

PHILIPPINE

REGIONAL SECTION

ADMINISTRATION,

APRIL 1944

# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. \_\_\_\_\_



SERIAL NUMBER.	FROM —	DATE.	TO —	SYNOPSIS.
1 d	CW	1 Apr 44	G-2	Msg sent PERALTA <sup>from</sup> / QUEZON re recommendations for awards. Suggested amendment of msg to QUEZON re citations and award
2 d	CW	1 Apr 44	C/S	LATTA being relieved of NARWHAL. Wishes a photo of C in C.
3d	CW	1 Apr 44	C/S	Advising that sub with 57 evacuees has reported her ETA.
4d	CW	1 Apr 44	G-2 (Gen. Willoughby)	Suggesting Lt. BALDWIN be placed on duty with G-2.
5d	CW	2 Apr 44	A.D.C. to C in C	Forwarding information on Lt. LEROY SCOVILLE & others.
6d	CW	3 Apr 44	AIB	Asking to be put on distribution list for AIF Intell. summary.
7d	CW	5 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE thru AG, GHQ	Forwarding letter of CARSON further re to killing of Americans on Panay. Lt. KING tortured and killed. Wife & Son evacuated
8d	CW	5 Apr 44	G-2	Forwarding transcripts and statements of CRUZ
9d	CW	7 Apr 44	C/S	Report of Finance on 6th MD, PERALTA.
10d	G-2	6 Apr 44	FRS	Re the analyzing of PI intelligence to help Planning Sections Request intel. directives be co-ordinated with G-2 before dispatch.
11d	CW	8 Apr 44	C/S	Extracts of letter from Roy HOWARD re President QUEZON.
12d	CW	8 April 44	C/S G-2	Forwarding second issue of FREE PHILIPPINES.
13d	DC/S	6 Apr 44	Col. L.A. Diller Chief FRS Thru G-2	Re the transmitting of msgs of QUEZON's reply to appointment of members of Iloilo Currency Committee & reply to Governor MARAPAO on finances.
14d	CW	9 Apr 44	C/S	Forwarding letter from Maj. SMITH re his reaction to Filipinos he took with him. Value of Dr. EVANS.
15d	CW	9 Apr 44	C/S	Everything ready to inaugurate Air supply operations. Asks if any objection to him going on first trip.
16d	CW	9 Apr 44	C/S	Recommending loyalty msg from CinC be put in next issue of FREE PHILIPPINES.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.



# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. \_\_\_\_\_



SERIAL NUMBER.	FROM —	DATE.	TO —	SYNOPSIS.
17d	G-2	4 Apr 44	CW	Transmitting of msgs re information required in case of plane crash.
18d	CW	10 Apr 44	C/S	Telling him recent evacuees from Pany have high regard for PERALTA
19d	G-2	5 Apr 44	CW	Returned complete correspondence re coastwatcher on Balabac Island.
20d	CW	10 Apr 44	AG, GHQ	Requesting PARSONS, ROWE, HIGBEE be designated top secret officers
21d	CW	10 Apr 44	G-2 Thru: C/S	10th MD will be given highest priority in support. 250 tons supplies sent to 10th MD.
22d	CW	10 Apr 44	C/S	Further inauguration of Air Supply operation. Dispatch of msg on Air fields. Supplies will be dropped if impossible to land.
23d	CW	11 Apr 44	C/S	Asking C in C to interview Carson BELL, and SILLIMAN
24d	CW	12 Apr 44	C/S	Instructions to CUSHING re disposition of prisoners were in his hands at 9:30 last night.
25d	CW	12 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE Thru AG, GHQ	Further info received confirming Americans free and alive in Phil RAMSEY, ATWELL, JOHNSON RUMSEL
26d	CW	13 Apr 44	C/S	Complete correspondence in re captured JAP OFFICERS in CUSHING territory.
27d	CW	13 Apr 44	G-2	Further ref CRUZ et al. Situation becoming difficult. Hope it won't be long before disposition of these men can be settled.
28d	CW	13 Apr 44	G-2	No comment to make on Directive of Staff & PRS functions in PI. Directive attached.
29d	CW	13 Apr 44	AIB	Correspondence concerning the the Evacuation of A.I.F. officers still in Mindanao.
30d	G-2	12 Apr 44	PRS	Re Manzano in charge of Luzon intelligence net.
31d	CW	14 Apr 44	G-2	Discussed Staff procedure with C Present procedure O.K. Amended directive attached.
32d	CW	14 Apr 44	G-2	Re the co-ordination of "Free Philippines and other propoganda
33d	CW	15 Apr 44	G-2	Re OWI programs to be broadcasts to the Philippines.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.



# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. \_\_\_\_\_



SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
34d	CW	15 Apr 44	G-2	Re the handling of evacuees. Procedure from AG, GHQ attached
35d	G-2	13 Apr 44	CW	Requesting Msgs re intel. information desired of enemy air capacity be dispatched.
36d	CW	16 Apr 44	G-2	Re the establishment of watcher party on TALAUD Island.
37d	CW	16 Apr 44	G-2	Re the Filipino who was picked up by a central Pacific sub.
38d	CW	17 Apr 44	Deputy Cont. AIB	Requesting Jap military currency be turned over to this section for packing & shipment to Darwin
39d	CW	18 Apr 44	C/S	Re development of Air Supply project. Asking to have 2 C-54 one C-47 assigned here also 3 officers and 20 EM.
40d	CW	18 Apr 44	G-2	Re the use of intelligence funds. by FERTIG.
41d	G-2	17 Apr 44	CW	Re msg. from Quezon to Ingeniero Re Delbano designated as representative. All his acts null and void.
42d	CW	20 Apr 44	G-2	Re Capt. ROSENQUIST assignment to 10th MD for assistance to POW's
43d	CW	<del>20 Apr 44</del>	<del>C/S</del>	Re establishment of weather observatory in Fertige Hes. 1 officer & 6 Em from 5th A.F.
44d	C/S	19 Apr 44	CW	Transmittel of msgs. from QUEZON to Montelibano & ABCEDE. Extending his warmest congratulations on steadfast determination in fighting the enemy.
44da	<del>CW</del>	21 APR 44	C/S	Asking if KRAMER and RAMSAY appear on record
45d	CW	22 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE AG, GHQ	Informing them of Officers who escaped from POW camp at Davao
46d	CW	22 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE Thru: Ag, GHQ	Re Americans killed in PANAY. Suggest take statements of Mr. & Mrs SCHURING and Mr. SPENCER who witnessed killing, for WD.
47d	CW	22 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE Thru: AG, GHQ	Giving names of the Filipinos that recently arrived from TAWI-TAWI.
48d	Lt. G.F. Rowe	23 Apr 44	G-2 Maj. McVitte	Re Office of Strategic Services equipment.
49d	CW	24 Apr 44	C/S	Re decoration of Col. MATA.
50d	CW	25 Apr 44	C/S	Navy wishes to send Lt. SIMMONS and 3 EM to establish a new radio station.
51d	CW	25 Apr 44	C/S	Re radar detection units. Also Also cameras being secured.
52d	CW	26 Apr 44	C/S	Requesting authority to send to FERTIG 50,000 U.S. dollars and 1,500,000 Enemy mil. currency.
53d	CW	26 Apr 44	C/S	Weather Task Force Teams
54d	Capt. TELESCO	<del>26 Apr 44</del>	Sol. Gideon, A-3, Fifth A.F.	
55d	PRS	27 Apr 44	C/S	30 gallon gasoline drums will fit in torpedo tubes on NARWHAL and NAUTILUS. Can send up a supply of gasoline by using this space.



# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. \_\_\_\_\_

SERIAL NUMBER.	FROM —	DATE.	TO —	SYNOPSIS.
56a	CW	28 Apr 44	Depty Cont., AIB	Requesting 2,000,000 pesos enemy currency be made available for packing and forwarding to Darwin
57a	GW	29 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE	Requesting orders promoting YOUNG to 1st Lt.
58a	CW	30 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE Thru AG, GHQ	Requesting that 25 EM be assigned to this section.
59a	CW	30 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE Thru: AG, GHQ	Recommending MANZANO, STAHL and ROBLES be appointed 2nd Lts. in AUS.
60a	CW	30 Apr 44	AG, USAFFE Thru: AG, GHQ	Recommending HAWLEY, MANN, SPENCER be commissioned 2nd Lts. in AUS.
61d	H.W. Allen Asst. Adj. Gen.	29 Apr 44	<del>Cmdr Allied A Force</del> <del>" " Naval "</del> Director PRS	<del>Directive re "Task Force</del> <del>Weather Teams"</del>

*In weather file.*



DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5

PRS

AG, USAFFE  
Thru: AG, GHQ

30 April 1944

1. Recommend that the following named individuals be commissioned as 2nd Lieutenants in the Army of the United States. W.D. A.G.O. Form No. 0850 pertaining to each is attached hereto:

Maynard C. Hawley  
Homer A. Mann  
Cyril L. Spencer

2. The above named were all recently evacuated from PANAY where they have each contributed splendid service in connection with the guerilla movement in that area. All have been functioning under guerilla commissions and/or commissions given by General Christie prior to the surrender. Through past service all are familiar with enemy tactics in occupied areas and mopping up operations in those areas yet unoccupied and are valuable material for later dispatch on independent missions to the Philippines or to reinforce parties now in position for which there is crying need for American leadership and employment.

3. I suggest that the commissions herein recommended be granted de novo without regard to the validity of commissions under which authority has heretofore been exercised by the individuals concerned, and without prejudice to any later confirmatory action covering such original commissions.

Incls:

WD AGO forms 0850 fr  
Hawley, Mann, Spencer

C.W.



5181

600





FRS

Thrus AG, USAFFE  
AG, GHQ

30 April 1944

1. Recommend that the following named enlisted men be discharged from their enlistment and appointed 2nd Lieutenants in the Army of the United States:

1st Sgt Aniceto C. Mansano, 39171906  
T/3 Robert E. Stahl, 33236898  
T/4 Crispolo G. Robles, 39837857

2. Of the above, Sgts. Mansano and Robles have for some time been operating a radio position on the LUZON mainland and have done excellent intelligence work in Central LUZON and MANILA. They have now been selected for even more hazardous work in the development of LUZON intelligence. Sgt. Robert E. Stahl has been in charge of our most forward radio control station and has now been selected to take an advanced position of even greater hazard and responsibility.

3. All men have proved by service of greatest value in enemy occupied areas their capacity and qualification for the commissioned grade recommended.

4. Following is a brief record of the military service of each:

1st Sgt Mansano

Length of Service: 2 years 1 month  
Service in Grade: 1 year 8 months  
Age : 37  
Military Qualifications: Cannoneer

T/3 Stahl

Length of Service: 1 year 9 months  
Service in Grade: 6 months  
Age : 23  
Military Qualifications: Cryptographer, Radio Operator

T/4 Robles

Length of Service: 2 years  
Service in Grade: 1 year 9 months  
Age : 29  
Military Qualifications: Radio Operator (Skilled- high speed)

1188

5. Attached are messages number 42 and 94 from Major Smith in point.

C.W.

598

~~SECRET~~

29 FEBRUARY 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : M A C A (SMITH)

NR 42 28 FEBRUARY

WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND: STAHL BE COMMISSIONED  
SECOND LIEUTENANT AUS AS HE IS IN CHARGE OF STATION  
M A C A AND DOING A VERY GOOD JOB; PROMOTION OF MANZANO  
AND ROBLES TO WARRANT OFFICER AND MASTER SERGEANT  
RESPECTIVELY. THESE TWO ARE ON BONDOC PENNINSULA AND  
HAVE BEEN REPORTING AN AVERAGE OF SIX SHIPS PER DAY IN  
ADDITION TO GETTING INFORMATION FROM THE NORTH. THESE MEN  
HAVE SHOWN COURAGE AND FORTITUDE IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF  
THEIR MISSIONS.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI  
20 AUG 75



~~SECRET~~

0082



T/4 Robles, Crispolo G. 39857857

1. Total service - <sup>2 years</sup> ~~1 yr 11 mos~~  
no previous service  
~~Induction~~ date - 16 apr/42

2. Service in grade - 1 yr 10 mos

3. Age - 29

4. Qualifications - (Military)  
Army Classification Test - 96  
Skilled Radio operator -  
high speed (766)



1st Sgt.

Mangano, Aniceto C. 39171906

1. Total Service - about 2 yrs! <sup>month</sup>  
no previous service.  
~~Inducted~~ Inducted 30 March/42

2. Service in-grade - 1 yr 8 mos.

3. Age - 37 yrs.

4. Qualifications - (Military)  
ARMY Classification <sup>Test</sup> Grade - 94  
Cannoneer (531)





T/3 Stahl - Robert E  
3323 6898

1. Total Service — 1 yr 9 mos.  
no previous service  
Inducted ~~Entered~~ - 25 July /42

2. Service in grade — 6 mos

3. age — 23 yrs.

4. Qualifications (Military)

Cryptographer; Radio Operator  
~~Radio Operator~~

ARMY Classification <sup>Test</sup> Grade - 146  
1



FRS

AG, USAFFE  
Thru: AG, GHQ

30 April 1944

1. Request that 25 American enlisted men be assigned to this Section for duty in connection with secret projects directed by C in C.

2. These men should be of average intelligence, capable of being entrusted to work where security is of utmost importance.

C.W.



580

7081



G-3

AG, USAFFE  
Thru: AG, GHQ

8 September 1944

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of C/N, dated 30 April 1944. Of the 25 American enlisted men requested 12 were supplied and were assigned to the 5217th Reconnaissance Battalion. It is requested that the balance of the group be made available for assignment to that organization.

S.J.C.



5-80

2022

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: AG, USAFFE

Date: 29 April 1944

1. In accordance with approval on attached C/N of 26 April request that orders issue promoting the following named officer to the grade indicated:

2nd Lieut. Frank H. YOUNG, O-888453, Inf. - 1st Lieut.

2. Your earliest possible action on the matter would be appreciated as the officer concerned is under extremely heavy enemy pressure and it is desired to dispatch the C in C's message just as soon as the necessary administrative details have been attended to.

Incl:  
C/N of 26 April

*CW*  
C.W.

*See #19  
to young  
29 Apr 44.  
also see  
Young's 201*

*Received AG-AP USAFFE  
29 April 1944  
1058 hrs.*

*AF*



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

*570*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

*[Handwritten signature]*

File No.:

Subject:

Date: 26 April 1944

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

1. Attached message discloses re-establishment of contact with YOUNG on TAWITAWI. There are a number of points requiring clarification and additional information desired which is being worked out in close coordination with navy.

2. YOUNG's position is of utmost importance to us during this period and the determined spirit he has exhibited in re-establishing communication with us exemplifies the highest standard of devotion to duty that you would ask of any element in forward positions.

3. YOUNG left here as a 2nd Lieutenant. I recommend his promotion one grade and notification of same by commendatory message from the C in C as follows:

"I commend you for courage and resourcefulness that has permitted you to sustain your position and report on enemy dispositions in that area despite heavy enemy pressure. In recognition of that service I have promoted you to the grade of first lieutenant in the Army of the United States"

4. If above action is approved I will process the matter through USAFFE for the necessary administration prior to dispatch of message proposed.

*Incl  
MSG 3F  
FR YOUNG*

*CW  
C.W.*

*[Large handwritten signature]*



*[Handwritten initials]*

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

~~TOP SECRET~~

720354

33

2022

~~SECRET~~

25 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : YOUNG

NR 35 25 APRIL



BATOBATO ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCE. SHELLED 5:00 A. M. TWELVE APRIL BY THREE WAR VESSELS. LEFT PORT BONGAO COURSE NORTHEAST 5:00 P. M. 14 APRIL. ONE DESTROYER ARRIVED PORT BONGAO, LEFT, FOLLOWED SAME COURSE. TWO SHIPS MV AT ANCHOR PORT BONGAO 21 APRIL. JAP OBSERVATION POST ON WATCH AGAINST ALLIED SUB ON 100 FOOT TOWER HAS BEEN PUT UP LAST ISLAND OF TANDU GROUP. ENEMY BARRACKS ERECTED IN BATOBATO PROPER. JAP OUTPOST LOCATED KM TWO KULAPE AND MALAMY.

THREE HIGH CAL GUNS EMPLACED AROUND BONGAO MOUNTAIN ONE POINTING SOUTHWEST ONE WEST THIRD EAST. GUNNER SHACK ERECTED AT PASIAGAN FACING SOMUNOL (SIMUNUL ?). MINE AREAS FOUND FROM TAPAAN ISLAND DOWN TO KALUPAG. INVASION OF BATOBATO EFFECTIVE TWELVE APRIL. PLACE LIABLE TO BE GARRISONED. FOUR SEAPLANES AND THREE WAR VESSELS INCLUDING LIGHT TANKS WITH 675 JAP SOLDIERS, EXCLUDING SMALL NUMBER OF PRO JAPS, TOOK PART DURING INVASION. MOSTLY JAPS CAME FROM KUCAING, BORNEO, ENEMY CASUALTIES THREE TRUCKLOADS.

~~SECRET~~ FOR SECURITY HAVE MOVED OUT TO HIGHEST PEAK SUKABUDAN MOUNTAIN. HARD WITH FOOD PROBLEM INCLUDING FIGHTING SOLDIERS

~~SECRET~~ REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354



~~SECRET~~

NR 35 FROM YOUNG PAGE 2

STILL BUSY AND INTACT SNIPING JAPS MAKING USE OF CARBINE  
RIFLES SENT OVER. SOLDIERS MORALE STILL HIGH.

WILL TRY MY BEST TO FURNISH YOU ENEMY INFORMATION AND  
BE CAPTURED ONLY ON MY DEAD BODY. REGARDS TO HAMNER AND CAIN.

CHANGE TO KEYS FIVE AND THREE FUTURE MSGS SENT FOR  
SECURITY.



~~SECRET~~

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

FRS

Deputy Controller, AIB

28 April 1944

It is desired that the approximate amount of 2,000,000 pesos in enemy occupation currency be made available for packing and forwarding to shipping base at Darwin.

C.W.



502

56d



~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

Date: 27 April 1944

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

1. It has been determined that 30 gallon gasoline drums will fit into the deck torpedo tubes (now unused) on both the NARWHAL and NAUTILUS. Each vessel can in this manner safely carry 2500-3000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline per trip without displacing either cargo or personnel. The drums in that size are readily portable even though filled.

2. I contemplate using this space in the manner indicated and thereby gradually building up a store of aviation gasoline, dispersed and concealed near the airfields we contemplate using, for both the projected supply and future operations.

CW  
C.W.

*Mr. [Signature]*  
*WER*

*[Signature]*

*CW*



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

55d

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 26 April 1944.

1. Authority is requested to send in to FERTIG by next trip of NARWHAL:

\$50,000 - U.S. Dollars  
P1,500,000 - Enemy military currency.

2. The necessity for intensifying operations in DAVAO, where only enemy military script presumably may be used, suggests the advisability of having FERTIG well fortified with such script. United States dollars are intended for general intelligence purposes, particularly in the Central LUZON, including MANILA, area.

C. W.

6 May 44

G-2

C/S

1. I am utilizing this request as a mild test case. It will involve ultimately a matter of policy, primarily on the continued use of U.S. currency. I have never been entirely satisfied with the extensive use of dollars in enemy-occupied territory, knowing that heavy penalties are prescribed by the enemy against their circulation.

2. As signator to WD Voucher No. 6, "complete knowledge of the transaction" is a pre-requisite, obviously in the interests of GHQ for a later accounting. My views on the subject are as follows:

a. The use of U.S. dollars in enemy-occupied territory is obviously a complete indiscretion. Are they to be converted into Phil. pesos? Then we shall send in pesos, as in the past.

b. Are they to be converted locally into Jap. occupation currency? Then we shall send and are sending in Jap. currency.

c. The one (1) bona fide agent to enter and leave Manila and return to GHQ for a personal report travelled with Jap currency obtained by Abcede -- that is a most significant test of successful usage of money in enemy-occupied territory?

- 1 -



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720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

53d

53d

File  
on



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

Date:

From:

To:

d. Past expenditures and the various levels are rather interesting:

Peralta	\$55,000.00 U.S.	P119,813 Philippine	P100,000 Japanese
7th MD		24,352 Philippine	P100,000 Japanese
10th MD	\$ 5,000.00 U.S.	P450,187 Philippine	P200,000 Japanese
Smith	\$ 5,000.00 U.S.	P100,000 Philippine	P200,000 Japanese
Additional money approved for Smith but not yet dispatched -			
	\$20,000.00 U.S.	P100,000 Philippine	P500,000 Japanese

3. It is quite apparent that there is no uniformity or equality in the allotment of these funds. I believe they ought to be made equal, a matter of principle, though cognizance may be taken of the relative efficiency of an organization, and the relative number of agents employed. As it stands, there are only three or four nets:

- a. Parsons . . . . . Composition unknown
- b. Villamor-Andrews . . . . . Composition known.
- c. Phillips . . . . . Failed
- d. Smith . . . . . Just starting, via Bicolandia.
- e. Fertig . . . . . Composition unknown
- f. Monzano . . . . . Promising & direct entree in Luzon Group.

