

Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands

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CHAPTER VII

THE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON PANAY
AND NEIGHBORING ISLANDS

27 November 1944

SECTION: I. GENERAL BACKGROUND:

The history of the guerrillas on Panay is unique among the island commands in the early and complete establishment of the command and the continuation of its authority without question since. In both military and civil matters it is probably the most extensive and the best example of a completely Filipino patriotic effort of all the Philippine guerrilla organizations.

The 61st Philippine Army Division was on Panay when the Japanese invasion forces landed in 1942. The division had only had five months training under a few American officers, and was able to offer little serious resistance to the Japanese. Gen. CHRISTIE, CG of the 61st Division, was only too aware of the limited Division potential and when surrender orders were published, he is said to have told Filipino leaders that so far as he was concerned the orders did not apply to them. As a result the Filipinos took to the hills with most of the Division weapons and other supplies and equipment. Only the few American officers and a few Filipinos surrendered.

Some of the outstanding Filipino leaders of the Division, Macario FERALTA, Division G-3, Leopoldo RELUNIA, Division Engineer, and Julian CHAVES, CO 3d Battalion, 63d Regiment, were called to Gen CHRISTIE's headquarters before he surrendered. He had them promise that they would not organize guerrillas or guerrilla activity for two months after the date of surrender.

Immediately after surrender FERALTA was in northeast Panay, Braulio VILLASIS (also 61st Division) in Capiz, RELUNIA in eastern Panay, CHAVES in central Panay, Cririlo GARCIA (also of 61st Division) in the northwest, and Governor CONFESOR, pre-war governor of Iloilo Province, in the south. Bands of soldiers roamed the island undirected and independent. Little organization existed.

The guerrilla organization was actually started in August 1942, ten weeks after surrender. FERALTA was chosen leader or assumed command with the tacit approval of all concerned, and was acknowledged commander of the island almost immediately. Throughout the next four months, former army personnel were reassembled, new recruits taken in and the units of the 61st P. A. Division reactivated into a new 61st Division. By November the reorganization was complete; the Japanese were contained in garrisons at San Jose (Antique), Capiz town and Iloilo City. Radio contact had been established with SWPA in late November 1942, and the morale of the people and army was at a high level.

The initial success of the organization was due largely to the amount of equipment available to the guerrillas and the comparatively light Japanese garrison on the island during 1942. This latter allowed the guerrillas freedom of action, ample space and uninterrupted time to organize and train units. Except for disappearance of manufactured and imported items, life on Panay was substantially the same as it had been before the war. The civil government under Tomas CONFESOR was effectively in operation throughout the island. This early good start gave the organization an impetus that has enabled the movement to withstand repeated and ruthless Japanese terror raids since.

Late in 1942, FERALTA heard that guerrilla movements were springing up on Cebu, Negros, etc., and conceived the idea of organizing a Corps. The IVth Philippine Corps was therefore activated by FERALTA with himself in command and RELUNIA then became CO of the 61st Division. By agreement with Col FERTIG, Guerrilla commander on Mindanao, the IVth Philippine Corps was to include Palawan, Panay and the Visayas with the exception of Samar and Leyte. Palawan, Mindoro and Masbate were too remote and thinly populated to have been integrated into the Corps by early 1943, but Negros Occidental was well organized and attempts were being made to extend the authority of the Corps over the Negros Oriental, Cebu and Bohol guerrillas.

In February 1943, FERALTA was officially appointed CO of the 6th Military District only, which included Panay, the Romblons and Guimaras Island. Prior to the war the Philippines had been divided into ten districts for the purpose of recruiting army divisions, and GHQ decided to reactivate these districts in guerrilla organized areas as the simplest means of establishing guerrilla commands and authorities. At the same time FERALTA was appointed CO of the 5th, Col W. W. FERTIG was appointed CO of the 10th Military District (Mindanao and Sulu) and FERALTA so informed. FERALTA was also informed that other district commands would be recognized as information and the situation warranted. This nullified the IVth Philippine Corps.

