

Whitney Papers

Guerrilla Records

Organization, 1943-1944



~~SECRET~~

G-2

Finance Officer
Base Section 3
(Lt Col Miller)

14 Feb 44

Reference check sheet this office dated 18 December 1943,
following paraphrase of cable No. 4124, dated 13 Feb 44, is furnished for
your information:

"REFERENCE OUR 1899 (WDOBI) SURFACE SHIPMENT
NUMBER SF 1797 IS AT SEA LEFT DASH ORD RPT
OFD DASH OFD ONE ON EACH PACKAGE IS MARKING"
(Signed BISSELL)

C.A.W.

copies to Col. [unclear]
A. Whitney



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~

Commander Southwest Pacific Force
Advanced Intelligence Center

RESTRICTED

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial No. 301-44..... Date 31/January/1944.. Mono Index

Evaluation

Subject **US PACIFIC FLEET LETTER 61-44 - Responsibility for handling, processing, and maintenance of Prisoners-of-War at Pearl Harbor. Prepared by United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief.**

Brief or Comment:

NONE.



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Distribution:

- CinC SWPA (2)
- G-2, GHQ, SWPA (2)
- D. OF I. AAF SWPA (2)
- ATIS (2)
- AIB (2)
- AIB(PRS) (2)
- LHQ (2)

*See info file on
Miscellaneous*

Cincpac File
Pac-23-rp
A2-11
A16-2

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial 208

15 January 1944

RESTRICTED

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET LETTER 6L-44

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Responsibility for handling, processing, and maintenance of Prisoners-of-War at Pearl Harbor.

1. All prisoners-of-war arriving in the Hawaiian Islands will be delivered into the custody of the Commandant, 14th Naval District. The Commandant, 14th Naval District will be responsible for the maintenance and safe keeping of prisoners-of-war so delivered and they will be held by the 14th Naval District until the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, notifies them that processing has been completed.

2. The Joint Intelligence Center will be responsible for processing and will provide interpreters and clerical assistance for the purpose of processing all such prisoners. On the request of the Joint Intelligence Center, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, will make available to the Joint Intelligence Center facilities for physical examination, finger printing, and photographing the prisoners-of-war. Prisoners-of-war will not be interrogated except by authorized personnel under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Center.

3. When it is necessary to hospitalize prisoners-of-war, they will be kept isolated, if practicable, and will not be interviewed or interrogated except under direction of the Joint Intelligence Center, with approval of the Medical Officer in Charge.

4. The Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, will determine when the processing of each individual prisoner-of-war has been satisfactorily completed and he is ready for transfer to Army authorities.

J. H. NEWTON,
Deputy Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas.



DISTRIBUTION: (13N-43)
LIST II.
P, SP, MC, NTS, X1-5, Y, Z.
EN1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 28, KS3, 4,
NA11-54, NB18, 49, ND11-15, NY8-10, CG.

P. V. Mercer,
Flag Secretary.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY
IN SOWESPAC

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28 AUG. 78

Cincpac File
Pac-23-rp
A2-11
A16-2

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
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P. V. Mercer,
Flag Secretary.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY
IN SOWESPAC

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20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

MOST SECRET

10 January 1944

SUBJECT: AIB All Sections - Security - General.

TO : Distribution as below.

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20 AUG. 75

1. Information has recently been received of an operative disclosing particulars of the AIB organization with details of personnel in headquarters and of parties in the field, together with particulars of communications, frequencies and call signs, equipment, supply arrangements, and operational areas of other parties operating in the same general locality. Information was also supplied regarding Allied military organizations and intentions. From the detailed nature of the information disclosed, knowledge of the individual concerned and other evidence, it appears probable that the success of the interrogation was due to torture or drugs, or a combination of the two.

2. It is essential that steps be taken to reduce the possibility of the enemy obtaining information of Allied strengths, dispositions, equipment and installations, or of AIB activities by the interrogation of personnel who may be captured.

3. It is, therefore, requested that you take steps to:

- a. Reduce the information available to operatives going into the field to the minimum possible. This particularly applies to information relating to Allied plans, dispositions, etc.
- b. Operatives who have any knowledge of Allied military plans, dispositions, etc. or of AIB activities, should be provided with an easily hidden and quick means of self-destruction.

4. It is believed that the best method of attaining the first of the two objectives set out in paragraph 3, in the case of white operatives at any rate, is to explain to them that, owing to methods used by the Japanese, no man can be relied upon to remain silent on interrogation and that the best protection against them disclosing information which may lead to the loss of other men's lives is to know as little as possible about matters which do not immediately affect their work. They should, therefore, be impressed with the necessity for making conscious effort to curb their natural curiosity regarding activities of the Allied forces in general and the operations of other AIB agencies.

Distribution:

Colonel C. Whitney
Commander G. B. Salm, R.N.N.
S.I.O., N. E. Area
Captain R. Kendall, R.N.R.
Lt. Col. J. Chapman-Walker



C. G. Roberts
C. G. ROBERTS, Col.
Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau

*File
aw*

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8 January 1944

SUBJECT: AIB All Sections - Information Required - General.

TO : Distribution as below.

1. Attached for your information is a list of subjects on which information is required, which has been forwarded to us by the Director of Intelligence, Allied Air Forces.

2. It is requested that this be brought to the notice of all parties in training for future projects. This list replaces that in our memorandum of 26 August, 1943, subject: Basis for Training.

C. G. Roberts

C. G. ROBERTS, Col.
Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

1 Incl:
List of subjects on which inf. is
required.

Distribution:

S.I.O.
Colonel C. Whitney ✓
Captain R. Kendall, R.N.R.
Commander G. B. Sala, R.N.N.
Lieut. Col. J. Chapman-Walker
Intelligence Instructor, Cairns



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20 AUG. 75

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Aerodromes and Seaplane Bases

Dumps - position and contents.
Buildings - position and use.
Airplane dispersal areas.
New construction.
Shelters and camouflage.
Dummy airplanes or defences.
A/A positions and calibre.
S/L positions.
Barricade or other defences.
W/T and Radar.

Aerodrome Activity

Refuelling points and methods.
Repair points and spare parts depots.
Bomb loading points and methods.
Are tanks drained at night?

Enemy Air Activity

Numbers and types of airplane and nature of movements.
Time and direction of arrival and departure.
Approach procedure.
Any regular schedules.
Rendezvous for fighters with bombers.
Visual signalling methods.
Airplanes failing to return from offensive missions.
Training?
Ferrying and freight carrying?
Nature of freight carried.
Unusual concentrations of transport airplanes.

Allied Air Attacks

How much warning received.
Defensive measures taken.
Results of our attacks.
Methods and time of aerodrome repair.
Effect on (i) Troops (ii) Civilians.

Air Order of Battle

Arrival and departure of air units.
Ranks, names and duties of officers.
Army or Navy Air Service.
Figures, letters or emblems on airplanes.
Names, code names or code numbers of units.
(Code name usually appears on board or flag outside H.Q.)
Markings on staff cars.

General Target Information

Shipping.
Troop movements and concentrations.
Airplane factories and oil refineries.

Weather Reports, if required.

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G-2 GHQ

Finance Officer
Base Section 3
(Lt. Col. Miller)

18 Dec. 1943.

Following is paraphrase of War Department radio No. 1899 of 17 December 1943 to GHQ:

"TEN PACKAGES CONSIGNED GENERAL WILLOUGHBY LEFT HERE BY AIR SHIPMENT ON SIXTEENTH OUR 938 WDCBI. YOU SHOULD CONTACT YOUR ATC CONTROL OFFICER APR 1-135272-UNC FOR ETA. THESE PACKAGES CONTAIN ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND HALFS, ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ONES, SIXTY THOUSAND FIVES, FIFTY THOUSAND TENS - SIGNED STRONG".

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

C. A. McVITTIS,
Major, CE

cc: AIB (Col. Ind.)



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20 AUG. 75

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

A.P.O. 500,
23 October 1943.

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
NO.....30)

Wound and war service chevrons.....	Section I
Medals.....	Section II
Expedition of correspondence.....	Section III
Transmission of documents.....	Section IV



The following extracts of War Department Circulars are quoted for the information and guidance of all concerned:

I. WOUND AND WAR SERVICE CHEVRONS. Section I, War Department Circular No. 224, 21 September 1943:

"1. Wound chevrons and war service chevrons (par. 27, AR 600-35) are authorized for wear (AR 600-40) by those individuals entitled to them for service in the first World War only. Wound and war service chevrons will not be authorized for service during the current war.

"2. All commanders will assure themselves that only authorized decorations, service ribbons, battle stars, chevrons, etc., are worn by members of their commands."

AG 421 (21 Sep 43)

II. MEDALS. Section II, War Department Circular No. 224, 21 September 1943:

"Striking of new medals (except the Good Conduct Medal), including the American Defense Service Medal, the Army of Occupation of Germany Medal, and the American, European-African-Middle Eastern, and Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medals for the current war has been postponed until after the war. Service ribbons will be supplied gratuitously in lieu of medals."

AG 421 (21 Sep 43)

III. EXPEDITION OF CORRESPONDENCE. Paragraph 5, Section VI, War Department Circular No. 224, 21 September 1943:

"5. The use of a suspense date on correspondence other than red-bordered paper is authorized. When used on indorsements, it should be placed above to the right of the number of the indorsement in the form

~~RESTRICTED~~

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~~RESTRICTED~~

82

S-13 Aug. 43. Example:

AG 201 Baggott, John
(14 Aug 43)CI

1st Ind

S-1 Sep 43"

AG 312 (21 Sep 43)

IV. TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENTS. Section I, War Department Circular No. 242, 6 October 1943:

"1. It has been brought to the attention of the War Department that a misunderstanding exists as to the appropriate classification of documents transmitted in groups or as attachments or inclosures. This misunderstanding results in over-classification.

"2. In order to establish a uniform procedure applicable to all such documents, the following policy will govern:

a. In transmitting a group of documents, or attachments or inclosures to a letter, each document, attachment, or letter will carry its own independent classification or no classification, consistent with the proper safeguarding of the information contained therein.

b. A letter of transmittal or cover letter will be classified no lower than the highest classification carried by any of the inclosures. It should be noted that in some cases a letter may be deserving of a higher classification than any of its inclosures.

c. Groups of documents will be prepared for transmittal and dispatched as prescribed in AR 380-5, according to the highest classification of any document in the group, that is, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, or RESTRICTED."

AG 312.1 (6 Oct 43)

By command of General MacARTHUR:



R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

B. M. Fitch

B. M. FITCH,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

~~RESTRICTED~~

APO 500
20 September, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WHITNEY:

Subject: Anderson Cipher Key Questions.

In answer to N.C.L.'s request for questions to be put to Captain Bernard Anderson for the purpose of identifying him beyond doubt, and providing us a series of key words for cipher systems, the following are suggested. It is pointed out that most of the answers will require words of not less than fourteen, or more than twenty-five letters, although, of course, Captain Anderson may still give the proper answer without actually choosing words of this length. I think, however, out of the ten questions, at least six or eight good key phrases should be forthcoming.

(1) Name of post and full name of building where Anderson first met Allison Ind. (answer)- Selfridge Field, Bachelor Officers' Quarters.

(2) Fill in blank space with one word: The cook at that place was a _____ artist. (answer)- Woodcarving artist.

(3) Rank and full name of lady-killer pilot at that post with whom Anderson used to put on parties. (answer)- Captain _____ Jack. (Do not remember first name myself.)

(4) What was the first and last name of Ind's office assistant on that post? (answer)- George Hartford.

(5) What was name of post and town where Anderson shook hands with Ind upon rejoining him at Philippines station? (answer)- Fort Santiago, Manila.

(6) Rank and full name of officer with Anderson on that occasion. (answer)- Captain Paul Loetzel.

(7) What was the name of the pet monkey at the mess hall at Bataan Field? (answer)- Premier Tojo.

(8) What was the make and model name of the radio receiver at the tree back of General George's command shack? (answer)- Halli-crafter Sky Buddy.

SV-1-

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(9) Where was it moved so boys could listen late at night
without disturbing the General? (answer)- Squadron Operations Shack.

X (10) Give full, nick name and last name of pilot who flew
Ind and Eades out of Bataan. (answer)- "Jitter Bill" Bradford.

ALLISON W. IND, Lt. Col.,
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS-ITR OF
28 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~

3 August 1943

SUBJECT: Captain BERNARD ANDERSON, O-360167

TO : Colonel Courtney Whitney

1. In answer to your inquiry as to a one BERNARD ANDERSON, I am glad to say I can give you a general character report of "Andy."

2. I first met this officer, then a 2nd Lieutenant, at SELFRIDGE FIELD. General CLAGETT thought so well of "Andy" that he requested his transfer to the Philippines in the summer of 1941. He was made Assistant S-4, in which capacity he served so well that General BRERETON carried him over on his staff as Assistant G-2.

3. On BATAAN, "Andy" worked faithfully and well, living closely with General GEORGE and myself. General GEORGE made him S-4 at the Advanced Air Headquarters. In addition, "Andy's" work was of such caliber that the General asked him to do many extra-curricular activities which he performed with such satisfaction that the General remarked one day that "Andy is the kind of fellow that counts in times like these."

4. According to Major DYESS, "Andy" was at Air Force Headquarters one day just before the surrender, when he simply disappeared and had not been heard of until this time.

A.W.I.
A.W.I.

DECLASSIFIED BY 103 (1) ON
30 AUG. 75



05

~~SECRET~~

P.R.S.

Advance Map Depot

2 December 1943

Will you please furnish this Section with the following maps.
Lieut. Richard Baldwin called yesterday and was told the maps would
be ready today.

1 map of Philippine Islands - 1:500,000 - 32 sheets
6 National Geographic Central Europe and Mediterranean
6 " " " Europe and Middle East

Thank you.

C.W.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OP
20 AUG. 73

Gen. Misner

P.R.S.

Advance Map Depot

23 November 1943

Will you kindly furnish this Section with 12 copies of each of the following maps:

Philippine Islands	- Consisting of 4 sections Scale - 1:1,000,000
Southern Luzon	- Consisting of Western, Central and Southern sections of Southern Luzon Scale - 1:200,000
Central Luzon	- Consisting of two parts Scale - 1:200,000
Mindoro	- Scale - 1:200,000
Masbate	- Scale - 1:200,000
Samar	- Scale - 1:200,000
Leyte	- Scale - 1:200,000
Romblon, Tablas and Sibuyan	- Scale - 1:200,000

This requisition was verbally approved by Colonel Dunbar.

G.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OP
20 AUG. 75



FILE: _____

VOUCHER #: _____

ADVANCE MAP DEPOT
USAFFE
A.P.O. 923

RECEIPT FORM

SHEET NO: 1 of 1

DATE: 23/11/43

TO: Col Whitney

ORG: DIB (PRS)

BASIS: IA

Requisition #: Check Sheet

Requisition Date: 23/11/43

Approved: Col. Dumbore

AMT.	DESCRIPTION	SHEET #	SCALE	ED.	POSTED & INITIAL
	<u>Philippine Islands</u>				
<u>12</u>	<u>Central Luzon</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1:200,000</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>Southern Luzon (Western Sheet)</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>" (Central Sheet)</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>" (Southern Sheet)</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>Mindanao</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>ROMBLON TABLASES & SIBUYAN</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>Marikina</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>Samor</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>"</u>		
<u>12</u>	<u>Leyte</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>"</u>		

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OP
20 AUG. 75

MAPS ARE WEAPONS.

Please Return all Maps in excess of Immediate Needs
to ADVANCE MAP DEPOT, A.P.O. 923.

Completed By: _____

Checked By: _____

Issue: _____

Direct: _____

Delivery: _____

Via: _____

SIG: _____

GRADE: _____

ORG: _____



C.N.

A.W.I.

2 December 1943

Will you please arrange to have Venetian blinds hung in the following rooms on this floor:

Room 45 - Col. Courtney Whitney
Room 46 - Secretarial, P.I. Section
Room 47 - Dr. Joseph Hayden

C.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
28 AUG. 75



Gen Misc
~~4/11~~

URGENT

T.G. 42 B.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA—POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Messages may be Quickly, Safely and Economically Transferred by MONEY ORDER TELEGRAM.

TELEGRAM

This Telegram has been received subject to the Post and Telegraph Act and Regulations. The time received at this office is shown at the end of the message.

The date stamp indicates the date of reception and lodgment also, unless an earlier date is shown after the time of lodgment.

Office Date Stamp.



Sch. C3873 7/1942

Office of Origin.

No. of Words.

Time of Lodgment.

36

40 UPGT MELBOURNE COLLINS ST -38/1 10-12 A

MAJOR ALLISON W. IND ALLIED INTELLIGENCE

BUREAU GHQ U S ARMY 7371

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA APO 500 AUST (BRISBANE)

Am P Bldg

Am P Bldg

REFERRING YOUR LETTER SIXTEENTH NOVEMBER REGRET NO NOTES AVAILABLE
COULD SUPPLY 117 IN COIN ONLY WRIGHT MANAGER COMMONWEALTH BANK

Phil Roy

1555992

5850
10-11-42
10-11-42



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 29 AUG. 75

P.R.S.

Hq. Commandant

11 Oct 43

1. Due to the increase of administrative work of this Section, it is requested that P.R.S. be furnished with two (2) additional typewriters, preferably the Remington Seventeen Model.

2. If there are no typewriters available at this time, it would be appreciated if we were placed on the eligible list for typewriters as soon as they become available.

C. W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject :

From : P.R.S.

To : Hq. Commandant

Date : 1 Oct 43

1. It is requested that the following-named officers be placed on the eligible list to call upon the GHQ Motor Pool for motor transportation when there are no cars available at the Base Pool:

Lieut. C. B. FERGUSON
Lieut. C. B. McFARLAND
Lieut. K. F. BRY

2. Lieut. E. H. HALE, of the Cryptographic Section, is on the eligible list.

CW
C. W.

Hq. Comdt.

P. R. S.

2 Oct 43

The above named officers have been placed on the list of officers authorized to call upon the GHQ Motor Pool when there are no cars available at the Base Pool. Due to shortage of cars at the GHQ Motor Pool at the present time it is requested that steps be taken to hold down the use of GHQ cars to emergency cases when cars from the Base Pool are not available and the need for transportation is immediate.

P.L.T.
P. L. T.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OP
20 AUG. 79



23

Road GHO. SWPA.

444 OCT 2 11 40 09

1943 OCT 1 PM 8 01

Road GHO. SWPA.

AG 121 (14 Sep 43)B

A.P.O. 500,
14 September 1943.

SUBJECT : Regularization of Confidential Funds for A.I.B. & P.R.S.

TO : Controller, Allied Intelligence Bureau, Southwest Pacific Area.
(Att'ns: Chief, Philippine Regional Section).

1. Funds made available for P.R.S. are derived from G-2, War Department, exclusively for Intelligence purposes. The relief of civilian internees and P.W. is at present beyond the scope of G-2 funds. In the handling of such funds, you will be guided by the following general policy, viz:

a. Cash expenditures for Intelligence activities in the Philippines will be accounted for on separate W.D. Confidential Voucher No. 6, in the usual manner; the accounting of these funds is distinct and separate from the American contribution to the general A.I.B. maintenance fund.

b. The Chief of the Philippine Regional Sub-Section (A.I.B.) makes a preliminary check of proposed disbursements, as to 1) Necessity of expenditure; legitimacy of purpose, etc. 2) Reasonable amounts; non-excessive costs, etc., and will be prepared to counter-sign the "recapitulation" accompany W.D. Voucher No. 6, at the end of the accounting period.

c. On receipt of special intelligence funds (Currency) from G-2, War Department, these monies are placed in the custody of the Base Section Finance Officer and are drawn against by A.I.B.; it is further provided that A.I.B. drafts are authenticated and cleared by the A. C. of S., G-2, S.W.P.A.

d. Cash expenditures for P.R.S. must be specific in amount, purpose and destination, and must have the direct prior approval of the G-in-C or the Chief of Staff; conversely, the addressee or recipient will be required to furnish a reasonably clear sub-voucher, at a later date.

e. This prior approval represents an essential part of the validity of the sub-voucher for W.D. Confidential Voucher No. 6.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



H. E. ALLEN,
Lieut. Colonel, A. G. S.,
Ass't Adjutant General.

File
CW

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

APO 500
11 September, 1943.

