

PHILIPPINE

REGIONAL SECTION

ADMINISTRATION,

JANUARY 1944

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. _____

January 1944 Cont'd

SERIAL NUMBER.	FROM —	DATE.	TO —	SYNOPSIS.
25a	CW	17 Jan 44	C/S	Sug msg to WD re PEASE rpt on POW's.
26a	CW	18 Jan 44	C/S	Stronger hand suggested in dealing with ABCEDE-BADOR situat. 7th M.D.
27a	CW	23 Jan 44	C/S	Re enemy use of BLIMPS in MINDANAO
28a	D C/S	23 Jan 44	CW	Msg fr QUEZON to INGINIERO-BOHOL.
29a	CW	25 Jan 44	C/S	Author to send SUAREZ 50,000 P
30a	CW	25 Jan 44	C/S	Msg fr Marshall re Escapee Rpts.
31a	CW	26 Jan 44	C/S	Birthday Greetings to CINC
32a-6/12/44	D C/S	26 Jan 44	Chief PRS.	Re Gador and ABCEDE
33a	CW	27 Jan 44	AG, USAFFE thru: GHQ.	Commission on GENTRY.
34a	CW	27 Jan 44	C/S	Sugg msg for GADOR re 7th M.D.
35a	CW	27 Jan 44	Gen.	ROWE as Executive Officer.
36a	CW	27 Jan 44	C/S	3rd trip NARWHAL.
37a	G-2	28 Jan 44	CW	Msg to be sent to Fertig re guns, Identification, CATALINA landing.
38a	CW	29 Jan 44	C/S	Planning 4th trip NARWHAL-PARSONS
39a	CW	29 Jan 44	C/S	Re the corres. on Lieut Rosenquist re establishment of contact with POW
40a	CW	30 Jan 44	C/S	Sugg Msg reaction to Atrocity story by Japanese.
41a	CW	31 Jan 44	McMicking	Increase allotment NEWSMAPS.
42a	CW	31 Jan 44	C/S	Sending in of sm radio units to show appreciation for coop etc.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR O6
20 AUG 75



DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. _____



January 1944

SERIAL NUMBER.	FROM —	DATE.	TO —	SYNOPSIS.
1a	CW	5 Jan 44	C/S	Forwarding of samples of Jap money that was printed in Wash. Saying that he solved the mystery of why we had no report on security of Army control station
2a	CW	5 Jan 44	C/S	
3a	CW	6 Jan 44	C/S	Telling of having dispatched an officer and mento set up our own radio station.
4a	CW	7 Jan 44	AG, USAFFE	Corres. re the repatriation of Charles Cushing & family.
5a	CW	6 Jan 44	DC/S	Re the evacuation of Dr. CRUZ.
6a	CW	7 Jan 44	C/S	Saying that he is going to send PARSONS on the next trip so that he may talk to PERALTA & ARCEDE
7a	CW	7 Jan 44	C/S	Comment on the news that NARWHAL may be removed from Philippine operation to go into new area.
8a	CW	7 Jan 44	C/S	Forwarding of msgs re the arrival of WHITEHEAD, COBB & FILIPINOS.
9a	CW	7 Jan 44	G-2, G-3	Giving them information as to what the NARWHAL has taken - what it is expecting to take.
10a	CW	8 Jan 44	C/S	Sending copy of FREE PHILIPPINES
11a	AIB	8 Jan 44	CW	Req send tele on KWOK for future use in N. Borneo.
12a	CW	8 Jan 44	C/S	Arrival of WHITEHEAD and COBB and party. (Put them in hospital).
13a	CW	8 Jan 44	G-2 G-3	Arrival of WHITEHEAD and COBB and party. All for interrogation.
14a	CW	9 Jan 44	C/S	Re unbroken messages that passed between PARSONS & EVANS April 43
15a	CW	9 Jan 44	Major Brown	Req Orchestra play for Red Cross.
16a	C.W.	10 Jan 44	Willoughby	Telling him about Disting. Service
17a	AIB	10 Jan 44	CW	Use of AIF for volunt dy with FERTIG.
18a	CW	11 Jan 44	C/S	Comment on Report by INSPECTOR GEN of Tabragalba and Captain PICKERING.
19a	CW	12 Jan 44	PRO (Col. Diller)	Fwd copy of FREE PHILIPPINES.
20a	CW	13 Jan 44	AG, USAFFE	Adv that HUBBARD, PRYOR killed & other taken prisoner.
21a	CW	14 Jan 44	C/S	Chronological order re FENTON's execution.
22a	CW	12 Jan 44	C/S	Re SUAREZ apt to Sulu Area Cmd.
23a	CW	15 Jan 44	AG, USAFFE	Miller & Wife reached free area.
24a	AIB	16 Jan 44	Col. Whitney	Req msg to be sent to FERTIG re quest to be asked DUTCH Escpees.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
NO 6486 ZS

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

~~SECRET~~



OP/AJH/dfh

Portable Compact Self-Contained Radio
Receiving Sets.

C.Sig.O.

AG
THRU: PRS
C/S

31 January 1944

~~DECLASSIFIED PER ACD 100.01~~
~~EXEMPT~~

1. The matter of obtaining radio receiving sets suitable for the purpose indicated in basic check sheet has been thoroughly investigated by this office. At present, radio equipment that would satisfy the requirements which the equipment must meet and the conditions under which it will be operated, is not available. Equipment of this nature would have to come from the States.

2. A radio set for this purpose (under present circumstances) should have the following characteristics:

- a. Portability, lightweight, and compactness.
- b. A.C. (220 volts) and D.C. Battery (self-contained) operation.
- c. Frequency range, limited to one or two High Frequency bands.
- d. Specially calibrated tuning dial for ease in tuning.
- e. Self-contained antenna, preferably fishpole type (an added length of wire as an alternate antenna, should also be included).
- f. Adequate initial supply of sets and batteries to include maintenance.

3. The nearest approach to the type of set desired would be the Hallicrafter S-29. This set, however, has three distinct disadvantages:

- a. Total reliance on battery power. The set is also designed for 110 A.C. and either an additional transformer would have to be furnished or power unit redesigned since 220 volts A.C. is furnished on the islands.
- b. Frequency range of set approximately .5 to 15 megacycles. Under present circumstances this may not prove beneficial. The low frequency band is of no value whatsoever since the broadcasts to these islands are on the high frequencies.
- c. Tuning is more critical on a wide range frequency set and complete familiarity with the set would be essential to properly tune to the high frequencies desired.

Points mentioned above, though seemingly of minor importance, could totally defeat the purpose for which the sets were intended.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OP/AJH/dfh

Portable Compact Self-Contained Radio
Receiving Set.

C.Sig.O.

AG
THRU: PRS
C/S

31 January 1944

(Cont'd)

4. Recommend attached radiogram be dispatched to the States.

1 Incl: Radiogram to States.

B. H. P., Exec.

From: PRS

To: AG
Thru: C/S

31 Jan 44

Recommend dispatch of attached radiogram prepared by the Chief Signal Officer.

C. W.

1 Incl:
n/c



~~SECRET~~

374

42a

PRS

Chief of Staff

12 Jan 44

1. As a means of stimulating shortwave reception in the Philippines, we can get hold of a number of small, compact battery operated shortwave radio units.

2. For wide distribution, I suggest that one of these sets go to municipalities recommended by District Commanders for outstanding loyalty among its civilian population, and that each be accompanied by a short letter addressed to the Mayor from the C-in-C. This procedure would accomplish the triple purpose of (a) stimulating the dissemination of information, (b) recognizing, in tangible manner, loyal support to District and Area Commanders, and (c) furthering direct contact between the C-in-C and the people.

C. W.

*9. sent to Sig - there now.
1. B-2 remark.*

*Trace this memo.
CW*



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

3/74

AM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X

PRIORITY

X

30 JANUARY 1944

SC BHP/eag

SUBJECT: Portable Compact Self Contained Radio Receiving Set.

AGWAR

IMMEDIATE NEED IN THIS THEATER FOR PORTABLE COMPACT SELF CONTAINED RADIO RECEIVING SETS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO HALLICRAFTERS SUGAR DASH TWO NINE PD THE SUBJECT RADIO SET MUST BE CAPABLE OF OPERATION FROM SELF CONTAINED BATTERIES AND FROM TWO TWO NOUGHT VOLT ABLE CHARLIE POWER CMA FREQUENCY RANGE APPROXIMATELY THREE TO ONE NOUGHT MEGACYCLES CMA SELF CONTAINED FISHPOLE ANTENNA PD SET SHOULD BE LIGHT AND EASILY TRANSPORTED CMA COMPLETE TO INCLUDE SPARE BATTERIES AND ESSENTIAL MAINTENANCE ITEMS PAREN _____ PAREN PURPOSE OF SET FOR DISTRIBUTION TO LOYAL FOLLOWERS IN ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRITORY FOR RECEPTION OF SPECIAL SHORT WAVE BROADCASTS TO THEM EMANATING FROM AUSTRALIAN MAINLAND PD REQUEST INFORMATION ON AVAILABILITY OF RADIO SETS SUCH AS HALLICRAFTERS SUGAR DASH TWO NINE OR SIMILAR RADIO SETS MEETING THESE SPECIFICATIONS CMA ALSO PRACTICABILITY OF MODIFYING THE SUGAR DASH TWO NINE FOR USE AS OUTLINED ABOVE PAREN FOR GENERAL INGLIS FROM GENERAL AKIN PAREN

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH
C. M. A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

MACARTHUR



-1-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Radiogram to AGWAR, subj: Portable Compact Self Contained Radio Receiving
Set. 30-1-44. (Cont'd)

NOTE FOR RECORD: Check sheet from PRS to C/S dated 12 January suggests procurement of small compact battery operated short wave radio receivers for use in the Philippines. Indorsement dated 18 January from G-2 to C/S concurs in above idea but expresses opinion that definite procurement of supplying and distribution should be worked out taking into account shipping space that will be available.

B. H. P.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

108

-2-

~~SECRET~~

PRS

Spec Serv Officer, USAFFE
Attention: Maj McMICKING

31 Jan 44

It is requested that the allotment of NEWSMAPS to the Philippine
Regional Section, AIB, be increased to 2,500 per issue.

C. W.



A/a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

C. W.

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: C/S

Date: 30 Jan 44

1. Opportunity to evaluate reaction in treatment of our Prisoners of War to release of the enemy atrocity disclosures, is only possible through information obtainable from our intelligence contacts in the several areas concerned.

2. Suggest message be dispatched to appropriate contacts as follows:

"HAVE AGENTS OBSERVE AND REPORT ON ANY CHANGES IN TREATMENT OF INTERNEES OR PRISONERS OF WAR RESULTING FROM RECENT DISCLOSURE OF ENEMY ATROCITIES COMMITTED ON AMERICAN AND FILIPINO PRISONERS OF WAR IN POW CAMPS PD DETERMINE WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT RED CROSS SUPPLIES LANDED IN MANILA ON TEIA MARU ON SIXTH NOVEMBER WERE DISTRIBUTED AMONG INTERNEES AND POW."

Ask all contacts 31 Jan 44

C. W.

[Signature]

DC/S

To: Chief PRS
Thru: G-2

30 Jan 44

Approved.

[Signature]
RJM.

G-2

PRS

30 Jan 44

Noted.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

[Signature]
C.A.W.

385
400

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

PRS

Chief of Staff

29 Jan 48

1. I am requested by Col. Mellnik to arrange for the outfitting and transportation to the 10th Military District of 1st Lieut. H. A. ROSENQUIST, O-378037.

2. It is proposed that the officer concerned proceed with directive to the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District as follows:

"1. Letter Orders of _____ directs Lieut. H. A. ROSENQUIST to MINDANAO, Philippine Islands for the prime mission of establishing contact with American Prisoners of War at Davao Penal Colony, and any others which may be on the Island of Mindanao, to:

- a. Assist in improving health conditions of POW's by furnishing needed medicines and vitamins.
- b. Improve morale of personnel by the supplying of news bulletins, letters, etc.
- c. Establish an intelligence system within the POW camp (s) and to act as an outlet for intelligence information.
- d. Prevent massacre of American POW's in the event of our landing on the Philippine Islands, by preparing ground work for mass evacuation when deemed advisable.
- e. Obtain data on POW personnel; a record of atrocities and other factors which violate Geneva Convention rules.

2. Officer will act under your direction in the furtherance of such intelligence activities in the vicinity of Davao as you may direct. These activities however should not interfere with his primary mission.

3. It is directed that the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District furnish Lieut. ROSENQUIST:- such personnel and supplies as may be available; establish communication and transport facilities; also render such other assistance as may be necessary to accomplish this mission."

3. This project has not been referred to this Section for comment but as it bears the approval of the Chief of Staff (except for the proposed directive itself) I shall limit my comment to pointing out that, by the terms of the directive, the officer concerned is not subject to the control of the local commander and is not restricted in his right to call upon the latter for "such personnel and supplies as may be available," communication and transport facilities, and such other assistance as may be necessary to accomplish the mission.

39a

- 1 -
~~SECRET~~

4. In other words the directive tends to subordinate the mission and activity of the 10th Military District to the mission assigned Lieut. H.A. ROSENQUIST. It leaves the latter, presumably without knowledge of the area and its people, the sole judge of his actions in the premises and any call which he may make upon the local commander.

5. I recommend that the proposed directive be carefully reviewed to avoid the creation of a difficult situation for the District Commander, the prisoners, and the officer himself, and request instructions with respect to the latter's transportation.

6. A copy of the entire file is attached hereto for purposes of reference.

1 Incl:
Mission of Lt. ROSENQUIST.

G. W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

8

General WILLOUGHBY:

Suggested draft of directive to Colonel Fertig, re mission.

S.M.M.

I. Rosenquist.

Will act under your direction in the furtherance of such intelligence activities in the vicinity of DAVAO as you may direct. These activities however should not interfere with his primary mission.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

28 January 1944

SUBJECT: Mission of 1st Lt. H.A. Rosenquist (O-278037).

TO : Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, Philippine Islands.

