

Personal for
General ERWIN

[IRWIN]

Begin



✓

~~SECRET~~
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
OUTGOING MESSAGE

CofS: EMA/wrb

25 June 1950

~~SECRET~~

FROM: CINCPE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DA WASH DC. OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
(056775) Personal from General
MacArthur. Personal for General Irwin.

Umsg WAR-84427. All information available here has been and is being forwarded you promptly. The ammunition requested by KNAG in its WRI 077 has already been ordered shipped to Korea destination Pusan with safe conduct air and surface guaranteed. My purpose is to supply ROK all needed supplies as long as they show ability to use same. Your messages WAR-84429, WCL-29567 and WCL-29566 received and correspond to information received here. My message C-56772 crossed your WAR-84427. Complete later information is following separately.

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH
Brig Gen, USA
Adjutant General



COPIES TO:

- CinC
- CofS
- G-1
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- G-3
- G-4
- JSPOG
- FEAF (Courier)
- NAVFE (Courier)

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG 75



S

MCN: 8872
TOO: 251016Z
TOS: 251024Z

056793 *ref*

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

GB/CAN/whw

OUTGOING MESSAGE

25 June 1950

FROM: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DA WASH DC EMERGENCY

PERSONAL FROM GENERAL MAC ARTHUR
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL IRWIN

251200

C-56777

1. UR WAR-84427 and W-84428. Our C-56772 represents
 KMAG information to 1500, except for three late items. First item: Radio 280425Z
 (State Ser 928) from Muccio quoting text of memorandum of conversation with
 Pres Rhee this date. This Muccio radio has been passed to your headquarters.
 Second item: An unconfirmed report that twenty (20) North Korean vessels,
 utilizing Russian type fighter aircraft cover, attempted a landing at 251630I
 in POHANG (1285-1455) area. Third item: Kimphe Airport (972-1651) was attacked
 by hostile fighter-bombers at 251735I and at 251445I; results reported in Arma
 24. We remain in constant touch with KMAG and Embassy. We accept pattern of
 simultaneous enemy penetration of 38th parallel by possibly three divisions
 spearheading south. Western sector Ongjin peninsula to Imjin river vulnerable
 salient and relinquishment by South Korean forces, previously decided in
 defense plan, and does not represent vital loss. Probable main defensive line
 identified by the following points: TONGJIN (954-1664), TONO-RI (983-1685),
 TONGBUCHON-NI (1005-1689), CHUNCHON (1070-1683), SANGNAM-NI (1120-1680),
 KANGHUNG (1155-1687). This line covers main corridors of enemy advance into
 south. Friendly forces disposed as follows: First Division (880-1690 to 998-
 1690), Seventh Division (998-1690 to 1090-1690), Sixth Division (1050-1690)
 to 1155-1690), Eighth Division (1155-1690 to East Coast).

2. Present actions probable meeting engagement with no
 decision reportable at this time. Enemy effort serious in strength and strategic
 intent and is undisguised act of war subject to United Nation's censure.
 Current situation too obscure to permit definition of North Korean intentions
 and plans. North Koreans achieved tactical surprise and South Korean Forces
 are now operating to recover. All map references to AMS L 551, Scale 1 to
 250,000. Summation of opposing forces, viz: North Korea employing three
 divisions along entire border; friendly forces have available four divisions in
 opposing general areas and 2d Korean Division reported displacing northward
 towards Seoul expecting arrival 30 June. CINCPAC has directed, unless contrary
 orders are received from Washington, that applications from Korea for munitions
 supply be promptly met from his resources. These supplies will be sent under
 proper defense protection to initial points of delivery in Korea. He is
 suggesting in a later message a movement of the 7th Fleet to this general area
 in preparation for any eventuality.

OFFICIAL:

K.B.BUSH
Brig Gen USA
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

R.S.BRATTON
Colonel, GSC
RELEASSED PERMITS OF-2 Officer
BRUG 75



COPIES TO:

CinC--C of S--G--S--G-2 (Ret)--G-2 T/Intel(Ret)--G-2F/Intel Opns (Ret)

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~~SECRET~~

copy 5

C In C COPY

Personal for
General ERWIN

[ERWIN]

END



Personal for

Various People

Begin



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PERSONAL FOR

3 April 1951

PRIORITY

PERSONAL FROM: GENERAL TURNER

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL HICKEY

NUMBER : C1800AG 3 April 1951



Cite CINCPAC message CX58999 regarding arrival of Honorable Frank J. Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, and party in the Philippines. Information from Ambassador Cowen that State Department has charged him with looking after Secretary Pace's party. Information from General Hobbs that he is prepared and desirous of handling party. This command standing ready to handle all arrangements if party lands at Clark AFB. In order to avoid confusion which was encountered on occasion of visit of the Honorable Mr. Lewis Johnson, Secretary of National Defense, in the Philippines in June 1950, the following information is requested earliest:

1. Number and type of plane transporting Secretary's party.
2. ETA and point of landing in the Philippines, i.e., Manila at Manila International Airport or at Clark Air Force Base.
3. Names and rank of all members of the Secretary's party.
4. Indication of entertainment and honors desired or recommended.
5. Funds available for entertainment if handled by military.
6. Purpose of visit.
7. When will this subject be down graded in order that appropriate information may be released to news media.
8. U.S. Ambassador, Manila, indicates the following minimum formalities will be expected by Philippine authorities:
 - A. Call on the President, AM, Malacanan Palace.
 - B. Luncheon engagement with the President of the Philippines on Sunday April 15.

[Personal for HICKEY; not indexed]

This message was also sent to Major General Lawrence W. Craigie, USAF, for information.

MCN: 34107

TOO: 03 200Z (0311001)

TOR: 030920Z (0318201)

DECLASSIFIED PER

AR 380-5
JES eto of 20 Aug 71

NO PASSPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CX 59707
7147884 Bales

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
F A R E A S T C O M M A N D

FLASH ()
EMERGENCY ()
OPNL IMMEDIATE ()
PRIORITY ()
ROUTINE (R)
DEFERRED ()

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ROUTINE

TOP SECRET ()
SECRET ()
CONFIDENTIAL (C)
RESTRICTED ()
IN CLEAR ()

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CINCUNC LEB/fjs
(Office)

3 MARCH 1951
(11.2.51)

030529Z

FROM: CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DEPTAR WASH D C

C-56818 PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY CMA FRANK PACE JR PD

REURMSG DA EIGHT FOUR SEVEN SEVEN THREE CMA TWO MARCH PD DELIGHTED AT

PROSPECT OF YOUR VISIT PD SIGNED MacARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: CINCUNC
C/S



[PERSONAL FOR FRANK PACE
not indexed]

DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5
DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OE
MAY 78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This is in reply to NO. _____.

MCN 6079
TOO 030529Z
TIS 030541Z
TOO 031430Z

FLASH
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
PAC EAST COMMD

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CofS: DOH/re

26 January 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~

260651

FROM: CINCPE TOKYO JAPAN (HICKEY)

TO : ARMY EIGHT KOREA. FLASH

-54214

Personal for Allen. Is it your plan to continue by

phase line to Han River if hostile action does not dictate otherwise?

