

GUERRILLA
ACTIVITIES -

LUZON, ~~PH~~

AUGUST - DECEMBER
1944

Guerrilla - Luzon

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~TOP SECRET~~



CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Wm
TS 268A

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-3

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 28 December 44

1. Attention is invited to attached msgs 645, 646, and 647 from Cabangbang in re the Merrill forces in Zambales and Bataan. It is noted that both Col. Merrill and Col. Volckmann claim to have assumed command of our forces in Luzon upon Col. Thorpe's capture. Formerly, Major Anderson assumed that he had inherited that responsibility.

2. This conflict appears to have been largely responsive to the lack of communication which prevented accurate knowledge of the situation beyond the immediate area in which each was operating. In addition, Col. Merrill and the officers with him appear to have been much less aggressive than other officers with whom we have been in direct radio contact. The explanation for this may well lie in closer restriction upon the activities of the Merrill group due to the enemy situation in its immediate area.

3. The policy in re the unification of the forces available to our employment in Luzon has been clearly established by the C-in-C. It envisages the employment of American and Filipino officers of tested reliability in the organization of the resistance movement in the respective areas of personal influence of each to serve our military requirements primarily in the field of enemy intelligence -- without their employment as commands in the strict military sense. It is a distinction at times difficult to arrive at but essential if we are to avoid an army strength beyond all reason, and unification (destructive to existing theory underlying the utilization of separate and distinct agencies both for the security of the structure as a whole and to provide an overlapping check on vital enemy intelligence) for which there is neither logical reason nor available means. The overall control has thus been held direct by the C-in-C and as far as practical is being treated as a people's movement.

4. From our meagre knowledge of the potentialities of the Merrill group their evaluation should be made only with the exercise of extreme caution -- without losing sight of the fact, however, that a substantial guerilla movement in the Zambales-Bataan area may someday prove of extreme value and should be given every encouragement.

5. The C-in-C has outlined a general policy for application in the utilization of the patriotic groups in Luzon. It is but natural that all such groups should seek recognition as elements of the Philippine Army within the purview of the Commonwealth Government's executive order 21. Every day applications are now received to such end. This presents a delicate and difficult problem which will be made the subject of a separate study.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

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Guerilla - Luzon

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SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

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TS 268A

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-3

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 28 December 44

6. Recommend that reply substantially as follows be dispatched to Colonel Merrill: -

"I HAVE RECEIVED WITH MUCH SATISFACTION THE REPORT OF YOUR READINESS WITH OTHER OFFICERS AND SUBSTANTIAL FORCES, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, IN THE ZAMBALES-BATAAN AREA TO INSTITUTE MILITARY ACTION IN SUPPORT OF OUR MAIN OPERATIONS (MACARTHUR TO MERRILL) MY POLICY IN THE UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE INTERIOR STRENGTH IN LUZON IS TO TREAT IT, INSOFAR AS PRACTICAL, AS A SPONTANEOUS PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP, DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE USAFFE, OF TESTED RELIABILITY, OPERATING WITHIN AREAS AND AMONG PEOPLES OF PRIMARY PERSONAL INFLUENCE. I DESIRE FOR THE MOST PART THAT SUCH MOVEMENT BE EMPLOYED IN THE ACQUISITION OF RELIABLE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON ENEMY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH LATER COMMITMENT AS REQUIRED TO HARASSING ACTION TO THE EXTENT OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES. AS RESOURCES PERMIT ME TO DO SO I SHALL SEND IN ARMS, AMMUNITION, SIGNAL EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES TO STRENGTHEN YOUR POSITION BUT SUCH ACTION OF COURSE MUST BE BASED UPON STRATEGIC PRIORITIES IN THE OVERALL SITUATION. CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS HEADQUARTERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE POLICY UNTIL OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED AND DISPATCH ALL IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE SECURED FROM SOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUGH CAPTAIN CABANGBANG NOW IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH ME. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SECURING INFORMATION ON ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS, MOVEMENT AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY UNITS."