SUBJECT: Storage of A.I.B. Car.
TO : Provost Marshall, Base Section 3.

Attention: Major Taggart.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS 17R OF
20 AUG. 75

1. Some time ago, your office was good enough to cooperate in permitting us to store our civilian-colored Hudson sedan in the M. P. garage on Ann Street at North Quay.
2. We now have another car of standard military color assigned to this Bureau which frequently is used during the night by Colonel C. Whitney, Chief of one of the regional sections of this Bureau. Colonel Whitney lives at Lenbons and to be able to store his car in the same place would be a matter of great convenience to him and assistance to us.
3. I therefore am requesting permission to so store the car. It is a Plymouth sedan, No. AP8052. It does not have the Base 3 Triangle since it is not a Base car, but an A.I.B. car. Colonel Whitney or his driver, and possibly Major Lewis Brown, his Executive Officer, would be the only ones using this car.
4. May we thank you for your cooperation.



Allison W. Ind
ALLISON W. IND, Lt. Col.,
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

1st Ind.

OHT/ms

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL, Base Section 3, APO 923, 12th
September, 1943.

TO: Deputy Controller, Allied Intelligence Bureau, APO 500.

1. Arrangements have been made for the car to be stored in the MP Garage, North Quay.

Owen H. Taggart
OWEN H. TAGGART,
Maj. Cav.,
Asst. Provost Marshal.

① Col. Whitney to see W
② file

6 September 1943

My dear Mr. Stiver:

The next time that you are in Brisbane, I would be very glad if you would call upon me. I think there are very real and practical means by which your organization can help us in the Philippines, and I should like to discuss the matter with you.

Very sincerely,

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Philippine Regional Section

Mr. Michael L. Stiver,
Office of War Information
Asbestos House
65 York Street
SIDNEY, New South Wales
AUSTRALIA

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS 17E OF
20 NOV 76



RELIEF FOR AMERICANS IN PHILIPPINES

101 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

Telephone
MUrray Hill 5-8483

NEWS LETTER #16

July 31, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

FUNDS FOR MANILA

We are very glad to state that the \$25,000.00 sent by the American Red Cross to Manila some months ago, has arrived at its destination and has been distributed among the internees at Santo Tomas. This is most encouraging news. The Red Cross has also sent another \$25,000.00 and it is to be hoped that further sums of money will now be sent and that other internment camps will also share in this essential relief.

It is impossible for relatives or friends to send money to internees under a Treasury regulation, which prohibits the sending of money into any enemy occupied territory.

REPATRIATION

A recent announcement of the Department of State indicates that progress, (though necessarily slow) is being made in negotiations for the exchange of Civilian Internees. In its latest proposal the Department suggested that a minimum of three more exchanges involving repatriation of 1,500 on each be agreed upon. It is stated, however, that the Japanese Government prefers to limit consideration to one exchange of 1,500 civilians on each side. This is the exchange now being arranged; subsequent exchanges being left for future consideration.

GRIPSHOLM

Arrangements are being made by the Red Cross for the reloading of the Gripsholm when the sailing date has been agreed upon, with a large quantity of fresh relief supplies for American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in Japanese Occupied Territory.

The supplies which were loaded on her last Autumn have been removed and sent elsewhere. Besides the relief supplies, the Red Cross is making every effort to arrange for the sending of individual parcels to American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees by their next-of-kin in the United States. When transportation of these parcels is made available permits will be issued by the Office of the Provost Marshal General automatically every sixty days to those whose relatives are Officially reported.

DAVAO, ILOILO, AND CEBU

The Japanese have now released through the International Red Cross the names of the Civilian Internees in Camp Davao, Mindanao; Iloilo City, Iloilo; Cebu City, Cebu; Bacold Internment Camp on Occidental Negros; Tacolban, Leyte; Tagbilaran, Bohol. Among the names in the Davao Camp are those of the eight Army Nurses whose plane made a forced landing on Mindanao, while escaping from Corregidor.

Those who were supposed to be interned in Lanao, according to information supplied by a British repatriate, are now in the Davao Internment Camp together with those from Zamboanga. This would indicate that the Japanese have now concentrated the scattered civilians on Mindanao at Davao.



BROADCASTS

The Tokio Broadcasting Station has resumed, from July 1st, the reading of messages from Army and Navy personnel, and has for the time being ceased reading messages from Civilian Internees. We presume this is only temporary and that later the reading of the civilian messages will be resumed.

The following schedule of short wave programs broadcast daily by the Office of War Information will be of interest to our readers. It is to be hoped that the Japanese authorities have been unable to locate many short wave receiving sets. This has been the case in many occupied countries and without doubt the underground system of conveying information is operating equally as well in the Philippines. This is known, in the Far East, as the "Bamboo Telegraph" and has always operated in the Philippines with amazing skill and speed. These daily broadcasts will help, no doubt, to offset continuous Japanese propaganda broadcasts in English, Spanish and Tagalog to which the people in the Philippines are unfortunately subjected.

PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
DAILY PRODUCTION SCHEDULE

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<u>PACIFIC WAR</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>DAYS</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>*MANILA-TIME</u>	<u>STATIONS</u>
	2:30-2:45am	Daily	Tagalog News	5:30-5:45pm	KGEI, KRCA
	2:45-3:00am	Daily	Victory #1	5:45-6:00pm	KGEI, KRCA
	3:00-3:15am	Dly ex Monday	English Tagalog News	6:00-6:15pm	KGEI, KRCA, KWY
	3:00-3:15am	Monday	News for the Philippines (10:00pm News)	6:00-6:15pm	KGEI, KRCA, KWY
	3:15-3:30am	Daily	Freedom (English)	6:15-6:30pm	KGEI, KRCA, KWY
	3:30-3:45am	Dly ex Monday	Philippine Newscast	6:30-6:45pm	KWY
	3:30-3:45am	Monday	Weekly News Review (English)	6:30-6:45pm	KWY
	3:45-4:00am	Dly ex Monday	Stories Behind the Headlines	6:45-7:00pm	KWY
	3:45-4:00am	Monday	Weekly News Review (Tagalog)	6:45-7:00pm	KWY
	5:45-6:00am	Dly ex Sunday	Victory #2	8:45-9:00pm	KWY
	6:05-6:15am	Monday	This Wk in Phil. History (Tag)	9:05-9:15pm	KWY
	6:05-6:15am	Dly ex Sun & Mon	Filipino Looks at the News	9:05-9:15pm	KWY
	6:15-6:30am	Dly ex Sunday	Freedom (Tagalog)	9:15-9:30pm	KWY
	6:35-6:45am	Sunday	This Wk in Phil. History (Eng)	9:35-9:45pm	KWY
	6:45-7:00am	Daily	Freedom (English)	9:45-10:00pm	KGEI, KRCA
	7:00-7:15am	Dly ex Monday	English Tagalog News	10:00-10:15pm	KWY
	7:00-7:15am	Monday	10 PM News (Tagalog)	10:00-10:15pm	KWY
	5:15-5:30pm	Dly ex Wed & Sun	Victory #1	8:15-8:30am	KWU
	5:45-6:00pm	Dly ex Wed & Sun	Freedom (Tagalog)	8:45-9:00am	KWU
	6:00-6:15pm	Dly ex Wed & Sun	News for the Philippines	9:00-9:15	KWU
	6:15-6:30pm	Dly ex Wed & Sun	Victory #2	9:15-9:30am	KWU

<u>STATIONS</u>	<u>METER BAND</u>	<u>MEGACYCLES</u>
KGEI	41	7.25
KRCA, KES	31	9.49
KWY	40	7.56
KWU	19	15.35

*Add one hour for Tokyo-Philippine Time



MAIL

The Red Cross Bulletin announces that a new and faster mail route to the Far East has been opened. "The new route at present, however, is capable of handling only a limited amount of First Class Mail and it is important to emphasize that the use of the lightest weight paper and envelopes will permit a greater volume of letters to go through on the route". Heretofore, because of the great distance to be traversed and difficulties and irregularity of transportation during a war, the time involved in transmitting mail was of necessity very long. To add to these delays there are the inevitable censorships and the very natural congestion in Geneva which has been the clearing house for Prisoner Mail for practically the whole world. This, without doubt, has been the reason, that until now, only a few letters from Japanese Prison Camps have reached this country. With the opening of this new route, some of these difficulties will be overcome, and we have every reason to believe that a larger quantity of mail will be coming through in the future.

"INTERNEWS"

A letter from England tells us that an article with big headlines on "Internews" appeared recently in the "Daily Mail", under the caption: "First Full Story of British Internees in the East".

"TRANSIENT" AND "RESIDENT"

As a result of the paragraph in our last News Letter which referred to the 125 transients to be repatriated, we have had many inquiries as to the exact definition of "transient" and "resident." We have been informed that the term "transient" refers to those who were enroute to or from other countries and were caught in Manila by the war. The term "resident" refers to those who live in the Philippines and to those whose occupations require their presence there.

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IMPORTANT

It is urgently requested that all changes of address be sent promptly to us as the Post Office does not forward Fourth Class Mail which is the classification under which our Letters are mailed. This will insure the prompt delivery of the News Letter. In most instances the failure to receive them is due to this cause.

PERSONAL ITEMS

We have been requested to announce that Dr. C. T. Cross, Lt. Commander, U. S. N. R., has been officially listed as a Prisoner of War in the Philippines. He was listed, for almost a year, as Missing in Action and was serving in the Manila Bay Area at the time of his capture.

It would be most helpful if those who have received cables from their relatives in the Philippines, transmitted via either Berne or Geneva, would inform us of this fact.

Word has been received of the death of Colonel Joseph H. Wolfson at the Philippine General Hospital in Manila on October 29th, 1942. He died of old age.

We understand that a few of the originals of the short wave messages which the Japanese have been broadcasting from Tokio have reached this country. We would appreciate being informed by those who have received these messages.

Announcement has also been made of the death of Major Christopher Leslie Bruns in a Japanese Military Prison Camp. He was a Mining Engineer before entering the Army.



The following names, of those whom we believe to be in the Philippines, are included solely for the purpose of obtaining names and addresses of the nearest relatives of whom we have no record. These names do not constitute an official list. Lack of space necessitates this being done in alphabetical order.

PRADO, Oscar Huerta	REID, Norman & Louise
PRAGER, J.A.	REID, W.R.
PRESTON, Mary	REIDER, A.H.
PRICE, F.G.	REINSTEIN, V.P.
PRESTON, WILLIAM	REITER, Joseph Edward
PRICHARD, R.A.	REITH, Joseph
PRILL, William	REPIKOFF, John
PRISING, Mr. & Mrs. F.W. and son	RHISS-JONES, P.M.
PRITCHETT, H.G.	RICE, Mrs. Clara
PROPPER, Norbert	RICE, Mr. & Mrs. Eugene Florence
PROUDFOOT, A.	RICE, F.S.
PROUT, J.O.	RICE, Mrs. Peggy
PURKISS, G.G.	RICHARD, George L.
QUILINAN, F.W.	RICHARDS, E.F.
QUINN, D.A.	RICHARDS, Mrs. F.M.P.
RABEN, K.H.	RICHARDS, Mary
RACICH, S.W.	RICHARDS, Thomas
RACKMIL, Leonard H.	RIDLEY, J.E.
RALPH, Lr.	RLEPER, Miss Rose E.
RAMSEY, Miss R.H.	RILEY, H.D.
RASAVET, Miss D.	RIMMER, Mr. & Mrs. W.G.
RASCHE, William	RIVERA, Mrs. R.O.
RAST, Bennie	ROALES, Miss Marie Lou
REA, Mr. & Mrs. George P.	ROAPER, Ludwig
REDDISH, Mr. & Mrs. William	ROBB, R.Y.
REDFERN, Sam or F.	ROBERTS, Elizabeth
REDSTON, C.F.	ROBERTS, Mrs. James E.
REECE, J.	ROBERTSON, Charles Alexander
REED, Mr. Charles H.	ROBIN, Mrs. E.
REED, Mr. & Mrs. J.H.	ROBINSON, H.H.
REES, E.A.	ROBINSON, Charles A.
REESE, W.H.	ROBINSON, Mr. & Mrs. James Theresa
REESE, Emil	ROBINSON, Miss R.M.
REID, George	ROBINSON, Dr. S. Wade
	ROBINSON, T. A.

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ROBINSON, T.P.
 ROBSON, Arthur Walker
 ROCHE, Frank
 ROCKWELL, Mr. (Mindanao)
 RODGERS, L.
 RODGERS, T.J.
 ROGERS, Evelyn
 ROGERS, J.E.
 ROGERS, J.J. (Seaman)
 ROGERS, Miss Joselyn J.
 ROGERS, Lee
 ROGERS, Lewis E. (Mindanao)
 ROMFREN,
 ROMPAN, H.G. & wife M.
 RONAN, H.J.
 RONTINSON, T.
 ROONEY, C.M.
 ROSA, A.H. La
 ROSCOM, J.N.
 ROSE, Mr. & Mrs. George
 ROSIER, W.W.
 ROSS, Alfred
 ROTHMAN, Christian
 ROWCLIFFE, Mrs. & Son
 ROWE, Mrs. Betty
 ROYSTON, J.
 RUIZ, O.H.
 RUSHTON, Mr. & Mrs. George
 Violet
 RUSSELL, Mrs. A.B.
 RUSSELL, R.K.
 RUTLER, Mrs.
 RUTTER, D.D.
 RYALL, T.L.
 RYDBERG, Carl G.
 SACKIEWICZE, N.T.
 SAMS, G.R.
 SANCHEZ, E.
 SANFORD, Mrs. J.B.
 SANTOS, Joseph
 SANXRS, U.L.

SAUL, (Family-Iloilo)
 SCHACKLETTE, Miss E.E.
 SCHAELEHLIN, K.
 SCHAPIRO, Herman
 SCHECHTER, M.E.
 SCHECHTER, Seymour
 SCHINTZING, Charles
 SCHLINGER, Mr. & Mrs. E.P.
 SCHMIDT, Mr. (Baguio)
 SCHMIDT, Mrs. Helen
 SCHMIDT, Miss Dorothy
 SCHMIDT, Sven
 SCHMITZ, Charles
 SCHNEIDER, C.H.
 SCHNEIDER, George
 SCHNITZLER, T.S.
 SCHOENDUBE, C.W.
 SCHOENDUBE, Misses Dorothy & Mimi
 SCHOENDUBE, Robert
 SCHOLL, Miss D.B.
 SCHROTH, Max
 SCHRUBSOLE, Mr. & Mrs. & children
 SCHULTZ, A., Carman, J.R. & Pacita
 SCHWAB, Mr. Lever B.
 SCHWARTZ, George W.
 SCOTT, David
 SCOTT, Miss Dorothy
 SCOTT, Frank D. (Albay)
 SCOTT, Peggy Stewart
 SCOTT, Rev. Robert
 SCOTT, William
 SCYER, E.V.
 SEAWALL, Mrs. Carman
 SEDILLO, Ralph
 SEIDENFADEN, Mr. & Mrs. W.G.
 SELK, E.F.
 SHAW, W.R.
 SHEEHAN, Father J.J.
 SHERMAN, Richard
 SHERWOOD, C.J.
 SHOPPEE, Mr. & Mrs. (Davao)

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SHUSTER, Mr. & Mrs. Howard &
Daughter Helen

SIELSKI, W.

SIMMONSON, Mr. & Mrs. Fred (Ann)

SIMONS, Otto

SINCLAIR, F.A.

SINCLAIR, G.W.

SINK, Miss Ruth

SKERL, Dr. & Mrs. & two daughters

SLANE, Charles L.

SLINKARD, H.A.

SMACKMAN, J.A.

SMALL, W.V.

SMITH, A.T.

SMITH, Frank

SMITH, H.G.

SMITH, H.J.

SMITH, J.A.G.L.

SMITH, J.E.

SMITH, Mrs. M.D.

SMITH, Mrs. M.J.

SMITH, P.L.

SMITH, Suzanne K.

SMITH, Walter

SMITH, W.C.

SMITH, W.N.

SNODGRASS, Mr. & Mrs. James & child

SNYDER, Gaines

SOKORA, Samuel Chain

SOLLEE, Eric

SOLLEE, O.B.

SOMYER, Egbert

SORRELL, N.J.

SOUTHERTON, Mr. & Mrs. R.C. & Bobby

SPEARS, Earl F.

SPEIR, Mrs. Margaret & two sons

SPENCER, Mrs. E.L.

SPIEGELMAN, Marek

STACEY, Mrs. Alice

STACEY, Mrs. G.H.

STACEY, Miss G.R.

STAGNER, R.C.

STAGNER, Mr. & Mrs. G.H. & family

STAIGHT, Mrs. L.M.

STALKER, B.L.

STALEY, Mr. & Mrs. K.E.

STANGL, Miss I.M.L.

STANLEY, J.M.

STAPFF, M. & Mrs. Eva

STAPLES, S.W.

STARK, H.B.

STEEL, J.L.

STENSEN, B.W.

STEPHENS, S.

STEVENS, Mr. L.E. (Davao)

STEWART, Mrs. B.T.

STEWART, Mr. & Mrs. A.D. & child

STEWART, G.A.

STEWART, Marshall, Mitchell & Carl

STICKMAN, Mrs. Eileen

STILL, Dorothy

STINSON, Mr.

STONE, Walt E.

STONEHAN, Mrs. W.J.

STOUGH, Mr. H.W.

STRACHAN, Mr. & Mrs. Gordon D. & son

STRATTON, J.G.L.

STREEGAN, Mr.

STRUTH, Capt. J.B.

STUBBINS, T.

SUDHOFF, R.G.

SULLIVAN, Father R.E. (Davao)

SUNDEEN, Mr. & Mrs. Ludwig J.
Esther

SUNTZENICH, Philip

TAAPKEN, Mr.

TANNER, A.D.

TAYLOR, Betsy

TAYLOR, G.E.

TAYLOR, Mr. Rufus L.

TAYLOR, S.S.

THOMAS, Betty

THOMAS, David

THOMAS, G.

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P.R.S.

C. of S. 15 July 43
Coor: G-2

1. I have considered the attached comments of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and have appended hereto a revised organizational plan (Tab "C") which incorporates most of his ideas. I believe that his idea of limiting enrollment in the "AVENGER" unit to men after definite selections for Philippine service is fundamentally sound, although this is at variance with the principle employed in the organization of "COMMANDO," "RANGER," and "SPECIAL SERVICE" units and may later prove unwise in practice. The incentive to maintain a high standard of service in the units last mentioned is derived from the summary relief from the unit of any who show any disqualifying tendency. The revision suggested could be accomplished by having the men filtered through a replacement (Tab "C") unit rather than another AVENGER unit as in the first plan submitted (Tab "B").

2. I am also in agreement with his idea that the school staff could just as well remain under my Section, A.I.B., as at present. I believe, however, that for effective administrative - - possibly later operational - - control, the 978th Signal Service Company should be a component of the proposed Force. The men of this unit will be for the most part technically trained Filipinos who, under my agreement with General AIKEN, are to be available to us for any type of Philippine service at any time. The unit itself is designed and intended for ultimate Philippine service. For the most part, its personnel will be exclusively devoted to signal communication in the Philippines or here incident to our intelligence operations, cryptographic or instructional work. It would seem, therefore, convenient to tie it into the administrative control of the proposed force - - otherwise, it would have to be a special unit administered by USAFFE headquarters direct. However, this is a relatively unimportant point and the main purpose of the proposed organization would be little effected whether it is a component of the force or remains a loose end for USAFFE to tie up in some other manner.

