

CHAPTER VIII

THE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON NEGROS 10 December 1944

SECTION I. GENERAL BACKGROUND:

The growth of the guerrilla organization on Negros is the story of the birth of small units, struggle for island command and the final emergence of Lt. Col. Salvador ABCEDE as the accepted and recognized commander. The struggle for the island command was bitter and prolonged. It was not settled completely until late 1943 but, since, the quarrels have been almost forgotten.

The terrain of Negros has not lent itself well to maintaining a coherent organization. The island is a fertile horseshoe plain around a rough interior and south coast of mountains. The Japanese occupied this plain and the guerrillas were driven to the interior into three separate areas, north, central (east and west slopes) and the south. Supplies were poor and communications between areas were disrupted almost entirely by mountains and absence of radios. Thus limited and immobilized, the guerrillas suffered proportionately more from Japanese terror raids and destructive attacks than they did on Panay, Mindanao, Samar or even Luzon.

Recognition of the organization under Lt. Col. ABCEDE and the shipment of supplies and radios has enabled a fairly well knit organization to be built up in spite of these difficulties.

SECTION II. HISTORY OF GUERRILLA UNITS:

ABCEDE: This guerrilla unit was organized in the central and southern Negros Occidental area in July 1942 under command of Lt. Col. (then Capt.) Salvador ABCEDE, O-1520, PA. ABCEDE had been a Battalion Commander in the area under Col. HILSMAN at time of surrender and this battalion formed the nucleus of the guerrilla unit centered in the vicinity of Kabankalan. Maj. (then Capt.) Enrique TORRES, one of the best fighting commanders on Negros, organized another unit in the vicinity of Zamalagan under ABCEDE. Much USAFFE equipment was saved and the unit, with 500 rifles, was the best armed of the original guerrilla groups, and the largest. Many of the officers and men came from the plantations in the vicinity and the unit never wanted supplies. When the guerrillas were forced back into the hills, many of these families evacuated with them but maintained contact with supply sources in the lowlands. The first engagement of the unit with the Japanese took place at Buenavista in early August 1942.

ABCEDE was a classmate of Col. PERALTA, guerrilla commander on Panay, and the two were friends. When PERALTA commenced organization of his IVth Philippine Corps in November 1942, ABCEDE joined and was appointed commander of Negros and promoted to Lt. Col. by PERALTA. ABCEDE's force then totalled 7,000 men. ABCEDE tried to extend PERALTA's influence and may have enlisted the support of Lt. Col. MATA in northern Negros. ABCEDE also attempted to contact AUSEJO in southern Negros for the same purpose. AUSEJO had already joined FERTIG on Mindanao, and negotiations were further discouraged by the difficult overland communications between Oriental and Occidental Negros. ABCEDE's association with the IVth Philippine Corps ended with the dissolution of the Corps in January 1943 and PERALTA then began to back ABCEDE as 7th ND commander.

In the meantime, Japanese pressure increased in the Kabankalan-Binalbagan area and ABCEDE and his men moved further south into the hills and finally to the south coast. Maj. VILLAMOR arrived in that area in January 1943 from SWPA and ABCEDE became one of his chief supporters, throwing his entire organization to the disposal of Maj. VILLAMOR for the accomplishment of his mission.

ABCEDE is about 31 years old, born in Zambales; father is a machinist in the Olangapo Naval Yards, and ABCEDE came early under American influence. He graduated from the University of the Philippines in 1936 and held a reserve commission; was commissioned in the PA in 1938, and was ROTC commandant at Silliman University for two years before war broke out. ABCEDE is young, well trained and competent. He organized his force early after surrender and has always led his men into the attack. He is aggressive and often given to snappy judgments but is never afraid to admit mistakes. He is hearty and frank and well liked throughout Negros since his appointment to District Commander in 1943. His travels about the island have been extensive, and have enabled him to keep close touch with the guerrillas. He has kept himself free from politics. His men respect him, and being a strong disciplinarian he deals directly and decisively with trouble when it arises. He was appointed Acting Commander 7th MD in July 1943 and the appointment confirmed in March 1944; promoted to Lt. Col. in October 1944.

MATA: The guerrillas in northern Negros were organized in mid-1942 by Lt. Col. (then Capt.) Ernesto S. MATA, O-1550, PA. MATA is about 29 years old, graduated PMA 1937 and was Battalion Commander in northern Negros under Col. HILSMAN at the time of surrender. He reorganized the battalion after surrender and this formed the base of his unit. Next to ABCEDE this was the best armed force in Negros. He is believed to be a good officer, is young, brave and believed to be well liked. He is reported to be a good organizer, but has been hampered by want of competent junior officers and the efficiency of the organization was never excellent as a result. MATA has been always aware of this and has constantly changed and tried new officers to improve his organization.

MATA seems to have been very difficult to become acquainted with and kept information on his organization fairly close. This and tenuous communications with southern Negros where SWPA contact was maintained has tended to isolate the organization and little has been known of its activities except that it did inflict much damage on Japanese installations in the Bacolod area and near Fabrica and was a large factor in the failure of Japanese plans to grow food and cotton in northern Negros. Maj. Uldarico BACLAGON and Maj. Luis BAYLON were prominent early leaders in MATA's guerrilla force.

Lt. Col. ABCEDE and Lt. Col. MATA had been cooperating somewhat in December 1942 and both went to Panay to see Col. PERALTA, in connection with the IV Philippine Corps. Col. PERALTA appointed Lt. Col. ABCEDE as CO of the proposed 72nd Division (Negros). Lt. Col. MATA agreed to become Chief of Staff and a regimental commander. Later the 73rd Provisional Division was organized in Negros Oriental and MATA was made Chief of Staff in the District Headquarters and has been continuing duties as CO 72nd Division until a replacement is found.

MERCADO: Maj. Hermenegildo MERCADO commanded guerrilla activities in the area Guihulngan and northwards in Negros Oriental in May or June 1942 and was thus one of the first guerrilla leaders on Negros. He joined forces with GADOR's command about September 1942 but withdrew with his men the next month over some unknown dispute and thereafter was at odds with GADOR. MERCADO remained independent of other Negros commands until late 1943, though he is believed to have had some association with guerrillas in northern Negros Occidental. He is reported to have remained aloof from the 7th MD Command hoping for a better position than was offered him. In September-October 1943, MERCADO joined the 7th MD Command and is now CO of the 72nd FA Regt (East Negros sector), 72nd Division.

MERCADO is about 30 years old, was classmate of Col. PERALTA (Panay) in the Infantry School and was for a time instructor in Guihulngan.

PURING: This is a lawless band in the hills to the west of Vallichermoso, Negros Oriental, and San Carlos, Negros Occidental. There seems to have been two brothers leading the unit, one a former Pfc in the Philippine Army who was known as PURING (Casieng GEMILLAN?) and the other an illiterate ex-convict by the name of Margarito GEMILLAN. PURING is reported to have been killed by ABCEDE's men. Margarito GEMILLAN has been reported since by several sources as the present commander of the unit. Other persons attached to this unit are Terribio TRASMORTE, attorney, now surrendered and puppet mayor of Guihulngan; Capt. J. W. WILSON, former US Army Sgt., was second in command, now evacuated to the USA; LISONDRA, identity unknown; and Mr. Manuel P. TRINIDAD, pre-war attorney, surrendered to the Japanese in January 1944.

The size of the unit is unknown but there were approximately 50 weapons in their possession, captured from a USAFFE truck before surrender. They have attacked the Japanese and have also interfered with nearby guerrilla activity and molested civilians in the vicinity. The PURING guerrillas may at one time have had some connections with GADOR's men in central Negros Oriental. It was dissolved in September 1944 and the men fled to Cebu.

GADOR: This guerrilla organization controlled the area between Concepcion and Libertad, Negros Oriental, and was under Lt. Col. Gabriel GADOR, O-1050, PA. GADOR was Assistant Inspector General of the PA just prior to the war; was District Commander 7th MD (Negros and Siquijor) when war broke out; is now 50 years old.

It appears that Gen. SHARP, USAFFE Commander at Davao, Lanao, removed GADOR from command 7th MD because of difficulties with his junior officers, but retained him on his staff in Mindanao. GADOR claimed later that Gen. SHARP gave him written orders to return to the visayas to organize guerrilla operations there. He returned to Negros in June 1942 but stayed in the Negros hills until other guerrilla organizations began to grow up in August-September 1942. GADOR then set himself up in central Negros Oriental; Maj. MERCADO in northern Negros offered GADOR command of his unit about this time. GADOR gladly accepted and shortly his organization became well established. By virtue of his location GADOR was able to and did obstruct and interfere with surrounding organizations seriously. He took advantage of disagreements in these organizations by offering attractive appointments in his organization, and by assigning his men to commands in these neighboring areas. The original commands were thus forced into open conflict with GADOR's men in order to maintain their integrity.

The internal discipline and organization in the area seems to have been fairly good. There were training schools, which taught mostly marksmanship. Defenses and communications were organized and the people in the area appeared to be loyal to GADOR's civil government. There is record of little actual engagement with the enemy; rather, most armed activity seems to have been directed against neighboring guerrilla units over selfish and petty matters to further GADOR's ambitions. The strength of the unit may have been as high as 2,000 but they were poorly armed.

BELL in southern Negros offered GADOR command in Negros in 1942 but GADOR refused. Like BELL, Lt. Col. ABCEDE, then commanding in Negros Occidental, asked GADOR to take command of Negros. GADOR refused in both instances on the grounds that he did not want to be responsible for previous incidents among guerrillas. He stated he would take command only on the orders of the War Department or SWPA. Then when Lt. Col. ABCEDE attempted to unite the Negros guerrillas in Nov-Dec 1942 under PERALTA's IVth Philippine Corps, GADOR issued a memorandum (11 Dec 1942) assuming commanding of Negros, predicated on the supposed orders of Gen. SHARP. His purposes were not clear on this matter and his duplicity at once antagonized other guerrilla leaders.

A letter was then received by GADOR from Lt. Col. W. W. FERTIG, on Mindanao, in January 1943, in which FERTIG announced himself as Commander of Mindanao and Visayan guerrillas and asked GADOR to come to Mindanao to discuss his part in this organization. GADOR, since he was senior to FERTIG, immediately appointed himself commander of the Philippines, with rank of Major General. GADOR informed FERTIG and all Negros guerrilla leaders that he was assuming this command but all ignored him since they knew he had no authority from higher headquarters.

About this time GADOR began to place relatives and close friends, with little or no training, in positions above his good officers. This, with GADOR's ambitions, began to arouse a feeling of resentment and opposition among his officers. MERCADO had already withdrawn his men from GADOR's organization in October 1942.

On 7 April 1943, Maj. VILLAMOR, then in southern Negros, on a special mission from SWPA, sent a message to all guerrilla leaders on Negros appealing for cooperation among the various leaders. GADOR refused to believe that VILLAMOR had authority and did not reply but reiterated his claims to command by virtue of his seniority. This decision further antagonized his officers, who were anxious to be members of a recognized organization.

Maj. VILLAMOR was appointed temporary CO of the 7th MD on 14 May 1943, and later in May called a conference on Negros leaders. After much pressure from his officers, GADOR went but took his entire staff and a large number of guards with him, forming a procession that attracted much attention and whose movements were actually publicized by him. On 26 June, shortly after GADOR arrived at VILLAMOR's headquarters, the Japanese landed in the immediate vicinity and penetrated into security areas. GADOR and most of his men fled without assisting in the local defenses though he had a position assigned. At the conference GADOR accepted the post of Executive Officer in the 6th MD headquarters but resigned when he fled, and resumed his opposition activities.

On 8 July 1943, Lt. Col. ABCEDA was appointed Acting Commander of the 7th MD, and when he called a conference in early September 1943 to develop a plan of organization satisfactory to all leaders on Negros, and particularly to reach a more amicable solution on the seniority problem, GADOR refused to attend but continued obstructive tactics and expansion of his opposition organization. In December 1943, rumors of a Japanese attack on GADOR reached his ears and then Lt. Col. ASPILLA, GADOR's former Chief of Staff, executed a coup and replaced GADOR. GADOR fled to Bohol with a few officers and men, and ASPILLA brought the remaining organization under the 7th MD Command. The guerrilla unit on Bohol was under the command of Maj. Ismael P. INGENIERO, who had formerly been a junior officer under GADOR and who had recognized GADOR as commander of Negros Oriental.

When GADOR arrived on Bohol he received a letter sent from SWPA in October 1943 directing him to report to SWPA through 7th MD radio. He replied by radio through the Bohol command that he had come to Bohol after receiving the SWPA letter on Negros and that he was awaiting further instructions. No reply was sent from SWPA, and GADOR has not been heard from since the Japanese landed in strength on Bohol late in June 1944.

Throughout the history of his organization, GADOR showed himself to be unreasonable and unwilling to meet any other guerrilla leader on an equitable working basis. He demanded respect and authority without recognizing the claims of others, and was unscrupulous in seeking his own ends. His behaviour earned him the ridicule of guerrillas throughout the Visayas and ultimately cost him the loyalty of most of his officers.

Personnel known to have been in the organization are as follows:

ANTONIO, Capt. Eugenio

ASIS, Sgt.-de

ASPILLA, Lt. Col. Julian C.

BAVERIA, Capt.

DIONALDO, Maj. Luis

ESTACION, Capt.

GORDON, 1st Lt. Alexander
KAYANAN, Maj. Corsino C.

MARIAS, Maj. Alejandro las
MERCADO, Maj. Hermenegildo

SALAZAR, Maj. Jose

SY, Capt. Antollano P.

TEVES, Capt. Ibar

Former Mayor of San Carlos; now with the 7th MD as Bn CO of the 77th Prov. Regt. Constabulary Clerk; leader of an early guerrilla band around Tanjay and an unscrupulous killer; left GADOR before this organization collapsed and now Lt. 7th MD.

Former Chief of Staff for GADOR, revolted and brought the unit under command of the 7th MD; now Chief of Staff, 73rd Div. Gador relative and commissioned by him, no military training; was clerk in Dist. Engr. Office before war. Was GADOR's G-4. Relative of GADOR; was G-2 and possibly fled to Bohol with him, believed to be possibly executed.

Former teacher at Silliman University, was for a time GADOR's second in command; joined de ASIS for a time; present activities unknown.

Now with G-2, 7th MD.

Came from Negros Occidental to join GADOR in July 1943; GADOR Regt. Commander in Libertad area; went to Bohol. Now with 7th MD.

Left GADOR in October 1943 and now a commander under ABCEDE.

GADOR's Signal Officer; now 7th MD Signal Officer.

GADOR's Adjutant General; presently on Bohol with GADOR.

Brother of the former Mayor of Tanjay, G-2 for GADOR; present activities unknown, (has brother in ABCEDE's organization)?