1. Letter Order of _____ directs Lt. H. A. Rosenquist to Mindanao, Philippine Islands for the prime mission of establishing contact with American Prisoners of War at Davao Penal Colony, and any others which may be on the Island of Mindanao, to:

a. Assist in improving health conditions of Ps/W by furnishing needed medicines and vitamins.

b. Improve morale of personnel by the supplying of news bulletins, letters, etc.

c. Establish an intelligence system within the P/W camp (s) and to act as an outlet for intelligence information.

d. Prevent massacre of American Ps/W in the event of our landing on the Philippine Islands, by preparing ground work for mass evacuation when deemed advisable.

e. Obtain data on P/W personnel; a record of atrocities and other factors which violate Geneva Convention rules.

out)
(marked/ 2. In addition to prime mission, this officer under your direction is to establish an intelligence coverage of enemy activities, installations and conditions in Davao and surrounding areas, by broadening the scope of Major Laureta's work in the direction, and acting as an outlet for it. Such intelligence to be routed thru Hq., 10th Military District, to GHQ, G-2 Section, SWPA.)
Pencil notes:
(see other page)

3. It is directed that the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District furnish Lt. Rosenquist:— such personnel and supplies as may be available; establish communication and transport facilities; also render such other assistance as may be necessary to accomplish this mission.

For the Commanding General:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Brig. General, U.S. Army
A.C. of S., G-2

COPY

SECRET



20 Dec 43

To: Chief of Staff
Subject: Expansion of MIS-X Activities.

1. MIS-X is now set up under Commander Allied Air Force under authority of letter this headquarters to Cmdr AAF, subject: MIS-X Activities in SWPA, dated August 24, 1943.

2. The attached study on Development of Contact with American POW in Jap Camps was prepared by Lt. Col. S. M. Mellnik, himself an Escapee from Davao POW Camp. He states that the following proposals were discussed with Major General Sutherland in Washington, and that the latter's reactions were favorable: MIS-X should be expanded to carry out its initial mission of contact with POW as follows:

a. One MIS-X officer, at present available in SWPA, to be sent to Mindanao to assist POW at Davao and to set up a POW intelligence Net.

b. Contact to be established between G-2, GHQ, through MIS-X Brisbane, and POW on Luzon, for purposes of morale and to establish POW Intelligence Net.

3. G-2 Recommendations: Proposals a. and b. above appear sound, and well worth the expense and effort required to put them in effect. Their approval is recommended.

/s/ Willoughby
C.A.W.

To: G-2
Pencil: Approved, subject to volunteering for mission Lt. Rosenquist.

Initialed: RKS

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

Development of contact with American POW in Jap Camps.

SECTION I: General Background.

1. Lt. Col. Mellnik's work with MIS-X, Washington, D. C.
2. Possibility of making contact with POW in Mindanao and Luzon.

SECTION II: Detailed study of Mindanao POW situation.

1. POW camp, organization, work activities, extent of Jap surveillance.
2. Proximity of guerilla organization, intelligence activity of this unit, tactical and intelligence possibilities of this unit; possible aid to POW.
3. Conclusions: Desirable to send MIS-X officer to guerilla unit to assist POW and coordinate intelligence.
4. Recommendations in detail to carry out para. 3.

SECTION III: Detailed Study of Luzon POW situation.

1. POW camp, organization, work activities, channels of communication to Manila, intelligence possibilities.
2. Conclusions: Desirable to contact POW for morale and intelligence reasons.
3. Recommendation: That PRS of AIB contact POW.

APPENDIX: "A" - Memo to AC of S, G-2 from Lt. Col. Mellnik.
"B" - Map showing the POW camp in Mindanao.
"C" - Letter of instruction to Lt. Col. Englehart at Cabanatuan.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OMB
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

11 December 1943.

STAFF STUDY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF.

SUBJECT: Development of contact with American POW in Japanese Camps.

SECTION I: GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. A memorandum to A. C. of S., G-2 was recently received from Lt. Col. Mellnik in regard to contacting American POW in Japanese camps (Appendix "A"). The problems involved, the benefits to be gained, and the known desire of the C-in-C to aid these prisoners, has led to a G-2 Staff study of his memo and recommendations.

2. Briefly, Lt. Col. Mellnik, in his MIS-X work in Washington, D. C., was impressed with the value of MIS-X activities in European POW camps. The extent to which the camps were organized, the valuable information secured, the escape assistance provided, and the high morale effect on POW as a result of direct contact with their own forces. When he queried MIS-X as to its POW activity in the SWP, they replied there was none; that they had not been able to start work in this area, and would he present the features of MIS-X to GHQ, SWP, particularly the work it was doing in POW camps in Europe. He talked over the possibility of aiding POW in P.I. with MIS-X. One MIS-X officer, who was ordered to duty here, was tentatively slated for POW activity, when and if authorized. This was Lt. Rosenquist, MIS-X, on duty with 5th AAF in Brisbane.

3. Lt. Col. Mellnik contends that the problem of aiding the prisoners is one of making and maintaining contact with them. One camp is at the Davao Penal Colony in Mindanao, easily accessible to guerilla units, and lightly guarded. To this camp, the assistance can be substantial. The second camp is at Cabanatuan, in Luzon. This area is highly organized by the enemy. Contact with this camp, while difficult, will pay dividends, as the camp acts as a pool of POW labor, which covers important Luzon military installations.

SECTION II. Detailed Study of Davao Penal Colony POW Camp.

1. a. This camp is located 52 km northeast of Davao, and about 12 km from Davao Gulf. There is one second-class road to it from Davao, with numerous bridges. The camp is in the center of a jungle, and was originally built to house Filipino convicts with 20 year sentences. The camp is the shape of a rectangle, one by two miles in dimension. (See map, Appendix B).

b. It contains 2000 American POW, of whom 600 are officers. About 1000 go to work each day in the colony grounds. The camp also serves as a labor pool for outside work details for the Japs. These include:

- 1) 20 men in the motor repair and truck drivers' pool in Davao City.
- 2) 30 men making salt on Davao Gulf.
- 3) 100 men on a Japanese abaca plantation.
- 4) variable number stevedoring in the Davao dock area.

The 1000 who work in the camp itself are divided into about 50 groups of various sizes, from 150 repairing the road to Davao, to three or four doing Jap K.P.

c. (1) The main American hospital is at the Davao Penal Colony. POW sick on outside work details are brought in to this camp. At infrequent intervals, outside work details are rotated. The camp is organized with an American Camp Headquarters, whose main duty is to fill the labor requisitions each day. The Camp Hq. normally assigns individuals to specific work details. Freedom of movement within the camp ground is not restricted. Visiting is frequent between hospital and camp.



(2) Interior work details are scattered throughout the colony. The Japs make no pretense of guarding the prisoners. The duty of the sentry is to supervise and direct the work. Such work details as logging, firewood gathering and abaca stripping, are all in the jungle. Under such circumstances, it is impossible for the sentry to exercise much surveillance. He merely counts noses at noon and prior to return to camp. The orchard and coffee picking details had no sentries, as those details were composed of old and sick officers, too weak to do much work, much less escape (McCoy & Mellnik escaped from the coffee detail). All POW are brought back to the prison compound at 6 p.m. each day. The compound is surrounded by barbed wire, with tall sentry towers placed at intervals.

(3) The Jap garrison is not over 250. This includes mess and administrative personnel, outpost guards (Japs worried about guerillas), work detail guards, and an interior guard of the camp. There are seldom more than 50 sentries available to guard the 50 different work details.

2. a. 30 km north of the POW camp in the jungle is a community of 5000 Filipinos who evacuated Davao City when the Japs invaded Mindanao. To protect themselves against Jap interference, they organized a guerilla unit under Major Laureta. Major Laureta was a Philippine Constabulary officer, and for two years prior to the war, was traffic control officer of Mindanao. At the outbreak of war he was in command of a P.C. battalion in Davao City. When Mindanao surrendered, he evacuated to the hills with part of his unit. This served as a nucleus for his present organization. It now numbers 1000 men and 150 rifles. He exercises absolute powers in his area. Is extremely loyal and has effectively prevented Jap interference with community life in the area.

b. (1) Major Laureta's unit is composed of men, natives of Davao City, between 18 and 25 years of age. He has established contacts in Davao City, has procured Jap passes for his men, and in April 1943, was quite active in getting information out of Davao which would keep him abreast of Jap activities affecting his area. His southern outpost at Lungagog, is 12 km from the POW camp at the Colony. The 12 km in between is guerilla territory - guerilla patrols use it. The Japs stay in their outpost at Anabogan. Laureta's Headquarters is at Kapungagan, on the Libuganon River.

(2) In the past few months he has established weekly courier contact with Col. Fertig's Headquarters, has had his unit inducted into the 10th Military District, and is now a member of U.S. forces in Mindanao. Travel time from Major Laureta to Col. Fertig's Headquarters is about 7 days by courier.

(3) About 10 of Laureta's men are former inmates of the Davao Penal Colony. With Col. Fertig are the two Filipinos who assisted Colonel Mellnik's party in its escape. Two Americans who escaped at the same time are now unit commanders in the Agusan Province.

3. a. Col. Fertig has been quite busy in other areas in the past year, and has not had a competent officer to send to Laureta to assist in organization and intelligence. Considering the distance involved, and the location of Laureta's unit (it could not tactically assist Fertig in Occidental Misamis, Lanao or the Agusan) this organization is the last organized guerilla unit to get attention from the 10th MD.

b. (1) It seems apparent that a force of 1000 rifles (which could be developed under Laureta) would be a distinct asset to us in the event of our landing in Mindanao. The unit is 3 days march from Davao City, and in a direction unprotected by the Japs (jungle).

(2) This unit, so intimately familiar with Davao City, can likewise be utilized for intelligence purposes far beyond its present undirected scope of activities. Directed sabotage activity could easily be affected.

(3) Its proximity to the POW camp and direct communication with the 10th MD, makes it the logical point of contact with the POW, and the place from which active assistance to POW may be initiated.



4. a. Considering Major Laureta's organization with a view to its suitability as a focal point for aid to American POW in Davao Penal Colony, the following is a discussion of what can be done:

- (1) Photographic evidence of conditions in the camp. Col. Mellnik states that it is possible to get anything into the camp which can be carried.
- (2) Positive assistance to POW in the shape of vitamin pills, A and B-1 particularly. Mail and news bulletins will follow. The morale effect of contact with their own forces will be greater than any materiel benefits.
- (3) Data for the State Department re additional violations of the Geneva Convention rules. Data for the War Department re casualties, etc., as so many have died, and more will die, with no record of date of death or circumstances.
- (4) Establishment of an intelligence system within the camp (there are sufficient officers there). The POW outside work details will be a fruitful source of information. This should result in accurate intelligence of enemy activities in all areas in which POW labor is used.

b. Laureta's intelligence system at present is directed towards local security. This is due to lack of experience in relative value of information and lack of contact with agencies who could use the information, rather than to lack of effort on his part. The fact that many of his men were residents of Davao, with friends and relatives there, makes his unit invaluable from an intelligence viewpoint. This means an intelligence coverage of the key city of Davao. Laureta's intelligence training is limited. He will need a directing hand.

g. That his force of 1000 men has kept intact for 18 months and his civil community enthusiastically supporting him, is good evidence of Laureta's organizational ability and honesty. His force, if equipped, would be a valuable asset in attacking the enemy from the rear in conjunction with our own forces. His men, familiar with the area, could likewise assist us by sabotaging bridges, power plants and railroads in conjunction with our own operations. His position on the Libuganon is impregnable. Jungle trails only lead into it. His area is well patrolled, and enemy intelligence is extremely limited.

5. a. The possibilities inherent in operating in Major Laureta's areas aid to POW, intelligence in Davao, organization for active support of our own troops, requires that an officer be sent into that area. MIS-X at Washington in conjunction with Lt. Col. Mellnik, tentatively selected Lt. Rosenquist. He has been in MIS-X for over a year, has served in the National Guard (Field Artillery) for ten years prior to that as 1st Sgt. Mellnik thinks Rosenquist can do the job. Rosenquist is now on duty at the 5th Air Force in Brisbane, on MIS-X work, and is willing to take over the job.

b. The officers to direct establishment of POW intelligence system in the camp are Lt. Col. Memory Cain, 200th CA (NG), and Lt. Col. G.H. Stubbs, CAC. They are both trustworthy, active, intelligent, and their morale is high. There is on file at G-2 a recent letter to Lt. Col. Stubbs from his mother. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact.

g. The possibility of aiding the escape of POW was considered. From all reports, the POW are too weak to engage in a mass escape, while the escape of smaller units may invite drastic retaliation.

6. a. Recommend that 1st Lt. H.A. Rosenquist, MIS-X be authorized to proceed to Mindanao, P.I., and that Col. Fertig be directed to make arrangements for his trip to Major Laureta's headquarters.

- (1) That Lt. Rosenquist will work under G-2, GHQ.
- (2) That he be authorized to procure supplies from SWP or MIS-X agencies (vitamins, etc) for this mission.



b. His primary missions:

- (1) Make contact with POW at the Davao Penal Colony.
- (2) Furnish them such assistance in medicines and vitamins, mail, news bulletins, as transports facilities may permit.
- (3) Investigate the possibility of assisting the escape of selected POW.
- (4) Direct the establishment of an intelligence system within the camp and act as an outlet for it.
- (5) Broaden the scope of Major Laureta's intelligence network to include coverage of military installations in Davao City.
- (6) Investigate, and report to GHQ, what Laureta's unit, properly equipped, could do to:
 - a) Assist the American landings thru direct attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao.
 - b) Prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao Penal Colony in the event of our landing in Mindanao.
- (7) Recommend to this headquarters minimum supplies needed to accomplish b(6), (a) and (b).

c. His secondary mission will be:

- (1) To act as Col. Fertig's liaison officer to Major Laureta.
- (2) Direct the procurement of such intelligence as the 10th MD may desire.

SECTION III: Detailed study Cabanatuan POW Camp.

