry into Manila. They were treated much like any other foreigner. On one occasion there was a report of a Japanese officer pulling his Samurai on a German national.

b. It has been reported that upon the surrender of Italy all Italians were interned and treated as enemy nationals.

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
CONCLUSION

For a man of my age, I have lived a pretty full life. But of all my experiences -- in peace and in war -- none can ever equal those which has been my lot during the three hundred days which I have just spent in my native land.

Into those three hundred days have been crowded the sweetest and the most bitter, the humblest and the proudest, the brightest and the darkest moments of my life. During those days I have seen my people, weary, sick and battered, pick themselves up from the dusty ruins of defeat and rise again to lift high the torch of liberty in our country.

I have left my country and my people before, but when I left them this last time it was truly the most heartbreaking moment of my life.

I thank God I was given the opportunity to contribute something to my people's relentless fight for liberty. I pray that God may bless my people and bless those arms which are soon to redeem our beloved land.


JESUS A. VILLAMOR,
Major, Air Corps



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LIST OF PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS BEING SUBMITTED SEPARATELY

ENEMY

1. Report of Mr. J. B. VARGAS to the Director JMA.
(Jan 23, 1942, to March 31, 1943)
2. Synopsis of Plans of Development of Natural Resources
of the Philippines.
3. Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration
-- 11 Volumes.
4. City Gazette -- 4 copies.
5. Official Gazettes -- 3 copies.
6. File on Executive Orders of Mr. J. B. VARGAS.
7. Magazines --

Philippine Review -- 5 copies.
Miscellaneous -- 20 copies.
8. Miscellaneous Japanese pamphlets -- 21 copies.
9. Japanese Propaganda Posters.
10. Japanese Passes.
11. Newspapers --

The Mainichi (Japan) -- 6 copies.
La Vanguardia -- 13 copies.
Domei News -- 24 copies.
New Negroes Weekly -- 12 copies.
The Tribune -- 66 copies.
12. Captured Japanese map of Leyte and Samar.

FRIENDLY

1. File on Sixth Military District.
2. File on Seventh Military District.
3. File on Eighth Military District.
4. File on Ninth Military District.
5. File on Lieut. Col. GADOR.
6. File on Counter-Propaganda.
7. Diary of a Prisoner of War.
8. File of Cipher Systems in use in the Philippines.



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