

Whitney Papers
Guerrilla Records
Operations - 1943



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

39 May
1943.

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

TO:

FOR:

Comdr Allied Air Forces	Nec. Action
Comdr Allied Naval Forces	Note & return
	Information
Ass't Chief of Staff G-1	File
Ass't Chief of Staff G-2	
Ass't Chief of Staff G-3	
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4	
Adjutant General	



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18 APR 78

Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of Staff.

Return to Col. Whetstone

Van S. ...

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of February 18, 1943.

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Order Sec Army
By TAG, per 710574

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Allied Intelligence Bureau

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27 May, 1943.

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Philippine Operations.

TO : Chief of Staff.



1. Following wire was received from Peralta this date:

"PROBLEM OF MONEY THIS DISTRICT ACUTE. RELEASED ONE MILLION PESOS PRINTED LAST MARCH AND ALL GONE. TO COMBAT JAP ATTRACTION POLICY, WE HAVE BEEN PAYING PARTIAL SALARIES OF SOLDIERS AND BUYING FOOD. OTHERWISE SOLDIERS FAMILIES STARVE. CIVIL GOVT IN SAME HOLE. MONEY YOU SENT ME IS RESERVED FOR INTELLIGENCE ONLY. EXPENSES HALF MILLION PESOS A MONTH. PLEASE CONSIDER OUR STRENGTH IN PERSONNEL, ACTIVITIES, HIGH PRICES. CHIEF PROBLEM IS PREVENT PEOPLE FROM RETURNING TO TOWNS AND EVENTUALLY COMING UNDER ECONOMIC BONDAGE. HISTORY OF LUZON SHOWS GUERRILLA AUTOMATICALLY SMASHED ONCE PEOPLE IN JAP ECONOMIC GRIP. DO NOT EVEN HAVE MATERIAL TO PRINT MONEY. AM CONFIDENT OF LOYALTY OF PEOPLE BUT AM TOO MUCH OF A REALIST TO FORGET THAT MONEY TALKS. JAP POLICY OF ATTRACTION INCLUDES REDEEMING OUR EMERGENCY NOTES WITH THEIR MILITARY NOTES, SELLING GOODS CHEAP. REQUEST IMMEDIATE HELP. I DO NOT ORDINARILY ASK FOR HELP UNLESS I NEED IT. I AM YELLING FOR IT NOW. IF I DO NOT GET HELP BY JUNE, SHALL BE FORCED TO ATTACK JAP OCCUPIED TOWNS IF I NOTICE ANY TENDENCY FOR PEOPLE TO RETURN TO TOWNS. THIS IS PURE SELF DEFENSE."

2. I am reluctant to recommend any change in basic policy in view of the relatively short time that I have been attached to this headquarters -- time which has been insufficient to permit me to thoroughly digest all material forming policy background. However, the content and tone of the foregoing radio makes it mandatory that our existing Philippine policy be thoughtfully reviewed in the light of certain fundamental considerations which I shall hereinafter outline.

3. Historically, our Philippine policy since the outbreak of war has been sadly remiss from that which our wards, the Filipinos, have been led to expect during the past forty odd years of our sovereignty. Remiss, not only in our failure to take the necessary military measures, as a great nation in the discharge of its solemn undertakings, to secure the defense of the Islands once the attack was launched, but remiss in our utter failure to extend any degree of political leadership or instruction to the Filipino people in their extremity.

4. At the time of the fall of Manila, with the consequent suppression of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Commonwealth government, I foresaw the urgency of aggressive political leadership as well as military action from Washington and urged upon the President, intervention by the United States within the spirit of par. 14, Section XI, Act of Congress of March 24, 1934 (Public.No. 127-73rd Congress) and Section XV of the ordinance appended to and forming a part of the constitution of the Philippines Commonwealth. In fact I submitted to the President a draft of a proposed proclamation to give effect to such action. The President approved the underlying principles involved and the proclamation itself as submitted, but held that its issuance should be coordinated with military action. As a consequence of the War Department's unwillingness or inability to act, the issue soon became a lost cause and we missed the opportunity to at least extend that degree of sovereign leadership and instruction to a people for whom we were no less responsible than for the people of any state in the American Union. For such help, if any, as it may afford to the present study, I am attaching hereto, tab "A", a copy of that proposed proclamation which was submitted with the following comments:

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"1. Herewith is a draft of a proclamation which I believe substantially covers what the President should sign. While it provides somewhat of a novelty in Government, it is well within the letter and the spirit of the statutory and constitutional provisions for intervention. It sets up flexible machinery for exercise by the President of as much or as little of the function of the Government as may be required by the circumstances existing in each locality. It provides encouragement and leadership to the Filipino masses and properly instructs them in the manner in which official and private citizen alike is expected to respond to the issues of war with which he is unfortunately confronted. It contains no direct threats to those who may be treasonably inclined but from it may be drawn the clear implication of that inevitable day of reckoning for the transgressor which lies ahead. It reaffirms our existing Philippine policy and thus prevents the Japanese or Filipino collaborationists from propagandizing it as a blow to Philippine aspirations for political independence.

"2. The proclamation is purposely so drawn that it definitely commits the President to no further action, but affords the basis for any further action which may be called for by the trend of coming events."

Quite recently such action was discussed with President Queson by General Donovan, who informs me that the former, after reading the proclamation, stated that he would have readily approved the action indicated had the matter been taken up with him. Its present interest is of course limited to the fact that it sets up action with which both chief executives appear to have been in full agreement and may suggest how far either may be expected to go now, or in the future, should circumstances suggest the advisability of intervention into the civil affairs of the Commonwealth.