If so, CinC tentatively plans to visit advance elements, landing at Suwon on Sunday, 28th. if possible. Please advise earliest as to condition of air field and possibility of landing the "SCAF" there.

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH
Brig Gen, USA
Adjutant General

Copies to:
CinC
CofS (return)

DECLASSIFIED PER events
DECLASSIFIED PER AR 390-5.15 Nov 49
20 AUG. 75



... must cryocenter before
... handle accort of clas carried herein per pars
17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and (4) AR 390-5.15 Nov 49.

[PERSONAL FOR VARIOUS PEOPLE]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CofS: DOH/wrb

21 January 1951

210424

FROM: CINCFE (HICKEY) TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DA WASH DC. OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C - 53897) Personal for Brooks. Re DA 81628.

SA

No objection here to proposed detail for McClure. Orders directing his return to ZI are suspended pending decision. Request reply soonest.

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH
Brig Gen, USA
Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED PER *JCS Group 6 Jun 75*



COPIES TO:
CinC ✓
CofS
G-1

Paraphrase not required. Consult cryptocenter before decias. Handle as corr of clas carried herein per pars 17a(1)(2) and 41c 2X3 and g(1). AR 380-5.15 Nov 49.

S

TOP SECRET

4

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~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

141453

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CofS: DCH/wrb

14 January 1951

B

FROM: CINCFC TOKYO JAPAN

TO : CG FIFTH AF KOREA. FLASH

(C - 53119) Personal for General Partridge. CINCFC passes following message from General Stratemeier, CG FFAF. General Vandenberg and I plus Landon, Col Melhugh and one other will depart Tokyo in B-17 3555 for K-2 approximately 1000, 15 January.

OFFICIAL:

DECLASSIFIED PER events



K. B. BUSH
Brig Gen, USA
Adjutant General

paraphrase not required. Consult cryptocenter before
decide. Handle escort of clas carried barem per para
7a(1)(2) and 4c(2)(3) and g(1) AR 380-5.15 H-1008

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CofS

~~TOP SECRET~~

VE

0

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SGS JME/jhs
24 December 1950

FROM: CINCFC TOKYO JAPAN
TO : X CORPS KOREA FLASH

3
241011

C - 52002

Personal for Major General Almond. Urmsg X-15401, 24 December 1950. Thanks, Ned, for your fine message. I cannot tell you of the admiration I feel for all concerned over the operations of the past ten days. They were magnificent and a model for all time. At the proper time, please give everyone my congratulations and the gratitude not only I but the whole nation feels towards them. Signed, MacArthur.

CINC

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH,
Brig Gen, USA,
Adjutant General.



COPIES TO: CinC
CofS

DECLASSIFIED PER AR 300-5

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS 104-1
20 AUG. 75

[PERSONAL FOR GEN ALMOND;
NOT INDEXED]

Information not to be disseminated outside the Department of Defense
without the express approval of the Director of Defense Security Information
7-112 and 4c 2.5 and AR 300-5

21 ~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
PERSONAL FOR

18 December 1950

B

FLASH

PERSONAL FROM: GENERAL ALMOND

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL MACARTHUR

NUMBER : X 15295 18 December 1950

Hungnam airstrip was constructed for emergency use by C-47 aircraft. Landing area is 4,000 feet long and 80 feet wide. Surface is well compacted sand with clay worked into the top six inches which is now frozen. 425 feet of pierced steel plank 1,500 feet from south end of landing strip. C-47's have landed with no difficulty; however, no larger aircraft have landed. Field is subject to strong cross winds and has deep ditches and gun emplacements adjacent to strip. Approach from south is clear. Block house 25 feet high on extreme north end of runway. In case landing is attempted pilot should contact "LAZARUS" control when 50 miles out for clearance into naval gunfire area on 137.88 primary or 126.18. Traffic control jeep is on runway with normal tower frequency.

Amphibious operations here progressing in orderly and highly satisfactory manner except that non-arrival of shipping indicates a delay of two days in schedule furnished GHQ on 11 December. Troops are performing all tasks magnificently.

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS Sp. 6 Jun 75 and events



MCN: 52642

TOO: 182243I

TOR: 190017I

"PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING."

PERSONAL FOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

01 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

CINCUNC LEB/rjs

18 DECEMBER 1950

181001

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN

TO: CG TENTH CORPS

C - 51545

PERSONAL FOR MAJOR GENERAL ALMOND PD IS THERE
A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT MY PLANE CAN LAND ON THE EMERGENCY STRIP AT
HUGHMAN QUON. I AM ANXIOUS IF POSSIBLE TO PERSONALLY VISIT THE
ELEMENTS OF THE THIRD DIVISION PERIMETER PD YOUR AMPHIBIOUS MOVEMENT
APPEARS TO BE GOING MAGNIFICENTLY PD SIGNED MacARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General.



Distribution: CINCUNC (Return)
C/S

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Tests of zoning K

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

865 2997


~~TOP SECRET~~
THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

29 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

Your attention is invited to the attached copy of Top Secret Redline, TS #108, from General Vandenberg to me.

I am in the process of preparing the reply and will secure concurrence from Far East Command prior to its dispatch.



GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

1 Attachment as noted

DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5



[ORIG. LETTER, LESS ENCL., IN VIP FILE]

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Page# 1 of 1 Pages

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~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY

Fm: Hq USAF, Washington, D. C.

To: CG FFAF, Tokyo, Japan.

TOP SECRET - REDLINE - TS-108.

FROM VANDENBERG TO STRATEMEYER.

28/2355/Z

Nov.



The addition of the two groups of fighter aircraft now arriving in your theater makes the problem of congestion on your airdromes increasingly serious. I note here the concentration of several hundred odd aircraft in Manchuria. The possibility of this having been done in conjunction with the Chinese attack is quite apparent. I believe it is possible the attack was launched by the Chinese ahead of schedule and that the possibility of their first intention was to accompany the attack with a Pearl Harbor type on your operational fields. This causes me great concern. For the future, I feel that it is imperative that no stone is left unturned to provide dispersal areas and even possible revetments since the destruction of your Air Force combined with an all-out attack might cause the loss of Korea and even possibly set up the Japanese Islands for invasion. Our ground troops, unaccustomed to hostile air attack might well be unable to become acclimated before a disaster could occur. Will you advise me as to your ideas and what preparations you have and are intending to accomplish in order that this threat be avoided. END

DECLASSIFIED PER *Jes et/20 Aug 75*

29 Nov

~~TOP SECRET~~

ES

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925, C/O POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

REDLINE

14 November 1950

1 3

Strateneyer, G. E., Lt. Gen/d

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER

JLS lts/20 Aug 75

TCYS ✓
140600 Z

From: COMGEN FFAF

To : CSAF (Redline)

Cite: V 0439

CG

REDLINE PERSONAL VANDENBERG FROM STRATENAYER. Remy A 3425 Op-Op.