In December 1942, the Japanese in Iloilo started their first offensive against the guerrillas. The units under CHAVES in southern Iloilo had been exceptionally aggressive and a campaign of burning, looting and killing ensued in that area but the Japanese were not able to break up this part of the guerrilla organization. The people and the army dispersed into the hills and the Japanese ~~occupation~~ occupation of the area was an empty victory. As soon as the Japanese left, the people returned and reorganization of the area commenced. The drive was resumed in southern Iloilo in July 1943 and reached to Sara in the northwest by September. This time the guerrillas suffered a large material loss, especially in Sara since the latter area had been the district headquarters area. The invasion here was so sudden and the Japanese knowledge of the situation so complete that much equipment was lost. This did not affect morale and subsequent reorganization seriously, however. In November and December 1943, activity against the guerrillas was again resumed northwards along the east coast,

attacking the Romblons in December and the Aklan area in northwest Panay in January to February 1944. This was the most through-going and ruthlessly destructive campaign of all. Loss of life and civilian property was exceptionally heavy but this only further embittered the people against the Japanese. The army reassembled and continued on slightly decreased efficiency and power.

When the IVth Philippine Corps was abandoned, two complete staffs were left on Panay: the former Corps staff under PERALTA, and the Division staff under RELUNIA. These staffs were retained and carried on as the District and the Division staffs respectively and much looseness and sluggishness of command followed. The December 1943 to February 1944 Japanese raids demonstrated the inefficiency all too well and alterations in the command were made at once by RELUNIA. In place of the Divisional channels to the regiment, combat teams were organized in March 1944, each combat team semi-autonomous in its own area and controlled by the Division for administrative purposes only. This gave local leaders more authority and greater freedom of action, and was planned to reduce the overhead command organization measurably. There are seven of these combat teams at present. The combat team staffs are given in Part III and the areas of the combat team commands are shown on map following page. As part of the reorganization, the control of intelligence organization was separated from the combat commands. The S-2 units were liaison to combat units but for overall intelligence purposes reported independently through intelligence echelon channels to the district intelligence section.

SECTION II. The PRESENT GUERRILLA SITUATION:

PERALTA: Col Macario PERALTA is a Filipino 30 years old, graduate of the University of the Philippines, law and ROTC, 1935. He took a course at the Philippine Army special school in Baguio and is regular Army officer. In 1941 he was G-3 of the 61st Division on Panay but has had no combat experience. It is believed he was a Captain before surrender; and he was promoted by GHQ to Lt Col 13 January 1943 and Colonel 6 August 1943. He was appointed CO of the 6th Military District 15 February 1943. People who have known him report that he is a strong character, a good organizer, aggressive, sure of himself to the point of being cocky, and a strong nationalist. He tends to be impetuous, lacks experience, is on occasion arbitrary and sometimes lacks follow-up on his ideas. He wants the Panay guerrilla organization to be a purely Filipino accomplishment. Americans who were left free on Panay after the USAFFE surrender were used by the Army to help build up the organization while those who could not contribute were cared for but tolerated as though they were not wanted. PERALTA remains mostly in the mountains with a minimum staff and has very little contact with his troops. He has maintained undisputed leadership of the 6th Military Districts since 1942 but is probably more respected for his force than he is loved by the people who serve under him. PERALTA, RELUNIA, Cirilo GARCIA, JURADO, GUARINIA, etc., are Tagalog (central Luzon peoples) by birth. Being outsiders on Panay, as it were, has enabled these leaders to maintain a certain amount of objectivity in their work. They have no families on Panay and no local axe to grind. Being Tagalogs and

HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINES-RYUKYUS COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

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in permanent positions on Panay, has aroused some jealousy on the part of Visayan leaders, but FERALTA has endeavored to deal fairly with the situation.

Organization: From the beginning FERALTA has exhibited a strong desire to bring a large area under his command, to extend his influence as widely as possible, and to set up an intelligence system that would give him complete detailed coverage. First he assumed leadership of the Panay forces and welded together an articulated organization. Then he planned an organization which would comprehend and coordinate all the Visayan guerrillas - the IVth Philippine Corps. The decision of GHQ to reestablish the military Districts as guerrilla command areas vitiated these plans.