Incls:
Msgs 645, 646, 647 fr CABANGBANG

A. E. S.J.C. CW



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OK. Mch

Guerilla, Gen.



~~TOP SECRET~~

TS 268B

G-3

Chief of Staff



28 December 44

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Return to G-3 OPERATIONS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TS 268B

G-3

Chief of Staff

28 December 44

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"I HAVE RECEIVED WITH MUCH SATISFACTION THE REPORT OF YOUR READINESS WITH OTHER OFFICERS AND SUBSTANTIAL FORCES, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, IN THE ZAMBALES-BATAAN AREA TO INSTITUTE MILITARY ACTION IN SUPPORT OF OUR MAIN OPERATIONS (MACARTHUR TO MERRILL) MY POLICY IN THE UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE INTERIOR STRENGTH IN LUZON IS TO TREAT IT, INsofar AS PRACTICAL, AS A SPONTANEOUS PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP, DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE USAFFE, OF TESTED RELIABILITY, OPERATING WITHIN AREAS AND AMONG PEOPLES OF PRIMARY PERSONAL INFLUENCE. I DESIRE FOR THE MOST PART THAT SUCH MOVEMENT BE EMPLOYED IN THE ACQUISITION OF RELIABLE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON ENEMY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH LATER COMMITMENT AS REQUIRED TO HARASSING ACTION TO THE EXTENT OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES. AS RESOURCES PERMIT ME TO DO SO I SHALL SEND IN ARMS, AMMUNITION, SIGNAL EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES TO STRENGTHEN YOUR POSITION BUT SUCH ACTION OF COURSE MUST BE BASED UPON STRATEGIC PRIORITIES IN THE OVERALL SITUATION. CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS HEADQUARTERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE POLICY UNTIL OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED AND DISPATCH ALL IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE SECURED FROM SOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUGH CAPTAIN CABANGBANG NOW IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH ME. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SECURING INFORMATION ON ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS, MOVEMENT AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY UNITS."

S.J.C.



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Msgs 645, 646, 647 fr CABANGBANG

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| | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|-----|
| Asst C of S G-3 | Requirements | --- |
| Maj Gen S J Chamberlin | Lt Col W M Turner | --- |
| Executive | Lt Col F H Boland | --- |
| Col G A Rohm | Maj R L Specht | --- |
| Administration | Maj Carrington | --- |
| Maj H W Port | Lt T C Bird | --- |
| CWO C J Hallinan | Lt J Wells | --- |
| WO(jc) H J Farrington | Historian | --- |
| Operations | Col W J Niederpruem | --- |
| Brig Gen W E Chambers | Maj H V Bail | --- |
| Col H B Wheeler | Lt J A Isely | --- |
| Col C Whitney | Lt R R Smith | --- |
| Capt C C Phleger | Lt R A Gardner | --- |
| Col J M Bartella | Drafting | --- |
| Col J E Bowen | M/Sgt R T Hoover | --- |
| Comdr R S McIver | Chief Clerk | --- |
| Lt Col B J Macheroy | | |
| Lt Col K I Curtis | | |
| Lt Col J V Rathbone | For: | |
| Lt Col L J Loughran | Approval | --- |
| Lt Col D G Sherrard | Comment | --- |
| Lt Comdr N E Weaver | Concur | --- |
| Lt Comdr G Dwight | Info | --- |
| Maj F E Anderson | See Action | --- |
| Maj L A Telesco | Signature | --- |
| Capt H B Bowman | Ret Adm | --- |
| Lt J A Sipfle | Note Ret | --- |
| Planning | Dispatch | --- |
| Brig Gen W C Dunkel | Summary | --- |
| Brig T W White | Journal | --- |
| Col B R Peyton | Your File | --- |
| Col H C McLean | File Adm | --- |
| Capt R D Tarbuck | | |
| Col D Larr | | |
| Col R H Kreuter | | |
| Col C Giebel | | |
| Col C T Tench | | |
| Col W T Ryder | | |
| Comdr R W Allen | | |
| Lt Col E J Latoszowski | | |
| Lt Comdr R H Amberg | | |
| Lt Comdr F E Borchert | | |
| Maj E C Hawes | | |
| Maj G T Walker | | |
| Lt E M Fitzpatrick | | |
| Capt S F Lee | | |
| Lt J T Spangler | | |