5. Subsequent to the fall of Corregidor, I repeatedly urged that the President appoint an acting High Commissioner to go to the Philippines, confer with leaders of known loyalty, present letters of instruction and counsel for the Filipino people and generally extend some semblance of sovereign leadership. This effort met with no greater success.

6. Shortly before my assignment to this headquarters, I again urged that the President dispatch to selected Filipino leaders, by personal representative, a letter in substantially the tenor of that attached as tab "B". I doubt that such effort has met with any greater success, as officials close to the President appear to be blind to any continuing responsibility of the United States, as sovereign, to extend what little leadership the situation now permits.

7. Coming now to the policy of this headquarters, which I believe should be reviewed in the light of the Peralta message set forth in par.1 hereof, I note that by formal action we have created military districts within the Philippines and placed them under the command of guerilla leaders, commissioned in the Army of the United States for such purpose, and incorporated in our army units heretofore committed to guerilla action. The effect of this is the assumption by the United States, and this headquarters more particularly, of full responsibility for the operations of such military commanders and the forces under their control. Its danger lies in that:

- a. We are unable to exercise effective control and intelligent direction over such operations.
- b. We are unable, due to logistical difficulties, to sustain such action against determined Japanese military measures, which are directly challenged in the absence of secrecy.
- c. We are unable to preserve such secrecy surrounding our action, due to that oft-found inherent phase of Filipino character that renders him boastful of power and arrogant in its exercise. See radio reference to Peralta, tab "C".

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- d. Defeat of any of the military commanders will be construed by the people as a further defeat of the United States and duly propagandised as such by the Japanese, with resultant further decline in American prestige.
- e. Any such defeat, with the resultant adverse effect upon public morale and extension of enemy occupation and control, will render more difficult the development of intelligence facilities and the reopening of channels of communication.
- f. Acts of our commanders and the forces under their control, however oppressive to the people and opposed to the policies and directives of this headquarters, will be done in the name of General MacArthur and construed by the people, under the stimulus of Japanese propaganda, as his acts or at least by his sanction.



8. In subject radio, Peralta advises that for present commitments he requires a half million pesos a month. Soon such requirement may be expected to be doubled and trebled. How much of these funds actually are disbursed for legitimate purposes and how much are dedicated to the creation of an overlordship that may later prove a harassing thorn in our side, is a matter for pure conjecture but, as Peralta himself points out in his radio, "money talks". I know of no place in which it "talks" louder than it does in the Philippines. His tone is both demanding and threatening. He threatens to do just what he has been ordered by express directive of the Commander-in-Chief not to do -- attack Japanese occupied towns. He is obviously drunk with power, as noted by Villamor in his radio, tab "C", and unless brought under immediate and effective control may be expected to present an increasingly difficult problem to cope with -- may ultimately align himself and his adherents directly against us, once he deems himself sufficiently well entrenched to do so.

9. The issues herein raised are basic. Policies and decisions and the operations thereunder will have a profound effect upon our strategical plan of re-occupation -- hence such policies and decisions must be sufficiently flexible to permit their ready adjustment and modification to meet the situation as it develops.

10. The following courses of action are open to the Commander-in-Chief:

- a. Adhere to existing policy, with such control as the circumstances will permit.
- b. Reduce guerilla action in the Philippines north of Mindanao to purely local efforts in the several areas with such secret support and encouragement as we can give, utilizing such officers and men, thereby released, as is desirable in the development of intelligence facilities until such time as the situation calls for additional employment.
- c. Reduce all guerilla action in the Philippines as set forth in b., with a consequent intensification of the development of intelligence facilities as outlined.
- d. Irrespective of decision as to a, b or c above, to spread an intelligence net over the main centers of population, coastal areas and seaports as rapidly as possible, organized according to detailed plan, utilizing volunteer and paid agents throughout the Islands and directed by carefully selected, trained and indoctrinated leaders secretly responsible to this headquarters, with sufficient transmission outlets to handle all informational traffic.
- e. Limited intervention by the United States under the statutory and constitutional provisions cited in par.4 hereof, to enable the establishment of military government over unoccupied areas in the Philippines.

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11. In our present inability to sustain either offensive or defensive action in any area of the Philippines against determined enemy opposition, I believe that, under existing policy, we unnecessarily risk further deterioration of American prestige among the Filipino people, who will construe our public formalization of guerilla action by the incorporation of officers and units in the American Army, as a further well calculated stand in their defense, -- the defeat of such units as our further defeat, with a consequent further deterioration in that spirit to resist which by our very action we seek to preserve. I therefore recommend:

- a. That the existing policy of this headquarters be reshaped to envisage a period of time devoted exclusively to quiet and well organized penetration to positions from which vital enemy information may be obtained and transmitted to this headquarters; arrangements being made for the interception of vital naval information by submarines in position to immediately act thereon. The stage being thereby set to give the people effective leadership in the mobilization of effort from within as required -- to exert strong influence over the people to counter Japanese propaganda. All other than secret military action in the Philippines to be suspended for the present. Secret aid to guerilla units continuing to operate from patriotic motives to continue as deemed desirable and possible.
- b. That a definitive policy covering the Philippine situation in its present phase be enunciated by the Commander-in-Chief and conveyed, together with detailed instructions to those officers or agents who are selected to direct intelligence or other activities in the name of and under the control of this headquarters.
- c. That the influence of sovereignty be exerted upon the Filipino people through the dissemination of specific instructions governing their norm of conduct during the present phase of operations. In this I have in mind the historical McKinley letter of instructions dispatched to the Philippines at the turn of the century. Such instructions were less needed then than similarly definitive instructions are needed now. Carefully prepared and thoroughly disseminated, such a document would have a profound effect upon events to come through the attendant stability it would give to the thought processes of the Filipino mind -- might well prove the equivalent to a major Japanese military defeat.
- d. That, regardless of decisions resulting from this study, a high ranking officer should be dispatched to the Philippines, as the personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief, in full dignity of office and mission:
 - (1) To deliver to and thoroughly impress upon local leaders the policies and instructions of this headquarters;
 - (2) To make "on the ground" decisions as required, not inconsistent with such policies;
 - (3) To assist local leaders in the development of plans to carry out the directives of this headquarters;
 - (4) To arrange and preside over a conference of local leaders on all phases of the problem of mutual interest and develop proper coordination of effort.
 - (5) To arrange for the dissemination to the Filipino people of such letter of instructions as the Commander-in-Chief may determine to issue and meet such local political leaders in the name of General MacArthur as may be possible and desirable.