FERALTA had, in the meantime, established contacts with guerrilla leaders on Negros, Leyte and Samar. He did not relinquish these contacts but developed and backed the organizations involved, hoping to assist these leaders to become island commanders indebted to him. On Negros, 7th MD, Salvador AVCEDE was commanding a unit under the influence of FERALTA. After the dissolution of the Corps, FERALTA immediately backed AVCEDE as 7th MD commander. On Leyte, in the 9th MD, Blas MIRANDA was encouraged to resist the efforts of Col KANGLEON to unify the island under his command. Bloodshed resulted and the appointment of a commander on Leyte was delayed considerably. A similar situation eventuated on Samar though not as violent.

FERALTA's activities in the Visayas conflicted with those of other strong leaders. He nevertheless maintained his contacts and the flow of intelligence. Only Cebu and Mindanao defied his attempts to gain contacts and a foothold. To the north in Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro and west of Palawan FERALTA met no opposition or competition. He had undisputed freedom of action in these islands but because of the number of small leaders on these islands the activities of the Panay command became involved in local politics. Shifting support, failure to thoroughly examine facts in disputes and the resultant hasty decisions, often by junior and inexperienced officers, have aggravated the local political situation on these islands. This is treated more fully in SECTION V. At present FERALTA appears to be still attempting to establish his authority and has remained until recently the sole source of intelligence on these areas and their sole encouragement and source of supplies. FERALTA has asked repeatedly for recognition of his authority and has remained until recently the sole source of intelligence on these areas and their sole encouragement and source of supplies. FERALTA has asked repeatedly for recognition of his authority in these areas and failing to receive any answer at all has continued his attempts to organize them independently (see SECTION V).

FERALTA has also attempted to extend his influence into Luzon. Regardless of loss of equipment and personnel, FERALTA has sent parties and radios repeatedly to southern Luzon and the intervening islands. The Masbate radio has only been recently established. Several radios have been lost in attempting to establish positions on Mindoro to the northwest of Panay, but it is not certain that the 6th MD has yet succeeded in developing radio contacts on Luzon itself. In the meantime efforts have been limited only by the amount of supplies available.

One of the purposes of this expansion of influence was development of intelligence coverage. Thus, FERALTA's activity explains itself somewhat in terms of more than sheer ambition.

The home front has not been entirely without fault. In spite of efforts to curb the compadre system, it is still rampant, especially in the accounting and supply system. The compadre system is an institution which allows members of families to assist each other and branches of the family by providing jobs and supplies, etc., at the expense of the organization. Supplies sent from SWPA are reported to have appeared in quantity on the black market and seldom reach the needy or those for whom the supplies were intended.

FERALTA has shown repeatedly his ability to alter plans and organization to meet changed conditions. He tried martial law to maintain law and order on Panay in 1942. He started organization of a corps, and when this was nullified diverted his efforts to the establishment of a sphere of friendly commanders around him and the development of a comprehensive intelligence net. Without encouragement he has been godfather to small otherwise unrepresented guerrilla organizations on other islands. On Panay, itself, when his district-division-regiment organization demonstrated its inefficiency he reorganized the entire command immediately.

At the same time a good deal of this flexibility of organization and plans has been directed towards a policy of self aggrandizement at all odds and under any conditions. The possibility of utilizing to advantage existing organizations and persons in authority has often been disregarded or neglected in the urge to establish his own authority. This is particularly evident in his dealings with the Masbate, Mindoro and Palawan guerrillas (see SECTION V) and his relations with the civil government on Panay.

Intelligence: The products of FERALTA's intelligence network have been vastly detailed and exceptionally voluminous. Monthly reports are prepared from scheduled courier runs from the entire network. These reports include enemy strengths and movement of even individual Japanese soldiers, enemy installations, supply areas, communications, etc. The ability of the agents to secure information is unlimited and their patience in preparing reports on these details seems bottomless. The actual result of these labors has been considerably hampered by want of appreciation of sources and types of intelligence desired. Carefully worded radio directions and printed intelligence guides have raised the level of FERALTA's intelligence activities.