Lt. Col. P. AUSEJO and Maj. H. R. BELL: On 26 May 1942 the Japanese landed at Dumaguete, capital of Negros Oriental. This was the last province to be occupied. During hostilities elsewhere most of the facilities and equipment from the town and from Silliman University in Dumaguete had been moved to the hills, and after the Japanese landing at Dumaguete, many university staff members took positions in the free government and guerrilla groups, and Silliman students and graduates were collecting into the nuclei of guerrilla Bolo Battalions. The Silliman University influence in the area was, in fact, largely responsible for the growth of a successful resistance movement in the south Negros region.

In the early stages of the Japanese occupation there was no organization among the guerrillas, although the desire of the people to resist was high; much equipment was available; and many unsurrendered soldiers were in the area. These soldiers wandered about and gradually drifted into the several Bolo Battalions then forming or went to Mr. BELL's camp at Malabo, west of Dumaguete. The main Bolo Battalion leaders were Maj. B. N. VILORIA, a former Silliman student and ROTC instructor at Silliman, and escaped USAFFE Lt. from Mindanao with an organization in the Malabo area; Capt. Felix ESTRADA, PA Reserve Officer and high school teacher in Dumaguete; Capt. Leon FLORES, former school teacher in Dumaguete, PA Reserve Officer, with an organization to the north of Dumaguete; Victor JORNALES, escaped Mindanao USAFFE officer (?) and former Silliman student; and Sgt. David CIRILO, PC, escaped Mindanao USAFFE soldier. One by one these leaders also went to Mr. BELL seeking leadership.

Mr. Henry Roy BELL was a well known and well liked American who had been on the Silliman University staff since 1921 as Professor of Physics and for a time Athletics Director. It was he who organized evacuation of

university equipment. When the Japanese occupied Dumaguete, Mr. BELL and his family and other Silliman staff members evacuated to Malabo and Lake Balinsasayao and assisted civil and guerrilla affairs in south Negros. It was natural that Silliman University graduates and students now in the guerrilla movement should come to Mr. BELL for assistance and on 20 August 1942 the guerrilla leaders in the area unanimously elected Mr. BELL to organize their forces. Mr. BELL devoted much time in establishing an organization among them and also enlisted the support of Manuel SY CIP, Chinese merchant in Dumaguete, in obtaining supplies for the guerrillas.

After completing the initial stages of the organization, Mr. BELL sought a military officer of sufficient rank to command the unit. He first contacted Lt. Col. GADOR, then in central Negros Oriental and so far as is known not very active at that time. GADOR refused and Mr. BELL contacted Maj. Placido AUSEJO who accepted the command and formed the 75th Regiment with headquarters at Malabo in October 1942. There were 1,000 men in the regiment in early 1943.

Maj. Placido A. AUSEJO, O-1213, PA, is about 51 years old; is a graduate of Silliman University; went to the Constabulary Academy in 1922 and was in southern Negros or Misamis Occidental (Mindanao) at the time of USAFFE surrender. He is diplomatic, mature in judgment and a good organizer, all excellent assets in stabilizing a guerrilla movement about to go wild. He was liked by the civilians and soldiers, and the 75th Regiment soon became well established and disciplined under his guidance. Later when Lt. Col. ABCEDE (then Capt. and junior to AUSEJO) was appointed 7th MD Commander, AUSEJO accepted the appointment without complaint, and has since done good service with the 7th MD Command as District G-3.

VILORIA became AUSEJO's Executive Officer, BELL became Civil Administrator for south Negros and the mayors and officials of towns were persuaded to resume their posts. Dr. Jose GARCIA of Dumaguete was performing valuable medical service and became 75th Regiment Medical Officer. An orderly state of affairs existed at the time. Though the south Negros area was without money and had only poor sources of food, both of these were to be had on Mindanao, where Col. FERTIG was developing a guerrilla organization at the time. Mr. BELL went to Col. FERTIG in late 1942 and arranged for supplies of food and Mindanao Emergency Currency to be sent to Negros together with some military supplies, and the 75th Regiment was attached to Col. FERTIG's command where it remained until Maj. VILLAMOR was appointed temporary CO, 7th MD, in May 1943.

The Japanese were confined to Dumaguete, Bais and Tanjay at this time and comparative peace reigned until trouble began to develop with GADOR's ambitions and methods of attaining his ends; control of neighboring areas. He interfered particularly with communications which had to pass through his area to all parts of Negros and Cebu. This dispute was the main bother to the 75th Regiment until the collapse of GADOR's organization in late 1943.

Since mid-1942, BELL had been attempting to contact the United States or Australia with the radio he had brought from Silliman University. He was assisted by a Lt. Louis VAIL, an American mestizo from northern Negros. VAIL had had considerable radio experience before the war and had been commissioned 2nd Lt. by USAFFE before surrender. VAIL escaped to the hills from Fabrica, Negros Occidental, after surrender, and joined the guerrillas there in June 1942. When he heard of Mr. BELL's activities in south Negros, VAIL and several others gathered salvaged radio equipment and went to Mr. BELL's headquarters through numerous Japanese patrols on Negros and Cebu and in Tanon Strait. VAIL and BELL worked tirelessly to build a satisfactory radio and to develop contact. Their constant calls went unheard or unheard; their supplies were low and they were about to give up after six months' efforts. Guerrilla morale was also dropping since there seemed no hope of outside contact and encouragement. Contact was unexpectedly established in February 1943. This, together with the arrival of Maj. VILLAMOR in southern Negros on a special mission from SWPA, revitalized

the organization. Mr. BELL subsequently became part of Maj. VILLAMOR's organization as a Major. VAIL later became 73rd Division Signal Officer.

Mr. BELL's spirit, originality and organizing ability were the guiding strength in the development of the guerrilla organization in this area and later in the establishment of the Negros Command, as Civil Affairs Director and finally as Chairman of the 7th MD Research Board. He commanded the respect of soldiers and civilians alike; his work was widely known and appreciated. The Japanese burned his camp in June 1943 and again in November 1943, when he narrowly escaped capture. BELL and his family and other members of the Silliman staff, many of whom had been instrumental in the development of order in southern Negros, were evacuated to Australia in early 1944.

Siquijor: The guerrillas on Siquijor were originally two battalions under the command of Maj. Benito CUNANAN, retired M/S, Philippine Scouts. These guerrillas drove off Japanese landings several times beginning in August 1942 and killed the Japanese-appointed Governor. There were no Japanese troops on Siquijor from August 1942 until late June 1943. The transport, then bring troops to Larena, Siquijor, struck a mine that CUNANAN had captured and placed in the channel. The vessel sank and many troops drowned. Other Japanese landed and the guerrilla organization dispersed.

When Maj. AUSEJO organized the 75th Regiment, in October 1942, CUNANAN was contacted and his unit became the 4th Provisional Battalion of the 75th Regiment, with CUNANAN as Battalion Commander. He held this post until June 1943 when Capt. Luis P. MORGAN, FERTIG's Chief of Staff on Mindanao, contacted him while on a mission to extend FERTIG's influence in the Visayas. This was just prior to the Japanese invasion of June 1943. MORGAN appointed CUNANAN commander of the 8th MD (Cebu and Bohol) for FERTIG, without authority from FERTIG. CUNANAN went to Cebu and some misunderstanding between Cebu and the 10th MD developed. The matter was ironed out and CUNANAN left Cebu. He is now Hq Commandant, Headquarters 7th MD.

2nd Lt. Eduardo CORNELLA is the present commander of the reorganized Siquijor guerrillas which are designated M Company, 75th Regiment, 73rd Division.

SECTION III. MAJOR VILLAMOR AND THE DISTRICT COMMAND:

Maj. Jesus A. VILLAMOR, O-1568, PA, 30 years old, was sent to the Philippines from SWPA on a special mission and arrived on southern Negros in January 1943. VILLAMOR has achieved fame in air combat during the Philippine Campaign in 1942 and was evacuated to Australia before the USAFFE surrender. He had had considerable training in the United States, was well educated and well connected in the Philippines. Although he was young and lacked experience, Maj. VILLAMOR was capable and moved by intensely patriotic motives.

Among VILLAMOR's instructions when he was sent to the Philippines was advice to maintain aloofness from guerrilla affairs and to report objectively on guerrilla personalities and organizations for use in SWPA decisions. He arrived in Negros at the time the organizations of ABCEDE, AUSEJO and GADOR were full blown and PERALTA and FERTIG were attempting to gain control of Negros guerrilla affairs. He perforce came into close contact with AUSEJO and ABCEDE and received cordial support from both and they came to him for advice on conduct of their affairs. VILLAMOR reported conditions carefully and advanced recommendations on the solution of local problems, particularly on the command situations, on supplies being sent the guerrillas, on his being given some authority to deal with some problems, and on dealing with GADOR firmly. On none of these recommendations was action taken at this time. GADOR took advantage of the absence of affirmation of VILLAMOR's authority and became

more defiant of local attempts to secure his cooperation in the settlement of the command question. His activities eventually threatened to disrupt AUSEJO's organization and intelligence communications with Cebu, undermined VILLAMOR's prestige and his ability to carry out SWPA instructions, and delayed the appointment of a commander on Negros unnecessarily. To prevent open hostilities between GADOR and other guerrillas, VILLAMOR suggested that he himself be appointed temporary commander of the district. This was done in May 1943.

In the meantime, PERALTA actively backed MATA, FERTIG backed AUSEJO, VILLAMOR backed ABCEDE and GADOR loudly proclaimed himself for recognition as permanent District Commander. VILLAMOR managed to bring together MATA, ABCEDE and AUSEJO under his command at the time, however, and secured GADOR's cooperation for a few days. GADOR withdrew his support shortly but many of his men became disaffected and later rejoined the District Command. VILLAMOR organized the District Headquarters, appointed a Negros Civil Administrator (Mr. BELL); organized a Research Board; and secured authority for a civil government for free Negros under Alfredo MONTELIBANO, pre-war governor of Negros Occidental. In all this he received very little outside support and was relieved in July 1943 when ABCEDE was appointed temporary Commander. ABCEDE was supplied late in 1943 but his command was not confirmed until March 1944. He achieved complete command of Negros units by December 1943 when GADOR fled.

Alfredo MONTELIBANO is about 36 years of age and believed to be a wealthy planter in north Negros. He is a politician, interested in power and self willed. He was responsible for the organization of north Negros guerrillas together with Lt. Col. MATA, assisting particularly in the procurement of food and money for the guerrilla organization. MONTELIBANO is reported to be aggressive, a tireless worker, and exacting in his demands for work done. He apparently has the popular support of the populace on Negros and is a program socialist fighting for the welfare of the poorer class.

Maj. VILLAMOR was evacuated to Australia in October 1943 and Lt. Col. Edwin ANDREWS, O-1313, PA, took his place as special mission representative, and was assigned to the 7th MD for control. Lt. Col. ANDREWS is an American mestizo, 39 years of age; graduated PG Academy 1927; sent by Commonwealth Government to the United States in 1929 to study investigation works and handwriting analysis with the Secret Service, Treasury Department, Washington. He returned to the Philippines and was assigned to the Intelligence Section, PC; became air pilot in 1937; and was CO Zablan Field at Bukidnon; took to the hills after surrender and joined guerrillas as Chief of Staff, Bukidnon-Cotabato Force under Col. FERTIG, CO Mindanao guerrillas, called him to Misamis in mid-1943. Shortly after, he crossed to Negros to join Maj. VILLAMOR as Camp Commandant. ANDREWS has been well trained and has had experience. He has been close to American influence and is appreciative of the treatment he received while in the United States. He is sensitive to his mixed blood and when things are not going to his personal tastes, often jumps to the conclusion that he is being discriminated against because of this. Since his assignment to ABCEDE, ANDREWS has continued the work commenced by VILLAMOR and acts as Lt. Col. ABCEDE's forwarding agent for 7th MD intelligence.

SECTION IV. CURRENT SITUATION:

ABCEDE continued the development of the organization and the policies established by VILLAMOR, always striving to improve its efficiency and stature and to increase its usefulness to SWPA in the planning and execution of the war.

After ABCEDE took command in July 1943 Japanese raids and patrols became seriously active on the south coast from Dumaguete to Sipalay for the first time. This was the last unmolested area on the island, and what with heavy raids in food producing areas of central Negros Occidental

and Oriental, and penetrating terror attacks on guerrillas in northern Negros, it seemed for a while that effective guerrilla organization would cease. The resourcefulness and tenacity of the leaders and the people alone made their continued existence possible, and the organization has apparently now enjoyed relative freedom from Japanese attacks for several months.

ABCEDE has surrounded himself with the ablest officers he could find. Also, he consults with them and is not afraid to delegate authority to them, the result being that he has a staff which functions normally, and he has found no necessity to build up a one man show. He has been well aware of the limitations of his own organization, and has admitted realistically that the Japanese can do anything they want to on Negros. He has therefore conserved his forces and has sought to maintain the proper balance between a sufficient amount of action to keep up morale of officers, men and loyal civilians, and over-aggressiveness which might invite strong retaliatory measures. He has dispersed organization and supplies as much as possible, has set up an efficient warning service for Japanese raids and has been careful to develop as great a secrecy discipline as possible. ABCEDE has paid a great deal of attention to development of the intelligence network on Negros, and has provided good coverage on current activities. His men have also assisted numerous crashed Allied pilots to safety. Friendly relations have been maintained with the civilians and the free civil government under Alfredo MONTELIBANO has been cooperative with the guerrilla organization.

American civilian personnel were of considerable assistance in establishing the organization, but their evacuation in 1943 and early 1944 has left the organization an almost entirely Filipino enterprise. The chief shortcoming of the 7th MD is lack of competent and reliable officers. This was particularly true in the north but the situation exists throughout Negros. Politics are rife and many of the officers are not above appropriation of army supplies for their own purchases and aggrandizement of their positions for after the war.

Strength and Personnel Assignments 7th MD

Resume District Strength:		Officers	EM
7th Military District Hq	CO Lt.Col. ABCEDE O-1520	217	1193
72nd Division:	CO Lt.Col. MATA O-1550	531	8663
Division Hq	190 Off 2237 EM		
74th Infantry	148 1945		
76th Infantry	111 2259		
72nd FA Regt	82 2222		
73rd Division (Prov):	CO Maj. C. GALVEZ O-1547	175	2388
Division Hq	37 Off 27 EM		
75th Infantry	83 1586		
77th Infantry	55 725		
GRAND TOTAL		923	12,193

Personnel Assignments:

District Headquarters, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental:

- CO: Lt. Col. Salvador ABCEDE, O-1520, PA
- C/S: Lt. Col. Ernesto S. MATA, O-1550, PA
- Adj: Maj. Fidel SOLIVEN, O-1042, PA
- G-1: Capt. Gregorio LAROT
- G-2: Maj. Rodolphe REYES
- G-3: Lt. Col. Placido A. AUSEJO, O-1213, PA (Major)
- G-4: Maj. Benjamin HOLLERO
- Dist FD: Lt. Col. Romeo A. INTENGAN, O-1537, PA
- Dist SO: Maj. Jose SALAZAR
- Dist FI: Maj. Rito E. DOMINADO
- CO Dist
- Hq trps: Maj. Enrique L. TORRES, Sr.