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(6) To arrange for the financing of operations as directed.

12. The recommendations herein made are admittedly debatable and are designed primarily as a basis for thought on a situation in which danger signals appear ahead. It may be urged that we cannot now reshape our existing policy without loss of prestige among the Filipino people -- without alienating from the cause Peralta and other local leaders. I believe the answer to both rests entirely upon the manner in which such action is taken and explained to the people. Our prestige among the Filipino people will suffer far more through unrealistic thinking and planning than through any reshaping of policies to meet the situation as it develops. Our local leaders' action on the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief are, after all, but a fair test of underlying loyalty to a cause to which all are equally committed.

13. Intervention by the United States in the civil affairs of the Philippines at the present time would be of very doubtful value and the attempt to administer military government in any form over the unoccupied areas would but result in the extension of the occupation with a consequent curtailment of opportunities to secure military intelligence and the further oppression of the people.

Courtney Whitney
COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps.

N.B. As the above was in preparation, the following radio was received from Peralta:

"EARNESTLY COMMEND YOUR ATTENTION TO BUILDING OF LARGE NUMBER OF GIANT CARGO AND TRANSPORT SUBMARINES FOR SUPPLY PURPOSES AND INVASION FLEET. IF VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT WAS POSSIBLE IN CRETE, UNDERSEA ENVELOPMENT IS POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINES. BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE THESE OF SURPRISE AND AVOIDANCE OF FRONTAL ASSAULT WHERE POSSIBLE. YOU SEEM COMMITTED TO KNOCKING OUT JAP NAVAL AND AIR POWER BEFORE YOU CAN GET THERE. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS IS NOTHING BUT FRONTAL ASSAULT ON STRONGEST ENEMY OBSTACLES WHICH YOUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN BLOODY AND LONG. BELIEVE TACTICAL PRINCIPLES ON USE OF PARACHUTE AND AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE ABOUT SAME AS UNDERSEA TROOPS."

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"A"



BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS certain of the political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, on the Island of Luzon, including the city of Manila, seat of the Commonwealth Government, have been occupied by Japanese military forces; and

WHEREAS such occupation has interfered with and necessarily restricted the normal processes of civil government under the constitution and laws of the Philippine Commonwealth and is endangering through restraint of officials and agencies of government and disruption of communications, the duly constituted government thereof and its subordinate branches in the several Provinces, Municipalities and other political subdivisions; and

WHEREAS in paragraph 14, Section XI, Act of Congress of March 24, 1934 (Public No. 127 - 73rd Congress) and Section 15 of the Ordinance appended to the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, provision was expressly made for intervention by the United States for the preservation of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and for the maintenance of the Government as provided in the constitution thereof, and for the protection of life, property and individual liberty and for the discharge of government obligations under and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution; and

WHEREAS the full power of the United States is pledged to the early expulsion of the Japanese invader from the Philippine soil, the redemption of liberties which have been ruthlessly violated, the restoration of that peace, security and happiness with which the peoples of the Philippines have been blessed throughout the past four decades, and the orderly transition into complete political independence projected by law to become effective in the year 1946; and

WHEREAS in the fulfillment of such purposes and for the protection of the government of the Philippine Commonwealth and the preservation of individual liberties including the sacred right to government by constitutional process, I have determined that intervention, within the spirit of the statutory and constitutional provisions referred to, has become mandatory upon the United States:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in the discharge of the sovereign responsibilities of the United States to the peoples of the Philippine Commonwealth and in accordance with the statutory and constitutional provisions aforesaid, with the concurrence of the Honorable Manuel Queson, President of the Philippine Commonwealth, do hereby assume the prerogatives of Government over the territory and peoples of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

I direct that pending the expulsion of the Japanese invader from Philippine soil by the armed forces of the United States and of the Philippines, all duly elected, constituted or appointed Public Officials of the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the provincial, municipal and other political subdivisions thereof, continue in the discharge of their several offices until relieved by my order or under constitutional process; and I enjoin upon all such public officials the exercise of the utmost vigilance and painstaking care in the discharge of

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their responsibilities to the end that the lives, property and individual liberties of the Filipinos and other friendly nationals within their several jurisdictions may be adequately safeguarded, and that all public funds and other property committed to their custody may be accounted for as provided by law; and

I do enjoin upon all citizens of the Philippine Commonwealth, strict obedience to the laws in force and to all lawful orders from duly constituted authority; unswerving loyalty to the common cause in which the peoples of the United States and of the Philippines are joined; a calm but inflexible understanding that the ruthless and paramount purpose of the Japanese invader of Philippine soil is the enslavement of the Filipino people, with the consequent suppression of those fundamental liberties for the preservation of which free men are ever willing to fight, including the freedom of religious expression and the sanctity and inviolability of the home, upon both of which rests the strong foundation of Philippine culture; and a fixed determination for unrelenting resistance; and

