

RG-23

PAPERS OF CHARLES

A. WILLOUGHBY

GUERRILLA RESISTANCE  
MOVEMENT IN THE  
PHILIPPINES: 1941-

1951

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G-2 STAFF STUDY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SITUATION

25 February 1944.

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25 February 1944.

SUBJECT: G-2 Staff Study of the Philippine Islands Situation.

TO : Chief of Staff.

SECTION I: General Situation in the PI.

1. Guerrilla organizations were initially formed by Filipinos as a police force to check the wave of lawlessness following the breakdown of civil police due to Jap occupation. (This applies to rural areas only.) The guerrilla organizations were in reality local community police units. With the passing of time, and some "co-prosperity" education, these police units took on the added responsibility of protecting the communities from the Jap.

2. Guerrilla organizations were supported by the communities which they protected. Facilities of the towns such as power plants, machine shops, coconut oil plants, and distillation units, were made available to the guerrilla forces. As a result, coconut oil was produced to run diesel engines in launches and coconut milk was distilled for the alcohol to run the few motor vehicles available. In the more populated areas, civil administrators were established. As the Americans who had not surrendered came down from the hills, they developed command units to unify larger areas. As a result, inter-community trade and liaison were established, and the defense became an area one instead of local. Plans were made to increase the production of food, supply officers were appointed, to procure it, and a currency was established to purchase it. The civil administration, working with guerrilla authorities, is now firmly established. Gradually island areas became unified and were recognized as Military Districts (area divisions of the Philippine Army with which Filipinos were familiar). District commanders were "re-recognized" by GHQ, and the Philippine Regional Section of A.I. B. was established to coordinate the activities in the islands.

3. The strength of guerrilla organizations at present varies in different islands. Generally speaking, they are strongest in the islands which have the poorest road system. The strength depends pretty much on the extent of Japanese penetrations. Jap activity is centered in the more highly developed and productive islands. In assessing guerrilla strength it is important to note the extent of civilian support. Filipinos at present are more pro-American than American themselves. Reasons for this attitude would fill a book, and vary from their liking of American movies to Jap prohibition on wearing white collars and ties.

4. LUZON: Organized guerrilla activity here on a large scale is negligible. Recent reliable information shows the existence of numerous anti-Jap units, actively supported by the civil populace, but as yet unorganized. The excellent system of roads permits the Japs to police all areas and to deny the guerrillas the use of food producing areas. It will be impossible to organize a combat unit in Luzon. Intelligence activities only are carried on there. These activities are increasing in scope and should be encouraged. With an extremely loyal civil populace, ready to do anything within reason to harm and expel the enemy. It is possible to establish intelligence units in Luzon to a point where we could get daily reports of enemy troop, ship and plane strengths and movements within 24 hours. (In some sections of Luzon this is possible now.) Plans should be made now to cover all important Jap facilities in Luzon with an intelligence network. Not because of its immediate value,



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but for future employment. Preparations or sabotage activities is a feature of Luzon activity to be encouraged. The volume of shipping in Manila Bay provides an excellent target. When active operations are conducted in Luzon, controlled sabotage activities will do much to hinder enemy movements. A sabotage organization, acting in conjunction with our own forces, could, on or prior to 'D' day, immobilize a considerable portion of the enemy air strength and motor transport facilities.

5. The Visayan Islands of Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Bohol, Leyte and Samar are under various stages of guerrilla control. Guerrilla strength varies from 300 in Mindoro to 14,000 in Panay. The Japs are most active in Panay, Negros, and Cebu, the richest and most productive islands in the group. As our forces approach the P.I., the Japs will undoubtedly intensify their efforts to reduce the combat efficiency of the guerrillas in these areas, and will meet with considerable success. Thus the activities of the guerrilla units in the Visayas will be reduced to intelligence, harassing, ambushing and sabotage. These functions the guerrillas can carry out. Japs at present are ruthless in their destruction of guerrilla supporting communities in these areas. Whole communities evacuate to the hills when the Japs approach. In the mountains Jap patrols find the going too expensive. It will be impossible for the Japs to eradicate all resistance in these areas, although they can and probably will, keep it in a disorganized state. We should therefore plan on receiving sabotage and intelligence assistance from the Visayas; if they can actively support our operations with combat units, so much the better. At present, the Visayan Islands are the bases from which intelligence activities are carried on in Luzon.

6. a. MINDANAO: This island is ideal for guerrilla organization. The size of the island, plus the limited number of cross island roads, the mountainous nature of the terrain, and the large number of inland agricultural communities, provide guerrilla units with food, protection and maneuver room. Japs now occupy in force the cities of Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Cagayan, with smaller units (100-300) in other communities. Outside of Davao proper, Jap penetrations are possible only in force. Jap force in Mindanao total about 12,000 men.

b. The guerrilla organization here has about 20,000 men, of whom half are armed. The island is divided into division and regimental areas. About 100 Americans hold key positions and run the extensive radio net. The crying need in Mindanao is American combat officers. The 100 Americans there are mostly enlisted men of the Air Corps, Infantry and Navy, who were able to avoid capture. Their experience and vision is limited. Their primary purpose is to wait the war out as comfortably as possible; their morale precludes any aggressive activity. In short, they are tired, have been on the defense too long, and are in need of assistance if the latent power of the guerrilla units is to be fully developed.