SOLIVEN: 34 years old, graduate Ilocano University, Vigan, in 1906; was Chief of Police in Bacolod before surrender. Joined guerrillas soon after surrender and had radio station in the Northwest Negros Sector in 1943. Is now District Adjutant 7th MD.

REYES: Was a former lawyer in Bacolod. He is efficient, exacting in his demands and picks and trains his intelligence personnel himself. He goes about Negros inspecting intelligence officers unexpectedly and sometimes incognito. He gives all possible attention to intelligence instructions and to improving the efficiency of the 7th MD intelligence organization. Is now 7th MD G-2.

INTENGAN: 30 years old; graduated University of the Philippines in 1936 and went to the special army school in Baguio; permanent commission in 1939. He was active in the early Negros Occidental guerrillas and was carried by PERALTA on the rolls of the IVth Philippine Corps in January 1943. Now 7th MD Finance Officer.

SALAZAR: Was Signal Officer with GADOR organization; became dissatisfied in mid-1943 and left to join the 7th MD Command. Was made District Signal Officer.

DOMINADO: 26 years old; great courage, was the best officer in the 7th Regiment under Lt. Col. AUSEJO. He went into combat with his men, had a good head and was well liked. He is a reserve PA officer and now District Field Inspector.

TORRES: Former civilian in Negros Occidental, organized a guerrilla group in the vicinity of Binalbagan in mid-1942 and joined ABCEDE's command. He is one of the best fighting commanders in Negros and when ABCEDE moved his headquarters to the south coast, TORRES and his unit were moved along to protect the District Headquarters and security areas. In this capacity TORRES and his men engaged in several sharp engagements with Japanese patrols and were instrumental in preserving the safety of supplies, papers and personnel on several occasions; is completely reliable.

72nd Division Headquarters, Canlaon Volcano area, Negros Occidental:

CO: Lt. Col. Ernesto S. MATA, O-1550, PA
C/S: Maj. Uldarico BACLAGON, O-1687, PA
D C/S: Maj. Luis BAYLON
Adj: Maj. Jose JOMALESA
G-1: Maj. Gregorio CAFE
G-2: Capt. Mariano S. ABAYGAR
G-3: 1st Lt. Emilio BORROMEO, O-1801, PA
G-4: Maj. Jaime C. DACANAY

74th Infantry, Northwest Negros Sector:

CO: Maj. Luis BAYLON
Ex O: Capt. Ruben ABAO
Adj: Capt. Melchor INFANTE
S-2 & 3: Capt. Seferin P. ALOVA
S-4: Capt. Leon MOYA

76th Infantry, Central Negros Sector:

CO: Maj. Abenir BORNALES, O-1691, PA
Ex O: Capt. Joaquin VELARDE
Adj: Capt. Emilio GENOSA
S-2: Capt. Quirino BATOG
S-3: -
S-4: Capt. Manuel C. CORDERO

72nd Field Arty Regt., East Negros Sector:

CO: Maj. H. Y. MERCADO
Ex O: Capt. Rustico PARALEJAS
Adj: 2nd Lt. Geminiano M. ELECCION
S-2: 3rd Lt. Salustiano PALINGHE
S-3: 1st Lt. Porifirio ALFORQUE
S-4: 1st Lt. Palagio YMALAY

BACLAGON: 26 years old, graduated PMA 1940. He is very well liked by the civilians and soldiers and is active in fighting the Japanese with his soldiers. Now C/S, 72nd Division; trustworthy.

BAYLON: 28 years old, has been active with north Negros guerrillas since 1942, was Adjutant 72nd Division, now D C/S, 72nd Division and CO 74th Infantry.

BORROMEO: Young but has seen action and shown much originality. He was in Luzon at the time of surrender of USAFFE and became associated with the remnants of NAKAR's 14th Infantry in Central Luzon in 1942. BORROMEO was in Manila in January 1944 when the intelligence organization members of these remnants were being captured en masse and he escaped to Negros. He was also attached to the Fil-American Guerrilla Troops in the Manila area, as Signal Officer. He seems to have been a friend of either Maj. VILLAMOR or Lt. Col. ANDREWS who superceded VILLAMOR. Is now G-3, 72nd Division.

JALANDO-ON: He was CO of the 72nd Engineering Corps and went to considerable trouble attempting to improve that organization. He is military, active and hard working; is now CO of the Northeast Negros Sector.

SMITH: An American mestizo and branch manager of the International Harvester Co. in Bacolod before the surrender. Joined guerrillas soon after surrender and has been active since; now Executive Officer, Northeast Negros Sector.

BORNALES: 28 years old, graduated PMA 1940. He is capable, aggressive, most loyal and is well liked by his men. Now CO 76th Infantry in Negros Occidental.

73rd Provisional Division Headquarters, west of Dumaguete:

CO: Maj. Ceferino R. GALVEZ, O-1547, PA
C/S: Lt. Col. Julian C. ASPILLA, O-1324, PA
Adj: Capt. Iluminado D. TALE
G-2: Capt. Galicano L. SIBALA
G-3: Capt. Jose GUILLANO
G-4: Capt. Timoteo S. ORACION
Div SO: Capt. Louis N. VAIL
Div MO: Capt. Jose S. GARCIA

75th Infantry, South Negros Sector: (HQ in vicinity of Zamboanguita)


CO: Maj. Felipe LUBATON
Ex O: Maj. Juan DOMINADO
Adj: 2nd Lt. Cesario TUBAT
S-2: 2nd Lt. Apolonia B. DIPUTADO
S-3: Capt. Francisco SARROSA
S-4: 2nd Lt. Modesto GOMEZ


77th Infantry:

CO: Maj. Ceferino GALVEZ, PA
Ex O: Capt. Joaquin FONDA
Adj: 2nd Lt. Venancio BANDOQUILLO
S-2 & 3: 1st Lt. Francisco CANARES
S-4: 2nd Lt. Ramon RIVERA

GALVEZ: 33 years old, graduate PMA 1937 and of Corp Murphy Infantry School in 1940; regular commission 1939. At the outbreak of the war he was a 1st Lt. was captured by the Japanese and later placed in the Bureau of Constabulary. He escaped in late 1943 and joined the Negros guerrillas. Now commander 73rd Provisional Division in Negros Oriental.

ASPILLA: 42 years old; graduated Constabulary Academy in 1928; believed to have been 1st Lt. when war broke out. Became associated with GADOR in Negros Oriental and was appointed his Chief of Staff. ASPILLA was one of the first to rebel against GADOR and began cooperating with the 7th MD command in July 1943, at least. He later is reported to have led an open coup and forced GADOR to leave Negros.





GUIMARAS ISLAND

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

TANON STRAIT

ILOILO STRAIT

EAST CHANNEL

GUIMARAS STRAIT

PANAY GULF

CEBU

NEGROS

NORTH NEGROS

10° 30'

10° 30'

10° 00'

10° 00'

Danjugan I
1245


MT MALAPANAO
2070

Old Zamboanga

Pescadore I

San Agustin I

San Juan I



**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
 GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
 AND
 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
 10 DECEMBER 1944

Scale 1:500,000

122° 30'

123° 30'



CHAPTER IX

THE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON BOHOL 15 December 1944

SECTION I. GENERAL BACKGROUND:

The commander of the small USAFFE garrison on Bohol, Capt. Victoriano BLANCAS, surrendered to the Japanese early in 1942 and his Executive Officer and Adjutant, 1st Lt. Jose M. MANEJA, succeeded to the command. MANEJA moved the remnants of the Bohol force to western Leyte for greater security, and reorganized them into a guerrilla force called "Camp Liberty", after their headquarters.

When the Japanese occupied Tagbilaran, the capital of Bohol, in May 1942, the Governor of the province, Agapito HONTANOSAS, became puppet Governor. Loyal officials and patriots went to the hills, and a number of informal guerrilla bands arose throughout unoccupied areas of the island. The largest and most active of these groups was the "Behind the Clouds" unit organized in June 1942 in northern Bohol, under the command of 3rd Lt. Ismael P. INGENIERO. The group was active in northern and central Bohol, and may have harassed the Japanese to some extent. Another unit was the "East Bohol Battalion", active in eastern and southern Bohol during mid-1942.

MANEJA returned from Leyte in mid-1942 with the intention of organizing guerrilla resistance on Bohol and found these rival guerrilla groups unable to agree on a unified policy or command because of seniority disputes among the officers. However, all guerrilla leaders met at Betuan in November 1942, and agreed on INGENIERO as commander of a unified Bohol guerrilla force; a free civil government was reestablished in the unoccupied area at the same time. The achievement of this concord may have been due to loyal officials of the former provincial government, who still commanded considerable authority.

SECTION II. THE BOHOL AREA COMMAND:

The Japanese occupied Tagbilaran, the capital, as well as Panglao Island and Guindulman, where they worked the manganese mines. The rest of the island remained comparatively untouched by the enemy, and the guerrillas, well supported by civilian population, were able to operate freely.

INGENIERO assumed the rank of Major, and during 1943 was able to build up a fairly well-organized military unit on Bohol which was called BOFORCE, set up headquarters at Carmen, in the center of the island, and claimed authority over the pre-war 8th Military District, Cebu and Bohol. The Bohol unit organized on a regimental basis, with attached battalions, and an intelligence net covering not only Bohol but Cebu City as well. The organization was run in military manner with some formality, and guards and sentry posts were frequent on the highways. Discipline was reported as good. The former Volunteer Guard organized by Executive Order of President QUEZON before the surrender was converted into a Bolo Battalion whose duties included messenger work, transporting supplies, and posting sentries on coasts, roads and trails. A "Women's Auxiliary Service" (WAS) was created as a female counterpart to the Bolo Battalion; their duties were largely the production of clothing and equipment for the soldiers and the raising of funds by entertainments. An official organ, "Bolos and Bullets", edited by attorney G. LAVILLES, regularly circulated news and propaganda.

Despite this outward show the military efficiency of the organization was questionable, and little action was taken against the enemy other than occasional ambushes and the gathering of intelligence. Some arms and ammunition were received from SWPA late in 1943.

The organization was recognized by SWPA as the Bohol Area Command, with authority over the island of Bohol only and under the command of Maj. INGENIERO by SWPA (in December 1943). A radio was sent for direct contact with SWPA.

Chief officers of the organization are believed to have been as follows:

Commanding Officer	Maj. Ismael P. INGENIERO
Executive Officer	Capt. Esteban BERNIDO
A.C. of S., G-2	Capt. H. J. ALANO, O-1666, CSP Inf
Adjutant	Capt. Juan GALIA
Inspector	1st Lt. Jose M. MANEJA
Finance Officer	Capt. Sergio JAMILA
Signal Officer	Capt. Gavino LAPURA
Engineer	Lt. Melanio LIGAN
Liaison Off. to Cebu	Lt. ABELLANA
Liaison Off. to Mindanao	1st Lt. Primo O. PATIGDAS
CO, 1st Bn	Capt. Vicente K. NUNAG
Ex O & Adj, 1st Bn	Capt. Martin A. MALIWANAG
S-2, 1st Bn	Capt. Washington PONCE
S-3, 1st Bn	Capt. Pedro MORALES
CO, 2nd Bn	Capt. Zoile HAGONOS
CO, 1st MP Bn	Lt. Alberto D. DAROSIN
CO, 2nd MP Bn	Capt. Anastacio MANIGQUE
CO, Bolo Bn	Capt. Filomeno ZAFRA

SECTION III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

When INTENIERO assumed command of the Bohol forces with the rank of Major, in November 1943, he was put in a position of authority over several officers whose official ranks were superior to his. This may have caused friction within the command, and there are indications that INGENIERO maintained a close surveillance of these men lest they attempt to assume command.

Reports have indicated the probability that INGENIERO's regime maintained its authority by virtue of its close connection with the free civil government reconstituted in late 1942. There have been difficulties in the distribution of supplies from SWPA through Bohol to Cebu, and fairly reliable indications that the Bohol regime is concerned less with fighting the enemy than with aggrandizement of their political power, renown and economic well-being, even at the expense of the civilian population. Relations with CUSHING's Cebu Area Command were further strained, due to differences on points of policy and early conflicting claims to authority over the pre-war 8th Military District.

INGINIERO formerly served under Lt. Col. Gabriel R. GADOR, who after surrender organized and led an independent and uncooperative guerilla group on the eastern coast of Negros. INGENIERO is described as a weak character, and inclined to take orders from GADOR, whom he alone recognized as commander of Negros Oriental. When GADOR was driven from Negros in January 1944, he fled to Bohol and took refuge with INGENIERO, together with the remnants of his group, including Capt. KAYAMAN, described as an undisciplined opportunist and unreliable.

Due probably to some or all of these factors, a plot to kill INGENIERO and replace him with a new commander arose among the officers of the command in June 1944, and was frustrated only by the timely arrival at headquarters of Senator Carlos P. GARCIA, the backbone of the civil government on Bohol. INGENIERO's movements during this month are not clear. He was reported on Panay at Hq 6th Military District early in the month.

On 23 June 1944 strong Japanese forces landed at several points on Bohol. There was little or no guerrilla resistance, and the Japanese were in all of the larger towns by noon of the first day. Their patrols penetrated all parts of the island during the following month, looting and killing, and thoroughly disorganized the guerrilla forces. The radio transmitter was captured, and possibly intelligence papers, but most of the arms were hidden and escaped capture by the Japanese.

Secrecy discipline of the organization had been reported as bad, and it is known that the Japanese had obtained complete rosters of the Bohol guerrilla forces before their invasion through Senior Inspector NUEGO of the puppet Constabulary. Shortly before their invasion many Japanese undercover agents from Cebu moved to Bohol, and at the same time SC's (members of the puppet Bureau of Constabulary forces) surrendered and joined the guerrilla forces in Bohol.

The body of the Japanese troops left the island at the end of July, and the guerrilla forces started to reorganize under Capt. Esteban BERNIDO, INGENIERO's second in command. INGENIERO himself returned during August or early September. Negotiations were started with guerrilla commanders in Cebu, Negros, and Leyte to obtain arms and ammunition and a radio transmitter, and at the end of September INGENIERO reported his organization intact and was resuming "resistance" against the small Japanese garrison left on the island. The battalions were reorganized into the 84th, 85th and 86th Regts, with a total reported strength of 8,000, probably poorly armed.