I quote Colonel Richard H. Carmichael's report to FFAF Bomber Command:

"1. On 13 November 1950, the 98th Bombardment Group (M) was ordered to destroy the railroad bridges spanning the Yalu River, connecting the cities of SINGUIJU and ANTUNG. Three flights, composed of four, two, and three aircraft respectively, attacked the bridges at 1205 local time.

"2. The first flight, composed of four aircraft, made their final bomb run on an axis of 230 degrees. The second flight, composed of two aircraft, turned slightly short of the initial point and made the final bomb run on an axis of 237 degrees. The last flight, composed of three aircraft, made their attack on an axis of 232 degrees. The altitude separation was 500 feet between each flight, with the average altitude at 25,000 feet pressure. A total of one-hundred two 1,000 pound demolition bombs were released from the nine aircraft in the formation in less than ten seconds. The remaining six bombs were not released due to a bomb door malfunction, and were salvaged at sea after departing from Korea. The intervalometer setting was 50 feet, allowing a walk of 500 feet from the first to last release. Bomb releases were made on the three squadron leads, and the three flights turned from the axis of attack immediately

GENERAL MACARTHUR - Courier



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SGS 2001



2

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

after bombs away to avoid any possible violation of the Manchurian border. The general bombing pattern was confined to an area of 1,400 feet in radius; however, an explosion was observed and scored 4,123 feet from the mean point of impact. The explosion was 2,800 feet from the farthest bomb in the immediate target area. The aiming point for the formation was the most eastern end of the two railroad bridges spanning the Yalu River. The bombs on the western perimeter of the main distribution were less than half way across the Yalu River separating North Korea from Manchuria. The explosion observed was approximately 1,800 feet southwest of the western end of the railroad bridge. The divorced explosion was 1,983 feet from the average range of the three flights and the deflection was 3,500 feet from the average pattern of the composite group.

"3. It is remotely possible that the explosion observed was a bomb dropped by the formation of nine aircraft attacking the bridges, if the following conditions were revolved. To account for the range, distance fore and aft, the bomb would have to have been carried another nine or ten seconds along the same axis of attack. To proffer an explanation for the deflection, lateral error, an aircraft would have to assume a sharp bank of $1/4$ needle width or greater.

"4. All three flights turned off the axis of attack immediately after bombs away to avoid tracking flak and the proximity of the border. No one aircraft in any of the three flights broke formation, which lent no opportunity to continue on the same course to drop a single bomb. The three

~~TOP SECRET~~


3 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

turns executed by the trailing flights were normal formation turns, providing little or no opportunity for a 1,000 pound bomb to be centrifugally thrown almost 3,000 feet. After reaching terminal velocity the 1,000 pound demolition bomb becomes extremely stable, and it is difficult to find a suitable or logical explanation for the one explosion which occurred 4,123 feet from the aiming point assigned to the 98th Bombardment Group (M)."

The facts of this case are too indefinite to reach any authoritative conclusions. YMD

OFFICIAL:


W. L. RAMSEY
Capt., USAF.
Ass't Adj Gen



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

REDLINE - STRATLINE - COURIER

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 November 1950

Stratmeyer, G. F., Lt.Gen/d

1 1

FROM: COMGEN FEAF

TO: 070030Z

TO : CBAF (Redline)

INFO: CINCPAC (Courier)
CG FIFTH AF KOREA (Stratline)
CG FEAF BOMCOM (Stratline)

Cite: VC 0421 _____ CG

REDLINE PERSONAL VANDENBERG FROM STRATMEYER WITH INFO PERSONAL COURIER CINCPAC AND INFO PERSONAL STRATLINE PARTRIDGE AND O'DONNELL.

Further to my V 0420 CG. In addition to postponing FEAF BOMCOM missions against specific targets cited JCS 39873 and your TS 5304, I have directed Partridge to refrain from bombing any targets within five (5) miles of Border. He has been and still is authorized to perform armed recon flights up to Border utilizing napalm, rockets, and machine gun fire against appropriate targets both in the air and on the ground. END

CINCPAC APO 500

OFFICIAL:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS Group 6 Jan 75



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Page# 1 of 1 Pages.

Edward Tamm
EMUL, TAGL R, M.
W. G. USAF
Asst. Adjutant General

ES

STRATLINE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

1173

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

3 Nov 50

Stratemeyer, G.F. LtGen/a

1 1

From: COMGEN FEAF

TOO 030455Z

To : CG FIFTH AF (in Korea)

Cite: V 0413 _____ CG

STRATLINE PERSONAL PARTRIDGE FROM STRATEMEYER

THIS RADIO IN THREE PARTS

PART I. Reured DH-OPS 2375, dtd 2 Nov 50, in discussion with General MacArthur this morning, he indicated that he would not burn SINULJU at this time because of contemplated occupation by UN troops.

PART II. You are authorized to use fighters with any ^{16/5} armament you so desire to take out the anti-aircraft batteries in and around city of SINULJU, at the same time not repeat not violating the border.

PART III. Reured KH-OPS 2324, dtd 2 Nov 50, I have brought this matter to CINCPAC's attention and at the present time he is studying your request. END

OFFICIAL:

DECLASSIFIED PER JCS Group 6 Jan 75

E. E. TORO
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

TOP SECRET
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~~TOP SECRET~~

81

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

TO: CG FEAF, APO 925

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP	19 OCT 50	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	<i>Top Secret</i>
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	OPERATIONAL INFORMATION	IMMEDIATE COURIER
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION		

Non concur in CG FEAF proposed message to CG 5th AF. CG FEAF proposed message and 5th AF message KF-GEN-36 contain proposals which are not in consonance with the provisions of Annex F, GHQ UNC Opn Order No. 2.

DECLASSIFIED PER

*JCS Op. 6 Jun 75**filed in 75 incoming files 15 OCT*

~~TOP SECRET~~

03

Distribution:

CinC
CofS (3)
G-3 (Return) (6)

Approved by CofS 16 Oct, initials: "HH".

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

SYMBOL

AG 370.2 (16 Oct 50)GC-0

TELEPHONE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

OFFICIAL TITLE

Top Secret
K. B. RUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

FORM 173
1 MAY 49

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

6390-FEC P&PC-10/50-50M

CINCFE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

COPY

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

HQ FEAF, TOKYO, JAPAN

TO:

CG FIVE AF IN KOREA

INFO:

CINCFE (COURIER)
COMNAVFE (COURIER)
CG X CORPS

CITE A _____ CG

STRATLINE TO PARTRIDGE FROM STRATEMEYER. Reference your
KF-GEN-36, Part 1. Under the provisions of Annex F to UNC
Opers Order No 2 I propose that at such time as the X Corps
assumes control of ground units ashore, that you will have
operational control of land based elements of 1st MAW at
Wonsan. Part 2. Under this arrangement contemplated CG
1st MAW will be given primary mission close support to X
Corps units End.