G-2 has no knowledge of any local plans. In each case, we are sending in money on complete trust and it is going into the hands of "amateurs". Separate recommendation in a revised Philippine Intelligence Plan will be submitted, to cover this feature.

4. Recommendation:

- a. It is requested that an outline of the nets and pertinent data be furnished GHQ in order to establish a comparative basis for the future granting of funds.
- b. That general equality in the support of nets be established in principle and that this policy be expressed in terms of equality of financial support, unless data under a. support variations.
- c. That the penetration of Luzon be progressively coordinated by a central GHQ agent, Col. Monzano, who is favorably known and a Regular. Further details to be covered in revised Intelligence plan, now in preparation.

5. For the specific request in basic communication, I recommend only a partial approval as follows:

\$30,000 - U.S. Dollars  
P750,000 - Enemy Military Currency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED A. W.  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 26 April 1944

1. Both Chief Signal Officer (Lt. Col. P. W. Albert, Section 22) and Navy are anxious to secure information on enemy fixed radar installations in Philippines, concerning which there is nothing definite now of record. Colonel Albert has assured me that a portable, battery operated radar detection unit is now in the process of development and that a supply of twelve of such units should be available in a month or six weeks - that selected Filipinos with knowledge of radio can be trained in its use in about two weeks.

2. Unless there is objection I will go ahead and work out a plan of ground radar reconnaissance. Results may be later checked by air reconnaissance, possibly advantageously in connection with our projected air supply operation as radar detection would give the signal for evasive action.

3. I have also taken action to secure suitable cameras to place in the hands of our agents keeping surveillance over enemy fleet units in the Gulf of DAVAO and the coast watcher overlooking the BASILAN Strait. My understanding is that if we can secure individual photos of larger enemy vessels such photos can be blown up to afford a view in considerable detail, including the type of radar aerial from which may be deduced the general type of radar equipment installed. Such information if developed might prove of considerable technical value and at the same time provide an accurate check on reports on enemy naval strength.

*CW*  
C.W.

*4/1 To PRS 27 Apr.*

*Develop plan*

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720354



*3002*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*File CW*

*528*  
*31*

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: C/S

Date: 22 April, 1944

1. Conference 21 April between PRS and G-2 resulted in agreement on following directive to Commanding Officer, 10th Military District;

\*SUBJECT: POW Activity

TO : C.O., 10th Military District

1. Capt. Harold A. Rosenquist, O-278037, has been placed on temporary duty with your command for the purpose of acting as your advisor in the planning of assistance to prisoners of war in your military area. Such matters will be conducted in accordance with the policies of the C in C as communicated to you from time to time.

By command of General MACARTHUR\*

2. G-2 will request AG to issue necessary travel orders and the above directive.

3. PRS has agreed to provide such equipment and supplies as will be necessary.

4. PRS requests specific authority for transport of this officer on next trip going to the area.

Information Copy  
PRS - 1



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

*Law*  
C.A.W.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

*428*  
*PRS to G-2*

*Approved [Signature]*

*File [Signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY

10 May/44

To: C-in-C

In view of the imminent departure of transportation, the recent request of PRS to furnish Fertig 50,000 U.S. dollars and 1 million and a half enemy currency should be acted on with the G-2 recommendation for 30,000 U.S. dollars and 750,000 instead of 1,500,000 military currency as per check sheet May 1944.

C. A. W.

O.K.  
(signed)  
MacARTHUR

*This is a certified true copy:*

*DC Taylor, W/O*

0051





CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Mil. Int. Section, Gen. Staff

10 May 194

TO:	FOR:
Commander-in-Chief _____	Approval _____
Chief of Staff _____	Concurrence _____
Dep. Chief of Staff _____	Information _____
G-1 _____	Initials _____
G-2 _____	Issue Orders _____
G-3 _____	Rec Action _____
G-4 _____	Signature _____
Adjutant General _____	Ret to C-2 _____
C/Engr Officer _____	File <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____
S/Sig. Officer _____	Comment _____
Public Relations _____	Circulate _____
Aides de camp _____	_____
Geog Section _____	_____
Translator _____	_____
A.I.B. <u>PRS</u> _____	_____
C.O.I.C. _____	_____
U.S.A.F.F.E. _____	_____

*W. H. P. M.*



0581

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY

AG 983.6 (26 Apr 44)

A.P.O. 500  
26 April 1944

SUBJECT: Prisoner of War Activity.

TO : Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, Philippine Islands.

Captain Harold A. Rosenquist, 0278037, Field Artillery, has been placed on temporary duty with your command for the purpose of acting as your advisor in the planning of assistance to prisoners of war in your military area. Such matters will be conducted in accordance with the policies of the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, as communicated to you from time to time.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

s/ B. M. FITCH,  
t/ B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, A.G.D.,  
Adjutant General.



*file  
w*

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
62 03 24

~~REMOVED UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

*42a*



To: PRS

1. We will request AG to issue orders and directive as stated in Par.2.
2. Capt. Rosenquist will see Comdr. Parsons re supplies.

*SMM*  
SMM



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Mil. Int. Section, Gen. Staff

\_\_\_\_\_ 1944

TO:

Gen'l Willoughby \_\_\_\_\_  
Col. Cooper \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Col. Craig \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Col. Bowen \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Col. Lander \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Comdr. McCabe \_\_\_\_\_  
Maj. Deverall \_\_\_\_\_  
Maj. Hardsoeg \_\_\_\_\_  
Maj. McVittie \_\_\_\_\_  
Capt. Magruder \_\_\_\_\_  
Capt. Burns \_\_\_\_\_  
Capt. McGaughey \_\_\_\_\_  
Capt. Baker \_\_\_\_\_  
Capt. Davis \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Cheney \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Rowland \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. Williams \_\_\_\_\_  
Lt. (j.g.) Wallsten \_\_\_\_\_  
W/O Saltzstein \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. COIC \_\_\_\_\_  
S.O. Navy COIC \_\_\_\_\_  
S.O. \_\_\_\_\_

FOR:

Circulation \_\_\_\_\_  
Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Information \_\_\_\_\_  
Nec. Action \_\_\_\_\_  
Signature \_\_\_\_\_  
File \_\_\_\_\_  
Ret to Admin \_\_\_\_\_  
Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft \_\_\_\_\_  
Sketch Map \_\_\_\_\_  
Overlay Map \_\_\_\_\_  
Ltr Draft \_\_\_\_\_  
Ck Sht Gr \_\_\_\_\_  
Folder \_\_\_\_\_  
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\_\_\_\_\_





From FRS

To: G-2  
Thru: Chief of Staff

Date: 20 April 1944

1. I believe that the directive desired should substantially follow the last sentence of your foregoing C/M of 16 April, qualified to subject the activity involved to the specific policies of the C in C, rather than the broad policies of the War Department.

2. In implementation of the above I recommend that Captain Rosenquist's assignment be " x x x to the 10th Military District for duty as advisor to the Commanding Officer thereof in the planning of assistance to prisoners of war in that military District, under such policies as the Commander in Chief may from time to time prescribe."

3. My objection to the plan as previously proposed lay in the:

(a) Status given Captain Rosenquist rendering him subject only to the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, G-2.

(b) ~~Un~~ restricted right to call upon the local commander for such

ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
UNCLASSIFIED  
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42d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1 -

UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

7-2-44-4

FRS

Thru: 6-2  
Chief of Staff



20 April 1944

personnel, supplies, communication and transport facilities and other assistance as may be necessary to accomplish his mission.

- (c) Establishment of an intelligence system within the POW camp by the injection therein of a written directive from this Headquarters addressed to certain of the officer prisoners.
- (d) Plan for mass evacuation or escape of selected prisoners.

4. With respect to (a) and (b) the plan as outlined would not only do violence to the principle of command, but it would inject Captain Rosenquist, in an independent status, into an area behind the enemy's lines with which he is wholly unfamiliar and in a position of authority over a people with whom he has had no previous contact or experience.

5. With respect to (c) the proposal to establish an intelligence system by written directive in the POW camp would not only place in extreme jeopardy the lives of all prisoners in that camp but in all such camps wherever situated. The written directive if intercepted by the enemy (and in gambling human lives we should consider the worst) would lay a substantial basis for wholesale slaughter. The publication of such a directive by the enemy with the charge that all of our prisoners were engaged in the espionage directed, would be difficult to refute and might call upon the issuing Headquarters itself the charge of serious and indefensible indiscretion.

6. Furthermore, the directive, cold and callous in its terms, could hardly be expected to be well received by a group of prisoners who for two years have been subjected to ill treatment almost beyond the capacity for human endurance. I believe that if we must call upon these poor souls to organize among themselves an intelligence system for our benefit, it is a sad commentary upon our effort in the organization and employment of a whole populace potentially loyal. I believe that we should but ask these prisoners to continue to show the fortitude that alone will make it possible for them to survive the difficult and trying ordeal which yet lies ahead - - ourselves to bear the burden of the fight without call upon their further service in their present extremity.

7. With respect to (d) we have witnessed the savage penalties which have been inflicted upon the remaining prisoners as the aftermath of escape from the DAVAO Penal Farm. Information has been received and confirmed that twenty five executions resulted from the last such break. As a consequence of knowledge and experience, thus gained at the blood of our own people, it would be folly to attempt to apply this situation the policies and practices of HHS-I Washington, gained solely

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





FRS

Thru: G-2  
Chief of Staff

20 April 1944

from experience with prisoners in the hands of European enemy powers.

8. I consider that the DAVAO prisoner situation is an extremely delicate one. There are now 1961 prisoners in that area. Of these, 50 are bedridden and 500 are unable to work. In planning individual or small group escapes consideration should be given to the executions and further deprivations to follow. In planning mass evacuation consideration should be given to those 50 who are bedridden and 500 who, unable to work, would presumably be capable of little, if any, self help.

9. An abortive attempt to relieve the situation would, beyond doubt, result in mass executions if not complete extermination. The enemy would presumably be only too glad to be afforded any justification, however, flimsy, for such action. I look upon the DAVAO prisoner situation in the nature of a testing laboratory to determine what, if any, consideration is to be given the great bulk of our prisoners held further North. Today there are, as before said, 1961 lives at stake in that area, but infinitely more lives may depend upon the policy adopted with respect to the proposals now under discussion and consideration. My own view is that substantial relief for the prisoners in the DAVAO area should await and become a specific objective of active military operations. In tampering with the situation now we might well precipitate the very result we seek to avoid. Furthermore, it is not improbable that in defeat the enemy will exhibit much more consideration for factors of morality involved than he did in his hour of victory.

10. The views herein expressed do not argue against the dispatch of Captain Rosenquist as desired by the Chief of Staff but are intended to point out that the former's mission must be realistically attuned to the situation existing in the Philippine area, rather than guided by policies and experience gained by MIS-X through European operations. In Germany our means for securing intelligence on enemy dispositions are vastly more limited than they are in the Philippines - our prisoners are there better cared for and protected - savage retaliation does not follow escape. These situation differences should be carefully weighed and considered.

11. My recommendation covering Captain Rosenquist's assignment is contained in paragraph 2 hereof. I believe that any directive issued should be addressed to the Commander, 10th Military District rather than to Capt. Rosenquist, and that both policy and directive in this matter could profitably await the arrival of officers recently escaped, that they be fully oriented to factual considerations possibly now little known or understood.

Inals: Folder of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
of Capt. Rosenquist;  
FRS C/N to C/S - 29 Jan 44;  
G-2 C/N to C/S - 30 Jan 44

- 3 -

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
C.W. 720354

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FRS

Chief of Staff

25 April 1944

1. Navy is sending in another complete radio installation to replace Z4K as a standby station for Z4V, now carrying full load of communications on enemy naval and air observations.
2. Navy informally desires to send in Lt. (jg) JOHN D. SIMMONS D-V (6) 120866, USNR, with three enlisted communicators to staff the new station and re-inforce Z4V. Officer and men are volunteers for the service indicated.
3. Recommend that this plan for sending in additional naval personnel for the purposes indicated be approved. It will not only result in increased efficiency but the re-inforcement to FERTIG's position by selected, well trained, American personnel is a morale factor of importance.

C.W.



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

512



~~TOP SECRET~~

FRS

Chief of Staff

25 April 1944

1. Navy is sending in another complete radio installation to replace Z4K as a standby station for Z4V, now carrying full load of communications on enemy naval and air observations.
2. Navy informally desires to send in Lt. (jg) JOHN D. SIMMONS D-V (6) 120866, USNR, with three enlisted communicators to staff the new station and re-inforce Z4V. Officer and men are volunteers for the service indicated.
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C.W.



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

512

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 04  
20 AUG. 75



File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 24 April 1944

1. Your attention is invited to WD radio number W-26414 of 21 April from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, reading as follows:

"Pending outcome of conference regarding use of strategic services between Director of OSS and C in C SWPA theater OSS declines to ship any TR-1 transmitters."

2. This follows written advice from the same office under date of 13 March commenting:

X X X X X X X X X X

TR 1

100 each

*not dispatched  
aw*

Six only have been shipped. The office of Strategic Services requests a report on this item as to its adaptability and usefulness. OSS advises that, beginning 1 April 1944, fifteen per month can be shipped provided the item has proven satisfactory. Advice is requested on the subject.

X X X X X X X X X X

3. Advice was subsequently given of satisfactory performance and plans laid for the employment of the equipment. Air shipment was requested covering first deliveries under the above schedule.

4. These transmitters, in compact size, range and adaptability to universal power, are by far the best so far developed for use in enemy occupied cities such as MANILA, CEBU and DAVAO where house current is readily available.

5. Major SMITH, after field tests, has urged that a number be supplied him for such ~~purpose~~, as has also Colonel FERTIG.

490

6. It is apparent from the above War Department advice of 13 March that



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 24 April 1944

the equipment is available to supply our requirements. It is a sad commentary on the orderly and vigorous prosecution of the war that the agency controlling the available supply can nevertheless withhold the same pending favorable action on an unrelated issue. It is difficult to believe that General Donovan would lend himself to such practice.

7. Unless policy suggests the inadvisability of creating the issue, I recommend that this matter be placed before the Secretary of War with the request that appropriate representations be made in the premises.

C.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OR  
20 AUG. 75



6-32

~~SECRET~~

Maj. McVittie

Gen. Willoughby

23 Apr '44.

1. Following for your information is paraphrase of WD radio No. W-26414 of 21 April, signed SOMERVELL:

"Pending outcome of conference regarding use of Strategic Services between Director of OSS and C-in-C SWPA in SWPA theater OSS declines to ship any TR-1 transmitters."

2. The TR-1 transmitters referred to are those requested for use by AIB parties in the total of 100.

3. Presumably action to be taken in respect of this radio should wait until we have a clear definition of policy following General Donovan's visit.

ph  
Information Copies:  
A.I.B.

McV.

*ASW*



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG 75

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SPDDL 475 Equipment.

13 March 1944

SUBJECT: OSS Special Equipment.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.

1. Reference is made to letter SPDDL 475 Equipment dated 6 November 1943, subject same as above, and to letter SPDDL 475 Equipment dated 6 November 1943, subject: "Special Issue of OSS Equipment", requesting shipment of certain items to your theater, a copy of which was inclosed with the first referenced letter.

2. The Office of Strategic Services advised this Headquarters on 7 March 1944 as follows in regard to the special equipment to be shipped to the Southwest Pacific.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Switch, barometric	24 each	Expect to make shipment on or about 1 April. This item is in development and has not yet been available.
Clockwork time delay mechanism	20 each	"
Thermit well	50 each	"
Incendiary explosive (for firing gasoline tanks)	24 each	Shipment is being made at this time.
.Stingers	25 each	Shipment expected on or about 15 March. Item has been in development and has only recently been made available.
Silent, flashless gun	20 each	The Office of Strategic Services advises that they cannot identify this item. OSS can furnish a Cal. .22 automatic pistol (Colt Woodsman) with silencer. Advice is requested as to whether this is in item desired.



732

<u>Items</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Underwater lungs	50 each	This item still in development. Availability date not known.
Educational Films		Office of Strategic Services advises that more specific information is required.
TC 501	20 each	Four have been shipped. Availability of the balance is dependent upon future developments because this model proved unsatisfactory. More of the same model as the original four are available if they can be used.
TR 1	100 each	Six only have been shipped. The Office of Strategic Services requests a report on this item as to its adaptability and usefulness. OSS advises that, beginning 1 April 1944, fifteen per month can be shipped provided the item has proven satisfactory. Advice is requested on this subject.
TV 321	1 each	Production difficulties have prevented shipment. It is expected to be available about 1 April. Office of Strategic Services requests a report on this item after it has been given a trial.
AA 401	5 each	This item has been in short supply but is not available. The Office of Strategic Services advises that shipment is being effected as this time

For the Commanding General:

F. A. HEILEMAN,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Director of Supply, A.S.F.

/s/ W. N. WHITE,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Executive for Supply, A.S.F.



2831



~~SECRET~~

FRS  
Lt. G. F. Rowe


G-2  
Major G. A. McVittie

23 April 44

In reference to our telephonic conversation the following are the names of the members of the Filipino party that recently arrived here from TAWITAWI:

Captain Guillermo de la Cruz  
Captain Laja Biteng  
1st Lieut. Angsa Damsik  
1st Lieut. Tantung Ganang  
2nd Lieut. Kablayan Bismani  
2nd Lieut. Optoinsani Jamli

G. F. R.



~~SECRET~~

SECRET

480

File No. FEXM 383

Subject: American Personnel in the Philippines.

From: Asst AG, USAFFE

Thru: AG, GHQ  
To: PRS

20 April 1944

Request any further information which may be available as to the source of the report of death of the individuals listed in basic communication so that a reply may be made to the War Department.

R.D.M.

2. From: PRS

To: AG, USAFFE  
Thru: AG, GHQ

Date: 22 April 1944

1. Information was first received by signal dated 6 February from the Commander, 6th Military District, with names containing many apparent inaccuracies. Thereafter on 5 April by carrier note (copy herewith), I forwarded you a letter of Dr. Arthur L. Carson, President of Silliman University, giving amplifying data on the subject with corrected identities.

2. Recently evacuated were Mr. and Mrs. H. G. Schuring and Mr. Cyril Spencer who were nearby at the time of the tragedy. They are now all at the American Red Cross installation at Caloundra, knew all of the victims intimately and verified the facts immediately following the massacre.

3. Suggest that the statements of the individuals above named be taken for reference to the War Department.

Incl:

PRS C/N to AG, USAFFE  
dated 5 April

C.W.



~~SECRET~~

472



PRS

Thru: AG, USAFFE  
AG, GHQ

22 April 1944

1. Information has been received from the C.O., 10th Military District, that the following named officers escaped from the POW camp at DAVAO on 27 March, 1944:

1. Capt. Mark WOHLFELD, O-314054
2. Lieut. Hadley Clarence WATSON, O-390290
3. Lieut. James HAYBURNE
4. Capt. Glen WOHLER
5. Lieut. CAMPBELL
6. Lieut. FANSLER
7. Lieut. L. F. WRIGHT
8. Lieut. McCLURE
9. Ensign CARMICHAEL
10. Ensign BOONE

2. Of the above officers only the first three have thus far arrived within the protection of our forces. The full names of the officers listed above are unknown.

3. The above information is digested from a number of signals received from the area with much unrelated information. Copies of all messages are, however, hereto attached in response to my understanding of your wishes in such matters.

Incls:

Copies of msgs  
870, 888, 916,  
920, 922 fr Fertig

C.W.



462

FRS

Thru AG, USAFFE  
AG, GHQ

22 April 1944

1. Request confirmation that the following officers appear of record with the serial numbers noted after their respective names:

1st Lieut. Robert Sealey KPAMER, O-23729, 14th Eng.  
1st Lieut. Edwin RAMSAY, O-368746

2. The above officers have established contact with the C.O., 6th Military District, who desires this confirmation for purposes of identification.

C.W.



AS&



FBS

Chief of Staff

21 April 1944

1. Herewith is a copy of "Philippines" March issue, published by the Philippine Commonwealth.

2. I particularly invite your attention to the following contents which I have blue penciled:

- (a) Release of information on guerilla warfare by President QUEZON - page 4
- (b) CONFESOR's letter of 20 February - page 5-8
- (c) "Avenge Bataan" scroll - page 6
- (d) Message of President QUEZON to the Philippines - page 9
- (e) Disclosure that CONFESOR letter was released in the United States by VILLAMOR - page 16
- (f) QUEZON's broadcast to Philippines on National Heroes Day - page 21
- (g) QUEZON's New Year's message to the Philippines - pages 22, 35

Incls  
March issue of  
Philippines

C.W.