3. With respect to the entire group of selected Filipinos to be brought in, I feel very strongly that with unit leadership under Filipinos, an overall command under American direction is essential to secure maximum results. I have talked to the regiments, screened them, and personally selected these men, each one of whom has volunteered to me for extra hazardous service. They know just what I expect of them while in training and thereafter. I must keep the closest watch and control over them from the moment they arrive until the moment they depart on assigned missions, and this can be much more effectively done through a command rather than an administrative relationship.

4. With respect to G-2 comment on plans for future employment of Filipinos in other than the intelligence services, I believe we should remain conscious

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of potentialities even though so far removed as to be beyond the sphere of present planning. I looked over the two Filipino regiments in the United States rather carefully and entertain strong doubt that they will ever qualify as such for combat service. However, a hand picked battalion - - possibly two - - could be selected that would measure up to the standards of almost any other unit of comparable size for Philippine operations. It is probable that a trained reserve of this character will be required. From it could be drawn a small unit (company, platoon or squad) for attachment to each division conducting Philippine operations, for advanced infiltration, guides, interpreters or other similar services. I merely scan these potentialities without losing my grip on the task with which I am immediately charged - - but propose an organizational structure capable of the necessary expansion to embrace such services at the appropriate time. I believe we should now view Filipino manpower in relation to its potential value as well as its present usefulness - - to permit us to fully realize on that value when the situation develops that permits us, in turn, to view it and act on it in terms of "present usefulness."

C. W.



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G-2

C. of S.

12 July 43

SUBJECT : FIRST PROVISIONAL FILIPINO TASK FORCE

1. Attached is memorandum from Colonel Whitney, dated 9 July 1943, proposing the activation of a First Provisional Filipino Task Force. It differs from his memorandum of 1 June 1943, also attached, primarily in that it is more specific as to details of the organization.

2. The principle object is to stimulate morale of Filipinos used in penetration parties by assigning them to a special unit, using a name chosen to indicate its dedication to the freedom of the Philippines.

3. A second objective is to provide a convenient administrative unit for Filipino personnel being sent to this area.

4. The Filipinos, in which A.I.B. has an interest, are at present assigned to the Headquarters Detachment, USAFFE, "for duty with A.I.B.", and are quartered and trained at the "Tennis Court", and remain in that status when they leave Australia for duties in the field.

5. I appreciate Colonel Whitney's difficulties in that he has tried to foresee all possible activities in which Filipinos may play a part, and apparently contemplates to combine them all in one organization -- a depot unit, a school with instructors, a secret service unit, personnel for armed reconnaissance, for landings in force for popular uprisings, for securing beach heads and airfields, for general reconnaissance and for signal services. At the same time, he wishes to preserve an esprit de corps which will be effective as a morale measure. It would seem to me that this organization attempts to combine too much and thus defeats its first object -- morale. To a unit primarily intended for active service and to stimulate esprit de corps, there is appended a school as an integral part and various elements that relate to general administration.

6. For a year or more, the primary objective is to provide a small picked unit from which detachments may be sent into the field for secret service. It seems to me that this unit should be small for the sake of security, for the honor conferred and in order to render it susceptible to emotional stimulus. To spread this pattern too widely to include purposes far in the future and to attach to it elements relating to purposes other than active service tends to reduce its effectiveness for the functions presently needed. I think the small picked unit alone should be termed the "Avengers" and other units for active service might be added when the necessity for them occurs.

7. There is also needed a general depot unit which should be attached to USAFFE, perhaps a part of the Headquarters Detachment. To this depot unit,



(RE: First Provisional Filipino Task Force - Cont'd)

should be assigned all the Filipinos who have been asked for from the States, until they have completed such training as may be necessary for their selection for the picked "Avenger" unit.

8. The school should have separate identity, the usual procedure, and not constitute an integral part of the organization. There is already a school or training scheme operated by A.I.B. which can be expended as required. It hardly seems practicable from the standpoint of discipline and regulation to have the instructors, probably differing in nationality and service, an integral part of the active service unit.

9. The 978th Signal Service Company should, I think, be left out of the picture for the present. It only complicates matters.

10. I would consider Villamor an excellent head of a separate secret service unit, but not as the head of a unit as diverse in purpose and character as the one proposed.

11. It may be convenient to lump the units together, as suggested, but I doubt whether such lumping of heterogeneous functions will make for effectiveness and accomplish the morale purpose which Colonel Whitney has in mind.

V.S.M.-S.

2 Incls.

Incl. No.1-Col.Whitney memo dated 9 Jul/43.
Incl. No.2-Col.Whitney memo dated 1 Jun/43.

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1. Organizational Plan.

Tab "A" - Memorandum of 1 June 1943,
Subject "Organization for Philippine
Activities" (Also G-2 comment)

Tab "B" - Organizational Chart for First
Provisional Philippine Task Force.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

~~SECRET~~

9 July 1943

SUBJECT: Organizational Plan

TO : Chief of Staff

Coordination: G-2

1. Since return to me of my memorandum of 1 June 1943, attached (Tab "A"), with concurrence in principle but non concurrence with the plan of organization therein proposed, I have endeavored to find some solution that would meet with your approval. I hope that I have found it in the attached plan of organization (Tab "B") which I submit for consideration.
2. In the development of this plan, I have been guided by a desire to (a) find a medium for insuring high morale, (b) create a structure that could conduct any activity in which the utilization of selected Filipino manpower is required, and (c) provide for such Filipinos a Filipino organization, insofar as is possible, under Filipino leadership.
3. I have been influenced by the thought that present plans for Philippine intelligence coverage do not encompass the entire field of future activity for which the employment of selected Filipinos may be required - - that ultimately they will find employment for (a) armed reconnaissance in the Philippines, (b) landings in force to organize the people and secure airfields and beach heads in coordination with offensive operations, and (c) infiltration to flank enemy held positions.
4. I have been further influenced by the knowledge that United States Filipinos who volunteer for immediate Philippine service have two purposes to serve by so doing - - to avenge their dead and to liberate their living - - that such thought must be constantly before them, the very credo of their service if we are to secure maximum results from such service. It is precisely for such reason that I have suggested the term "AVENGER" as synonymous with Commando, Ranger, etc., but bearing at the same time the deeper purposeful significance to the individual.
5. As I have before stated, I am deeply concerned with the necessity of finding some adequate substitute for personal leadership in the intelligence operations soon to be undertaken - - some moral force that will encourage the individual to take that last step to his assigned objective that will make the difference between success and failure in the discharge of his mission. I believe this can best be done by placing him from the start under the psychological influence of Esprit de corps - - that membership in an organization such as that proposed would be conducive to Esprit de corps in its very highest form.
6. I have in mind that under the plan of organization herewith submitted, all Filipinos specially selected for Philippine service would, upon arrival in this area, be assigned to the 2nd Battalion for training - reassignment to the 1st Battalion to follow definite selection, after training, for one of the specialized sections in the 1st Battalion for which close observation has shown the individual best qualified, if qualified for specialized intelligence service at all. Resulting from this procedure, the 1st Battalion would ultimately have most of its personnel on detached service, maintaining only a reasonable replacement reserve, while the 2nd Battalion would have a relatively large reserve for any special missions, including combat, for which carefully selected, highly trained Filipinos might be desired.
7. Operational control of parties or individuals once despatched for Philippine Intelligence service, would vest as heretofore in the Allied Intelligence Bureau, but with the stage all set for the transfer of such control

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with the attending responsibility to the Force Commander should a developing situation require it.

8. The 978th Signal Service Company was activated under authority of the War Department on 1 July 1943. Its purpose is to facilitate Philippine signal communications. As its composition is to be partly American, and as its Filipino membership is to be drawn from sources apart from volunteers heretofore selected, while set up as a component of the Force for administrative control, it is kept separate and distinct from the "AVENGER" Battalions as are the Force Headquarters, the Headquarters Company and the Training Section.

9. The force has been set up as a "provisional" unit in view of my understanding that as such, specific War Department approval to its activation is not required. No T/O has been provided for, as the unusual conditions under which personnel are to be organized, trained and committed to missions render the restrictions of any T/O highly undesirable. The matter of unit strengths and grades should be left subject to the policy of the C-in-C as the operations develop. In this respect, the plan is similar to that under which the "M Special Unit" of the Australian Army functions.

10. The plan of organization is both simple and flexible, but believed workable. As a unit under USAFFE, adequate provision would be made for administrative control, providing at the same time a strong moral influence over its membership. I am satisfied that under such an influence lies our best hope that these men will reach individual and collective objectives.

11. I believe that we must realize in planning Philippine intelligence operations that the men we despatch will not only be under the constant fear of enemy apprehension, but will come under the sinister influence of many of their own people - - possibly members of their immediate families as well, - - who, having turned collaborationists, no longer seek liberation, no longer desire to avenge their dead. To counteract these influences, we can only find and develop a psychological force adequate to control the individual. I was gratified to hear the other day that the members of the Filipino parties we have heretofore despatched to the Philippines have voluntarily submitted themselves to a private "do or die" oath while enroute to their destinations. This is an expressive phase of Filipino character to be understood and encouraged, as in it he finds moral strength - - that strength requisite to meet and overcome the severe tests he will inevitably find ahead. It is just that strength I seek to develop through an organization in which he will have such pride of membership that he will take that last vital step, in reckless disregard of personal consequences, to contribute to it his full share of individual achievement.

12. For Filipino leadership of the "AVENGERS", if the principle of this plan be approved, I believe that VILLAMOR upon his return is the logical choice. For the time being, the undersigned should occupy the dual positions of Commander of the Force and Chief of this Section, A.I.B., for the purposes of control over the activity as a whole.

13. If the principle of this plan meets with your approval I will work up the details of activation with the assistance of G-3 for your further consideration.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OK
20 AUG. 75



COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Philippine
Regional Section

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB "A" - Memorandum of 1 June 1943,
Subject "Organization for Philippine
Activities " (Also G-2 comment)

See Org. file New.



DECLASSIFIED PER J.P.S. L.A. OF
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~

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TAB "B" - Organizational Chart for First
Provisional Philippine Task Force



DECLASSIFIED PER 163 118 08
29 AUG. 73

~~SECRET~~

3
Free file

29 May, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED PER ICS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD.

SUBJECT: Clarification of AIB responsibility.

TO : Controller, AIB.

1. At a conference in his office at 1345 this date, the Chief of Staff clarified the relationship of G-2 to AIB and, more particularly, the Philippine Regional Section, AIB, as well as the responsibilities for both. Present, besides the Chief of Staff, were Colonel Merle-Smith and the undersigned.

2. Following the directive under which it was set up, the Chief of Staff pointed out that the AIB was an independent agency responsible directly to GHQ. That, in practice, matters relating to AIB and, more particularly, those pertaining to Philippine operations, because of their intelligence nature, had been referred to G-2 for comment, although this was by no means an infallible rule, as he would make such reference to any section of the staff he believed to be most intimately concerned with the immediate subject matter.

3. This, of course, follows usual staff procedure, but does not nor is it intended to imply any measure of command or control in G-2 over AIB, its personnel or activities, the former continuing to act as an advisory rather than an operating agency.

4. In the matter of responsibility, the Chief of Staff made it quite clear that you had full responsibility for the activities of AIB and I for the activities of the Philippine Regional Section; I being, of course, subject to usual channels of command, which were frequently by mutual understanding short-circuited for reasons with which I knew you are in full accord.

5. While the Chief of Staff gave no positive direction in the matter of routing of papers pertaining to Philippine operations, in view of his practice of referring the bulk thereof to G-2 for comment, I suggest that, for administrative expediency, AIB initiate a practice of coordinating all such matters, wherein intelligence is the primary concern, with G-2. Such papers to be thereafter forwarded to the Chief of Staff with G-2 comment, if any. I am assured that no undue delay in the transmission of my views and recommendations to the Chief of Staff will result from such coordination.

6. I am satisfied that with this clarification of the ultimate responsibility for the activities of AIB and, more particularly, this Section, we can work in close harmony with G-2 for the common good. I shall certainly exert every personal effort in that direction, seeing to it only that there is

20

preserved to me full independence of thought and action to meet my responsibilities in the furtherance of the policies and directives of the Commander-in-Chief.

CW
COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Philippine Regional Section.

Copies to:
C. of S.
A.C. of S., G-2.

1-1 Incl

Note:

Copies presented simultaneously to C/S office and to Col. Merle Smith (11:50 May 30, 1943)

Col. Merle Smith indicated that in general the draft coincided with his views as to what had transpired, and that he proposed to "stay out of it."



R.A.S.

*Given to Chief of Staff by Lt Col Ind
23/May/43*

I. Premise: (1) The Sections of AIB are "Operational" in nature and are concerned with the selection, training, equipping and dispatching of parties whose mission is to collect all possible information and communicate it to this headquarters for evaluation, collation and distribution as intelligence.

(2) "AIB" is an organization for co-ordinating and controlling (under GHQ direction) the activities of these Sections and for supplying administrative, financial, supply and training assistance. It is not in itself an intelligence unit in that it does not evaluate or collate information gathered by Sections, but after adding a comment, if any, passes this information on to G-2 for processing.

(3) The "Philippine Section" of AIB as now organized and developing is fulfilling the functions set forth in (1) above, and a flow of information is established and is increasing in volume.

(4) In addition to this flow, a steadily growing volume comes from guerilla sources, which has been routed through AIB Philippines Section principally because this Section was the one most directly concerned and organized to handle the traffic.

II. Contention: That what now is needed is -

(1) The creation of a G-2 Philippine Sub-Section for the receipt of all Philippine information from any source and the processing thereof for the A.C. of S., G-2.

(2) The appointment of a chief of this G-2 Philippines Sub-Section.

(3) That Colonel Courtney Whitney be so appointed.

(4) That the Philippines Section of AIB remain independent and separate and be considered strictly a part of AIB to function as such.

(5) That Lt. Colonel Allison W. Ind continue to serve as Chief of this Section.

III. Argument: (1) (Creation of a G-2 Philippines Sub-Section). Again keeping in mind that sections of AIB essentially are operating organizations designed to gather information and that this Section has been functioning in a manner and to an extent commensurate with our ability to supply transportation to the Islands, it would appear that the need for further direction does not lie at this point. However, a very definite need is indicated in the realm of processing the information gathered by this operating section. Information from the Islands now proceeds from two main sources -

- a. C.O's. of Military Districts.
- b. Guerilla Chiefs.
- c. AIB Agents.

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20 AUG. 75

In addition, information may come from such other sources as O.N.I. and the War Department, Washington. All of this information should be directed to a central section concerned exclusively with Philippine matters. This section should no more concern itself with the operational side of AIB than with the operational side of the Navy or of the Office of Special Services in Washington, for instance. Primarily, it would be an office for the receipt, evaluation, collation and forwarding of information converted into intelligence. Except indirectly, it should not concern itself with training matters, supply matters, equipment details or transport of parties, since these are purely the functions of an operation section and parties merely constitute the information gathering machines which produce the grist for the mill of the G-2 Philippines Sub-Section.

This office could be housed any place -- with Allied Intelligence Bureau, probably, if for no other reason than to expedite common business.



(2) Obviously, individuals having a considerable knowledge of the Philippine Islands and its people should be considered for duty in the G-2 Philippines Sub-Section office. It is only through such individuals that adequate and accurate comment can proceed and proper evaluations and information supplied by any source (AIB included) be arrived at. Such individuals are Colonel Courtney Whitney and Major Joe McMicking. Lieut. Williams, through his association with Philippine matters since these became prominently a part of G-2 work at this Headquarters, also should be included in this bracket.

(3) Colonel Whitney obviously is equipped to serve in this capacity with maximum value to GHQ.

(4) The Philippines Section of AIB should remain independent and separate because, as opposed to an Intelligence evaluation section, it is purely an operational organization, closely integrated with other portions of AIB designed for the same purpose. As an information gathering machine, it will continue to expand and the product of its efforts will be constantly requiring the attentions of trained and experienced evaluators such as would be found in the Intelligence Processing Section headed by Colonel Whitney. This Section, receiving the product of the AIB Philippines Section, of guerilla chieftains, of military commanders, and other sources, would find itself fully occupied and would be unable to devote itself to the operations of the AIB Philippines Section. The AIB Philippines Section should have its own full time chief.

(5) Lt. Colonel Ind should remain as Chief of the AIB Philippines Section, because -

- a. He is a trained Military Intelligence officer (originally commissioned in P.I.). His theoretical training has been backed up by field training in active service and in the assembling, training, equipping and shipping of successful field parties.
- b. He is familiar with the problems involved and the various personalities and organizations which are required to co-operate in the performance of missions assigned to the Section.

Colonel Ind also can continue to serve as Deputy Controller because, with the recent addition of an Administrative Officer, a Personnel Adjutant (both Australians) and a full time Auditor, the duties of Deputy Controller are not so rigorous but, at the same time, Colonel Ind possesses the contacts and knowledge necessary to the proper assistance to Colonel Roberts, with whom he is on excellent terms and co-operates well.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS 118 OF 10 NOV. 75



~~SECRET~~

February 23, 1943

SUBJECT: Appreciation

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1. It is desired to express the warm appreciation of this Bureau for the splendid cooperation in spirit and fact extended to us by the officers and men alike of the United States Navy in matters of planning, movement, accommodations and advice relating to present special intelligence parties for penetration of the Philippines.

2. I have the written statement from the leader of the party departing in December and the written and oral statements of the leader of the most recent party testifying to the completeness of Naval cooperation in a manner entirely beyond what might have been expected in the execution of duties or in satisfying the requirements of an order.

3. Despite the fact that these expeditions have meant severe encroachments upon the comforts of the submarine crews, officers and men in all instances indicated immediate willingness to adjust themselves.

4. It is desired to say, too, that the cooperation extended to and consideration for our people while at the West Australian base were of the highest quality. Base as well as ship officers have extended certain helpful suggestions to us which should be of value in any further expeditions. These are being studied and will be incorporated in our planning.

For the Controller:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

ALLISON W. IND, Lt. Col.
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau
(Chief Philippine Sub-Section)



Phil. File

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



Maj. Ind Col. Merle- 11/19/42
Smith

1. There is every indication that AIB must be responsible for physical contact with the guerilla leader Lieut. Colonel Peralta on Panay and to deliver to him codes for the future conduct of radio traffic between his station, WBM, and Australian and United States points.

2. However, I believe it most desirable to avoid involving the AIB preliminary party in contacts and possible entanglements with the undoubtedly energetic and ambitious Peralta. I believe that such involvement will militate against the security and freedom of movement of Captain Villamor in his attaining of the primary - and approved - objectives of the party, concerning general political and military aspects upon which we may plan future operations. Captain Villamor has submitted a brief memo sustaining my convictions.

3. Therefore, it is proposed to effect the contact with an especially chosen man of Captain Villamor's selection who will not reveal the existence of the Captain, his party or his plans, but who will have prearranged means of communicating with Captain Villamor prior to his departure for Australia.

4. In choosing the man, it has been considered necessary to have either: (1) A highly trained, thoroughly astute individual capable of meeting Peralta on all points and playing a game if necessary to avoid undue pressures etc., or (2) One with intelligence but no political or military prestige, who ~~thus~~ would offer no suitable tool to Peralta. Colonel Valesques, aide-de-camp to President Quezon in Washington would be such a man as indicated in the first instance. Frankly, though, I am not of the belief that we are ready for such a man; later, yes. Therefore, we propose a man of the second classification. After careful consideration, Captain Villamor believes that outstanding man is Lieut. Roberto Lim, son of the late General Lim. Lieut. Lim is now with the 1st Filipino Regiment at San Luis Obispo, California.

5. It is requested that his transfer by air be authorized on an emergency priority matter.

6. However, since severe delays may be encountered in obtaining Lieut. Lim despite authoritative pressure, it is considered advisable to have a second choice available. He is 2nd Lieut. YUHICO, Ship and Gun Crew Command, Kineoppal Barracks, Sydney.

7. It is requested that he be transferred to this station and attached to the U.S.A.T. Service for duty.

A.W.I.