The Staff of the reorganized command was:

Commanding Officer	Maj. Ismael INGENIERO (Ho Caran)
Chief of Staff	Maj. Esteban BERNIDO
Adj & G-1	Maj. Juan GALIA
G-2	Maj. Heracles J. ALANO, C-16. S, PA
G-3	Maj. RAMAS
G-4	Maj. SALAZAR
CO, Engr Bn	Capt. Luis CLARIN

84th Regt., Hq. Batuan
CO: Maj. Sofio L. BAYRON
85th Regt., Hq. Calape
CO: Capt. Vicente K. NUNAG
86th Regt., Hq. Ipil, Talibon
CO: Maj. LAGAHIT

Col. GADOR's unit is still on Bohol between Efate and Inabanga and is known as the Negros Force. They are reported to be unpopular with the civilians as a result of their activities. GADOR went to Leyte in December 1944.

CHAPTER X

THE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO AND SULU 31 January 1945

SECTION I. GENERAL BACKGROUND:

The guerrilla resistance movement in Mindanao is unique in several respects. The movement was guided and directed mainly by Americans; it organized shortly after the surrender of USAFFE forces; it was quickly supplied with arms and ammunition from SWPA; it developed a civil administration parallel with its military organization, and in every respect justified the confidence of the U.S. in the loyalty of the Filipino people.

Conditions in Mindanao were favorable to the formation of a guerrilla movement. A comparatively large number of Americans, both military and civilian, were available for such work. There were few casualties among Filipino military and civil leaders, most of whom cooperated with the guerrillas. The island was large in area, with numerous isolated food producing sections and extremely limited road nets. The cities (which the enemy occupied) were all on the coast - Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Cagayan and Surigao. The enemy limited his activities to control of the cities and patrol of road nets and waterways. The hinterland, comprising ninety-five percent of the island, was free of enemy occupation or patrols. In effect, Mindanao, throughout the period following the surrender of USAFFE forces in May 1942, was ninety-five percent American territory with "Japanese guerrillas" occupying a few coastal cities.

The history of the guerrilla development is replete with confusion, jealousies, misunderstandings and internal squabbles. There were inevitable in view of the poor and difficult communications existing on the island. The fact that most of the guerrilla leaders, organizing their units in remote areas, were unknown to each other before the war merely added to the mistrust and confusion. It is a tribute to the Americans and Filipino patriots that in spite of these difficulties, the island was welded into a military unit with a minimum of internecine strife.

The Proclamation reproduced below is the earliest written indication of the movement which culminated in the formation of the 10th MD:

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
IN THE FIELD OF MINDANAO & SULU

18 September 1942

P R O C L A M A T I O N

On September 18, 1942, our forces under Maj. L.L. MORGAN completed the occupation of Misamis Occidental Province and Northern Zamboanga from the hands of the Japanese Military Government, and raised the American and Filipino flags therein.

In behalf of the United States of America, the Philippine Commonwealth Government is re-established in these regions under the Military Authorities. All Civil Laws and regulations will be followed except in those cases where they conflict with Military Laws. In such cases Military Laws will prevail.

This procedure shall continue to be enforced until such a time when it shall be declared suspended, or terminated.

/s/ W. W. FERTIG
Brigadier General, USA.
Commanding Mindanao & Sulu Forces.

SECTION II. THE 10TH MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND AND CURRENT SITUATION:

The story of the formation of the Headquarters 10th Military District, the control agency for the Mindanao guerrillas (as differentiated from combat guerrilla units), is the story of Col. Wendell J. FERTIG.

He was an American mining engineer in the Philippines, called to active duty with the Corps of Engineers in early 1941, served on Bataan, and was evacuated to Mindanao to continue airfield construction there about March 1942. Following the surrender of USAFFE forces, FERTIG, who was on an inspection trip at the time, went into the hills and stayed at Kolambugan, Lanao. Here he was contacted by a Capt. Luis P. MORGAN, and the organization of all guerrilla forces on Mindanao was begun.

Capt. MORGAN, an American mestizo, had succeeded in organizing guerrilla forces in Lanao and Misamis Occidental by September 1942. Lacking administrative ability, and recognizing his limitations, he asked Col. FERTIG (then Lt. Col.) to take command of the headquarters of the guerrillas and administer them, while MORGAN would assist consolidation of units in the field as FERTIG's Chief of Staff. The Mindanao guerrilla headquarters was then set up at Misamis. Contact was slowly established with scattered units, and small independent guerrilla groups were consolidated into larger organizations. Such consolidations required considerable tact, diplomacy and discussion. FERTIG won the loyalty and adherence of many leaders by such means and rarely had to use force.

In February 1943 radio contact was established between S-PA and Mindanao, and shortly thereafter, Col. FERTIG was officially recognized as the commander of the 10th Military District (Mindanao and Sulu). Sulu was later separated from the 10th MD and placed under the command of Col. A. SUAREZ.

Supplies to Mindanao: The existence of the Mindanao guerrillas was made known to GHQ when Capt. HANFEL and Capt. SMITH arrived in Australia from Mindanao in November 1942, bringing reports and statements from the guerrillas. The need for supplies was studied and a party with some equipment and supplies under Commander PARSONS as GHQ observer was sent to Mindanao in February 1943. Commander PARSONS remained until July. This was the first shipment of supplies to the Philippines and Commander PARSONS went ashore at Tukuran, Zamboanga, uncertain of conditions. He returned to the vessel at dawn with a lighter flying the American flag. Initially, supply shipments totalled only about seven tons per trip. Later, more adequate means were made available, and shipments were increased in size and frequency.

The most notable landing took place at sundown when a vessel tied up at a guerrilla held concrete pier. The guerrilla orchestra was out to greet the arrival and all hands pitched in to assist in the unloading of a record shipment. When the unloading was finished, coffee and sandwiches were served on board. The supplies were enroute to various parts of Mindanao by sailboat, motor banca and truck the same night.

About 500 tons of supplies have been shipped to Mindanao since that first trip in February 1943. As local security and banca contact with other islands were excellent, Mindanao was developed as a supply base for other guerrilla units, particularly on Bohol, Leyte, and Luzon. The Mindanao guerrilla force is the largest organized unit in the Philippines and is now the best equipped.

Instructions: Col. FERTIG was designated CO of the 10th Military District in February 1943 and then instructed to perfect his organization and to develop his intelligence net on Mindanao and Samar-Leyte.

When Commander PARSONS went to Mindanao, further instructions were sent regarding the development of the guerrilla organization and local supplies. Most important, plans were laid for the establishment of a radio net and coastwatcher system on Mindanao, and instructions were sent concerning the preparation of secret airfields.

Current Situation: As soon as Col. FERTIG assumed command of the guerrillas in September 1942, administrative units known as divisions were established in the various natural geographic regions of Mindanao. The Philippine Islands had been divided before the war into ten Military Districts. Philippine Army Divisions were organized, at least partially, in each District, i.e., 11th in the 1st District (Northern Luzon), 71st in the 7th District (Negros), and the 101st in the 10th District (Mindanao). The designation was therefore familiar and as the Mindanao areas were organized, the terms, 105th Division (Zamboanga), etc., were quickly accepted. The T/O for these units was based on the pre-war Philippine Army Reserve Division. The units in order of their activation are: 105th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 106th and 107th. The total strength of the guerrilla organization is about 37,807 with equipment as follows:

45 pistols	974
45 revolvers	240
carbines	6,285
rifles	11,032
AR and MR	438
TSMG	741
cal 30 MG	39
cal 50 MG	21
20mm	7
37mm	2
81mm mortars	23
bazookas and miscellaneous captured Japanese weapons.	

In January 1945, approximately 70 radios were in operation covering all roads, important enemy areas and coastal positions commanding shipping channels. Flash reports on aircraft and ship movements have been regularly received for some time.

Guerrilla held airfields at Dipolog, Labo, Lala and Sarobe have been frequently used by distressed airplanes. These fields are likewise used to speed up the flow of supplies into the island.

Civil Affairs: In October and November 1942, Col. FERTIG commenced collecting material for organization of a civil government on Mindanao. Lt. Col. HEDGES assisted, working particularly in Lanao Province. Where possible, reliable and unsundered government officials with pre-war positions of responsibility were called into service. Provincial governors were appointed and local governments established with as little interference by the military as the situation permitted. Schools were generally not established because facilities had either been destroyed or local conditions would not permit.

In the matter of food and other supplies Mindanao was fortunate in having many comparatively untouched food growing areas. Pineapples were available in quantity from the Del Monte plantations near Cagayan de Misamis; potatoes and temperate climate vegetables grew well in the Bukidnon hills near Talakag and near Claveria, Misamis Or.; coffee was available, and sufficient rice was grown in the Panguil Bay area and on the east coast of Surigao to feed people in other areas of Mindanao. The main difficulty was distribution. Trails and water transportation were developed and the 10th MD planned and coordinated exchange between areas as much as local transportation facilities permitted. For instance, a carabao trail was opened from the coast of Misamis Or. near Balingasag into central Bukidnon for

taking salt to the interior and bringing chinchona bark and food supplies to the coast. The trails from the hills south of Talakag were developed to make food grown in that area available to troops in Misamis Or. and Bukidnon. Local food production and safe storage in remote locations in the hills were likewise encouraged. As a result of this organization, the food situation on Mindanao has been one of the most satisfactory of any of the guerrilla controlled areas in the Philippines.

In early 1943, President QUEZON created the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board and authorized it to print emergency currency. The use of this currency provided a medium of exchange for guerrilla forces.

Of considerable assistance in civil affairs, especially in early 1943 were Marcelo T. PAISO, Deputy Governor of Lanao at time of invasion and appointed by FERTIG as Governor of Lanao; Mr. Edward KUDER, Moro expert and Civil Affairs Director for the 10th MD Command; and Ubaldo D. LAYA, pre-war Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Occ., who supervised the activities of the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board and advised FERTIG extensively on civil matters.

SECTION III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE COMMAND:

105TH DIVISION AREA (Zamboanga-Misamis Occ.)

With the exception of eight officers and about 100 enlisted men, the USAFFE garrison stationed at Zamboanga City surrendered on 15 May 1942. The unsundered personnel, together with loyal civilians and refugees from surrendered forces on other islands, gathered in various sections of Zamboanga and Misamis Occ. They were gradually contacted by outside forces and unified into the 105th Division under the 10th Military District Command. This Division is composed of the 105th, 107th and 115th Regiments and formerly what is now the 121st Regiment.

121st Separate Regiment (Zamboanga City and Basilan Id): In June 1942 unsundered USAFFE officers organized loose area forces in the vicinity of Zamboanga City as follows: Lt. Colso FERNANDEZ commanding near San Roque; Lt. Enrique GARCIA and Lt. Emilio GARCIA at Morce; Lt. Gerardo MALCAMPO at Cacao; and Lt. Abdulrahim IMAO, a Moro from Jolo, in the Curuan sector. In November 1942, Capt. Luis MORGAN, guerrilla leader and Chief of Staff to Col. FERTIG, arrived at Vitali with Capt. Frank Mc CARTHY, Jr., Capt. William TATE and others to incorporate the loose area forces into a unit under the 10th MD Command.

In December 1942, Capt. McCARTHY returned to Zamboanga City, appointed Lt. ALARCON commanding officer and designated the unit the 3rd Battalion, 115th Regiment (south coast of Zamboanga). The Battalion Executive Officer and S-3 was Lt. MAMA, a Moro. The S-2 was Lt. B. PINEDA. Sector commanders were appointed or confirmed and McCARTHY returned shortly to Malangas, the Regimental Headquarters (then under command of Maj. LASOLA).

In May 1943, Maj. Manuel D. JALDON was sent to the 3rd Battalion area as CO and the Battalion was reorganized into the 121st Regiment. His staff:

Exec. Officer and S-1	Capt. HAMID (Moro)
S-2	Lt. C. BERENGUER
S-3	Lt. ALARCON
S-4	Lt. V. ROMERO
CO Hq Bn	Lt. Ernesto CABATO
CO 1st Bn, Lamitan	Lt. ASAKIL
CO 2nd Bn, Curuan	Lt. MAMA
CO 3rd Bn, Cacao	Lt. Alfonso ENRIQUEZ

Maj. JALDON came from Misamis Oriental where he had been CO of the 109th Regiment in November 1942. Trouble developed between him and Maj. LIMENA in that area, and Maj. JALDON was transferred to the

command of the 121st Regiment. He had seen service with the USAFFE in Zamboanga before surrender and is reported to have given valuable service. His guerrilla service however has not been outstanding. While JALDON was in command of the Zamboanga guerrilla regiment his pro-Japanese brothers persuaded him to come to Zamboanga and sign a peace agreement with the Japanese. He was relieved of his command when the news reached FERTIG in June 1943 and the Regiment became disorganized. No supplies or support were received by the regiment from the District Headquarters until Maj. Felipe FETALVERO (early guerrilla leader in Lanao) arrived in December 1943. He announced that the 121st Regiment no longer existed and activated the 1st Separate Battalion with Lt. Donald LECOUVRE as CO.

Lt. LECOUVRE, an unsurrendered American enlisted man, had given valuable assistance to Col. FERTIG, and after his assignment to the Separate Battalion, organized intelligence contacts in Zamboanga City. The Battalion has been carefully reorganized and redesignated the 121st Regiment. It has withstood determined large scale Japanese attacks and has reported valuable intelligence from Zamboanga City. Small detachments of this regiment are located at Sirawai and Sicoon on the west coast. The 121st Regiment is now not part of the 105th Division but is a separate regiment under control of the "A" Corps (see page 92).

The guerrilla unit on Basilan Id. was organized from Philippine Constabulary remnants. Due to the proximity of large Japanese forces, it is not particularly strong or well organized. In March 1943, Lt. ALARCON went to Basilan Island from Zamboanga to organize a guerrilla unit, but found Lt. SANTIALLANA already in command of an organized unit. Lt. ALARCON returned to Zamboanga, and the Basilan Island guerrillas have been attached to the Zamboanga City area command since, though contact is probably remote. Basilan guerrillas are located largely on the southern, eastern and interior parts of the island.

115th Regiment: Little is known of the guerrilla history of the Zamboanga south coast. Capt. Frank McCARTHY, Jr., organized guerrillas in the Malangas area in late 1942. Some guerrilla units are active in the Kabasalan area and, in addition, are collecting latex from the rubber plantation. Other guerrillas have been active in the Pagadian-Tukuran area since mid-1942. The present CO of the regiment is believed to be Maj. Angel MEDINA.

107th Regiment: Guerrillas have been active on the Zamboanga north coast since mid-1942. Small detachments are at barrier in the southern sector but the main concentrations are in the area from Sindangan northwards. The 107th Regiment has been particularly active in the area between Dipolog and Calamba. Lt. Col. Justina TAMBO, PA, in command of the regiment, is about 49 years old, has had long service with the Constabulary and is known for his high integrity.