Pedro SERRAN, FERALTA's Intelligence Officer, from 1942 until probably early 1944, laid the foundations of the network. He is about 26 years old, graduate of the University of Philippines in law and was a Lt. in the Intelligence Section of the 61st Division on Panay before surrender. People who have known him report that he has a strong desire for personal glory, is a little heady with his guerrilla rank of Lt Col and his position on the island. There is good indication that his reports are reliable but that his sources are loosely organized and developed, and that little effort is being made to keep the financial accounts of the

intelligence section. In his efforts to expand intelligence sources, SERRAN has mixed in local politics to some extent. His lack of experience and some hasty and ill-considered judgments have confused command and political matters in several localities. Since the reorganization of the command in February 1944, SERRAN has been CO of the 2d Combat Team and Maj Frederico SALCEDO is now the District Intelligence Officer.

Panay intelligence now seems to be largely a matter of special units attached to combat teams which funnel reports through the district headquarters from SWPA. Luzon intelligence penetration has been divided into two sections, one into southwest Luzon via the 2d Combat Team and Masbate the other into southwest Luzon via the 1st Combat Team and Mindoro. The intelligence echelon of the 2d Combat Team is under Capt Alejandro P. HONTIVEROS. HONTIVEROS is about 25 years old, graduate of the Ateneo de Manila College and enjoys a good reputation among his men. He edits reports coming from Luzon agents and forwards them through the districts headquarters to SWPA. There are recent indications of rebellion against FERALTA's authority on Masbate. Whether this has had any effect in the functioning of intelligence net is not known.

The southwest approach to Luzon was under Lt Col Enrique JURADO. JURADO was former Chief of the Offshore Patrol, Philippine Army. He had ability but did not get along well with people and was recently killed in a dispute with guerrillas in central eastern Mindoro. His headquarters was located on the eastern coast of Mindoro and forwarded intelligence through the 1st Combat Teams to the district headquarters. The effect of his death on the intelligence system is not known yet. Some details of these two nets are described in SECTION VI.

Combat: The efficiency of the combat side of the organization has been much vaunted. The units have engaged in frequent ambushes but they have not participated in pitched battles with the enemy. Rather the guerrillas have scattered into the hills on the approach of a large force, leaving the civilians unprotected and at the mercy of the Japanese. This has not helped relations with the civilians but has retained the army almost intact. The army lives off the land, securing supplies locally by commandeering or purchase, and often their local activities have also aroused the animosity of the civilians.

The Panay guerrilla strength, including Masbate was approximately 350 tons of supplies, but no trained personnel other than weather observers have been sent to Panay.

Besides graft and sometimes strained relations with the civilians the compadre system by increasing overhead personnel and depleting supplies seriously has further reduced the effectiveness of the organization, destroyed discipline almost entirely and at times immobilized the army. The army discipline is further limited by lack of good, strong leaders right down the line. There are several outstanding leaders as BELUNIA, CHAVES and GRASPARI but they lack men under them to follow up their lead and enforce discipline among the men.

The potential of the army remains good. The morale of the men has been kept up by local successes, the general war situation and the support

given them by SWPA. The men are eager to serve their country, wanting only adequate training, leadership and guidance. It must be remembered that this organization has been built up from the remnants of a partially trained division, and without outside assistance except for supplies. The Achievement of this army then becomes remarkable.

At present the guerrillas are endeavoring to hold the Japanese into their garrisons at San Jose (Antique), Santa Barbara, Iloilo City and Capiz town. To date the Japanese have actually withdrawn from most outlying posts and are more or less confined to their garrisons mentioned above.

SECTION III. DISTRICT AND COMBAT TEAM STAFFS:

Headquarters, 6th Military District:

East Central Antique Headquarters (First Echelon):	
District Commander	Col Macario PERALTA, PA
Executive Officer & C/S	Lt Col Leopoldo R. RELUNIA, PA
Adjutant	Lt Col F MONTINOLA
G-1	Maj Celestino S MONROY
G-2	Maj Frederico L SALCEDO
Signal Officer	Lt Col Amos M. FRANCIA, PA

G-2

Eastern Panay Headquarters (Second Echelon)	
Commanding Officer	Lt Col Leopoldo R RELUNIA, PA (2D in command, Panay)
Executive Officer	Maj Eriberto T. CASTILLO
Asst Executive Officer	Lt Col JULIAN C. CHAVES, PA
District QM	Lt Col William F. GEMPERLE (Now in Australia)

Total Headquarters strength is 25 officers and 222 EM.