AIB G-2 Oct. 20/42

1. Attached hereto for approval or amendment is proposed general plan of operation for the Philippines Sub-Section of Section "C", with which I agree.

CGR
C. G. R.

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20 AUG. 75



(4)

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20 AUG. 75

17/7/42

Account of Commodore
Lafayette Phillips
is attached as Appendix
to Dir Intelligence
Summary Serial N° 10
19 June 42.

Noted Dir Commodore
Hewitt for a copy
for Philippine Project
File.



Deming Present
Rig -

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



File Phelps Project
17/1/42

"Dorning." Original sig.
Typecast Filipino

Sketch by Herndon.

ROMERO
A.T.S.
Sydney

These have
to make this
no. 2 known
files boat

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



Would personnel in all sections of A.I.B. please note that when it is necessary to transport quantities of material etc. to the 4th Floor, the goods lift at the rear of the building must be used.

This is essential in order to obviate disruption to the passenger lift service and congestion in the narrow entrance to the lifts on the ground floor.

Stan S. Capron
MAJOR
O.I.C. ADMINISTRATION.

Distributions:

N.E. Area
P.R. Section (2) ✓
Stores Section
Finance Section
Cypher Section
File Copy

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20 AUG. 75



Miscellaneous

even Sunday Tribune does not seem
to be written by loyal diligents

Tilik (Luba?) radio station of
Bu of Posts

Jose Baguez in huberg. straight?

S/Sgt Emilio Tumbaga

Tagaplan

Cpl Eutiquio Alanis

Tagusara

Brooks Pt.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OP
20 AUG. 73

Dr. John H. Hanks

Culion

Lorenzo de la Rosa
Batang



handbook of Jap, Engl. - J.
4 Tagalog phrases by Illanusa

landing fld. in Puerto
NE ~~est~~ Princess (Houston?)

27005

go for plane only one a week
from Manila to
Puerto Princess

del Rio, Texas about 60
7 in Palawan

co Rio y Alabonita
in S. ...

copy of diary of Gause

list in Cayo

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
28 AUG 75



Cebu 6925 kc. B of A 6210
 2nd mite
 (wiring) 200w - 4360 kc. Schaffner
 (1) 260 260 LPT - 6860
 (2) VPA set 24J 7740
 (3) 24J 7740

MINDANAO

Radio sets hidden
 by A.C. outfits in April, 1942

Maramag
 Radio set complete
 in the
 Teachers Quarters
 of Pallas school.
 200 Watts - 4360 kc

Another hidden in
 hills around Santa
 Barbara, Parang
 LPT 6860



DECLASSIFIED PER ACS ITR OF
 28 AUG. 75




Mindanao

60 30

1- Hidden radio sets (abandoned by A.C.)

Maramag area



127
Radio set
complete

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 69
20 AUG. 75



A gift from . . .

(12)



THE AUSTRALIAN COMFORTS FUND

Received from Capt Osborne
W. L. & Lieut James D. G.
U. S. A. F. F. E. for use by
Australian Army the
following:-

- ~~1 23 ft~~ 23 ft Motor sailor Craft
- 1 8 or 10 H.P. Soling engine
- 1 spare propeller shaft
- 2 6 volt storage batteries
- 1 Nautical 6" Compass
- 1 gasolene blow lamp
- 1 50 lb. anchor
- 200 ft 1/2" kemp rope.

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20 AUG 75

Sgt. G. J. Walker, Lieut.
N. A. C. V.
Australia



IN YOUR LETTER DO NOT REFER TO:

The name of your ship or other ships in the convoy or its escorts; the dates of sailing, ports of call, or probable destination; the description of troops aboard; any other information which, if intercepted, would be of value to the enemy.

A gift from...

THE AUSTRALIAN COMFORTS FUND

Received from Captain Osborne, W.L. and Lieut. Gause, D.C. USAFFE for custody of Australian Army the following :-

23 Ft. Motor Sailor Craft
1 8 or 10 H.P. Solvieje Engine
1 Spare propellar, shaft
2 6 volt storage batteries
1 Nautical 6" Compass
1 Gasolene Blow lamp
1 50 lb. anchor.
200 ft $\frac{1}{2}$ hemp rope.

SGD: A.J. Walker, Lieut.
N.A.O.U.
Australia

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS 17A OF
20 AUG 75



A gift from...

THE AUSTRALIAN COMFORTS FUND

Received from Captain Osborne, W.L. and Lieut. Gause, D.C. USAFFE for custody of Australian Army the following :-

23 Ft. Motor Sailor Craft
1 8 or 10 H.P. Solvieje Engine
1 Spare propellar, shaft
2 6 volt storage batteries
1 Nautical 6" Compass
1 Gasolene Blow lamp
1 50 lb. anchor.
200 ft $\frac{1}{2}$ hemp rope.

SGD: A.J. Walker, Lieut.
N.A.O.U.
Australia

NO. 111 123 456 789 1011



This man can be depended upon.
He may not work himself, but translations
He will not give the game
away. can furnish many connections.

DECLASSIFIED PER EA 118 ON
20 AUG 73

Dear Tony -

Such a long time since I last
heard from you. I suppose you to
be well, and everyone else at your home.

I am asking you to do something
for the benefit of this other, who is a
poor chap who only desire is to do
what he thinks is right. He will
tell you all about it.

Do not hesitate, Tony. Much will
depend on all this.

By the way, I understood that my
wife should know something about me
but for you as well as for my self it
would be better if she did not know.

Regards.

Joe M. Wickham

addressed to:

A. F. Gonzalez
Insular Life Building
Manila Philippines.



① Then Gonzalez.

Manila {
① Salvador Aranelā - lawyer, was very pro-American.
Jose^① Ozamis - Senator, res. off Phil Army. Was on Vargas
temporary government.
Jose[⊗] Razón - Plantation Manager. This man is good. But
as he was in Carrizido and was P.A.W. he may be
a ~~strong~~ suspect.

⊗ Antonio Perterra - manager Mr. Mick's plantation
at Calatagan (Batangas) is good w/ J operator -
He is, however, indiscriminate but may work out of
personal loyalty - to MICM.

⊗ Jose Perterra - Cebu - very good man, dependable.
Former Sea Captain. Rouse connection. Best
man for Visayas. If he is not in Cebu,
look him up anyway wherever he may be -
he will always help.



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20 AUG. 75

you can mention my name.

main park land at Mindanao (Put Lanson)
establish station.

Leadn proceed to Cebu (or pseudo courier) to
Jose Pertierra at Cebu. Pertierra could
arrange to go to ~~Mindanao~~ Cagayan, on
pretext of inspection of affairs. men and
girls on the books etc.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
80 AUG. 75




x Pertierra Cbn.

Batangas -
Layabas - Ligaspi Rucena
San Fernando Callumon
Panga

CALATRAGAN
TONY PERTIERRA

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
29 AUG. 75




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GENERAL ORGANIZATION

HARVEY & MCDONOUGH PTY. LTD., MELBOURNE.

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2	McMicking	10/4/42	Roberts	Philippine Intell. Net.
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22	AG	9/14/43	Controller, AIB Att: Chief of PRS	In reply to our request to have Sig. off. put on list for cars-Old ordering 2 more typewriters
23	Hq Comdt	2 Oct 43	PRS	
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


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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 73





MACARTHUR
ARCHIVES

Luzon (Manila)
 VISAYAS (Cebu)
 Mindanao (Davao or Cagayan)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
 20 AUG. 75

Querido Tony -

Tanto tiempo sin oír nada de ti. Supongo estás bien como todos de casa. Te ruego hagas lo que puedas para el portador, un pobre chico cuyo único interés es cumplir con su deber. Ya te contaré el

lo vaciles, Tony. Mucho dependerá de todo esto.


Por cierto, comprendo que mi cara mitad debería saber algo de mi pero para tí, como para mi mejor será que no sepa de esto. Recuerdos -

Dionisio Balibute!

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
28 AUG. 78



1ST PROVISIONAL PHILIPPINE TASK FORCE



1. To provide all administration, supply, mess, guard, and police.
2. Now activated under VD Orders - - to operate Darwin Station, code and decode all messages - - study radio development - - radio procurement - - be prepared to facilitate development of interior communication lines, incident to offensive operations in the Philippines.
3. 1st Bn. designed for intelligence, solely for Filipinos selected for Philippine service.
4. For men while in training and prior to selection for 1st Bn. (Intelligence). A replacement reserve for Avenger Bn.
5. For coast watching and mobile reconnaissance.
6. For secret intelligence in cities, towns, etc.
7. To staff and operate re-transmission stations.
8. For guerilla aid, including delivery of supplies to District Commanders.

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 APR 75
BY: 101 101 101



~~SECRET~~



G-2

C. of S.

June 2/43

1. The attached memorandum from Colonel Whitney proposes the "activation" of a "First Special Philippine Scout Force", to be attached to G.H.Q. and to undertake present functions of Philippine Regional Section, A.I.B.

2. The arguments are that present status of Filipinos engaged in this work is uncertain and enlistment in this formal unit, dedicated to the liberation of the Philippines, would improve esprit de corps, strengthen morale and spiritual bond within the unit and with G.H.Q., increasing its control over personnel when in the field.

3. B-2 reactions : -

a. Believe such formal action premature; whole matter still in planning stage and might appear grandiose to Washington if due to lack of transportation its activities take long to develop.

b. It does not seem consistent with the first priority -- development of a secret service net. The policy hitherto has been to keep the whole Philippine activity as secret as possible and, as far as practicable, to keep the names of personnel sent in on missions secret even from other Filipinos who may later be engaged in a similar mission. This policy was to guard as far as possible against betrayal under torture. The essence of the plan now proposed appears to be to glorify the name of "First Special Philippine Scout Force" to stimulate morale. This would seem to be difficult without serious sacrifice of security. In Para. "7", it is contemplated that the various parties might be used to "develop internal pressure". At the present time, such activity would, I believe, prejudice security of the secret net. At this time, I would prefer to use existing guerrilla bands for such activities.

c. Filipino willingness to volunteer both here and in the States for this dangerous duty, and the record of men already sent in should indicate that morale under the present system is satisfactory. The necessity for the activation of the proposed organization is not clear. It would appear possible in other ways to sustain the spirit of fidelity and sacrifice, and it is possible that it can be sustained and stimulated by the Chief of Philippine Regional Section as successfully as by Commanding Officer "First Special Philippine Scout Force".

4. In order to avoid delay in forwarding this memo to you, it has not yet been submitted for comment to G-1.

1 Incl. - Memo fr Col. Whitney

V.S.M.-S.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCIS LTR OF
16 AUG. 75

(2)

~~SECRET~~

1 June, 1943. ⊖

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Organisation for Philippine Activities.

TO : Chief of Staff.

Coordination: G-2.



1. In furtherance of the objectives of the Commander-in-Chief in respect to Philippine intelligence coverage, it is recommended that a "1st Special Philippine Scout Force" be activated. This force to be a reconnaissance unit attached to GHQ and the commander thereof to be charged with the responsibilities presently devolving upon the Chief, Philippine Regional Section, AIB and, generally, to conduct Philippine reconnaissance and intelligence activities or perform other assigned missions under the policies and directives of the Commander-in-Chief.

2. The reasons for this change in present procedure are manifold. In the first place, we can only achieve maximum results with agents we train and dispatch to the Philippines if we realize:

a. That each agent enters the Philippines with a high price on his head and a task ahead of him, the hazards of which find few counterparts in military history. He becomes instantly the object of merciless hunt by both enemy and many of his own people, as well.

b. That from the moment he departs we lose all measure of physical control and leadership over him and it is, therefore, necessary that the strongest possible spiritual tie be developed and maintained. In the development of such a tie that will permit us to effectively hold the individual to his charted course and command his explicit obedience, regardless of hazard or enemy efforts toward alienation, we must deal with and consider the souls rather than the bodies of men.

3. Granted the foregoing premise, examination of present procedure discloses that the men being dispatched to the Philippines currently are without clearly defined status. They are neither, strictly speaking, agents of this Section, AIB, nor of G-2; might possibly be generally described as agents of GHQ. Furthermore, the organization to which they legally belong is meaningless to them and can exert no possible influence over their future course of action. Thus, the indefinite nature of their status is neither conducive to high morale nor to disciplined movement and action, especially in the presence of the enemy. Certainly it provides no basis on which a strong spiritual bond can be created in replacement of and substitution for physical control and leadership.

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4. On the other hand, each member of a command, such as that recommended for activation, would be moved and given moral strength by the knowledge that:

- a. Such command, expressly dedicated to the liberation of the Filipino people, upon successful operations by its widely separated units, would long live in Philippine history as the real spearhead of counter invasion.
- b. That operational success will be measured by the achievements of each individual -- such achievements being preserved in the organizational records of a permanent command of which he is an integral part.
- c. That those who survive will be the recipients of high honor by their people for duty well done -- those who fail to survive will achieve a measure of immortality (more than which the Oriental mind knows no greater reward.)
- d. That pride in the responsibilities and achievements of such a command would be conducive to that esprit de corps so essential to high morale and would provide the basis for the strong spiritual tie between commander and individual, essentially a necessary substitute for physical control and leadership, which the circumstances will not now and, by the very nature of the operations, never will permit.

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5. I have in mind the development of an organization both simple and flexible, broken down into relatively small units of 4 - 6 men with a commissioned leader for each, provision being made for both air and naval attachments as available.

6. The principles herein stated involve psychological considerations most definitely applicable to the character of the Filipinos. The action recommended is designed to develop the underlying, if somewhat latent, strength and control the weakness in that character, and provide a spiritual or moral force that will help the individual to resolutely adhere to his duty, despite the stern reality that many who do so will not survive. It would, furthermore, provide the basis for sound administration, for which there is no adequate provision at the present time.

7. Once such a force is distributed to cover strategical points throughout the Philippines, a firm basis will be laid, not only to provide us with information on enemy activities, but to develop internal pressure, as and where required, to serve operational plans of counter invasion.

8. If the principles stated are approved, I shall prepare and submit, for your consideration, an organizational plan in detail.



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CW.
COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Philippine Regional
Section.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

AG 322.999 (4-19-43)B

A.P.O. 500,
April 19, 1943.

SUBJECT : A.I.B. Administrative Adjustments - Memorandum Supplemental
to A.I.B. Directive, dated July 6th, 1942.

TO : Chief Philippine Regional Section.

Inclosed herewith for your information copy No. "12" of
memorandum, dated April 16, 1943, setting forth internal administrative
adjustments effected within Allied Intelligence Bureau.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

B. M. Fitch
B. M. FITCH,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
AIB Administrative Adjustments - Memo
supplemental to AIB Directive July 6/42.

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AG 322.999 (4-19-43)B

A.P.O. 500,
April 19, 1943.

SUBJECT : A.I.B. Administrative Adjustments - Memorandum Supplemental
to A.I.B. Directive, dated July 6th, 1942.

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supplemental to AIB Directive July 6/42.

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~~SECRET~~GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAA.P.O. 500,
April 16, 1943.

SUBJECT : A.I.B. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS

(Memorandum Supplemental to A.I.B. Directive, dated July 6, 1942)

This memorandum outlines certain administrative adjustments effected in A.I.B., with the concurrence of the parties primarily concerned, for the purpose of the simplification of the organization, economy of man-power, increased efficiency and improved co-ordination of effort.

I. Primary Objectives:

a. To emphasize the responsibility of the Regional Sections for the gathering of vital military intelligence in the areas allotted to them and to co-ordinate under the Regional Section heads all activities within the respective areas.

The Northeast Area, as defined in the original Directive, will be under the Northeast Section, Commander E. A. Feldt, Chief of Section.

The N.E.I. Area will include all Netherlands possessions within S.W.P.A., Commander Quere, Chief of Section, under the co-ordinating control of Commander Salm.

The Philippine Area will be under control of Chief of Philippine Section, Lieutenant Colonel Ind.

Remaining areas, namely Sarawak, British North Borneo and Portuguese Timor, will be under direct control of A.I.B., which may delegate to any of the Regional Sections or to S.O.A. or S.I.A., military intelligence and other missions in these areas.

b. In order to avoid duplication and to increase efficiency to consolidate directly under control of A.I.B. those joint facilities necessary for all Sections, some of which previously functioned within Section "A".

c. To clarify relation of all Sections to Controller, A.I.B. and G.H.Q.

d. Eliminate the designations Section "A" and Section "B" and substitute therefor S.O.A. and S.I.A., respectively.

II. Control - Liaison

a. No activities of the Regional Sections, S.O.A. or S.I.A., will be undertaken in S.W.P.A. without prior approval of G.H.Q., through Controller, A.I.B., and, in the case of S.O.A. and S.I.A., the supplemental concurrence of the following:

(1) In the N.E. Region - Commanding General, Allied Land Forces.

(2) In the N.E.I. Region - Commander-in-Chief, Netherlands Forces in the East or his representative in Australia.



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(3) By Chief of the appropriate Regional Section as to personnel and plan of operation.

b. On A.I.B. Staff, the several Sections will be represented as follows:

- N.E. Regional Section by Chief of that Section.
- N.E.I. Regional Section by Chief that Section or the representative designated for that purpose.
- Philippine Regional Section by Chief that Section.
- S.O.A. by Lieut. Col. Chapman-Walker as S.O. Advisor.
- S.I.A. by Captain R. Kendall, R.N.R., as S.I. Advisor.

III. Intelligence Reports:

All information and operational and intelligence reports received from parties operating in the S.W.P.A., whether under Regional Sections, S.O.A. or S.I.A. control, will immediately be transmitted to G.H.Q. through the appropriate Regional Sections and Controller, A.I.B. Transmission of such information and reports to other authorities within and without S.W.P.A. will be subject to approval of G.H.Q. Direct communication on technical matters with appropriate Government authorities is, nevertheless, authorized providing such communications do not carry information relating to operations within S.W.P.A.

IV. Training:

a. Training facilities, at present consisting of a school at Cairns, will be operated by A.I.B., and will be available to all Regional Sections and (within reasonable limits) to S.O.A. and S.I.A., each of which will be responsible for the training of its own personnel and, to the Commandant, for their discipline.

b. The possibility of moving the school to Brisbane will be considered.

c. The Dutch to provide additional personnel for guard, orderlies, etc., when available.

V. Luxury Maintenance Section:

a. This organization, now used for maintenance of small craft and as a staging point for the dispatch of parties, will be administered by A.I.B. It will be available to all Regional Sections, S.O.A. and S.I.A., who will be responsible for the provision and maintenance of small craft used by them.

b. The Dutch to provide additional personnel for guards, orderlies, etc., when available.

VI. Stores:

a. The Stores organization of A.I.B. will provide stores required by the Regional Sections, S.O.A. and S.I.A., (for operations within S.W.P.A.) except that the latter two will procure special stores required for their own operations. The selection of stores and final packing will be the responsibility of the respective Regional Sections, S.O.A. and S.I.A.

b. The following is an outline of the A.I.B. stores organizations considered necessary:

- (1) The head of the stores organization will be in Brisbane.
- (2) The present stores organization in Brisbane will be expanded, if necessary, to provide for the N.E. Area and the Philippine Section.
- (3) A stores organization will be maintained in Melbourne for supplying the N.E. Section and for procuring stores for other sections. With the exception of explosives and ammunition, delivery of stores for N.E.I. parties will be made in Melbourne.

(4) An officer will be maintained in Sydney, as at present, for acquiring stores unobtainable in Brisbane or Melbourne, (he also acts as general A.I.B. representative in Sydney).

(5) A small stores organization will be maintained at the training school for provision of training stores and packing facilities.

VII. Communications and Wireless Equipment:

a. Plans are under consideration, but not yet finalized, to improve existing A.I.B. communication channels and avoid duplication by use of Service channels when satisfactory to the Sections intimately concerned.

b. These plans will not, however, affect present Dutch control, manning and use of their Darwin and Craigieburn Stations.

c. Acquisition of Wireless Equipment will be as follows:

(1) The A.I.B. stores organization will procure signal equipment for each of the three Regional Sections subject to qualifications as in sub-paragraph "(2)" below.