c. The nuclei of combat groups already exist. Divisional, regimental and battalion areas are recognized and accepted. Boundaries between units are definite. Units have definite missions. Commanders are known to each other. Terrain studies are being made. A carabao transport system has been established to facilitate the distribution of food. All units are in radio or courier touch with the 10th M.D. Headquarters. Airfields are being built. American prestige is extremely high. Units must be restrained from seeking combat with the Japs.



d. The present policy of GHQ with respect to Mindanao is to supply the troops with arms, medical supplies and radios. Continue the organization and consolidation of positions. Avoid any aggressive action which will bring Jap reinforcements into the area. Concentrate on developing coast watcher stations and intelligence.

e. Notes on guerrillas:

(1) Units are skilled at ambushing the enemy. They will attack a column or convoy and run away, awaiting another opportunity. They are not accustomed to bombing or shelling. Either type of activity will disperse them.

(2) Units are extremely mobile within a few days walking distance from source of supply. Unit Headquarters consist of commander and a few messengers. To concentrate a large force in a particular area will require time to build up food supplies in the area.

(3) Units have maximum fighting efficiency in their own areas.

(a) They know the trails like a book - a force unfamiliar with the area will have extreme difficulty in making progress even without opposition.

(b) Nearby communities are extremely loyal to the units. When units are withdrawn to the hills, the people move with them.

(c) They have effectively blocked roads and trails leading into their areas by burning bridges, constructing road blocks and machinegun nests, and active patrolling. In one Jap penetration from Cagayan to Talakog with 800 men, a guerrilla force of 150 delayed the Jap advance of 30 miles for 8 days, inflicting over a hundred casualties. The Japs stayed in Talakog about three days and then withdrew. Their return to Cagayan was harassed every step of the way, resulting in many more casualties. Such Jap forays do little damage; their casualties raise the morale of the guerrilla units, and the civilians are further convinced of the necessity of supporting the guerrilla forces. Such delaying operations are now being accomplished with a limited ammunition supply, 30 cal. rifles, a few machine guns, and no trench mortars, bazookas or land mines.

(d) The lengthy coastlines of all the islands makes inter-island traffic quite secure. The Jap patrol boats cannot stop all the native bancas using the inland seas, as distances are short enough to be covered in a few hours of darkness. The overwhelming loyalty of the Philippine people assures assistance and shelter to Filipinos and Americans.

7. Summary of expected minimum guerrilla effort in support of our own forces, assuming adequate planning, continuation of present supply facilities and a more directive control over guerrilla activities in the P.I. than is being exercised by the Philippine Regional Section of A.I.B.

a. LUZON and VISAYAN ISLANDS:

(1) Prompt and accurate intelligence of all enemy activities on a wide scale prior to and after operations in the area are started.

(2) Planned sabotage of Jap airfields, motor and rail transport, coordinated with our own effort.

(3) Nuclei of combat organizations now in being, which can be recruited, officered and equipped by our forces after occupation to augment our combat strength.





b. MINDANAO:

- (1) Complete intelligence coverage of enemy units and military installations such as airfields, docks, landing beaches, etc.
- (2) Planned sabotage of Japs airfields, motor transports and shipping, to be coordinated with our "D" day effort.
- (3) Combat units to secure and guard a beachhead prior to our landing.
- (4) Continue construction of airfields now underway, seize enemy emergency landing fields.
- (5) Combat units to delay enemy advance against our beachheads thru destruction of bridges, mining of roads, roadblocks and delaying actions.
- (6) Following occupation of Mindanao:
  - (a) Organized combat units to be recruited to full strength, equipped with arms, officered by our forces, to be used for further operations. At least 20,000 men are now organized into loose organizations. Their use will permit us to reduce our L of C garrisons, take care of isolated Jap units hiding in the mountains, and spearhead an attack to the north.
  - (b) Expand the present guerrilla civil administration to take immediate control of civil affairs, thus releasing our forces for tactical duties.
  - (c) Immediately put into effect plans for increased food production to augment our food supplies.

SECTION II: Situation in Mindanao.

A. DISCUSSION:

1. In addition to intelligence and sabotage activities, the guerrilla organization in Mindanao can be equipped and trained to assist our forces with combat elements. We have complete freedom of action in 95% of the island. Jap activities outside of occupied cities are limited to patrols in force along main highways. These forays are becoming more expensive to the Jap as our supplies increase. The possibility that the Japs will send a strong force into Mindanao to neutralize the guerrilla force does not exist. However, with a strength of 12,000 in Mindanao he is unable to control more than 5% of the territory. To seriously curtail guerrilla activities will require ten times as many men as he now has in the area. Logistics and guerrilla activities preclude any attempt by the enemy to concentrate 100,000 men on the island. To neutralize guerrilla activities will require that every town and village be occupied in force. These villages and towns are extremely anti-Jap, and are the centers of guerrilla activity. The Jap forces (assuming they do occupy every village) will be extremely dispersed, with limited ability to concentrate in any one particular area. In view of the above, it is unlikely that the enemy will immobilize such a large force on the island, and it follows that it is unlikely he will be able to neutralize the guerrilla organization. The Jap has been aware of the extent of the guerrilla organization since early 1943, and has been unable to do much about it. His probable course of action will be to concentrate his forces in key areas where supply will be easy and rapid communication possible. Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Cagayan and Surigao are the possible concentration centers. Davao being the richest and most centrally located city, will most likely be the main Jap concentration area, as troops from here can move by water or marching