The first Echelon is a small group with Col PERALTA. This echelon devotes its time generally to policy and outside relationships. The Second Echelon is the tactical headquarters on Panay, with all service units, etc., attached to it.

RELUNIA: Graduate of the University of the Philippines, 1935. Duty on Panay in November 1941, as 61st Division Engineer. Strong, aggressive, fearless personality, maintains personal contacts with troops and operated in forward areas. Responsible for reorganization of 61st Division in March 1944. Demands orders be followed and takes strong action against non-compliance or making false reports. No personal or nationalistic desires, spends all time possible on training and keeping organization intact for final assault on the Japanese. Well liked by his officers and men. Reported by evacuees to be the brain and backbone of the 6th MD.

Present duties, Executive Officer and Chief of Staff, Hq, 6th MD.

MONTINOLA: Lt Col, AG, was in PC before the war, has seen action against Moros in Mindanao; was captain, PA, at time of surrender. Present duties, ~~Executive Officer~~ Adjutant, 6th MD.

FRANCIA: Lt Col, formerly assigned to ground communications, 64th Regiment Evacuees report him to be a poor organizer and that equipment has been lost frequently because of improper handling and security measures.

Present duties, District Signal Officer.

CASTILLO: Maj, was acting CO, 66th Infantry Regiment; had 3 years ROTC National University of Manila and has been reported to be dependable.

CHAVES: Formerly PA reserve officer and school supervisor, Calinog, Iloilo before the war. He was Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 63d Regiment, 61st Division, which was the only battalion to offer resistance to initial Japanese landing on Panay. He is reported to be pro-American, blunt, outspoken, and one of the best officers in Panay; desired no personal glory.

Present duties, Assistant Executive Officer, Headquarters, 6th MD; and Co Commanding Officer, 63d Combat Team.

GEMPERLE: 46 year old native of Switzerland, now citizen of the Philippines. Lt Col in both USAFFE and guerrilla forces. Before the war was President of Surigao Consolidated Mines (gold) and Manager of Loppel & Co., Iloilo branch. Reputation very high in Panay and he can be trusted. Present position, head of QM and FD. (now in Australia).

First Combat Team, Northwest Panay:

Headquarters, Liberatad, Antique:

Commanding Officer	Lt Col Cirilo B. GARCIA, O-1454, PA
Executive Officer	Capt H. V. RUIZ, 60010*
Adjutant S-1	2d Lt Torribio CRESPO, O-888253, AUS
S-2	Capt Peter A. GARRUCHO, 60024*
S-3	Capt P. M. YAP, O-1645, PA
S-4	Capt Jose P. LAYO

*Serial numbers beginning with "6" but ~~are not~~ not preceded by "0" are probably guerrilla serial numbers but there is no confirmation of this.

First Combat Team composed of companies instead of Battalions; the known companies:

"B" Co	Commanding Officer	1st Lt L HABLERO
"F" Co	Commanding Officer	Capt ESTICKO
"I" Co	Commanding Officer	Capt VILLASUR
"K" Co	Commanding Officer	Capt Silverio CADIAO
	Executive Officer	3d Lt Felipe ESTORES

Attached Units:

Romblon, Marinduque, Mindoro, Palawan. (See Section V)

Strength:	132 Officers and 2,166 EM
Arms:	2,000 of all types
Ammunition:	151,000 rounds

GARCIA: Lt Col in guerrilla forces and CO of the First Combat

Team, and is responsible for submarine rendezvous areas. He is Tagalog by birth. Before the war he was reported to be Captain in the Philippine Army; formerly Liaison Officer, 41st Division, Tayabas. Arrived on Panay from Bataan in February 1942. He is strict, unafraid, tactless and not generally liked by the Filipinos; he is ambitious, jealous of his authority and would not cooperate with Americans who escaped capture on Panay in 1942 and were under FERALTA's command. One report states GARCIA had organized a powerful guerrilla band in northwest Panay before FERALTA became acknowledged commander of the island, and because of this power he maintains considerable independence under FERALTA's command. His character does not seem to be above reproach. There have been many reports of misappropriation of supplies received from SWPA by submarine and in one instance, 30 tons of supplies were lost due to poor organization and planning for the shipment.