(2) The N.E.I. Section will procure and develop its own equipment (non-service out-of-pocket costs to be assumed by A.I.B.), except that acquired from the U.S. or Australian services.

(3) On reasonable notice, the N.E.I. Section will supply to the A.I.B. stores organization for other sections equipment developed by the N.E.I. Section.

(4) Each Section will be responsible for testing and packing wireless equipment obtained by it from the A.I.B. organization.

VIII. Transport:

a. Inside Australia: Each Regional Section, S.O.A. and S.I.A., will be responsible for the movement of their own personnel.

b. Outside Australia: Where small craft (including Service vessels) are used, each Regional Section, S.O.A. or S.I.A., will make its own arrangements. In case of difficulty, the assistance of A.I.B. will be sought. Where large Service craft, such as submarines or planes, are used, Regional Sections, S.O.A. and S.I.A. (for operations within S.W.P.A.) will apply to A.I.B., except that the N.E.I. Regional Section will arrange for transport from Dutch sources wherever possible.

IX. Administration of Personnel:

a. Responsibility for the administration of Service personnel will be as follows, irrespective of where employed:

Dutch: Chief of the N.E.I. Regional Section.

U.S. & Philippines: Chief of the Philippine Section.

Australian Service Personnel: Controller, A.I.B., through the appropriate Services; provided, however, that personnel of S.O.A. and S.I.A. may be administered by Chiefs of said Sections at their respective discretion.

X. Airlie:

a. Airlie will be an A.I.B. establishment and A.I.B. will make cash disbursements for rent, telephone, etc.

b. Accommodation at Airlie will be allotted by A.I.B.

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g. Rent and other overhead costs will be divided on the basis of space used. A.I.B. will be responsible for the space used by the N.E.I. Regional Section and A.I.B. Stores Organisation.

g. Peace officers, orderlies, cleaners and telephone operators will be furnished by Australian authorities.

II. Finance:

a. Expenses incurred for the following will be met from A.I.B. funds.

(1) Acquisition of stores and radio equipment for operations within S.W.P.A., other than those provided by the Services.

(2) Facilities not provided by the Services at Cairns "Airlie", Darwin and other establishments for A.I.B. operations, except that in the case of "Airlie", this shall apply only to the extent that it is used for A.I.B. purposes.

(3) Special allowances to Service personnel over and above usual Service allowances, subject to approval by Deputy Controller, A.I.B.

(4) Payment and travelling expenses of civilians employed in A.I.B. and its Regional Sections.

(5) Cash advances to field parties within S.W.P.A. for operating purposes within reasonable limits as determined by the Deputy Controller, A.I.B.

b. The following expenses will be borne by the respective Governments concerned:

(1) Payment of Service salaries and allowances, and cost of transportation of their own Service personnel.

(2) The cost of Service rations and stores supplied to A.I.B.

(3) Expenses involved in the use of Service craft, such as submarines, planes, etc., and repairs thereto carried out in Service establishments.

(4) Travelling expenses of Service personnel within Australia.

g. For craft other than Service craft, expenses of acquisition, operation and maintenance will be borne by the Dutch Government when such craft are used by the N.E.I. Regional Section, and borne by A.I.B. when used by other Regional Sections or by S.O.A. or S.I.A. for operations within S.W.P.A.

Distribution:

1. Hon. John Curtin, Prime Minister, Canberra, A.C.T.
2. Commander, Allied Land Forces, S.W.P.A.
3. Commander, Allied Naval Forces, S.W.P.A.
4. Commander, Allied Air Forces, S.W.P.A.
5. First Naval Member, Royal Australian Navy.
6. Commander-in-Chief, Netherlands Forces in the East.
7. Commanding General, U.S.A.F.P.E.
8. Controller, A.I.B.
9. Deputy Controller, A.I.B.
10. Chief N.E. Regional Section.
11. Chief N.E.I. Regional Section.
12. Chief Philippine Regional Section.
13. Chief S.I.A.
14. Chief S.O.A.
15. G-2, G.H.Q., S.W.P.A.
16. Adjutant General, G.H.Q., S.W.P.A.



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AIB

G-2

March/10/43

1. The question of submarine transport has been discussed informally with the staff of Allied Naval Forces, who advised that there are no practicable difficulties and have undertaken to ascertain the probable dates of the departure of the next two submarine missions in the course of which party and stores could be transported to their destination.

GR

L. G. R.



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G-2 A.I.B. Mar. 7/43

1. Confirming oral warning instructions please prepare as promptly as possible a plan covering the next submarine penetration of the Philippine Islands.

2. The suggested objectives are a) the establishment of coast-watcher parties covering Cuyo East Pass and, b) priority supplies for Peralta.

3. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a coast-watching party at one or more places on the west coast of Panay, possible need for establishing a party on one of the Cuyo Islands, the use of local Panay personnel for this purpose, essential personnel required from Australia, essential radio equipment required from Australia because probably unavailable in Panay, and a priority list of stores which should be despatched to Peralta for general purposes.

4. Effort should be made to expedite preparation for such a party so as to take advantage of the next sailing ex Australia. Personnel for objective a) must be qualified as radio technicians and trained for identification of enemy aircraft and naval vessels.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

VAN S. MERLE-SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive, G-2

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1.

Col. G-2 9 March,
Ind. Thrus 1943
Controller.

1. Suggestions and plans submitted herewith.

2.

W.S.
A.W.I.

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11 March, 1943.

SUBJECT: Philippines - Penetration by proposed "PELEVEN" Party.

TO : A. C. of S., G-2.

I. In response to check sheet Directive dated March 8, requiring a plan for the next submarine penetration of the Philippines, the following suggestions are advanced:

II. General Statement.

a. The planning for this project is guided by:

- (1) the need for establishment of coast watchers to report traffic through CUYO EAST PASS;
- (2) the need for running relief supplies into Lt. Colonel Peralta, C.O. 6th Military District;
- (3) the limited time assumed to be available (3 weeks?);
- (4) the shortage in Australia of trained radio-technician personnel.

b. It is therefore suggested that:

- (1) A message be sent to Peralta requesting information, for long-range planning, of the number of radio operators he has available, and instructing him to train as many radio operator-technicians as he can.
- (2) The PELEVEN party can take a letter of instructions to Peralta giving him the following missions:
 - (i) Establish two coast watcher stations to guard CUYO PASS.
 - (ii) Reports from these stations must indicate "what, where, when and composition" of the shipping sighted, and direction of movement, i.e. course north or south.
 - (iii) Transmission of this information must be rapid.
- (3) A special code for the coast watchers must be prepared. Suggest that the U.S. Navy Contact code or an adaption of it be used, because it will remind the observer on all the things that his message must contain.

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III. Plan.

- a. Personnel: The party, to be known as the "PELEVEN" Party, will consist of not less than four nor more than five individuals and approximately 5,000 lbs. of supplies and equipment with a volume of roughly 350 cu.ft.
- b. Mission:
- (1) To establish coast watcher stations controlling CUYO EAST PASS.
 - (2) To run in supplies and equipment to enable units already in the PANAY area to maintain themselves and relay information to GHQ, SWPA.
- c. Landing: It is tentatively recommended that the party be landed in one unit at one point in north-western PANAY, approximately in PANDAN BAY and specifically at a point as near to 11° 42' N. 122° 3' E. as is thought advisable by the commander of the craft to be used.
- d. Transport: The use of aircraft being impossible and of surface craft being impracticable, it is suggested that the party proceed by U.S. Naval submarine.
- e. Loading: All supplies and equipment will be encased according to practices approved by Naval submarine service officers concerned in previous expeditions of this nature, among these being the use of water-tight containers throughout.
- f. Travel Dates: Personnel and equipment will be assembled for moving from BRISBANE on MARCH 31. This date might be accelerated if necessary to meet earlier departure desired by U.S. Navy. It is assumed that special air transport will be made available to move the party to embarkation point.

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IV. Procurement.

- a. Personnel: Since it is desirable to staff these stations by all-Philippine personnel, at least in the Visayas, and since it is proposed to place responsibility for the operation of the stations with the C.O., 6th Military District, it is proposed to send north only sufficient personnel to (1) off-load the freight in the manner previously employed and found acceptable by the Navy, i.e. submarine crew to assist in passing cases to AIB-manned rubber boats, but not to leave the submarine's deck, and (2) provide Lt. Colonel Peralta with two officers capable of establishing the stations when assisted by Peralta personnel.

The leader will be 2nd Lieut. P. Crespo, T.C.

The sub-leader will be 2nd Lieut. G. M. Romillo, T.C.

Enlisted personnel has not been selected, but two suitable men are available here.



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b. Supplies and equipment: The list being assembled is based upon priorities expressed at different times by Lt. Colonel Peralta -

In December : Medical supplies.
In January : Signal equipment.
In February : Money, radio, ammo, medical supplies.
In March : Radio equipment, money, ammo and medicines.

(1) Radio equipment (also electrical):

(1) Four low power transmitters (ATR-4 and ATR-2A).

Note: This equipment is almost impossible to obtain on short notice. Section "A" of AIB lists several of these sets "for training" on its inventory. It is requested that permission be granted to withdraw two ATR-4's and two ATR-2A's immediately, with the provision that the Philippine sub-section will replace if and when our previously filed requisitions for similar material are filled.

(ii) One 3-B (telradio).

(iii) Spare tubes, condensers, resistors, etc.

(iv) Dry cells.

(v) Storage batteries.

(2) Medicines:

It is proposed to re-case the supplies carried north by the "PLANET" Party but not unloaded and now stored in Western Australia.

(3) Money:

It is proposed to send P50,000 (pesos) in one's, five's and ten's to Peralta and P40,000 to be held by him for dispatch to other areas upon instructions of GHQ.

(4) Ordnance:

40,000 rounds - .30-cal.
20,000 rounds - .45-cal.
2,000 rounds - .25-cal.
5,000 rounds - .50-cal.
10 Tommy Guns with spare magazines.
72 (6 cases) Hand Grenades.

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V. Miscellaneous:

It is proposed to send in a miscellaneous list similar to that given to C.O., 10th M.D., including ordnance spare parts and clothing (cloth). The ordnance spare parts will include 150 bolts for Enfield and Springfield rifles and the standard maintenance kits for Browning automatic rifles. Cigarettes,

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First Aid kits, water purifier kits and as much engine oil as possible, likely 16 gallons, will be carried, together with 56 gallons of gasoline for chargers.

ALLISON W. IND,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Controller.

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Like Phil. Sub. Sec. Organization

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March 8, 1943

SUBJECT: AIB Organization - Processing Information.

Notes on Discussion with General Willoughby on 7th March, 1943.

1. Following receipt of the attached check sheet originated by General Willoughby on 26th of February, 1943, the general question of responsibility of AIB for collecting and processing information was discussed with General Willoughby on the morning of 7th March.

2. The following argument was put up to General Willoughby:

emphasis

a. It was believed that the Directive envisaged AIB as a collecting agency covered by the headings of "Intelligence Scouts" and "Espionage" in the Intelligence Manual. Emphasis on the Directive and the suggestion by the Chief of Staff on the necessity of keeping staff to a minimum supported this view.

b. That I had looked upon AIB as one of the collecting agencies or sources which should be ordered to obtain certain information in a G-2 Intelligence plan.

c. That the duties of AIB at GHQ were equivalent to those of an S-2 of a Battalion to organize patrols or other activities to acquire information, while that portion of his responsibility which required him to collate and process information belonged at GHQ to the G-2 section.

d. That to require AIB to process information fully would divert its attention from its main duty of organizing parties and the acquisition of information by special means.

e. That any additional personnel engaged to process information from the Philippines should be part of G-2 and not part of AIB, although naturally the two sections would work in close liaison.

f. That AIB would naturally supply information which it obtained to G-2 in whatever form it was desired.

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3. General Willoughby agreed to the proposals submitted, including the suggestion that messages from guerrillas in the Philippines, as opposed to those coming from AIB agents, would go straight to the Philippine Section of G-2 when this is formed.

4. It was agreed that AIB Information Reports would be satisfactory if accompanied by sketch maps when these were necessary, by a full comment in the light of information available to AIB, and with the addition of a statement of action taken or recommended desirable.

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C.G.R.

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Phil Proj.
gen. ag

Lt. Col. A.C. of S., 25th
A.W.Ind. G-2 February,
Thru: 1943.
Col.Roberts

1. Herewith find Annexure 3, AIB Planning, as per request of A.C. of S., G-2.
2. As is indicated under remarks, the extensive use of submarine and air facilities would be required to bring even a small portion of this plan into realization. It is frankly believed that, while the use of operational submarines will suffice very early in the effort, only the definite assignment of one or more submarines -- preferably two -- can ensure even approximately satisfactory results. It is, therefore, suggested that every effort be made to provide this sub-section with such under-sea boats. As is also indicated in remarks, the use of aircraft for supplying 10th District requirements is imperative and it is, therefore, requested that I may be permitted to continue my discussions with General Kenny regarding propositions forwarded by Major Gunn, who is prepared to submit data in support of his contentions. It is submitted that this most unusual circumstance may require definitely unconventional methods and that Major Gunn's ideas should be considered seriously until they may be proved fallacious.
3. The equipping of all parties is dependant upon the supply of radio equipment, as indicated in our requisition to the Chief Signal Officer.

A.W.I.

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Lt. Col. A.C. of S., 25th
A.W.Ind. G-2 February,
Thrus 1943.
Col. Roberts

1. Herewith find Annexure 3, AIB Planning, as per request A.C. of S., G-2.
2. As is indicated under remarks, the extensive use of submarine and air facilities would be required to bring even a small portion of this plan into realization. It is frankly believed that, while the use of operational submarines will suffice very early in the effort, only the definite assignment of one or more submarines -- preferably two -- can ensure even approximately satisfactory results. It is, therefore, suggested that every effort be made to provide this sub-section with such under-sea boat! As is also indicated in remarks, the use of aircraft for supplying 10th District requirements is imperative and it is, therefore, requested that I may be permitted to continue my discussions with General Kenny regarding propositions forwarded by Major Gunn, who is prepared to submit data in support of his contentions. It is submitted that this most unusual circumstance may require definitely unconventional methods and that Major Gunn's ideas should be considered seriously until they may be proven fallacious.
3. Personnel to supply these various expeditions will not be easy to obtain, because of the very high quality of men required and the specialized training incidental thereto. Excellent material is available in Australian special units. Some of these men not only are willing to serve, but anxious to serve. It is requested that consideration be given to the possibility of drawing on a very limited number of these men should circumstances appear to warrant such action.
4. The equipping of all parties is dependant upon the supply of radio equipment, as indicated in our requisition to the Chief Signal Officer.

A.W.I.

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AREA 10th District.

(1)

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party.	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force.
I. DAVAO a. Davao Harbor b. Davao airfield c. Davao City d. Malita e. Surup & Luban f. Marant	Marine traffic Air traffic Military roads Marine coast watches Marine and c.w. Air traffic	To be determined by Lt. Col. Fertig, but dependent somewhat on our ability to supply	Overland or vinta by Lt. Col. Fertig - supply by submarine if necessary.	May 5
II. SARANGANI ISLAND a. Sarangani Straits b. Sarangani Bay c. Palmas Island d. Buluan e. Tempacan	Marine (convey) Marine (landings) Enemy marine & air Air Air	1 leader and 5 men (secret station)	Submarine	June 1
III. BAGANIAN PENINSULA a. Pagadian Bay area (Tukuran) b. Dumanguilas Bay area	Sea and air patrol and all land information, relative to landings destined for this area	1 leader 1 radio expert 1 " asst. 3 agent watchers 7 men and 3,000 lbs.	Operational submarine.	June 1
IV. BASILON ISLAND a. Zamboanga b. Jolo c. Tapul d. Tawi Tawi	Marine, air & roads Marine and post Marine Marine	1 leader 1 radio expert 2 watchers 5 men and 3,000 lbs.	Operational submarine	May 1

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* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:

- (1) The above party already has been considered in special orders being carried by the C.O. "Fifty" party.
- (2) One operational submarine to carry six men and 4,000 lbs. for Project II.
- (3) " " " " " six men and 3,000 lbs. " Project III.
- (4) " " " " " five men and 2,000 lbs. " Project IV.



AREA: PHILIPPINES.
10th District.

(1)

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party.	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force.
V. LANAOS a. S Del Monte airfields b. Malababay c. Dansalan d. Illigan e. Malinao f. Malabang g. Maranag h. Cotabato i. Cagayan j. Gingoog	Air & troop movements. -do- -do- -do- Air Air & troop mvt. Air Air & troop mvt. Sea, air & troop mvt. Sea and air mvt.	At discretion and organization C.O., 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland and vinta (possibly further supply by submarine).	May 1st
VI. MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL. a. Zamboanga Peninsula area b. Misamis Occid. area	Sea, land and air movements. Sea and air movements.	Under C.O. 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland	March 15th
VII. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. a. Coast area	Sea, land and air movements.	Under C.O. 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland	March 15th
VIII. SURIGAO a. Agusan coast (Buluan Bay) b. Dinigat Island c. Surigao Island d. Lianga Bay	Sea, air traffic -do- -do- -do-	Under C.O. 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland and surface small boat.	April 25th.
IX.				

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 76

* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

- Notes on above:
- (1) It is assumed that the C.O. 10th District already will have in operation some phases of this proposed intelligence net. However, his ability to organize it fully and to operate it is dependent upon our ability to supply him with necessary signal equipment and some personnel. Therefore, any plan looking toward the efficient operation of a 10th District net, must include provisions for sending in several tons of technical, medical and personal equipment. It is not intended that these suggested nets be operated in conjunction with AIB secret stations. In fact, the AIB stations must be entirely secret, in order to provide us with an assured channel in case of military disaster to 10th District Forces. It is planned to introduce and supply AIB parties by a submarine. However, it is suggested that the time has arrived for serious consideration of Major Gunn's plans for supplying this area by B-25 or other aircraft, stripped down for ultra-long distance operations to the end that the C.O. 10th Military District will receive supplies by this means.

PHILIPPINES.
AREA: 6th, 7th and 8th Districts.

ANNEXURE: 3.

(1)

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party.	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force.
II. 6th District (PANAY)	a. San Jose b. Pandan Bay c. Caidis d. Pilar Bay e. Iledio f. Santa Barbara Sea & air movements -do- Sea, air & troop mvts. Sea & air movements Sea, air & troop mvts. Air traffic.	Under direction C.O., 6th District.	Overland	March 10th.
I. 7th District (NEBROS)	a. Bacolod b. La Carlota c. Hinalhagan d. Cadis e. Dumaguete Land, air & sea mvts. Air movements -do- Land, air & sea mvts. -do-	"Planet" Party	--	Party in net operating March 10th.
XI. 8th District (CEBU & BOHOL)	a. Medellin b. Tuburan c. Cebu City d. Argao e. Tagbilaran f. Talibon g. Ubay h. Anda Air traffic -do- Land, air & troop mvts. -do- -do- Air & sea mvts. Air and sea mvts. Sea watcher.	Preferably AIR party organized by WIO, supplied from Australia.	Overland and surface boat -- supplies by submarine.	July 1st.
XII. 9th District (LEYTE, SAMAR & MASBATE)	a. Ormoc b. Tacloban c. Panaon Island d. Rabin Point e. Catarman f. Calbayog g. Sungi Point h. Borongan i. San Bernardino Passage Air & sea mvts. -do- -do- -do- -do- -do- -do- -do- -do- (important)	AIB party 1 leader 1 radio expert 1 radio assistant 3 men 6 men and 2,000 lbs.	Submarine	September 1st.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS (VR) OF
20 AUG. 75



* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

The introduction and supply of parties listed above would require priority assignment of non-operational submarines, or if this is impossible, the use of operational submarines on every northward trip. It is assumed that C.O., 6th District will require arms, ammunition and signal equipment to be supplied from Australia.