I announce it as my purpose, pending the time that the President, other officials of the Commonwealth Government, the legislature and the appellate branches of the Judiciary are able to discharge their several governmental functions as provided by law, without restraint, to establish military departments throughout the Philippines which will be announced from time to time by Executive Order clearly delineating the jurisdiction of each such military department and the powers delegated by me to the military commander thereof. Such powers will be sufficiently broad to permit any necessary modification of the laws in force in order that constitutional process, insofar as is possible in the existing circumstances, may be preserved to the people, and individual rights and liberties protected; and

I do call upon all good citizens of the Philippines, as free men, to resolutely assist me in this solemn undertaking and to devote every ounce of strength and, if need be, every drop of blood, to the task before us, to the end that they may not only emerge triumphantly through the grim tests which lie ahead, but that all other peoples of the world will recognize in their determined and unconquerable resistance to aggression an undisputed capacity for self-government.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this _____ day of _____
in the year of our Lord Nineteen hundred and forty-two,
and of the Independence of the United States of America
the one hundred and sixty-sixth.

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I have selected you as one on whom I can depend to assist me in acquainting your people with the progress being made toward the destruction of the Japanese military power that has, with such ruthless treachery, violated your homes, murdered or enslaved your people and destroyed the peace and tranquility with which your daily lives were so long blessed.

Lest your people be misguided by licentious Japanese propaganda, I want them to know that despite the temporary advantage gained by the enemy during the initial stages of the war, at the cost to it of international dishonor which history shall long record, the military power of the United States has grown at such a pace that no combination of powers for evil on earth can long resist. In ships, airplanes, tanks, guns and all other implements, accessories and supplies essential to offensive warfare, the vast industrial facilities of this country alone are now producing more than the maximum productive capacity of all of the axis powers combined and yet we are still far from the peak of our own productive capacity. Our people are united in the determination to spare no cost in either lives or resources in the attainment of our military objectives, foremost among which is the liberation of your people and the safeguard of their future security through the destruction of every vestige of Japanese military power.

Millions of fine, splendidly trained, well equipped and physically toughened American men, now comprising our Army, Navy and Air Forces, are energetically and enthusiastically building the mightiest military force in the history of the world - - a force that has already taken the offensive, in conjunction with our allies, wherever the enemy can be engaged.

Of immediate concern to the people of the Philippines, the allied forces in the Southwest Pacific under the able leadership of General MacArthur have launched an offensive against Japanese positions on the road back to the Philippines and have been victorious in every engagement, the last great victory having resulted in the sinking of every ship of a Japanese convoy of twenty-two warships and transports from which only five, of an estimated fifteen thousand troops, are believed to have escaped death. -- While to the West the great Chinese Armies, supported by strong American Air Forces, are girding to deal destructive blows against Japanese forces entrenched on the Asiatic mainland as a prelude to devastating allied air, sea and land attacks upon Japan proper.

At the same time I want your people to know that Filipinos who were in the United States and Hawaii at the outbreak of war, under the able and vigorous leadership of your President and my good friend Manuel L. Quezon, have risen as a man in devotion to the cause of Philippine liberation, and many thousands of them have joined military units in the fervent hope that they may before long be privileged to offer their lives in the alleviation of the distress of their fellow countrymen.

The gallant and heroic action of your people in defense of Philippine soil, prior to the enemy occupation, will long stand as an inspiration to free men. - - The blood of your sons who there unselfishly gave their lives is consecrated to that noble cause for which they valiantly fought and which those of us who now survive must inevitably sustain.

While I know that the indomitable spirit of resistance to the enemy is ever uppermost in the breasts of your people and you should unleash those pent up forces of righteous hatred wherever a telling blow against the enemy is possible, I counsel against any ungainful self-sacrifice and urge upon you a period of quiet organization and preparation against the proper time when, in coordination with our military plans, you can as a united people deliver a decisive blow to cast off the shackles with which the enemy has sought to enslave you. Meanwhile I urge patience and complete confidence

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in the trend of coming events.

This is a period in Philippine history to test the loyalty, courage, fortitude and wisdom of her sons - - that will record above all else their capacity for self-government under the free and independent nation projected by law for July 4, 1946. It is a period in which the daily trials which beset your people are my constant concern and that of all other Americans as well, whose affection and admiration they have earned by their devotion to ideals common to us both.

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EXTRACT

Of Villamor's Message No. 13
of February 18, 1943.



".....HE IS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR ARMED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OCCUPIED TOWNS IN PANAY AND NEGROS. HE IS ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED BY FACT NIPS ARE USING CONSTABULARY FOR GARRISON DUTY WHILE THEIR TROOPS OPERATE. SUGGEST YOU STOP HIM FROM CARRYING OUT HIS PLANS WHICH MAY BE PUT IN EFFECT ANY DAY NOW. ALSO SUGGEST YOU DEAL WITH HIM STRONGLY, HE IS A LITTLE DRUNK WITH POWER AND IS IMPRESSING EVERYBODY WITH THE FACT YOU APPOINTED HIM HEAD OF FOURTH CORPS. AT THE SAME TIME HE IS TRYING TO IMPRESS YOU WITH WHAT HE HAS DONE AND CAN DO."

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Allied Intelligence Bureau

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27 May, 1943.

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Philippine Operations.

TO : Chief of Staff.