to Cotabato and Cagayan, and by water to Zamboanga and Surigao. Davao city, with its substantial Jap population, is being used as a supply base, an outlet for the islands rice, hemp and lumber, and is being developed to make the Jap forces in Mindanao self-sufficient.

Acting on the assumption that our guerrilla forces can be kept intact, supplied and expanded, let us see what they can do to assist our forces prior to and after occupation.

2. Intelligence:

- a. A complete picture of enemy ground units.
- b. Data on all his airfields, including description, number of planes, fuel storage places, repair facilities, ammunition dumps.
- c. Data on all shipping entering Davao Gulf.
- d. Trail maps of areas we wish to operate in.
- e. A radio connected coastwatcher system already in effect in Mindanao and the Visayan Islands.
- f. Spot reports on all enemy activities in the island on short notice, via established radio net.

3. Sabotage:

- a. All enemy air fields. It would be possible for a well planned sabotage organization to practically ground all enemy planes in Mindanao on, or a few days before "D" day.
- b. Enemy shipping in Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Surigao.
- c. Delay the advance of enemy coming to attack our beachhead by:
  - (1) Planting land mines in the roads (the limited road net canalizes motor traffic into bottlenecks).
  - (2) Destroying bridges in advance of the enemy. (These bridges are usually small ones over streams, and can be rebuilt in a day).

4. Combat Units:

- a. Secure such beachheads as we need prior to our landing.
- b. Seize lightly guarded enemy emergency landing fields.
- c. Delay enemy advance against our beachhead by means of road blocks and delaying actions.
- d. Continue with present construction of airfields.
- e. Diversionsary attacks on enemy concentrations coordinated with our "D" day effort.

5. Post-occupation Activity:

- a. Organized combat units to be recruited to full strength, equipped with arms, officered by our forces, to be used for further operations.
- b. The present guerrilla civil administration to be expanded through prior appointments by the head of the Commonwealth government.
- c. Put into effect plans for increased production and distribution of food for our forces.
- d. Mobilization of civil manpower for stevedoring, road repair, airfield construction and such other work as may be required by our forces.

B. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION OF MINDANAO.

1. Headquarters 10th Military District is the directing agency of U.S. Forces in Mindanao. It is commanded by Col. W. Fertig, Corps of Engineers, who was called to active duty in April 1941 for the purpose of constructing airfields. About 47 years old, he was on duty in Mindanao at the time of the surrender. He fled to the hills and later came down and assumed command of guerrilla forces. He established communications with GHQ, and has gradually extended his control over all guerrilla forces in the island.





2. With the assistance of AIB parties, he has established an excellent crastwatcher system with a large radio net. He is gradually expanding his intelligence system to cover the island. Due to his preoccupation with administrative problems, lack of experienced assistants, his own inexperience, and the fatigue induced by living under pressure, he has reached the limit of his capabilities. It must be remembered that the guerrilla movement was a spontaneous and individual affair. Local leaders are still not trustful of this man who assumed control over units which THEY had organized. Col. Fertig is not a forceful personality. His influence at present stems from his being the source of all supplies from the S<sup>W</sup>PA, and that he is the officially recognized CO of the 10 M.D. His authority to commission officers is doubted (actually he has recommended the appointment of several Americans as officers). His authority to induct guerrilla units into the service of the U.S. in Nebulous. Actions which he should take relative to organization, promotion of officers, legalizing guerrilla units, pay laws, disability benefits, etc., are at present too numerous for him to handle even if he did have the authority to act.

3. As the guerrilla organizations grew up individually, they began to cooperate with each other for mutual exchange of foodstuffs and information. The assumption of command by Fertig came considerably later. Most of the units he had not seen. Local leaders paid him lip service only, and their cooperation was in direct proportion to what he could do for the units in obtaining supplies. This cooperation has increased considerably as greater amounts of supplies were shipped into the area, and the extent of GHQ's support of the 10th MD was noticed. In passing, the entire Philippine guerrilla movement is being retarded because of the lack of a recognized GHQ appointed commander who has not been involved in the early guerrilla free scramble for power.