PHILIPPINES,
AREA: 4th & 5th District.

(1)

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party.	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force.
XIII. 5th District (SOUTH EAST LUZON & MASBATE)				
a. Masbate City	Land, air & sea mvts.)	AIB party 5 men, 2,000 lbs.	Submarine and small surface boat.	October 1st.
b. Siwayan	Air & sea mvts.			
c. Cadurusan Point	-do-			
d. Palanog Point	-do-			
e. Bugui Point	Land, air & sea mvts.)			
f. Sorsogon (P)	Land, air & sea mvts.)	Camarines and Luzon guerrilla units supplied from Australia	Supplies by submarine	October 1st.
g. Legaspi (P)	Sea and air mvts.			
h. Cabariga	-do-			
i. Naga (P)	Land, air & sea mvts.)			
j. Bantua Point	Sea & air mvts.			
k. Bondoc Point (P)	-do-			
l. Cataganan	-do-			
m. Lucena (P)	Land, air & sea mvts.)			
n. Polillo Island (P)	Air & sea mvts.			
o. Balar Bay	-do-			
p. Marinduque	-do-			
XIV. 4th District (MINDORO, PALAWAN, CENTRAL LUZON)				
a. San Jose	Land, air & sea mvts.)	AIB party 4 men, 3,000 lbs.	Submarine	Minus 30 days M.
b. San Jose II	Air mvts.			
c. Wasig	Air mvts.			
d. Calapan	Land, air & sea mvts.)			
e. Paluan Bay	Sea & air mvts.)			
f. Culion Island	Land, air & sea mvts.)	AIB party 3 men, 3,000 lbs.	Submarine	August 1st.
g. Dumaran	Sea & air mvts.			
h. Puerto Princesa	Land, air & sea mvts.)			
i. Brook's Point.	Sea & air mvts.)			
j. VEDE Island	Sea & air mvts.)	AIB - Parsons' net party.	Overland and submarine	Minus 30 days M.
k. Batangas (P)	Land, sea & air mvts.)			
l. Lubang Island (P)	Sea & air mvts.)			
m. Cape Santiago	Sea & air mvts.)			
n. Macugn (P)	Land, sea & air mvts.)			
o. Ternate	-do-			
p. Lipa	Sea & air mvts.)			
q. Cavite (P)	Land, sea & air mvts.)			
r. Manila (P)	-do-			

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 20 AUG 75



* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above: -

- (1) As indicated above, the Masbate coverage would be by AIB party, while it is tentatively planned to make use of the Camarines guerrilla units for coast watching in south-eastern Luzon. Signal supplies particularly for these units would be dependent upon submarine transportation.
- (2) The Central Luzon units of the 4th District would be composed chiefly of individuals included in the Parsons' intelligence net. Transportation of Comm. Parsons, plus one or two key agents, together with signal equipment, would be necessary. The list of stations given is based upon the ideal and it is quite likely that these should be compelled to accommodate our needs to a very much less elaborate net. Observations posts marked (P) are suggested as priority points.

AREA: PHILIPPINES - 3rd, 2nd & 1st Districts.

(1)

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party.	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force.
IV. 3rd District (a. Batan b. Cabacben c. Marivales d. Subia e. San Fernando f. Clark Field g. Floridel h. Iba	Air & sea mvts. -do- -do- -do- Land, air & sea mvts Air mvts. Air mvts. Air & sea mvts.	Parsons' net plus Lunson guerilla units	Supplied by air or sub- marine.	Some operating now. Others minus 30 days M.
XVI. 2nd District a. Lingayen b. Tarlac c. Cabanatuan d. San Fernando (L.U.) e. Naguilian	Land, air & sea mvts. Land & air mvts. -do- Land, air & sea mvts. Sea & air mvts.	2nd District Guerillas	Supplied by air or submarine	Minus 30 days M.
XVII. 1st District a. Bayombong b. Robague c. Bantoc d. Baguio e. Vigan f. Loag g. Aparri h. Ilagan	Air & land mvts. -do- -do- -do- Land, air & sea mvts. -do- -do- Land and air mvts.	1st District Guerilla Units.	Supplied by air or sub- marine.	Minus 30 days M.

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28 AUG. 75

* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above: -

- (1) Since we have been advised that these guerilla units are operating precariously on very short supplies, we must assume that they could not carry on the functions indicated above without a considerable reinforcement of their equipment and personal needs. Dropping by aircraft or landing by submarine are the only possible means.

*File
Communications - Technical*

~~SECRET~~

17 February, 1943.

SUBJECT: Philippines - Radio Communications - Intelligence.

TO : G-2.

1. In the desire to avoid any infringement on the prerogatives of staff sections of G.H.Q., I have developed herewith my suggestions for equipment and personnel required for:

- a. A.I.B. purposes;
- b. communication with guerilla organizations in the P.I., which is not strictly a function of A.I.B. but on which A.I.B. assistance has been requested by G-2; and
- c. suggestions requested by Chief Signal Officer relating to possible future military operations in the P.I. which, I presume, concern G-2, G-3 and G-4, as well as the Chief Signal Officer.

2. Personnel and material required for the purposes described in subparagraphs a. and b. of paragraph 1. above, can be divided into two stages from the standpoint of when such personnel and material is required.

- a. First stage - Personnel and material required on or before May 1, 1943.
 - (1) 15 Filipino technician-operators (over and above Philippine operators here available).
 - (2) 1 key station (10 Kw.) in Australia (Signal Corps Station).
 - 8 "Beta" net control stations (100-watt or similar).
 - 20 "Gamma" low power semi-portable "watcher" stations.
- b. Second stage - Personnel and material required between September 1, 1943 and January 1, 1944.
 - (1) 185 Filipino technician-operators.
 - (2) 1 or more "key" stations.
 - 20-30 "Beta" net control stations (100-watt and 50-watt).
 - 60-70 "Gamma" low power semi-portable "watcher" stations.

*Note:
See Phil. Perf.
Don-049-File*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS 478 OF 20 AUG. 75



Note: See attached sketch map and station list showing tentative locations of proposed "Beta" net.

3. Requirements of material and personnel for invasion task force or forces seen to the undersigned beyond his capabilities of estimate, both as to personnel

and equipment required and time of requirement, although it may be envisioned that as a preliminary to the restoration of the old Bureau of Posts and Philippine Army networks, a requisition for approximately thirteen "Alpha" command control stations should be considered for locations roughly as follows:

Zamboanga
Del Monte
Iloilo
Cebu City
Masbate
Naga
Puerta Princesa

San Jose (Mindoro)
Los Banos (Luzon)
Manila
Cavite
Baguio
Tuguegarao

These should be approximately 1 Kw. stations and eventually might tie in all intelligence net control stations.

ALLISON W. IND,
Lt. Colonel, M.I.,
Deputy Controller.

2 Inclosures -
Sketch map
Station list.

DECLASSIFIED PER ACS 172 OF
20 AUG. 75



file
Phil
gen: 049

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1943

SUBJECT: Philippines - Radio Communications - Intelligence.

TO : G-2

1. It is desired to effect a clarification of the relationship, existing and anticipated, between A.I.B. and the several organizations of G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and the Chief Signal Officer of GHQ respectively.

2. Strictly speaking, A.I.B. is concerned with joint Allied attempts to obtain intelligence in enemy occupied areas; in its pure essence, it is not involved with military intelligence obtained by troops performing normal combat intelligence functions.

3. In the Philippines, however, the operations of guerrilla units having combat intelligence nets and radio transmitters capable of reaching Australia provides a realistic situation somewhat at variance with the true theoretical concept of A.I.B. In consequence, there has developed a bi-lateral aspect of A.I.B. operations; (a) the purely A.I.B. Secret Service aspect of relatively limited size and scope and possessing secret radio stations, (b) combat intelligence of general G-2 nature originating with guerrilla units operating command radio stations.

4. It might be said that quite logically this latter clarification should be handled by G-2 since it is combat intelligence and requirements for personnel and equipment required for operation and expansions made accordingly. In reality, owing to the secrecy required in all matters of the present phase, A.I.B. has been charged with co-ordinating intelligence matters to and from guerrilla units. This is understood by me to be a temporary situation which will obtain only so long as no major military effort toward the Philippines is in effect.

5. As I envision this inter-relationship, it is affected by three phases:

a. Present Secret Phase:

An A.I.B. - G-2 association, with A.I.B. retaining its inherent autonomy as a secret service organization but being of assistance in expediting intelligence to and from guerrillas.

b. Intermediate Phase of Initial Military Operations:

With A.I.B. increasingly divesting itself of responsibility for guerrilla associations, these then becoming a joint responsibility of G-2 and G-2 with G-4 a growing factor and A.I.B. returning more to secret intelligence and intelligence co-ordination functions.

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- g. Final Phase of Military Operations - Investment of the Islands:
Purely a G-3 operation, all other Sections performing as in any normal campaign, A.I.B. either being absorbed by G-2 or operated as a small independent unit for secret service.

Graphically this may be represented as on attached sheet, "A".

5. A graphic concept of the radio net for the Initial and Intermediate Phase appears in Chart "B".

6. It is desired to emphasize the eventually complete shift of responsibility for (a) traffic (b) personnel (c) equipment from A.I.B. G-2 to the Signal Corps, beginning and progressing in the Second or Intermediate Phase and completing in the Final Phase.

7. It is requested that consideration be given to isolating A.I.B.'s "immediate requirement" listings from general Signal Corps requisitions for anticipated military operations, otherwise it is feared that our needs may become lost in the large long-time order.

8. With regard to personnel, it is believed that the 18 Filipinos will be sufficient for immediate needs, and that the Intermediate Phase may be supplied by the projected Signal Service Company outlined by the Chief Signal Officer, SWPA. Condensed projected station chart for phases "A" and "B" appear in Chart "C".

ALLISON W. IND, Lt. Col.
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau

3 Incls:
Chart "A"
Chart "B"
Chart "C"

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CHART "C".

ALPHA Control Stations.

None

BETA Net Control

GAMMA Net

(Mindanao)

Davao
Surigao
Lanao

{ 7 airfields
15 coast watchers

(Visayas)

Iloilo
Dumaguete
Cebu
Ormoc
Catbalogan

{ 20 airfields
coast watchers

(Luzon-Camarines)

Sorsogon (area)
Antimonon
Bondoc Pt.

{ 15 airfields
coast watchers

Palawan

Puerta Princesa

{ 5 airfields
coast watchers

South (Mindoro)

San Jose

{ 5 airfields
coast watchers

(Los Banos)

Batangas

{ 3 airfields
coast watchers

Central

Mariveles

{ 3 airfields
coast watchers

Stotsenberg

3 airfields

Cabanatuan

2 airfields

Iba

{ 2 airfields, and
coast watchers

North

Bondoc

{ 3 airfields
3 coast watchers

Vigan

{ 2 airfields
coast watchers

Aparri

3 coast watchers

Total "BETAS" 2nd phase 21

Secret AIB Stations 8

TOTAL: 29

TOTAL
GAMMAS 91 *

* Including First and Second Phase.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1943

SUBJECT: Philippines - Radio Communications - Intelligence.

TO : G-2

1. It is desired to effect a clarification of the relationship, existing and anticipated, between A.I.B. and the several organizations of G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and the Chief Signal Officer of GHQ respectively.

2. Strictly speaking, A.I.B. is concerned with joint Allied attempts to obtain intelligence in enemy occupied areas; in its pure essence, it is not involved with military intelligence obtained by troops performing normal combat intelligence functions.

3. In the Philippines, however, the operations of guerrilla units having combat intelligence nets and radio transmitters capable of reaching Australia provides a realistic situation somewhat at variance with the true theoretical concept of A.I.B. In consequence, there has developed a bi-lateral aspect of A.I.B. operations; (a) the purely A.I.B. Secret Service aspect of relatively limited size and scope and possessing secret radio stations, (b) combat intelligence of general G-2 nature originating with guerrilla units operating command radio stations.

4. It might be said that quite logically this latter clarification should be handled by G-2 since it is combat intelligence and requirements for personnel and equipment required for operation and expansions made accordingly. In reality, owing to the secrecy required in all matters of the present phase, A.I.B. has been charged with co-ordinating intelligence matters to and from guerrilla units. This is understood by me to be a temporary situation which will obtain only so long as no major military effort toward the Philippines is in effect.

5. As I envision this inter-relationship, it is affected by three phases:

a. Present Secret Phase:

An A.I.B. - G-2 association, with A.I.B. retaining its inherent autonomy as a secret service organization but being of assistance in expediting intelligence to and from guerrillas.

b. Intermediate Phase of Initial Military Operations:

With A.I.B. increasingly divesting itself of responsibility for guerrilla associations, these then becoming a joint responsibility of G-2 and G-2 with G-4 a growing factor and A.I.B. returning more to secret intelligence and intelligence co-ordination functions.

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20 AUG. 73



- g. Final Phase of Military Operations - Investment of the Islands:
Purely a G-3 operation, all other Sections performing as in any normal campaign, A.I.B. either being absorbed by G-2 or operated as a small independent unit for secret service.

Graphically this may be represented as on attached sheet, "A".

5. A graphic concept of the radio net for the Initial and Intermediate Phase appears in Chart "B".

6. It is desired to emphasize the eventually complete shift of responsibility for (a) traffic (b) personnel (c) equipment from A.I.B. G-2 to the Signal Corps, beginning and progressing in the Second or Intermediate Phase and completing in the Final Phase.

7. It is requested that consideration be given to isolating A.I.B.'s "immediate requirement" listings from general Signal Corps requisitions for anticipated military operations, otherwise it is feared that our needs may become lost in the large long-time order.

8. With regard to personnel, it is believed that the 18 Filipinos will be sufficient for immediate needs, and that the Intermediate Phase may be supplied by the projected Signal Service Company outlined by the Chief Signal Officer, SWPA. Condensed projected station chart for phases "A" and "B" appear in Chart "C".

ALLISON W. IND, Lt. Col.
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau


3 Incls:
Chart "A"
Chart "B"
Chart "C"

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20 AUG. 75



EE


I. Present Stage - Secret Operations.



Immediate needs for communication maintenance include:

1. One key station (10 Kw.) in Australia (Signal Corps Station).
2. Eight "Beta" Net control stations (100-watt or similar).
3. Twenty "Gamma" low power semi-portable "watcher" stations.
4. Fifteen Filipino operators.

II. Intermediate Stage - Northward military movements.



Needs.

(Transition stage wherein Signal Corps assumes normal traffic responsibilities.)


- 1 or more "key" command stations
AIB - G-2.
- 20 or 30 net control stations
"Beta" AIB - G-2.
- 60 - 70 low power "Gamma" Station
eventually to be absorbed for combined G-2 G-3 work.

(AIB still retaining a few original secret stations - perhaps five or six.)

185 Filipino operators.

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III. Final Stage - Investment of Islands.



Needs.

Purely a Signal Corps matter to be determined by normal demands of military campaign. (AIB still presumed to retain few secret stations of low power)



CHART "C".

ALPHA Control Stations.

BETA Net Control

GAMMA Net

None

(Mindanao)

Davao
Surigao
Lanao

{ 7 airfields
{ 15 coast watchers

(Visayas)

Iloilo
Dumaguete
Cebu
Ormoc
Catbalogan

{ 20 airfields
{ 20 coast watchers

(Luzon-Camarines)

Sorsogon (area)
Antimonon
Bondoc Pt.

{ 15 airfields
{ 15 coast watchers

Palawan

Puerta Princesa

{ 5 airfields
{ 5 coast watchers

South (Mindoro)

San Jose

{ 5 airfields
{ 5 coast watchers

(Los Banos)

Batangas

{ 3 airfields
{ 3 coast watchers

Central

Mariveles

{ 3 airfields
{ 3 coast watchers

Stotsenberg

3 airfields

Cabanatuan

2 airfields

Iba

{ 2 airfields, and
{ coast watchers

North

Bondoc

{ 3 airfields
{ 3 coast watchers

Vigan

{ 2 airfields
{ coast watchers

Aparri

3 coast watchers

Total "BETAS" 2nd phase 21

Secret AIB Stations 8

TOTAL: 29

TOTAL
GAMMAS 91 *

DECLASSIFIED PER ACS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



* Including First and Second Phase.

~~SECRET~~

*File
Phil. Prot
gen ag*

G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from sheets)

From	To	Date	Remarks
G-2	Signal Officer	14 Jan/43	Attached passed to you for comment, and suggestions as to ways and means. For the A. C. of S., G-2: <i>V. Van S...</i>
C.Sig.O. GHQ	G-2	1/17/43	This appears to be a necessity. It will have to be handled by USASOS under a directive issued by this office. Suggest that Major Ind draft up a comprehensive plan of equipment and personnel not only for this phase of the work but also for the expansion to follow, particularly with additional stations to be established in P. I., so that personnel and equipment may be requisitioned. This is preferable to a partial scheme as herein proposed. Suggest it be submitted to this office for discussion and preparation of directive. <i>S.B.A.</i>
G-2	<i>a.i.d. Major Ind</i>	<i>1/17/43</i>	<i>For action.</i> UNCLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR DA 20 AUG. 75 SECRET

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-12-FOLE

SECRET

G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from sheet)

From	To	Date	Remarks
0-2	Chief of Office	14/1/43	Approved check to ... for ... and ... as to ...
0-2	Chief of Office	14/1/43	This appears to be a necessity. It will have to be handled by ... when a directive is issued by this office. Suggest that Major and staff of a ... preventive ... and personnel not only for this ... of the work but also for the ... for follow-up. Clearly with ... should be established in ... that ... and ... may be ... in ... to a ... which ... be ... to this office for discussion and preparation of directive.



SECRET

30

G-2

Signal
Officer

14 Jan/43

Attached passed to you for comment and
suggestions as to ways and means.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

V.S.M.-S.

DECLASSIFIED PER 603 ITR OF
20 AUG. 75





**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU**

~~SECRET & PERSONAL~~

January 14, 1943

SUBJECT: Radio Communications - Philippines

TO : Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith

1. It would appear that the necessity for the establishment of an exclusive United States Signal Corps communication channel and system for handling Philippine radio traffic must receive early consideration. Therefore, this preliminary report is advanced with the idea of initiating discussions among the proper authorities.

2. At present this headquarters does not possess an exclusive channel or organization devoted to traffic to and from the Islands. Such an establishment has not been required, since only within the past month has the volume of traffic exceeded more than a few desultory messages. However, traffic is expanding very rapidly with the establishment of regular schedules with at least two Philippine stations and a further increase is anticipated as attempts are now being made to make the necessary contact with a third station. At least one other station, apparently located in the Islands, also has been monitored in Australia, although it has not been heard from in the past several weeks.

3. Our traffic now is handled through R.A.A.F. station KAZ at Darwin. A second channel for the limited use of very secret communications relating to this Bureau and its parties will probably be in operation shortly, utilizing A.I.B. stations only. This channel would not be available to guerrilla leaders.

4. Since our only activity outlet is through R.A.A.F. organization, there can not be any such thing as purely U.S. security, inasmuch as messages to the Philippines must be encoded in the R.A.A.F. code office by R.A.A.F. personnel. This is done at Brisbane for transmission to Darwin. If other codes are used for international transmission, the plain language content of our messages must also be known in the Darwin R.A.A.F. office where re-encoding would be accomplished. The disadvantages and dangers of such a system are obvious. (This applies to technical messages only and not to adm. or operational)

5. In addition to the undesirable security angle, the point is made that code traffic to and from the Islands is certain to increase rapidly within the next few months. Whether R.A.A.F. will be willing to take on added loads, when already a considerable portion of their time and staff are utilized handling purely U.S. business, is a question requiring an answer from R.A.A.F. In any event, it is inconceivable that with the promise of awakening activity in the Philippine Section, we should continue to use an Allied organization for

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 20 AUG. 75

*Only
Technical
Messages*



~~SECRET~~

the performance of a function so vital as communications.