442a



**From** PPS

**To:** G-2  
**Thru:** Chief of Staff

**Date:** 20 April 1944

1. I believe that the directive desired should substantially follow the last sentence of your foregoing C/N of 16 April, qualified to subject the activity involved to the specific policies of the C in C, rather than the broad policies of the War Department.

2. In implementation of the above I recommend that Captain Rosenquist's assignment be " x x x to the 10th Military District for duty as advisor to the Commanding Officer thereof in the planning of assistance to prisoners of war in that military District, under such policies as the Commander in Chief may from time to time prescribe."

3. My objection to the plan as previously proposed lay in the:

(a) Status given Captain Rosenquist rendering him subject only to the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ.

(b) Unrestricted right to call upon the local commander for such





PRS

G-2

20 April 1944

Thru: Chief of Staff

personnel, supplies, communication and transport facilities and other assistance as may be necessary to accomplish his mission.

- (c) Establishment of an intelligence system within the POW camp by the injection therein of a written directive from this Headquarters addressed to certain of the officer prisoners.
- (d) Plan for mass evacuation or escape of selected prisoners.

4. With respect to (a) and (b) the plan as outlined would not only do violence to the principle of command, but it would inject Captain Rosenquist, in an independent status, into an area behind the enemy's lines with which he is wholly unfamiliar and in a position of authority over a people with whom he has had no previous contact or experience.

5. With respect to (c) the proposal to establish an intelligence system by written directive in the POW camp would not only place in extreme jeopardy the lives of all prisoners in that camp but in all such camps wherever situated. The written directive if intercepted by the enemy (and in gambling human lives we should consider the worst) would lay a substantial basis for wholesale slaughter. The publication of such a directive by the enemy with the charge that all of our prisoners were engaged in the espionage directed, would be difficult to refute and might call upon the issuing Headquarters itself the charge of serious and indefensible indiscretion.

6. Furthermore, the directive, cold and callous in its terms, could hardly be expected to be well received by a group of prisoners who for two years have been subjected to ill treatment almost beyond the capacity for human endurance. I believe that if we must call upon these poor souls to organize among themselves an intelligence system for our benefit, it is a sad commentary upon our effort in the organization and employment of a whole populace potentially loyal. I believe that we should but ask these prisoners to continue to show the fortitude that alone will make it possible for them to survive the difficult and trying ordeal which yet lies ahead - - ourselves to bear the burden of the fight without call upon their further service in their present extremity.

7. With respect to (d) we have witnessed the savage penalties which have been inflicted upon the remaining prisoners as the aftermath of escape from the DAVAO Penal Farm. Information has been received and confirmed that twenty five executions were carried out from the last such break. As a consequence of knowledge and experience, thus gained in the blood of our own people, it would be folly to attempt to apply this situation the policies and practices of MIS-I Washington, gained solely





PRS

G-2

20 April 1944

Thru: Chief of Staff

from experience with prisoners in the hands of European enemy powers.

8. I consider that the DAVAO prisoner situation is an extremely delicate one. There are now 1961 prisoners in that area. Of these, 50 are bedridden and 500 are unable to work. In planning individual or small group escapes consideration should be given to the executions and further deprivations to follow. In planning mass evacuation consideration should be given to those 50 who are bedridden and 500 who, unable to work, would presumably be capable of little, if any, self help.

9. An abortive attempt to relieve the situation would, beyond doubt, result in mass executions if not complete extermination. The enemy would presumably be only too glad to be afforded any justification, however, flimsy, for such action. I look upon the DAVAO prisoner situation in the nature of a testing laboratory to determine what, if any, consideration is to be given the great bulk of our prisoners held further North. Today there are, as before said, 1961 lives at stake in that area, but infinitely more lives may depend upon the policy adopted with respect to the proposals now under discussion and consideration. My own view is that substantial relief for the prisoners in the DAVAO area should await and become a specific objective of active military operations. In tampering with the situation now we might well precipitate the very result we seek to avoid. Furthermore, it is not improbable that in defeat the enemy will exhibit much more consideration for factors of morality involved than he did in his hour of victory.

10. The views herein expressed do not argue against the dispatch of Captain Rosenquist as desired by the Chief of Staff but are intended to point out that the former's mission must be realistically attuned to the situation existing in the Philippine area, rather than guided by policies and experience gained by MIS-X through European operations. In Germany our means for securing intelligence on enemy dispositions are vastly more limited than they are in the Philippines - our prisoners are there better cared for and protected - savage retaliation does not follow escape. These situation differences should be carefully weighed and considered.

11. My recommendation covering Captain Rosenquist's assignment is contained in paragraph 2 hereof. I believe that any directive issued should be addressed to the Commander, 10th Military District rather than to Capt. Rosenquist, and that both policy and directive in this matter could profitably await the arrival of officers recently escaped, that they be fully oriented to factual considerations possibly now little known or understood.

Incl: Folder of mission  
of Capt. Rosenquist;  
PRS C/N to C/S - 29 Jan 44;  
G-2 C/N to C/S - 30 Jan 44

C.W.



Subject: Plan of Mission to aid POWs in Philippine Islands

From: G-2

To: C/S

Date : 30 Jan 44

1. Plan of mission to aid POWs in Philippine Islands was submitted by G-2, 11 Dec, 1943, to C of S. The C of S approved it. Briefly, the approved plan will send a MIS-X officer into the Philippine area to assist POWs. In addition he will procure such intelligence of the Davao area as is within the means of the guerilla units. In implementing the mission it is necessary to procure the cooperation and assistance of guerilla units in the area. A draft of a directive to the CO 10th MD and supporting papers were referred to PRS. PRS feels that paragraph 3 of the directive gives the officer being sent into the Philippines too much authority over the local commander, and subordinates the activities of the 10th MD to the mission assigned. Such is not the intent. The successful accomplishment of the mission will require cooperation of the 10th MD but not its subordination. A revised draft of paragraph 3 of the directive to CO, 10th MD is quoted below. Transport facilities are such that officers going on mission must leave in about ten days.

2. "It is directed that the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District furnish such personnel and supplies as may, in his opinion, be available to assist the mission; permit the use of such communication and transport facilities as may be available, and render such other assistance as may be feasible".

C.A.W.



1731

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

~~SECRET~~

From:

c/s

To:

Chief PRS

Date:

19 April 64

Please transmit the following messages from President Quezon:

For Governor Montelibano: Received your report sent by Cruz. Your wisdom and self-sacrifice deserve my highest commendation. I approve everything you have done and also your recommendations. Convey my warm regards to all the officials of your government. *Abcede*

For Abcede: Thank you for report sent by Cruz. Warmest congratulations for the steadfast determination with which you are fighting the enemy. Our government and people have every reason to be proud of you and all your comrades. My warmest regards to your command.

*PRS*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

442

~~SECRET~~

*1-1-63  
Abcede*  
*1-1-64  
Abcede*



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

1944.

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

TO:

FOR:

Deputy Chief of Staff  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-1  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-2  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-3  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4  
Adjutant General

Nec. Action  
Note & Return  
Information  
File

Deputy Chief of Staff USAFFE



*Mr Rogers -*

*Respend until  
return to Brisbane  
when records are available*

*File attached*  
*CSAF*

Lieut. General, USA,  
Chief of Staff.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

~~SECRET~~

From:

C/S

To:

Chief PRS

Date:

19 April 44

President Quezon has indicated a desire to give Mata the same decoration that was awarded to Abcede. Request your comment.

RKS  
*[Handwritten signature]*

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 25 April 1944

On 10 March the following instruction was received from the Deputy Chief of Staff:

"It is desired that you inform Lieutenant Colonel Mata that President Quezon has conferred upon him the award of the Distinguished Service Star of the Philippines. President Quezon states that he believes Abcede will appreciate this award. Therefore it is desired that notification be transmitted through him."

The notification desired was dispatched.

CW  
C.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



500  
3

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 18 April 1944

1. In the development of the Philippine air supply project, authority is requested:

(a) For transfer of the two (2) C-54 planes with crews from ATC to the operational control of this section.

(b) For the transfer of one (1) C-47 plane with crew from ATC to the operational control of this section, for the purpose of shuttling supplies to the supply base and/or from the supply base to the forward operational base when available (C-54s should not be employed for this purpose).

(c) For the assignment by selection of three (3) officers and twenty (20) enlisted men to ground staff (operations supply, aircraft maintenance, and communications) at the supply base (Darwin) and/or forward operational base when available.

(d) For the procurement of such spares, equipment, supplies and facilities as may be essential to sustain the operation and accomplish the mission.

2. Colonel Gunn and Major Rhoades are in agreement with the above requirements.

*CW*  
C.W.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

*ops to PRS*  
*Seem it advisable to return*  
*operational control of these*  
*planes to the office of the Chief of*  
*Staff*  
*file*  
*CW*

~~TOP SECRET~~

64

~~SECRET~~

XXI

PRIORITY

XXXI

~~SECRET~~

5 May 1944.

CS:ppr

AGWAR

UNDERSTOOD FROM PREVIOUS COMMUNICATION PAREN FOR PRESIDENT QUEZON FROM  
GENERAL MACARTHUR PAREN THAT YOU HAD DESIRED TO DECORATE MATA WHO WAS  
ADVISED ON TWELFTH MARCH THAT YOU HAD CONFERRED UPON HIM THE DISTINGUISHED  
SERVICE STAR PD ( ) COPY OF CITATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO  
YOU FOR YOUR RECORDS

MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, AGD,  
Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



rest

~~SECRET~~



FRS

Chief of Staff

18 April 1944

1. In the development of the Philippine air supply project, authority is requested:

(a) For transfer of the two (2) C-54 planes with crews from ATC to the operational control of this section.

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(d) For the procurement of such spares, equipment, supplies and facilities as may be essential to sustain the operation and accomplish the mission.

2. Colonel Gumm and Major Rhoades are in agreement with the above requirements.

C.W.



1382

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

18 April 1944

1. I fully concur in the reasoning contained in foregoing comment.
2. I believe, however, that the matter can be satisfactorily adjusted by the simple expedient of:
  - (a) Instructing FERTIG that the disbursement in question was an improper employment of intelligence funds, and that he should adjust the matter by transferring the equivalent amount of local currency to his intelligence account.
  - (b) Instructing FERTIG to secure an accounting from Major LAURETA for his own protection.
3. The above action may be taken without the slightest intimation that it is designed or desired to curtail any assistance which it is possible to give to prisoners of war or internees.
4. All of our forces in the Philippines being committed to the primary mission of intelligence it is believed that almost any application of intelligence funds to sustain such forces or further such mission would be appropriate. However, the disbursement for prisoners welfare would clearly be foreign to such purpose regardless of how broad a construction could reasonably be given it.
5. If you are in accord with the action to adjust this matter indicated I should be glad to issue the necessary instructions.

C.W.



6022

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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



PRS (Col. Whitney)

17 Apr '44.

G-2

1. Attached (Incl. 1) is statement of account rendered by Fertig on expenditures made by him up to 30 Dec. 1943. It is noted that on 29 Nov. he delivered P25,000 to Major Laureta "as agent to get funds to prisoners and internees. Instruction of Lt. Cmdr. Parsons". This action which is in contravention of the provisions of AG letter of 14 Sept. 1943, subject: Regularization of Confidential Funds for A.I.B. & P.R.S., (Incl. 2) indicates that there is still some confusion regarding the proper use of intelligence funds. It is important that this matter be clarified and I would appreciate your cooperation to that end.

2. The history of the supply of funds to PWs and internees, as shown in the written record, is as follows:

a. Radio of 7 June 1943 from Fertig (Incl. 3) stated that money could be borrowed in Manila and smuggled into prisoners of war and possibly civil internees in that vicinity and requested permission for such action. Proposed action was apparently based on arrangements made by Lt. Cmdr. Parsons who was then in Mindanao. The message also mentioned attempts to smuggle funds to civil internees in Davao. There was no specific mention that these were intelligence funds. Reply approved by the CinC 9 June was as follows:

"Fully approve all possible aid being given military and civilian prisoners. You must, however, proceed with extreme caution".

b. On 3 Sept. 1943, Lt. Comdr. Parsons, then in Brisbane, wrote a check sheet (Incl. 4) suggesting that representation be made to the War Department concerning the type of Red Cross supplies required in the Philippines and also discussing the desirability of smuggling funds to prisoners of war. G-2 called attention to the fact that intelligence funds could not properly be used for this purpose and as a result the directive of 14 Sept (Incl. 2) was issued to PRS.

3. Comdr. Parsons left here for Mindanao early in November taking with him P250,000 of which P50,000 was specified for intelligence purposes and the balance was to be stored for future use, only on specific instructions of the C-inC. All of this money falls into the intelligence category since it was procured from the War Department for that purpose and is accounted for on Confidential Form No. 6. Fertig also had other unexpended intelligence funds in his possession at that time. On 29 Nov. 1943, shortly after Comdr. Parsons arrived, the P25,000 referred to in paragraph 1 of this check sheet was delivered to Laureta to be smuggled in to prisoners of war and internees. The delivery of these funds for this purpose was contrary to the existing directive of this Headquarters.

4. Steps to correct this improper use of intelligence funds and prevent a recurrence must obviously be taken. I believe the first should be a directive to

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(Cont'd)

G-2

PRS (Col. Whitney)

17 Apr '44.

Fertig (and other District Commanders) prohibiting the use of intelligence funds for this purpose and instructing him to so inform Laureta. Laureta should also be asked to furnish a record of the amount of money that he has already smuggled into prisoners in the Davao area. The method of reimbursing Fertig's intelligence funds for any unauthorized expenditure to date can be determined when accounting is received. G-2 has habitually stressed the fact that funds provided have been for intelligence purposes but it is not known what instructions of this nature, if any, were given to Fertig and other District Commanders by you, in this connection.

5. It would be unfortunate if restrictions on the use of intelligence funds should deprive prisoners of war of aid they might otherwise receive. I do not believe this need be so however. I understand that emergency currency being printed in Mindanao can be used equally well - or almost as well. In both cases it is desirable to supply prisoners of war with Japanese occupation currency and this can be bought with emergency currency even though perhaps not quite as cheaply as with Pesos or Dollars shipped from here. Forged Japanese occupation currency 200,000 pesos of which have been sent to Fertig, might also be used if the forgery is considered good enough to escape detection.

6. I would appreciate your comments on the action proposed above, or any other suggestion you may have to offer to assure that secret intelligence funds will not be used for unauthorized purposes, keeping in mind the importance of giving every aid to prisoners of war and civil internees.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI  
20 AUG. 75

C. A. W.

ph

4 Incls:

Incl.1-Statement of acct. fr Fertig.

Incl.2-Directive 14 Sept '43.

Incl.3-Radio 7 June 1943 fr Fertig.

Incl.4-C/Sht fr Cmdr Parsons, 3 Sept. '43.

Information Copies;



3382

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C O P Y ~~SECRET~~

AG 383.6 (18 Apr 44)B

A.P.O. 500,  
18 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Processing of Philippine Evacuees.

TO : Commander, Seventh Fleet.  
Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East,  
A.P.O. 501.  
Controller, Allied Intelligence Bureau (Attn: Chief, Philippine  
Regional Section).

1. Announcement is made of the following standing operating procedure for personnel evacuated from the Philippine Islands by United States Armed Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area.

2. Philippine Regional Section or other evacuating agency will:

a. Notify this headquarters and Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, of expected time and place of arrival of evacuees in Australia and expected time of arrival in Brisbane or other designated destination.

b. Deliver evacuees to Brisbane or to other destination directed by this headquarters, and be responsible for their security until such delivery is made.

3. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East will:

a. Accept custody of, administer and be responsible for United States Military and civilian personnel.

b. Accept custody of and be responsible for other nationals and will notify the nearest representative of government or armed forces concerned.

c. Make above-mentioned personnel available to General Headquarters or other appropriate intelligence agency until personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes.

d. When advised by General Headquarters that evacuees are no longer required for intelligence purposes:

(1) Return United States military personnel to the United States unless approval is granted for individual to remain in the Southwest Pacific Area.

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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI  
20 AUG. 75

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AG 383.6 (18 Apr 44)B (Cont'd)

- (2) Turn over United States civilians to the American Consul for transportation to the United States or for other disposition.
- (3) Turn over other nationals to representative of government or armed forces concerned unless other recommendation is made by this headquarters.

e. Arrange for suitable quarters and administration for military and civilian personnel except United States Navy and Marine Corps personnel during period of interrogation. United States Navy and United States Marine Corps personnel will be turned over to the Commander, Seventh Fleet, at designated point for administration.

f. Make shipping accommodation available when necessary for return of above-mentioned personnel to the United States.

4. The Commander, Seventh Fleet will:

- a. Accept custody of and be responsible for United States Navy and Marine Corps personnel.
- b. Make above-mentioned personnel available to General Headquarters until personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes.
- c. When advised by General Headquarters that personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes, dispose of them as desired unless otherwise directed by General Headquarters.

5. General Headquarters or such agency as may be designated by General Headquarters will be responsible for:

- a. Ensuring proper security arrangements, such as:
  - (1) Collecting, listing, and receipting for all identification papers, films, souvenirs, documents, letters, etc., in possession of evacuee.
  - (2) Collecting all letters written by or brought out of enemy-held territory by evacuees or evacuating agency and arranging for their proper censoring and dispatch, this to continue until evacuees are released from supervision of this headquarters.
  - (3) Preventing transmission of any messages by the evacuee until cleared by General Headquarters.
  - (4) Giving security briefing to all evacuees.

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C O P Y

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AG 383.6 (18 Apr 44)B (Cont'd)

b. Advising Military Intelligence Division, War Department, by radio the name, date and place of birth, name and address of nearest relative in United States, and approximate date of departure for United States of each United States civilian evacuee.

c. Obtaining from each evacuee prescribed War Department oath of secrecy and forwarding two (2) copies of same to Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

d. Preparing for signature of evacuee a report covering his experiences in enemy-held territory and giving such information as he may have concerning enemy forces, activities, etc.

e. Notifying Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and Commander, Seventh Fleet, when evacuees are no longer required for intelligence purposes, making any recommendation that is advisable.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, A.G.D.,  
Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG. 75



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PRS

G-2

15 April 1944

the fact that a few notes may have gone through undetected by it in the first shipment of evacuees back home.

4. In these matters PRS has been relieved of its further responsibility upon delivery of evacuees to the several agencies concerned upon arrival in Brisbane. For this I have been very grateful.

5. While evacuation is primarily a function of G-1, and G-1, USAFFE has worked with PRS closely in this matter, if the C/S desires to make the changes indicated in your proposed directive the operation should be conducted with no greater difficulty.

6. The process is now working smoothly under informal conference and agreement and I see no reason for formalizing or changing it. If, however, a contrary view is taken I trust that the evacuation will be left entirely the responsibility of PRS, as heretofore, until such time as evacuees have reached Brisbane. Prior to that point the entry of several agencies into the operation would cause confusion and should be avoided. In that phase of the project PRS has been successful thus far - that success argues strongly against change. What procedure is followed after evacuees safe arrival here is a matter concerning which PRS prefers not to concern itself.

Incl:  
n/c

C.W.



340



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G-2

AIB (FRS)

11 April 1944.

1. As you know the mechanics of handling evacuees from the Philippines have been distinctly informal. There has been a good deal of confusion as to what duties were to be performed by the various agencies involved.
2. An example of the weakness of this system was revealed in War Department Radio 53850 18 March 1944 which stated that a number of U. S. civilians evacuated from the Philippines had arrived in the United States in possession of various diaries and notes disclosing details of guerrilla activities. This material should have been confiscated.
3. In order to clarify this situation the attached directive has been drafted in collaboration with USAFFE and it is supposed to be submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval. Before doing so however I should like to have your comments and any suggestions you may have for improving it.

1 Incl. As indicated above.  
CAM/fmt  
Information Copies:

C.A.W.

From: FRS

To: G-2

Date: 15 April 1944

1. I have noted no confusion in the matter of handling the evacuation project from the Philippines. This Section has carried the responsibility of getting them to Brisbane and thereafter they have been split up into service or civilian groups for delivery to the G.O., 17th Replacement Batt., Navy or USAFFE, as the case might be.
2. Upon arrival at the port of entry into this country, they have been removed from sub at a rendezvous at sea and delivered to the AIB camp where provisions have been made to care for them and where they have been held under absolute security until boarding planes for Brisbane.
3. The matter of security after arrival here has been in the hands of G-2, USAFFE, who, I believe, has the situation now well under control, despite

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20 AUG. 75

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34d

D R A F T

9 April 1944.

AG 383.6 (9 Apr 44)B

SUBJECT: Processing of Philippine Evacuees.

TO : Commander, Seventh Fleet  
Commanding General, USAFFE, APO 501.  
Controller AIB (Attn: Chief PRS).

1. Pursuant to instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the following will be S.O.P. for people evacuated from the Philippine Islands by U.S. Armed Forces in S.W.P.A.