106th Regiment: A small Japanese garrison was left in Misamis Occ. after the invasion in 1942. Capt. Joaquin DISMAL was one of the first guerrilla leaders in the province and was active in confining Japanese patrols to the coastal towns. In September 1942, Capt. TATE and Capt. MORGAN, guerrilla leaders from Lanao, drove the Japanese from Misamis and freed Misamis Occidental and the entire north coast of Zamboanga. The 106th Regiment was organized in Misamis Occidental shortly thereafter. Col. FERTIG then established the Mindanao guerrilla headquarters at Misamis in September 1942 (see Introduction) and remained there until the Japanese re-occupation of Misamis Occidental and the Zamboanga north coast (July 1943). Capt. NARANJO was one of the few leaders who resisted this Japanese invasion and he performed outstanding service in reorganizing the scattered forces. Following the enemy re-occupation, Col. FERTIG moved his headquarters to Lanao.

105th Division: It is believed that this Division was organized when Col. FERTIG assumed command of the Mindanao guerrillas in September 1942. So far as is known Lt. Col. Ciriaco MORTERA, O-1081, PA, was appointed commander at that time and remained in command until January 1944, when he was replaced by Lt. Col. Hipolito GARMA, PA, for unknown reasons. Lt. Col. MORTERA is about 51 years old and has seen long service with the Constabulary. He is reported to be well trained, prefers headquarters to field duty, is neither aggressive nor particularly strong, and is now Adjutant General "A" Corps (see page). Lt. Col. GARMA is about 54 years old, was Chief of Constabulary under Gen. SHARP and hid in the mountains after the USAFFE surrender. It has been reported by one source that he lacks initiative and "fight". He was Adjutant General of the 109th Division, Bukidnon, in 1943. Lt. Col. Justino TEANO was reported to be Chief of Staff of the 105th Division in late 1944. It is believed that there are some disagreements between Lt. Col. TEANO and higher commands which have prevented his capacities being used to better advantage.

Staff and strength of the 105th Division:

	OFF	EM
105th Division, Hq Dipolog, Zamboanga		
CO : Lt. Col. Hipolito GARMA, O-1021, PA		
C/S: Lt. Col. Justino TEANO, O-1120, PA		
Division Hq Personnel	25	176
106th Regiment, Hq Bagacay, Misamis	85	1,322
CO : Unknown		
107th Regiment, Hq Miputak, Dipolog	70	987
CO : Lt. Col. Justino TEANO(?), O-1120, PA		
115th Regiment, Hq Pagadian, Zamboanga	88	1,014
CO : Maj. Angel MEDINA (?)		
ExO. Capt. CONTOY		
Adj: Lt. NITALIA		
S-2: Lt. GARCIA		
S-3: Lt. FREDERICKS		
121st Separate Regt. Hq Bajandi, Zamboanga	75	771
CO : Lt. Donald ENCOURTE, AUS		
Total	324	4,270

The only Japanese forces in the divisional area are at Zamboanga City. Guerrilla held airfields at Dipolog, Zamboanga, and Labo, Misamis Occidental, are being used frequently for supply to guerrilla forces and as emergency landing strips for disabled Allied aircraft.

As of December 1944:

ARMS		AMMUNITION	
45 pistols	148	cal 30 M1	75,569
carbines	1,261	cal 30 M2	43,480
rifles	706	cal .45	25,901
AR and MR	35	81mm	140
TSMG	202	hand grenades	30
cal 30 MG	2		
cal 50 MG	4		
81mm mortars	4		

108TH DIVISION AND "A" CORPS ORGANIZATION

In April 1942, the USAFFE Mindanao Command under Brig. Gen. Guy O. FORT was at Dansalan, Lanao. The troops had been hastily collected and for the most part had had five months' training and no action. The Japanese were at Malabang, Ilocos, 30 April 1942 and entered Dansalan 4 May. Gen. SHARP surrendered 9 May 1942 in Bukidnon and Gen. FORT surrendered at Dansalan on the 27th. The blow was so complete and sudden that civilians and army remnants were stunned and demoralized.

The Japanese mistreatment of civilians caused considerable dis-sension among the people. Their feelings were aroused and the guerrilla units sprang up spontaneously throughout the province. Manalao MINDALANO, among the Moros, Capt. Luis MORGAN, in the Kolambugan area, and Capt. Pedro ANDRES, in the Iligan area, were the principal leaders in the guerrilla movement in Lanao at this time.

Capt. Luis P. MORGAN: Capt. Luis MORGAN, an American mestizo, was a Philippine Constabulary company commander at Kolambugan, Lanao, before the war. In the disorganization following the USAFFE surrender, the Moros had moved down from the hills onto the Christian north plain of Lanao and were molesting the people around Baroy. MORGAN gathered his company together to protect the civilians and take revenge on the Moros. MORGAN is an opportunist and had the reputation of ruthlessness, daring and lack of consideration for civilians.

During this time William TATE, an American-Moro mestizo from Momungan who had joined the Japanese in June, left the Japanese and organized a group (mostly Moros) and went to Misamis Occidental. MORGAN subdued the Kolambugan area and joined bands with TATE in Misamis Occ. They pushed the Japanese out of Misamis Occ. entirely in September and TATE returned to Momungan. TATE was reported to be a rough character when he was under the influence of MORGAN. TATE is believed to have retired from guerrilla activity in 1943 and may have died since.

MORGAN decided to organize the Mindanao guerrillas by direct contact, coercion and persuasion. As a mestizo however, he did not have the necessary prestige to rally elements around him. Col. FERTIG, AUS, therefore took administrative command of the organized guerrilla units while MORGAN went to the field as Chief of Staff to persuade unattached guerrilla units to join up.

MORGAN set out to subdue and unify guerrillas in the outlying areas as soon as the headquarters under FERTIG was established in Misamis. In November MORGAN took a large armed party to Zamboanga and Sulu where he had heard small guerrilla organizations existed. His arbitrary actions in Zamboanga, affected perhaps by his attempt to induce the guerrillas to attack that city, antagonized the guerrillas in that area. The mission did, however, place outlying guerrillas on notice that there was a strong Mindanao guerrilla force in operation, and that its headquarters was at Misamis. Communications were also established between Sulu and the headquarters at Misamis.

MORGAN returned to Misamis in December 1942. He left Misamis 12 January 1943 with a party of 80 men which became known as the GENERAL HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, and went across northern Mindanao to Leyte and Negros and returned to Misamis in June 1943. On this trip he contacted guerrillas and made contacts for the unification of the Mindanao guerrilla command. He appointed commanders and promoted personnel as he went. Most notable event on this trip was an abortive attack on Butuan 1-11 March 1943. He joined forces with Lt. Col. McCLISH but the attack was ill timed and failed.

From Surigao MORGAN went to Leyte in April 1943. There he attempted to unite 9th MD (Leyte and Samar) guerrillas under Col. KANGLEON. He then went to Siquijor and contacted Maj. Benito CUNANAN, then commanding the guerrillas on that island. He appointed CUNANAN commander on Cebu and left for Negros to attempt to bring Lt. Col. GADOR into line with the 7th MD Command.

CUNANAN, thinking MORGAN's bona fides with SWPA unquestionable, set up a command and attempted to organize a guerrilla unit from dissatisfied Cebu guerrillas. The matter was later ironed out after some hard feelings between Cebu and the 10th MD.

On Negros, Capt. MORGAN met Maj. VILLAMOR, who was then at Tolong on a special mission from SWPA. VILLAMOR dissuaded MORGAN from interfering forcibly in Negros guerrilla affairs and MORGAN returned to Mindanao in June 1943.

It appears that in permitting MORGAN, his Chief of Staff, to go on this trip, Col. FERTIG may have hoped to keep MORGAN preoccupied so that he would not interfere with the peaceful organization of the Mindanao command. At anyrate MORGAN came back to Mindanao full of importance from his mission and started on a holiday in Lanao. The Japanese landed in Misamis in June 1943 just after MORGAN settled down and the guerrillas did not resist the landing (interpretation of GHQ orders not to engage the enemy needlessly and thus invite retaliation). Capt. MORGAN felt that the guerrillas had not acted properly and counter to Col. FERTIG's orders, ordered his own followers to attack Misamis and to take arms from those guerrillas who had fled.

Col. FERTIG had moved his headquarters to Liangan, Lanao, shortly after the Japanese invasion of Misamis, and in MORGAN's absence, had appointed Col. BOWLER to succeed him to the command of Mindanao should anything happen. MORGAN claimed openly that the move was looked upon unfavorably by the people and that the appointment of BOWLER was a breach of faith. He resigned from the 10th MD command and set up his own organization in Misamis Occidental in September 1943. The situation threatened to become serious due to MORGAN's violent attempt at mutiny. His evacuation to Australia at the end of September effectively eliminated a strong and dissident factor in Mindanao guerrilla affairs.

The Moros and the Maranao Militia Force: The Moro problems on Mindanao have long been a source of discontent and unrest. The Moros are a distinct Mohammedan group and are found throughout the Sulu, along the southern coast of Zamboanga, the southern half of Lanao Province and across Cotabato to the Davao Gulf. The Maranao (Lanao) Moros are perhaps the bravest, proudest and the most intelligent of the Philippine Moro groups: Maranao (Lanao), Maguindanao (Cotabato) and the Tausug and Samals (Zamboanga and Sulu). Intelligence, courage and pride, however, do not make the Lanao Moro either a valuable ally or a dangerous enemy. His intelligence is more nearly sly cunning, going hand in hand with treachery. The Moro has little respect for the Christian Filipino and may always be antagonistic towards him.

Moro villages are small, usually built up around a farming community, and the inhabitants are usually related to each other. While each community is loyal to its own leader, the leaders of these inter-related communities form an association and have a group leader, or Datu, to whom all community leaders are loyal. For the past forty years Moros have been under the control of the Philippine Constabulary, but most of the Moros remember that they were once the absolute rulers of their areas and were free to rob and murder groups less powerful than themselves. With any relaxing of police authority many of them soon return to their ancient customs of robbery and murder, with loyalty only to their immediate leaders.

To prevent bloodshed between Moros and Christians, no Moros were allowed to live on the north coast of Lanao and none lived in Bukidnon. During the chaos following the surrender, Moros came down the north slopes of the Lanao hills and began molesting the Christians. MORGAN's retaliatory measures were so violent, however, that the feelings of the Moros were aroused more than ever, and it has been only with considerable care that the support and neutrality of the Moros was maintained. In the Dinas vicinity of southern Zamboanga no Christian dares set foot now as a result.

In January 1942, when it became evident that it would be difficult if not impossible to stem the tide of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Gen. FORT tried to bolster the Mindanao Force by organizing and placing thousands of Moros in holding defensive positions along key

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In January 1942, when it became evident that it would be difficult if not impossible to stem the tide of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Gen. FORT tried to bolster the Mindanao Force by organizing and placing thousands of Moros in holding defensive positions along key

highways in the southern part of Mindanao. He organized the Moro Bolo Battalion, active young Moros armed with knives. The Moros were under their own leaders but were paid by USAFFE. They had little time for training and when the Japanese landed in Davao, the Moro force dissolved rapidly. Many prominent Moros were attached to this group and later became active in guerrilla affairs in Lanao and Cotabato.

Lt. Col. HEDGES began to organize the Moros in December 1942-January 1943. He collected most of the former members of the Bolo Battalion and formed the Maranao Militia Force. The early leaders of the Moros in guerrilla activities were: Manalao MINDALANO, former member of the Bolo Battalion, a hot tempered young Moro; Busran KALAW of Momungan; Datu LAGUINDAB of Ganassi; Joseph SANGUILLA of Mumay and Madalua; and Datu BUNTALIS of Masiu.

By late 1942 the Moros had collected a fairly large number of weapons. After the surrender they ransacked the battlefields and waylaid civilians and former USAFFE soldiers for weapons. The threat to the guerrilla organization was real. The efforts of Busran KALAW, MINDALANO, the Sultan of Ganassi and many others to bring the Moros into line is a monumental tribute to their respect for the American people. They were supported in their efforts by very small allotments of arms and supplies from the guerrilla headquarters. The one time location of the District Headquarters in Lanao and the presence of guerrilla leaders (such as Lt. Col. HEDGES and Mr. KUDER) who knew the Moros well, were fortunate in this connection.

For political reasons the Maranao Militia Force is maintained as a separate part of the 108th Division, and is probably the best armed single group of guerrillas on Mindanao. The present organization and strength of this force is as follows:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
124th Regt, MMF, Hq Rupagon, Lanao	36	1,538
CO: Capt. Macaurog ARUMPAC		
126th Regt, MMF	118	1,124
CO: Maj. Busran KALAW		
127th Regt, MMF, now sieging Malabang	73	788
CO: Capt. Manalao MINDALANO		
128 Regt, MMF, now sieging Malabang	100	951
CO: Maj. Anonngo BAGUINDAALI		
129th Regt, MMF, Hq Taraka, Lanao	78	1,202
1st Prov. Regt.	63	928
2nd Prov. Regt.	53	533
2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th Separate Battalions	71	1,470
5 separate Companies	5	307
Total	597	8,841

Lt. Naguib GUANDY, Chinese-Moro mestizo and pre-war mayor of Malabang, has been responsible for organizing Moro resistance south of Malabang on the Lanao coast. He has protected the Christians and has kept on good terms with the Japanese to obtain supplies. KALAW is a native of Momungan, Lanao, was mayor of Momugan at outbreak of the war and is ex-provincial treasurer of Lanao. He is an associate of Capt. MORGAN, and actively resisted the Japanese since 1942. MINDALANO is an ex-school inspector, clever and courageous, very hot tempered. He was the first to fight the Japanese after the USAFFE surrender. ARUMPAC was mayor of Lumbatan; clever, a little politico, a good manager and belongs to the Masonic order. BAGUINDAALI is popular as one of the first Moro guerrilla leaders.

Organization of the 108th Division: So far as is known the 108th Division was organized in late 1942 and Lt. Col. Charles HEDGES, O-540796, was appointed the commander. He has been in command since. HEDGES is an American about 48 years old. Before the war he was at the Kolambugan Lumber Mills on the north coast of Lanao, with a commission

as a Captain in the reserve. When the USAFFE forces were in Lanao he became the CO of the Motor Transport Co. at Dansalan. His experiences before the war made him familiar with the local people. He has since shown his ability to get along well with the Christians and to maintain the favor and support of the Moros. Mr. KUDER, an American educator who had spent many years teaching Moros, and numerous Moro leaders who had been educated by Mr. KUDER, were of outstanding help to HEDGES in dealing with the Moros. The 108th Division has seen much action on the north coast of Mindanao and the Lake Lanao-Malabang area. The division is probably one of the best armed and led of all the Mindanao divisions.