CINCFE Concurs _____

DATE-TIME GROUP

PRECEDENCE FOR:

ACTION

STRATLINE

INFORMATION

BOOK MESSAGE

ORIGINAL MESSAGE

MULTIPLE ADDRESS

CRYPTOPRECAUTION

YES

NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION



~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL
VCOF/OPW/r1r/15 Oct 50

TELEPHONE
301

OFFICIAL TITLE

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COPY

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 500



AG 370.2 (8 Jul 50)GC

15 July 1950

SUBJECT: Coordination of Air Effort of Far East Air Forces and United States Naval Forces, Far East

TO: Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, Navy No. 1165
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

In order to obtain the maximum effectiveness in the employment of all air resources in the Far East Command and to insure coordination of air efforts, the following conclusions agreed to by the Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, and Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, are approved and adopted as policy:

a. Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, will have command or operational control of all aircraft operating in the execution of Far East Air Forces mission as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East. This includes operational control of naval land based air when not in execution of naval missions which include naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and support of naval tasks such as an amphibious assault.

b. Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, will have command or operational control of all aircraft in execution of missions assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to Navy Forces, Far East.

c. Coordination:

- (1) Basic selection and priority of target areas will be accomplished by the General Headquarters target analysis group with all services participating.
- (2) Tasks assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East, such as an amphibious assault, will prescribe the coordination by designation of specific areas of operation.
- (3) When both Navy Forces, Far East, and Far East Air Forces are assigned missions in Korea, coordination control, a Commander-in-Chief, Far East, prerogative, is delegated to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

EDWARD M. ALMOND
Major General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:

- CinC
- CofS (3)
- CofS, ROK
- DCofS, FEC; G-1; G-2 (3); G-4; G-1, ROK (Rm 620); G-2, ROK (Rm 622); G-3, ROK (Rm 622); G-4, ROK (Rm 620); FEAF, ROK (Rm 619); NAVFE, ROK (Rm 619).

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~
PERSONAL FOR

31 October 1950

FLASH

PERSONAL FROM: MAJOR GENERAL ALMOND

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL MACARTHUR

NUMBER : X 11793,

31 October 1950



1143
1095

In company with G-2 and G-3 representatives of my staff, I visited I ROK Corps Headquarters in Hamhung at 1000 today and interrogated 16 CCF POWS captured at 1600 yesterday, 29 October vicinity Sudong CV 5747. This visit was made in order to gain first hand knowledge of the reported presence of CCF in North Korean battle areas.

Outwardly the prisoners appeared healthy, well-clothed, with new winter uniforms and shoes, and as a result of a hasty test of alertness and military training, i.e., the execution of a few simple commands, the prisoners appeared reasonably well trained. Average age was 28 - 30 years and their military service averaged approximately 2 years. The prisoners spoke the Peking dialect and the North Manchurian dialect of the Chinese language. Detailed interrogation was being conducted by I ROK Corps interrogators reinforced by a small party of the X Corps prisoner Interrogation Detachment.

A summary of the info obtained from these prisoners follows:

"The men were members of the mortar company of the 370 Regiment, 124 CCF Division, 42 CCF Corps (?). None admitted knowing names of their battalion, regimental, or division commanders but all knew their over all commander Lin Piao, the Manchurian CCF Commander. The strength of the mortar company was 180 men, 52 horses, and 4 US 81 MM mortars. The mortar company consisted of 2 mortar platoons each of which contained 32 men, 6 horses, and was equipped with 2 mortars. The third platoon of the mortar company was an ammunition platoon consisting of 90 men and 40 horses. The balance of the company strength consisted of Company Headquarters, cooks, and signal men. Within the ammunition platoon each horse carried 4 boxes of ammunition at 2 rounds per box. Within the mortar platoons the 6 horses carried split loads comprising the 2 mortars and a few rounds of ammunition.

DECLASSIFIED PER *John L. 920 Aug 75*

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CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING."

~~TOP SECRET~~

INDEXED BY MACARTHUR ARCHIVES

~~TOP SECRET~~
PERSONAL FOR

"In addition to the previously described mortar company, the 370 regiment included 3 infantry battalions at 680 men each and a regimental gun company. The latter was equipped with 4 small caliber Jap regimental guns, carried on pack horses at 3 horses per gun, and totaled 167 men.

"The prisoners belonged to the 370 regiment, of the Chinese Nationalist Army from 1947 to April 1949 located near Tientsin. In about April 1949 the entire regiment, with its US and Jap equipment, was integrated into the Chinese Communist Army. In February 1950 the 370 regiment arrived at Horunjan, on the Soviet - Manchurian border. In July of 1950 the regiment moved from Tunghua by train to Chian, Manchuria, detrained, crossed the Yagu river at Nanpojin, and moved by foot and pack animal at night beginning 16 October thru Kanggye, Changjin, to Toksilli until 2-29 October when it encountered the 26 ROK Regiment south of Choshin reservoir. In this engagement 2 prisoners from the 2nd battalion, 370 Regiment were taken on 26 October, 1 mile west of Sudong, and 16 prisoners from the mortar company were taken on 29 October at 1600 hours in the same general area. These prisoners were hungry and had not eaten for 3 days. Three of the 4 mortars of the company had been destroyed; the 4th mortar had been evacuated; and the ammunition platoon, of which all prisoners were members, was overrun. Prisoners state that the 370 Regiment CP was on the hill 3 miles west of Sudong, and that the balance of the regiment was in the same area."

Interrogation continues and the results will be forwarded as obtained.

While it is too early from the foregoing information to verify the presence of CCF units of any considerable size in the North Korean Armed Forces, the I ROK Corps estimates a force of 8000 CCF troops at Sudong, and another force of 2000 CCF troops at Chnugyande - W1. Also, 1 prisoner states that 2 CCF divisions are moving from a Yalu river crossing at Nanpojin with the object of capturing Hamhung beginning 1 November.

Our operations are continuing as planned and as already reported to GHQ in X 11780. Two RCTS, 1st Marine Division, are concentration from landing areas and moving on Hamhund, closing there by 2 November and the 3rd ROK Division is no in position 30 kilometers, north and northwest of Hamhung, to oppose any threat to that city. There are no other evidences of CCF forces opposing I Corps units.

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~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

PERSONAL FOR

Our situation is excellent to develop any real threat that may materialize from indicating CCF movements. Probing attacks by BOK 3rd Division units are in progress to determine the real nature of opposing forces.

This brief report is furnished to indicate our information to date and the measures being taken here to determine the nature of possible new threats and steps to meet them. Prompt reports will follow.

MCH: 90579
TOO: 3103001
TOR: 3108001

DELAY DUE TO SERVICE



"PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING."