2. P.R.S. or other evacuating agency will:

a. Notify this Headquarters (A. C. of S., G-2) and Headquarters, U.S.A.F.F.E. of expected time and place of arrival of evacuees in Australia and expected time of arrival in Brisbane or other designated destination.

b. Deliver evacuees to Brisbane or to other destination directed by this Headquarters.

c. All personnel meeting evacuees must be approved by this Headquarters.

3. The C.G., U.S.A.F.F.E.:

a. Will accept custody of, administer and be responsible for U.S. Military and civilian personnel.

b. Will accept custody of and be responsible for other nationals and will notify the nearest representative of government or armed forces concerned.

c. Will make above-mentioned personnel available to G-2, G.H.Q. or other appropriate intelligence agency until personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes.

d. When advised by G-2, G.H.Q., that evacuees are no longer required for intelligence purposes.

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- (1) Will return U. S. military personnel to the U.S. unless approval is granted for individual to remain in S.W.P.A.
- (2) Will turn over U.S. civilians to the American Consul for transportation to the U.S. or for other disposition.
- (3) Will turn over other nationals to representative of government or armed forces concerned unless other recommendation is made by this Headquarters.

e. Arrange for suitable quarters and administration for military and civilian personnel except U.S. Naval and Marine personnel during period of interrogation. U.S.N. and U.S.M.C. personnel will be turned over to the Commander 7th Fleet at designated point for administration.

f. Will make shipping accommodation available when necessary for return of above-mentioned personnel to the U.S.

4. The Commander, 7th Fleet:

a. Will accept custody of and be responsible for U.S. Navy and Marine personnel.

b. Will make above-mentioned personnel available to G-2, G.H.Q., or other intelligence agency until personnel is not required for intelligence purposes.

c. When advised by G-2, G.H.Q., that personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes, will dispose of them as desired unless otherwise directed by G.H.Q.

5. This headquarters (A. C. of S., G-2) or agency designed by this Headquarters will be responsible for:

a. Meeting evacuees at expected point of arrival in allied-held territory in S.W.P.A. and accompanying evacuees to destination.



b. Ensuring proper security arrangements, such as:

- (1) Establishing security guard to prevent conversation re evacuee's experiences with unauthorized personnel of all ranks.
- (2) Collecting, listing and receipting for all indentification papers, films souvenirs, documents, letters, etc. in possession of evacuee.
- (3) Collecting all letters written by or brought out of enemy-held territory by evacuees or evacuating agency and arranging for their proper censoring and dispatch, this to continue until evacuees are released from supervision of this Headquarters.
- (4) Preventing transmission of any messages by the evacuee until cleared by G.H.Q.
- (5) Giving security briefing to all evacuees.

c. Radioing Military Intelligence Division, War Department, the name, date and place of birth, name and address of nearest relative in United States, and approximate date of departure for United States of each U.S. civilian evacuee.

d. Obtaining from each evacuee prescribed War Department oath of secrecy and forwarding two (2) copies of same to Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

e. Preparing for signature of evacuee a report covering his experiences in enemy-held territory and giving such information as he may have concerning enemy forces, activities, etc.

f. Notifying C.G., U.S.A.F.F.E. and Commander, 7th Fleet when evacuees are no longer required for intelligence purposes, making any recommendation that is advisable.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

**1031**

B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.





D R A F T

9 April 1944.

AG 383.6 (9 Apr 44)B

SUBJECT: Processing of Philippine Evacuees.

TO : Commander, Seventh Fleet  
Commanding General, USAFFE, APO 501.  
Controller AIB (Attn: Chief PRS).



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a. Notify this Headquarters (A. C. of S., G-2) and Headquarters, U.S.A.F.F.E. of expected time and place of arrival of evacuees in Australia and expected time of arrival in Brisbane or other designated destination.

b. Deliver evacuees to Brisbane or to other destination directed by this Headquarters.

c. All personnel meeting evacuees must be approved by this Headquarters.

3. The C.G., U.S.A.F.F.E.:

a. Will accept custody of, administer and be responsible for U.S. Military and civilian personnel.

b. Will accept custody of and be responsible for other nationals and will notify the nearest representative of government or armed forces concerned.

c. Will make above-mentioned personnel available to G-2, G.H.Q. or other appropriate intelligence agency until personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes.

d. When advised by G-2, G.H.Q., that evacuees are no longer required for intelligence purposes.

- (1) Will return U. S. military personnel to the U.S. unless approval is granted for individual to remain in S.W.P.A.
- (2) Will turn over U.S. civilians to the American Consul for transportation to the U.S. or for other disposition.
- (3) Will turn over other nationals to representative of government or armed forces concerned unless other recommendation is made by this Headquarters.

e. Arrange for suitable quarters and administration for military and civilian personnel except U.S. Naval and Marine personnel during period of interrogation. U.S.N. and U.S.M.C. personnel will be turned over to the Commander 7th Fleet at designated point for administration.

f. Will make shipping accommodation available when necessary for return of above-mentioned personnel to the U.S.

4. The Commander, 7th Fleet:

a. Will accept custody of and be responsible for U.S. Navy and Marine personnel.

b. Will make above-mentioned personnel available to G-2, G.H.Q., or other intelligence agency until personnel is not required for intelligence purposes.

c. When advised by G-2, G.H.Q., that personnel is no longer required for intelligence purposes, will dispose of them as desired unless otherwise directed by G.H.Q.

5. This headquarters (A. C. of S., G-2) or agency designed by this Headquarters will be responsible for:

a. Meeting evacuees at expected point of arrival in allied-held territory in S.W.P.A. and accompanying evacuees to destination.





b. Ensuring proper security arrangements, such as:

- (1) Establishing security guard to prevent conversation re evacuee's experiences with unauthorized personnel of all ranks.
- (2) Collecting, listing and receipting for all identification papers, films souvenirs, documents, letters, etc. in possession of evacuee.
- (3) Collecting all letters written by or brought out of enemy-held territory by evacuees or evacuating agency and arranging for their proper censoring and dispatch, this to continue until evacuees are released from supervision of this Headquarters.
- (4) Preventing transmission of any messages by the evacuee until cleared by G.H.Q.
- (5) Giving security briefing to all evacuees.

c. Radioing Military Intelligence Division, War Department, the name, date and place of birth, name and address of nearest relative in United States, and approximate date of departure for United States of each U.S. civilian evacuee.

d. Obtaining from each evacuee prescribed War Department oath of secrecy and forwarding two (2) copies of same to Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

e. Preparing for signature of evacuee a report covering his experiences in enemy-held territory and giving such information as he may have concerning enemy forces, activities, etc.

f. Notifying C.G., U.S.A.F.F.E. and Commander, 7th Fleet when evacuees are no longer required for intelligence purposes, making any recommendation that is advisable.

By command of General MacARTHUR: -

B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 17 April 1944.

1. Contents noted.
2. Forwarded for dispatch to Inginiere.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

1 Incl: WAR 23458, fr Quezon, 15 Apr '44.  
jpd

*Shelby*  
S.N.M.

*sent 19 Apr 1944*  
*204*  
*WAR 23458*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08  
20 AUG 75



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*AIC*

~~SECRET~~



05231

~~SECRET~~

FOR GENERAL MACARTHURS EYES ONLY PASS TO INGINIERO  
FROM PRESIDENT QUEZON  
WAR 23458 FIFTEENTH

*Handwritten signature*

*6:4*

*PRS*

Neither I nor the Auditor General who lacks the right to designate anybody as his representative have so designated Roman Delbano. I declare all Delbano's acts null and void. Warn him in my name that any further attempt on his part to exercise same authority as he has done will bring about his immediate dismissal from the service. Instruct him to explain to me through you what he has done and his reasons for doing

*Handwritten initials*

BISSELL (WDGBI)

*Handwritten initials*

TOO 151634 Z 160234 K  
RECD SIG CEN GHQ 160037 Z 161037 K

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



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31 *level 2*

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FRS

Deputy Controller, AIB

17 April 1944

Request that the counterfeit Jap military currency which you have on hand be turned over to this Section for special packing and preparation for shipment to our Darwin warehouse where it will be held for delivery to forward units as directed by the C in C.

C. W.

From: Deputy Controller, AIB

To: Chief of FRS.

Date: 17 Apr 44

Will you please state your proposed plan of distribution and give a brief description of the control and security measures you propose to use in order that GHQ may be properly informed and approval obtained?

C. S. M.

From: FRS

To: Deputy Controller, AIB

Date: 19 April 1944

1. My plan with respect to the counterfeit enemy currency is to place same in sealed tins and store it at our Darwin supply base against future shipment under policies, from time to time, prescribed by the C in C. The base in reference is staffed entirely by selected American personnel. Adequate security measures have been taken to render same inviolate by unauthorized persons.

2. I do not believe that any fiscal accountability for this material should be assumed by this Headquarters because of its nature but I do believe that disbursing agencies in the Philippine area should be held to the same accountability covering its disbursement as is exacted in the disbursement of authentic currency - this to prevent its unauthorized and improper use as a purchasing medium. Instructions to make this clear will be issued.

C.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

588



From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 7 April 1944

1. A central Pacific sub recently picked up between Leyte and Mindanano a Filipino who was working for guerilla forces. They interrogated him as a POW, and published the report of his interview in a Central Pacific G-2 publication.
2. Data obtained was accurate to the extent that there were guerilla forces and that Fertig was on the Agusan River. The balance of his statements were rumors and exaggerations of guerilla combat activities.
3. Central Pacific now believes the POW (?) would be of possible value to us.
4. Attached is Central Pacific's report and draft of a letter to G-2, Central Pacific.
5. Request your comments, if any.

C.A.W.

2 Incls:

- Incl. 1 -Draft of ltr to G-2, Central Pacific.
- Incl. 2 -Annex No. 5 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 13  
Central Pacific Area, 25 Mar 44.

jpd

Information Copies:



From: PRS

To: G-2

Date: 16 April 1944

1. This Section does not desire the Filipino in reference unless it is deemed desirable to bring him here for enlistment in view of the information of which he is in possession.
2. Reference last paragraph of your proposed letter to General Twitty, it might be advisable to inform the Navy of Dewey's victory of Manila Bay - of the ensuing sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines.

C.W.

2 Incls:

~~3000~~ n/c

372

~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 15 April 1944

1. This message is in response to our query as to why CUSHING messages in re Jap prisoners, dated 9 April, were not dispatched here until 12 April. Discloses that messages although dated 9th were not actually received by FERTIG's station until 12th.

2. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that CUSHING was in the field and had to dispatch messages by runner to his headquarters for radio transmission.

3. Progress is shown today in bringing CUSHING into direct communication with this Headquarters. He already has and is using special codes.

Incl:

Svc msg 37  
fr Fertig

CW  
C.W.



62

CW

260  
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~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354



~~SECRET~~  
14 APRIL, 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : FERTIG (EVANS)

SVC NR 37 14 APRIL

OUR STATION RECORD SHOWS THAT MESSAGES REFERRED TO IN YOUR SERVICE NUMBER 43, FROM PGA, WERE RECEIVED BY US ON 12 APRIL AT 1035 LOCAL TIME. THEY WERE ALL DATED 9 APRIL. THEY WERE RELAYED TO KAZ AT 1417 LOCAL TIME SAME DAY RECEIVED: APRIL 12. DELAY AT THIS STATION ONLY ABOUT FOUR HOURS. MESSAGES SENT TO YOU WERE SAME AS RECEIVED. FAULT LIES WITH PGA, WHERE MESSAGES WERE HELD THREE DAYS BEFORE SENT TO US. SUGGEST YOU INFORM THEM.



~~SECRET~~  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354  
~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

1944.

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

TO:

FOR:

Deputy Chief of Staff  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-1  
~~Ass't Chief of Staff G-2~~  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-3  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4  
Adjutant General

Nec. Action  
Note & Return  
Information  
File

Deputy Chief of Staff USAFFE

S. P. R. S.

*No action*



*[Handwritten signature]*

*AM*

**CCSI**

Lieut. General, USA,  
Chief of Staff.

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720354

*File*



~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 14 April 1944

1. Herewith is message number 10, dated 12 April, just received from CUSHING.

2. All messages received on the matter of the prisoners are also attached. From these messages it will be noted that:

Msg No. 7 (thru FERTIG) announcing capture of prisoners was dated 8 April

Msg No. 8 (thru FERTIG) giving names of prisoners was dated 9 April

Msg No. 265 (thru ANDREWS) discussing manner and means of disposition was dated 9 April

Msg No. 11 (thru FERTIG) same as above was dated 9 April

Msg No. 12 (thru FERTIG) advised of prisoners release dated 9 April

From the above it will be observed that release was effected on 9 April or two days before our message of instructions in re prisoners disposition. This action taken was, as a consequence, not in disregard of specific instructions.

3. Messages above have disclosed a delay in transmission thru FERTIG's station WAT which I am having investigated.

4. James CUSHING was a Captain Reserve placed on active duty at start of war. Following surrender he joined FENTON and they became Co-Commanders of the CEBU Forces. On 2 September 1943 CUSHING arrived in NEGROS to communicate direct with this HEADQUARTERS. During his absence FENTON was executed by his own men. CUSHING is the undisputed leader of the CEBU Forces and all are in agreement that his courage and personal leadership has been largely responsible for the sustained resistance. He was appointed Commander, CEBU Area Command on 22 January.

5. I believe that action against CUSHING for the release of the prisoners, based upon an agreement with the enemy to refrain from further atrocities upon the people, would but further complicate a situation already difficult for this Headquarters to handle. CUSHING's action was taken in the interests of the people. It will probably draw them closer to his leadership. If he is discharged as Area Commander he would but revert to the position previously held (~~as~~ chieftain) and it would be impossible for this Headquarters to exercise

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 14 April 1944

any measure of control over him or coordinate his actions or those of his forces. It would be impossible furthermore to establish any other leadership over the people, who would look upon CUSHING's discharge as a penalty for serving their immediate interests. We have as yet no information on the killings which may have prompted his decision.

6. I strongly recommend that no action be taken in the premises.

Incls:

Orig of msg no. 10  
from Cushing  
Copies of msgs nos  
7, 8, 11, 12 fr Cushing  
Copy of msg no 265  
from Andrews

CW  
C.W.



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720354

~~TOP SECRET~~



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject: ~~TOP SECRET~~

From:

c/s

To:

Chief PRS

Date:

13 April 44

Despatch the following message to Cushing:

"Your action in releasing important prisoners after negotiation with the enemy is most reprehensible and leads me to doubt your judgment and efficiency. You are hereby discharged from your functions as Commander of the 7th Military District."

Despatch the following message to other designated commanders in the Philippines:

RIS.  
"The Commander of the 7th Military District captured a number of important prisoners and was directed to make every effort to remove them to a place of safety. Captain Cushing, however, after negotiation with the enemy, released the prisoners. He has therefore been discharged from his functions as commander of the 7th Military District."

RKS.



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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12 APRIL 1944

TO • : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : CUSHING

NR 10 12 APRIL

SINCE A DIRECT OR A REPRESENTATIVE COULD NOT BE SENT HERE, AFTER ALL MY ATTEMPTS FOR DIRECT, WE APOLOGIZE FOR ACTION TAKEN REGARD THE 10 PRISONERS, FROM SLIPS MADE IN CONVERSATION BY PRISONER, NAME OF CHIDA OR SHIDA PART OF GENERAL'S NAME, YAMAMOTO APPARENTLY A COMMANDER. REITERATE AN OFFICER FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS CAPABLE OF HANDLING THIS SITUATION WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
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~~SECRET~~  
12 APRIL, 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : CUSHING (VIA WAT)

NR 11 9 APRIL

JAP CAPTIVES FROM PALAO. ENEMY AWARE THEIR PRESENCE  
HERE. WE ARE CATCHING HELL. WE ARE STAGING A FAKE REMOVAL  
FROM THIS ISLAND TO WITHDRAW PRESSURE, WHILE AWAITING YOUR  
FURTHER ORDERS. SOUTHEAST COAST CEBU IMPOSSIBLE NOW. WILL  
MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO HOLD THE JAPANESE GENERAL AND NEXT  
RANKING OFFICER. PLEASE RUSH ADVICE; NORTHEAST COAST STILL  
CLEAR FOR SUBMARINE.

(THE PHRASE "CUSHING TO MACARTHUR" APPEARED IN PARENTHESES.)  
(SPELLING OF PALAO AS RECEIVED, NOT "PALAU.")



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~SECRET~~

COPY

12 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : CUSHING

NR 12 09 APRIL

JAP PRISONERS TOO HOT FOR US TO HOLD. DUE TO NUMBER OF CIVILIANS BEING KILLED, I MADE TERMS THAT CIVILIANS ARE NOT TO BE MOLESTED IN FUTURE, IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PRISONERS. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY DID NOT KNOW IT, WE HAD ONLY 25 SOLDIERS BETWEEN THE ATTACKING FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED AND OUR POSITION. ENEMY NOW WITHDRAWING TOWARDS CITY. IN SOUTHERN CEBU, JAPS WERE REPORTED TWO THOUSAND STRONG, LOOKING FOR PRISONERS.



3351

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354



~~SECRET~~

11 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : ANDREWS  
NR : 265 10TH APRIL

CUSHING REPORTS NIP GENERAL AND TEN HIGH RANKING OFFICERS CAPTURED IN PLANE CRASH. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HIM TO MACARTHUR DATED 9TH APRIL:

"JAP CAPTIVES FROM PALAU. ENEMY AWARE THEIR PRESENCE HERE. WE ARE CATCHING HELL. WE ARE STAGING FAKE REMOVAL FROM THIS ISLAND TO WITHDRAW PRESSURE, WHILE AWAITING YOUR FURTHER ORDERS. SOUTHEAST COAST CEBU IMPOSSIBLE NOW. WE WILL MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO HOLD THE JAPANESE GENERALS NEXT RANKING OFFICER. PLEASE RUSH ADVICE, NORTHEAST COAST STILL CLEAR FOR SUBMARINE."

HAVE ASKED CUSHING TO GET PARTICULARS WANTED IN YOUR 129. WILL USE SUBSTITUTION ALPHABET NR ONE INSTEAD OF FIVE FOR NEXT PERIOD.

*CS  
EdA*



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

~~SECRET~~

COPY

9 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : CUSHING  
NR : 7 8 APRIL

WE HAVE 10 JAPANESE PRISONERS NOW EN ROUTE TO OUR HEADQUARTERS.  
PLEASE ADVISE ACTION TO BE TAKEN. CONSTANT ENEMY PRESSURE MAKES THIS SITUATION  
VERY PRECARIOUS. FURTHER INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS WILL FOLLOW.



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

0051



COPY

~~SECRET~~

9 April 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : CUSHING

NR : 8 9th APRIL

REFERENCE TEN JAP PRISONERS -- THEY CAME FROM FOUR-MOTORED PLANES WHICH CRASHED OFF SAN FERNANDO AT TWO O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING 1st APRIL. THEIR NAMES:

GENERAL TWANI FUROMEI, COMMANDING OFFICER OF  
LAND AND SEA FORCES IN MACASSAR  
YOJI YAMAMOTO, MARINE OFFICER BOUND FOR MACASSAR  
YASUKICHI YAMAGATA  
MATSUTARE OKANURA, AVIATOR  
USHIKISA IMANISHI  
KEIS OKUJESIMI, AERONAUTICAL ENGINEER  
TOMIDO OLASOGI, OPERATOR  
TUSHIDO OKADA, ENGINEER  
MASATUSI YUSITU, OPERATOR  
TAKASHI TANIKI, ENGINEER

THEIR PERSONNEL EFFECTS:

A PAIR OF SHOULDER STRAPS FROM MARINE OFFICER YAMAMOTO. ONE MEMORANDUM NOTEBOOK WITH JAPANESE SCRIPTS. ONE WRAPPED PACKAGE OF JAPANESE RELICS. THREE HOSPITAL CASES, INCLUDING GENERAL FUROMEI AND MARINE OFFICER YAMAMOTO. RUMORS THAT PLANE SHOT DOWN BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE FROM SUBMARINE. HOWEVER, WE ARE CHECKING. DUE TO GENERAL CONDITION OF PRISONERS AND SITUATION AS IT IS, FURTHER INFO MAY BE SOMEWHAT DELAYED.



10051

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 13 April 1944

I regret the result reflected in attached message but feel that CUSHING did all he could in the circumstances.

Incl:

Orig of msg 12  
fr CUSHING

*CW*  
C.W.



*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

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~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
12 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : CUSHING

NR 12 09 APRIL

JAP PRISONERS TOO HOT FOR US TO HOLD. DUE TO NUMBER OF CIVILIANS BEING KILLED, I MADE TERMS THAT CIVILIANS ARE NOT TO BE MOLESTED IN FUTURE, IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PRISONERS. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY DID NOT KNOW IT, WE HAD ONLY 25 SOLDIERS BETWEEN THE ATTACKING FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED AND OUR POSITION. ENEMY NOW WITHDRAWING TOWARDS CITY. IN SOUTHERN CEBU, JAPS WERE REPORTED TWO THOUSAND STRONG, LOOKING FOR PRISONERS.