6. Since this question is beyond the pale of A.I.B., except indirectly, a formal request for a U.S. establishment cannot be made from here. Nevertheless, should this come to pass, A.I.B. likely would immediately alter its present arrangements concerning its own secret stations and bring those dealing with the Philippines within the U.S. Signal Corps net.

Allison W. Ind

ALLISON W. IND, Major
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
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Station KAZ (RAAF) is handling traffic very well at present. If to be replaced by U.S. station, that station should be located in North Australia for best communication, but problem arises concerning rapid contact with this station from Brisbane. Ideal would be direct teletype.



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If station is established:

- 1) Operators should visit KAZ & get all info.
- 2) Philippine stations would have to be informed of the change & the U.S. station identified.
- 3) Sufficient personnel for all-night watch will be necessary (2 or 3 operators)

A special section of at least 2-3 men would be required as crypto. clerks.

H.C.

The above requirements are only for Phil. net.

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

February 13, 1943.

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : District Commanders, P.I.

1. It is the intention to progressively establish territorial command areas based on the Military Districts, in force on December 7th, 1940, for the mobilization of the Philippine Army.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Mecario Peralta, Jr., P.A., is designated Commanding Officer, 6th Military District.
3. Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Fertig, C.E. A.U.S., is designated Commanding Officer, 10th Military District.
4. It is directed that there will be maximum co-operation, mutual support and the avoidance of friction between Commanding Officers of Military Districts operating in a common cause.
5. The assignment of command over other Military Districts, will be made from time to time, as conditions warrant.
6. Until otherwise directed, the Commanding Officers of Military Districts will function under direct control of this Headquarters.
7. These command assignments are made on a tentative basis, and may be reviewed upon further information and individual record of performance.
8. The District Commanders, 6th and 10th Districts, will continue to perfect their intelligence nets, in their districts, and establish liaison with organized forces in adjacent Districts. In order to prevent uneconomic duplication, Colonels Peralta and Fertig will develop a co-operative scheme of operations in the establishment of military intelligence nets as follows:

Lieut. Colonel Peralta: 6th, 7th and 8th Districts.
Lieut. Colonel Fertig : 9th and 10th Districts.
9. These intelligence nets constitute at this time the main mission of our Commanders; their installation and personnel should receive the greatest care; the organization should be based on the P.A. Military District and Provincial Areas therein, utilizing loyal Army and P.C. personnel, if practicable.

Information is generally desired in the following order of priority:

1. Enemy strength and dispositions:
 - a. Occupied seaports.
 - b. Occupied cities, towns and villages.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

Directive to District Commander, P.I., Cont'd.

2. Enemy identifications; captured documents, etc.
3. Enemy operational air-fields:
 - a. Number and type of planes, hangars, fuel tanks, etc.
 - b. Disposition of guard troops and A/A defenses.
4. Enemy movements, transfer of troops, etc.
5. Enemy naval dispositions.
6. Enemy treatment of civilians.
7. Enemy civil administration.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIALS:

VAN S. MERLE-SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

C. O. 6th Military District.
C. O. 10th Military District.
G. H. Q., S. W. P. A.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1943

SUBJECT: Philippine Project - Intelligence Radio Net.

TO : Chief Signal Officer. Thru: Colonel Merle-Smith.

1. Consideration of the development of radio nets for complete intelligence channel traffic incidental to ultimate full-scale military operations in the Philippines requires consideration of three phases: (1) Present limited secret, (2) Intermediate progressive military advance, (3) Ultimate operational investment of Islands area.

a. Requirements have been calculated upon the following classification of stations:

- (1) Key station - 20-40 kw master multiple traffic on 24 hour schedules on all necessary bands
- (2) Alpha Area Control Station - 1-5 kw multiple traffic units on 24 hour schedules
- (3) Beta Net Control Stations - 100-watt multiple traffic units, 24 hour schedule
- (4) Gamma Net Stations - low power, semi-portable and portable voice - c.w. units, one or two-man, infrequent transmissions.

2. Phase Requirements:

a. Initial (Secret)

- (1) One Key (Australia)
- (2) Eight Beta net control
- (3) Twenty Gamma watcher station

Note: Immediate personnel requirements in Annex I

b. Intermediate

- (1) Three Key (at least two operating, one in transit.)
- (2) Thirty Beta net control units (five in transit)
- (3) One hundred Gamma units.

c. Islands Investment

(See attached chart)



ALPHA
(Controls)

BETA Net
Controls

GAMMA Net
Controls

I - Mindanao
a. Del Monte

Davao
Agusan
Surigao
Misamis Oriental

7 Airfields
5 Inland Observers
10 Coast Watchers

b. Zamboanga

Misamis Occidental
Lanao
Cotabato
Jolo
Sulu Archipelago

5 Airfields
5 Inland Observers
11 Coast Watchers

II - Visayas
a. Panay (Iloilo)

Capiz
San Jose
Dumugete
Bacolod

6 Airfields
4 Inland Observers
8 Coast Watchers

b. Cebu (Cebu City)

Tagbilaran (Bohol)
Ormoc (Leyte)
Catbalogan (Samar)

7 Airfields
5 Inland Observers
16 Coast Watchers

c. Masbate (Masbate town)

Marinduque
Romblon (Is.)

1 Airfield
2 Inland Observers
4 Coast Watchers

III - Luzon
1. Camarines
a. Naga

Sorsogon
Legaspi
Paracale
Antimonon

5 Airfields
5 Inland Observers
15 Coast Watchers

2. Palawan
a. Puerta Princesa

Brooke Pt.
Culion
Coron

4 Airfields
3 Inland Observers
6 Coast Watchers

3. Mindoro (South Luzon)
a. San Jose

Calapan
Santa Cruz

5 Airfields
3 Inland Observers
5 Coast Watchers

Luzon
b. Los Bana

Lucena
Batangas
Nasugbo
Mauban

5 Airfields
4 Inland Observers
6 Coast Watchers

4. Central Luzon
a. Manila

Mariveles
Stotsenberg
Cabanatuan

8 airfields
11 Inland Observers

b. Cavite

c. Baguio

Iba
Lingayen
Baler

6 Airfields
4 Inland Observers
7 Coast Watchers

5. North Luzon
a. Tuguegarao

Aparri
Laoag
Vigan
San Fernando (La Union)
Echague

9 Airfields
6 Inland Observers
14 Coast Watchers.



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ANNEX E

Immediate Personnel Needs

1. It is neither desirable nor practicable to utilize American (white) radio operator-technicians in present secret operations... Filipino personnel should be used. There is no reservoir of suitable Islanders in Australia at present. Such a reservoir is believed to exist in the United States.

2. Therefore, it is suggested that immediate survey be conducted to provide Allied Intelligence Bureau with not less than 18 trained operator-technicians having the following characteristics:

(1) The minimum requirements for such personnel are:

a. Unquestioned loyalty and courage.

b. Sufficient intelligence and education for encoding and decoding in English.

c. Sufficient training to enable them to send or receive Morse at a minimum rate of 15 words per minute, and to run, maintain and repair field signal equipment, including gas-driven battery chargers.

(2) To fulfil possible requirements, it is desired that such personnel should be available in Australia as follows:

a. Six by 1st May, 1943

b. Six by 1st July, 1943

c. Six by 1st September, 1943.

(3) It is believed that it would be more practicable to provide the fundamental training in the United States on a schedule which would insure their arrival in Australia according to the above schedule.



AW
ALLESON W. IND,
Major, M.I.
Deputy Controller.

DECLASSIFIED PER ACS ITR ON
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET & PERSONAL~~

January 14, 1943



SUBJECT: Radio Communications - Philippines

TO : Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

1. It would appear that the necessity for the establishment of an exclusive United States Signal Corps communication channel and system for handling Philippine radio traffic must receive early consideration. Therefore, this preliminary report is advanced with the idea of initiating discussions among the proper authorities.
2. At present this headquarters does not possess an exclusive channel or organization devoted to traffic to and from the Islands. Such an establishment has not been required, since only within the past month has the volume of traffic exceeded more than a few desultory messages. However, traffic is expanding very rapidly with the establishment of regular schedules with at least two Philippine stations and a further increase is anticipated as attempts are now being made to make the necessary contact with a third station. At least one other station, apparently located in the Islands, also has been monitored in Australia, although it has not been heard from in the past several weeks.
3. Our traffic now is handled through R.A.A.F. station KAZ at Darwin. A second channel for the limited use of very secret communications relating to this Bureau and its parties will probably be in operation shortly, utilizing A.I.B. stations only. This channel would not be available to guerrilla leaders.
4. Since our only activity outlet is through R.A.A.F. organization, there can not be any such thing as purely U.S. security, inasmuch as messages to the Philippines must be encoded in the R.A.A.F. code office by R.A.A.F. personnel. This is done at Brisbane for transmission to Darwin. If other codes are used for international transmission, the plain language content of our messages must also be known in the Darwin R.A.A.F. office where re-encoding would be accomplished. The disadvantages and dangers of such a system are obvious. *(Applies to technical messages only; not administrative or operational)*
5. In addition to the undesirable security angle, the point is made that code traffic to and from the Islands is certain to increase rapidly within the next few months. Whether R.A.A.F. will be willing to take on added loads, when already a considerable portion of their time and staff are utilized handling purely U.S. business, is a question requiring an answer from R.A.A.F. In any event, it is inconceivable that with the promise of awakening activity in the Philippine Section, we should continue to use an Allied organization for

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the performance of a function so vital as communications.

6. Since this question is beyond the pale of A.I.B., except indirectly, a formal request for a U.S. establishment cannot be made from here. Nevertheless, should this come to pass, A.I.B. likely would immediately alter its present arrangements concerning its own secret stations and bring those dealing with the Philippines within the U.S. Signal Corps net.

ALLISON W. IND, Major
Deputy Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

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20 AUG. 75



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November 19, 1942

SUBJECT: Commando Unit for Operation on Island of Mindanao.

TO : Major Allison W. Ind.

1. The plan has been submitted by Lieut. G. V. Hurley, U.S.N.R., wherein it is proposed to organize, train and equip a commando force of one thousand Moros officered by about a dozen naval or marine officers and N.C.O's. The object is "to use this force for an effective, inexpensive and harassing operation against the Japanese", which would "undoubtedly make necessary a substantial increase in the Japanese garrison of Mindanao and would be a stimulus to all segments of native population now under Japanese control." Although not stated, yet the idea is conveyed that this suggested operation be undertaken as soon as possible. I assume that that is what was in Lieut. Hurley's mind when he drew up the plan, because in no way does he link it with future offensive military actions. On the contrary, in many instances does he suggest the idea that this is to be an independent action for "harassing purposes."

2. In my opinion, the plan as a whole merits consideration, but I sincerely doubt if now would be the appropriate time for ventures like these. To begin with, our present knowledge of enemy troop dispositions in the Islands seem to indicate that the Japanese forces are, for the most part, concentrated in important and strategic centers and some provincial capitals. Apparently, no great effort is being made by the enemy to "roam the countryside" in search of the still unconquered units of the Philippine Army. This then would oblige our commando forces to carry the fight where the enemy is - in or very near populated centers. Such a practice, however, besides being extremely hazardous for the friendly forces involved, would very definitely be a source of great danger for local inhabitants not only during the assaults, but later as well, as there is no telling what the Japanese will do by way of reprisals. At present we know of one particular instance where a couple of people were killed by the Japanese for suspected connections with guerilla forces in Mindanao. This information was given by Captains Gause and Osborne, and it concerns Mr. and Mrs. Laird, American father and Filipino mother of an officer who belonged to my command in Batangas. It would be safe to assume then that the Japanese, to instill fear in the hearts of the people and to prevent guerilla forces from receiving aid from outsiders, wouldn't hesitate to kill or perhaps even destroy communities suspected of harboring or having any dealings with guerillas.

3. As for it providing a stimulus for the rest of the country, I am afraid that eventually it will actually produce the opposite effect. True, at the outset and probably for a little while, the deeds and sacrifices of the men engaged in these operations will be a source of pride or even hope for the entire population. But we must realize that alone and unaided, operations like these, besides exposing the population to great danger and frightful privations, are hopeless in that they can never drive the Japanese from the Islands. On

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the contrary, they will serve to give the Japanese an excuse for a ruthless and iron-handed rule over the country. This, the people are bound to realize sooner or later and when they do, their spirits will undoubtedly be even lower (if that could be possible) than they already are. I believe that rather than commando operations like these, bombing raids conducted periodically, will produce greater psychological results.

4. I repeat then that I do not believe this operation should be undertaken now. Perhaps when the Allied offensive takes place, it might then be successfully carried out. Whenever that time might be, I must give warning now about the proposal embodied in paragraph 6 of the plan which suggests that as an "incentive for effective field performance" the amount of two to five pesos be paid per head, "payable when the head was produced." I believe that such a practice will not only be savage but dangerous as well in that it might boomerang to our own side. I say this because such a practice will tend to induce even criminally minded persons to join for the sole purpose of earning such lucrative awards. Such men would be dangerous to have in undertakings like these. Besides, they would be unnecessary as there will be hundreds of thousands in the Islands who would give anything to pay back the Japanese for the sorrows and destruction they spread. The author of the plan himself knows of the "seriousness with which these men regard an obligation or an oath of allegiance." As for the fighting ability and spirit of the Moros, there is no question. So it would be ridiculous and dangerous to introduce such ideas as paying a certain amount for every head brought in.

5. Considering the foregoing, I believe that the plan should temporarily be set aside at least until such a time as when it can be supported within a reasonable length of time by stronger and more permanent forces.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS-172 OF
20 AUG. 75

J. A. Villamor
J. A. VILLAMOR
Captain, Air Corps



SECRET

November 18, 1942

SUBJECT: Philippine Project.

TO : Colonel Roberts

THRU : Major Ind.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR# OF-
20 AUG. 75



1. In the light of recent developments wherein several messages, duly evaluated as bona fide, have been received from the Philippines, it seems important to stress once again the objectives of the proposed AIB party for the Philippines. This is being done to avoid any conflict of interests, inasmuch as the messages so far received have unwittingly suggested the idea that the AIB party should be used to contact the sender of these messages and thus furnish them with suitable codes and whatever instructions GHQ may desire.

2. I believe, however, that such a procedure does not entirely fall in line with the original plan of sending a party for purely intelligence purposes. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that it will materially handicap, if not entirely prevent any intelligence activities on the part of this party. Among other things, I had hoped to obtain information regarding the true political status in the Islands. I had also hoped to get a clear and unbiased picture of the trend of mind of Filipinos from all walks of life and from all parts of the Islands. Then again, I was going to try and gain information regarding Japanese political, economic, military and naval intentions in the Philippines. Finally, I was going to attempt to get a true picture of conditions in Japan proper, through certain people of unquestionable integrity and intelligence who I would send with the different cultural, economic, political and religious junkets that are being sent and apparently encouraged from the different occupied countries to Japan. I have no doubt but that should I succeed in getting all, or even part of this information, its value for future operations will demand that nothing should be permitted to jeopardize its acquisition and that therefore the original plan of sending out this AIB party on purely intelligence purposes should still be carried out. Such a step requires great secrecy and infinite care which would be lost once contact is made with guerilla parties. On the other hand, it is evident that the pleas and problems of those still fighting the enemy with patriotic zeal and heroic fever simply cannot and must not be brushed aside.

3. I am, therefore, submitting a plan with which it is hoped that both objectives, e.g. (a) obtaining information for intelligence purposes, (b) contacting the leaders of guerilla parties still operating, can be attained without prejudice to each other. I propose that in addition to the proposed AIB party of four (4) which includes myself, one other be sent along for the express purpose of performing the mission outlined herein. He would be used to contact guerilla leaders and take to them whatever codes may be decided upon for their use. It might even be advantageous to have him take along a letter or a proclamation from President Quezon inasmuch as the people apparently still regard him as the Filipino leader. I believe that this fact should not be overlooked or dismissed lightly as it might affect to a much

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greater extent than we think now, future policies in the Islands. In other words, I feel that encouraging the people to feel that their leaders before the war are still fighting for them, will, when the time comes for reconstruction, greatly aid our cause in that we shall have leaders in whom both the people and the supreme authorities will have faith and confidence in.

4. For this mission, I can think of no better man than Lieutenant Roberto Lim, now with the 1st Filipino Regiment in San Luis Obispo, California. Lt. Lim is the son of Brigadier General Vicente Lim. He is very well known to me as we grew up together. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and his loyalty is unquestionable. His intelligence is attested to by his scholastic records not only in the Academy but in all schools he has attended, all of which he has always rated among the top-notchers. Still another reason I favor his choice is that most people in the Philippines knew of his being in the United States (once, in Bataan, we even listened to his broadcast from KGEL) and there would be no question of his being a bona fide representative of the authorities once he is able to identify himself, which shouldn't be hard to do in view of the fact that he, as well as his family, are very well known in the Islands. As for his willingness to undertake this mission, I am positive there will be no question about it. He is a Lim, a La Salle boy, a cadet in the Philippine Military Academy (prior to his appointment to the Naval Academy) and a graduate of Annapolis, --- any single one of which would be enough to have a man go unhesitatingly where duty called.

5. This then would permit me to operate as originally planned. Naturally, should at any time I feel that it would be desirable for me to make my presence known to these guerilla parties, I could easily do so through Lieut. Lim. As a whole, therefore, this plan would permit extreme flexibility to our operations and I feel fully confident that carried out as suggested and planned, it will succeed beyond expectations. In view of the foregoing, I therefore, strongly recommend that this plan be incorporated with the original and that steps be taken to have Lieut. Lim relieved from his present assignment and transferred to this area with the least practicable delay.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 85

J. A. VILLAMOR,
Captain, A.C.



~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

AIB G-2 Oct. 20/42

1. Attached hereto for approval or amendment is proposed general plan of operation for the Philippines Sub-Section of Section "C" with which I agree.

----- C. CR. -----

G-2 G. of S. Oct. 21/42

1. Would appreciate your approval or comments.

For the A.C. Of S., G-2

V.S.M. - S.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

EXCELLENT.

Mac A.

G-2 AIB Oct 23/42

1. Note C-in-C's approval.

V.S.M. -S.

AIB G-2 11/5/42

1. Ret'd for your file.

A.W.I.





~~SECRET~~

October 20, 1942

SUBJECT: Proposed Directive for Philippines Sub-Section.

TO : Colonel C. G. Roberts.

1. The following is submitted as a general plan of operation for the Philippines Sub-Section of Section "C":

(1) Mission: To -

- a. establish a net for military intelligence and secret service throughout the Islands.
- b. establish a chain of communication, both local and to Australia.
- c. establish an eventual "escape route" to serve those it is desired to evacuate in the interests of future planning, etc.
- d. develop an organization for covert subversive activities and propaganda for use at the appropriate time.

(2) Method: It is proposed to inaugurate operations through -

- a. the medium of an initial small picked reconnaissance party, which shall be transported to the Islands by airplane or submarine.
- b. the formation of and penetration by successive parties organized and operated on the basis of the findings of this "Preliminary Party."

2. The Preliminary Party:

This party shall consist of Captain J. A. VILLAMOR, leader, and two or three very carefully chosen men whose task will involve the most covert type of survey operations, to

- a. locate and contact certain individuals known, or strongly considered to be loyal and desirous of giving assistance, immediate or eventual.
- b. establish through these, the rudiments of the intelligence net, which shall be formulated upon the "cell" system for the mutual protection of Captain Villamor and party against possible betrayal, and of loyal assistants in the Islands against betrayal by unfortunate contacts.
- c. determine means of obtaining such essentials as (a) aviation fuel, (b) food, (c) small boats, (d) small boat supplies, (e) passes, (f) identifications, etc., for subsequent parties.
- d. locate radio equipment and listening stations.
- e. locate Bureau of Posts and old Philippine Army transmitters and their operating frequencies.
- f. obtain general information on
 - (a) Japanese political intentions.
 - (b) Japanese military intentions.
 - (c) Japanese civil intentions.
 - (d) Japanese military strength, disposition, quality, equipment, morale, etc.
 - (e) Japanese operations of future significance.
- g. arrange for the channel through which this information is to be passed for compilation by Captain Villamor.

h. establish a portable radio transmitter for contacting Darwin on matters of arranging transportation rendezvous only.

i. establish Captain Villamor's assistant agents in suitable location of maximum value consistent with security.

j. return Captain Villamor to Australia with full report and recommendations for future parties.