1. Cabanatuan is in the province of Nueva Ecija, in Central Luzon. It is about 100 km north of Manila. The POW camp is located 9 km east of the town of Cabanatuan. It is in the center of a rice growing area.

a. The POW camp consists of a hospital area and the camp compound proper. Latest reports indicate a minimum of 6000 American POW at this camp about 1000 officers and 5000 enlisted men. The camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence. High sentry towers are located at strategic points, and the approaches to the camp are quite open and guarded. The countryside is flat and low - a typically rice paddy area.

b. The Jap guard consists of about 250 reservists, with about one yr of training. This unit furnishes the guards for outside work details, interior guard, administration and supply and the routine police duties of the camp.

c. The interior administration of the POW camp is handled by an American Camp Hq. This Hqs coordinates roll calls, admissions to the hospital area, keeps records and initiates sanitary precautions. Its chief duty is to provide work details as called for by the Japs. The camp serves as a labor pool from which the Japs draw as occasion demands. As of Oct. 1942, the Japs had POW working parties in Bataan, Corregidor, Nichols Field, Clark Field, Ft. McKinley, Nielson airport, dock area in Manila and a motor pool in Manila. As members of these working parties get sick, or the job is completed, the POW are returned to Cabanatuan. At infrequent intervals these working details are rotated. The POW cannot make use of what they see.

d. Work details in and around the camp proper consists of routine police, repair of buildings and roads, and gathering firewood. The firewood detail of about 100 men goes out each day into the woods. This detail is the camp's only daily contact with the outside world. At noontime several carabettas arrive at the scene of the woodcutting with items of food to sell. The Japs permit this sale - profiting thereby. Carabettas proved to be reliable channels of communication with Manila. Another channel was the American truck driver who took the Jap truck into Manila each week.

2. a. Communication from the POW camp at Cabanatuan to Manila is already in effect. Col. Watrous, Medical Corps, a former physician in Manila has a reliable channel, Maj. Cavender, formerly manager of the Manila hotel, and also has one. These channels are through to their friends in Manila, and are being used to supply currency and mail into the camp. Letters from internees in Sante



7emas were not infrequent. No attempt had been made by the POW as of Oct. 1942, to use these channels for military intelligence, as there was no definite outlet for it in Manila, and the need for currency was great. The channels were used by those who had personal friends in Manila or the civilian internment camp.

b. The possibility of POW securing information of military value in Luzon appears excellent. The widely scattered working parties in important military areas cannot avoid seeing what is going on. This source of information should prove more reliable than the infrequent Filipino verbal reports which too often are colored. The state of mind of civilians, the supplies available to them and the conduct of the Japs in the area, will give us an indication of the civil support to be expected in the event of invasion.

g. (1) It appears that aside from assistance to POW at Cabanatuan, which in view of the location of the camp will be limited to letters and news bulletins, contact with the POW will develop a prolific source of military intelligence in the most important island in the Philippines. There are about 1000 officers in this camp. Selected ones should be instructed to establish an intelligence agency to question returning members of outside work details, evaluate the information and, as occasion permits, expand the scope of intelligence activities.

(2) The officers known to be in this camp, and with whom contact should be made are: Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart, CAC (formerly with G-2, Philippine Dept); Lt. Col. Saint, Corps of Engineers, Lt. Col. Watrous, Medical Corps, and Maj Howard Cavender. These officers are healthy with high morale, and have numerous contacts with the camp. G-2 has a letter to Maj. Erven Somerville (POW at Cabanatuan) from his wife. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact.

(3) To take advantage of the intelligence facilities available in the POW camp will require a channel of communication from GHQ to the Camp. The agency at present operating in Luzon is the Philippine Regional Section of AIB. The nature and extent of its activities need not be commented on here. The initial contact will take time; subsequent contacts with the POW will be simplified, as the POW have a direct channel to Manila.

3. a. Recommend that P.R.S. of A.I.B. establish a channel of communication between G-2, GHQ, and the POW at the Cabanatuan Camp. The first letter to go in will contain:

(1) A letter for Maj. Somerville at Cabanatuan to establish the authenticity of the contact.

(2) A letter of instruction, reestablishment of a POW intelligence system within the camp addressed to L. Col. E. Carl Englehart and Lt. Col. Saint Corps of Engineers, (See Appendix C).

(3) A late news summary of world events.



C. A. W.

~~SECRET~~

4 December 1943

MEMORANDUM :

TO : A. C. of S., G-2, GHQ, SWPA.

1. In conversation with MIS-X at Washington, D.C., I found this section extremely active in assisting American POW in enemy hands. Among their many activities were: briefing air crews in escape procedure; methods of communicating with our forces in the event of capture; establishment of escape and intelligence channels. The activities of MIS-X has resulted in the planned escape of several hundred American POW, a continuous flow of military intelligence from the enemy area, and a highly organized POW unit in each of the enemy POW camps.

2. The 8000 American POW now concentrated in the Philippines have had no contact with American forces since their surrender. Conditions in these camps are deplorable, morale is extremely low, guerrilla units are active in all areas, and no action has been initiated to prevent the massacre of these POWs in the event our forces land in the camp areas.

3. The two main concentration areas for American POWs are Cabanatuan (6000) in the province of Nueva Ecija, and the Davao Penal Colony (2000), with about 15 smaller groups on working parties nearby.

a. The Cabanatuan camp, located in the middle of Luzon, can be contacted through agents in Manila or guerrilla units operating in the area. The camp sends out working parties each day, members of which are permitted to buy items from the local people. The assistance to this camp will be limited to easily concealed mail, news bulletins, currency, etc. The effect on the morale of the POWs as a result of contact with their own forces will be very great. The camp should be directed to organize an intelligence system. The numerous working parties returning to Cabanatuan would be interrogated and a prolific source of accurate information within the occupied area thus made available. There are at least 500 officers in this camp, freedom of movement within the camp area is not restricted, and the camp can develop its own intelligence network throughout the working party areas of Luzon.

No attempt was made to obtain intelligence or interrogate incoming working parties while I was in this camp. This was due to our inability to send it out. We were able to keep a constant flow of messages to and from Manila; messages from internees at Santo Tomas University were frequent.

To assist this camp, and to obtain information from it, will require that an agency of GHQ contact the camp itself through channels which already exist in AIB. Officers to be contacted at Cabanatuan are: Maj. Larry Bosworth, CAC; Maj. R. D. Glassburn, CAC; Lt. Col. Saint, C.E.; Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart (former member of G-2, Hq. Philippine Department).

b. (1) The camp at the Davao Penal Colony presents a much easier problem. It is 52 KM northeast of Davao, 12 KM from the coast, and in the center of the jungle. About 30 KM north of the colony there is a community of civilians who had evacuated from Davao when the Japs invaded that city. This community has organized a guerrilla unit under Maj. Laureta, a Constabulary officer who commanded an Infantry battalion during the Jap invasion. The guerrilla unit was organized to prevent Jap interference with the life of the community, and has succeeded to

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI
20 AUG. 75



such an extent, that the Japs leave them severely alone. The unit consists of 150 rifles and 1000 men. They are extremely loyal and well organized. Travel time from Col. Fertig to Maj. Laureta is about 14 days. Maj. Laureta's unit is too far away to actively assist Col. Fertig in the north.

(2) There are 2000 POW in the colony. About 800 go out to work each day. The American camp Headquarters assigns the members to specific work details. The POW work in the rice fields, orchards and in the jungle logging. There are few Jap guards, as the hazards of the jungle and physical weakness of the POW are deterrents to escape. Contact with the POW is a simple matter. There are about 600 officers in this camp.

(3) In Maj. Laureta's organization there are at least ten men who were formerly civil prisoners in the colony. The two Filipinos who assisted our party to escape are in Mindanao and available. When our party spent ten days with Maj. Laureta, he indicated a strong desire to put himself and his unit under U. S. control. He is at present in contact with Col. Fertig's Headquarters and with civil prisoners in the colony.

He had already established numerous contacts with civilians in Davao City, had obtained several Jap passes to go into the city, and was collecting such intelligence as would enable him to keep abreast of Jap activities affecting his area. He has no radio transmitter or receiver. Laureta's outpost is 12 KM from the Penal Colony.

4. a. Assistance to the POW at the Colony can be more substantial than at Cabanatuan. It is easy to bring in relatively bulky objects into the camp. Vitamins, A and B1 particularly, mail, news bulletins can be taken in. A camera can be introduced and photographic evidence of conditions in camp secured. The range of activities and assistance will be limited by transport facilities and the ingenuity of the person concerned.

b. (1) Intelligence of enemy activities, installations, conditions in Davao and the surrounding area can be secured by an organized group within the camp, as the camp furnishes the pool of truck drivers and motor repair men for the Jap motor pool in Davao. Other working details will cover different areas.

(2) Intelligence, the type we want, can also be obtained through Maj. Laureta's agents within Davao proper.

5. Recommend that an officer be sent to Maj. Laureta to do the following:

- a. Make contact with the POW at the Davao Penal Colony.
- b. Furnish them such assistance in medicines and vitamins, mail, news bulletins, as transport facilities may permit.
- c. Direct the establishment of an intelligence system within the camp and act as an outlet for it.
- d. Broaden the scope of Maj. Laureta's intelligence network.
- e. Formulate a plan of action for Maj. Laureta's unit to:
 - 1) Assist the American landings through attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao.
 - 2) Prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao Penal Colony in the event of American landings in Mindanao.
 - 3) Secure such arms, munitions and sabotage materiel as will enable it to fulfill its mission.

6. Officers to be contacted at the Penal Colony area: Lt. Col. M. Cain, CAC; Lt. Col. G.H. Stubbs, CAC; Lt. Comdr. Smith, USN, and Lt. Col. Nelson, Inf.



/s/ S. M. MELLNIK
Lt. Col. CAC

map

here.

218

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence.

TO : Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart, CAC, and Lt. Col. Saint, CE,
POW Camp, Cabanatuan.

1. It is directed that you establish an intelligence system within the POW camp to procure and evaluate information on:

- a. Enemy activities throughout Luzon, to include:
- 1) Corregidor
 - 2) Bataan
 - 3) Clark Field
 - 4) Nichols Field
 - 5) Ft. McKinley
 - 6) Manila
 - 7) Nielson airport
- b. Conditions among civilians in populated areas to include:
- 1) Status of food and other supplies available to civilians.
 - 2) Their attitude towards the enemy.
 - 3) Degree of cooperation to be expected when U.S. forces arrive.
- c. Conditions existing in the POW camp to include:
- 1) Violations of Geneva Convention rules.
 - 2) Roster of prisoners, alive and dead.
 - 3) Physical condition of POW.
- d. The Jap administration and guard unit to include:
- 1) Number, state of training, unit and officers.
 - 2) Attitude towards POW, with trend if any.
 - 3) Attitude towards the war.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Brig. General, U. S. Army,
A. C. of S., G-2

COPY

618

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence.

TO : Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart, CAC, and Lt. Col. Saint, CE,
POW Camp, Cabanatuan.

1. It is directed that you establish an intelligence system within the POW camp to procure and evaluate information on:

- a. Enemy activities throughout Luzon, to include:
- 1) Corregidor
 - 2) Bataan
 - 3) Clark Field
 - 4) Nichols Field
 - 5) Ft. McKinley
 - 6) Manila
 - 7) Nielson airport
- b. Conditions among civilians in populated areas to include:
- 1) Status of food and other supplies available to civilians.
 - 2) Their attitude towards the enemy.
 - 3) Degree of cooperation to be expected when U.S. forces arrive.
- c. Conditions existing in the POW camp to include:
- 1) Violations of Geneva Convention rules.
 - 2) Roster of prisoners, alive and dead.
 - 3) Physical condition of POW.
- d. The Jap administration and guard unit to include:
- 1) Number, state of training, unit and officers.
 - 2) Attitude towards POW, with trend if any.
 - 3) Attitude towards the war.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR O6
20 AUG. 75



C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Brig. General, U. S. Army,
A. C. of S., G-2

COPY

618

30 Jan. 1944

To: C. of S.

1. The idea is basically sound.

2. PRS should prepare a directive for Cmdr Parsons which will be submitted to GHQ for review before dispatch. This directive should cover such points with respect to the development of his net:

- ✓ a. Proposed channels of communication between OZAMIS net and GHQ.
- ✓ b. Some indication of the general areas to be covered by the OZAMIS net.
- ✓ c. Instructions that only information of immediate value be forwarded by radio and the balance by document (see PI Intelligence Guide).
- ✓ d. In order to avoid security leaks agents should be kept in ignorance, as far as possible, of information concerning friendly forces in the recognized military districts.

3. With respect to the other parties to be met on this mission of the submarine:

- a. Cmdr Parsons should be instructed that in his contacts he should be careful to avoid giving any impression that he is there to act as an arbiter for or speaks with the authority of GHQ.
- b. Cmdr Parsons should be instructed to render a report to GHQ upon his return.

PRS

Lawton
W.

Chief P.R.S

Not at present time

Feb 7, 1944. [Signature]



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Mil. Int. Section, Gen. Staff

_____ 1943

TO:	FOR:
Commander-in-Chief _____	Approval _____
Chief of Staff _____	Concurrence _____
Dep. Chief of Staff _____	Information _____
G-1 _____	Initials _____
G-2 _____	Issue Orders _____
G-3 _____	Nec Action _____
G-4 _____	Signature _____
Adjutant General _____	Ret to G-2 _____
C/Engr Officer _____	File _____
C/Sig. Officer _____	Comment _____
Public Relations _____	Circulate _____
Aides de camp _____	_____
Geog. Section _____	_____
Translator Sec. _____	_____
A.I.B. _____	_____
C.O.I.C. _____	_____
U.S.A.F.F.E. _____	_____

914



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

Jan 29 1944.

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

TO:

FOR:

Deputy Chief of Staff
Ass't Chief of Staff G-1
Ass't Chief of Staff G-2
Ass't Chief of Staff G-3
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4
Adjutant General

Nec. Action
Note & return
Information
File

Deputy Chief of Staff USAFFE

Remark?



[Signature]
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 29 Jan 44

1. Authority is requested to send Commander PARSONS on the fourth trip of the NARWHAL (third trip being now underway).

2. The primary mission to be accomplished by the fourth trip will involve:

- a. Delivery of supplies, codes and instructions to the Commander, SULU Area Command;
- b. Supply of Major PHILLIPS and the withdrawal of documentary intelligence material accumulated by the latter;
- c. Delivery of supplies, codes and instructions to the Commander, CEBU Area Command; and
- d. Delivery of any cargo thereafter remaining to the 10th Military District.

3. At the time vessel is in North MINDORO, I believe we should avail ourselves of the opportunity to organize the OZAMIZ Manila Intelligence Net toward greater efficiency and utility as an agency directly responsible to this headquarters. While this net should continue to communicate with this headquarters by courier or radio signal through Major PHILLIPS, I do not believe it should lean too heavily upon Major PHILLIPS, nor that the latter should regard it as made to order for the purposes of his own mission, obviating the necessity for the organization of his own separate and distinct intelligence contacts. Furthermore existing codes should be revised for greater security, and adequate signal equipment delivered to permit direct communication with this headquarters when the urgency of information so requires it or transmission through PHILLIPS proves impracticable.