~~TOP SECRET~~  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 11 April 1944

1. In re enemy prisoners in CUSHING's hands the following message has been dispatched:

"REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER EIGHT DESIRE IF POSSIBLE EVACUATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF THE SENIOR PRISONERS WITH AS MANY OF PARTY AS POSSIBLE CMA SELECTED IN ACCORD WITH RELATIVE IMPORTANCE PD NORTHEAST COAST CEBU IS NAVIGATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE PD CAN YOU SEND THEM UNDER SAFE CONDUCT TO A RENDEZVOUS SITE SOUTHERN BOHOL OR SOUTHERN NEGROS CMA PREFERENCE OF RENDEZVOUS AREA IN ORDER NAMED PD HOW SOON COULD PARTY BE AT SITE PD PARTY BELIEVED OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE BE ALERT TO USE OF ASSUMED NAMES AND RANKS UNDER WHICH SENIOR PRISONER MAY POSE AS JUNIOR PD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO KEEP THEM SAFE FOR EVACUATION AND PREVENT RECAPTURE PD GIVE MATTER UTMOST SECRECY"

*See 20  
Cushing  
mag # 5*

2. Reflecting on CUSHING's mental sluggishness (pre-war) I thought it advisable to insert the warning contained in the underscored portion of the message. I endeavored to get you at the office for confirmation of this change but you had left. I thereafter took the responsibility for the insertion.

3. If a Jap admiral is posing as a general he may just as well be posing as a junior member of the party. I thought CUSHING should be warned against the possibility of evacuating the wrong person.

*CW  
C.W.*



*62  
PRS*

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*File  
CW*

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 11 April 1944

1. Attached message just received from CUSHING.
2. Following message to be dispatched to CUSHING, following conference with General WILLOUGHBY and Captain McCOLLUM:

\*REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER EIGHT DESIRE IF POSSIBLE EVACUATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF THE SENIOR PRISONERS WITH AS MANY OF ~~THE~~ PARTY AS POSSIBLE CMA SELECTED IN ACCORD WITH RELATIVE IMPORTANCE PD NORTHEAST COAST CEBU IS NAVIGATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE PD CAN YOU SEND THEM UNDER SAFE CONDUCT TO A RENDEZVOUS SITE SOUTHERN BOHOL OR SOUTHERN NEGROS CMA PREFERENCE OF RENDEZVOUS AREA IN ORDER NAMED PD HOW SOON COULD PARTY BE AT SITE PD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO KEEP THEM SAFE FOR EVACUATION AND PREVENT RECAPTURE PD GIVE MATTER UTMOST SECRECY

3. Any modifications? I am endeavoring to hold open the circuit with FERTIG to get message through this afternoon. That is the most secure means available because of new codes now in effect.

Incl:

Orig msg no 265  
fr Andrews

CW  
C.W.



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720354

11 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : ANDREWS  
NR : 265 10TH APRIL

CUSHING REPORTS NIP GENERAL AND TEN HIGH RANKING OFFICERS  
CAPTURED IN PLANE CRASH. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HIM TO MACARTHUR  
DATED 9TH APRIL:

"JAP CAPTIVES FROM PALAU. ENEMY AWARE THEIR PRESENCE  
HERE. WE ARE CATCHING HELL. WE ARE STAGING FAKE REMOVAL  
FROM THIS ISLAND TO WITHDRAW PRESSURE, WHILE AWAITING YOUR  
FURTHER ORDERS. SOUTHEAST COAST CEBU IMPOSSIBLE NOW. WE  
WILL MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO HOLD THE JAPANESE GENERALS NEXT  
RANKING OFFICER. PLEASE RUSH ADVICE, NORTHEAST COAST STILL  
CLEAR FOR SUBMARINE."

HAVE ASKED CUSHING TO GET PARTICULARS WANTED IN YOUR  
129. WILL USE SUBSTITUTION ALPHABET NR ONE INSTEAD OF FIVE  
FOR NEXT PERIOD.

cd  
ESH



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0001



~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

*Handwritten signature*

File No.:

Subject:

From: FRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 10 April 1944

1. Attached message number 8 from CUSHING gives amplifying info on ten Jap prisoners reported by his message number 7 now before you with my recommendation for action.

2. In view of the nature of the prisoners does the C in C desire any special disposition made?

Incl:

Orig. of msg no 8  
from Cushing

*C.W.*



*File in*

~~SECRET~~

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~SECRET~~

32

9 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FROM : CUSHING  
NR : 8 9TH APRIL



REFERENCE TEN JAP PRISONERS -- THEY CAME FROM FOUR-MOTORED PLANE WHICH CRASHED OFF SAN FERNANDO AT TWO O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING 1ST APRIL. THEIR NAMES:

GENERAL TWANI FUROMEI, COMMANDING OFFICER OF LAND AND SEA FORCES IN MACASSAR

YOJI YAMAMOTO, MARINE OFFICER BOUND FOR MACASSAR

YASUKICHI YAMAGATA

MATSUTARE OKANURA, AVIATOR

USHIKISA IMANISHI

KEIS OKUJESIMI, AERONAUTICAL ENGINEER

TOMIDO OLASOGI, OPERATOR

TUSHIDO OKADA, ENGINEER

MASATUSI YUSITU, OPERATOR

TAKASHI TANIKA, ENGINEER

THEIR PERSONAL EFFECTS:

A PAIR OF SHOULDER STRAPS FROM MARINE OFFICER YAMAMOTO.  
ONE MEMORANDUM NOTEBOOK WITH JAPANESE SCRIPTS. ONE WRAPPED PACKAGE OF JAPANESE RELICS. THREE HOSPITAL CASES, INCLUDING GENERAL FUROMEI AND MARINE OFFICER YAMAMOTO. RUMORS THAT PLANE ~~SHOT DOWN~~ BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE FROM SUBMARINE. HOWEVER, WE ARE CHECKING. DUE TO GENERAL CONDITION OF PRISONERS AND SITUATION AS IT IS, FURTHER INFO MAY BE SOMEWHAT DELAYED.

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~~SECRET~~

ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU  
PHILIPPINE REGIONAL SECTION

~~SECRET~~

AIB Info.  
Report No. 1973

Date: 9 April 1944

PRS Action Sheet

No. 1593

TO: Chief of Staff.

Coordination: G-2

Message No. 7 from CUSHING

Precis: In re CUSHING request for instructions in re disposition of prisoners.

Comment: Any of our other guerilla leaders would have decided this problem in the circumstances with 10 bullets without reference to this Headquarters. CUSHING has, however, before demonstrated a more disciplined regard for the will of higher authority. Such attitude may be somewhat indifferent to guerilla standards but gives rise to greater assurance of reliability from the standpoint of command. I believe you will find in CUSHING an able but still subordinate fighter and leader in whom you can fully depend to discharge his mission to the full limit of his capabilities. At the crucial time this is what you will require.

In action taken on the question raised I believe it should be assumed that the message of the C in C may reach the hands of the enemy and precautions in its phraseology taken accordingly.

Action taken:

G-2 advised.



Action recommended:

Dispatch of following reply:

"DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS PAREN YOUR NUMBER SEVEN PAREN MUST BE IN ACCORD WITH OUR RULES OF LAND WARFARE. IF THEIR REMOVAL TO THE AREA OF ANOTHER COMMAND IN BETTER POSITION TO SECURE THE PRISONERS IS POSSIBLE I WILL ISSUE THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMANDER THEREOF TO FACILITATE SUCH ACTION."

C.W.

5131

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

9 APRIL 1944

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

FROM : CUSHING

NR 7 8 APRIL

WE HAVE 10 JAPANESE PRISONERS NOW EN ROUTE TO OUR HEADQUARTERS. PLEASE ADVISE ACTION TO BE TAKEN. CONSTANT ENEMY PRESSURE MAKES THIS SITUATION VERY PRECARIOUS. FURTHER INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS WILL FOLLOW.



~~SECRET~~

ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

TSRE

26d



~~SECRET~~

G-2

PRS (Col. Whitney)

13 Apr 44

1. Attached is a type program proposed by OWI for broadcasts to the Philippines to start shortly.
2. I should like to have your comment on it before submitting it to the Chief of Staff for approval.
3. Because Mr. Marquardt proposes to leave shortly, I would appreciate getting this as soon as possible in order to clear the matter before his departure.

1 Incl: as above.  
ph

C. A. W.

From: PRS

To: G-2

Date: 15 April 1944

General outline of program appears to be satisfactory. I think the main consideration is to maintain sufficient flexibility to permit the adjustment of the program as the situation develops and to flash spot news.

Incl:  
n/c

C.W.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



*See OWI file  
for proposed program*

~~SECRET~~

338

~~SECRET~~

FRS

G-2

14 April 1944

1. I discussed this matter with the Chief of Staff yesterday evening. He takes the view that the time has not yet arrived for the general absorption by G-2 of the functions now vested in FRS, as proposed in the attached amended directive.

2. He reiterated his view expressed on 29 May last that AIB was an independent staff agency operating under G-2 and advised that present procedure under which certain documents are laid directly before him by this Section is satisfactory.

3. As I find that present procedure permits this Section to discharge its responsibilities with no great difficulty I should as a consequence be reluctant to suggest any major modification thereof.

4. I shall continue as in the past to exert every effort to get the intelligence material that you desire with the greatest possible dispatch and believe that the record discloses satisfactory progress in that direction.

5. You may be sure that an harmonious working arrangement with G-2 and all other staff sections now concerned, or hereafter to be concerned, with Philippine matters is an objective toward which I shall continue to strive with the utmost earnestness. I shall defend, however, the staff position in which FRS has been cast by the Chief of Staff and its right to work under existing policies and directives toward the common goal without obstruction.

Incl:

Amended directive  
C/N fr FRS to G-2  
G-2 to FRS in reply

C.W.



312

2002

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720354



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

FRS

19 April 1944

1. The papers were referred to you informally, for comment, modification of language etc. The papers were not referred to the C/S at all, pending your reactions etc. You were invited to make such changes that you desired or felt entitled to, and if there were any erroneous points, to correct them informally. Under the circumstances, I feel that I have taken a conciliatory position which does not warrant this kind of reply?

2. If you prefer, this matter is still wide open, and I should be glad to have your views, or solution, in a personal conference.

ITM  
Information Copies:

C. A. W.

~~SECRET~~

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13 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Philippine Island Activities.

TO : GHQ Staff Sections (See distribution).

1. Current operations ultimately involving the PI require more direct staff interests and coordination of current PI activities in the frame work of AIB. To orient all staff sections and interested agencies, and to assure coordination, relative responsibilities as between G-2 and PRS are defined and enumerated below.

2. PI activities at present fall under the following headings:

- a. Intelligence: military, political and civil.
- b. Supply of guerilla forces and special parties.
- c. Communication with our forces in the area.
- d. Conduct of guerilla affairs.
- e. Evacuation of personnel.



3. The formation of AIB envisaged primarily intelligence penetration into enemy held territory. The general staff agency having paramount interest in the PI at present is G-2 GHQ. Consequently, to avoid duplication of effort and to provide controlled channels of communication, the following provisions will govern with respect to PI activities. It is expected that many problems will be solved by joint G-2/PRS action.

4. G-2 will be responsible for:

- a. Evaluation and dissemination of documents and other intelligence received from the PI. Such documents are to be delivered promptly to G-2 upon receipt. G-2 is the authorized office of record for reports compiled by evacuees and all documents received from the PI, as well as their dissemination to other staff Sections and to Washington.
- b. Directives to new parties and intelligence direction of parties and organizations in the field; the development of intelligence penetration in priorities based on operational plans.
- c. Coordination and supervision of propaganda activities towards the PI, including all OWI activities connected therewith as falling within the field of "Psychological Warfare" a staff responsibility.
- d. Coordination, approval, and check recording of all radio traffic to the PI with the exception of service messages and operational messages connected with ship and supply movements or conditions affecting a rendezvous. The present procedure is satisfactory.
- e. In order to assure coordination of activities all correspondence pertaining to the PI, except that relating to supply matters and administration of personnel, will be routed through G-2.

5. G-2 will be responsible for preparation and execution of appropriate plans for the employment of guerilla forces in coordination with appropriate Staff Sections.

6. G-4 will be responsible for making available supplies for guerrilla forces.

7. PRS will be responsible for:

- a. Procurement, training, organization and dispatch of intelligence parties, in coordination with G-2.
- b. Supply of guerrilla forces and field parties in coordination with G-4.
- c. Evacuation of personnel from the PI.

8. The Chief Signal Officer will be responsible for supply and maintenance of signal communications with guerilla forces.

9. Processing of evacuees will be in accordance with attached directive dated \_\_\_\_\_ April, subject: Processing of Philippine Evacuees..

**SISE**

DISTRIBUTION:  
C/S, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, AIB,  
USAFPE, 7th Fleet, AAF.

R. K. SUTHERLAND,  
Lieut. General, U.S. Army,  
Chief of Staff.

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354



~~SECRET~~

From To Date  
C/S G-2 9 April 44

The co-ordination of Philippine propaganda will be co-ordinated by GHQ. The G-2 division is primarily the interested staff section.

1 Incl: Chit fr G-2 dd 8 Apr 44.

R.K.S.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OMI  
20 AUG. 75



G-2 P.R.S. 13 Apr 44

1. To note.

2. This applies to "Free Philippines" as well as to Philippine propaganda in general. It does not change the procedure followed to date under which the work done by you in this connection has been coordinated through G-2.

3. I believe the desired end can best be obtained by continued close cooperation.

1 Incl: n/c  
ph

C. A. W.

-----  
FRS G-2 14 Apr 1944

1. Noted.

2. I take it that the expression "coordination" means neither control, direction nor preparation, which is properly a responsibility of FRS.

3. At the time that the publication of "Free Philippines" was approved (my C/N of 6 October 1943) the Chief of Staff explained to me that it was his desire that the initial contact in such matters with ONI be handled through GHQ - that thereafter, once a project was approved, it became the responsibility of this Section to carry it into execution. This I have sought to do, clearing the photographs and text with the Public Relations Officer and/or G-2 as the circumstances required.

**SECRET**

C.W.

~~SECRET~~

228

Copy

8 April 1944

Chief of Staff X

1. Attached letter from Mr. Marquardt for your information.
2. I believe the policy of keeping Mr. Stiver in Australia to handle OWI Australian activities is very satisfactory. It keeps a man here who is accustomed to our ways and is persona grata with us.
3. May I raise a question: Has CirC or C/S taken a position in regard to co-ordination of PI propaganda as handled by OWI Sydney. At present G2 has done this.

W.



1510



~~TOP SECRET~~



No. R 8-4/165.

A.I.B. All Sections - Escaped Prisoners -  
Australian.

Controller, A.I.B.

Chief, P.R.S.

8 April, 1944.

1. In view of their long absence from Australia, the hardships they have undergone, and their knowledge of places and conditions outside the Philippines, Landforces have requested that, if possible, arrangements be made for the return to Australia of the remaining Australian escaped prisoners now in MINDANAO. From records here the personnel concerned are:-

- QX 4648 T/Capt. BLOW, R. B.
- VX 34838 T/Capt. GILLON, L. M.
- QX 21058 T/Lieut. McLAREN, R. K.

2. It would be appreciated if the necessary arrangements can be made and advice given of probable date of their return.

Copy to: Brig. Rogers.

C. G. R.

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 11 April 1944

1. Attention is invited to foregoing C/N from the Controller, A.I.B.
2. Action requested will be a disappointment to Colonel FERTIG and probably to the A.I.F. officers themselves, who have elected to remain with FERTIG, but I recommend that he be instructed to effect their evacuation as the opportunity presents itself.

C.W.

G-1

THRU: A.I.B.  
P.R.S.

13 April 1944

In view of the fact that these officers desire to remain in Mindanao, that their services there are more important than elsewhere and the extraordinary difficulty of replacement, it will be impracticable to comply with request at present.

B. F. F.

From: PRS

To: AIB

13 April 1944

Invitation to preceding C/N.

C.W.

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

292



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 13 April 1944.

Request that following message be dispatched to Fertig, Peralta, Abcede, Cushing, Inginiere, Kangleon and Smith:

"To obtain accurate estimate of enemy air capability, desire that intelligence agencies report numbers of planes at fields as of 10 and 25th of each month. Important that coverage be simultaneous. Planes will be reported by type. Airfield information required: number of runways, length and width, type of surfacing, number of revetments, number of dispersal points (affording no protection to plane). Radio such information and send detailed maps and sketches by mail. Obtain air organizations operating on fields, identity of squadrons, wings and air army."

*Fertig 356  
Inginiere 21  
Kangleon 4  
Smith 18  
Peralta 65  
Abcede 62  
Cushing 8*

jpd  
Information Copies:

*C.A.W.*

*OK CW*

*all dispatched  
jpd*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG 75



1382

358

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: PRS

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*Fertig 356  
Inginiero 21  
Kangleon 4  
Smith 18  
Peralta 65  
Abcede 62  
Cushing 8*

jpd  
Information Copies:

*[Signature]*  
C.A.W.

*OK CW*

*all done  
jpd*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG 75



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358

~~SECRET~~

PRS

G-2

13 April 1944

With respect to attached papers I have no comment to make other than to point out that the recitation of facts finds no support of record and is for the most part false. This is within the knowledge of your staff.

Incls:

G-2 check sheet  
to C/S;  
Directive

C.W.



28d



~~SECRET~~

G-2

C/S

10 April 1944

1. In accordance with your verbal instructions, a draft of a directive is attached to clarify Staff and PRS functions in the PI.

2. G-2/PRS differences have resulted from a lack of a specific directive to PRS outlining its duties, and to its unfamiliarity with staff procedure. These facts have encouraged PRS to attempt to solve all questions by itself.

3. G-2 has repeatedly referred to the C/S, and had approved by him, SOPs for PRS/G-2 action. PRS has invariably ignored them, or made them ineffective thru inaction (or lack of appreciation). A typical case in point.

a. In August 1943, upon arrival of a sub from the PI, which carried PI reports, documents etc., G-2 was forced to admit that it had no knowledge of what documents were received. To correct this, G-2 submitted a chit to the C/S as follows:

"As a general premise, PRS should be advised to follow staff procedure with regards to documents, viz:

a) Report incoming documents by listing title, maps, number of copies, etc.

b) G-2 to check and determine by inspection classification and routing.

c) Routing to appropriate agency: Japanese documents to ATIS thru G-2.

d) Reports of escapees etc., processed by G-2."

This chit was approved by C/S and G-2 sent PRS a check sheet with instructions to put the SOP into effect. G-2 has yet to see that SOP carried out. At present, a sub came in about 2 April from the PI. G-2 has received several bundles of papers and documents, but has no definite knowledge that all documents have arrived.

b. A second source of confusion results from PRS distributing correspondence directly to other agencies. Such actions are based on the supposition that PRS is competent to judge what agencies are interested. Numerous papers from the PI are forwarded to the C/S directly by PRS. Much of this required evaluation - some of it is not worth reading. G-2 is the evaluating agency of GHQ. To correct this condition the directive states that "PI communications will be routed thru G-2."

c. A PRS agent was sent to Mindoro a few months ago. He was not briefed. During his stay, his radios were requests for information and definition of policy. To correct this condition the directive states that the dispatch of intelligence parties will be coordinated with G-2.

-1-

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~~SECRET~~

G-2

G/S (Con'd)

10 April 44

d. PRS now sends messages to guerrilla forces without prior coordination with G-2. This practice may do considerable harm. Such messages have resulted in the arrival here of 15,000 pesos of guerrilla money - the redemption of which is still a problem. The directive corrects this practice by stating that radio traffic with the PI will be checked by and coordinated with by G-2 prior to dispatch, except for CinC or G/S messages "service and operational messages connected with ship and supply movements, or conditions affecting a rendezvous."

C.A.W.

1 Incl; Draft of directive.

rrm

Information Copies:

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20 AUG 75



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~~SECRET~~

9 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



SUBJECT: Philippine Island Activities.

TO : GHQ Staff Sections (See distribution).

1. Current operations ultimately involving the PI require more direct staff interest and coordination of current PI activities in the frame work of AIB. To orient all staff sections and interested agencies, and to assure coordination, relative responsibilities as between G-2 and PRS are defined and enumerated below.

2. The G-in-C or C/S initiate and approve all matters of policy in relation to Philippine affairs.

- 3. PI activities at present fall under the following headings:
  - a. Intelligence: Military, political and civil.
  - b. Supply of guerrilla forces and special parties.
  - c. Communication with our forces in the area.
  - d. Conduct of guerrilla affairs.

4. The formation of AIB envisaged primarily intelligence penetration into enemy held territory. The general staff agency having paramount interest in the PI at present is G-2 GHQ. Consequently, to avoid duplication of effort and to provide controlled channels of communication, the following provisions will govern with respect to PI activities. It is expected that many problems will be solved by joint G-2/PRS action.