The staff of the Division and Christian Regiments (Moro Regt. staffs have been given on page 91):

108th Division, Hq Dansalan, Lanao; Adv Hq, Iligan		
CO :	Lt. Col. Charles W. HEDGES, AUS	
C/S:	Maj. Angeles LIMENA, PC	
Adj:	Capt. Regalo D. BALA	
G-1:	Capt. Celso V. VALMORES	
G-2:	Maj. Amado CURAMING (Maj. Rex BLOW, AIF ?)	
G-3:	Maj. Juan K. TADURAN	
G-4:	Capt. Ricardo ABELLANOSA	
		Off Enl
Division Hq Personnel		120 530
105th Regiment, Hq Baroy, Lanao		75 1,168
CO: Capt. BARRO (?)		
108th Regiment, Hq Kauswagan		85 1,139
CO: Maj. Felipe P. QUEJADA, PC (?)		
120th Regiment, Hq Dalipuga		97 1,334
CO: Capt. Pedro ANDRES, PA Res.		
Maranao Militia Force (see page 91)		597 8,841

	Total	974 13,012

Maj. BLOW is one of a group of AIF prisoners of war from Singapore. They escaped in 1943 from their camp at Sandakan, British North Borneo. BLOW and his party were brought by natives to Tawi Tawi where they assisted Col. SUAREZ set up his command of the Sulu Area and then went to Mindanao. Several of the men were evacuated to Australia early in 1944 but Maj. BLOW remained and has rendered valuable service with the guerrillas in western Mindanao.

As of December 1944:

ARMS		AMMUNITION	
45 pistols	242	cal 30 M1	28,924
carbines	1,633	cal 30 M2	146,326
rifles	5,661	cal .45	21,414
AR and MR	172	81mm	90
TSMG	250		
cal 30 MG	14		
37mm	1		
81mm mortars	4		

The organization of "A" Corps: In late 1943 Japanese pressure on the north coast of Lanao threatened the District Headquarters and it was decided to move that headquarters to the Agusan Valley. Shortly after the move in January 1944, a sub command for western Mindanao was set up for rapid communications and command purposes. This command was called the "A" Corps, and included the 105th, 108th, 109th and 106th Divisions. The Commander of "A" Corps is Lt. Col. Robert V. BOWLER, O-294619, former Commander of the 109th Division.

Lt. Col. BOWLER was a reserve officer, called to active duty prior to the war. He was in Bukidnon at the time of surrender and went into the hills until about August 1942. He collected several U.S. enlisted

men who were starting guerrilla organizations and brought the groups under his command. He is judicious, brusque and somewhat cold in manner. He is reported to be respected by Filipinos for his firmness and fairness.

So far as is known, the staff of the "A" Corps is:

CO : Lt. Col. Robert V. BOWLER
Adj: Lt. Col. Ciriaco MORTERA, PA
G-1: Capt. Isaias O. ARBOLEDA
G-2: Maj. Chandler B. THOMAS, AUS
G-3: Capt. Donald H. WILLS
QM : Maj. Tomas CABILI

"A" Corps personnel: 142 Officers 798 EM

Lt. Col. MORTERA is an old Philippine Constabulary officer, well trained and competent. He was the original commander of the 105th Division but was relieved in late 1943.

The "A" Corps headquarters was located near the former 10th MD Headquarters at Lala, Lanao, but has since been moved to Misamis, Misamis Occidental.

109TH DIVISION (Cagayan de Misamis Area and Bukidnon)

The guerrilla movement in this area started in two sections, one in the area about Cagayan de Misamis and the other in the southern Bukidnon-Cotabato border area. In the Cagayan area between Talakag and Sumilao several American Air Corps enlisted men started semi-renegade guerrilla groups. Most of these men have since been evacuated but the organizations started formed the basis of the 111th and 112th Regiments. Lt. Col. BOWLER, AUS, now "A" Corps Commander, contacted these men and other guerrilla leaders in late 1942 and began to coordinate and regularize the units. Arms and equipment were salvaged from USAFFE supplies and equipment. The 109th Regiment organization was started by Maj. Manuel JALDON in the vicinity of Alubijid, Misamis Or., in 1942. JALDON was transferred to Zamboanga in 1943. Four regiments were ultimately activated in the 109th Division area: the 109th, 111th, 112th and the 117th.

117th Regiment: The 117th grew out of the guerrillas organized in southern Bukidnon as a defense against Japanese terror tactics. The Bukidnon guerrillas were weak and Manuel FORTICH and Vicente LEUTERIO persuaded Maj. Salapida PENDATUN, then successfully attacking the Japanese in Cotabato, to come to Bukidnon and assist in driving out the Japanese. Maj. PENDATUN came and drove the Japanese from Kibawe, Maramag, Valencia and Mailag before the end of 1942. His forces then numbered 2,400 men. In mid-January, Malaybalay was attacked from the south. Support was supposed to have been promised from the north by Lt. Col. BOWLER, but did not materialize and the attack was a failure.

In the meantime radio contact was established with Col. FERTIG. Col. FERTIG is reported to have accepted the contact as agreement by PENDATUN to join the 10th MD Command and PENDATUN was appointed by Col. FERTIG CO of the 117th Regiment. Lt. Col. BOWLER and Father HAGGERTY visited PENDATUN to formalize the command and found PENDATUN with his forces still harassing the Malaybalay stronghold of the Japanese. PENDATUN was resentful of FERTIG's presumptions and the meeting with PENDATUN's representatives was not a happy one. Father HAGGERTY was rector of the Ateneo de Cagayan before the war and did a great deal in restoring order and confidence among the guerrillas and people on the north coast of Mindanao. Both he and Manuel FORTICH (pre-war Bukidnon Assemblyman) did their best to smooth affairs but the dispute was not settled until Commander PARSONS arrived in May 1943. He persuaded PENDATUN to return to Cotabato with the Moro guerrillas who had come into Bukidnon by this time in great numbers. The 117th Regiment then became a Christian regiment but never equalled the power and force of the 117th Regiment under Maj. PENDATUN.

Lt. Col. ANDREWS and Tomas CABILI (pre-war Assemblyman from Lanao) who had been with Maj. PENDATUN, were called to Misamis by Col. FERTIG to explain the trouble with PENDATUN. ANDREWS subsequently went to Negros and joined an old friend, Maj. J. A. VILLAMOR. CABILI remained in Lanao and has been working with guerrillas there in various capacities since.

109th Division: The division was organized in early 1943 but did not consolidate its present area of control until the settlement of the PENDATUN dispute. Lt. Col. Robert V. BOWLER was the original commander of the division, but was relieved by Lt. Col. James GRINSTEAD, AUS, when Lt. Col. BOWLER was appointed CO of the "A" Corps in January 1944.

GRINSTEAD is 50-55 years old, a retired PC officer of many years service in the Philippines, many of them spent among the Moros in Mindanao. He was living on his plantation in Cotabato when the war started. He reported to the District Headquarters in February 1943 and was asked to return to Cotabato to organize guerrillas. He was later made CO of the 109th Regiment, then C/S 109th Division and finally was made CO of the 109th Division. He has been a stable and careful commander in a difficult area. The supply situation in Bukidnon and the morale problems arising therefrom, have required skillful handling.

The present strength and know staffs of the 109th Division follow:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
109th Division, Hq Talakag, Bukidnon		
CO : Lt. Col. James GRINSTEAD, AUS		
C/S: Maj. Crispino M. de CASTRO, PA		
Division Hq Personnel	101	678
109th Regiment, Hq near Alubijid	63	1,005
CO: Maj. LAPLIP, PA		
111th Regiment, Hq near Mambuaya	85	1,144
CO: Capt. J. S. CRUZ, PA		
112th Regiment, Hq near Sumilao	36	626
CO: Capt. William McLAUGHLIN, AUS		
117th Regiment, Hq near Mailag	<u>41</u>	<u>534</u>
Total	327	3,987

McLAUGHLIN, former Sergeant in the 31st Infantry, commissioned when war broke out and has been in command of the 112th Regiment since August 1943. CRUZ was formerly Division QM 102 Division, PA, on Mindanao.

Status of equipment December 1944:

ARMS		AMMUNITION	
45 pistols	183	cal 30 M1	456,559
carbines	1,027	cal 30 M2	316,099
rifles	1,421	cal 45	124,282
AR and MR	81	cal 50	2,250
TSMG	134	20mm	4
cal 30 MG	13	37mm	47
cal 50 MG	3	81mm	92
20mm	2	hand grenades	59
81mm mortars	9		

110TH DIVISION (E Misamis Or., N Agusan and Surigao)

The guerrillas in this area were a mixture of civilians, ex-USAFFE soldiers, Philippine Constabulary, a few Philippine Scouts and American Army and Navy personnel. Small unconnected groups organized themselves in "hometown" barrios. They were led by natural leaders who assumed their responsibilities for various reasons - personal aggrandizement, banditry, desire to fight the Japs or establishment of law and order.

The division organization started in September 1943 and three regiments were formed: the 110th, 113th and the 114th.

At the time of the organization of the guerrillas in this divisional area, the Japanese lightly garrisoned Cagayan and Bugo, Misamis Or.; Butuan, with an outpost at Libertad, Agusan; and Surigao town. Occasional enemy launch patrols of several hundred men went from Cagayan to Balingasag and from Butuan to Buenavista.

110th Regiment Area: This regiment extended from the Tagaloan River, Misamis Or., to the eastern Misamis Or. border. The guerrilla band which was to form the nucleus of the regiment was started at Balingasag sometime in September 1942, when a group of armed Filipinos led by Pfc Clyde M. ABBOTT, 14th Bomb Squadron and Lt. Pedro COLLADO (Constabulary Pfc), successfully attacked a Japanese patrol which visited Balingasag to set up a puppet government. COLLADO took the initiative in forming a guerrilla organization and collected around him a bodyguard of toughs. COLLADO was later disarmed and imprisoned for conspiracy of mutiny after the 110th Regiment was established, with Capt. LUZ in command.

Several small units organized at Claveria under M/Sgt. James McINTYRE, USAC, and at Malitbog under M/Sgt. Alfredo FERNANDEZ, USAC, but did not cooperate with each other until Lt. Col. McCLISH arrived in the area. Other guerrilla contacts were established in the vicinity of Gingoog Bay where Rosaurio DONGALLO was the chief leader.

113th Regiment Area (Northern Agusan): The early guerrilla bands which were eventually unified under the 113th Regiment were the small units that sprang up at Nasipit, Buenavista, Cabadbaran and the lower Agusan River. These were brought under control by a Syrian mining engineer named Khalil KHODR, a highly intelligent, brave, forceful leader. His integrity and energy were responsible for the organization of the 113th Regiment with 900 arms in 1943. Little is known of the lesser leaders in this area.

The chief event in the early history of this Regiment (and the division) was the attack on Butuan, Agusan, in May 1943. The 113th Regiment with 900 rifles and the 110th Regiment with 1,000 rifles massed to attack the town from all sides. The Japanese garrison was forced into the concrete schoolhouse in Butuan, but the nine day siege failed to dislodge them. Japanese planes attacked the guerrillas and finally Japanese reinforcements arrived, forcing the guerrillas back. The chief leaders in the attack were Lt. Col. Clyde C. CHILDRESS, Lt. Willard MONEY, AUS, Lt. Thomas BAXTER, AUS, Capt. Rosaurio DONGALLO, Capt. William KNORTZ and Maj. Khalil KHODR. The attack failed because of lack of proper equipment. As a result of the attack, there was an acute shortage of rifle ammunition in the area for some time but the attentions of the people had been focused on the guerrilla movement by showing them that the guerrillas would really fight.

114th Regiment Area (Surigao north from Lianga): One of the first leaders of the Surigao area was Sam GOODE, who operated in the Tago area in June 1942. He was thoughtless and weak, but organized a semi-lawless group preying on the people in the area under the pretense of policing and protection. He was arrested early in 1943 and Joe McCARTHY who had previously commanded a detachment at Tandag took command of the Tago area as well. McCARTHY was active in guerrilla affairs and was sent to Davao as Division QM when the 107th Division was formed in May 1944.

Other Surigao leaders were Macario DIAZ at Masgad; Maj. GARCIA in central Surigao; and Capt. TOMANNING at Lianga. These small groups were loosely controlled and behaved as bandits in their areas. They inflicted damage against property, refused to submit to each other and gave the guerrillas a bad name generally. It appeared as though establishment

of order in these areas would be difficult. Capt. William KNORTZ was given the mission of consolidating or eliminating these dissident elements. The bandit groups caused no more trouble after Capt. KNORTZ returned from his mission.

Capt. KNORTZ (Corporal, USAC) went to the hills in Bukidnon when USAFFE surrendered. He was a fearless fighter when meeting the Japanese and a square, firm dealer in organizing recalcitrant guerrilla groups. In mid-1943 he was attached to the 10th MD Command as liaison officer. He was trustworthy, daring and efficient, and one of the best officers in the 10th MD guerrilla organization. He was drowned in September 1943 when the banca in which he was delivering supplies from Lanao to Agusan capsized.

About mid-1943, Capt. Paul H. MARSHALL (then Pfc) and Lt. Robert SPIELMAN (then Sgt), who had both escaped from the Davao Penal Colony in April 1943, were assigned to the 114th Regiment. Their energy and activity made the 114th one of the hardest hitting on Mindanao. MARSHALL, CO of the regiment, is a forceful, firm leader and well liked by his men. Other P.I. escapees who escaped at the same time and remained in the 110th Division area to assist guerrillas were Maj. J. C. SHOFNER, Maj. M. DOBERVICH and Maj. Jack HANKINS, and USMC, now evacuated.

110th Division: Lt. Col. Ernest E. McCLISH, the commander of the 110th Division was at Imbatug, Bukidnon, organizing guerrillas in August 1942. He went to Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, to organize guerrilla forces in September or October with Lt. Robert BALL, Lt. Anton HARTIK, and Capt. William A. KNORTZ, all AUS. McCLISH and BALL went to FERTIG's headquarters at Misamis shortly thereafter, and arrangements were made for McCLISH to command the guerrilla organization being formed in northeastern Mindanao. McCLISH returned to Misamis Oriental in November with Lt. Col. Clyde C. CHILDRESS, AUS, as Chief of Staff. BALL was left with FERTIG and later became District Communications Officer until he was sent to Luzon in 1944 to develop intelligence contacts there.

CHILDRESS was a Battalion Commander in the 61st Division, PA, before war broke out. After surrender he went to Sindangan, Zamboanga, with Maj. TEANO and most of the original battalion. Some local trouble developed and CHILDRESS left. In December 1942 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the 110th Division and by his activity in the area helped to build a fairly effective guerrilla organization. He was placed in command of the 107th Division in Davao in early 1944 and evacuated to Leyte in January 1945.

The original 110th Division headquarters was established at Medina, Misamis Oriental, but was moved to Rizal, Misamis Oriental, in mid-1943 to be nearer the center of the Division area. The headquarters staff at this time was.