3. To give effect to this plan requires conference with OZAMIZ or a personal representative. This should be done by Commander PARSONS, who organized the net in the first instance, at Major PHILLIPS' headquarters. At that time, Major PHILLIPS could be a little closer oriented to the desired course. I am quite satisfied that the latter will come through as desired. The edges a little rough at first, are gradually getting smoothed down and a bit of the guerilla is getting out of his system.

4. Following her fourth trip the NARWHAL will undergo refitting at PERTH and hence will be out of Philippine operations for from 5 - 6 weeks. As a consequence, Commander PARSONS' presence here during the period that the vessel is

~~SECRET~~

38a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From:

To:

Date:

on her fourth trip will not be required for supply activities.

CW
C. W.



112

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Subject: Comments on Fertig Messages Nos. 613 and 619.

File No.:

Date: 28 Jan. 1944.

From: G-2

To: PRS

1. Re Fertig Message No. 613:

a. Navy states that 137 mm gun has not been reported on Japanese Naval ships. Any confirmation or details of use, range, etc. would be appreciated.

b. 69 Engineers: It would be appreciated if Fertig would be asked if this refers to Division, Regiment, or Battalion.

2. Re Fertig Message No. 619:

a. Believe it might be useful to know of security sight for Catalina landings in case of emergency. The Air Corps states the chief problem is take-off and loaded Catalinas require 1200 yards clear water with open ground beyond to get into the air.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

*Subj. to Fertig 44
28 Jan 44*
[Signature]
C. A. McV.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OBI
20 AUG. 75



032

37a
[Handwritten notes]

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL OFFICERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~
CHECK SHEET

CV Lincoln
DA

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 27 Jan 44

1. Advise that the NARWHAL has sailed from northern base on her third trip to the Philippines. Mission to supply the 6th and 7th Military Districts and evacuate Americans and Dr. CRUZ from NEGROS.

2. Supplies to each district include 1500 carbines with a million rounds of mixed ammunition, 14 complete radio units with spares, carefully prepared units of medical, quartermaster, and special service supplies, 1500 copies of the Pictorial magazine "Free Philippines," for distribution in each area and currency for use in areas under enemy occupation -- supplies are considerably more than those requisitioned by either area.

3. I am confident that deliveries will be successfully effected. The successful dispersal of supplies after delivery is, of course, dependant upon local dispositions of both enemy and friendly forces at time contact is made.

CW
C. W.

Mark

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

381A 36a

Philippine Regional Section

27 January 1944

SUBJECT: Office Memorandum

TO : Distribution as below.

Lieutenant **GEROGE F. ROWE**, USNR, having reported to PRS in compliance with Verbal Orders of the C-in-C, is hereby designated Executive Officer of the Philippine Regional Section, AIB, vice Major **LEWIS BROWN, III**, Cavalry, Commandant of the Training Camp (Tabragalba), relieved.

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief Philippine Regional Section



Distribution:

Chief of Staff,
Controller, AIB,
G-2,
Adjutant General,
File (2) ✓

35a
3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: C/S

Date: 27 Jan 44

1. In view of the decision of the C-in-C in re the 7th M.D. command, I suggest that consideration be given to reply to GADOR's message of 20 January (attached) in substance as follows:

"YOUR ORDERS PAREN QUERY YOUR MESSAGE OF TWENTY JANUARY PAREN ARE CLEARLY SET FORTH IN LETTER OF EIGHTEENTH OCTOBER."

2. GADOR's presence in BOHOL, ostensibly awaiting orders from the C-in-C, is further complicating an already complicated situation. The clarification, while unnecessary from American standards, would bring the NEGROS situation in re GADOR to an immediate head and permit early disposal of the issue -- obviate continuing uncertainty as to GADOR's status, if not in his own mind, at least in the minds of all those with whom he comes in official contact.

3. GADOR has twice requested instructions from BOHOL. It is doubted that the Filipino mind (regardless of training) would correctly interpret silence of this headquarters to such queries. The action recommended would appear to give clarity to the situation within the framework of the C-in-C's policy and decision.

1 Incl:
Msg No. 12 fr GADOR
Info rpt No. 1542.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75



DCS to Chief P.R.S. thru G-2:

28 January 1944

The Commander in Chief still does not wish to make any reply to Gador in Bohol.

R.J.M.

G-2

P.R.S.

28 January 1944.

Noted.

~~SECRET~~

C.A.W.

34a

File on - 1 -

FRS

THRU: AG, USAFFE
AG, GHQ

27 Jan 44

1. Request that, upon recommendation of the C.O., 10th Military District, Philippines, consideration be given to the promotion of the following-named soldier to the grade of 2nd Lieutenant, AUS:

S/Sgt. ROBERT E. GENTRY, M.C., ASN 6569572 (*Infopert - 1541*)

2. This soldier, reported to have been discharged on 16 April 42, by orders of General CHEDOWYTH to accept a commission as 2nd Lieut, MAC (no confirmation in W.D.) has been on duty and rendered excellent service with the 10th M.D. for over a year. Since 1 July 43, GENTRY has held the temporary grade (10th M.D. Forces) of 1st Lieut.

C. W.



33a

308

PRS

Chief of Staff

26 Jan 44

On this anniversary, PRS, in behalf of all those who compose it or come directly or indirectly under its direction or influence, wishes the Commander-in-Chief a succession of decisive victories leading to the fulfillment of his historic pledge to the Filipino people, to which objective PRS' best effort is fully dedicated.

C. W.



31a

308

P.R.S.

C/S

25 Jan 44

This message from General MARSHALL would appear to confirm report that the DYESS et al statements were about to be released by the War Department.

C. W.

Incl:
Msg fr Gen. MARSHALL.



30a

308

C O P Y

23 January 44

TO : GHQ SWPA
FROM: WASHINGTON (MARSHALL)
NR : 3349 22ND

UNLESS RELEASED BY THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2 WAR DEPARTMENT
CERTIFICATES SIGNED BY EVADERS AND ESCAPERS FORBIDDING THEM TO TALK
OR PUBLISH THEIR EXPERIENCES CONTINUE IN FORCE THIS DESPITE ANY PUBLICITY
ON THIS SUBJECT THAT MAY APPEAR.

ULIO

TOO: 321030 L
TOR: SC MSG CEN 231358 L
TOR: AG R/C SWPA 231425 L

DISTR:
INFORMATION COPIES TO:
CHIEF OF STAFF
G-2
PRESS RELATIONS OFFICER
ACTION COPY TO:
CG, USAFFE



C O P Y.

608

PRS

Chief of Staff

25 Jan 44

1. Authority is requested to dispatch 50,000 pesos of Philippine currency to SUAREZ with his initial supply delivery.

2. I will shortly draft a letter of appointment for consideration of the C-in-C. In it, I will incorporate general instructions in reference the mission of his command, the use and conservation of supplies and equipment, and the expenditure of these funds.

C. W.



292

~~SECRET~~

G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from sheets)

From	To	Date	Remarks
DC/S	Chief PRS	23 Jan 44	<p>It is desired that the following message from President Quezon be transmitted to Ingeniero:</p> <p>"I have been ill for the last six months but I am sure that by God's mercy I will be sufficiently recovered to return with General MacArthur to the Philippines. I send greetings and best wishes to Senator Garcia, the Cuencos, Governor Marapao, you and your officers and men and all civil officials. Tell the Cuencos I have received their letter.</p> <p>"The approach of redemption day for our own dear country and ultimate victory is unquestionably indicated by Allied military successes in all areas. The Filipino people and government will duly recognize the inspiring demonstration by all of you in Bohol, military and civil, of courage, loyalty and patriotism.</p> <p>"I assume that my August telegram to Marapao and Garcia granting authorization for printing of money by the Currency Board of Bohol was received. I am delighted by what you say of the Bohol Provincial Government and Malacanan civil servants. I was deeply touched by your whole message on behalf of your officers and men and the people of Bohol."</p>

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG. 75

RJM
RJM.



*Recd
123 Jan 44
263*

28a

G.W.Q. FORM-3/42

~~SECRET~~

108

FRS

Chief of Staff

23 Jan 44

I don't know whether the C-in-C noted the following extracted from captured enemy documents (Page 28, MO Force (18th Army) Intelligence Reports No. 76 -- 20 Jan 44:

"It seems that the enemy is keeping in touch with their submarines by using blimps. It is reported that on 9 June, at about 0800 hrs, a gray balloon (equipped with a propeller) descended about ten km NW of BONKO Island in the state of KOTABATO in MINDANAO Island. At about 500 m above the sea it spread a smoke-screen, and about four minutes later a submarine surfaced. The balloon descended over the submarine and landed on it, and about ten minutes later it took off from it and flew off to the BAKAJIAN region in the state of ZAMBOANGA. (Report of secret agents of the KOMEHATA Military Police Unit).

C. W.



27a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OMB
20 AUG. 75

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: C/S

Date: 18 Jan 44

1. In considering disposition of the 7th M.D. problem (ABCEDE-GADOR), I believe sight should not be lost of the change in the general situation in the several Philippine areas, occasioned by (a) increasingly direct contact between the C-in-C and the military forces and the people; and (b) our ability to deliver supplies in much larger quantities than formerly.

2. Some six months and more ago, expediency dictated the wisdom of non-interference by this headquarters in the struggles of rival leadership for supremacy in the several areas concerned. Now, however, the situation appears to call for a firmer hand in such matters with a definite command relationship at least extending between the C-in-C and the forces to whom recognition has been formally extended. I am satisfied that, regardless of the issue involved, his decisions will be universally well received by the officers and men of the several commands and his instructions faithfully complied with. Voluminous evidence has come out of the Philippines to support such view.

3. Development of maximum strength in the several areas concerned appears only possible through realization of this fundamental change in the situation and the taking of full and timely advantage thereof.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]



CW
C. W.

(W)

[Handwritten scribbles]

[Handwritten signature]

(26a)

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

W/O

From: PRS

To: C/S

Date: 17 Jan 44

Suggest following dispatch to War Department:

"AMERICAN POW SGT ROBERT L PEASE AIR CORPS ESCAPED FROM DAVAO PENAL COLONY TWO FIVE OCTOBER REPORTS ALL MEDICAL ATTENTION WITHDRAWN CMA FOOD FURTHER REDUCED AND CONTINUED BEATINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF BRUTALITY INFLICTED SEMICLN REPORTS SEVENTY THREE DEATHS SINCE APRIL WITH PHYSICAL CONDITION OF SURVIVING PRISONERS AS QUOTE ONE HALF PERMANENTLY DOWN WITH POOR CHANCE TO LIVE CMA ONE FOURTH PRACTICALLY DOWN BUT WITH FAIR CHANCE TO LIVE CMA REMAINING STILL ABLE TO WORK BUT IN POOR CONDITION UNQUOTE SEMICLN REPORTS CONTINUED PREVALENCE OF MALARIA CMA DYSENTERY CMA BERIBERI CMA AND OTHER FORMS OF DISEASE."

G. ✓

rec'd 18 Jan 44

C.W. B.K. Mack

RM

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 02
20 AUG. 75



25a

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

~~SECRET~~

File No.:

Subject:

From: AIB

To: Col. Whitney

Date: 16 Jan 44

1. Reference is made to signal No. 479 of 15 December from FERTIG.
2. You will remember that the Dutch requested that the leader of the party of escapees from the CELEBES should be evacuated to Australia. This not being possible, it was suggested that the Dutch be asked to forward a short list of questions so that the leader of the party could be interrogated by one of your representatives in the Philippines.
3. The following is the list of questions forwarded by the Dutch:
 - a. Is the old Dutch silver and paper currency still valid?
 - b. Is the Japanese paper money printed directly after the occupation still valid (which denomination)?
 - c. Are natives required to have identity papers - if so, what kind?
 - d. Can they give us a copy of the ship's papers required for prahu's in the N.E.I. Archipelago?
 - e. Can one travel overland by public transport (train or bus) without papers?
4. As there is a very great scarcity of information regarding conditions in the N.E.I. under Japanese occupation, it would be greatly appreciated if the leader of this party of escapees could be evacuated at some future date.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



C.G.R.
C. G. R.

*Recd
18 Jan 44
JAB*

~~SECRET~~

24a

PRS

AG, USAFFE

15 Jan 44

Information has been received that CHARLES S. MILLER, Jr., and wife, Mary Jean of BEACH CITY, OHIO, have reached a free area in the Philippines and are under the protection of friendly forces.

C.W.



232

~~SECRET~~
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI
20 AUG. 75

From: G-2

To: C/S

Date: 14 January 1944.

1. Separation of the Sulu Archipelago from Col. Fertig's control and assignment of the area to command of Lt. Col. Suarez would be in keeping with the C-in-C's policy established in the recognition of area commands for Bohol and Leyte.

2. Our first knowledge of Col. Suarez was through a courier sent by him to Col. Fertig last April, presumably seeking assistance and authority for the Suarez organization. The number of the Sulu Force is approximately 300, concentrated in Tawi Tawi and vicinity. Jolo was cleared of guerrillas more than six months ago. In the past few months guerrillas have been attacked heavily in Siasu and nearby islands. These two areas were the previous strongholds of the Sulu Force in the northern part of the Archipelago. Actually the "desired strengthening of our position" which PRS suggests would come from approval of their recommendation would probably be small.

3. The mission of this supposed command must be coordinated with the 10th MD and the Chapman-Walker party now in North Borneo. The Chief of Staff directed on 12 December that Capt. Hamner should work out with Chapman-Walker means of establishing coast watchers overlooking Balabac Straits and the Sibutu Passage while Chapman-Walker covered Sandakan (see attached map) and other points further south on both coasts. Presumably the establishment of the Sulu Command would involve revision of this decision. Believe that if the command is approved that Suarez should be charged with the coverage of Sibutu Passage and that Balabac Strait be covered by Chapman-Walker's party after Capt. Hamner is evacuated next month.

4. The difficulties involved in supplying the Sulu Archipelago from Fertig's present Headquarters (see map attached) are prohibitive. PRS proposal would insure supplies for this force and would increase the control which GHQ has over the organization. Recommend approval of the idea but before final decision is reached on exactly which points are to be covered by the respective parties that the leaders concerned, i.e. Fertig, Hamner and the North Borneo party, be consulted.