4. Civil authorities in guerrilla areas were delighted to cooperate, as the guerrillas were the sole law enforcement agencies. Civil provincial governors, judges, etc., who held these jobs prior to the war were allowed to continue. Those civil officials who had cooperated with the Japs were liquidated by the civilians, or took refuge in Jap occupied territory. The Japs receive little cooperation from civil authorities in the occupied cities of Mindanao. Such cooperation is merely a means to survival. The people, who see their properties taken over by the Japs military and civilians, are firmly resolved to wait it out, are keeping their bolts sharpened, and continue to maintain contact with guerrilla forces. The Jap version of "the Gestapo", the "Kempai" makes sporadic attempts at exterminating subversive activities, but normally concentrates on the wealthier Filipinos whose properties they can appropriate. Civil administrators and currency committees are appointed by President Quizon, their powers are defined, and their activities will continue until a Commonwealth government is established. For our purposes, it can be assumed that civil officials will be available to step into jobs now held by Jap puppets when occupation takes place. The Filipino civilians will have taken care of puppet officials prior to our arrival.

5. In 95% of Mindanao, civilian communities continue to live under normal conditions. Occasional Jap forays (about every 6 months) merely provide a bit of excitement to an otherwise placid existence. This state of affairs is due largely to the fertile soil, much cultivated land, and an abundant food supply. The island is practically self-sufficient in all respects. Coconut oil and distilled coconut milk serves as fuel; abaca furnished the fiber for weaving clothes, the land will grow 3 crops of corn per year. Sugar, coffee, and cocoa are cultivated. There is sufficient rice, corn and camotes (a lowgrade sweet potato) for the people, while pigs and chickens are just as



nurtures as ever. Sole civilian shortages are shoes (which rural Filipinos wear for adornment), matches, soap and medicines. Such items were never too plentiful in the rural districts, and their loss is not too great a hardship. The Japs offer the civilian a job in the rice paddy, an opportunity to learn "Nippon-ese", a return to the days of no toilet facilities, no movie or ice cream, no white collar jobs, and most irritating of all, no political discussions. The Filipinos have responded to "co-prosperity" inducements with tongues in cheek in the occupied areas, and with open ridicule in unoccupied areas. The initial Jap propaganda effort was directed to make the "back to the soil" movement palatable to the Filipinos. In view of the high standards of education and the high proportion of adult literates in the Philippines, this attempt to push the Filipino people back into the rice paddies, has aroused all the parents of children for whom better things were planned. The Jap was quite sincere and outspoken in his idea that the Filipinos were to be the laborers while the Japs would do the directing. A policy such as this, forced on a people having the highest standard of living in the Far East, an occidental culture derived from 400 years of contact with white people, and an awareness of the equality of all people, was bound to cause extreme bitterness and resistance. The policy has accomplished all that and more. It can be taken for granted that in the entire Philippine area the people will actively support our efforts to expel the enemy. This paper is concerned with capitalizing the physical and human resources of Mindanao to assist our war effort.

6. The present policy of GHQ towards the Philippines is to supply the guerrilla units with arms, medical supplies and radios. Continue the organization and consolidation of positions, avoid any aggressive action which will bring Jap reinforcements into the area, and concentrate on developing constabulary stations and intelligence. This policy has encouraged guerrilla forces, aided them and has resulted in a stable, well organized civil and military government controlling 95% of the territory of Mindanao. This organization has the enthusiastic support of the civilians in the area. It has developed transport facilities for exchange of commodities, arranged for the planting of crops for guerrilla forces, established an authorized system of currency, set up a constabulary and intelligence system, divided the island into regimental areas, and in all respects, has justified the policy and faith of GHQ in the American and Filipino people living in the area. Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Mindanao showing organization, troop dispositions, and regimental areas of Mindanao. A breakdown of Americans in the area is included, with sketches of leading commanders and staffs. Considering the total personnel of the guerrilla units, the most striking feature of the set up is the extremely small number of experienced American officers. It is a tribute to the foreign policy of America, that the Filipino people have rallied around the few Americans to such an extent. The situation in Mindanao at present is such that healthy Americans with guerrilla forces do NOT want to be evacuated, and a recent evacuee, having had his appendix removed, has asked to be returned to the area.

#### C. CONCLUSIONS:

1. From the above discussion, certain conclusions can be drawn about Mindanao; extent of its possible assistance to our war effort, and the need for active direction of guerrilla activities by GHQ.

- a. The 10th Military District in Mindanao is a stable, well organized well run unit of the U.S. Army.
- b. The possibility of its neutralization by the enemy prior to our invasion is remote.
- c. The extent of civilian support of guerrilla units, quite sizeable at present, will increase in scope as our forces approach the Philippine Islands.





d. That the latent power of guerrilla and civilian units in the area if properly directed, will do much to assist our landings, save us thousands of lives, and months of time.

e. That intelligent planning and direction will shorten the period of confusion following occupation, establish civil government promptly, permit our mobilization of civil manpower for military use, and make the transition from Jap occupation to American occupation as rapid and as painless as possible.

f. That available American personnel have reached the limit of their capabilities. This is due not of inefficiency, but to lack of trained staff and combat officers.

2. To exploit the latent power of Mindanao will require intelligent direction of the intelligence and tactical units of the guerrilla forces. In view of the lack of trained personnel in the area, it is believed impractical to maintain such direction by remote control from the STPA. The personnel available in Mindanao are unable to do more than keep the status quo. Considering the vast amount of work yet to be done in the area, training and organizing units, building up food supplies, preparing unit dispositions to assist our forces, coordinating intelligence agencies, planning for eventual expansion of civil governments, it is evident that the available American personnel in Mindanao are too few and inexperienced to handle the job.