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Wll
Planning for
system at necessary
data from attached
papers

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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CHECK SHEET

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TTS 267

File No.:

Subject:

From: Major Lee A. Telesco

To: General Wm. E. Chambers

Date: 23 October 1944

1. In reference to attached memorandum, the following information is submitted:

a. Demolition Parties were dispatched to VOLCKMAN, LAPHAM and ANDERSON with the following equipment equally distributed to each. (Incl 1)

b. Demolition Parties located. (Incl 2)

2. The plan in setting up these parties was to organize teams of saboteurs to send into the several areas with well balanced demolitions to there organize and train further local teams to assist the Area Commander in sabotage activities.

3. Copies of BUICK and FORD Plans as forwarded this Headquarters by Major Anderson are attached for information. (Incl 3)

3 Incls.

Incl 1. List of Demolition Equipment

Incl 2. Map showing location of parties

Incl 3. Copies of BUICK and FORD Plans

LAT
L.A.T.



Incl #3

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LIST OF DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT

TS 267

| | |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| Switches #10 Red | 2675 |
| Copper Tube Igniters | 2945 |
| Switches #10 Yellow | 2675 |
| Switches #10 Blue | 2675 |
| Switches #10 Green | 2675 |
| Fuses Delay Action | 90 |
| #1 Pull Switches | 1425 |
| #4 Pull Switches | 1135 |
| Incends P. T. White | 1500 |
| Incends, P.T. Yellow | 1500 |
| Incends, P.T. Green | 1500 |
| Incends, P.T. Blue | 1500 |
| Incends, Paraffin, Tysules | 1440 |
| M.L. Flares | 720 |
| Switches # 5 | 725 |
| Igniters, fog signal | tins 70 |
| Clams filled | 660 - 2 |
| Limpets | 15 |
| Holdfasts magnetic | 20 |
| Magnets | 756 |
| Matches Fuzee | boxes 60 |
| Striker Boards | 100 |
| Welrods | 40 |
| Tools, Crimping | prs 42 |
| Knives, Dagger Jack | 56 |
| Tape, adhesive | rolls 350 |
| .32 Ammunition | rds 1400 |
| Electron Turnings | lbs 42 |
| Ampoules | 210 |
| Wreath Formers | 44 |
| Switches #5 Push Mech | 600 |
| Limpets Rigid Type 6 | 30 |
| Tools, Crimping type 6 | prs 98 |
| Magnets 1/2 lb | 1582 |
| Wreath Formers 8x8 | 101 |
| Fuses, delay action MK 1 | 60 |
| Switches, #4, Pull type 6 | 290 |
| Aust Army Issue Knife | 50 |


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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA


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DEMOLITION PARTIES IN
POSITION

25 October, 1944.

G-3 PRS

LUZON — MINDORO



120°

18°

17°

15°

14°

13°

APARRI

LAOAG

VIGAN

TUGUEGARAO

Volekman
2 Officers
4 EM

BONTOC

ILAGAN

SAN FERNANDO

BAGUIO

SAN QUINTIN

LINGAYEN

Laphan
2 Officers
4 EM

TARLAC

CABANATUAN

IBA

Anderson
2 Officers
4 EM

SAN FERNANDO

MALOLOS

POLILLO IS.