1 Incl: Map

~~SECRET~~

Lawrence
C.A.W.

OK

20 Jan 44

~~SECRET~~
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

Date: 14 January 1944.

From: G-2

To: C/S

1. Separation of the Sulu Archipelago from Col. Fertig's control and assignment of the area to command of Lt. Col. Suarez would be in keeping with the C-in-C's policy established in the recognition of area commands for Bohol and Leyte.

2. Our first knowledge of Col. Suarez was through a courier sent by him to Col. Fertig last April, presumably seeking assistance and authority for the Suarez organization. The number of the Sulu Force is approximately 300, concentrated in Tawi Tawi and vicinity. Jolo was cleared of guerrillas more than six months ago. In the past few months guerrillas have been attacked heavily in Siasu and nearby islands. These two areas were the previous strongholds of the Sulu Force in the northern part of the Archipelago. Actually the "desired strengthening of our position" which PRS suggests would come from approval of their recommendation would probably be small.

3. The mission of this supposed command must be coordinated with the 10th MD and the Chapman-Walker party now in North Borneo. The Chief of Staff directed on 12 December that Capt. Hamner should work out with Chapman-Walker means of establishing coast watchers overlooking Balabac Straits and the Sibutu Passage while Chapman-Walker covered Sandakan (see attached map) and other points further south on both coasts. Presumably the establishment of the Sulu Command would involve revision of this decision. Believe that if the command is approved that Suarez should be charged with the coverage of Sibutu Passage and that Balabac Strait be covered by Chapman-Walker's party after Capt. Hamner is evacuated next month.

4. The difficulties involved in supplying the Sulu Archipelago from Fertig's present Headquarters (see map attached) are prohibitive. PRS proposal would insure supplies for this force and would increase the control which GHQ has over the organization. Recommend approval of the idea but before final decision is reached on exactly which points are to be covered by the respective parties that the leaders concerned, i.e. Fertig, Hamner and the North Borneo party, be consulted.

1 Incl: Map

Lawrence
C.A.W.

~~SECRET~~

OK Mack

sent 20 Jan 44

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

W. J. [Signature] 1943.

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

TO:

FOR:

Deputy Chief of Staff	Nec. Action
Ass't Chief of Staff G-1	Note & Return
Ass't Chief of Staff G-2	Information
Ass't Chief of Staff G-3	File
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4	Comment
Adjutant General	

DC/S USAFFE

[Handwritten signature]

103 .:



Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff

CHINA SEA

SULU SEA

Balebaco Id



Tagbidi

PROVINCE OF SULO

Jolo

Siasu

Tawi Tawi

300

Sibutu Pass

HQ 104 MD

20

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

To Accompany:

CELEBES SEA

○ — Chapman-Walker
responsibility

○ — Hamner
responsibility

~~SECRET~~

PRS

Chief of Staff

14 Jan 44

Following are the radiographic reports in chronological order concerning FENTON's executions:

23 June 43 from VILLAMOR:

"...CUSHING & FENTON STILL IN COMMAND. FENTON NOT VERY WELL LIKED BUT CUSHING IS..."

21 August 43 from VILLAMOR:

"...THOUGH NOT MENTIONED APPARENTLY THERE NOW EXISTS MIS-UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FENTON AND CUSHING. FOLLOWING PER BAURA: FENTON NOW ALMOST DESERTED, BULK FORCES FAVOR CUSHING, PRESENT TRIP UNKNOWN TO FENTON WHO IS IN HIDING NORTH CEBU..."

2 September 43 from VILLAMOR:

"...CUSHING JUST ARRIVED...CLAIMS THAT MAJORITY FORCES WILL NO LONGER OBEY FENTON WHOSE LIFE IS IN DANGER..."

"...BREAK BETWEEN CUSHING AND FENTON CONFIRMED BY CUSHING HIMSELF WHO CLAIMS HE HAS ALWAYS DISAGREED WITH FENTONS RUTHLESS ANTI COLLABORATIONISH POLICY..."

20 Sept 43 from VILLAMOR:

"...FENTON IS REPORTED HELD BY OWN MEN"

19 October 43 from VILLAMOR:

"...PER BREVET LT COL SANCHEZ OF CEBU NOW IN BOHOL FENTON WAS KILLED FIFTEEN SEPTEMBER AFTER COURT MARTIAL."

29 October 43 from VILLAMOR:

"HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH CEBU OCT 28. EXECUTION OF FENTON CONFIRMED BY THEIR FIRST MESSAGE..."

3 November 43 from ABCEDE:

"PRELIMINARY FACT ON FENTON: WAS ARRESTED BY MAJOR ESPIRITU CMDR OF GEN HQRS BATTALION IN CENTRAL CEBU SECTOR AFTER CUSHING LEFT FOR NEGROS EARLY LAST AUGUST ON CHARGES ORDERING EXECUTION OF CERTAIN IRISH PRIEST FATHER DRUM WHO EVACUATED FROM CEBU CITY. PRIEST BELIEVED INNOCENT OF FENTONS CHARGE OF ESPIONAGE."

4 November 43 from FERTIG:

"...FENTON REPORTED TRIED AND EXECUTED BY HIS OWN MEN, NOT CONFIRMED BUT BELIEVE POSSIBLE..."

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

212

~~SECRET~~

18 November 43 from FERTIG:

"FENTON WAS EXECUTED BY HIS OWN FORCES AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION FOR ATROCIOUS ACTS AGAINST FILIPINOS, INCLUDING RUTHLESS MURDER OF SUSPECTS WITHOUT PROPER TRIAL. HE WAS NOT KILLED BY THE ENEMY. THIS INFORMATION FROM MAJOR INGINIERO AND ASSEMBLYMAN PEDRH (PEDRO) LAPE OF CEBU NOW HERE REPRESENTING GOV OF CEBU."

17 December 43 from ANDREWS:

"...MY AGENT CEBU REPORTS TIMELY ARRIVAL CUSHING THERE PREVENTED COMPLETE DISORGANIZATION ESPECIALLY OVER EXECUTION OF FENTON AND OTHER CEBU OFFICERS. THIS BEING LOOKED INTO BY CUSHING AS ESTRELLA WHO HAD ARRESTED, TRIED, AND EXECUTED FENTON WAS REACHING SECTIONALISM WHICH MAY HAVE DISASTEROUS RESULTS FOR CEBU"

18 December 43 from ABCEDE:

"REFERENCE FENTON: HE TOOK FOR HIS WOMAN WIFE OF ONE OF HIS BODYGUARDS, THIS BODYGUARD REVENGED BY BETRAYING FENTON TO JAPANESE WHOM HE EVADED WHEN THEY SURROUNDED HIM. CEBU SOLDIERS CAPTURED AND SHOT HIM IN HIS HIDING SOME TIME LATE OCTOBER FOR NUMEROUS GRIEVANCES AGAINST HIM INCLUDING ALLEGED SHOOTINGS ORDERED BY FENTON. CEBU PEOPLE GMD OF ELIMINATION OF FENTON, HOPING THIS WILL UNIFY THE 8TH MILITARY DISTRICT."

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

C. W.



~~SECRET~~

PRS

AG, USAFFE

13 Jan 44

1. Advise that the following Americans are reported to have been recently killed on TABLAS ISLAND, Philippines:

- a. MARK HUBBARD
- b. PRYOR

2. American civilians recently taken prisoner by the enemy:

- a. HANK LINDBLOOM
- b. HUGO MILIER
- c. GENE WING

C. W.



20a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 12 Jan 44

1. In reference desired strengthening of our position in the SULU ARCHIPELAGO, including observation of adjacent sea passages, I believe we are overlooking strong potential support in Col. ALEJANDRO SUAREZ and his guerilla forces now entrenched on TAWITAWI.

2. Dr. HAYDEN has given me the following brief word picture of the background of Col. SUAREZ, whom he knows quite intimately:

Col. SUAREZ's father was an officer of the Spanish Army, his mother a Mora, and he has spent most of his life in the predominately Moro provinces. A graduate of the Philippine Constabulary Academy, Colonel SUAREZ served for a number of years in the Southern Islands and made a reputation as a fearless and determined officer. His outstanding exploit was to run to earth in the center of MINDANAO and eliminate a band of desperate Moro criminals with a long record of banditry and murder. In the late twenties, Col. SUAREZ received a year's leave and spent most of the time in the graduate school of the University of Michigan, where he made an excellent record and many friends. Most of his subsequent service has been in SULU. He left there about 1938, after having been station commander and deputy governor at SIASSI.

From SULU, Col. SUAREZ was transferred to ANTIQUE, where he attracted favorable attention by capturing a Japanese fishing launch that, as many other such craft had done, was trespassing in Philippine waters in defiance of Philippine law.

Later Col. SUAREZ became Provincial Commander in the Province of CAGAYAN, where he was when the War broke out. Almost immediately thereafter he was sent to SULU as Provincial Governor in an effort to strengthen the position there. Arriving in JOLO on 19 Dec. 41, the enemy invaded at TAGLIBI on the 24th and by superior force soon overcame the local resistance. Colonel SUAREZ escaped to MINDANAO where he joined General FORT's command. Surrendering in accordance with the latter's orders, he was released by the Japs and sent to COTABATO to command the B.C. in that Province. Within a short time, however, he escaped and returned to SULU, where he organized guerilla forces, finally reaching TAWITAWI and establishing contact with Colonel FERTIG's headquarters.

3. Colonel SUAREZ is now tied in to FERTIG's command as a regimental commander. He is too far detached, however, to permit supply from or any

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OE
20 AUG. 75



222

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From:

To:

Date:

degree of administrative or operational integration with the 10th Military District.

4. Captain WHITEHEAD, recently arrived, spent two weeks in TAWITAWI just prior to his departure from that Island on 18 December last. He had, during that time, an opportunity to see Colonel SUAREZ and observe his forces and his work. He informs me that repeated attempts of the enemy to land on TAWITAWI proper have been repulsed at the beaches; that the Moros follow Colonel SUAREZ's leadership with fanaticism because of his aggressive character - in the last encounter he having led his forces into such close quarters with the enemy as to cause him to receive a bayonet thrust through his shoulder.

5. HAMNER has mentioned Col. SUAREZ and his forces in his dispatches.

6. This officer in his work is entitled to whatever direct support the C-in-C can give him and may well furnish the answer to the problem of observation over the approaches to the CELEBES, SULU and CHINA SEAS, as he should be able to control both natives and native craft throughout the Archipelago. With communications developed, arms, ammunition and other supplies delivered, Colonel SUAREZ and his men should be able to keep us fully informed of enemy dispositions in the ARCHIPELAGO and all enemy air and sea movement over or adjacent thereto.

7. I recommend that a "SULU AREA COMMAND" be established with Col. SUAREZ appointed by the C-in-C as its Commander; that direct communications with this headquarters be maintained; that a load of 15 - 20 tons of supplies be delivered to Col. SUAREZ by the fourth trip of the NARWHAL; that the "Sulu Area Command" be charged, for the time being, with intelligence coverage over the land area and important sea passages, reporting enemy sea movement direct to the Navy Control Station (10th M.D.).

8. To implement the above, I recommend dispatch of the following message to Col. SUAREZ:

"I HAVE LEARNED WITH INFINITE SATISFACTION OF YOUR ACTIVITY AND THAT OF YOUR GALLANT MORO FOLLOWERS ON AND IN THE VICINITY OF TAWITAWI PAREN GENERAL MACARTHUR TO COL SUAREZ PAREN I DESIRE TO RECOGNIZE THE RESOLUTE RESISTANCE TO THE ENEMY IN YOUR AREA BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE COMMAND TO BE KNOWN AS THE "SULU AREA COMMAND" TO EMBRACE THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO PD FOR THE PRESENT THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COMMAND WILL BE CONFINED TO KEEPING ME FULLY INFORMED OF ALL ENEMY DISPOSITIONS AND ACTIVITY IN THE AREA AND ALL ENEMY AIR OR SEA MOVEMENT THEREOVER OR ADJACENT THERETO PD IT IS MY FURTHER DESIRE THAT



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 031
20 AUG 75

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From:

To:

Date:

YOU ASSUME THIS COMMAND PD WHILE MY ABILITY TO SUPPLY IS SERIOUSLY RESTRICTED BY PRESENT LIMITATION TO SUBMARINE METHOD OF TRANSPORT CMA I WILL ARRANGE TO EFFECT EARLY DELIVERY TO YOU OF FIFTEEN TO TWENTY TONS OF VITALLY NEEDED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES UPON YOUR ADVICE OF REQUIREMENTS WITH PRIORITIES PD ACKNOWLEDGE"

9. This plan, if approved, should of course be coordinated with FERTIG, but Comdr. PARSONS informs me that the latter is unable to effectively administer the area concerned and would welcome relief from the responsibility.

10. The action herein recommended need not take the form of final decision on the problem of effecting observation over the BALABAC Strait and SIBUTU Passage, but could work toward that end without jeopardy to any better plan that might ultimately be developed.

CW
C.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OBI
20 AUG. 75



- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

PRS

PRO (Col. Diller)

12 Jan 44

I thought you would like to see a copy of the attached. I think it is a splendid job and will accomplish a lot of good.

C. W.

1 Incl
Copy of Magazine
"FREE PHILIPPINES"



19a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR CW
20 AUG. 75

File No.:

Subject:

From:

To:

Date:

another as recommended by the Inspector General.

6. A Manila youngster, whose parents are confined in SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY, Capt. PICKERING has much personal interest in the Philippine occupation -- an intense desire for assignment to Philippine service. While he has many faults, primarily based upon youth and inexperience, he nevertheless has some good qualities -- sufficiently strong, I believe, to render him susceptible to guidance and correction by a patient and discerning commander.

7. I suggest that no action be taken on the recommendations of the Inspector General at this time. Neither Captain PICKERING, nor any other officer, will be selected to lead a party on a forward mission who is not believed fully qualified to perform the task and no man will be placed under the leadership of another who is not wholeheartedly willing to subordinate himself to that leadership. At the same time, the camp is not to be conducted as a kindergarden and any man, who is susceptible to serious distraction or demoralization by another, will be subjected to closest scrutiny to determine his suitability himself for forward service, where distracting and demoralizing influences will be at their height.