#### D. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. This discussion leads to an obvious recommendation: that qualified American staff and combat officers be sent into the area. A limited number initially to make a survey of material and personnel needs. They will undoubtedly recommend further additions. Specifically; the following personnel should now be sent in:

a. A senior officer, rank of Colonel or Brigadier General, to take command of all U.S. Forces in the Philippines. He should be physically active, resourceful, with sound judgment (see \*2\* below for amplification).

b. An officer, grade of Lt. Colonel or Colonel, as operations officer. He should have had staff training if not experience.

c. An officer, grade of Captain or Major, trained in intelligence work, to develop and coordinate G-2 activities in the PI.

d. An officer, grade of Captain or Major, Signal Corps, with radio experience, to advise on all matters pertaining to radio traffic (present personnel in Mindanao handling radios are EM from PT boats, B-17s and Filipinos).

e. An officer, grade of Captain or Major, with Australian "commando" training, to investigate use to which sabotage material can be used, train commando units, and recommend type of equipment to be sent in.

f. Five officers (1 for each division area), rank of Captain or Major, Infantry, with combat training if not experience, to investigate the needs of divisions, assist in planning defense of those areas, recommend types of equipment required, and extent to which guerrillas can support our effort.

2. At first sight it does not appear reasonable or necessary to send in an officer senior to Col. Fertig. However, the prompt unification of guerrilla elements in the PI requires an unbiased GHQ appointee.

a. Col. Fertig has attained his position as CO 10th MD in competition with other guerrilla leaders. Prior to stabilization of the Military Districts, he had attempted to extend his control to other areas outside of Mindanao. This move has caused considerable resentment among the other island leaders, the resentment resulting in their taking a suspicious viewpoint of all Fertig's activities. As the bulk of supplies are at present going to Colonel Fertig's area, they feel their suspicions are well founded.



b. The greatest unifying element in the PI at present is Gen. MacArthur. His influence exceeds that of all others, including President Quezon. GHQ visitors to the area so far have been transient observers with specific missions. A GHQ appointee to take command of all guerrilla units would be welcomed by all factions because it would indicate:

- (1) Increased interest by Gen. MacArthur in guerrilla forces.
- (2) Imminence of more concrete support.
- (3) An arbiter with GHQ authority to settle disputes and make decisions not colored by personal ambitions or prior commitments.
- (4) An end to the confusion resulting from misinterpreted radio messages from GHQ to MD commanders.
- (5) A more realistic GHQ policy towards the PI forces, based on sound, unbiased recommendations of a known and trusted commander.

c. Col. Fertig is an excellent administrator but has little if any tactical experience. While a tactical commander is necessary in Mindanao, it is much more important to have a GHQ representative to command all U.S. Forces in the PI, as Mindanao is only one part of the PI picture.

d. The officer sent into the area must be physically active, as he will need to travel considerably. He should have had considerable military experience in the field to enable him to make sound military recommendations based on resources and terrain. While previous experience with Filipinos and the Philippines is desirable, it is not absolutely essential. The important essential is that GHQ have confidence in his judgment. His observations, investigations and recommendations will cover a wide field, from currency committees to landing beaches. Such an officer would be of inestimable value to us in preparing the groundwork for future operations.

### SECTION III: Direction of PI Activities.

#### A. DISCUSSION.

1. Strengthening our forces in the PI with additional office personnel and supplies will be a great step forward in putting the PI forces on a working basis. The result of additional officers will be more definite military recommendations, more specific intelligence data, and requests for a definition of policy on numerous civil affairs.

2. a. The agency charged with the conduct of affairs in the PI is the Philippine Regional Section of A.I.B. It was established originally to maintain radio traffic with guerrilla units. Prior to that time the initial organization was developed by G-2 with policy decisions by the C-in-C; the ground work for current activities was laid under a plan "Signal Communications required for Philippine Operations" which covered intelligence and coastwatchers; supply of radios and the organization of a signal company to handle the traffic. As communication facilities increased, it was found possible to send in supplies. The Navy was interested in coastwatcher stations, so it provided operational subs to take radios, coastwatcher parties, and arms into the area. Several parties have already been sent in, the volume of supplies has steadily increased, our information on internal conditions has likewise increased, and has disclosed an exceedingly favorable state of affairs.

b. PRS now has the duty of advising the C-in-C in guerrilla matters, arranging for supplies to be shipped to the islands, establishing coastwatcher stations, sending intelligence parties into the area, and interpreting for the C-in-C the guerrilla messages for GHQ. G-2 coordinates messages and comments, and publishes a monthly G-2/G-3 Situation Report and Estimate, for limited staff circulation. Extracts





of these reports reach O.P.D., War Department. When guerrilla activities were a mystery, and the guerrilla agencies were getting started, the PRS was adequate to handle the problems. The PI situation has changed considerably, (or rather our knowledge of it has become greater). It is a situation where 16,000,000 people are anxiously awaiting our return; where anti-Jap organizations exist all over the country seeking for means to help us; where civil governments, loyal to the U. S., function and defy the invader. That is the situation confronting GHQ. The problem is how to capitalize on the manpower, loyalty and available resources in the PI to the end that our conquest of the islands will cost us the least in manpower and time. The PI problem has outgrown the exploratory stage. It is now an operational and intelligence problem. A list of things which PI forces can do is contained in Section 1, para. 2 of this study, under the headings of Intelligence, Sabotage, Combat Units, and Post Occupation activity. It is firmly believed that these activities represent a MINIMUM of what we can expect if aggressive and intelligent direction is given PI affairs.

c. Known United Nations strength and current operations point to an accelerated allied advance into the PI. It is believed that planning for PI activities should be taken over by General Staff Sections.