1. Following wire was received from Peralta this date:

"PROBLEM OF MONEY THIS DISTRICT ACUTE. RELEASED ONE MILLION PESOS PRINTED LAST MARCH AND ALL GONE. TO COMBAT JAP ATTRACTION POLICY, WE HAVE BEEN PAYING PARTIAL SALARIES OF SOLDIERS AND BUYING FOOD. OTHERWISE SOLDIERS FAMILIES STARVE. CIVIL GOVT IN SAME HOLE. MONEY YOU SENT ME IS RESERVED FOR INTELLIGENCE ONLY. EXPENSES HALF MILLION PESOS A MONTH. PLEASE CONSIDER OUR STRENGTH IN PERSONNEL, ACTIVITIES, HIGH PRICES. CHIEF PROBLEM IS PREVENT PEOPLE FROM RETURNING TO TOWNS AND EVENTUALLY COMING UNDER ECONOMIC BONDAGE. HISTORY OF LUZON SHOWS GUERRILLA AUTOMATICALLY SMASHED ONCE PEOPLE IN JAP ECONOMIC GRIP. DO NOT EVEN HAVE MATERIAL TO PRINT MONEY. AM CONFIDENT OF LOYALTY OF PEOPLE BUT AM TOO MUCH OF A REALIST TO FORGET THAT MONEY TALKS. JAP POLICY OF ATTRACTION INCLUDES REDEEMING OUR EMERGENCY NOTES WITH THEIR MILITARY NOTES, SELLING GOODS CHEAP. REQUEST IMMEDIATE HELP. I DO NOT ORDINARILY ASK FOR HELP UNLESS I NEED IT. I AM YELLING FOR IT NOW. IF I DO NOT GET HELP BY JUNE, SHALL BE FORCED TO ATTACK JAP OCCUPIED TOWNS IF I NOTICE ANY TENDENCY FOR PEOPLE TO RETURN TO TOWNS. THIS IS PURE SELF DEFENSE."

2. I am reluctant to recommend any change in basic policy in view of the relatively short time that I have been attached to this headquarters -- time which has been insufficient to permit me to thoroughly digest all material forming policy background. However, the content and tone of the foregoing radio makes it mandatory that our existing Philippine policy be thoughtfully reviewed in the light of certain fundamental considerations which I shall hereinafter outline.

3. Historically, our Philippine policy since the outbreak of war has been sadly remiss from that which our wards, the Filipinos, have been led to expect during the past forty odd years of our sovereignty. Remiss, not only in our failure to take the necessary military measures, as a great nation in the discharge of its solemn undertaking, to secure the defense of the Islands once the attack was launched, but remiss in our utter failure to extend any degree of political leadership or instruction to the Filipino people in their extremity.

4. At the time of the fall of Manila, with the consequent suppression of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Commonwealth government, I foresaw the urgency of aggressive political leadership as well as military action from Washington and urged upon the President, intervention by the United States within the spirit of par. 14, Section XI, Act of Congress of March 24, 1934 (Public.No. 127-73rd Congress) and Section XV of the ordinance appended to and forming a part of the constitution of the Philippines Commonwealth. In fact I submitted to the President a draft of a proposed proclamation to give effect to such action. The President approved the underlying principles involved and the proclamation itself as submitted, but held that its issuance should be coordinated with military action. As a consequence of the War Department's unwillingness or inability to act, the issue soon became a lost cause and we missed the opportunity to at least extend that degree of sovereign leadership and instruction to a people for whom we were no less responsible than for the people of any state in the American Union. For such help, if any, as it may afford to the present study, I am attaching hereto, tab "A", a copy of that proposed proclamation which was submitted with the following comments:

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710574

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Allied Intelligence Bureau

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MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Philippine Operations.

TO : Chief of Staff.



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2. I am reluctant to recommend any change in basic policy in view of the relatively short time that I have been attached to this headquarters -- time which has been insufficient to permit me to thoroughly digest all material forming policy background. However, the content and tone of the foregoing radio makes it mandatory that our existing Philippine policy be thoughtfully reviewed in the light of certain fundamental considerations which I shall hereinafter outline.

3. Historically, our Philippine policy since the outbreak of war has been sadly remiss from that which our wards, the Filipinos, have been led to expect during the past forty odd years of our sovereignty. Remiss, not only in our failure to take the necessary military measures, as a great nation in the discharge of its solemn undertakings, to secure the defense of the Islands once the attack was launched, but remiss in our utter failure to extend any degree of political leadership or instruction to the Filipino people in their extremity.

4. At the time of the fall of Manila, with the consequent suppression of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Commonwealth government, I foresaw the urgency of aggressive political leadership as well as military action from Washington and urged upon the President, intervention by the United States within the spirit of par. 14, Section XI, Act of Congress of March 24, 1934 (Public.No.127-73rd Congress) and Section IV of the ordinance appended to and forming a part of the constitution of the Philippines Commonwealth. In fact I submitted to the President a draft of a proposed proclamation to give effect to such action. The President approved the underlying principles involved and the proclamation itself as submitted, but held that its issuance should be coordinated with military action. As a consequence of the War Department's unwillingness or inability to act, the issue soon became a lost cause and we missed the opportunity to at least extend that degree of sovereign leadership and instruction to a people for whom we were no less responsible than for the people of any state in the American Union. For such help, if any, as it may afford to the present study, I am attaching hereto, tab "A", a copy of that proposed proclamation which was submitted with the following comments:

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"1. Herewith is a draft of a proclamation which I believe substantially covers what the President should sign. While it provides somewhat of a novelty in Government, it is well within the letter and the spirit of the statutory and constitutional provisions for intervention. It sets up flexible machinery for exercise by the President of as much or as little of the function of the Government as may be required by the circumstances existing in each locality. It provides encouragement and leadership to the Filipino masses and properly instructs them in the manner in which official and private citizen alike is expected to respond to the issues of war with which he is unfortunately confronted. It contains no direct threats to those who may be treasonably inclined but from it may be drawn the clear implication of that inevitable day of reckoning for the transgressor which lies ahead. It reaffirms our existing Philippine policy and thus prevents the Japanese or Filipino collaborationists from propagandizing it as a blow to Philippine aspirations for political independence.