- 5. G-2 will be responsible for:
  - a. Evaluation and dissemination of documents and other intelligence received from the PI. Such documents are to be delivered promptly to G-2 upon receipt. G-2 is the authorized office of record for reports compiled by evacuees and all documents received from the PI, as well as their dissemination to other Staff Sections and to Washington.
  - b. Directives to new parties and intelligence direction of parties and organizations in the field; the development of intelligence penetration in priorities based on operational plans. G-2 expects to utilize PRS' existing facilities and personnel.
  - c. Coordination and supervision of propaganda activities towards the PI, including all OWI activities connected therewith as falling within the field of "Psychological Warfare" a staff responsibility.
  - d. Coordination, approval, and check recording of all radio traffic to the PI with the exception of service messages and operational messages connected with ship and supply movements or conditions affecting a rendezvous. The present procedure is satisfactory.
  - e. Evaluation and check recording of correspondence pertaining to the PI. To this end, PI communications will be routed thru G-2.
  - f. Processing of evacuees from the PI in accordance with SOP now under study.

6. G-3 will be responsible for preparation of appropriate plans for the employment of guerrilla forces.

7. G-4 will be responsible for coordination of supply to guerrilla forces.

- 8. PRS will be responsible for:
  - a. Procurement, training, organization and dispatch of intelligence parties, in coordination with G-2.
  - b. Supply of organizations and parties in the field, and evacuation of personnel from the PI.

9. The Chief Signal Officer will be responsible for maintenance of signal communications with guerrilla forces.

R. K. SUTHERLAND,  
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:  
G/S, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, AIB,  
USAFS, 7th AF, AAF.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~ OFFICERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

### CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: G-2

Date: 13 April 1944

Reference is made to my C/N of 5 April 1944 in re the party of CRUZ, et al. The position is becoming increasingly difficult and I trust that the time will not be long before decision can be made concerning the disposition of these men.

*CW*  
C.W.

G-2

----- PRS -----

17 April 1944

1. Note G-2 concurrence of PRS' recommendations.
2. Re PRS check sheet 13 April, action papers were inadvertently filed in this office.
3. Information reports from PRS are being held for further study.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

*S.M.M.*  
S.M.M.

1 Incl:

Ck sheet fr G-2, PI to Gen. Willoughby, 7 Apr '44.

jpd

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20 AUG. 75



*File  
- CW*

*(27a)*

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 12 April 1944

Instructions to CUSHING in re disposition of prisoners  
were in his hands at 9:30 last night.

CW  
C.W.

G. W.  
M



W. L.  
C.W.

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

242

1131

~~TOP SECRET~~

FRS

AG, USAFFE  
Thru: AG, GHQ

12 April 1944

Further information has been received confirming the fact that the following named Americans are alive and free in the Philippines:

Lieut.                      RAMSEY  
James W. ATWELL, 17019754  
Frank JOHNSON of Lignum Coal Mines  
                     RUMSEL of Alateo Transportation Co.  
Dick WISNER of Masbate Mines

C.W.



2122

250



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

1944.

TO:

FOR:

Deputy Chief of Staff  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-1  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-2  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-3  
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4  
Adjutant General

Nec. Action  
 Note & Return  
 Information  
 File

P.R.S.

Deputy Chief of Staff USAFFE

*Col. Sebros*

*5:30 pm April 12*

*RS*

*ds*



**CSIS**

Lieut. General, USA,  
Chief of Staff.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 11 April 1944

1. Would it be convenient for me to present the following gentlemen, recently evacuated from NEGROS, to the C in C prior to their departure for the United States in the next couple of days:

Dr. Arthur Carson  
President, Silliman University.

Mr. Roy Bell  
Instructor in Radio Physics, Silliman University  
Director of Civil Affairs, Negros

Mr. Robert Silliman  
Deputy Governor of Negros (VILLAMOR appointment)  
Over 18 years Instructor in Philippine History  
and Political Science at Silliman University

2. All of the above have rendered conspicuous service to the guerilla cause in NEGROS. BELL has been particularly outstanding. He was dispatched to CEBU to contact FENTON and made the trip when no one else would undertake it. He later went to MINDANAO and contacted Colonel FERTIG. VILLAMOR commissioned him a Major in the AUS claiming specific authority from the C in C - failed to advise us of action taken or request confirmation.

3. I believe a short interview with these men prior to their departure for the United States would be recognition for their services and would be helpful in other ways.

CW  
C.W.



OK 1700 Apr 12  
Mull

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER  
720354

23d  
59

5132

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

file  
CW



~~TOP SECRET~~

PRS

G-2  
Thru: Chief of Staff

10 April 1944

Reference G-2 note on attached Action Sheet number 1561. On 1 November the C in C verbally stated his policy that the 10th M.D. should be given highest priority in the matter of support. At that time he stated " x x the guerillas in PANAY and NEGROS may be overcome but those in MINDANAO must be sustained for their future tactical employment x x ." Proceeding under this clearly expressed policy approximately 250 tons of supplies have been delivered to the 10th M.D. (including supplies for transshipment to CEBU, BOHOL, and LEYTE) while 45 tons each have been delivered to the 6th and 7th Military Districts. It is contemplated to dispatch another supply shipment to PANAY and NEGROS about the end of May, within the above stated policy which PRS will continue to adhere to until some other policy is prescribed. There is no question of "proportionate share" for the 6th M.D. in the circumstances.

Incl:

PRS Action Sheet  
number 1561

C.W.



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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

720354

~~TOP SECRET~~

212

0122

FBS

Chief of Staff

10 April 1944

1. This is reply to my message setting time for the inauguration of air supply operation, copy attached. After conferring with Major Rhoades late last night I dispatched the following:

"WEIGHT OF PLANE ON LANDING WILL NOT EXCEED FIFTY NINE THOUSAND POUNDS. REF YOUR EIGHT SIX EIGHT. UNIMPORTANT WHETHER GRASS IS CUT SO LONG AS RUNWAY IS COMPACT SMOOTH, UNOBSTRUCTED AND WELL MARKED. RUSH QUERY TO BOWLER AND ADVISE FURTHER IMMEDIATELY. DESIRE TO MEET SCHEDULE INDICATED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE."

2. This morning it was determined that if field is not ready for initial landing on 13th, at midnight on same date, by prior arrangement, the operation will be inaugurated by dropping supplies between road and beach just east of PAGADIAN in the PAGADIAN Bay area. Both Col. Gunn and Major Rhoades agree that flight is feasible.

Incls:

Copy of msg 350 to  
Fertig;  
Orig. of msg 868  
fr Fertig

C.W.



1122

22d



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: AG, GHQ

Date: 10 April 1944

It is requested that the following named officers, of this Section, be designated as additional Top Secret Control Officers for PRS:

Commander CHARLES PARSONS, USNR  
Lieutenant GEORGE F. ROWE, USNR  
Captain DONALD M. HIGBEE, AC

*(W)*  
C.W.

AG

PRS

11 April 1944

The names of the above-mentioned officers have been added to the list of designated TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICERS.

*B.M.F.*  
B. M. F.



*file*  
*cu*

*200*

*2002*

~~SECRET~~

MAILED 12 25 APR 11 '44 AG, GHQ



1209



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 10 April 1944

Advise that preliminary conversations had with the Americans recently evacuated from PANAY disclose a complete unity of highest regard for Colonel PERALTA and his dispositions and activities in PANAY. He is described as a tireless worker passionately devoted to the cause of Philippine liberation. A great preponderance of the people of PANAY, in both public and private life, reportedly respond wholeheartedly to his leadership.

aw  
C.W.

Mueh

*[Handwritten signature]*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



*[Handwritten signature]*

shy

*[Handwritten signature]*

File  
C.W.

8222

182

~~SECRET~~

FBS

Chief of Staff

9 April 1944

I recommend that a loyalty message from the C in C be incorporated in the next issue of FREE PHILIPPINES in which will be published, side by side, the letters of Governor CONFESOR and Datu MINDALANO. Suggest something along the lines following:

"Through the medium of this issue of FREE PHILIPPINES I desire to address myself and pay tribute to the unflinching loyalty of her people in this tragic period of Philippine history. With soil overrun by a savage foe devoid of both mercy and honor, the people of the Philippines have in preponderant numbers met the resulting grim tests in manner that has won for them the admiration and respect of liberty loving peoples everywhere.

"As appropriately reflecting their concept of loyalty to that high purpose, to which the vast majority of the people of the Philippines by resolute action militantly subscribe, I have caused to be inserted herein letters from the pens of Governor TOMAS CONFESOR and Captain (Datu) MANALAO MINDALANO. These letters, although written by men of different racial origin and diverse religious beliefs, eloquently portray the spirit of national pride and unity by which the people, with few exceptions, have met the stern realities of the hour and defiantly rejected compromise with human liberty or national honor. As such they will serve to immortalize the spirit of resistance to evil aggression than which no other peoples merit higher tribute on the pages of human history.

"When I shall return to Philippine soil with a great army of liberation to destroy the invader and restore the supremacy of democratic process under your Constitution, the hearts of all committed to our joint task will find inspiration from this splendid record of resolute and determined adherence to these lofty ideals of human liberty which have formed a common cornerstone to the national progress of our two peoples."

C.N.



(162)

3028



FMS

Chief of Staff

9 April 1944

1. Yesterday, following our conference in your office, I communicated to FERTIG the desire that our air supply operations be inaugurated by an initial landing in his area at dawn 13 April. All preparations at this end will be complete at the time indicated. It is possible that FERTIG may offer some objections to so early a date from his standpoint but if he does so his reasons can be studied and objections possibly overruled - in any event the action taken will emphasize to him that the project is designed for immediate execution rather than long range planning.

2. Is there any objection to my accompanying the first flight in? It would involve an absence of only a couple of days and I believe it would be helpful in many ways. The work of this Section is fully current and my absence for the time indicated would have no ill effect.

C.W.



3033

150

~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: FRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 9 April 1944

Herewith is a personal letter from Major SMITH written on 21 December. For the most part it discusses his reaction to the Filipinos he took with him. All of the men have since reached their destinations and have done a commendable job. Blue penciled portions may be of interest to you - particularly the reference to Dr. EVANS and the value of his work among the people.

Incl:

Ltr fr Maj. Smith  
to Col. Whitney

(u)  
G.W.

G 2  
RS

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



SECRET

148  
37

~~SECRET~~



Esperanza, Mindanao  
Dec. 21, 1943



UNITED STATES ARMY

Dear Colonel Whitney,

I am enclosing a money order for you to cash when you return to Manila. I hope it will not be too long before you are back there.

I have three parties enroute with ATR4 portable sets. Sgt. Monzana to Bondoc Peninsula with Robles as operator. He went north with Prámotivo San Augustin. Sgt. <sup>Besid</sup> went to Masbate with Bargo and Savellano. Besid will get them settled there and then proceed to Samar to join me. Sgt. Sanchez went to Mactan Island with Sabado and an agent from this area who has been making trips into Cebu. This agent will make a trip in and obtain the information desired on the new Military Headquarters there and then join Sanchez on Mactan where they will make one contact and send the information to you thru Fertig's station here.

I will be sitting on a bunch of pins until I know that these men are all safely settled. Sanchez will join me in Samar as soon as he gets the information out of Cebu. Both he and Besid have good agents from here with them who have made several trips into enemy territory. They have connections so that they can secure passes from the Japs for our men which will be a big help. I am proud of the men with me so far, they have left a very good impression here and left here full of enthusiasm and confident that they can carry their missions thru to a successful conclusion.

~~SECRET~~

I let Fertig have Evans. He needed him much more than I did. Evans is doing a good job here in both radio and medical work. People are coming from all



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OM  
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~


over the country for treatment. Doc has performed several minor operations and has shown the people the power of some of the new drugs. Some of the people are beginning to think that he is a miracle man. He has cured Tropical Ulcers of long standing in a few days with the new Sulfa drugs. A few more American Medicos up here would help out.

I would like to bring out one point regarding the sending of Filipinos from the states that we had not considered. These men that came up with me displayed no hesitancy when I proposed to send them out on a job for several months. They have no family ties here and are willing to go out in the bush on a Watcher station while it is almost impossible for Fertig to get men to leave their home ties and go to a new location particularly to a place where they cannot take their family. Fertig has a lot of Radio equipment here but does not have men willing to go out to lonely watcher stations with it. Neither men who are willing nor men who have training to handle the equipment. He sent a request to you for trained operators but no officers as he has plenty already.

Tomorrow night the remainder of the party leaves with me for Samar. It will probably take us two or three weeks to get up there. Fertig already has a station working on San Bernardino so I have not been in a hurry to get up there. The men from Misamis who are to accompany me will arrive tomorrow. They have been delayed on account of Jap activity. The Japs are very active the last few days in stopping sailboats. This is one reason I am worried about my men that went north. San Augustin gave us the dope on Anderson. He is near Tayabas, Tayabas with several Americans and 20 to 30 Scouts. I will try to get him out of there, as I believe the scouts can handle a radio and get the information for us better without Americans to watch out for.

~~SECRET~~

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20 AUG. 75





Will know more on this after I talk with Anderson. I and Fertig have already sent letters to him. My Bondoc station will be less than a days trip by hiking and banca from his hideout. Since I arrived here 3 separate agents of Fertigs have come in from Luzon. From what they tell me it is not too difficult to get information from Manila but it is hard for an American to attempt to operate there. I believe, we can do more good by having Philipinos trained in Australia in both the operation of radio equipment and in the methods of obtaining military intelligence information.

~~SECRET~~

Sergeant Stahl has made a good impression here. He has helped Fertig's code section out a lot with his knowledge of codes. Chick took the codes which I brought for Absede and Andrews in Negros. I am afraid he was unable to deliver them so Stahl has prepared two codes for me. I will send the two extra codes I brought for my own party to Negros and Fertig can send out the copy for your code section of the new codes on the next trip. We have been unable to contact Peralta's Station to tell him to send an officer for the codes and 209s which my party brought in. We have requested Negros to try and contact him for us but no reply to date.

I was against bringing the Philipinos from the states up here for a long time. Now, I am glad I brought them along. It would have pleased you to have been present when each of the three parties left here on their first mission. They left in separate boats as I did not want to put all of our eggs in one basket. I would liked to have seen Chick reaction to their reception here and to the manner in which they conducted themselves.

~~SECRET~~

An order of supplies for my party is attached. A lot of our personal supplies disappeared on the sub. Please send by the first trip to Fertig.

With best wishes for a Merry Xmas and a Happy New Year

Yours

Chas

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 8 April 1944

Herewith are copies of the second issue of FREE PHILIPPINES. Effort is being made now to produce a new issue of this magazine monthly.

Incls:  
6 copies of  
magazine

CW  
C.W.

62

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG 77



ERS

128  
35

2222

~~SECRET~~



FBS

G-2

8 April 1944

Attached herewith are copies of the latest issue of FREE PHILIPPINES.

Incls

4 copies of  
magazine

G.W.



128

FRS

Col. L. A. Miller

3 April 19

Herewith are copies of the second issue of FREE PHILIPPINES. Effort is being made now to produce a new issue of this magazine monthly.

Incls:  
2 copies of  
magazine

C.W.



128 .

128



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

*G 2*  
*w*

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 8 April 1944

Attached are extracts from a letter from Roy Howard to his son, Lieutenant Jack Howard in re President Quezon. Lieutenant Howard thought this informal report might be of interest to you.

Incl:  
Extract as identified

*CW*  
C.W.

*Eric*

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG. 75



*ES*  
*Wick*

*File*  
*w*

3222

*118*  
*72*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: Lieut. J. Howard

To: Col. C. Whitney

Date: 8 April 1944

Extract of a letter, dated 25 March, 1944:

"While in Miami last Tuesday night (21 March) I called on Casey, but only remained about a half an hour because I did not want him to over-tax his strength. His voice was so far gone that he could not talk to me on the phone, and was scarcely audible with me sitting alongside his bed. He looks to me to be a very sick man, although he says that his weight has come up from a low of 112 to a present weight of 135. He told me that the TB lesions have all healed. Before I went out I had a private talk with this Swiss doctor whom he has had with him for a long time, and the doctor admitted to me that the lesions had not healed. As a matter of fact, while Casey made considerable progress last summer at Saranac, there is considerable evidence that he has lost ground at Miami. You will recall that I did everything possible to induce him to stay away from there because of the moist, humid climate, but he was so crazy to get some place that was warm by contrast with Washington, that he went ahead to Florida anyway. I understand they have had a lousy wet winter there, and I'm afraid he's paid a price for his indiscretion.

"Incidentally, on the basis of several talks I have had with the Swiss doctor, I am inclined to believe that he's (the doctor) pretty thick between the ears. Possibly even worse than that is the fact that he is frightened to death of Casey. Casey tells the doctor what he is going to do, rather than vice versa.

"According to his present plans, Casey expects to go to Saranac Lake early next month. I'm going to write him, however, and urge him to make the trip in two jumps, stopping off for a while at Asheville, North Carolina, because I think it might be easily fatal for him to jump from the warm, humid climate to the climate that he will encounter in Saranac any time up to the middle of May."

J.H.



2321

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 09  
20 AUG 75

811



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject: Re 338 to Fertig

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 6 April 1944.

1. This office is cataloging and analyzing FI intelligence with a view to giving maximum intelligence assistance to Planning Sections and Task Force Commanders.

2. Various agencies require specific types of intelligence.

3. To avoid undue radio traffic, and misunderstanding on the part of guerrilla forces due to overlapping and amended instructions, request that intelligence directives be coordinated with G-2 prior to dispatch.

*Re: 338 Mar. 24k*

*Lawton*  
C.A.W.

jpd

Information Copies:

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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG. 75



1944

~~SECRET~~

108

~~SECRET~~

G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from sheets)

From	To	Date	Remarks
DC/S	Chief PRS Thru: G-2 AL	6 April 44	<p>With reference to recommendation of Juan Buenafe, Chairman Iloilo Currency Committee, that Demetrio George Vinson and Aniceto Belisario fill vacancies in offices of Provincial Auditor and Provincial Fiscal, please transmit President Quezon's reply as follows:</p> <p>"Aniceto Belisario is appointed Acting Provincial Auditor and Demetrio George Vinson is appointed Acting Provincial Fiscal. Both are to be members of Iloilo Currency Committee.</p> <p>"Next for Governor Marapao. If one million pesos will last until December 1944, why do you want the authority now. If and when more money is needed it will be authorized for purposes stated."</p> <p>Second paragraph of message refers to radio C-10219 sent to President Quezon.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>RJM.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Sent 9 Apr 44. msg 63 to Rens msg 20 to [unclear]</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON 20 AUG 73</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MAGARTHUE ARCHIVES</p> <p>132</p> <p>0222</p> <p>SECRET</p> <p>mu-1/a-1012 42</p>



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
 Mil. Int. Section, Gen. Staff

7 April 1944

TO:	FOR:
Commander-in-Chief _____	Approval _____
Chief of Staff _____	Concurrence _____
Dep. Chief of Staff _____	Information _____
G-1 _____	Initials _____
G-2 _____	Issue Orders _____
G-3 _____	Rec Action _____
G-4 _____	Signature _____
Adjutant General _____	Ret to G-2 _____
C/Esqr Officer _____	File _____
S/Sig. Officer _____	Comment _____
Public Relations _____	Circulate _____
Aides de camp _____	_____
Geog Section _____	_____
Translator _____	_____
A.I.D. <u>PRS</u> _____	_____
C.O.I.C. _____	_____
U.S.A.F.F.A. _____	_____

*F.T.A*



*598*

*8051*

*File where it can be  
 later found.  
 CW*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET ~~SECRET~~

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From:

G-2

To:

C/S

Date:

28 Mar 1944

SUBJECT: Balabac Island Coastwatcher

1. On 29 February G-2 requested in check sheet to C/S that the proposed establishment of a coastwatcher station on Balabac Island be held in abeyance pending the return of Capt. McCollum from Washington.
2. G-2 has discussed this matter with Capt. McCollum since his return. He is anxious to establish this station to verify naval intelligence concerning this area.
3. Recommend the establishment of the station as proposed in PRS check sheet be approved.

4 Incls:

- Incl. 1-Copy Check Sheet fr PRS to C/S 23 Feb 44.
- Incl. 2-Copy Check Sheet fr G-2 to C/S 25 Feb 44.
- Incl. 3-Copy Check Sheet fr PRS to C/S 28 Feb 44.
- Incl. 4-Copy Check Sheet fr G-2 to C/S 29 Feb 44.

*C.A.W.*

G-2

PRS

5 April 1944

Forwarded.

ipd

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG 75

198

FOUR

Incl A



~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

*62*

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 27 March 1944

1. Further reference is made to my C/N of 23 February with respect to the dispatch of a small party to BALABAC Island for coastal observation and to initiate intelligence coverage and open a channel of radio communication into PALAWAN.