3. a. Activities with respect to PI affairs fall under the general heading of:

- (1) Procurement, evaluation, analysis and compilation of intelligence, both operational and civil.
- (2) Tactical organization and training of guerrilla units.
- (3) Planning for specific use of guerrilla forces.
- (4) Planning for conduct of civil affairs, to include governments finance, civil economy, propoganda and Quislings.
- (5) Supply of, and communication with, guerrilla forces.

b. Intelligence activities under 3.a.(1) above, is at present a PRS affair coordinated with G-2. There was a small PI section of G-2, recently enlarged to cope with increased volume of intelligence coming in. The extent and value of this intelligence is constantly increasing. This activity should be a G-2 function, with PRS the collecting agency.

c. Organization and training activities under 3.a.(2) above is at present, charged to no staff section. The limited number of trained officers in the PI precludes any such activity. Guerrillas do not know how to use new weapons such as bazooka guns, land and tank mines (ideal weapons in guerrilla areas). The ease with which Filipinos can travel throughout the area should be capitalized by training natives in sabotage activity and commando work. The training of these troops for specific tasks cannot be over emphasized. This activity should be charged to G-3.

e. Civil affairs activities under 3.a.(4) above are handled by the C-in-C, in conjunction with the Philippine Commonwealth government in Washington, D.C. The numerous civil problems attending our occupation will require that a competent person or group, familiar with PI government affairs, be present to plan for and advise the C-in-C in these matters.

f. Supply of guerrillas under 3.a.(5) above is now handled by PRS. This agency had developed an excellent supply system to the PI. The volume of supplies is increasing; the facilities for such supplies will likewise increase. The type of supplies (at present combat and morale) will require study to fit in with the planning. PRS should continue to handle this phase of the work.



B. CONCLUSIONS.

1. The extent of FI activities has reached a stage where general staff sections must study the problem with a view to:
  - a. Outlining staff procedure to be followed in handling FI affairs.
  - b. Assigning definite responsibilities to general staff section.
  - c. Establishing a "Philippine Island General Affairs Section" to study, plan for and advise the C-in-C on civil affairs.
2. To take advantage of the assistance which the organized forces in the FI can give us, our key personnel must be sent in at least 6 months prior to our attack. Planning must start at least nine (9) months prior to attack day.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That a "Philippine Island General Affairs Section" be established under the Chief of Staff, with the mission of studying and planning for conduct of civil affairs to include :

- a. Government, finance, economy, propaganda.
- b. Mobilization of civil economy to assist our effort.

Since the G-2 will be involved in the analyses of FI intelligence, this section should maintain close liaison with G-2.

2. That intelligence matters be assigned to G-2, charged with the dispatch of missions, planning, procuring, evaluation, analyzing and compiling FI intelligence.

3. That organization and training of FI units be assigned to G-3, with the mission of preparing FI forces to support our effort.

4. That supply matters be assigned to G-4, with FRS as its operating agency (in view of its success and experience in supplying guerrillas to date).

5. That communications be assigned to the Chief Signal Officer.

C. A. McLAUGHLIN,  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,  
A. C. of S., G-2.





ANALYSIS OF STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT 10th MILITARY DISTRICT  
(See Map Attached)

SUMMARY (taken from available figures, and does not include the Sulu Command):

	<u>U.S. Personnel</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Total Arms</u>
Mil Dist Hq	37	-	-
105th Division	2	3500	2100
106th Division	5	3000	1500
108th Division	4	6000	4000
109th Division	7	3000	1600
110th Division	<u>27</u>	<u>4000</u>	<u>3000</u>
TOTAL	82	19500	12200

NOTE: Commander Parsons states that Col. Fertig told him that as of 5 December 1943 the total guerrilla personnel on Mindanao were 28,400 and the total arms registered 16,000. The distribution of the difference between above totals is not known.