CW
C. W.

From: C/s

To: Chief PRS

11 Jan 44

1. Noted.

2. It is deemed advisable that under the circumstances Captain Pickering be relieved and I have issued instructions to that effect.

[Signature]
RRS

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR CW
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 11 Jan 44

1. I have carefully examined the conclusions and recommendations of the Inspector General, attached. It is unfortunate that the Inspector General did not call upon me before submitting his paper or better still before making his investigation, in order that I could have oriented him as to factual considerations, plans and policies, having a distinct bearing upon his conclusions, but on which information was unavailable to him at the Camp itself as, for reasons of security, I have not taken the Camp Commander or any other officer thereat into my confidence in reference present and future Philippine projects and the C-in-C's underlying policies controlling the same.

2. I don't think you need be concerned over the problem of morale at TAERAGALBA. Morale, of course, is a relative term and the Inspector General put his finger on the basic adverse influence on morale at that camp when he concluded (sub para f, para 5) that "the men, with few exceptions, are intense in their desire to be sent on a mission. They realize the hazard, but are sincere in their desires, their chief complaint being that they have not been sent on a mission." That they are restive under the multitudinous fatigue details incident to new camp construction, coupled with the delay in commitment to action, is a reaction common to all soldiers of all races and is a healthy, rather than an unhealthy, sign.

3. The camp has the usual number of misfits and some problem has resulted from the men sent here from the United States being preponderantly from among those I rejected in my survey of the personnel of the 1st and 2nd Filipino Regiments, rather than the contrary. However, these problems are not of a serious nature and are being worked out in a manner to avoid detriment to the service.

4. I have remained as close to these men as my time will permit and, from my knowledge of Filipino psychology, I find them reasonably happy and making satisfactory progress in the training or other work assigned. That they are fervent in their desire for early commitment to Philippine operations is, as aforesaid, confirmed by the Inspector General himself.

5. Concerning Capt. PICKERING, while I will re-examine his relationship to the command in the light of the specific charges made by the Inspector General, I am inclined to believe that his case can best be handled through guidance, or, if need be, disciplinary or reclassification action. His relief from the command would solve nothing. That a subordinate officer, regardless of temperament, can demoralize an entire command is inconceivable. He may be misplaced in his duty assignment, may require correction and guidance or even disciplinary action, but decision and action in the premises is a responsibility of command, that should not be evaded by transfer of the problem to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



PRS

Chief of Staff

11 Jan 44

1. I have carefully examined the conclusions and recommendations of the Inspector General, attached. It is unfortunate that the Inspector General did not call upon me before submitting his paper or better still before making his investigation, in order that I could have oriented him as to factual considerations, plans and policies, having a distinct bearing upon his conclusions, but on which information was unavailable to him at the Camp itself as, for reasons of security, I have not taken the Camp Commander or any other officer thereof into my confidence in reference present and future Philippine projects and the C-in-C's underlying policies controlling the same.

2. I don't think you need be concerned over the problem of morale at TAERAGALBA. Morale, of course, is a relative term and the Inspector General put his finger on the basic adverse influence on morale at that camp when he concluded (sub para f, para 5) that "the men, with few exceptions, are intense in their desire to be sent on a mission. They realize the hazard, but are sincere in their desires, their chief complaint being that they have not been sent on mission." That they are restive under the multitudinous fatigue details incident to new camp construction, coupled with the delay in commitment to action, is a reaction common to all soldiers of all races and is a healthy, rather than an unhealthy, sign.

3. The camp has the usual number of misfits and some problem has resulted from the men sent here from the United States being preponderantly from among those I rejected in my survey of the personnel of the 1st and 2nd Philippine Regiments, rather than the contrary. However, these problems are not of a serious nature and are being worked out in a manner to avoid detriment to the service.

4. I have remained as close to these men as my time will permit and, from my knowledge of Filipino psychology, I find them reasonably happy and making satisfactory progress in the training or other work assigned. That they are fervent in their desire for early commitment to Philippine operations is, as aforesaid, confirmed by the Inspector General himself.

5. Concerning Capt. PICKERING, while I will re-examine his relationship to the command in the light of the specific charges made by the Inspector General, I am inclined to believe that his case can best be handled through guidance, or, if need be, disciplinary or reclassification action. His relief from the command would solve nothing. That a subordinate officer, regardless of temperament, can demoralize an entire command is inconceivable. He may be misplaced in his duty assignment, may require correction and guidance or even disciplinary action, but decision and action on the premises is a responsibility of command, that should not be evaded by transfer of the problem to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

another as recommended by the Inspector General.

6. A Manila youngster, whose parents are confined in SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY, Capt. PICKERING has much personal interest in the Philippine reoccupation -- an intense desire for assignment to Philippine service. While he has many faults, primarily based upon youth and inexperience, he nevertheless has some good qualities -- sufficiently strong, I believe, to render him susceptible to guidance and correction by a patient and discerning commander.

7. I suggest that no action be taken on the recommendations of the Inspector General at this time. Neither Captain PICKERING, nor any other officer, will be selected to lead a party on a forward mission who is not believed fully qualified to perform the task and no man will be placed under the leadership of another who is not wholeheartedly willing to subordinate himself to that leadership. At the same time, the camp is not to be conducted as a kindergarden and any man, who is susceptible to serious distraction or demoralization by another, will be subjected to closest scrutiny to determine his suitability himself for forward service, where distracting and demoralizing influences will be at their height.

C. W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR O#
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

Copy

FROM: DC/S
USAFFE

TO: C/S, GHQ
Adv Echelon

15 December 1943.

1. This provisional unit is under the operational control of GHQ operating, as I understand it, under instructions from the head of the Philippine Regional Section of the AIB.

2. Decision as to action to be taken on recommendations contained in paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of basic check sheet from the IG, USAFFE, appear to be GHQ matters.

3. The matter of special T/O and T/E for this provisional unit has been carefully considered. Grades and ratings now held by enlisted men are, in general, higher than could reasonably be expected in any T/T for a unit of this size which would meet War Department approval. When and if a suitable allotment of personnel, grades and ratings for theater overhead is received from the WD, this unit will be included and specific grades sub-allotted to it. It is recommended that no action to obtain approval of a special T/O by the WD be made at this time. WD action on similar requests (as for A.T.I.S.) have been returned stating that such personnel should be included in the theater overhead allotment.

4. Though not specifically covered in the IG check sheet, it is recommended that experienced officers of GHQ exercise closer supervision of the unit in question.

C.P.S.



188

Handwritten mark

Subject: 5217th Reconnaissance Bn (Prov), APO 923.

FROM: IG

TO: D C/S

13 December 1943.

1. During an inspection of the 5217th Reconnaissance Bn (Prov) APO 923, 6-7 December 1943, it was apparent to the Inspector General that the morale of the organization is low. Inquiry, observation, and information gained during the complaint hour, held in compliance with par 4e(1) AR 20-5 indicate very definite reasons for this condition.

2. The organization is composed of men who are supposed to have volunteered for a specific purpose and who are primarily of Filipino birth or extraction, drawn from the 1st and 2nd Philippine Regiments now training in the United States.

3. Hq & Hq & Service Co of the 5218th Reconnaissance Co are composed of men of Filipino extraction or birth. The 978th Signal Service Co (attached) are men other than Filipino. The organization was activated on authority contained in GO 58, Hq USAFFE, 8 October 1943, classified as "Secret". It is carried on the station list as USAFFE troops, but is in fact directly responsible to the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Colonel Courtney Whitney, Chief, Philippine Regional Section, AIB, is the direct contact of the Commanding Officer of the battalion, Major Lewis Brown, Cavalry.

4. The mission of the organization is understood to be the training and preparation of men to accomplish a special mission, secret in character, hazardous of performance, requiring special training, equipment, and personnel specifically qualified, who have volunteered their services for this duty.

5. The causes of the unfavorable morale situation are as follows:

a. (1) The present Plans and Training Officer, Captain Abner K. Pickering O-1283130, Inf, in direct charge of training of the 5218th Reconnaissance Co has lost the confidence of commissioned and enlisted personnel through the use of abusive and foul language, humiliation of individual personnel, belittling of efforts, threats of consequences, lack of tolerance, and an arrogant attitude. These matters were discussed with Major Brown, Commanding Officer of the battalion, who advised he is aware of the conditions and has attempted to correct them. Finding his efforts to correct the actions of the officer produced no improvement, he has, on two occasions, recommended to Colonel Whitney that Capt Pickering be relieved from duty with the battalion due to his demoralizing effect upon his command, but the recommendations were not considered favorably.

and
(2) It is evident from conversation with/the observation of Capt Pickering that he lacks the experience, leadership, and psychology required of an officer in the capacity in which he is serving. He is a man 23 years of age, called to active duty 1 May 1942, having received his commission as a second lieutenant from Officer Candidate School, Ft Benning, Georgia.

003 A rumor is prevalent that Capt Pickering is alerted to lead the



next mission to the islands. The source of this rumor is not known, but in view of it certain men under his training requested that they be permitted to withdraw if assigned to a mission led by him. They emphasized their desire to accompany any other officer of the command.

b. The organization has not been provided with a T/O or T/E, causing a situation which precludes the promotion of commissioned and enlisted personnel. Under the provisions of GO 58, the activation order, it is stated that a special T/O and T/E will be provided. Because of this situation the organization has been almost wholly dependent upon the AIB for its supplies, equipment, and property, and is attached to the 978th Signal Service Co (attached) for rations, a condition which lacks stability and permanency of organization. The difficulties in the development of a T/O and T/E are readily understandable, but it does not detract from the fact that these men have left organizations where promotion has been possible, to do a job of a hazardous nature for which recognition might normally be expected. Instead, they find themselves in a position where hope of future advancement is lacking.

c. Included in a recent group of men assigned to the battalion from the 1st and 2nd Philippine Regiments for training were 54 men who had not volunteered for the assignment. The understanding here is that the men selected for training will be volunteers. As a result, those who do not volunteer after their arrival are used on work details about the camp. This creates a condition which segregates the men into volunteer and non-volunteer classes, and has the effect in the Filipino mind of causing men to "lose face". Consequently, men volunteer for the mission who otherwise may not consider it. This does not appear to be in the best interests of the accomplishment of the mission.

d. Instances have occurred recently where the leaders of missions have been selected who have not had training with the men they take with them. The most recent instance is the last mission. The officer selected as leader appeared at the camp and, with the assistance of the Commanding Officer and S-3 of the battalion, selected the men who accompanied him. His contact with the men prior to departure did not exceed several days. This lack of contact between men and leader creates a situation conducive to misunderstanding and lack of confidence. Due to the nature of the mission it is considered that implicit confidence of men in their leaders, and intimate knowledge of the abilities of the various men included in the group are vital to the success of the mission.

e. Some individuals who returned from missions have been assigned to the battalion or permitted to address the members of the battalion. Their actions and statements have been detrimental to the morale of the Filipinos in that they have stressed their own individual accomplishments, both military and personal, in a manner of bravado. Their statements have been resented by the Filipinos of the command. It is believed that these individuals could be of inestimable value if required to contain their remarks within proper bounds.

678



f. The men, with few exceptions, are intense in their desire to be sent on a mission. They realize the hazard, but are sincere in their desires, their chief complaint being that they have not been sent on a mission. Inquiry disclosed that, when they leave America, they are given information regarding the mission and how the training and administration will be handled, but upon arrival here find a very different situation. For example, each man is led to believe that he will become a part of a closely integrated team which will train and operate as such under a leader who will accompany them.

6. Organization, statement of mission, stability of training procedures, and means and method of accomplishment, are lacking in the battalion. The Commanding Officer is a capable and able officer, but it is apparent that he has been handicapped through interference, lack of complete authority, and the temporary basis upon which the battalion is now organized and attempting to function.

It is recommended that:

7. Capt Abner K. Pickering O-1283130, Inf, be immediately relieved from duty with the 5217th Reconnaissance Bn (Prov).

8. Suitable special Tables of Organization and Equipment be provided the battalion at the earliest possible time.

9. A policy be established and followed that all men assigned to the battalion are available for duty with a mission upon orders.

10. To establish mutual confidence and teamwork, leaders of missions be given a minimum training period with the men selected to accompany them.

11. Personnel who have returned from missions, and who are permitted to associate with or address the men in training, be restricted to discussion of subjects considered by the Commanding Officer to be appropriate to training and development of morale.

/s/ C.H.B., Jr.
/t/ C.H.B.JR.





PRS

Chief of Staff

11 Jan 44

1. I have carefully examined the conclusions and recommendations of the Inspector General, attached. It is unfortunate that the Inspector General did not call upon me before submitting his paper or better still before making his investigation, in order that I could have oriented him as to factual considerations, plans and policies, having a distinct bearing upon his conclusions, but on which information was unavailable to him at the Camp itself as, for reasons of security, I have not taken the Camp Commander or any other officer thereof into my confidence in reference present and future Philippine projects and the C-in-C's underlying policies controlling the same.

2. I don't think you need be concerned over the problem of morale at TAERAGALBA. Morale, of course, is a relative term and the Inspector General put his finger on the basic adverse influence on morale at that camp when he concluded (sub para f, para 5) that "the men, with few exceptions, are intense in their desire to be sent on a mission. They realize the hazard, but are sincere in their desires, their chief complaint being that they have not been sent on mission." That they are restive under the multitudinous fatigue details incident to new camp construction, coupled with the delay in commitment to action, is a reaction common to all soldiers of all races and is a healthy, rather than an unhealthy, sign.

3. The camp has the usual number of misfits and some problems has resulted from the men sent here from the United States being preponderantly from among those I rejected in my survey of the personnel of the 1st and 2nd Filipino Regiments, rather than the contrary. However, these problems are not of a serious nature and are being worked out in a manner to avoid detriment to the service.

4. I have remained as close to these men as my time will permit and, from my knowledge of Filipino psychology, I find them reasonably happy and making satisfactory progress in the training or other work assigned. That they are fervent in their desire for early commitment to Philippine operations is, as aforesaid, confirmed by the Inspector General himself.

5. Concerning Capt. PICKERING, while I will re-examine his relationship to the command in the light of the specific charges made by the Inspector General, I am inclined to believe that his case can best be handled through guidance, or, if need be, disciplinary or reclassification action. His relief from the command would solve nothing. That a subordinate officer, regardless of temperament, can demoralize an entire command is inconceivable. He may be misplaced in his duty assignment, may require correction and guidance or even disciplinary action, but decision and action on the premises is a responsibility of command, that should not be evaded by transfer of the problem to

another as recommended by the Inspector General.