CO	: Lt. Col. Ernest E. McCLISH, AUS
C/S & G-3	: Lt. Col. (then Maj.) Clyde C. CHILDRESS, AUS
Adj & G-1	: Maj. Dionisio VELASCO, PC
G-2	: Capt. Virgilio S. AGUILAR
G-3	: Lt. Richard THOMMES

Maj. VELASCO has not been mentioned for some time and his present whereabouts is uncertain. Capt. AGUILAR is now G-2, 107th Division and a good G-2 officer. THOMMES has a coastwatcher station on Camiguin Island.

The 110th Division played an important part in the supply system established on Mindanao. Fuel for the operation of radios and considerable quantities of rice were procured on the east coast of Surigao. These supplies were brought to Cabadbaran by road, as long as the road was free, and hauled by banca to various parts of northern Mindanao. The most famous of these bancas was a large two-masted motor banca, "ATHENA",

flagship of the USFIP Navy, skippered by Capt. Vicente ZAPANTA. The banca was originally equipped with a homemade smooth bore cannon but later armed with a 20mm cannon and 50 caliber machine guns. Other well known bancas on Mindanao waters were the "TREASURE ISLAND", an inter-island passenger launch with high superstructure and 75 HP deisel engine; the "ROSALIA", a light tug with 50 HP engine; the "NARA", the "CAPT. KNORTZ", the motor banca, "SO WHAT", and the "NARWHAL". The "ATHENA" was burned by the guerillas to prevent her capture when the Japanese occupied the northeast coast of Mindanao in mid-1944.

The known staff and strength of the 110th Division in December 1944:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
110th Division, Hq east of Butuan (?)		
CO : Lt. Col. Ernest E. McCLISH, AUS		
G-2: 1st Lt. Fausto DUGENIO		
Division Eq Personnel and Special Troops	83	932
110th Regiment	81	1,744
CO : Maj. Rosaurio P. DONGALLO		
113th Regiment	83	1,340
CO : Maj. Khalil KHODR		
114th Regiment	70	1,070
CO : Capt. Paul H. MARSHALL, AUS		
S-4: Lt. William GORLER (Australian)	-----	-----
Total	317	5,086

Lt. Col. McCLISH was relieved as division commander in January 1944 and evacuated to Leyte. Capt. MARSHALL was appointed CO of the 110th Division as of 21 January 1945.

In addition to the above regiments the area now covered by the 107th Division (see page 99) under Lt. Col. (then Major) Claro W. LAURETA was part of the 110th Division. The 107th Division was activated in early 1944.

As of December 1944:

ARMS		AMMUNITION	
45 pistols	170	cal 30 M1	87,294
45 revolvers	34	cal 30 M2	117,133
carbines	782	cal 45	27,588
rifles	1,438	cal 50	3,333
AR and MR	64	20mm	880
TSMG	79	37mm	125
cal 30 MG	2	81mm	75
cal 50 MG	8	bazookas	38
20mm	3	hand grenades	530
37mm	1		
81mm	11		
bazookas	7		

106TH DIVISION (Cotabato)

Before the surrender of the USAFFE on Mindanao, Gen. FORT organized a large group of Moros into a Bolo Battalion and stationed them mainly across the Digos-Kabacan Road, armed only with knives, to harass and hinder the Japanese advance from Davao. The force had little training before it was called to action, and the Bolo Battalion disintegrated rapidly before the enemy advance. A few of the Moro leaders: Salapida PENDATUN, a young Moro lawyer from Cotabato; his brother-in-law, Datu Matalam UDTOG; Datu Mantil DILANGALAN and his brother-in-law, Gumbay PIANG; and Datu ALIMAN.

After the USAFFE surrender, the Japanese began a reign of terror in the Cotabato Valley, attempting to subjugate the populace. Due to the popular antagonism generated by this reign of terror, guerrilla units composed largely of former Bolo Battalion members were formed in Cotabato. PENDATUN organized the first guerrilla group and attacked the Japanese garrison at Pikit, Cotabato, in August 1942. The attack was a success and large numbers of Moros joined the organization shortly. PENDATUN's men then attacked Kabacan and secured control of the Digos-Kabacan Road in September 1942. The sector along this road was held by Datu ALIMAN, the most influential Moro between Kidapawan, Cotabato, and Mt. Apo, Davao Province. His force numbered about 600 armed men who were thoroughly familiar with the country.

The Midsayap-Dulawan-Pikit area was controlled by Mantil DILANGALAN and his two brothers with a force of about 1,000 men, of whom 500 were armed. Also in the Midsayap area, Maj. MATAS led about 500 armed Christians, known as "MATAS Militia," who spread southwards towards Lebak. The activities of this unit earned MATAS the title, "The God of Midsayap". MATAS served 12 years with the U.S. Navy and was retired. He was reported to be brave, determined but reckless and defiant. Late in 1944, "MATAS Militia" started a mutiny near Midsayap and set up an independent organization known as the "Mindanao AUSFIP Philippine Army, Cotabato Sector".

ALIMAN, DILANGALAN, MATAS, etc., placed themselves under the command of PENDATUN in 1942 and many of them went to Bukidnon with him. The combined force was organized into the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force in December 1942 and controlled the Cotabato Valley and southern Bukidnon. Lt. Col. Edwin C. ANDREWS was Chief of Staff. ANDREWS graduated from the Constabulary Academy in 1927, studied at an FBI school in the U.S., and returned to work in the intelligence section of the Constabulary. He became a pilot in 1937, was transferred from Zablan to Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and went to the hills when the surrender came. PENDATUN and ANDREWS have been friends before the war and when PENDATUN came to Bukidnon, ANDREWS joined him immediately.

Other leading figures with PENDATUN were: Maj. Teodor CABILI, pre-war Assemblyman (Lanao) and now with Lanao guerrillas; Lt. Col. (then Captain) Doroteo SORIANO, still with Cotabato guerrillas; Maj. Nicolas GABUTINA, now with Cotabato guerrillas; Lt. Col. (then Maj.) Frank McGEE, now CO 6th Division; Datu UDTOG, Datu DILANGALAN and Datu ALIMAN all now with Cotabato guerrillas. PENDATUN attempted to take Malaybalay in January 1943 but failed after a costly siege. Differences developed between FERTIG and PENDATUN which were not settled until Commander PARSONS from SWPA visited PENDATUN in May 1943. PENDATUN was persuaded to return to Cotabato with his Moro force.

The 106th Division is made up of the 116th, 118th and 119th Regiments and the 116th Separate Battalion.

116th Regiment: The 116th Regiment, south and southwestern Cotabato, is commanded by Maj. Herbert PAGE, retired American officer who had been with the PC for many years. PAGE is not a forceful leader, but knows the south coast of Cotabato and has been assisted by the following named officers who are familiar with various parts of the 118th Regimental Area: Fred JOHNSON, American planter in southeastern Mindanao; VILLAMOR between Davao Gulf and Sarangani Bay; Capt. Macario GUBALLA, PC, in the western 118th Regiment and Maj. MATAS near Lebak.

118th Regiment: This regiment is under the command of Maj. Salapida PENDATUN. He is assisted by associates from the Bukidnon campaign, Lt. Col. SORIANO, Maj. GABUTINA and Datus ALIMAN and UDTOG (2nd En CO). UDTOG is one of the most powerful Moro Datus in southeastern Cotabato and a member of the original Bolo Battalion. UDTOG's leadership and influence and PENDATUN's education have forged a powerful unit in this area. The regiment kept the Kigos-Kabacan Road closed to enemy traffic until early 1944 when shortage of equipment and supplies forced the guerrillas to yield control.

119th Regiment: This regiment was commanded by Gumbay PIANG who joined the 10th LD Command organization in September 1943 and brought his entire following with him. The DILANGALAN brothers are the other leading Moros in the area. PIANG was taken prisoner by the Japanese in 1942. He was released to appease the Moros and went to Cotabato after he was released, setting a sign over his door reading "Gumbay PIANG, Prisoner of WAR". He stayed in the house benevolently neutral to guerrillas in the area and stood his ground when the Japanese came, as they did several times, to find out what he was doing. His pat answer was to point to the sign over the door and then insist on his rights as a P. When the Japanese had fairly good proof of his pro-guerrilla activities, they sent their most polished diplomat to visit PIANG. He maintained his position but knew that after this interview the Japanese would not respect his "PW" status and he left the house to join the guerrillas.

106th Division: The division, the control unit for the 116th Bn, 118th and 119th Regiments, was probably organized about October 1943, with Lt. Col. Frank McGEE, AUS, in command. McGEE served in the first World War and was recalled to duty in 1941. He was in Bukidnon in May 1942 and went to the mountains east of Malaybalay after surrender. When PENDATUN brought his guerrillas into Bukidnon in December 1942, McGEE joined him. They had apparently been friends previously. McGEE has a difficult position and has done a moderate job in organizing the area.

Staff and strength 106th Division:

106th Division, Ho Poloypoloy, Salauan, Cotabato:
 CO : Lt. Col. Frank McGEE, AUS
 C/S: Maj. Nicholas GABUTINA, PC
 G-2: 1st Lt. Alan LONTOCK
 G-4: Maj. Doroteo SORIANO
 Adj & G-1: 1st Lt. P. C. MORALES

	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
Division Hq Personnel	88	127
116th Regiment, Hq Upper Nakadel	64	1,189
CO: Maj. Herbert PAGE, AUS		
118th Regiment, Hq Dungos, Liguuan	118	1,921
CO: Maj. Salapida PENDATUN, PA		
119th Regiment, Hq Kilala, Talayan	28	358
CO: Capt. Gumbay PIANG, PA		
Ex O: Capt. OFFDAL		
116th Sep Battalion		
CO: Capt. MAGSAKAY, PC		
Total	298	3,595

Status of equipment, December 1944:

ARMS		AMMUNITION	
45 pistols	131	cal 30 M1	60,204
carbines	694	cal 30 M2	55,380
rifles	1,231	cal 45	34,902
AR and MR	86	hand grenades	400
TSMG	35		
30 MG	6		
81mm mortars	2		

107TH DIVISION (South Agusan-Davao Area)

This division comprises the area in Agusan and Surigao Provinces, south of an east-west line through Lianga, Surigao, and extending to Davao City. It was originally part of the 110th Division but was designated the 107th Division early in 1944 with Lt. Col. Clyde C. CHILDRRESS, AUS, in command. Small guerrilla organizations were formed shortly after the surrender in the following areas: Northwest of Davao in the foothills of the mountains; in the hills northeast of Hijo and Kingking;

north of Mati in the hills to Caraga Bay, at Cateel and Compostela, etc. Later the 130th Regiment, the 111th and 112th Provisional Battalions were activated with these units as nuclei.

130th Regiment Areas: This regiment comprises the area in Davao Province north from Davao City and east to the dividing range along the coast. The guerrillas northwest of Davao were the nucleus of this regiment and were organized in June 1942 by Lt. Col. Claro B. LAURETA, O-1407, PA, an active, colorful leader, 36 years old and a graduate of the Constabulary Academy. Lt. Col. LAURETA (then Captain) was in command of the Camp Victor Co, PC, at Davao 1941-42 and after surrender of the USAFFE went to the hills with about thirty members of his unit. There he found a large number of civilian evacuees (3,000-5,000) from Davao City settled along the Libuganon River. He used his small unit to enforce law and order in this jungle community. The evacuees provided food and recruits, and he established farms so that his guerrilla unit became self supporting. By mid-1943, Lt. Col. LAURETA was virtual ruler of the community. A system of passes was in force, and all visitors were considered spies unless prompt proof to the contrary was produced. Ammunition was scarce but occasional Jap patrols, easily ambushed along jungle trails, furnished his men with arms, ammunition and clothing. His headquarters at Paniki was near enough to the Davao Penal Colony that the guerrillas gave assistance to many escaping prisoners of war and smuggled supplies into the Colony.

Lt. Col. LAURETA's USAFFE command and his resistance after the surrender made him the acknowledged guerrilla leader in Davao. Other independent Davao guerrillas later joined him. One of these (of which little is known) was in the mountainous area between the towns of Nijo and Kingking and was active from 1942 with headquarters near the Davao Gold Mine on the Maraut River. Other units were established at Saug, under Lt. PEPITO with 30-40 men; Compostela under Lt. NAVARRO with 30-50 men. These units became part of LAURETA's organization and have been active against Japanese patrols in their respective vicinities. Lt. PEPITO was a battalion commander of the 130th Regiment but later committed suicide.

Contact letters were sent to Lt. Col. LAURETA sometime in early 1943 from the 110th Division Headquarters. LAURETA reported personally to the headquarters in Misamis Oriental in July, and his unit was then activated the 130th Regiment, 110th Division. Closer contact was established when Col. FERTIG moved his headquarters to the Agusan Valley in November 1943. With communications improved and supplies arriving in Davao, the organization and intelligence coverage developed rapidly.

111th Provisional Battalion: This battalion lies along the east coast of Davao Province and absorbed guerrilla units north of Mati and at Manay, the latter with about 200 men under Capt. ASIS. ASIS was reported to have been killed by his First Sergeant, Javito PEDRAYA, in June 1942 for attempting to force his men to surrender to the Japanese. PEDRAYA took command of the unit and is now Executive Officer of the 111th Provisional Battalion.

Lt. Owen P. WILSON (unsurrendered Sgt, USAC) is now in command of the battalion. He lived near Caraga, Davao, from the time of surrender until October 1943 when he reported to the 10th MD Headquarters. He had not been active with guerrillas up to that time. Col. FERTIG gave him a radio and sent him back to Caraga to organize intelligence coverage on the southeast coast. He was later appointed CO of the 111th Provisional Battalion when it was activated.

112th Provisional Battalion: This unit was formed from isolated units in the upper Agusan Valley and in southern Surigao at Cateel, at Lingig (under Lt. VILLARIN), etc., and is now under command of Lt. Anton HARATIK, AUS. The unit has not been important or active.

Sternberg Detachment: Lt. Adolph STERNBERG, Jr. (unsurrendered Sgt, USAC) joined the guerrillas in February 1944. He had been bed ridden in Davao Province with a tropical skin disease for over a year preceding this time. During his illness, he stayed with Lt. Col. LAURETA on the Libuganon River. When he recovered, he reported to Col. FERTIG's headquarters and was sent back to Davao as a liaison officer between the 130th Regiment and the 110th Division. Shortly after he was placed in command of a guerrilla unit near Malativas, Davao, which was then activated as a Special Intelligence Detachment with about 80 armed men. Lt. STERNBERG's intelligence activities in the Davao area have been quite valuable.