U.S. Personnel known to be on Mindanao with guerrillas . . . . . 82  
 Total of these known to have been holding commission  
 before surrender . . . . . 10  
 Total of these known to now be holding guerrilla  
 commissions, or appointed to commissions AUS  
 since surrender . . . . . 51  
  
 Total known personnel shown on map and listed as  
 key personnel (incl Filipinos). . . . . 32  
 Total of these known to have held commissions prior to  
 surrender (incl Filipinos). . . . . 18

DATA ON KNOWN MINDANAO GUERRILLA LEADERS \*\*  
(See Map Attached)

GRINSTEAD, Lt. Col. James, AUS: \*  
 40-45 years, US Army Reserve in PI. Brought to PI by Gen. Wood in 1926 as one of several hand picked young officers to strengthen the Philippine Constabulary. Was sent to Mindanao as a Lieut. PC and according to Doctor HAYDEN did a good job suppressing the Moro outlaws there. He rose to a Captain and was Provincial Inspector for Lanao, left the Constabulary in 1936-37 and conducted a personal business on Mindanao. Joined the guerrillas in early 1943, placed in command of the guerrilla 106th Division in December 1943. Dr. HAYDEN considers him very capable.

MORTERA, Lt. Col. Cirisco, PA:  
 Graduated PC Academy 1917 and was active in combating the Mindanao guerrillas afterwards. Was deputy governor of Cotabato, in 1938 was stationed in Cotabato as Major and was on Cebu with General CHENOWYTH before surrender of the USAFFE forces. Was CO of the (guerrilla) 106th Infantry in Misamis Occidental in 1942 and later became CO of the (guerrilla) 105th Division, Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental. Is reported to be trusted by FERTIG and holds his own with the other American Division commanders on Mindanao. Personally known to Dr. HAYDEN who considers him able and completely reliable.



SUAREZ, Lt. Col. Alejandro, PA:

Well educated Constabulary officer with a year in the University of Michigan. Served many years in the southern islands and earned for himself a reputation as a determined and fearless officer. Left the Sulu where he had been station commander and deputy governor of Siasi, in 1938. Was Provincial Commander of Province Cagayan when the war broke out and was sent shortly after to Sulu as provincial Governor to strengthen the position there. He fought the Japanese on Jolo and then escaped to Cotabato and fought with the USAFFE forces until surrender. Escaped from the Japs and returned to Sulu to organize the guerrillas there. Well known to Dr. HAYDEN, who speaks highly of his ability.

HEDGES, Lt. Col. Charles, AUS:

American gold mining engineer in Philippines for several years, was commissioned on Mindanao in April 1942 and performed duty as CO Motor Transport, 81st Division in Lanao. Went to hills after surrender, joined Fertig early in the guerrilla movement and was appointed CO of the guerrilla 106th Division in Lanao in 1943. FERTIG states he is an excellent worker and has demonstrated his leadership ability. KUDER states he is an excellent field commander.

CUR/MING, Major: \*

Was among original guerrilla leaders in Lanao, commanding the 120th (guerrilla) Regt north of Iligan. Present duty not reported, possibly G-2 108th Division.

KALAO, Major Busran: \*

Moro Datu, active in organizing the Bolo Bn on Mindanao before surrender of the USAFFE forces and in persuading the Moros of Lanao to resist the Japanese. Was hostile to the guerrillas originally but joined forces with the 108th (guerrilla) Division early in 1943. Was associated for a time with Capt. MORGAN'S activities. CO of the 126th (guerrilla) Regt, Southwestern Lanao, still active in anti-Jap propaganda among the Moros. KUDER does not like him personally.

MINDALINO, Capt. Mansao: \*

Moro Datu in Lanao, CO 127th (guerrilla) Regt in southeastern Lanao. Reported to be one of most brilliant and ruthless Moros in dealing with the Japanese. Former school teacher.

BAGUINDALI, Major Anonno: \*

Another colorful Moro Datu in Lanao, CO 129th (guerrilla) Regt, northeastern Lanao.

AIF OFFICERS, Capt. K. A. STEELE, Lts. R. BLOW and GILLOR:

With the AIF in Singapore, taken prisoner at surrender, moved to Kuching early 1943 and later to Sandakan in North Borneo, escaped from Sandakan in June 1943 and arrived at Tawi Tawi in August or September 1943 where they assisted the Sulu guerrillas until leaving for Mindanao in November 1943. On Mindanao they assisted the 109th (guerrilla) Division in successful attacks on Japanese patrols landing along the north coast of Lanao in January 1944. Col. FERTIG values their services.

McGEE, Lt. Col. Frank, AUS:

Retired Major, Cavalry, American resident in PI, plantation owner from the Mati, Davao area. Was interned by the Japanese and escaped in early 1943, went to Cotabato, joined the guerrillas there and was made CO of the 106th (guerrilla) Division when it was formed in Cotabato in Dec. 1943.





PAGE, Major Herbert, PC:

45-50 years, old time Constabulary officer. In 1938 was a Major stationed in Zamboanga as Provost for southern Mindanao, now CO 116th (guerrilla) Regt in southern Cotabato and Davao. Dr. HAYDEN states his rating is not very high.

FERTIG, Col. Wendell W., AUS:

Mining engineer before war connected with Mabbate Consolidated Gold, went to Manila 1941 on construction work for the US Army Engineers. Was on Batan and later sent to Mindanao to replace Major Eads of General Sharpe's command. Escaped to the hills at time of surrender coming out late in 1942 to coordinate the guerrilla bands on Mindanao. Well liked by the people for organizing peace and supplies on the island. Does most of work without staff, for want of capable assistance.