~~TOP SECRET~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.
~~TOP SECRET~~
Per Authority
Commanding General
FEAF APO 925
11 Oct 50 *osp*
initials

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

Commanding General
Far East Air Forces

DATE-TIME GROUP 110045Z		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION OP IMM	INFORMATION COURIER
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPROTECTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REFERS TO MESSAGE:		
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	

TO:

Commanding General
Fifth Air Force in Korea

INFO:

Commanding General
FEAF Bomber Command, Yokota AB, Japan

✓ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Commander-in-Chief, Far East



Cite VC 351 IG
STARTER

Stratling to Partridge. This msg in 3 parts. Part one: Following msg from Vandenberg passed to you for action and report: Quote

I have repeatedly stressed the grave implications resulting from any violation of the territory of communist China and USSR, and directed that you take such action as might be necessary to prevent such an occurrence. Last night I received your message A-931516 reporting possible attack by two F-80's on a USSR airfield. In view of my several messages to you on this subject, which I know you passed on to your commanders in the strongest and clearest terms, I consider these incidents, particularly the last one, supervisory failures which cannot be tolerated. If you find that this was another border violation, I

DECLASSIFIED PER *J. S. G. 6 Jan 75*

~~TOP SECRET~~
AG Chancery File No. **351-OR-50**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when verified) ✓
Copy Number _____
Page _____ of _____ Page

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYMBOL IG/OSP/veg	TELEPHONE 414	OFFICIAL TITLE
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ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

TOP SECRET

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

DATE-TIME GROUP		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	

TO:

INFO:

desire that you determine within 48 hours the commander responsible for this failure and relieve him at once. What further action will be taken will be determined upon receipt of your investigation report.

Unquote. Part two: Following msg from Norstad passed to you for action and report: Quote Reference reported violation of USSR border. Report of your investigation, including your judgment as to whether the attack was actually made, is required here not later than 1400Z, 11 Oct. Unquote. This requires that FEAF's answer reach USAF by 2300 Item, 11 Oct 50. Part three: USSR protest states two F-80's attacked airfield at Dry River on seacoast 100 kilometers from Soviet-Korean border. This probably Sukhaya Rechka, 100 nautical miles from Chongjin. End.

OFFICIAL:



~~TOP SECRET~~

AG Unsubd Ref. No. 351-OR-50

Copy Number 2

DRAFTER'S NAME (and Signature, with Initials) _____ Page _____

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>E. E. Toro</i>	
OFFICIAL TITLE Colonel, USAF Adjutant General	

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYMBOL

IG/OSP/vog

TELEPHONE

614

NME 1 MAY 49 173

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-100, 15 JUN 1948, AND WD AGO FORM 888, 7 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

IND-PBC Printing Plant-2-50-3000

Precedence

STRATLINE

(Do not write in this space)

Page _____ of _____ pages.

OUT GOING
SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGES
HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 October 1950

Stratemeier, G. E. Lt. Gen.
(Office Symbols)

From: COMGEN FEAF

TOO 100515Z

To : COMGEN FIFTH AF IN KOREA (STRATLINE)

Cite: V0346 CG



Personal Stratline Partridge from Stratemeier.

Soviet Government according to Moscow radio has protested to the United States violation of Soviet frontier by United States airplanes. The note charges that two American F-80's attacked and fired upon a Soviet airdrome one hundred kilometers within Korean-Soviet border, located on seacoast in Kukhaya Richka area. Incident is said to have taken place 4:17 P.M., 8 October local Soviet time.

This to my mind confirms the violation of the Soviet border by your F-80 fighters as recently reported by you on 8 October as having possibly taken place.

General MacArthur and I are most unhappy about this violation. It shows a disregard for orders issued by you and me as well as from your organization commanders. At such a time near the end of the Korean war, you and your people must repeat must be sure of your targets and not permit such exhibition of haphazard navigation and disregard for instructions issued. To be over one hundred miles off in navigation is inexcusable.

A thorough and complete investigation of this incident will be made without delay and submitted direct to me. END



DECLASSIFIED PER

JCL Group 6 June 75

~~TOP SECRET~~
AG Classified Reg. No. 396-OR-50
Copy Number 3

This replies to No. _____ From _____ Dated _____ Classification _____
(The above will be completely filled out when answering an incoming radio.) /

Classification

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SECRET
Per Authority
CG FEAFAPO 50
Date: 23 Aug 50
Initials: BBS

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

TOP SECRET
23 August 1950
GCSratemeyer, Lt. Gen:bd

1 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: COMGEN FEAFA

TOO: 23 06 00 2

TO : CSAF (Operational Immediate)

INFO: CINCPAC (Courier)

CITE: VC 0 2 1 2 _____ CG

Personal Norstad from Stratemeyer.

Cite your 51952.

MACARTHUR
ARCHIVES

Re the Wayne Thomas article which distresses me greatly. It is completely unrealistic and plainly dogmatic propaganda and is probably and unfortunately part of a planned conspiracy for the accomplishment of basic changes in the Defense Department.

CINCPAC - APO 500

*Scuttled
20 Aug 50*

Counter-action must be on a much broader scale than the Korean theater of operations to safe-guard the interest of the Air Force and the National Defense in general. Everything possible to correct such biased reports is and has been done in this theater. From CINCPAC down through all ranks of the Army and the Navy, and largely in the dispatches, commendations of the Air Force have been of the most complete and generous nature. The cooperation between the services could not be improved. I regard it as near perfection as is possible.

This article is not only a planned affair but is a scuttle-butt one and a certain number of scuttle-butts always exist whenever men assemble

51952

CSAF

21 Oct

Restricted

~~TOP SECRET~~
AG Classified for No. 212-OR-50
Copy Number 2
Page 1 of 2 pages

8

MACARTHUR
ARCHIVES

Note: Ref msg CSAF 51952 was not passed to this hq.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES

~~TOP SECRET~~

APO 925

2 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

together and whenever action is undertaken. Attention has been drawn to the Marine high command here of the damage caused by this type of irresponsible and scurrilous reporting and I believe that the Marines themselves do not in general support this type of mackery.

The mad scramble among pressmen for sensational headlines can only be suppressed by the publishers and editors themselves.

The reporters respond to the impulse from the top and up to the present time such impulse in the Korean operations has been to encourage and foster the most highly sensational articles irrespective of the psychological damage they might cause. I recommend most urgently that the journalistic higher-ups be informally requested to discourage doubtful articles which can only tend to create dissension and disunity within our own ranks and give comfort and aid to the enemy.

I have furnished a copy of this message to CINCFE who is exerting every possible effort to dry up the flow of injurious reporting. END

OFFICIAL:

E. E. TORO
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

AS ... 212-0R-50

COPY ... 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

12 August 1960

PERSONAL FROM: GENERAL RIDGWAY, CSUSA.

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL ALMOND.

NUMBER : W 88304 (1121463)



Initial names of consideration for the temp promotion to the grade of Colonel are as follows:

Army promotion list:

Regular officers through Charles H Klumefeld, promotion list number 3612.

Non-regular officers with date of rank 31 Jan 1943 or earlier.

Medical Corps:

Regular officers through Bernard H Sedarberg, promotion list number 434.

Non-regular officers with date of rank 31 December 1935 or earlier.

Dental Corps:

Regular officers through Albert M. Mollenbach, promotion list number 79.

Non-regular officers with date of rank 31 Jan 1945 or earlier.

Veterinary Corps:

Regular officers through Neil O Wilson, promotion list number 44.

Non-regular officers with date of rank 31 October 1947 or earlier.