6. A Manila youngster, whose parents are confined in SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY, Capt. PICKERING has much personal interest in the Philippine reoccupation -- an intense desire for assignment to Philippine service. While he has many faults, primarily based upon youth and inexperience, he nevertheless has some good qualities -- sufficiently strong, I believe, to render him susceptible to guidance and correction by a patient and discerning commander.

7. I suggest that no action be taken on the recommendations of the Inspector General at this time. Neither Captain PICKERING, nor any other officer, will be selected to lead a party on a forward mission who is not believed fully qualified to perform the task and no man will be placed under the leadership of another who is not wholeheartedly willing to subordinate himself to that leadership. At the same time, the camp is not to be conducted as a kindergarden and any man, who is susceptible to serious distraction or demoralization by another, will be subjected to closest scrutiny to determine his suitability himself for forward service, where distracting and demoralizing influences will be at their height.

C. W.



Copy

FROM: DC/S
USAFPE

TO: C/S, GHQ
Adv Echelon

15 December 1943.

1. This provisional unit is under the operational control of GHQ operating, as I understand it, under instructions from the head of the Philippine Regional Section of the AIB.

2. Decision as to action to be taken on recommendations contained in paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of basic check sheet from the IG, USAFFE, appear to be GHQ matters.

3. The matter of special T/O and T/E for this provisional unit has been carefully considered. Grades and ratings now held by enlisted men are, in general, higher than could reasonably be expected in any T/T for a unit of this size which would meet War Department approval. When and if a suitable allotment of personnel, grades and ratings for theater overhead is received from the WD, this unit will be included and specific grades suballotted to it. It is recommended that no action to obtain approval of a special T/O by the WD be made at this time. WD action on similar requests (as for A.T.I.S.) have been returned stating that such personnel should be included in the theater overhead allotment.

4. Though not specifically covered in the IG check sheet, it is recommended that experienced officers of GHQ exercise closer supervision of the unit in question.

C.P.S.



Subject: 5217th Reconnaissance Bn (Prov), APO 923.

FROM: IG

TO: D C/S

13 December 1943.

1. During an inspection of the 5217th Reconnaissance Bn (Prov) APO 923, 6-7 December 1943, it was apparent to the Inspector General that the morale of the organization is low. Inquiry, observation, and information gained during the complaint hour, held in compliance with par 4e(1) AR 20-5 indicate very definite reasons for this condition.

2. The organization is composed of men who are supposed to have volunteered for a specific purpose and who are primarily of Filipino birth or extraction, drawn from the 1st and 2nd Philippine Regiments now training in the United States.

3. Hq & Hq & Service Co of the 5218th Reconnaissance Co are composed of men of Filipino extraction or birth. The 978th Signal Service Co (attached) are men other than Filipino. The organization was activated on authority contained in GO 58, Hq USAFFE, 8 October 1943, classified as "Secret". It is carried on the station list as USAFFE troops, but is in fact directly responsible to the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Colonel Courtney Whitney, Chief, Philippine Regional Section, AIB, is the direct contact of the Commanding Officer of the battalion, Major Lewis Brown, Cavalry.

4. The mission of the organization is understood to be the training and preparation of men to accomplish a special mission, secret in character, hazardous of performance, requiring special training, equipment, and personnel specifically qualified, who have volunteered their services for this duty.

5. The causes of the unfavorable morale situation are as follows:

a. (1) The present Plans and Training Officer, Captain Abner K. Pickering O-1283130, Inf, in direct charge of training of the 5218th Reconnaissance Co has lost the confidence of commissioned and enlisted personnel through the use of abusive and foul language, humiliation of individual personnel, belittling of efforts, threats of consequences, lack of tolerance, and an arrogant attitude. These matters were discussed with Major Brown, Commanding Officer of the battalion, who advised he is aware of the conditions and has attempted to correct them. Finding his efforts to correct the actions of the officer produced no improvement, he has, on two occasions, recommended to Colonel Whitney that Capt Pickering be relieved from duty with the battalion due to his demoralizing effect upon his command, but the recommendations were not considered favorably.

and
(2) It is evident from conversation with/and the observation of Capt Pickering that he lacks the experience, leadership, and psychology required of an officer in the capacity in which he is serving. He is a man 23 years of age, called to active duty 1 May 1942, having received his commission as a second lieutenant from Officer Candidate School, Ft Benning, Georgia.

(3) A rumor is prevalent that Capt Pickering is alerted to lead the



next mission to the islands. The source of this rumor is not known, but in view of it certain men under his training requested that they be permitted to withdraw if assigned to a mission led by him. They emphasized their desire to accompany any other officer of the command.

b. The organization has not been provided with a T/O or T/E, causing a situation which precludes the promotion of commissioned and enlisted personnel. Under the provisions of GO 58, the activation order, it is stated that a special T/O and T/E will be provided. Because of this situation the organization has been almost wholly dependent upon the AIB for its supplies, equipment, and property, and is attached to the 978th Signal Service Co (attached) for rations, a condition which lacks stability and permanency of organization. The difficulties in the development of a T/O and T/E are readily understandable, but it does not detract from the fact that these men have left organizations where promotion has been possible, to do a job of a hazardous nature for which recognition might normally be expected. Instead, they find themselves in a position where hope of future advancement is lacking.

c. Included in a recent group of men assigned to the battalion from the 1st and 2nd Philippine Regiments for training were 54 men who had not volunteered for the assignment. The understanding here is that the men selected for training will be volunteers. As a result, those who do not volunteer after their arrival are used on work details about the camp. This creates a condition which segregates the men into volunteer and non-volunteer classes, and has the effect in the Filipino mind of causing men to "lose face". Consequently, men volunteer for the mission who otherwise may not consider it. This does not appear to be in the best interests of the accomplishment of the mission.

d. Instances have occurred recently where the leaders of missions have been selected who have not had training with the men they take with them. The most recent instance is the last mission. The officer selected as leader appeared at the camp and, with the assistance of the Commanding Officer and S-3 of the battalion, selected the men who accompanied him. His contact with the men prior to departure did not exceed several days. This lack of contact between men and leader creates a situation conducive to misunderstanding and lack of confidence. Due to the nature of the mission it is considered that implicit confidence of men in their leaders, and intimate knowledge of the abilities of the various men included in the group are vital to the success of the mission.

e. Some individuals who returned from missions have been assigned to the battalion or permitted to address the members of the battalion. Their actions and statements have been detrimental to the morale of the Filipinos in that they have stressed their own individual accomplishments, both military and personal, in a manner of bravado. Their statements have been resented by the Filipinos of the command. It is believed that these individuals could be of inestimable value if required to contain their remarks within proper bounds.



f. The men, with few exceptions, are intense in their desire to be sent on a mission. They realize the hazard, but are sincere in their desires, their chief complaint being that they have not been sent on a mission. Inquiry disclosed that, when they leave America, they are given information regarding the mission and how the training and administration will be handled, but upon arrival here find a very different situation. For example, each man is led to believe that he will become a part of a closely integrated team which will train and operate as such under a leader who will accompany them.

6. Organization, statement of mission, stability of training procedures, and means and method of accomplishment, are lacking in the battalion. The Commanding Officer is a capable and able officer, but it is apparent that he has been handicapped through interference, lack of complete authority, and the temporary basis upon which the battalion is now organized and attempting to function.

It is recommended that:

7. Capt Abner K. Pickering O-1283130, Inf, be immediately relieved from duty with the 5217th Reconnaissance Bn (Prov).

8. Suitable special Tables of Organization and Equipment be provided the battalion at the earliest possible time.

9. A policy be established and followed that all men assigned to the battalion are available for duty with a mission upon orders.

10. To establish mutual confidence and teamwork, leaders of missions be given a minimum training period with the men selected to accompany them.

11. Personnel who have returned from missions, and who are permitted to associate with or address the men in training, be restricted to discussion of subjects considered by the Commanding Officer to be appropriate to training and development of morale.

/s/ C.H.B., Jr.
/t/ C.H.B.JR.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

~~SECRET~~

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject: AIB All Sections - Escaped Prisoners - Australian.

From: AIB

To: Colonel Whitney

Date: 19 Jan 44

1. Reference message No. 552 of 31 December from FERTIG, in which he asked permission to place all AIF men who volunteer on duty.

2. I am advised by Brigadier Rogers, by whom this possibility has been discussed with General Blamey previously, that those who volunteer may be retained if they are doing a worthwhile job of work.

3. In view of the paucity of information regarding SINGAPORE and the treatment of prisoners subsequent to its fall, it is requested that at least one of the escapees be returned to Australia as soon as possible for questioning and that this man, from his own experiences and those of his companions, should be in a position to give as complete a picture as possible.

C.G.R.
C. G. R.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OE
20 AUG. 75



*File
on*

17a

~~SECRET~~

10 Jan 44

Dear Charles:

I want to tell you about the PRS distinguished service award. Its purpose is to encourage Staff harmony and particularly helpful cooperation by other Staff Sections toward PRS.

The award is made for repeated acts of helpful cooperation with PRS, based upon consideration and understanding. The recipient must have been accredited with three legs toward the award before he is entitled to the same. Acts of manifest hostility may be deemed sufficient to cancel one or more legs previously earned.

For instance in your own case, Charles, when you so valiantly defended the right of PRS to the uninterrupted use of the NARWHAL (deprivation of which would have reduced PRS to the naval impotency of the Swiss Republic) you well earned a leg on the award. However, when you turned right around and reported PRS to the Chief of Staff and the Chief Signal Officer for commission of an "offense" for which your own Staff Section was directly and exclusively responsible, the leg previously so well earned was automatically cancelled, thus forcing you to start again from scratch.

The award itself consists of the honor of having the initials of the head of the Staff Section concerned assigned as the call letters of an important position in the Philippines.

I hope it will not be long, Charles, before we can assign the letters "CAW" to one of those positions.

C. W.

A copy was furnished Col. Ind.



16a

*Just go
w/for
School*

PRS

Brig. Gen. C.A. Willoughby

9 January 1944

Dear Charles:

In honor of your naval victory of 8 January, whereby its entire battle fleet was preserved to PRS (which otherwise would have reduced PRS to the naval impotency of the Swiss Republic), PRS will assign to the next important position established in the Philippines the call letters "CAW."

C.W.



FRS

Major Brown

9 Jan 44

1. If possible, I would like to have our full orchestra play for the American Red Cross on Sunday, 23 January, at the Red Cross Center here in BRISBANE.
2. It is a means of returning in tangible form some of the assistance the Red Cross has been in our recent activities.
3. If this is feasible, please have the orchestra leader contact Mr. Jack Malach, Program Director, ARC, as soon as possible for the purpose of making definite arrangements.

C. W.



15a
A. M.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff
Thru: G-2

Date: 9 Jan 44

1. Subsequent to my conversation with you yesterday, investigation disclosed that there were several unbroken messages in the Message Center which passed between Commander PARSONS and the War Department (Col. EVANS) last April. The explanation for these messages is contained in attached copy of carrier note from Commander PARSONS to the Chief Signal Officer of even date.

2. I have satisfied myself that use of the keys and codes involved was abandoned, once the channel of communication was fully established, and that copies thereof have been destroyed, except insofar as they may be on file here or in the War Department.

3. This matter, despite its ancient origin incidental to the accomplishment of a service of inestimable value to this headquarters, is now under formal investigation by the Chief Signal Officer at the behest of G-2, who, I understand, in presenting the same, placed it in the light of a reflection upon PRS. Such action tends to discredit PRS before other Staff Agencies and renders the preservation of desired Staff harmony increasingly difficult.

4. PRS has many faults for which it is properly answerable, but this is not one of them. The incident, if indeed censurable, occurred long before the present PRS organization was set up and while Commander PARSONS was a member of the G-2 Staff and acting under the supervision and control thereof. G-2, rather than PRS, should accordingly be held to account, if the matter in issue is one in which you feel any further action is indicated.

1 Incl:

Copy of Cmdr Parsons' Ch
Sheet to Ch Sig O.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08
20 AUG 75



CW
C. W.
*Withdrawn at request of
Gen. Wallerby (Chm Parsons)*
CW

~~SECRET~~

Lt. Cmdr Parsons, USNR, AIB

Chief Signal Officer, GHQ

9 Jan 44

1. Intercepted messages indicated in attached papers are messages sent by me while in the Philippines and for the purpose of establishing keys to be used by a new station accidentally discovered during one of my trips thru MINDANAO. It was my idea to establish this new station as a standby unit to act as guerilla contact with the SWPA thru the War Department (procedure which had been used in establishing original contact with PERALTA). The station had not yet contacted any guerilla station, nor had it been able to contact KAZ. Subsequently, the station was placed in contact with FERTIG and with SWPA and the keys established with the War Department were destroyed. The station functioned as an emergency station for FERTIG until knocked out by enemy action around August - September 1943.

2. Subsequent to the incident in question, no messages have been sent either by me or by this station which I was able to place in operation to any other station outside the Philippines except to SWPA

C. F.



PRS

G-3
G-2
(in turn)

8 Jan 44


1. Captain ARTHUR K. WHITEHEAD, 26th Cavalry, Mr. ALFRED COBB, guerilla leader of PALAWAN, two Moros and a Filipino (boatmen), having arrived in a northern port from the Philippines by surface craft, are now here and available for questioning.

2. Capt. WHITEHEAD and Mr. COBB will be in the 42nd General Hospital for a short time for medical survey -- the remainder of the party are at the PRS Filipino Camp (Tabragalba).

C. W.



13a



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

GV

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 8 Jan 44

1. The party of Capt. ARTHUR K. WHITEHEAD arrived last night. It consists of the following personnel:

Capt. ARTHUR K. WHITEHEAD, 26th Cav.
Mr. Alfred COBB, Guerilla Leader
KAHIL BUANGSI, Moro
RENALDO ABADIANO, Filipino
JELIAN MASALUDIN, Moro

2. The party left TABLAS ISLAND last August, worked their way around PALAWAN to TAWITAWI where they arrived 4 Dec 43. Left TAWITAWI on 18 Dec 43. Trip was accomplished in a 26 foot Moro kumpit.