2. I now have the personnel trained and prepared for this mission, the equipment tested and issued, a plane on call for transport to Perth, and an operational submarine allocated to the purpose leaving within the first week of April.

3. In the absence of objection to my doing so I propose to commit the party to the mission indicated which is within the plan of intelligence coverage previously approved, in order to take advantage of the opportunity now available.

*CW*  
C.W.



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OBI  
20 AUG. 75

~~SECRET~~

*Fuel B*

~~SECRET~~

*7/19/82*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: C/S

Date: 29 February 1944.

1. Factual information available to G-2, and the recommendations based on that information as contained in G-2 check sheet to C. of S., 25 February, remain unchanged.
2. This was handled as a normal staff procedure.
  - a. Proposed by PRS.
  - b. Check against current plans.
  - c. Check against priorities.
  - d. Navy position, as stated.
3. Navy Intelligence reports that they were approached by PRS with a draft, cancelling statement of February 24th. This is irregular and objectionable. Statement is made that Capt. McCollum was especially interested. Under the circumstances I request the matter be held in abeyance until his return.

*C.A.W.*  
C.A.W.

ipd



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20 AUG. 75

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198



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 28 February 1944

1. The reason that Navy has little current information on enemy Naval movement through the passages adjacent to BALABAC Island is precisely because there is no present means of observation and report.

2. Prior to his departure for the United States Capt. McCollum regarded the coverage of this position as of utmost importance and requested that it be given highest priority following a plan previously approved to establish such coverage at all important entrances to and outlets from Philippine waters. The potentially increased importance of such observation is readily apparent.

3. Our latest report (by mail) dated 6 December 1943 from the intelligence agents of the 6th M.D., stationed in Southern PALAWAN, has this to state in re enemy Naval movement observed off of BALABAC Island:

" x x x Japanese Naval movements on this water started during the early part of July and their movement from North to South have been observed three (3) to four (4) times a week and sometimes daily one to twelve ( 1 to 12) ships in number are seen from BALABAC."

4. It is proposed, in addition to coverage of the BALABAC Sea passages, to land sufficient equipment to permit contact later to be established with a group of American servicemen at BROOKES Point, PALAWAN and through them to gradually develop an intelligence net throughout PALAWAN itself and other adjacent waters.

5. I understand that Lt. Comdr. HITE, acting for Capt. McCOLLUM in the latter's absence, has written a memo to G-2 asking that his memo of 24 February, forming a part of this file, be disregarded.

6. Understand further that Naval operations are receptive to extending full cooperation in this matter.

7. I believe that this project should be approved for execution at the earliest time feasible.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF  
20 AUG 75



CW  
C.W.

4 Incls:

3 n/c

1 added - Check Sheet

fr G-2 to C/S

~~SECRET~~



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

*C. A. W.*  
*R. J. M.*

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: C/S

Date: 25 February 1944.

1. Information presently available to Naval Intelligence indicates that relatively little Japanese shipping of consequence passed through Balabac Straits during the past two months. In addition, the total amount of shipping which passed through North Balabac Strait is believed to have been less than that which passed through Balabac Strait proper.

2. Naval Planning feels that urgency of station is not sufficient to warrant diversion of an operational submarine for this mission. Naval Operations have sent a dispatch to the submarine base requesting what delay and operational hazards are involved in this mission.

3. In principle, the establishment of a coastwatcher station on Balabac Island was approved March 1943. The plan was originated in this office and was coordinated with Navy and G-3. However, a priority of urgency was then set, and Balabac Strait station was number 10 on the list. Several stations on the approved list with higher priorities have not as yet been filled.

4. G-2 recommends:

- a. Urgency of station not supported by facts.
- b. Higher priorities should be carried out first.

*C. A. W.*  
C.A.W.

3 Incls:

Incl. 1-Check sheet fr PRS to C/S, 23 Feb 44.

Incl. 2-Memo to Gen. Willoughby fr Lt. Comdr. Hite, 24 Feb 44.

Incl. 3-Map.

-----  
DCS to Chief P.R.S.:

28 February 1944

For further remark in view of the foregoing carrier note from G-2.

*R. J. M.*  
R.J.M.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI  
20 AUG. 75



~~SECRET~~

192



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: Chief of Staff

Date: 23 February 1944

Authority is requested to immediately prepare and dispatch a small party (5 men) to BALABAC Island for the purpose of observing and reporting upon enemy Naval movement through the BALABAC Strait and North BALABAC Strait.

It is proposed to dispatch this party by operational sub rather than the NARWHAL and to make prior arrangements for tying in its reports direct to the Navy Control Station. The party to operate under the direction of this headquarters and independent of any other command.

The sea passages indicated are becoming of increasing importance as it becomes incumbent upon the enemy to reinforce his positions in the Pacific and coverage thereover should be obtained at the earliest practical moment.

The dispositions recommended would not prevent coverage of the BALABAC Strait from the South by a watcher from the British party now in North BORNEO if later found feasible. Current information discloses that the bulk of enemy shipping passes through the Strait north of BALABAC Island which it would be impractical in any event for the British party to cover. See map attached for positions indicated.

*CW*  
C.W.

Incl:  
Map

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



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198

Incl 1

UNITED STATES FLEET  
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

February 24, 1944.

**SECRET**

**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WILLOUGHBY**

Reference: (a) G-2, GHQ, SWPA Check Sheet dated 2/24/44.

1. On the basis of information presently available to this command, it is believed that a relatively limited amount of enemy traffic of consequence passes through Balabac Strait. Still less is believed to pass through North Balabac Strait.
2. It is not believed that the current situation warrants use of an operational submarine to transport a watcher to Balabac Island.

*Bentley Hite*  
BENTLEY HITE.  
Lt. Cdr., USNR,  
Acting Intelligence Officer.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75




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incl 2



~~SECRET~~



SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS  
&  
MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

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20 AUG 75




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SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS  
&  
MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff



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20 AUG 75



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G-2

C/S

29 February 1944.

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2. This was handled as a normal staff procedure.

- a. Proposed by PRS.
- b. Check against current plans.
- c. Check against priorities.
- d. Navy position, as stated.

3. Navy Intelligence reports that they were approached by PRS with a draft, cancelling statement of February 24th. This is irregular and objectionable. Statement is made that Capt. McCollum was especially interested. Under the circumstances I request the matter be held in abeyance until his return.

C.A.W.

jp -----

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI  
20 AUG. 75



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cett

~~SECRET~~

FRS

G-2

5 April 44

Herewith are transcripts of the statements of CRUZ and his party made before Lieut. ROWE of this Section together with the latter's comments thereon. At the time I first talked to CRUZ upon his arrival I was convinced that much of his story was fabricated. This was early established in his formal examination and it remained but to determine the motive behind his falsehood.

I agree with Lieut. ROWE that the underlying purpose to the mission dispatched by BITENG was to gain the recognition and material assistance of this headquarters for the prestige, power and/or economic gain it would give BITENG in the area from whence the mission was dispatched.

Because of the suspicion aroused in the course of the examination I have caused the entire party to be kept under close surveillance. The men are all of a civilian status and their enlistment and assignment to our Filipino Unit is not desirable.

Possibly further information could be obtained on BITENG from PERALTA and/or SUAREZ but this would appear unnecessary.

As a consequence of the facts disclosed it would be my recommendation that:

- a. Attached intelligence report on the BORNEO area be most cautiously evaluated.
- b. No official recognition be given to the request of BITENG for supplies.
- c. CRUZ and his party be placed under the control of G-2, USAFFE as a matter of interior security and referred to the American Consul for disposition as civilian citizens of the Philippines stranded in AUSTRALIA.
- d. No further action.

C. W.



82



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C. W.



82



Lieut. Rowe

Col. Whitney

4 April 1944

1. Attached are transcripts of interviews of, and statements by Captain Guillermo de la Cruz and his party. I have, as much as possible, transcribed verbatim, the interviews by Lieutenant Valera and myself. One man, 2nd Lt. Olteinsani Jamli, is in hospital and has not yet been interviewed but this will be done as soon as he is released.

2. My general impressions gathered during the interrogations and my reactions on the story in general are as follows:


a. Cruz is still far from the truth when it comes to a general picture of the organization Colonel Biteng claims to have in Borneo. He claims that all of the 12,000 men in Biteng's organization have been taught the Manual of Arms and close order drill. He continues to insist that the above is true in spite of my explaining that the time, trouble and staff work necessary to accomplish this in a jungle and under other adverse conditions makes such an assertion ridiculous.

b. It appears to me that Colonel Biteng et al have been doing a bit of wishful thinking and are exaggeratedly presenting their case to impress CinC sufficiently to warrant his sending them the supplies requested. The receipt of the supplies would be of great psychological benefit to Biteng, so much so that the attempt was worth the trouble.

c. Some degree of patriotism may exist but I believe it is overshadowed by dreams of empire and self aggrandisement politically and commercially.

d. Captain Biteng seemed to be truthful in all respects with the exception of the whereabouts of his brother and the size of their Unit. It is believed Col. Biteng is still in Tawi Tawi and that his operations in Borneo are limited to commercial trading.

e. The other four members of the party appear to be "crew" only. I do not know whether Col. Biteng or Capt. Cruz is responsible for the original story, however I do not believe there is any subversive intent or action involved.

  
G. F. R.

Inclosures - 10

- |                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1 - 1st Interview Capt. Cruz.   | 6 - Interview Lt. Bismani.                             |
| 2 - 2nd Interview Capt. Cruz.   | 7 - Interview Lt. Ganang.                              |
| 3 - 1st Interview Capt. Biteng. | 8 - Interview Lt. Dansik.                              |
| 4 - 3rd Interview Capt. Cruz.   | 9 - Statement by Lt. Valera.                           |
| 5 - 2nd Interview Capt. Biteng. | 10 - Most secret letter to Lt. Rowe from Capt. Biteng. |





Lieut. Rowe

Col. Whitney

4 April 1944

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G. F. R.

Inclosures - 10

1 - 1st Interview Capt. Cruz.  
2 - 2nd Interview Capt. Cruz.  
3 - 1st Interview Capt. Biteng.  
4 - 3rd Interview Capt. Cruz.  
5 - 2nd Interview Capt. Biteng.

6 - Interview Lt. Bismani.  
7 - Interview Lt. Ganang.  
8 - Interview Lt. Daasik.  
9 - Statement by Lt. Valera.  
10 - Most secret letter to Lt. Rowe from Capt. Biteng.

29 March 1944

3rd Interview of Captain de la Cruz:

Guillermo de la Cruz was born June 28, 1921 at Zamboanga City. Parents are emigrants from Leyte.

Cruz studied Civil Engineering at Mapua Institute. During this time he also took the R.O.T.C. course. At the end of his first year his money ran out so he quit school and went to work as a Surveyor's helper at the Zamboanga airdrome under Col. Livingstone. He worked there during April and May of 1941. In June he was appointed a teacher in the Municipal School.

Cruz joined Col. Tome Biteng's forces shortly after the start of the war. He was appointed a Captain by Col. Biteng and was sent to Australia with Capt. Laja Biteng, 1st Lieutenants Tantung Ganang, Angsa Damsik, 2nd Lieutenants Kablayan and Oltoinsani Jamli.

Cruz and his party left Tandubas on January 10th, 1944 by sailing vessel and arrived in Elcho Island, North Australia on 10th March 1944.

Captain Cruz has had no military training other than the aforementioned year in R.O.T.C. He is willing to join the U. S. Army.



0000



29 March 1944.

Name: Laja Biteng.

Captain Biteng was born in Tawi Tawi, Sulu, twenty six years ago. His father and mother were Moros and he was educated in the Sulu High School at Sulu. He stated he had been in Borneo since October 1943 and was the brother of Colonel Tome Biteng. He was in Jolo at the outbreak of the war and proceeded from Jolo to Tawi Tawi where Colonel Biteng inducted him on the instructions of Colonel Peralta. From February 1942, both he and his brother worked for the Peralta organization organizing the Borneo Guerillas. During the time he worked for Colonel Peralta, he went to Taracan for the purpose of intelligence work. He claims that he made sketches of Taracan with reference to the guns and dispositions of the enemy.

He stated that he went from Tawi Tawi to Borneo in October 1943 and that he sent relatives from Tawi Tawi to other parts of Borneo for additional intelligence work. He stated that he and his brother broke off relations with Colonel Peralta in November 1943 after he had taken a note from his brother to Colonel Peralta. With reference to the note he stated that he went to Panay from Borneo on November 12, 1943. He waited two weeks for a reply and after receiving the reply returned to his brother in Tawi Tawi. He stated that he made the trip in a Moro Kumpit.

Upon his return his brother decided to go ahead with his own organization and established his headquarters around Mount Kini Balu in Borneo. He stated they recruited 12,000 men and their arms consisted of 1 Springfield rifle - 1917, one automatic rifle, two shotguns and many spears. He stated they had no radios as all sets were removed by the Japanese. He claimed to have the confidence of the civilians in his particular area and was able to feed his troops by giving receipts for food. He further claims to have sent agents and relatives into Singapore, Sumatra, Java and other parts of Borneo for the purpose of intelligence but had not heard from them to date. There were fifty of the men that were disguised as fishermen. They proceeded by kumpit in the latter part of November 1943.

He stated he had no further contact with Colonel Peralta nor had he seen action against the Japanese. He stated that in December of last year he was chosen by Captain Cruz to accompany him to Australia. He further stated that this was the first time he had seen Cruz, although he had heard about him many times before.

Although he stated the mission was kept absolutely secret, he later disclosed that everyone in the vicinity knew of the party leaving and their purpose in coming to Australia. His description of the route and trip from Borneo to Australia is shown on the attached map. Captain Biteng will be questioned again in the near future.

Note: Capt. Biteng will be questioned again tomorrow by an officer speaking his dialect.



611



28 March 1944.

During the interrogation of this date, Mr. Cruz was asked to repeat his story. He did so and enlarged upon several phases of his work on Bataan and his ride alone on the raft from Bataan to the Island of Panay. When discrepancies in his story were called to his attention he pleaded that his memory was faulty because of the fact he had been through so much during the past two years. He again repeated his story in full and at this time was frankly told that he was not believed and that if he persisted in further lying he would be placed under arrest. He reiterated the fact that he was telling the truth and again was asked to trace his route from Bataan to Marinduque and the circumstances surrounding it. In the re-telling of the story he so enlarged the facts that the story bordered on the ridiculous. After some arguing he broke down and confessed that most of his story was untrue. Further interrogation revealed that he had not been a 3rd Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, was not on Bataan and had not made the ride on the raft from Bataan to Panay, nor had he been transported by natives from Panay to Zamboanga.

He stated that he had attended Mapua Institute in Manila for approximately one year prior to the outbreak of war. He had received some R.O.T.C. training in the Institute but was unable to continue his studies due to financial difficulties. He left Manila about six months prior to the outbreak of war and proceeded to Sulu where he was able to obtain a position as instructor at one of the schools there. After December 8th he proceeded to Tawi Tawi where he met Colonel Biteng. He worked with Colonel Biteng until his trip to Australia. He produced evidence that he had been appointed Captain by Colonel Biteng and stated that Colonel Biteng was responsible for the lies in his first story. He stated that Colonel Biteng felt that more attention would be given to him and his mission if he stated he had been in the Philippine Army and had fought in Bataan. The remainder of his story was again repeated and he stated that that part was true. Mr. Cruz will be interrogated again upon completion of the questioning of the remaining men in his party.

Note: Cruz will be questioned again in his native dialect.



3711



27 March 1944.

As per letter No. R 26-3/127, Subject: SIA Project, North Borneo, To: Colonel C. S. Mayers, from Colonel C. G. Roberts, dated 26 March 1944, Guillermo M. de la Cruz and five other men who claimed to have come as the representatives of Colonel Biteng of Borneo were interrogated by this office. Their statements follow. While written in the third person the statement is essentially verbatim.

Name: GUILLERMO M. de la CRUZ.

Mr. Cruz stated he was born in Zamboanga province, June 28, 1919. His father lived in Zamboanga but was born in Leyte while his mother came from Samar. He stated that he went to school in Zamboanga and after completing High School he went to the Mapua Institute of Technology at Manila for one year.

Because of poverty he was then obliged to go to work. He stated he worked for Mr. Hallili, one of the instructors at the Institute. This was in 1940. Also during that year he was called for military training in the Philippine Army Reserve and served five and one half months at Camp Murphy, Risal. Just prior to the outbreak of war he was mobilized and reported to duty in the rank of 3rd Lieutenant.

Along about the early part of 1942, Mr. Cruz was sent to Bataan from Camp Murphy. He stated they went by Q boat No. 113 from Pier 7 to Bataan Peninsula. He stated that he fought on Bataan in an honorable fashion. On Bataan he met Major Villamor. He stated he was advised by Major Villamor that General MacArthur was leaving Bataan for Australia and it would be wise for him (Cruz) to leave also.

He constructed a raft and that night sailed from Bataan through Verde Island passage arriving at the west coast of Marinduque Island three days later. He went ashore at Marinduque and after obtaining food set sail for Tablas Island. From Tablas Island he went to Pilar on Panay Island and was transported by natives to Estancia on the east coast of Panay. From Estancia he was taken by banca to Ilog, Negros and from Ilog to Manicahan, Zamboanga Province via Dapitan, Mindanao. He stated that he paid P60.00 for the entire trip and his purpose was to see his mother who was in Cuzum. He stated that he stayed at Manicahan for one day only and communicated with his mother by note then took a Moro kumpit to Tawi Tawi.

He stayed on Tandubas Island for some time and it was there that he met one so-called Colonel, Tome Biteng. He report for duty to Colonel Biteng and some time later was sent to Palawan on an intelligence mission. He made the trip in a Moro kumpit. He stayed on Palawan for three days and contacted one Lieutenant Tumbaga, who he stated was the head of the guerilla units on Palawan. He stated that this was a routine check-up mission as Colonel Biteng was intelligence officer for Mindanao, Sulu, Celebes, Borneo, and Palawan. He stated that he met a Mr. Edwards at Brookes Point, also, one V. Kerson, reputed to be a deep sea diver.

He also met Colonel Estores in Brookes Point and understood that Kerson had about three hundred soldiers in his command. Upon his return to Tawi Tawi he stayed with Colonel Biteng until October 1943, when Colonel Biteng and about fifty men went to Borneo and set up his Headquarters in the vicinity of Mount Kinabalu.

While here, Cruz stated that he helped Colonel Biteng to organize his command. He stated they were about to organize this command to the extent of 12,000 men, however, the arms consisted of one Springfield rifle, 1917, one shotgun and one automatic rifle.

During November 1943 Colonel Biteng ordered him to organize his party and proceed to Australia for the purpose of delivering a letter requesting supplies to the C-in-C of Southwest Pacific Area. Cruz chose five men to accompany him. Among which was Captain Biteng, brother of his commanding officer. The route followed from Borneo to Darwin is shown on the attached map.

Cruz states that he was appointed a Captain by Colonel Biteng with





the promise of a majority upon the completion of this mission.

8 Note: During the interrogation, Mr. Cruz did not seem certain of himself or the facts with regard to that part of the story pertaining to events from the time of being called to active duty to the time of arrival in Zamboanga. As there seems to be many discrepancies in his story he will be questioned further.



711



Interview of 1st Lieutenant Angsa Damsik.

Born June 8, 1918 at Ungus Matata, Tandubas Island, Sulu.

Fisherman from 1937 to 1942. Operated trading kumpit until October 1943. Joined Col. Biteng at that time.

By reason of his nautical knowledge Damsik was appointed navigator of his present party and was apparently responsible for their safe arrival in Australia. He picked up Cruz and party in Tandubas and sailed from there thru Sibuto Chanel then via Macasser to Elcho Island off the north coast of Australia.

Damsik has no military connection with Biteng and disclaims all knowledge of the strength of his unit.



572

2nd Interview of Captain Laja Biteng.

Born March 15, 1919 in Tandubas Island, Sulu, P.I. Brother of Col. Tome Biteng.

At the beginning of the war (Dec. 8, 1944) Laja Biteng was a high school student in Jolo. He left Jolo for Tandubas Island before Japs occupied the city. Occupation was effected on December 25th, 1941.

He joined his brothers forces in Tandubas Island on February 1943 and was assigned to Intelligence duty. He made only one trip away from Tandubas Island as an Intelligence Agent. This was to Tarakan posing as a food vendor.

Laja Biteng states that Colonel Peralta and Colonel Biteng split forces (date not known). Col. Biteng then set up his own Unit in Tandubas and Jesselton, North Borneo.

In January Biteng with five other members of Col. Biteng's forces were sent to Australia to ask help from General MacArthur.

Laja Biteng claims Col. Tome Biteng's forces in Borneo are large. He does not know the size of the Unit on Tandubas Island.

Prior to departure for Australia Laja Biteng was appointed Captain in his brother's forces. He speaks English, Tausug and Samal.



4511



2nd Lieutenant Kablayan Bismani.

At the start of the war he was a student in Lepac Agricultural High School (Siasi Island).