Medical Service Corps:

Regular officers through Bernard Aabel, promotion list number 26.

Non-regular officers with date of rank 30 June 1944 or earlier.

Judge Advocate General:

Regular officers through Charles L Decker, promotion list number 78.

Non-regular officers with date of rank 30 Nov 1943 or earlier.

Chaplains:

Regular officers through Earl D Compton, promotion list number 47.

DECLASSIFIED PER MR 380-5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W 88504 (112146Z) (Cont'd)

Non-regular officers with date of rank 31 May 1945 or earlier.

NCH: 70593

FOO: 112146Z (120746 IDSF)

FOR: 112316Z (120916 IDSF)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

10 August 1950

PERSONAL FROM: GENERAL FOX

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL ALMOND.

NUMBER : FX 5004, (100331E)



Reference JCS 88248 of 9 August.

1. The requirement that the Liaison Group "Clear through and cooperate with the Senior US Military Attache" impossible procedure not contemplated in our original instructions or in your supplementary instructions contained in paragraph 5 of JCS 15 of 9 August. Interpreted literally, this would appear to establish Adm. Jarrett as the US Military representative through whom all liaison will be effected with the Chinese Armed Forces. Actually, this stipulation has been overtaken by events, since we have already established the extensive and intimate liaison with the Armed Forces essential to the accomplishment of our mission of liaison and survey. I assume Adm. Jarrett will accept this as an accomplished fact and not interpose restrictive procedures, since the latter will constitute a step in retrogression. I anticipate that Adm. Jarrett will desire to confer with me upon his receipt of JCS 88248.

2. The directive to "Cooperate closely" again raises the question of our relations with the Attache, since it implies that he be kept informed of our plans and of our progress in the various fields. This could be done in a general way by periodic consultation, if desired. If he required more detailed information it would impose an added burden and would probably result in piece-meal information being transmitted through his channels to Washington. Until receipt of further instructions from you I plan to maintain our relations on an amicable basis, and if queried, to inform him in general terms of our objectives and our progress.

3. Reference paragraph 2. All personnel now here are on a TDY basis. Hence the necessity to assign them to duty with the Attache does not arise.

4. Reference paragraph 3. Understood and concur.

5. A summation of our accomplishments to date would probably be helpful to you in the consideration of this problem:

a. By dint of persistent persuasion we have succeeded in attaining adequate office space in the Ministry of Defense building. The Chinese are now arranging this to suit our purposes. In addition, facilities for the Communication Center have been obtained and the Center is now operable on the 4th floor of the Defense building.

DECLASSIFIED PER *JCS Group of 9 Jul 73*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. The officers of the Group are now billeted in Hostel number 2. We have made strong representations to the Chinese for officer accommodations in the Grand Hotel. We have been assured that as spaces become available we will be permitted to move into these accommodations, with the eventual expectation of having that facility entirely at the disposal of American Military and official personnel on duty in Formosa, and possibly under the exclusive control of the FEG Liaison Group.

c. Provision of adequate accommodations for enlisted personnel has been most difficult. Yesterday we were informed that a club and surrounding grounds would be made available to us on noon Saturday, 12 August. While this building is not adequate for housing all of the enlisted men, it will provide the necessary messing, recreational and limited billeting facilities. With the addition of tentage, cots and other minor items which we have requisitioned, we feel we will have excellent accommodations which will permit the regular control of our enlisted personnel which we deem absolutely essential.

d. With the visit of General MacArthur and the relationship he established with the Generalissimo, we have been given an entree which certainly never would have been otherwise forthcoming. As a consequence we have been enabled to establish an intimate relationship between our various staff section representatives and their Chinese counterparts which would be difficult to improve upon. It could not be expected that such extensive and intimate access to the plans, facilities and units of the Chinese Armed Forces could ever be obtained by any Attache Group.

6. Any new procedures or Modus Operandi which would in any way restrict the relationship already established by the Liaison Group would be unfortunate and might have an adverse impact upon our present and future effectiveness. General Chou, the Chief of Staff, yesterday requested that I submit to him in writing a statement of our objectives and a proposed method for the coordination of the work of our group and that of the Chinese Staff. Upon receipt of this he proposed to call a conference of all concerned, in which these would be fully explained and clarified. In that memo I proposed to state in general terms our objectives, to the extent considered judicious. While I do not anticipate that JCS 88248 will cause you to direct any radical change in our present instructions, I propose withholding this memo until receipt of further information from you. If the Military Attache is to come more intimately into the picture than he has been contemplated to date, obviously that would of necessity have to be revealed to the Chinese Military authorities in order to obviate misunderstanding and possible confusion.

7. Request comments soonest.

Signed For.

MGN: 70205

TOO: 100331Z (101331ZDST)

FOR: 100815Z (101815ZDST)

"PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED."

CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PERSONAL FOR

7 August 1950

PRIORITY

PERSONAL FROM: CHQ LIAISON OFFICER, TAIPEI

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL ALMOND

NUMBER : None cited. 7 August 1950.

1. Request see most 2 office and 2 field type safes. Office type safes essential to provide the security we require for which field safes not adequate.

2. Request 1 officer and 1 enlisted man, Chinese linguists. While English-speaking Chinese are available here in Chinese Military Forces, it is essential that we have our own linguists for certain conferences.

MCM : 69530

TOO : 070520Z (071520 IDST)

FOR : 070723Z (071723 IDST)

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PERSONAL FOR
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FX 500? McLean

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SGS: JHC/wrt

30 July 1950

~~TOP SECRET~~

301133

[Handwritten signature]

FROM: CINCPE TOKYO JAPAN
TO : CG RYCOM OKINAWA. PRIORITY

(C-59042) Personal for General McClure. Party of approximately
16 senior officers, this headquarters, will arrive RYCOM about 1400, 1 August, ^{KING}
for stop of one hour duration. More definite ETA later.

OFFICIAL:

DECLASSIFIED PER *JCD Group 6 June 75*

K. B. BUSH
Brig Gen, USA
Adjutant General



COPIES TO:
CinC /
CofS
CofS ROK
SGS (Return)

[Faint, illegible text]

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SGS JHC/re

21 July 1950

~~SECRET~~

B
211123

FROM: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN
TO : GOC BCOF PRIORITY
INFO: DA WASH DC (FOR JCS) PRIORITY
COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN PRIORITY (COURIER)
CG PRAF, TOKYO JAPAN PRIORITY (COURIER)

CX58372

Personal for Lt Gen Sir Horace Robertson, K. B.

Upon completion of the first phase of the campaign in Korea, marked by the deployment of major elements of the Eighth United States Army in the battle area, I wish to express to you my appreciation for the outstanding manner in which the Naval and Air Forces under your command have operated. In conjunction with other United Nations forces, your efforts have represented a marked contribution in preventing conclusively the North Korean initial opportunity for victory. There remains no slightest doubt but that our combined efforts have insured the establishment of a secure base in Korea. Signed MacArthur.