Second Combat Team, Northeastern Panay and Masbate:

Headquarters, Amayong, San Dionisio, Iloilo:	
Commanding Officer	Lt Col Pedro SERRAN, PA
Executive Officer	Capt Jose R PORTUS, 60015
Adjutant & S-1	2d Lt Sandho Y INSERTO, 62447
S-2	1st Lt Roberto HINCLAN, 60080
S-3	Capt Rogelio L ARANADOR
S-4	2d Lt Lucio P MENDOZA

First Battalion, Alapasco, San Dionisio, Iloilo:	
Commanding Officer	Capt Leon GAMBOA, 62048

Second Battalion, Tagaytay, Masbate: (See Section V for further information)

Commanding Officer	Maj Vicente A TANSIONGCO
Executive Officer	Capt Manuel DOMATO, PA
S-1	1st Lt Resurreccion ORTIGAS
S-2	1st Lt Clemente V MAJAR
S-3	1st Lt Vito ZARAGOSA
S-4	1st Lt Felifranco AVENIDO

Intelligence Echelon:	
Commanding Officer	Capt Alejandro P HONTIVEROS, 60141

Strength:	Officers	EM
Headquarters	24	251
1st Bn	22	385
2d Bn (Masbate)	59	943
Miscellaneous	<u>43</u>	<u>455</u>
Total	148	2,035

The second Combat Team has been combined with the 64th Combat Team, Masbate now being independent.

Third Combat Team, West Central Iloilo Province:

Headquarters:

Commanding Officer	Maj P. E. OSMAN
Executive Officer	Capt Salvador BAGUAY
Adjutant	Capt Sofronio ERASILAO, 62110
S-2	2D Lt Leon GELLADA, 62457
S-3	1st Lt Avelino E DAMIAN
S-4	3D Lt Diosdadio C CHAVES

Strength: (4 companies)	73 Officers, 1,340 EM
Arms:	814 of all types
Ammunitions:	85,000 rounds

63D Combat Team, Southern Iloilo Province:

Headquarters, Mt Tigatay Area, Iloilo Province:

Commanding Officer	Lt Col Julian C CHAVES, PA
Executive Officer	Maj A CORNELIO
Adjutant	Maj Pablo J BRILLANTES
S-2	Capt Patricio M MIGUEL, 63260
S-3	Capt Isauro OCTAVIANO
S-4	Capt Antonio A ALIGAN

First Battalion:

Commanding Officer	Maj Francisco OFFEMARIA, PA
Executive Officer	Capt Reynaldo SORONGAN
S-2	2D Lt Napoleon GOTICO
S-3	1st Lt A P JURADO
S-4	1st Lt Salvador ELICANOL

Second Battalion, Maasin, Iloilo Province:

Commanding Officer	Capt Ernesto P GOLEZ
Executive Officer	Capt Primo DOREGA
S-2	1st Lt Jose V AVENTINO
S-3	2D Lt Eugenio SIRUGA
S-4	2D Lt B A GRIC

Third Battalion:

Commanding Officer	Maj Epifanio CABALFIN, 62037
Executive Officer	1st Lt P SAAVEDRA
S-2	1st Lt Manuel P GOLEZ
S-3	2D Lt G G GENGUYON
S-4	1st Lt Teodoro CLARIN

Strength	Officers	EM
Headquarters	45	611
1st Bn	32	681
2D Bn	29	550
3D Bn	35	731
Miscellaneous	<u>49</u>	<u>685</u>
Total	190	3,258

Arms:	1,400 of all types
Ammunition:	37,000 rounds

OFFEMARIA: Major, formerly Lt PC and Executive Officer to CHAVES. One of the best fighters on the island and keeps above politics and personal ambition in the prosecution of the war and seems to have lost some favor with FERALTA as a result of his complaints about political activities of the 6th MD.

Present duties, possibly Inspector General of the 6th MD, or CO, 1st Battalion, 3D Combat Team.