BATAAN

MANILA

LAMON BAY

BATANGAS

NAGA

SANTA CRUZ

MINDORO

POLA

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA


DEMOLITION PARTIES IN
POSITION

23 October, 1944.

G-3 PRS

75267

LUZON — MINDORO



INCL. 2

UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
Headquarters Kalayaan Command

File: AA

29 August, 1944 /a

Subject: Offensive PlansTo : Commander in Chief,
Allied Forces in the Southwest
Pacific Area

1. Inclosed herewith are the plans this headquarters has been working on with a view to assisting the incoming forces.
2. It is requested that your desires regarding same and other actions that this Command is to take be furnished as early as practicable.

/s/ Bernard L. Anderson
Major, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls
Incl. 1- The Buick Plan
2- The Ford Plan



INCL.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Asst C of S G-3

Maj Gen S J Chamberlin

Requirements

Lt Col W M Turner

Executive

Col G A Rehm

Lt Col F H Boland

Maj R L Specht

Maj Carrington

Administration

Maj H W Port

Lt T C Bird

CWO C J Hallinan

Lt J Wells

WO(jg) H J Farrington

Historian

Col W J Niederpruem

Operations

Brig Gen W E Chambers

Maj H V Bail

Col H B Wheeler

Lt J A Isely

Col C Whitney

Lt R R Smith

Capt C C Phlegor

Lt R A Gardner

Col J M Bartella

Drafting

Col J E Bowen

M/Sgt R T Hoover

Comdr R S McIver

Chief Clerk

Lt Col E J Macheray

Lt Col K I Curtis

Lt Col J V Rathbone

Lt Col L J Leughran

Lt Col D G Sherrard

Lt Comdr N E Weaver

Lt Comdr G Dwight

Maj F E Anderson

Maj L A Telesco

Capt H B Bowman

Lt J A Sipfle

For:

Approval *Revised*

Comment *attached memo*

Concur

Info *Plan given*

Rec Action

Signature *mmat, mgt*

Ret Adm *my plat*

Note Ret

Dispatch

Summary *showing to*

Journal

Your *file*

File Adm

Planning

Brig Gen W C Dunkel

Brig T W White

Col B R Peyton

Col H C McLean

Capt R D Turbuck

Col D Larr

Col R H Kreuter

Col C Giebel

Col C T Tench

Col W T Ryder

Comdr R W Allen

Lt Col E J Latoszowski

Lt Comdr R H Amberg

Lt Comdr F E Borchert

Maj E C Hawes

Maj G T Walker

Lt E M Fitzpatrick

Capt S F Lee

Lt J T Spangler



*to be in Logon and
hand on with within 30 days
have, and should be eliminated
and rotating; portion deleted
strongly of each party,
under what Ruyvella leader
stay do to work, and
amount and kind of*

Completion material sent to each party. W. L.
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TS 266

21 October 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Planning and Operations Sections.

G-2 informs me that the Japanese apparently have taken a disposition in LUZON which may be very favorable to our main attack in LINGAYEN if properly taken advantage of.

The information indicates that a division has been deployed in the BICOL PENINSULA, a force of approximately a division south in the CAGAYAN VALLEY, and a force of unknown strength along the northwest coast between ~~VIGAN~~ and LAOAG.

If these forces can be held in position during our Central LUZON campaign, it is probable that the Japanese will be unable to find adequate forces to oppose our drive to the South.

These forces might be held in place by one of several methods:

- a. A minor landing at one or more of these places.
- b. Deception aimed at one or more of these places.
- c. Demolition by air to destroy communications at some favorable spot between the point of their concentration and Central LUZON.
- d. Same as c above by the employment of guerilla forces in explosives.

It is desired that the Planning Section make an immediate study (informally) to suggest what might be done along these lines. Particularly, it is desired that a thorough map study be made to determine where the air force may place the weight of its effort in heavy bombing to break communications between the outlying forces and Central LUZON, and the point where guerilla explosives could assist in this same objective. In the latter, it is desired that the Planning Section work closely with the Operations Section so that any conclusions reached can be put into effect by the Philippine Section supplying the necessary explosives and alerting the LUZON guerillas to activate a plan.

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S.J.C.



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UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
Headquarters Kalayaan Command

TS 265

Subject: Supplies and Equipment.