3. Both Capt. WHITEHEAD and Mr. COBB have a wealth of information on the areas in which they have been subsequent to the surrender. They are not well however and I have put them both in the 42nd General Hospital for medical survey and treatment.

4. The members of their crew are being sent out to the Filipino Camp where they can get some rice -- possibly be enlisted in the Army. Captain WHITEHEAD credits them with a good job throughout the trip.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



CW
C. W.

G-2

To: PRS

9 Jan. 1944

1. Noted.

2. G-2 wishes to interview Capt. Whitehead and Mr. Cobb according to established procedure as soon as these men are released from the hospital. Filipinos and Moros may be interviewed at a later date.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

12a

[Signature]
C.A. McV.

~~SECRET~~

[Signature]

[Signature]

G-2
[Signature]

9 January 1944

PRS CW/tpd

TO : FERTIG
FROM : MACARTHUR
NR :



11a
WHAT KNOWLEDGE HAVE YOU OF DR KWOK AND HIS ACTIVITIES NEAR
JESSELT [REDACTED] ARE YOU COMMITTED TO SUPPORT HIM PD HAVE YOU ANY
INFORMATION ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING HIS MOVEMENT?

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~BLISSH - MOST SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

~~U. S. - SECRET~~

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject: S.R.D. - Projects - 301.

From: AIB,

To: Colonel Whitney

Date: 8 Jan 44

1. Reference is made to message No. 34 of 6 November from HAMNER in which reference is made to Dr. KWOK and information given by a Chinese "LINKINGFATT" on KWOK's activities near JESSELTON.

2. In connection with arrangements which are being made for the S.R.D. party in the area to make contact with KWOK and in view of what appear to be his previous relations with Colonel FERTIG, it would be appreciated if the latter were asked the following questions:

- a. What knowledge has he of KWOK and his bona fides?
- b. Is he ~~permitted~~ ^{committed} in any way to support Dr. KWOK?
- c. Has he any information on the possibilities of exploiting KWOK's movements?

[Signature]
V. G. R.

Copy to:
Lt. Col. Chapman-Walker

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 8 Jan 44

Herewith is the finished product. This is a powerful weapon that will do us even more good than guns -- we won't neglect the guns however.

CW
C. W.

4 Incls;
Copies of Free Philippines.

[Large handwritten signature]

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



[Handwritten signature]

10a

~~SECRET~~

PRS



G-2
G-3

7 Jan 44

1. The NARWHAL has to date made two supply trips to the Philippines, both to MINDANAO. The combined load consisted of 200 tons made up approximately of 60% Ordnance, 10% Signal, 8% Medical, and 22% Miscellaneous supplies, in addition to two AIB parties for northern intelligence coverage.

2. We now have approximately 300 tons of supplies and equipment awaiting shipment at DARWIN, with another 700 tons to be received in monthly increments in accordance with schedule of estimated minimum requirements heretofore approved.

3. It is estimated that it will require not less than 35,000 carbines to arm the forces in the Philippines now regularly enrolled and resisting but unarmed. Five thousand carbines with appropriate units of fire constitute our complete load (100 tons) hence in small arms alone seven trips of the vessel would be required to put a carbine in the hand of every soldier regularly enrolled to resist the enemy. (Total estimated by G-2 at 58,000)

4. Based upon an estimated ratio between Ordnance and other supplies of 70% to 30% it would require another three trips to deliver miscellaneous supplies required.

5. Approved plans call in addition for a complete load of personnel and supplies to Northern Luzon and at least one additional load to supply AIB parties now in the field and establish a position in North Borneo to watch the adjacent sea passages.

6. It will thus require 12 trips of the NARWHAL to implement present plans for Philippine supply and AIB position coverage as it is impossible from an operational standpoint to count on over four trips every six months, it will require 18 months of continuous normal operation of the vessel on Philippine projects to meet the aforementioned objectives.

7. The above is based upon the prevalence of normal conditions without discounting the intensification of the enemy blockade of the areas in which our forces are engaged, which become more noticeable on each trip of the vessel.

8. This outline of objectives is of course based upon the ideal in time, availability of vessel, and ability to evade the enemy blockade. It is impossible to predict how much of it can be successfully accomplished and in what time in view of those imponderables present, but it is earnestly hoped no other call upon ~~ourselves~~ will intervene to interrupt her steady employment to meet the objectives indicated, while conditions in the areas concerned otherwise still permit us to carry on.

PRS

Chief of Staff

7 January 1944

1. Attached messages from Army and Navy disclose that Captain ARTHUR K. WHITEHEAD, 26th Cav., ALFRED COBB and three Filipinos have arrived at Melville Island (N.T.), from the Philippines by surface craft and have been dispatched here by aircraft. Party will arrive at Brisbane today at 2000 hours. Arrangements will be made for their reception and care.

2. Captain WHITEHEAD has been with PERALTA since December 1942.

ALFRED COBB, with his brother, has been guerilla leader of PALAWAN.

3. Further report will be made on this matter as information develops.

Incls:

Army msg R-4123
Naval msg

C.W.



8a

COPY

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

EGL/lb

January 7, 1944

TO : ABLE CHARLIE OF SUGAR GEORGE TWO
HQ USASOS ABLE CHARLIE OF SUGAR GEORGE TWO HQ USAFFE

FROM : CO BASE ONE

R-4123 SIXTH

(CITE BSAX-517) PHILIPPINE ISLAND ESCAPEES ARRIVED THIS HEADQUARTERS,
CAPTAIN ARTHUR KENDAL WHITEHEAD, ZERO DASH THREE SEVEN SEVEN TWO ONE
NINE, ALFRED ERVIN COBB AMERICAN CITIZEN AND THREE FILIPINOS THIS DATE.
DEPARTING THIS HEADQUARTERS MILITARY AIRCRAFT ZERO EIGHT ZERO ZERO HOURS
SEVEN JANUARY. EXPECTED ARRIVAL YOUR HEADQUARTERS TWO ZERO ZERO ZERO
HOURS SEVEN JANUARY.

SGD MEYER

TOO 061008 Z
TOR 061152 Z

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

USAFFE DISTRIBUTION:

INFORMATION COPIES TO:

DC/s - (1)

G-2 - (2)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NAVAL MESSAGE

SECRET CYPHER

TO: DNI MELBOURNE (R) SO (I) BRISBANE From: SO (I) PORT DARWIN

CAPTAIN A.K. WHITEHEAD 26TH CAVALRY PHILIPPINE IS. SCOUT
ALFRED COBB, AMERICAN AND 3 PHILIPPINE NATIVES ARRIVED
MELVILLE ISLAND 5TH JANUARY PER SAILING CRAFT (?) PARTY
BEING TAKEN OF BY RAAF AND DESPATCHED BRISBANE BY AIRCRAFT
FOR INTERROGATION.

/ /060531Z

6/1/44

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 05
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

COPY

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

EGL/lb

January 7, 1944

TO : ABLE CHARLIE OF SUGAR GEORGE TWO
HQ USASOS ABLE CHARLIE OF SUGAR GEORGE TWO HQ USAFFE

FROM : CO BASE ONE

B-4123 SIXTH

(CITE BSAX-517) PHILIPPINE ISLAND ESCAPEES ARRIVED THIS HEADQUARTERS,
CAPTAIN ARTHUR KENDAL WHITEHEAD, ZERO DASH THREE SEVEN SEVEN TWO ONE
NINE, ALFRED ERVIN COBB AMERICAN CITIZEN AND THREE FILIPINOS THIS DATE.
DEPARTING THIS HEADQUARTERS MILITARY AIRCRAFT ZERO EIGHT ZERO ZERO HOURS
SEVEN JANUARY. EXPECTED ARRIVAL YOUR HEADQUARTERS TWO ZERO ZERO ZERO
HOURS SEVEN JANUARY.

SGD MEYER

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75

TOO 061008 Z
TOR 061152 Z

USAFFE DISTRIBUTION:

INFORMATION COPIES TO:

DC/S - (1)

G-2 - (2)



~~SECRET~~

PRS

Chief of Staff

7 January 44

1. I understand that there is a study now underway to determine the feasibility of diverting the NARWHAL from Philippine operations for special service in another area.

2. I know that any decision in this matter will be based upon careful evaluation of the respective potentialities, but I do hazard the hope that plans already made for the employment of the vessel in the Philippine service will not be disturbed. The enemy blockade of our Philippine positions is intensifying and now is the time that supplies and personnel must be laid in if they are to be laid in at all.

C. W.



7a

Secret

PARAPHRASE OF RADIO P2691 FROM WILLOUGHBY TO MCVITTIE

ABLE ITEM BAKER PROPOSITION PROPOSED JOB ON BALIKPAPAN MAY
ENCROACH ON NARWHAL SUPPLY MISSION JANUARY FEBRUARY ADVISE
WHITNEY. HAS HE BEEN CONSULTED. THE NARWHAL SHOULD NOT BE
DIVERTED FROM PRIMARY MISSIONS PETER ITEM SUPPLY

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



*File
cw*

808 . . .

adm

PRS

Chief of Staff

7 January 44

1. I am planning to send Commander PARSONS on the next trip of the NARWHAL, as irrespective of whether the inter-leader conference recently suggested by me is approved at this time or not, the trip into PANAY and NEGROS will be somewhat delicate from a supply delivery standpoint and I believe that the opportunity thereby afforded for conference between PERALTA and ABCEDE with an officer from this headquarters should not be overlooked.

2. I shall request both PERALTA and ABCEDE to personally attend the rendezvous in the respective area of each for the purpose indicated.

C. W.



200 .8

6a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Cruz
Mc

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: D C/S

Date: 6 Jan 44

Arrangements have been made for the evacuation of Major CRUZ on the NARWHAL latter part of this month.

1 Incl:
Ltr fr D C/S

CW
C. W.

Cruz

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



Mc

5a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA


Office of Deputy Chief of Staff

A.P.O. 500,
5 January, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Colonel Whitney,
Chief P.R.S.

Please give me the latest information with regard to
the evacuation of Major Cruz. Please expedite.


R. J. MARSHALL,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG 75

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Repatriation of Charles Cushing & family.

1. From: Asst AG, USAFFE To: Col Whitney, PRS (AIB) 6 Jan 44.
Thru: Asst AG, GSHQ

1. To note & return.
2. Herewith information requested of War Department in response to your check note, 2 January 1944.
3. Request information on which reply to attached radio may be based.

1 Incl.
Paraphrased by
message #2539, WD,
5 January 1944.

R.D.M.

2 From: PRS TO: AG, USAFFE 7 Jan 44

Extract from FERTIG's message 22 Dec 43 - - "CHARLES CUSHING RELEASED AND ALLOWED TO SAIL ON EXCHANGE SHIP WITH FAMILY. PLEASE VERIFY."

3 Incls n/c

C. W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75



Ha

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TO: GHQ SWPA

FR: WAR

NR: 2539 FIFTH

PARAPHRASED MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

ON LAST TRIP OF GRIPSHOLM NEITHER CHARLES CUSHING NOR FAMILY REPATRIATED (FROM STRONG WDGBI REUR CHARLIE SIX THREE OF THREE JANUARY THIS YEAR) AS LETTER FROM HIS BROTHER JAMES CUSHING FROM PHILIPPINES TO MOTHER DATED TEN OCTOBER FOUR THREE STATES DEFINITELY CHARLES CUSHING IS JAP PRISONER REQUEST REASON YOUR INQUIRY

ULIO

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

PRS

AG, USAFFE

2 Jan 43

1. It is requested that the War Department be queried if CHARLES CUSHING and family were repatriated on the last trip of the GRISPHOLM.

2. This action is requested in order that an inquiry from the Philippines may be answered.

C. W.



200 .4

PRS

Chief of Staff

6 Jan 44

1. I have, in keeping with the desires of the Chief Signal Officer, dispatched one officer and twelve picked radio operators (Filipino) to ADELAIDE RIVER, to take over for PRS the operational control of the radio station handling all Philippine traffic. At the same time, I have taken steps to put Philippine communications on a 24 hour basis, to permit contact to be established from either direction at any time of the day or night.

2. I impressed upon these men the mark of confidence reflected in placing the control of so important a radio link between the Philippines and the C-in-C in Filipino hands, and I believe it will tend to higher morale in the Islands when Filipino operators there know that their communications are directed to their own countrymen guarding the reception at this end.

3. I look for a high standard of efficiency in the operation.

C. W.



3a

PRS

Chief of Staff

5 January 1944

1. I have just had solved a mystery in the 10th M.D. that has been perplexing PRS. Why we had no reports on the security of WYZB (Army Control Station) in the recent enemy raid on West LANAO.

2. When the Navy sent its equipment to MINDANAO to establish the Navy Control Station it was found so far superior to the equipment that made up the Army Control Station that some action was indicated.

3. Action: - After the Navy Station Z4K was established with Lieut. Comdr. SAM WILSON as senior officer present, like Lord Nelson, said WILSON "turned his blind eye to the signal" when it was beamed on our DARWIN Army Station KAZ and the Navy Control Station Z4K automatically became the Army Control Station WYZB. Army gained - - Navy lost nothing. What Navy doesn't know won't hurt them.

4. Reaction: - PRS' face is red. Not having had the above confided to it, it signalled FERTIG on 28 December as follows:

"WIDER DISPERSAL OF MAJOR RADIO POSITIONS BELIEVED ADVISABLE TO AVOID COMPROMISE OF ONE NECESSARILY FOLLOWING COMPROMISE OF ANOTHER PAREN REFERENCE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF WYZB AND Z4K PRIOR RECENT ENEMY LANDING."

C.W.



2a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:


From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 5 Jan 44

1. Herewith for comparison, as a matter of interest, are the Jap Military Notes (fifty centavos) prepared by the Japs and prepared in Washington:

Jap Issue (new)



Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials

Handwritten initials



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI
20 AUG 75

Handwritten signature

1a

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:



Subject:

From:

To:

Date:

Washington Issue



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 01
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

~~SECRET~~

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:



Subject:

From:

To:

Date:

Jap Issue (old)



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON
20 AUG. 75



2. It is observed that the new notes of Jap issue are somewhat sharper in tone than the notes of Washington issue, but comparison of the Jap issue (new) against the Jap issue (old) discloses a definite fading which Washington may have provided for.

3. Notes of other denominations appear to run about the same.

~~SECRET~~

CW
C. W.