Joined Colonel Biteng's command in October 1943 at Tandubas Island. Was at Jesselton until selected by Cruz for his present party. Has had no military training.



Interview of 1st Lieutenant Tantung Ganang.

Born Nov. 18, 1922 in Tandubas Island.

Student in Jolo High School at beginning of war. Left for Tandubas before Jap occupation of Jolo. Joined Col. Biteng's command in October 1943. Has had no military training.



5722 :



STATEMENT BY LT. J. V. VALERA  
AS TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF COL. TOME BITENG



1. At the outbreak of the war on 8th December 1941, Tome Biteng was in the city of Manila, studying law in one of the Universities there. He did not join any organisation of the armed forces then but stayed as a civilian in Manila up to August, 1942.

2. Tome Biteng secured help from the Bureau of Public Welfare a sum of ₱60/= for his transportation and family in returning to his own town, Tandubas, Sulu, P.I. He was able to go to Batangas and found people from Sulu having sail boats. He sailed with them in August, 1942 and stopped in Zamboanga where he met some of his town-mates going to Dumagete, Negros to buy sugar. He followed the group of traders and went as far as Panay.

3. He reached Tandubas, Sulu somewhere in October, 1942 and started a campaign to collect money to help the USAFIP. He was able to collect a sum of money and gave part of it to the Bato constabulary in Tawi Tawi. The rest of the money he used for trading sugar - buying from Visayan Islands and sell in Sulu.

4. In February, 1943 news spread that Tome Biteng was appointed first Lieutenant by Col. Peralta, Commanding the USAFIP, 6th Military District covering Panay and Palawan. He claimed to be G-2 of the 6th MD to gather information of enemy's whereabouts in Malaya and made his headquarters in Tandubas.

5. While in Tandubas he formed organisation under his control and claimed to be the order of Col. Peralta. He commissioned all his men officers with ranks 3rd, 2nd, 1st Lieutenants without any enlisted men, giving them Special Orders signed by him.

6. They have only one rifle and one shot gun and have around 20 men. Most of the work observed was trading and sending people to buy sugar giving them letters addressed to any USAFIP and signed those letters first Lieutenant.

7. Later on in October 1943, he signed his name Captain and claimed that his organisation covered Malaya. Some of his men went away and joined the USAFIP - the 125th Infantry Regiment under Lt. Col. Suarez in Sulu Area.

8. In December 1943, he claimed to be Acting Colonel commanding his organisation and said that his forces are United States Forces in Malaya. He has not seen Malaya (covering Straits Settlement and Federated Malay States) or not a single of his men knew or have been there. However, he and some of his men have gone as far as North Borneo where they trade sugar.

9. His men further claimed that they have extended their organisation to the West Coast of North Borneo, telling the names of some people who are under Lieut. E. Cook, who is connected to the 125th Inf. Regiment under Lt. Col. Suarez.

10. His organised men are all from Sulu and although he had commissioned a number of men, only around 20 are sticking to him.

11. Tome Biteng is no doubt he might have taken military Science in the college where he was studying and his ability as a future lawyer as well as his ability to speak gives some people idea that he is doing good work specially those without having education or little education among the Moros of Sulu.

12. There was one time about the early part of 1944 that Japanese forces attacked his garrisoned in Tandubas but he and his men were able to retreat in the jungle and the villagers informed the Japs that he is not there anymore.



13. In conclusion, Tome Biteng is not working against the Allies but a self made man to make a name during this war time to form forces with trading or making money for his own self. He hates Japanese and don't like to join Col. A. Suarez

s/ J. A. VALERA (PAR)  
2nd Lieut. 125th Inf. Regt.  
10th Military District P.I.



0722



No. B 26-3/127.

~~SECRET~~

File  
APO 500,  
26 March, 1944.

SUBJECT: S.I.A. - Projects - North Borneo.

TO : Col. C. S. Myers.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG 75



Guillermo La Cruz

1. The above named Filipino with five others reached Brisbane 25 March and are accommodated at Milton.
2. Cruz had a letter which he was to hand to the Commander-in-Chief, S.W.P.A., or the head of G-2 at G.H.Q. He also had recommendation and appointment to Captain from Col. Thomas BITENG, the writer of the letter he brought out for G.H.Q. The letter and the intelligence reports on JOLO, JESSELTON and TARAKAN were handed to General WILLOUGHBY by CRUZ on 25 March. The General said that he would send them down to us.
3. CRUZ claims that the Headquarters of the U.S. Forces on MALAYA set up by Col. BITENG in the MT. KINABULU area in the extreme North of BORNEO consist of Filipino officers who escaped after the fall of the Philippines and now control 12,000 natives of North Borneo. He had knowledge of Chinese activities in the neighborhood of JESSELTON and and the ~~information~~ given was that they considered the Chinese force as part of their command.
4. CRUZ said that he left MARUDU Bay in North BORNEO in January and proceeded by boat with his five "officers" to ELCHO ISLAND, east of DARWIN where he was picked up by a missionary. He states that the route followed was:-
  - MARUDU BAY
  - SIBUTU PASSAGE
  - MACASSAR STRAIT
  - MACASSAR (where they went ashore)
  - ALOR (at a small island called TERNATE)
  - Between LETI ISLAND and TIMOR
  - ELCHO ISLAND(First notification of Cruz' arrival at ELCHO Island was given in signal from L.M.S. of 12 March.)
5. During questioning by both General Willoughby and Col. Whitney regarding service in the Philippine Army, Cruz showed considerable hesitation ~~which~~ may have been due to dullness after his journey, or


No. R 26-3/127.

"S.I.A. - Projects - North Borneo."

the desire to hide something. His attitude raised doubts.

6. The following course of action has been agreed to by General Willoughby and Colonel Whitney:-

- a. CRUZ and party to remain at Milton for time being.
- b. Col. Whitney will arrange for obtaining a report from Cruz with the purpose of eliciting information and checking his reliability.
- c. Col. Whitney will try to evaluate CRUZ's report and letters and G-2 reports brought out by him, and forward through A.I.B. with recommendation for final control of situation on NORTH BORNEO. Capt. Kendall of S.I.A. and Director, S.R.D. to be consulted.

  
C. G. ROBERTS, Col.,  
Controller,  
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

Copies to:  
Captain Kendall.  
Col. Whitney. ✓  
Director, S.R.D.





PRS

Thru: AG, USAFFE  
AG, GHQ

5 April 1944

1. Herewith is a letter from Dr. Arthur L. Carson, President of SILLIMAN University giving amplifying information to my C/N of 8 February 1944 reporting the massacre of a group of Americans on the Island of PANAY. I understand that this information is confirmed by the American citizens just evacuated from PANAY.

2. Following its use to adjust your own records, I recommend that the letter be referred to the War Department for disposition.

3. Lieut. KING in reference is A. W. KING, whose widow and small son escaped the massacre and are among the evacuation party just arrived. KING himself was horribly tortured and his body mutilated before he was killed.

Incl:  
Ltr fr Dr. Carson

C.W.



7022 . 4

See (98) 87 February

(72)

~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)



File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 4 April 1944

1. Request following be dispatched:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75

a. To Peralta:

"Re your 83 and for guidance in future cases, obtain following:

1. Date and place of landing or crash.
2. Photograph or sketch of plane.
3. Sketch of markings on plane and motors.
4. Description of plane.
5. Caliber, number and exact location of guns.
6. Five rounds of ammunition from each gun.
7. All removable name plates. *This is very important*
8. All documents."

*60 to Peralta  
sent 5 apr.*

b. To Fertig:

"Re your 841, and for guidance in future cases, obtain following:

1. Date and place of landing or crash.
2. Photograph or sketch of plane.
3. Sketch of markings on plane and motors.
4. Description of plane.
5. Caliber, number and exact location of guns.
6. Five rounds of ammunition from each gun.
7. All removable name plates.
8. All documents."

*5462 Fertig  
sent 5 apr.*

c. To other MD CO's and intelligence agents:

"Following information desired in case of enemy plane crash:

1. Date and place of landing or crash.
2. Photograph or sketch of plane.
3. Sketch of markings on plane and motors.
4. Description of plane.
5. Caliber, number and exact location of guns.
6. Five rounds of ammunition from each gun.
7. All removable name plates.
8. All documents."

*60 to Alford  
129 to Anderson  
19 to Armstrong  
13 to Engstrom  
sent 5 apr.*

*C.A.W.*

jpd  
Information Center

178

*File on*

~~SECRET~~



FRS

AIB

3 April 1944

Would you please arrange to have this Section put on the  
distribution list for the Allied Air Forces Intelligence Summary.

C.W.



3022 .

68

Adm.

A.D.C. to      FRS              30 Mar 44  
C-in-C

For any information you may have reference personnel mentioned in attached letter.

1 Incl: Ltr dd 9 Mar 44 to C-in-C fr Mrs  
A J Scoville, 464 So Madison St,  
Evansville, Wis.

L. L.

---

FRS      A.D.C. to      2 Apr 44  
         C in C

1. Of the personnel named in attached letter

Lieut. LeRoy A. Scoville  
Pfc Rudolph Schuster  
Pvt Ralph Knappenburger

are listed by USAFFE as POW in the Philippines, exact camp unknown.

2. There is listed two Pvt. R. Hubbards. One is listed as in a POW camp in the Philippines, the other, with serial number 20645214, is listed as having died in the Hoten POW camp.

3. There is no record of the followings

Sgt. Herbert Durner  
Pvt. Kenneth Hatlevig



Incl: n/c

C.W.

59



FRS

G-2  
(Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

1 April 1944

1. I have suggested the advisability of placing 1st Lieutenant Richard Baldwin with G-2 inasmuch as there is no work of the specialized nature, for which he has been trained and in which he has had considerable practical experience, in this Section.

2. This officer has been known to me for many years and it was only with great reluctance that I arrived at the conclusion that both in full justice to this Headquarters and to the officer himself he should be moved to a staff agency having a broader field including the type of activity for which he appears to be admirably fitted.

3. At the time of his relief from General Patton's command it is of record that he was in line for promotion. While the situation during his service with this Section has not been such as to warrant such promotion, the proposition is commended to your future consideration. Lieutenant Baldwin is an officer of fine background, thoroughly conscientious and loyal and I am sure that his future service will meet with your full satisfaction as his past has with mine.

C.W.



*adm file*

1322

10

FRS

Chief of Staff

1 April 1944

Advise that the submarine with 57 evacuees from PANAY has reported her KIA at a northern port today at noon. Her delayed arrival has been cause for some concern but apparently was occasioned by extra precautions due to the great number (34) of women and children on board. Sub commander has advised that his food is exhausted, requested Red Cross assistance for evacuees upon their arrival. All such provisions had previously been made.

C.W.



58



FRS

Chief of Staff

1 April 1944

1. Comdr. Frank D. LATTA, U.S. Navy, who has commanded the **HARWHAL** on her last four Philippine trips is being relieved from the vessel to take command of a submarine squadron. He is presently in Brisbane.

*- Not a squadron - a new operational submarine.*

2. Comdr. Latta has previously indicated to Comdr. Parsons that what he would like to have next only to the Navy Cross was a photograph of the C in C. I recommend that he be given it. He has done a great job and has thoroughly infused every member of his crew with the spirit that has carried this effort on. Understand the Navy Cross has been awarded.

C.W.



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: PRS

To: G-2

Date: 1 April 1944

Service Star of the Philippines with following citations:

2  
'Commander Frank D. Latta, U.S.Navy, is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding accomplishment in the presence of the enemy during the period 23 October 1943 to 20 March 1944, when, as commanding officer of the USS Narwhal, he successfully completed four secret missions within enemy held Philippine waters. In the course of these missions supplies and reinforcements vital to the continued resistance of our forces operating within enemy lines were successfully delivered in the face of grave danger and the joint cause of the American and Filipino people was thereby materially strengthened and advanced. In the conduct of these operations Commander Latta demonstrated exemplary courage and devotion to duty.'

'Lieut. Commander Jack C. Titus, U.S.Navy, etc., etc.

C.W.

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 4 April 1944

3  
Attached copy of radio to Washington, in compliance with above check note.

1 Incl:

CAW/nrb Cy radio to C/S Washington re citations.

Information Copies:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



File  
CW

~~SECRET~~

(12)



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 31 March 1944

1. Attached are two check sheets regarding action direction in CinC's pencil note on WD radio.
2. Top check sheet to PRS paraphrasing Quezon's message to Peralta.
3. Second check sheet to C. of S. with suggested citation requested by CinC.
4. Would appreciate your comments, concurrence or suggested changes in these papers and their return to this office as promptly as possible.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

2 Incls: as above.  
ph  
Information Copies:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



*[Handwritten Signature]*  
C. A. MCV.

From: PRS

To: G-2

Date: 1 April 1944

1. Paraphrase of the QUEZON message to PERALTA appears to be quite in order.
2. Suggest that the message to President QUEZON be amended to:
  - (a) Specifically recommend the decoration for award;
  - (b) Citation for the evacuation of Americans be eliminated as not particularly calling for recognition by the Philippine government;
  - (c) Reference be made to the fact that the meritorious action cited served the joint cause of the American and Filipino people.
3. Hereunder is a suggested modification:  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ re your radio 27 March suggest awards of the Distinguished

(1d)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject:

From: G-2

To: PRS

Date: 29 March 1944.

Request following message be sent to Peralta:

"FOR PERALTA FROM QUEZON

FEBRUARY

HAVE YOUR LETTER DATED EIGHT/ PLEASE ACCEPT MY THANKS AND YOU  
HAVE MY APPROVAL FOR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS THEREIN PD YOU ARE  
PERMITTED TO CONVEY TO ALL FAITHFUL OFFICIALS OF THE CIVIL  
GOVERNMENT PAREN ABLE PAREN THAT PROPER REWARDS WILL BE  
GIVEN THEM BY THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT IN RECOGNITION OF  
THEIR LOYALTY WHICH INVOLVED DANGER TO THEIR LIVES PAREN BAKER  
PAREN THAT THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE FORGOTTEN PAREN CHARLIE  
PAREN THAT A SYSTEM OF PENSIONS WILL BE OPERATIVE FOR THE  
FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN THE PERFORMANCE OF  
THEIR DUTIES PD IT IS ASSUMED THAT YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE FROM AN  
EARLIER MESSAGE FROM ME DISPATCHED A NUMBER OF MONTHS PAST  
ABOUT THE PLANS OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING  
PROVISIONS FOR THE LEADERS MEMBERS AND FAMILIES OF THE GUERRILLA  
FORCES PD ACCEPT MY HEARTFELT THANKS AND ADMIRATION FOR YOUR  
COURAGE PATRIOTISM AND THE OUTSTANDING SERVICE YOU ARE RENDERING  
TO OUR NATIVE LAND PD I AM CERTAIN THAT THESE MY SENTIMENTS ARE  
ALSO THOSE OF THE PEOPLE AND THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT"

*Robert*  
for C.A.W.

jpd  
Information Copies:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR 08  
20 AUG. 75



*Sent*  
*2 Apr 44*  
*7PI*  
*Magn. 58*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



ROUTINE

X

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR ON  
20 AUG. 75



3 APRIL 1944

UTWO/CAW/pgh

TO : CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON DC

SUGGEST AWARDS REURAD WAR ONE FOUR SEVEN ONE FIVE CMA TWO SEVEN MARCH OF  
DISTINGUISHED SERVICE STAR OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH FOLLOWING CITATIONS CLN PAREN  
EDGBI FOR PRESIDENT QUEZON PAREN PARA QUOTE COMMANDER FRANK DOG LATTI CMA UNCLE  
SUGAR NAVY CMA IS CITED FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM AND OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT  
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY DURING THE PERIOD TWO THREE OCTOBER FORTYTHREE TO  
TWO NAUGHT MARCH FORTYFOUR CMA WHEN CMA AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE USS NARWHAL  
CMA HE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED FOUR SECRET MISSIONS WITHIN ENEMY HELD PHILIPPINE  
WATERS PD ( ) IN THE COURSE OF THESE MISSIONS SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS  
VITAL TO THE CONTINUED RESISTANCE OF OUR FORCES OPERATING WITHIN ENEMY LINES WERE  
SUCCESSFULLY DELIVERED IN THE FACE OF GRAVE DANGER AND THE JOINT CAUSE OF THE  
AMERICAN AND FILIPINO PEOPLE WAS THEREBY MATERIALLY STRENGTHENED AND ADVANCED PD  
IN THE CONDUCT OF THESE OPERATIONS COMMANDER LATTI DEMONSTRATED EXEMPLARY COURAGE  
AND DEVOTION TO DUTY UNQUOTE PARA QUOTE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JACK CHARLIE TITUS  
CMA UNCLE SUGAR NAVY CMA IS CITED FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM AND OUTSTANDING  
ACCOMPLISHMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY DURING THE PERIOD FROM THREE DECEMBER  
FORTYTHREE TO TWENTY MARCH FORTYFOUR CMA WHEN AS PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER  
CMA AND FROM TWENTY JANUARY FORTYFOUR AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER CMA OF USS NARWHAL CMA  
HE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED TWO SECRET MISSIONS WITHIN ENEMY HELD PHILIPPINE WATERS PD

(PAGE ONE)

18

ROUTINE

X

3 APRIL 1944

GTWO/CAN/pgh

(PAGE TWO)

UNQUOTE REST OF CITATION SAME AS FOR LATTA PARA QUOTE LIEUTENANT ROBERT ROGER  
MANAGHAN CMA UNCLE SUGAR NAVY CMA IS CITED FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM AND  
OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY DURING THE PERIOD  
TWENTYTHREE OCTOBER FORTYTHREE TO TWENTY JANUARY FORTYFOUR CMA WHEN CMA AS  
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE USS NARWHAL CMA HE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED TWO SECRET  
MISSIONS WITHIN ENEMY HELD PHILIPPINE WATERS PD UNQUOTE REST OF CITATION SAME AS  
FOR LATTA PD FOR REASONS OF MILITARY SECRECY THESE CITATIONS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE  
PUBLISHED

MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

Copy to:  
G-2



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR O8  
20 AUG. 75





~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

.....  
: ~~SECRET~~ :  
:Auth CG :  
:Init *FD* :  
:Date 18 May 44 :  
.....

GENERAL ORDERS )  
: )  
NO.....41 )

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LIR ON 12  
20 AUG 75

A.P.O. 501  
18 May 1944

AWARDS OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE STAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

By direction of the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, the Distinguished Service Star of the Philippines is awarded by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, to the following named officers:

Commander FRANK D. LATTA, United States Navy, is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding accomplishment in the presence of the enemy during the period 23 October 1943 to 20 March 1944, when, as commanding officer of the USS NARWHAL, he successfully completed four secret missions within enemy held Philippine waters. In the course of these missions supplies and reinforcements vital to the continued resistance of our forces operating within enemy lines were successfully delivered in the face of grave danger, and the joint cause of the American and Filipino people was thereby materially strengthened and advanced. In the conduct of these operations, Commander Latta demonstrated exemplary courage and devotion to duty.

Lieutenant ROBERT R. MANAGHAN, United States Navy, is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding accomplishment in the presence of the enemy during the period 23 October 1943 to 20 January 1944, when, as executive officer of the USS NARWHAL, he successfully completed two secret missions within enemy held Philippine waters. In the course of these missions supplies and reinforcements vital to the continued resistance of our forces operating within enemy lines were successfully delivered in the face of grave danger, and the joint cause of the American and Filipino people was thereby materially strengthened and advanced. In the conduct of these operations, Lieutenant Managhan demonstrated exemplary courage and devotion to duty.

Major ERNESTO S. MATA, Philippine Army, is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding accomplishment in the presence of the enemy during the period 14 May 1943 to 10 March 1944, in which he organized and commanded the Northern Defense Sector of the 7th Military District, Philippines. In the conduct of these operations, Major Mata demonstrated exemplary courage and devotion to duty, thereby inspiring both the members of his military forces and the civilian population of Northern Negros to continued resistance to the enemy and materially advancing the cause of the Filipino people.

Lieutenant Commander JACK C. TITUS, United States Navy, is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding accomplishment in the presence of the enemy during the period from 3 December 1943 to 20 March 1944, when, as prospective commanding officer, and from 20 January 1944 as executive officer, of USS NARWHAL, he successfully completed two secret missions within enemy held Philippine waters. In the course of these missions supplies and reinforcements vital to the continued resistance of our forces operating within enemy lines

~~SECRET~~

1456

(G.O. 41)

~~SECRET~~

were successfully delivered in the face of grave danger, and the joint cause of the American and Filipino people was thereby materially strengthened and advanced. In the conduct of these operations, Lieutenant Commander Titus demonstrated exemplary courage and devotion to duty.

FEED 200.6

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,  
Lieutenant General, United States Army,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

*L. S. Ostrander*  
L. S. OSTRANDER,  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,  
Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OI  
20 AUG 75



~~SECRET~~