OFFICIAL:

DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5

K. B. HUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
CinC
CofS
G-3
SGS (return)

INFORMATION COPY

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*Classification required. Consult cryptocenter before
declass. Handle as cov if clas carried by courier per
17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and 50, AR 380-5*

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES

APO 925

TOP SECRET
Per Authority
CG FEAF APO 925
Date: 19 July 50
Initial: *BBB*

CS file

NOTED
CS

19 July 1950



MEMORANDUM FOR: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

SUBJECT : Far East Air Forces Plans and Operations

TOY 5

Attached hereto for your information are copies of a teletype we received from the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington, D. C., and my answer thereto. I urge that you read both messages.

George E. Stratemeyer

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

2 Inclosures:

- #1 - Cy teletype Nb 472,
182200Z July 50. TOP SECRET
- #2 - Cy rad CG FEAF to CSAF
in reply. TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED PER *Jed ltr of 20 Aug 75*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

AG Classified Reg. No. 81-02-50

Copy Number *1*

Date *1* of *2* pages

SGS-260

INDEXED BY MACARTHUR ARCHIVES

~~TOP SECRET~~

TTY CONF NBR 472 182200Z July 50.

COPY

CSAF ITEM 1/TOP SECRET/



B

1. General Vandenberg has issued a specific directive that we obtain from you a clearer picture of your plans for operations and the results therefrom. For instance:
 - A. It appears that you should be working on at least two east-west lines of rail and highway bridge interdiction across the Korean Peninsula. We should know what those plans are, to include specific bridge targets, and should be kept up to date on the current state of damage or destruction to each. Do such specific plans exist?
 - B. Likewise, your plan against the petroleum or other critical industries should be made known to us with the significance of each target selected, and we should be kept up to date on the progress of these attacks.
2. Other deficiencies in our required information are as follows:
 - A. Reports of attacks frequently do not coincide with the plan of attack reported the previous day. For instance, after you have scheduled extensive B-29 strikes for the following day, the reports of actual strikes on that day have shown no or very few B-29 sorties. Appreciate here that your plans may change, but we should be informed of the change and reasons therefor.
 - B. Results of your major or particularly interesting attacks usually are not forthcoming. For instance, we still do not know the results of your large B-29 strike against the Wonsan oil refineries.
 - C. The lack of specific information on your planned operations for B-26's and fighters is often embarrassing here. For instance, B-26's sometimes are scheduled merely for "maintenance of air superiority" and fighters for "close support." We know you must be giving these aircraft specific targets before take-off, even if only to specific areas and we must have information.
3. In general, we must know your overall target systems plans, your specific plans and the specific targets for each system, and we must know the status of targets in each system that have been attacked, damaged, repaired, destroyed, or made impassable.
4. Can you supply us with any of the above information now?

END CSAF ITEM 1/TOP SECRET/

DECLASSIFIED PER

Jed L. King 20 Aug 75

COPY

Inclosure #1

565-360

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

AG Classified Reg. No. 81-02-50

Copy Number 1

Page 21 of 21

NAME



JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

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FROM: (Originator)

COMGEN FEAF

DATE-TIME GROUP 190100Z		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION OP IDM	INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE		
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	

TO:

CS USAF WASH D.C.

INFO:

CITE V O 132

1. With re to Gen Vandenberg's queries transmitted in TTY COnf No. 472, FEAF Mission Dir to 5th AF was sent USAF in ourad A 2868 of 18 July. This can only be a gen dir specifying close spt to the grd forces. We cannot indicate to you in adv 5th AF tgts as they are requested by Hq 8th Army direct to 5th AF Adv, both of which are in Korea. In the future we will specify the gen area of ops. Comm between Japan and Korea are at present slow and overloaded, and flash info included in our midnight msg to USAF comes only fr Itazuke, Ashiya and Iwakuni, with Korean info added to the midnight msg as it comes in.

2. The mission of FEAF Bom Com was also sent you in A 2868. Within this general directive Bom Com is charged with operations as follows:

a. Priority 1. Due to critical ground situation such close spt ops as may be directed personally by MacArthur, and

DECLASSIFIED PER JLH/gz0 Aug 75

~~TOP SECRET~~

AG Classified Reg. No. 81-01-50

Copy Number 1

SGS-260

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 4

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

R. H. Warren, Col USAF/mmk

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL

OP-OP 18 Jul 50

TELEPHONE
631

OFFICIAL TITLE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: (Originator)

DATE-TIME GROUP		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	

TO:



INFO:

which are beyond the capabilities of the 5th AF. I concur completely in this temporary over-riding priority.

Priority 2. Air Bases and acft thereon when int indicates a profitable tgt.

Priority 3. Isolation of the battle fld by destroying and keeping destroyed hwy and RR bridges in the fol order of priority:

- (1) All key bridges, coast to coast fr 37 00'N - 37 30'N.
- (2) All key bridges, fr coast to coast, fr 37 30'N - 38 00'N.

Priority 4. Destruction of the enemy comm system by destruction of fol tgt systems in optional priority.

- (1) All key bridges in the main North and South lines of comm, north of 38 00' to within 50 miles of the Manchurian border.
- (2) Marshalling yards.
- (3) Ports.

Priority 5. Destruction of petroleum refineries and storage.

Priority 6. Destruction of the industrial tgt to include

electric power plants.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ PAGE 2 OF PAGES 4

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

R. H. Warren, Col USAF/mmk

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL

OP-OP 18 Jul 50

TELEPHONE

631

OFFICIAL TITLE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER



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FROM: (Originator)

DATE-TIME GROUP		TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE FOR:		ACTION INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	

TO:

INFO:

- b. The commitments of Priority 1 will be met to the exclusion of all other priorities with the max effort that can be utilized. The Priority 3 mission will be accomplished to the exclusion of all lower priorities in so far as possible.
3. Re other specific questions in TTY Conf:
- a. Re par 1a. Detailed tgts for interdiction of 2 East West comm belts will be fwded you by courier 19 July.
- b. Re par 1b. Detailed petroleum tgts will likewise be sent by courier.
- c. Re par 2a. Variation between attack plans and reports caused by last minute tgt changes, often dictated by CINCFE, by use of wea alternates, and incomplete reporting procedures. Probably info in our midnight msg is misleading. We report 63 B-29 in commission, but not no. it is planned to use. This will be remedied by giving both figures.
- d. Re par 2b. Future post mission reports will be expedited and will be as complete as possible. Regarding WONSAN mission

~~TOP SECRET~~ PAGE 3 OF PAGES 4

DRIFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

R. H. Warren, Col USAF/mmk

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL

OP-OP 18 July 50

TELEPHONE

631

OFFICIAL TITLE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.



SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator) TO: INFO:	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td colspan="2">DATE-TIME GROUP</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">TOP SECRET</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 25%;">PRECEDENCE FOR:</td> <td style="width: 25%;">ACTION</td> <td colspan="2">INFORMATION</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE</td> <td></td> <td colspan="2"><input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS</td> <td></td> <td colspan="2">CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4" style="text-align: center;">REFERS TO MESSAGE:</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">IDENTIFICATION</td> <td colspan="2">CLASSIFICATION</td> </tr> </table>	DATE-TIME GROUP		TOP SECRET		PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION		<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		REFERS TO MESSAGE:				IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	
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REFERS TO MESSAGE:																									
IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION																							

recent rcn photos show damage to date in Wonsan area as follows:

Major damage to oil refinery and fuel storage tanks.