McCLISH, Lt. Col. Ernest E., AUS:

Formerly and officer in the 61st Infantry and stationed at the Malabang airfield. Was in Bukidnon after surrender and went to NE Mindanao early in 1943 to command guerrilla forces there. Is an active figure in local social activities and popular with the Filipinos. Combat duties reported to be left largely to Major CHILDRESS. There is some indication McCLISH is not always discreet or tasteful in his dealings.

CHILDRESS, Major Clyde, AUS:

Former Lieut., 61st Infantry. After surrender he joined the guerrillas at Sindangan, Zamboanga, in 1943 he moved to the 110th (guerrilla) Division area and is now Chief of Staff of the Division. He is reported to be a fearless fighter, well liked by the people and commands the loyalty of his men.

DONWILLO, Capt.:

It is believed he has had training in the Army or Constabulary and saw some action before surrender. Was with ABBOTT at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, when ABBOTT started organizing the guerrillas there. Later McCLISH moved him to Gingoog to strengthen the guerrilla organization there, is hard hitting, tough, able and well liked. Evacuees report that he is one of the most reliable of Filipinos under combat conditions.

ABBOTT, Capt. Clyde: \*

Formerly PFC, Hq and Hq Sqdn, 19th Bomb Group, now Executive Officer of the 110th (guerrilla) Infantry, Balingasag. ABBOTT was one of the prime movers of the guerrilla movement in Misamis Oriental. Evacuees had a good deal of respect for him and indicated he does a good job with the training he has.

MARSHALL, Capt. Paul: \*

Formerly a Sergeant, 60th Coast Artillery, on Batan and Corregidor, taken prisoner, moved to Davao and escaped from the Davao Penal Colony in April 1943. Was G-2 110th (guerrilla) Division, later CO 114th (guerrilla) Regt, Surigao. Able but lacks training.

SPIELMAN, Lt. Robert: \*

Formerly EM, Hq Det USAFFE, taken prisoner time of surrender, moved to Davao and escaped from Davao Penal Colony April 1943. Served with G-3 (114th guerrilla) Regt, Surigao and later as A. C. of S., G-3 110th (guerrilla) Division. No training.



HIFE, Capt. Leo: \*

Filipino, former EM, saw action on Luzon during the campaign, escaped to Mindanao and joined the guerrillas in Misamis Occidental. Not trained for intelligence work but worked self up from the bottom, now acting as A.C. of S., G-2 for the Headquarters.

BOWLER, Lt. Col. Robert V., AUS:

35-40 years, regular Army officer, was at Davao with the 38th Division, escaped to the hills after surrender. Took command of the 109th (guerrilla) Division early 1943, named by FERTIG to assume command 10th MD should anything happen to him, was appointed CO \*A\* Corps (consisting 105th, 106th, and 108th Divisions) early January 1944 with Headquarters in vicinity of Iala, Lanao. Is reported to be a quiet and not particularly good mixer.

PENDATUN, Major Salapida: \*

Cotabato Moro Datu, graduate of College of Law, University of Philippines, held a reserve PA commission and called to active duty before war, promoted to 1st Lt. before surrender, organized and acted as commander of the Moro BN of Cotabato. After surrender was one of first guerrilla leaders in the Cotabato-Upper Bukidnon area, was reluctant to join 10th MD forces, later was under BOWLER command and then moved to Cotabato as commander of the Northern Cotabato area 106th (guerrilla) Division. Dr. HAYDEN states he is intelligent, has displayed unusual initiative and energy and is one of the most promising young Moros.

UDTOG, Datu Matalam:

Illiterate Cotabato Moro, brother-in-law to PENDATUN, one of the most powerful Moros in southeastern Cotabato. His men were a portion of the Bolo BN under General Vachon and saw action in the Digos-Davao front before surrender of the USAFFE forces. The BN has been reorganized as part of the guerrilla forces.

DISANGAJAN, Datu:

Similar background to UDTOG and PENDATUN, probably attached to PENDATUN's unit.

LASANG, Lt. Salvador: \*

Nothing known of his abilities, serving as Asst Adjutant General, the 10th MD Adjutant being removed.

DIVA, Pacifico, PA: \*

Present grade unknown, formerly Lt. in QMC, 1940; now believed acting as A. C. of S., G-4, 10th MD.

ARONDINE, Major: \*

No information available, possibly A. C. of S., G-3, 10th MD, held post in 1943 until September, at least.

GARCIA, Lt. Patriciano: \*

Apparently had experience in G-1 office work before surrender and was known to be acting as A.C. of S., 10th MD before the Hq moved from Misamis Occidental in June 1943.

EVANS, Major James, AUS, MC:

American Army surgeon, went to PI late in 1943 with Major Smith. Now Signal officer and surgeon at CP of CO 10th MD.

YOUNG, Lt. Robert H., AUS:

Filipino, 24 years, saw action as a Lt. in PA on Luzon in the Philippines campaign, joined guerrillas on Zambales after surrender and came to Australia in 1942 as special messenger to Gen. McARTHUR. He returned as second in command Capt. Hammers party.

«This list is not inclusive, covering only leaders which have been reported to date.

\* Commissions not confirmed by SWPA, etc.