"2. The proclamation is purposely so drawn that it definitely commits the President to no further action, but affords the basis for any further action which may be called for by the trend of coming events."

Quite recently such action was discussed with President Queson by General Donovan, who informs me that the former, after reading the proclamation, stated that he would have readily approved the action indicated had the matter been taken up with him. Its present interest is of course limited to the fact that it sets up action with which both chief executives appear to have been in full agreement and may suggest how far either may be expected to go now, or in the future, should circumstances suggest the advisability of intervention into the civil affairs of the Commonwealth.

5. Subsequent to the fall of Corregidor, I repeatedly urged that the President appoint an acting High Commissioner to go to the Philippines, confer with leaders of known loyalty, present letters of instruction and counsel for the Filipino people and generally extend some semblance of sovereign leadership. This effort met with no greater success.

6. Shortly before my assignment to this headquarters, I again urged that the President dispatch to selected Filipino leaders, by personal representative, a letter in substantially the tenor of that attached as tab "B". I doubt that such effort has met with any greater success, as officials close to the President appear to be blind to any continuing responsibility of the United States, as sovereign, to extend what little leadership the situation now permits.

7. Coming now to the policy of this headquarters, which I believe should be reviewed in the light of the Peralta message set forth in par. 1 hereof, I note that by formal action we have created military districts within the Philippines and placed them under the command of guerilla leaders, commissioned in the Army of the United States for such purpose, and incorporated in our army units heretofore committed to guerilla action. The effect of this is the assumption by the United States, and this headquarters more particularly, of full responsibility for the operations of such military commanders and the forces under their control. Its danger lies in that:

- a. We are unable to exercise effective control and intelligent direction over such operations.
- b. We are unable, due to logistical difficulties, to sustain such action against determined Japanese military measures, which are directly challenged in the absence of secrecy.
- c. We are unable to preserve such secrecy surrounding our action, due to that oft-found inherent phase of Filipino character that renders him boastful of power and arrogant in its exercise. See radio reference to Peralta, tab "C".



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- d. Defeat of any of the military commanders will be construed by the people as a further defeat of the United States and duly propagandized as such by the Japanese, with resultant further decline in American prestige.
 - e. Any such defeat, with the resultant adverse effect upon public morale and extension of enemy occupation and control, will render more difficult the development of intelligence facilities and the reopening of channels of communication.
 - f. Acts of our commanders and the forces under their control, however oppressive to the people and opposed to the policies and directives of this headquarters, will be done in the name of General MacArthur and construed by the people, under the stimulus of Japanese propaganda, as his acts or at least by his sanction.

8. In subject radio, Peralta advises that for present commitments he requires a half million pesos a month. Soon such requirement may be expected to be doubled and trebled. How much of these funds actually are disbursed for legitimate purposes and how much are dedicated to the creation of an overlordship that may later prove a harassing thorn in our side, is a matter for pure conjecture but, as Peralta himself points out in his radio, "money talks". I know of no place in which it "talks" louder than it does in the Philippines. His tone is both demanding and threatening. He threatens to do just what he has been ordered by express directive of the Commander-in-Chief not to do -- attack Japanese occupied towns. He is obviously drunk with power, as noted by Villamor in his radio, tab "C", and unless brought under immediate and effective control may be expected to present an increasingly difficult problem to cope with -- may ultimately align himself and his adherents directly against us, once he deems himself sufficiently well entrenched to do so.

9. The issues herein raised are basic. Policies and decisions and the operations thereunder will have a profound effect upon our strategical plan of re-occupation -- hence such policies and decisions must be sufficiently flexible to permit their ready adjustment and modification to meet the situation as it develops.

10. The following courses of action are open to the Commander-in-Chief:

- a. Adhere to existing policy, with such control as the circumstances will permit.
- b. Reduce guerilla action in the Philippines north of Mindanao to purely local efforts in the several areas with such secret support and encouragement as we can give, utilizing such officers and men, thereby released, as is desirable in the development of intelligence facilities until such time as the situation calls for additional employment.
- c. Reduce all guerilla action in the Philippines as set forth in b., with a consequent intensification of the development of intelligence facilities as outlined.
- d. Irrespective of decision as to a, b or c above, to spread an intelligence net over the main centers of population, coastal areas and seaports as rapidly as possible, organized according to detailed plan, utilizing volunteer and paid agents throughout the Islands and directed by carefully selected, trained and indoctrinated leaders secretly responsible to this headquarters, with sufficient transmission outlets to handle all informational traffic.
- e. Limited intervention by the United States under the statutory and constitutional provisions cited in par.4 hereof, to enable the establishment of military government over unoccupied areas in the Philippines.

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11. In our present inability to sustain either offensive or defensive action in any area of the Philippines against determined enemy opposition, I believe that, under existing policy, we unnecessarily risk further deterioration of American prestige among the Filipino people, who will construe our public formalization of guerilla action by the incorporation of officers and units in the American Army, as a further well calculated stand in their defense, -- the defeat of such units as our further defeat, with a consequent further deterioration in that spirit to resist which by our very action we seek to preserve. I therefore recommend:

- a. That the existing policy of this headquarters be reshaped to envisage a period of time devoted exclusively to quiet and well organized penetration to positions from which vital enemy information may be obtained and transmitted to this headquarters; arrangements being made for the interception of vital naval information by submarines in position to immediately act thereon. The stage being thereby set to give the people effective leadership in the mobilization of effort from within as required -- to exert strong influence over the people to counter Japanese propaganda. All other than secret military action in the Philippines to be suspended for the present. Secret aid to guerilla units continuing to operate from patriotic motives to continue as deemed desirable and possible.
- b. That a definitive policy covering the Philippine situation in its present phase be enunciated by the Commander-in-Chief and conveyed, together with detailed instructions to those officers or agents who are selected to direct intelligence or other activities in the name of and under the control of this headquarters.
- c. That the influence of sovereignty be exerted upon the Filipino people through the dissemination of specific instructions governing their norm of conduct during the present phase of operations. In this I have in mind the historical McKinley letter of instructions dispatched to the Philippines at the turn of the century. Such instructions were less needed then than similarly definitive instructions are needed now. Carefully prepared and thoroughly disseminated, such a document would have a profound effect upon events to come through the attendant stability it would give to the thought processes of the Filipino mind -- might well prove the equivalent to a major Japanese military defeat.
- d. That, regardless of decisions resulting from this study, a high ranking officer should be dispatched to the Philippines, as the personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief, in full dignity of office and mission:
 - (1) To deliver to and thoroughly impress upon local leaders the policies and instructions of this headquarters;
 - (2) To make "on the ground" decisions as required, not inconsistent with such policies;
 - (3) To assist local leaders in the development of plans to carry out the directives of this headquarters;
 - (4) To arrange and preside over a conference of local leaders on all phases of the problem of mutual interest and develop proper coordination of effort.
 - (5) To arrange for the dissemination to the Filipino people of such letter of instructions as the Commander-in-Chief may determine to issue and meet such local political leaders in the name of General MacArthur as may be possible and desirable.

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(6) To arrange for the financing of operations as directed.

12. The recommendations herein made are admittedly debatable and are designed primarily as a basis for thought on a situation in which danger signals appear ahead. It may be urged that we cannot now reshape our existing policy without loss of prestige among the Filipino people -- without alienating from the cause Peralta and other local leaders. I believe the answer to both rests entirely upon the manner in which such action is taken and explained to the people. Our prestige among the Filipino people will suffer far more through unrealistic thinking and planning than through any reshaping of policies to meet the situation as it develops. Our local leaders' action on the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief are, after all, but a fair test of underlying loyalty to a cause to which all are equally committed.

13. Intervention by the United States in the civil affairs of the Philippines at the present time would be of very doubtful value and the attempt to administer military government in any form over the unoccupied areas would but result in the extension of the occupation with a consequent curtailment of opportunities to secure military intelligence and the further oppression of the people.

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps.

N.B. As the above was in preparation, the following radio was received from Peralta:

"EARNESTLY COMMEND YOUR ATTENTION TO BUILDING OF LARGE NUMBER OF GIANT CARGO AND TRANSPORT SUBMARINES FOR SUPPLY PURPOSES AND INVASION FLEET. IF VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT WAS POSSIBLE IN CRETE, UNDERSEA ENVELOPMENT IS POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINES. BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE THESE OF SURPRISE AND AVOIDANCE OF FRONTAL ASSAULT WHERE POSSIBLE. YOU SEEM COMMITTED TO KNOCKING OUT JAP NAVAL AND AIR POWER BEFORE YOU CAN GET THERE. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS IS NOTHING BUT FRONTAL ASSAULT ON STRONGEST ENEMY OBSTACLES WHICH YOUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN BLOODY AND LONG. BELIEVE TACTICAL PRINCIPLES ON USE OF PARACHUTE AND AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE ABOUT SAME AS UNDERSEA TROOPS."

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BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
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A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS certain of the political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, on the Island of Luzon, including the city of Manila, seat of the Commonwealth Government, have been occupied by Japanese military forces; and

WHEREAS such occupation has interfered with and necessarily restricted the normal processes of civil government under the constitution and laws of the Philippine Commonwealth and is endangering through restraint of officials and agencies of government and disruption of communications, the duly constituted government thereof and its subordinate branches in the several Provinces, Municipalities and other political subdivisions; and

WHEREAS in paragraph 14, Section XI, Act of Congress of March 24, 1934 (Public No. 127 - 73rd Congress) and Section 15 of the Ordinance appended to the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, provision was expressly made for intervention by the United States for the preservation of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and for the maintenance of the Government as provided in the constitution thereof, and for the protection of life, property and individual liberty and for the discharge of government obligations under and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution; and

WHEREAS the full power of the United States is pledged to the early expulsion of the Japanese invader from the Philippine soil, the redemption of liberties which have been ruthlessly violated, the restoration of that peace, security and happiness with which the peoples of the Philippines have been blessed throughout the past four decades, and the orderly transition into complete political independence projected by law to become effective in the year 1946; and

WHEREAS in the fulfillment of such purposes and for the protection of the government of the Philippine Commonwealth and the preservation of individual liberties including the sacred right to government by constitutional process, I have determined that intervention, within the spirit of the statutory and constitutional provisions referred to, has become mandatory upon the United States:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in the discharge of the sovereign responsibilities of the United States to the peoples of the Philippine Commonwealth and in accordance with the statutory and constitutional provisions aforesaid, with the concurrence of the Honorable Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth, do hereby assume the prerogatives of Government over the territory and peoples of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

I direct that pending the expulsion of the Japanese invader from Philippine soil by the armed forces of the United States and of the Philippines, all duly elected, constituted or appointed Public Officials of the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the provincial, municipal and other political subdivisions thereof, continue in the discharge of their several offices until relieved by my order or under constitutional process; and I enjoin upon all such public officials the exercise of the utmost vigilance and painstaking care in the discharge of



TAB A

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their responsibilities to the end that the lives, property and individual liberties of the Filipinos and other friendly nationals within their several jurisdictions may be adequately safeguarded, and that all public funds and other property committed to their custody may be accounted for as provided by law; and