107th Division: Early in 1944 the area south of an east-west line in Agusan Province through Lianga, Surigao, and extending to Davao City was reorganized into the 107th Division with Lt. Col. Clyde C. CHILDRESS, O-371217, AUS, in command. CHILDRESS was evacuated to Leyte in January 1945 and LAURETA placed in command. The strength and staffs of the command are:

107th Division, Hq Maniki (?), Davao		
CO : Lt. Col. Claro LAURETA, PA		
Adj & G-1: Capt. Jose MANEJA		
G-2: Maj. Virgilio S. AGUILAR		
G-3: Capt. Ramon R. BUHAY		
G-4: Capt. MANGAOIL		
Division Hq Personnel	Off	EN
130th Regiment	28	42
CO : Lt. Col. Clara LAURETA, PA	67	1,201
Ex O-S-2: Maj. Teofilo RIVERA		
111th Provisional Battalion	18	378
CO : Lt. Owen P. WILSON, AUS		
112th Provisional Battalion		
CO : Lt. Anton HARATIK, AUS		
STERNBERG Detachment	2	98
Total	141	2,308

After Lt. Col. CHILDRESS left, the organization was changed and it is believed the 107th Division now comprises the area of the 130th Regiment and the 111th Battalion only, with some new areas south of Davao City. The 112th Battalion is reported to have been activated into 10th MD Special Troops.

Status of equipment as of December 1944:

ARMS		AMMUNITION	
45 pistols	100	cal 30 M1	83,889
TSMG	41	cal 30 M2	200,786
carbines	888	cal 45	45,303
rifles	580	cal 50	15,158
30 cal MG	2	20mm	1,232
50 cal MG	6	37mm	512
20mm (use unknown)	2	81mm	128
bazooka (pts missing)	1	hand grenades	725
81mm mortars	4	bazooka	40
37mm	2	miscellaneous	806
miscellaneous	42		

SECTION IV. SULU AREA COMMAND:

The Philippine Constabulary garrison in Jolo was rapidly overcome by the Japanese invasion 24 December 1941 and effective resistance throughout the Archipelago ceased almost at once. Remnants of the dispersed PC forces formed the nucleus of subsequent guerrilla groups.

Tawi Tawi: 1st Lt. Alejandro TRESPECES was the PC commander in the Tawi Tawi area when war broke out. His food stocks and supplies on Bongao were low and after the surrender he moved to Bato Bato. He had 30 men under arms at Bato Bato when Col. SUAREZ arrived in January 1943. A Lt. Anton TAN, school teacher and Reserve Officer in Jolo, was with the Jolo USAFFE force in December 1941, escaped when these troops dispersed, and sent to Sibutu.

Siasi-Joly Area and Early Combined Command Attempt: When Capt. MORGAN visited Zamboanga in November 1942 he sent Lt. Abdulrahim IMAO, a Jolo Moro, from Zamboanga to organize the Sulu guerrillas. IMAO with Sgt. Ursula SIMPEK arrived on Siasi in December 1942. A guerrilla unit with few arms was organized on Siasi, attacked the Japanese garrison and captured 30 rifles on 25 December 1942. Japanese forces attacked the Siasi guerrillas early in 1943 but the organization remained intact.

In the meantime progress was made with the so-called Sulu Command. Contacts had been made and the following sectors were organized:

Siasi Sector	Lt. Konglam TIO
Tawi Tawi Sector	Lt. Alejandro TRESPECES
Silangkan (Jolo) Sector	Lt. Abdulrahim IMAO
Maimbung (Jolo) Sector	Lt. A. ALI
Karunglung (Jolo) Sector	Lt. E. AGGA
Luuc (Jolo) Sector	Lt. A. DUTILES
Taglibi (Jolo) Sector	Lt. BALLESTEROS
Bilaan (Jolo) Sector	Capt. Arolas TULAWIE

Lt. TIO was a Reserve Officer, PA, called to active duty in 1940 and served with the 71st Infantry, PA (?), in the Philippine campaign. He escaped to Sulu and was active with the guerrillas there until he was brought to Australia in late 1943. He later returned and is now with Col. SUAREZ on Tawi Tawi.

Jolo (and the Sulu Archipelago) is largely Moro and ruled by many independent and jealous family leaders or datu (chieftains), hence unified control of the island is difficult for anti-Americans or anti-Japanese. Sultan OMBRA is the leading Moro on Jolo and one of the leading Moros in the Sulu. He claims rights to be successor to Sultan Jamalul KIRAM, Sultan of Borneo and Sulu, who died in 1936. No successor was appointed because of difficulties of payment of dues between Borneo and the Philippines. The Japanese carried Sultan OMBRA's favor by promising to make him Sultan of Borneo and Sulu and to reestablish his tributes, hence many of the related families on Jolo are pro-Japanese and no western Jolo sector is really friendly to a unified guerrilla movement. Capt. Arolas TULAWIE is one of the few friendly leaders in the Luuc-Talipas Sector in the western part of Jolo. Pro-American Moros are confined almost entirely to the eastern portion of the island where families who oppose OMBRA live. Datu TAMBUYONG is the chief friendly leader in the Taglibi area (eastern Jolo) at present.

For a long time only a small Japanese garrison was stationed in Jolo and the guerrillas confined the Japs to Jolo town until mid-1943. At that time, the Japanese reinforced the garrison and literally destroyed organized guerrilla activity on Jolo.

125th Regiment (under Col. FERTIG): In February 1943, Col. Alejandro SUAREZ arrived at Tawi Tawi, set up headquarters in Bato Bato and began to integrate the Sulu guerrilla organization from Tawi Tawi. He consolidated Lt. IMAO's efforts under his command and the area became the 125th Infantry of the Mindanao Command in March-April 1943, after contact between Sulu and Mindanao was established.

Col. Alejandro SUAREZ, O-1174, PA, is about 47 years old, a Spanish Moro mestizo and has served with the Constabulary, largely in Cotabato and the Sulus since 1914. He has studied in the U.S., was

Provincial PC Commander of Cagayan Province when war broke out and was transferred to Sulu as Provincial Governor in 1941. When the Japanese landed at Taglibi, Jolo, in December 1941, SUAREZ was wounded in the fighting but escaped to Mindanao and served under Gen. FORT. He surrendered with Gen. FORT, was taken to Cotabato by the Japanese and appointed Bureau of Constabulary Commander for that Province. In January 1943 he escaped to Tawi Tawi. He is reliable, capable, knows the Moros well, is respected and has many friends among them.

A rudimentary free government was set up, supplies organized and emergency currency was printed. The 125th Regiment was organized into three battalions, the first on Tawi Tawi, approximately 350 men; the second on Siasi, about 250 men; and the third on Jolo, about 200 men. SUAREZ's Headquarters was on the Malum River near Bato Bato. The force is run almost entirely by his Lieutenants.

Action against the Japanese was limited as arms and ammunition were extremely scarce. The Third Battalion was dispersed in August 1943 and many of the members went to Siasi. Siasi was heavily attacked in September and the guerrillas dispersed, many to Tawi Tawi. The Tawi Tawi area was then attacked late in 1943 and again in June 1944. The guerrillas have only recently recovered from the pressure.

R. C. CHAMBERLAIN, Corporal, USMC, arrived on Tawi Tawi in early 1943 and was active collecting supplies from Borneo. CHAMBERLAIN escaped from Corregidor in 1942 and arrived on Tawi Tawi after an eventful trip to Panay, Palawan and Borneo. He went to Mindanao in March, returned to Tawi Tawi for a brief mission and was evacuated from Mindanao in late 1943. In mid-1943 several Australian officers and EM escaped from the PW camp at Sandakan, British North Borneo, and arrived on Tawi Tawi. From then until November of the same year when they left for Mindanao, they assisted SUAREZ in organizing and training his guerrillas and led several successful attacks on the Japanese garrison at Bato Bato.

Capt. Frank YOUNG, an American mestizo who was sent to Australia in mid-1942 by Col. THORP, central Luzon guerrilla leader, went to Tawi Tawi with Capt. Jordan A. HAMMER from SWPA in mid-1943 on a special mission. He is now assisting Col. SUAREZ; Capt. HAMMER was evacuated in early 1944. Lt. TIO came to Australia from Tawi Tawi in early 1944 but was returned later and is now on duty with SUAREZ on a special mission.

Sulu Area Command: Because supply and communication lines from Mindanao were tenuous, Sulu was separated from the Mindanao Command. Col. SUAREZ was appointed Sulu Area Commander in February 1944 and the area has been supplied separately. Col. SUAREZ was appointed CO at the time when his forces were at lowest ebb, and it appeared that the Sulu guerrillas would disintegrate. Col. SUAREZ managed to reorganize them with the help of small amounts of supplies from SWPA. The staff officers, so far as is known, in early 1944 were:

CO : Col. Alejandro SUAREZ, PA
Ex O: 1st Lt. Alejandro TRESPECES
G-2 : 1st Lt. Ismael RATAG
G-3 : 3rd Lt. Ursula SIMPEK
G-4 : 1st Lt. Yacin BAGIS

RATAG is a Moro from Simunul, ROTC graduate with reserve commission. SIMPEK was a former USAFFE Sergeant from Davao, went to Siasi with Lt. IMAO in December 1942, described as unstable and easily confused. BAGIS is an Arab-Moro mestizo, brother to the acting puppet governor of Sulu.

The dispositions and local COs of the Sulu Area Command in December 1944 were:

1st Bn, Tawi Tawi Area, CO unknown			
South Ubian		Lt. HUSSIN	115
Laun Tabauan	S. Ubian	Pvt. TAGALOG	10
Basbas	Tawi Tawi	Lt. Sabtal USMAN	115
Suba Luzon	Tawi Tawi	Lt. INDANAN	50
Tehem	Tawi Tawi	Sgt. STRATTAN	115
Cawacawa	Tawi Tawi	Lt. PAROJI	40
Tumonjol	Tawi Tawi	Lt. DATILES	12
Languyon	Tawi Tawi	Lt. A. LUDUM	115
Layya	Tawi Tawi (?)	Lt. D. SINDAGA	80
Sapa	Tandubas	Lt. M. ALI	80
Sibutu		Lt. AEDUL	25
Sitangkai	Tumindao	Imam ANNI	60
Lookan	Banaran	Capt. Ismael RATAG	65
2nd Bn, Siasi-Tapul Area, CO unknown			
Kontod	Siasi	Capt. Abdurahim IMMO	115
Pandan	Tapul	Lt. AMING	15
North Ubian			
3rd Bn, Jolo Area, CO unknown			
Lumakid	Jolo	Capt. S. Yasin BAGIS	80
Mt Tumantangis	Jolo	Lt. Taib P. SURIAN	70
Mt Bagsak	Jolo	Lt. BAHJIN	50
Ipil	Jolo	Lt. JUMADIL	115
Lumapidmarsh	Jolo	Lt. KIRAM	60
Kulaykulay	Jolo	Chief MAIN	30
Pangutaran	Jolo	Lt. ABDULASI	60
			1,477
Total			1,477

Guerrilla activity has increased throughout the Sulu within the past several months. The patriots on Siasi have regrouped their forces and now control most of the island. On Jolo the Jap Constabulary garrison has dispersed, most of the members surrendered to the guerrillas and the puppet government is reported to have been captured.

Independent Guerrilla: "Colonel" Tomo BITENG is the leader of a small independent guerrilla organization in the Tawi Tawi area. Very little is known of this unit but it is believed that he is an ex-USAFGE officer from Panay whose outfit is concerned mostly with shipping rice to North Borneo and profiteering on the sugar trade between Negros and the Sulus. He has kept his connections with Panay guerrillas and is probably encouraged by them to seek an independent command. He has not cooperated with Col. SUAREZ but expressed his willingness to take instructions from GHO. He sent a mission to Australia in mid-1944 and BITENG himself came to Leyte in November. He left Leyte for Sulu in February 1945.


Borneo Area: The Sulu Area Command has had contact with most parts of northeast Borneo largely through the assistance of Lt. Jose VALERA (now on special mission to northern Luzon). A patrol early in 1943 obtained contributions of money and arms from patriotic civilians along the Borneo coast and later expeditions have been able to capture arms and ammunition from the Japanese and puppet troops in that area. In April 1943, contact was also made with a Chinese-led guerrilla band of about 300 men operating east of Jesselton in North Borneo. The organizer and leader of this unit, Albert I. N. KWOK, was commissioned a 3rd Lt. by Col. FERTIG and his unit was attached unofficially to the Sulu Area Command at KWOK's request.


KWOK claimed to be a Chinese doctor, in the Medical Corps, Chinese Army, until 1937 when he was assigned to intelligence in Malaya and Sarawak. After the occupation of Borneo, he organized a small guerrilla unit near the Japanese garrison at Jesselton. He heard of Col. SUAREZ through a Moro trader and persuaded the trader to take him to Tawi Tawi, arriving in May 1943. He went back to Borneo,

came again to Tawi Tawi in June 1943 with money and much needed medical supplies and stayed until September.

In October 1943, the guerrillas attacked Jesselton and held the town for two days. The Japanese retaliated with a large attack and drove the guerrillas into the hills. The organization was reported to have dispersed and KOOK returned to Jesselton. It is rumored that he was killed in January 1944. Contact is still maintained between Col. SUAREZ and LIA King Fatt of the Jesselton guerrilla unit.

Manila, P.
Phil. Div.








MINDANAO
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
GUERRILLA FORCE
ORGANIZATION
31 JANUARY 1945

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 STATUTE MILES

DIVISIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AND REPRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES ONLY.








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
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**GUERRILLA
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS**

31 JANUARY 1945





S U L U


NORTH BORNEO

SULU AREA CO.
COL. A. SUAREZ

120° 20' 30' 40' 50' 121° 10' 20' 30' 40' 50' 122° 00' 10' 20'

U S E A

ZAMBEZI RIVER
DELINTEATION



N.E. BORNEO SULU ARCHIPELAGO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
 31 JANUARY 1945

STATUTE MILES

10' 20' 30' 40' 50' 121° 122°

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ABILA, Lt.	ANDREWS' officer who visited FESTON-CUSHING on Cebu in May 1943.	
ABLAN, Roque	Pre-war governor of Ilocos Norte. A guerrilla leader active in Ilocos Norte and Abra until mid-1943. He is believed to be still alive and free but probably not active.	45
ABOGADO, Gregorio E.	Ex-representative; appointed Governor of Samar by MERRITT succeeding Maj. SABARRE.	6
ABORDO, Gaudencio E.	Pre-war Governor elect of Palawan, now with guerrillas and the Governor of Free Palawan. Has cooperated fully with guerrilla units.	53
ABUBAKAR, Datu	Active Moro guerrilla on Ganassi-Malabang Road. Native of Uyan, Lanao.	
ACANTILADOR, Capt. Dominador	Bn CO, 86th Inf. Regt., Cebu.	
ACHACOSO, Capt. Eutiquiano O.	PA Inf. Res, was on active duty as CO Cebu training camp before the surrender; now with Hq Bohol Force.	
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