30 September, 1944

To : Captain Russell D. Barros, U. S. A.

1. GHQ - SWPA has indicated their intentions of delivering supplies and equipment direct to you. In the event you can be prepared to receive same, the first shipment of about ten tons will arrive about the 24th of October.
2. Submarine contact points suggested by SWPA are as follows:
 - a. Vicinity of LAMIT ISLAND.
 - b. Vicinity of San Miguel Bay.
 - c. Vicinity of Catanduanes Islands.
3. Contact site must be on coast sheltered from Northeast winds with clear approach, no reefs, channels or sandbars, and water must be deep just off shore to permit vessel coming in close.
4. You are to furnish boats for unloading and necessary men to handle supplies after they are landed.
5. Recommend you send recos to investigate suggest landing points and notify the undersigned of results as soon as possible. In the event information available indicates same is practicable, take the radio I am sending with this shipment and go to the vicinity of the suggested contact points and then establish communications with this hq.
6. Your recommendations regarding other possible contact points are desired, however, it is believed that the general vicinity of the points suggested in paragraph 2, above, should prove satisfactory and that higher headquarters will readily accept a contact point in this vicinity.



BERNARD L. ANDERSON,
Major, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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COPY

TS 267

UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
Headquarters Kalayaan Command

28 August, 1944.

/a

THE BUICK PLAN

SECTION I - East Coast

Appendix B

1. Plans are made and are being perfected to assist the incoming forces by establishing beachheads and/or assisting with the establishing of beachheads in the following places on the East Coast:

- a. Baler
- b. Dingalan Bay
- c. Infanta - Tignuan
- d. Mauban
- e. Atimonan



2. With the units now organized, it is believed that the cutting of the roads and trails, the only communication lines to these points, can be accomplished.

3. In addition, it will be possible to engage and harass the enemy from the rear.

4. Large numbers of men and sufficient equipment can be secretly landed and moved into positions with little difficulty in as far as conditions here permit.

SECTION II - Bicol

1. It is believed that with the organization or consolidation of the loyal forces in the Bicol Provinces, action of the nature mentioned in Section I, above, will greatly assist the incoming forces.

SECTION III - Bondoc Peninsula

1. The cutting of the roads to Unisan and Pitogo in Bondoc Peninsula can be undertaken by units now with this Command.

SECTION IV - Batangas

1. Units now organized in Batangas are making recos and plans for establishing and/or assisting with the establishing of beachheads. Their plans are expected to arrive this headquarters in the near future and same will be checked and forwarded.

SECTION V Zambales - Bataan

1. Details on plans in this area, including points where supplies, equipment and personnel can be landed will be furnished as soon as radio communications are operating from the area. Same will be established soon after the arrival of necessary equipment.

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**SECTION VI - Manila and
Vicinity**

- 1. Personnel, supplies and equipment can be secretly landed on the East coast and moved to within short distances of their objective.
- 2. Recos have been made and guides and other personnel are now available at this headquarters for missions of the nature mentioned above.
- 3. Many units in this vicinity are awaiting for orders to harass the enemy.

/s/ Bernard L. Anderson
 BERNARD L. ANDERSON
 Major, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.



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UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
Headquarters Kalayaan Command

1a
28 August 1944.

THE FORD PLAN

SECTION I - Railroad

Appendix C

1. It is believed possible to completely deny the use of all railroads in Luzon, to the enemy, at any time orders are received to accomplish same.

a. Many of the Filipino employees on the railroad are secretly organized and are waiting for orders to accomplish their assigned mission.

(1) Several of the engineers claim that they can derail their trains, in such a manner, that it will take from one to weeks to get the line back in operation with the limited facilities now available.

(2) Switchmen, yardmen, brakemen and dispatchers feel that they can disable many of main lines and put the main yards in such a state of confusion that the enemy will not be able to utilize the trains.

(3) Time bombs can be planted in the few remaining engines and render same completely useless.