I do enjoin upon all citizens of the Philippine Commonwealth, strict obedience to the laws in force and to all lawful orders from duly constituted authority; unswerving loyalty to the common cause in which the peoples of the United States and of the Philippines are joined; a calm but inflexible understanding that the ruthless and paramount purpose of the Japanese invader of Philippine soil is the enslavement of the Filipino people, with the consequent suppression of those fundamental liberties for the preservation of which free men are ever willing to fight, including the freedom of religious expression and the sanctity and inviolability of the home, upon both of which rests the strong foundation of Philippine culture; and a fixed determination for unrelenting resistance; and

I announce it as my purpose, pending the time that the President, other officials of the Commonwealth Government, the legislature and the appellate branches of the Judiciary are able to discharge their several governmental functions as provided by law, without restraint, to establish military departments throughout the Philippines which will be announced from time to time by Executive Order clearly delineating the jurisdiction of each such military department and the powers delegated by me to the military commander thereof. Such powers will be sufficiently broad to permit any necessary modification of the laws in force in order that constitutional process, insofar as is possible in the existing circumstances, may be preserved to the people, and individual rights and liberties protected; and

I do call upon all good citizens of the Philippines, as free men, to resolutely assist me in this solemn undertaking and to devote every ounce of strength and, if need be, every drop of blood, to the task before us, to the end that they may not only emerge triumphantly through the grim tests which lie ahead, but that all other peoples of the world will recognize in their determined and unconquerable resistance to aggression an undisputed capacity for self-government.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this _____ day of _____
in the year of our Lord Nineteen hundred and forty-two,
and of the Independence of the United States of America
the one hundred and sixty-sixth.



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I have selected you as one on whom I can depend to assist me in acquainting your people with the progress being made toward the destruction of the Japanese military power that has, with such ruthless treachery, violated your homes, murdered or enslaved your people and destroyed the peace and tranquility with which your daily lives were so long blessed.

Lest your people be misguided by licentious Japanese propaganda, I want them to know that despite the temporary advantage gained by the enemy during the initial stages of the war, at the cost to it of international dishonor which history shall long record, the military power of the United States has grown at such a pace that no combination of powers for evil on earth can long resist. In ships, airplanes, tanks, guns and all other implements, accessories and supplies essential to offensive warfare, the vast industrial facilities of this country alone are now producing more than the maximum productive capacity of all of the axis powers combined and yet we are still far from the peak of our own productive capacity. Our people are united in the determination to spare no cost in either lives or resources in the attainment of our military objectives, foremost among which is the liberation of your people and the safeguard of their future security through the destruction of every vestige of Japanese military power.

Millions of fine, splendidly trained, well equipped and physically toughened American men, now comprising our Army, Navy and Air Forces, are energetically and enthusiastically building the mightiest military force in the history of the world - - a force that has already taken the offensive, in conjunction with our allies, wherever the enemy can be engaged.

Of immediate concern to the people of the Philippines, the allied forces in the Southwest Pacific under the able leadership of General MacArthur have launched an offensive against Japanese positions on the road back to the Philippines and have been victorious in every engagement, the last great victory having resulted in the sinking of every ship of a Japanese convoy of twenty-two warships and transports from which only five, of an estimated fifteen thousand troops, are believed to have escaped death. -- While to the West the great Chinese Armies, supported by strong American Air Forces, are girding to deal destructive blows against Japanese forces entrenched on the Asiatic mainland as a prelude to devastating allied air, sea and land attacks upon Japan proper.

At the same time I want your people to know that Filipinos who were in the United States and Hawaii at the outbreak of war, under the able and vigorous leadership of your President and my good friend Manuel L. Quezon, have risen as a man in devotion to the cause of Philippine liberation, and many thousands of them have joined military units in the fervent hope that they may before long be privileged to offer their lives in the alleviation of the distress of their fellow countrymen.

The gallant and heroic action of your people in defense of Philippine soil, prior to the enemy occupation, will long stand as an inspiration to free men. - - The blood of your sons who there unselfishly gave their lives is consecrated to that noble cause for which they valiantly fought and which those of us who now survive must inevitably sustain.

While I know that the indomitable spirit of resistance to the enemy is ever uppermost in the breasts of your people and you should unleash those pent up forces of righteous hatred wherever a telling blow against the enemy is possible, I counsel against any ungainful self-sacrifice and urge upon you a period of quiet organization and preparation against the proper time when, in coordination with our military plans, you can as a united people deliver a decisive blow to cast off the shackles with which the enemy has sought to enslave you. Meanwhile I urge patience and complete confidence

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in the trend of coming events.

This is a period in Philippine history to test the loyalty, courage, fortitude and wisdom of her sons - - that will record above all else their capacity for self-government under the free and independent nation projected by law for July 4, 1946. It is a period in which the daily trials which beset your people are my constant concern and that of all other Americans as well, whose affection and admiration they have earned by their devotion to ideals common to us both.



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EXTRACT

Of Villamor's Message No. 13
of February 18, 1943.

".....HE IS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR ARMED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OCCUPIED TOWNS IN PANAY AND NEGROS. HE IS ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED BY FACT HIS ARE USING CONSTABULARY FOR GARRISON DUTY WHILE THEIR TROOPS OPERATE. SUGGEST YOU STOP HIM FROM CARRYING OUT HIS PLANS WHICH MAY BE PUT IN EFFECT ANY DAY NOW. ALSO SUGGEST YOU DEAL WITH HIM STRONGLY, HE IS A LITTLE DRUNK WITH POWER AND IS IMPRESSING EVERYBODY WITH THE FACT YOU APPOINTED HIM HEAD OF FOURTH CORPS. AT THE SAME TIME HE IS TRYING TO IMPRESS YOU WITH WHAT HE HAS DONE AND CAN DO."



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Tab c