ALLISON W. IND,
Major, M.I.
Deputy Controller.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

October 7th, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 73

MEMORANDUM:

FOR : Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith.
PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE NET



1. I detail below a rough plan for creation and establishment of a unit in the Philippines to: -
a) Obtain and transmit information regarding enemy air, naval and ground activities.
b) Render active support when a friendly landing operation takes place.

2. I do not believe there is any doubt regarding the loyalty of the vast majority of Filipinos to the United States, and the cause which she is fighting for. However, quite a number of Filipinos have probably the feeling that they have been let down by the United States. I found this while I was in Bataan, and again by talking to many people on my way from Bataan to Mindanao. Although loyalties and belief are apt to change, particularly under the strain imposed by hunger, sickness, bombings and all the other horrors suffered by people at war. The men of Bataan and Corregidor suffered all of these and almost every home in the Philippines bore the same sufferings through husbands, sons, relatives or friends. This disillusionment of the Filipinos in the things they have so long believed in has been very great. I have mentioned the above because I believe that only with elimination of the disappointments suffered by the Filipino people, lies the secret for their complete support against the Japanese in the Philippines. As I see it, it really isn't so much the collapse of the Philippine defenses that has hurt the Filipinos, rather they were hurt because the resources of the United States, in which they had such great hopes, never came through. In spite of many traits picked up by the Filipino in his association with the Occidental, he is still decidedly sentimental, and this point should be constantly borne in mind. Logic and a thorough appraisal of the facts could correct this false impression, but it must be remembered that logic and understanding cannot be expected of a people whose minds and bodies are torn by the horrors of war. In addition to this, the Japanese are undoubtedly taking advantage of the confusion in the minds of the people, and as a result, I would not be surprised in the least, to find quite a number believing Japanese propaganda and even perhaps hostile to the Allied cause.

3. Bearing this in mind, I think the best procedure would be for me to go to the Philippines with a very small party and dropped by submarine at a place on the Island of Luzon, the landing point to be determined later. We would take a small transmitter and six weeks after landed there, a daily watch over certain periods of a day and night should be maintained by signals so that I could make arrangements for a rendezvous to be picked up by a submarine and return to Australia to report. Based on the report that I will make, we can then decide the place where we can establish the main transmitter and the plan for the future.

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Regraded Unclassified
Order Sec Army
By TAG, per 710574

4. Since it is evident that I cannot take any money with me, I would suggest that I be given a quantity of precious stones, preferably diamonds, which have always had great exchange value in the Philippines, and from the money obtained from the sale of these stones, I would have the funds necessary to carry out my mission.

5. With the contacts that I have in almost every part of the Island, I am confident that all that I propose to accomplish during the initial survey, will be accomplished. During the same time, I will be able to gather military and aerial information, possibly pictures and sketches of personnel, equipment and establishments, and organize the initial group which we will be able to contact in subsequent missions.

6. In order to help me in this mission, it is requested that I be granted authority by the Commander-in-Chief, to accept, and if need be, commission in the United States Army, individuals whose work will help in the success of the mission. I also suggest that I be given specific authorization to overrule, if I have to, under certain circumstances, the privilege of rank that some of the officers now in the Philippines may have over me.

Jesus Villmor
JESUS VILLMOR,
Captain, Air Corps.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 79

OF

- 2 -

Reproduced Unclassified
Order Sec Army
By TAC, per 710574

~~SECRET~~

October 4th, 1942.

SUBJECT : Intelligence Net In The Philippines.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OP-
70 AUG. 79



The way to determine what is the best means of establishing an Intelligence Net in the Philippines is to go back and study the results of the systems previously in operation.

Operating from Bataan, an organization was formed under the direct charge of Brigadier General Simeon De Jesus, P.A. De Jesus had about sixty (60) agents working for him, most of whom were former constabulary officers and enlisted men. These men would receive their instructions, would cross enemy lines either on foot or by cutting across the Northwestern end of Manila Bay in a banca, and proceed on their mission.

It was a very crude system in that it would take the agents a week to reach their destination, another week back, and a few days stay in their theater of operations. The reports were unreliable and contained more village gossip than military information.

The main difficulty was communications. The secondary difficulty was the fact that occasional reports of troop movements in a certain locality cannot be depended upon as a report based on daily observations.

To improve communications, De Jesus established a radio station in Manila which was located in the projection room of a second-class movie theater. The noise in the projection room counteracted the sounds made by the transmitter and the theater made possible continuous movement of the agents in the vicinity to this gathering point without attracting attention. This radio station was in operation about six (6) weeks prior to our departure on the 11th of March, and in all probability, continued operations undetected until the fall of Bataan.

We had some trouble between the operator who was a Signal Corps man, and the principal agent of the Area, who was a De Jesus man. They were continuously bickering on who had authority, and we finally had to remove the signal man, replacing him with another who was specifically told that the De Jesus man was in charge.

There was one phase of the work which continuously worried us. If more radio stations were established, their detection would be easy if any of the agents were captured or some native villager gave away its location upon being questioned by the enemy.

Toward the end of February, we evolved the following plan which De Jesus was instructed to put into operation at once, but of this plan we have no information regarding its effectiveness, as we left before it was operating in the field.

Four main areas were established:

- (1) San Fernando (Pampanga), North to the foothills of the Mountain Province.

Duplicate



- (2) From San Fernando (Pampanga), South, including Manila with a southern boundary at the town of Las Pinas.
- (3) The SW end of Luzon, including the Provinces of Cavite Batangas and Laguna.
- (4) The SE end of Luzon, including Tayabas, Camarines Norte, Camarinas Sur. and Sorsogon.

Each of these areas would be in charge of a district agent who would be the only one to know the position of the transmitter and would know of the connection with De Jesus. The transmitter would be located in some inaccessible locale, but close to the strategical center of operations in the area, for instance, in area No. 1, in San Fernando (Pampanga) itself; as through this town, all traffic, vehicular and railroad had to pass on its way from Manila to Lingayen, which was the only base in the north being used by the Japanese.

In the instructions given to De Jesus, he was told that the district agent would have with him the radio operator and, at the most, one more person whom he would bring with him from Bataan. All other personnel would be employed locally. The organization would be formed on the principle of Cell groups of 5, and the district agent was cautioned not to go beyond this number as it would multiply his chances of detection.

Each of the three agents, working under him, if possible, should be chosen from three different classes of society: a laborer, a government clerk or small shop-keeper, and a land proprietor or political figure in the area.

These, in turn, would employ three men, and the next three, three more and so on. The initial selection of the three men in different classes of society, working for the district agents, would take care that the last group would also be in approximately the same social level and in this manner, the organization would cover every possible field of information.

It is inevitable in this kind of work that some of the people contacted will not prove faithful, either because they are definitely pro-Japanese, but mainly because of trying to obtain personal gain by divulging information to the enemy. The Cell organization limits the possibility of detection and capture of the main agent and the transmitter in the area.

We had great hopes for this type of an organization, but, unfortunately, we have no information as to how it worked out.

One of these two systems of operations will have to be organized by our emissary. No doubt, he would like to begin like De Jesus began, but I think that that would be dangerous and he should bide his time, and from the outset go into the Cell group principle.

Carelessness in organizing the Net will mean quick detection and months of preparation for this organization will have gone for naught

The point of disembarkation and the location of Headquarters must be left in the hands of the leader of the party. I still believe that the NE coast of Mindanao offers the best location for our main transmitter. It is isolated, has relatively easy access by submarine, and the distance from Northern Australia for radio communication is the shortest. It is true that such a Headquarters would be distant from the main center of information, Manila, but that is the price that must be paid for security.

One item that we have not considered is the question of money. No doubt, all Philippine currency has been withdrawn by the Japanese and occupation money is in circulation. We would, in time, have to obtain samples of this occupation money to have it copied locally, but for the initial phases we should immediately wire Washington and ask them to send out about 500,000 pesos in one and two and five Pesos bills. Philippine currency was printed by the Bureau of Printing in Washington. Some treatment should be given to these notes so as to give them the appearance of having been in use. This type of currency must still circulate to some extent. It would be dangerous to use U.S. currency, although a small amount of it may come in handy.

U. S. gold coin would be another means of exchange, but it has many inconveniences notwithstanding its high intrinsic value. (1) It is heavy to cart around. (2) All gold coin was withdrawn from circulation in the Philippines in 1933. (3) The appearance of any gold coin would immediately attract the attentions of the Japs to its source of origin. I suggest that until we are able to get hold of occupation money, we stick to the type of currency formerly issued by the Philippine Treasury.

I have mentioned in a previous memorandum the names of some people who should be contacted. I will expand further on this now.

JOSE PERTIERRA

Pertierra has been working for me since 1933. Because of the Depression, Madrigal (a wealthy Filipino shipping man) sold some of his ships. Pertierra was one of his captains. He put in about four (4) years as manager of a small plantation we had near San Fernando (La Union). He knows this district intimately. He then did a short stretch in Manila. In 1933, I sent him to Cebu to be the manager of the branch office of a fire insurance company. He has many connections which he attained as a sea captain and through our organization. I doubt if there are very many people in the Philippines who know as much of the Philippines as Pertierra. He is very energetic and the type of a man who gets things done. Given a brief outline of the work desired, he can go out and take care of all the details himself. His integrity is above reproach, and I am also sure of his loyalty. Besides English and Spanish, he can speak Visayan, Tagalog, and Ilocano. If he were here in Australia, I could think of no man better qualified to be the leader of an expedition going into the Philippines. Whoever goes forward, on making contact with Pertierra, can and should use my name with him. Pertierra can be located through Ayala and Company in Manila, or through "Filipinas" Compania De Seguros in Manila or Cebu.

ANTONIO F. GONZALEZ

Gonzalez, at present, is the general manager of the Insular Life Insurance Company in Manila. He is about 38 years of age, of a Filipino-Spanish family, and is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame. He could not go out in the field and make additional contacts nor could he be expected to employ others to work for him. But he can be trusted completely and there is no doubt of his loyalty to the U. S. Every day, at a meeting which takes place in his office, the other committee members discuss everything of any importance that they have heard in the last 24 hours, and Gonzalez is in a position to find out what is going on in Vargas' Government, and all the current financial information in the Philippines. He only speaks Spanish and English. He has personal acquaintanceship, through his family and through the position he holds, of practically all the important Filipino politicians. Though I had mentioned Gonzalez as the possible contact for Father Hurley, the head of the Society of Jesus in the Philippines, the best man for that would be Salvador Araneta.



SALVADOR ARANETA

Araneta is the lawyer of the Insular Life and is also the lawyer for the Society of Jesus. He was on most intimate contacts with Father Hurley and, besides, was a graduate of the Jesuit School, The Ateneo de Manila. He is a capable lawyer with wide financial and political connections. In 1940, he was the President of the Harvard Alumni Association in the Philippines. He was a member of the Constitutional Convention, which drafted the Philippine Constitution in 1935, and has been the prime mover of an organization which he founded, the Philippine Civic League, whose aim it was to do away with the myth of independence, and obtain from Washington recognition as a 49th state or a Dominion form of Government. Both he and his wife are wealthy and of the very highest type of Filipinos. His wife, Victoria, is a leader in social and charitable works. They are both in their middle 30's. I have confidence that we can depend on Araneta, but before contact is made with him, our man should speak to Gonzalez and find out from Gonzalez if approach can be made to Araneta. Gonzalez would know. Araneta speaks Spanish, English and several native dialects. He, unlike Gonzalez, would organize a net of his own and feed it to our man.

I should not like to give more names because conditions and people change quickly. The first two, I know can be depended upon, the last one, I am reasonably certain. Through these three (3) men, knowledge of every phase of work that the Japs are doing in the Philippines can be obtained, and if carefully outlined to Partierra, he would obtain military information which we require.

M. Wickham
MORNING

COPIES TO :

Col. Roberts (2)
C-2, GHQ, SWPA (1)



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20 AUG. 75

ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU.

July 17, 1942.

SUBJECT: Penetration of the Philippines.

TO : G-2, GHQ.

1. Attached are notes on general proposals for the penetration of the Philippines.

2. Approval or amendment of the Mission set out in Para. 1 is requested.

3. The proposals cover the activities of a Philippine sub-section of Section "C" with the object of obtaining information. On the results of information obtained would be based any plans for fifth column activities by Section "A". The responsibility for making any use possible of Moham-medan connections will rest with Section "B", under the direction of Capt. Kendall.

4. Criticism of the proposals outlined and suggestions for amendment would also be appreciated.

C. G. Roberts
C. G. ROBERTS, Col.
Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

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~~SECRET~~

July 16, 1942.

NOTES ON PHILIPPINE PROJECT.

1. The objects of penetration will be:-
 - (a) To obtain information out of the Philippines as soon as possible on -
 - (i) The political situation.
 - (ii) The attitude of various sections of the population.
 - (iii) Japanese strength, dispositions and installations.
 - (iv) Movement of convoys.
 - (v) Opportunities for fifth column activities, including sabotage.
 - (b) To establish an "escape route".
 - (c) From a date approximately one month before operations are undertaken against any part of the Philippines to supply:-
 - (i) Detailed information on enemy strength, dispositions and installations at those places against which operations will be carried out.
 - (ii) Information of enemy strength and movements in other parts of the Philippines from which the enemy could reinforce the localities attacked.

2. Recent experience of naval personnel escaping from Corregidor and the experience of the Herndon party indicate that at present the area is not closely patrolled. Information of recent withdrawals of enemy troops from the Philippines also indicates that it is lightly held. This position would probably change, however, in the event of a threat of Allied offensive operations from the South East. Therefore, the necessary organization to achieve objects (a) and (b) must be undertaken immediately.

3. To achieve object 1 (a) it is considered that connections should be established as soon as possible with agents in Manila, Cebu, Dansalan or Cagayan.

4. To effect this, it is considered that the first party should be introduced into Mindanao.

5. Object of the party will be to make the necessary arrangements for achieving object 1 (a) as early as possible and obtain the necessary information for establishing similar subsidiary parties in Luzon and Visayas, who will in turn introduce agents with wireless sets in positions whence they can supply information set out as object 1 (c) when the time arrives. The party should consist of an American of resource and courage, with knowledge of the language and inhabitants, and four to six Filipino agents. The leader of the party should remain in Mindanao with wireless communication to Australia, possibly via Dutch stations in the N.E.I. The agents will proceed to Manila, Cagayan and Cebu and there establish contact with local inhabitants who are likely to be loyal and willing to assist.

It is suggested that Lieut. Comdr. MORRILL, U.S. Navy, (2270) who was in charge of the party which recently escaped from Corregidor, or some member of his party, would be a suitable leader.

6.

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6. Agencies by which information might be collected in Manila, Cebu and Cagayan are -

- (a) The Society of Jesus.
- (b) Selected officers of the railways and telephone services and other widespread organizations.
- (c) Major MacMicking's connections.
- (d) Chinese.
- (e) If time permits, the Mohammedan community.

Appendix "1" contains notes on valuable information obtained from Major McMicking on the question of contacts. The leader of the party should certainly see Major McMicking before making his detailed plans.

7. The first party should be introduced by submarine. A suitable place for their landing is believed to be in the vicinity of Port Lamon on the West coast of Mindanao. As the country in this area is believed to be free of the enemy, it is considered that the leader with his means of communication with the N.E.I. or Australia could find a suitable hide-out. The agents could make their way to Cagayan with a view to proceeding to Cebu and Manila. The parties should take with them wireless sets capable of communicating with Australia, possibly via the Dutch stations in the N.E.I. and at least three (3) portable sets for communication between agents and the leader. The range of these smaller sets should be 700 miles. Apart from the emergency rations, the party should be prepared to "live on the country".

8. It is also considered that in addition to direct communication and in conjunction with Commander Quere's activities in the N.E.I. steps should be taken to establish a route by which written communications, personnel and small stores can be got into and out of the Philippines. If possible, this should consist of a series of agents, either running their own craft or traveling on local craft, who will not carry out through journeys from the Philippines to Australia but will each perform part of the journey, transferring messages, personnel or stores entrusted to them to the agent in charge of the next stage at the terminal port of their routes. The best way to establish this service will probably be for a party to leave from DARWIN and proceed from port to port towards the Philippines, making the necessary arrangements en route. The "DEMING", used by the Herndon party, might be used for this.

9. Action necessary now is:

(a) First party to land in Mindanao.

- (i) Selection of leader.
- (ii) Selection of party.
- (iii) Training of party.
- (iv) Arrangements with Commander, Naval Forces for provision of submarine.
- (v) Selection and provision of signal equipment, and codes.
- (vi) Provision of other stores.
- (vii) Statement of information required in the Philippines.
- (viii) List of suitable persons in the Philippines to be contacted.

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(b) Boat party to establish letter and supply route.

- (i) Selection of leader.
- (ii) Selection of party.
- (iii) Training of party.
- (iv) Planning route.
- (v) Fitting out vessel for the expedition, including signal equipment and codes.
- (vi) Provision of stores.
- (vii) List of personnel to contact at various points.

(c) Subsequent parties:

- (i) Select ten (10) parties of four (4) and train them.
- (ii) Collect and equip boats which may be necessary to introduce them to certain parts of the Philippines, if this is considered more satisfactory than submarine. As a beginning, six (6) boats might be so prepared.
- (iii) Obtain ten (10) sets of wireless equipment and the necessary spares.

The location of these parties would depend upon information received from the first party introduced. They would be located at points from which they could obtain information of Japanese strengths, dispositions and installations and transmit it to Australia prior to Allied Offensive operations.


C. G. ROBERTS, Col.
Controller,
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

Encl: 1
Appendix "1".



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Information received from
Major McMicking.

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1. Contacts.

- (a) The Society of Jesus - Fr. Hurley, with whom contact should be made through Mr. Gonzalez, to whom reference is made hereafter.
- (b) Selected officials of the Railways, Telephone Services and other organizations. (See Major Stevenot for list of telephone personnel who may be useful.)
- (c) Major McMicking's connections.
 - (i) A. F. Gonzalez, Insular Life Building, Manila, should be first contacted. This man can be relied on. He may not be able to assist himself, but will not compromise any agent. He can furnish many connections. Through him contact can be made with the following:
 - (a) Salvador Araneta - Manila - Lawyer. Was very pro-American.
 - (b) Jose Ozamis - Manila. Senator. Reserve Officer Philippine Army. Was on Vargas temporary government.
 - (ii) Jose Razon - Manila. Plantation Manager. This man is considered excellent, but as he was in Corregidor and was P.O.W. he may be too suspect to act.
 - (iii) Antonio Pertierra. Manager of McMicking plantation at Calatagan (Batangas). Good W/T operator. He is indecisive but may work out of personal loyalty to McMicking.
 - (iv) Jose Pertierra of Cebu. ("Filipinas Compania de Seguros"). Former Sea Captain. A very good dependable man with large connections. Considered to be the best man for Visayas. If he is not in Cebu, he should be looked up wherever he may be. He will always help. He could arrange to go to Cagayan on inspection in connection with Insurance Agencies, risks on the books etc.

NOTE: Major McMicking's name can be mentioned to RAZON, ANTONIO PERTIERRA, JOSE PERTIERRA and GONZALEZ.

2. Places from which information should be available before and during offensive operations.

<u>MINDANAO</u>	<u>VISAYAS</u>	<u>LUZON</u>
Davao	Cebu	Manila
Kotabato		Legaspi)
Cagayan		Lucina) Province of Tayabas
Zamboanga		San Pablo " " Laguna
		San Fernando " " Pampanga
		San Fernando " " La Union

BATANGAS

(Could probably be worked from Calatagan).

C.G.R.



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