(4) Many of the station masters are organized so that they will leave switches open and if directed to do so can remove rail spikes.

b. Plans have been made for destruction of bridges, removal of rails and other sabotage as a double check to insure the success of denying the use of rail facilities to the enemy. These plans include action in the following places:

(1) On the main line from Manila to the South between Cabuyao and Calamba.

(2) Between Gandelaria and Lucena.

(3) Between Pagbilao and Padre Burgos.

(4) Between New Aloneros and Ragay.

(5) The Batangas line between Tanauan and Lipa.

(6) The main line from Manila to the North in the vicinity of Navotas and Malabon.

(7) The Cabanatuan branch in three places:

(a) Vicinity of Baliwag, Bulacan.

(b) Vicinity of Massim, Bulacan.

(c) Vicinity of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija.

(8) The Pampanga-Tarlac branch in two places:

(a) Between Calumpit, Bulacan and San Fernando, Pampanga.

(b) Between Malolos and Calumpit, Bulacan.

c. Plans were made to accomplish this action with facilities available locally.



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d. The arrival of munitions, time bombs, etc., will assure the success of all or any part of the action outlined above.

e. In the event it is desired that this action be taken, it is recommended that orders and instructions be furnished. It is believed feasible to advise the degree of destruction desired.

SECTION II - Roads.

1. Plans for denying the use of the roads to the enemy include action in the following places:

- a. On National Road No. 5, between the following places:
 - (1) San Roque and Maasin, Bulacan.
 - (2) At Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
 - (3) Between San Jose, Nueva Ecija and Balete pass.

b. The road to Baler to be cut at three places between Bongabon and Baler.

c. The road from Laur, Nueva Ecija to Dingalan Bay at two places.

d. The road to northwestern Luzon at following places:

- (1) Between Malolos and Calumpit, Bulacan.
- (2) Just South of San Fernando, Pampanga.
- (3) Between San Fernando and Angeles, Pampanga.
- (4) Between Angeles and Porac.
- (5) Between Arayat, Pampanga and Cabiao, N. Ecija.
- (6) Between Dinalupihan and Olongapo.
- (7) Between Tarlac and Santa Ignacia.
- (8) At the Villasis Pangasinan bridge.

e. The road to Infanta is to be cut at two places between Famy and Tigmuan. Again between Barrios Kupalong and Kiloloron and again between Real and Barrio Gumian.

f. The road from Lucban to Mauban is to be cut between Lucban and Sampaloc and Mauban.

g. The road to the Bicol Provinces is to be cut at three points between Pagbilao and Atimonan.

h. Plans for cutting roads in the Bicol Provinces are not complete, however, preliminary recon show that there are many temporary structures which will be easily destroyed.

i. Plans for Batangas and Cavite are not complete. Details on this area will be submitted in the near future.

2. The main method to be used in denying roads to the enemy is destruction of the temporary bridges.

3. Units assigned to these missions are to perform their individual mission and then harass the enemy with available arms and ammunition.

SECTION III * Telegraph

1. Many railroad telegraphers are secretly organized and claim they can cut cables, destroy switchboards and other equipment in such a manner it will take the enemy a minimum of one month to put same back in operation.

2. The telegraph lines are to be cut at the same places, action is taken to cut the rail movements.



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SECTION IV - Telephone

1. Telephone lines paralleling roads and railroads are to be cut at the same places roads and railroads are cut.
2. We are still endeavoring to organize employees in the main terminals, but have not been successful to date.

SECTION V - Electric Power

1. There have been no plans made for destruction of electric plants and/or transmission lines.
2. The main hydro plants can be destroyed if such action is desired.
3. Main transmission lines can be destroyed.
4. It is requested that your desires regarding this item be furnished.

SECTION VI - Launches and
small boats

1. Many of the operators of launches, batels and other small boats in the vicinity of Lemon Bay are secretly organized and are waiting for orders to deliver their boats in good condition, sink or totally destroy same.

/s/ Bernard L. Anderson
BERNARD L. ANDERSON
Major, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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