Major damage to port warehouses.

Minor damage to Marshalling yards and locomotive repair shops.

Rcn photos being brought up to date and will be rushed to you.

4. Re par 3. By courier on 19 July, we are sending detailed tgt systems and status of tgts in each system. Status of tgts attacked, damaged, repaired and destroyed will be furn you by rad and confirmed by daily courier. END

OFFICIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~
 AG Classified Rtg. No. 81-02-50
 Copy Number 1
 Page 4 of 4 pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 4 OF PAGES 4

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required) <p style="text-align: center;">R. H. WARREN, Col USAF/mmk</p>	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL <p style="text-align: center;">OP-OP 18 Jul 50</p>	TELEPHONE <p style="text-align: center;">631</p>
OFFICIAL TITLE 	

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

From: G-2, GSUSA

14 July 1950

To : SSR, Tokyo

PRIORITY

WST-123

B

(EYES ONLY General MacArthur from Irwin)

Reference your TSW-168. Jarrett's contemplated mission that of General Liaison. He will be instructed to report direct to Taipei.

DECLASSIFIED PER *J. L. Sp. 6 Jun 75*



~~TOP SECRET~~

11

EYES ONLY

1506157 *refuse*

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

B

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: G-2 CSUSA

95W-168

13 JULY 1950

PRIORITY



(EYES ONLY GENERAL IRWIN FROM MacARTHUR)

YOUR WST ONE TWO ZERO PD NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER JARRETTS
PRIMARY MISSION IS TECHNICAL LIAISON BETWEEN SEVENTH FLEET AND THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR MERELY THE NORMAL FUNCTIONS OF A MILITARY ATTACHE PD
IF THE FORMER IS THE CASE CMA IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT HE BE PLACED
DIRECTLY UNDER MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL THROUGH COMNAVFE PD IF HIS MISSION
ON THE CONTRARY IS MERELY GENERAL LIAISON THIS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY PD
IN THE FORMER CASE HE SHOULD REPORT TO TOKYO PD IF THE LATTER THIS WOULD
NOT BE NECESSARY PD PLEASE CLARIFY PD

DECLASSIFIED PER JCL Sp. 6 Jun 75

*Orig given to Lt Col Bellamy
at 1930 13.VII.50*

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

01

150615 Z Refuse

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

From: G-2, GSUSA

13 July 1950

To : SSR, Tokyo

PRIORITY

WST-120

(EYES ONLY General MacArthur from Irwin)

Per authority of Secretary of Defense Rear Admiral H. B. Jarrett being assigned as Senior Military Attache Formosa. The present Joint Service Attache Office strength being increased by 3 additional Attaches from each service. These 10 officers will arrive in Formosa on or prior to 31 July 50. Mission is liaison between 7th Fleet and Chinese Government and furnishing Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information on situation in Formosa. Do you desire Admiral Jarrett and any or all Assistant Attaches to report Tokyo for briefing prior to arrival Formosa. Reply soonest.

DECLASSIFIED PER *JCS Sp. 6 Jan 75*



EYES ONLY
~~TOP SECRET~~

150615 Z R f

~~SECRET~~

RADIO MESSAGE
DISPATCHED ABOUT 282200-Z, JUNE 1950 FROM THE "BATAAN"
RELAYED BY GHQ SIGNAL OFFICER
TO COMNAVE AT 282205-Z, JUNE 1950

28 June 1950

TO: Admiral Joy (Repeat to G-3, GHQ)

Broadcast states British Fleet in Far East placed at our disposal. Coordinate at once with British Naval Commander. Consider feasibility of using both British and American Air Carriers for strikes in general vicinity of 38th parallel. Signed, MacArthur.

JOHN H. CHILES
Lt Col., GSC
Secretary, General Staff

cc: CinC
CofS
CofS (ROK)
G-3 (ROK)

DECLASSIFIED PER ACS LIB ON
20 AUG 75

INDEXED BY MacARTHUR ARCHIVES



~~SECRET~~

2002

~~SECRET~~

RADIO MESSAGE
DISPATCHED ABOUT 282215-Z, JUNE 1950 FROM THE "MATAAN"
RELAYED BY GCHQ SIGNAL OFFICER
TO GOC, BCOF AT 282219-Z JUNE 1950

28 June 1950

B

TO: GOC, BCOF (Robertson) (Repeat to G-3, GHQ).

In view of United Kingdom action placing British Far East
Fleet at disposal of CINCPAC, does Australia deem it feasible to do
likewise with your air elements in Japan for use against forces of
North Korea operating south of 38 degrees? Signed, MacArthur.

0748

JOHN H. CHILES,
Lt Col., GSC,
Secretary, General Staff.

cc: Cinc.
CofS
CofS (ROK)
G-3 (ROK)



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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

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BCOF 7 275 replas

~~TOP SECRET~~

010145 Z

SUS FJS/TJL
1 APRIL 1948

Eyes Only
PRIORITY

B

CINCPAC (DRAPER)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (EYES ONLY TO WOOD)

PAREN C-59629 PAREN REFER YOUR WAR NINE EIGHT SIX ONE
 EIGHT PD IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY SHOW THE SENATE AND HOUSE
 ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES IN EXECUTIVE SESSION THE APPROPRIATE EXCERPTS
 FROM CABLES NUMBER CHARLIE XRAY FIVE EIGHT ONE THREE ONE CMA TWO TWO
 JANUARY ONE NINE FOUR EIGHT AND CHARLIE XRAY FIVE EIGHT EIGHT THREE SEVEN
 CMA TWO FOUR FEBRUARY ONE NINE FOUR EIGHT CMA WHICH WERE DISPATCHED LONG
 BEFORE SELECTIVE SERVICE WAS CONTEMPLATED AND POINTED OUT VERY STRONGLY
 THE REASONS AND NEED FOR GREATLY INCREASED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THIS
 THEATER CMA AND THE DANGEROUS WEAKNESS RESULTING FROM ATTRITION OF OUR
 MILITARY FORCES HERE PD SINCE VOLUNTARY RECRUITING IN RECENT MONTHS
 HAS NOT FILLED THIS GAP CMA THESE CABLES SHOULD GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATE
 TO THE COMMITTEES THE URGENT NEED FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE TO PROMPTLY
 REMEDY THE SITUATION PD GENERAL MACARTHUR BELIEVES THIS APPROACH WILL
 BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN PERSUADING THE COMMITTEES OF THE EVIDENT NEED FOR
 INCREASED ENLISTED PERSONNEL PD END

CINCPAC

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED BY:

R. M. LEVY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED PER

John H. G. 20 Aug 75



08
~~TOP SECRET~~

Personal for
various people

END