64th Combat Team, East Central Iloilo and Capiz Province:

Headquarters:

Commanding Officer	Lt Col Leopoldo RELUNIA, PA
Executive Officer	Maj Tomas C LOPEZ
Adjutant	Capt Jose L CASTIGADOR
S-3	Capt Domingo R MALE
S-4	Maj Pedro Y Yatar, 62012

-- Company:

Commanding Officer	Capt Mariano ROELES
Executive Officer	Capt Fidel D DE ASIS

-- Company:

Commanding Officer	Maj Pedro Y Yatar
Executive Officer	Jose B BARRERA
S-2	2D Lt Bautista P SIAOTONG

-- Company:

Commanding Officer	Maj Inocencio FAITARIA
S-2	1st Lt Pedro ORTEGAS

Strength of the 64th Combat Team 282 officers and 4,055 enlisted men; armament, unknown. Little information has been received from or about the area.

65th Combat Team, Southern Antique Province and Palawan:

Headquarters, Lanaan, Antique:

Commanding Officer	Lt Col Braulio F VILLASIS, G-1373, PA
Executive Officer	Maj Marcial CAPINPIN, 62010
Adjutant	Capt Gil M MIJARES, 62101
S-2	Capt Ireneo H JAMORA, 62226
S-3	2D Lt Cornelio P RAVENA, 62523
S-4	Capt Joaquin V ORREGOSO, 62167

First Battalion, Tibuao, Antique:

Commanding Officer	Capt Felipe ALFAS, 62071
Executive Officer	Capt Luis U GOLEZ, 62116
S-2	1st Lt Benjamin M VALENTE, 62464
S-3	2D Lt Benjamin M VALENTE, 62464
S-4	3D Lt Manuel MERENAA

Second Battalion, San Remigio, Antique:

Commanding Officer	Maj Adriano SAMULDE, 62035
Executive Officer	Capt Gabriel CHECA, 62243

A-2 2D Lt Vicente R ACSAY
 S-3 2D Lt Gregorio L ALAVA, 62382

Third Battalion, Barbasa, Antique:
 Commanding Officer Maj Ceferino S CARRERON, O-1791
 Executive Officer 1st Lt Roberto CARBONELLA, 62161
 S-2 2D Lt Baniyes O NACIONALES
 S-3 3D Lt Jose CABALLERO, 62566
 S-4 2D Lt Conrade L METES, 62674

Strength:	Officers	EM
Headquarters	36	369
1st Bn	20	351
2D Bn	26	449
3D Bn	30	539
Miscellaneous	<u>25</u>	<u>367</u>
Total	139	2,075

Arms: 1,000 of all types
 Ammunition: 333,000 rounds

VILLASIS: Was Lt FC, good organizer and soldier but believed by his subordinates to be jittery and thinks the Japs supermen.
 Present duties, Executive Officer, 65th Combat Team.

CAPINFIN: Major, son of Gen CAPINFIN, reported to be a good fighter but very young. Formerly stationed at Ft McKinley.
 Present duties, Executive Officer, 65th Combat Team.

66th Combat Team, Northern and Western Capiz Province:

Headquarters:
 Commanding Officer Lt Col V V GRASPARIL, 62002
 Executive Officer Maj Gumaliel MANIKAN
 S-2 1st Lt G RIZALINO, 62426

First Battalion:
 Commanding Officer ~~62002~~ Maj Esteban ARANADA
 Executive Officer Capt Dumalao L PANTALEON
 S-3 3D Lt Leopoldo BERNALES

Second Battalion:
 Commanding Officer Capt Jesus M JIZMUNDO
 Executive Officer 1st Lt Jose M F BELLO
 S-2 1st Lt Dominador FERNANDEZ

Third Battalion:
 Commanding Officer Maj Samuel CFLAGATA, 62021
 Executive Officer Capt Cirilo HORTILLOSA
 S-2 3D Lt Mariano MALICUDIO

Strength: 192 officers; 3,321 enlisted men
 Arms 800 of all types (June 1944)
 Ammunition 160,000 rounds (June 1944)

GRASPARIL: Pre-war Sgt FC, who organized an independent guerrilla band in Antique in August 1942, joined FERALTA's command and then appointed CO 66th Regt. Reported to be brave tough fighter, pro-American and a friendly personality. Present duties, CO, 66th Combat Team.

<u>SUMMARY</u>		Total Personnel	
		<u>OFF</u>	<u>HM</u>
6th MD Hq	Col Macario FERALTA, PA	25	222
1st Combat Team	CO Lt Col Cirilo B GARCIA, PA	132	2,166
2D Combat Team	CO Lt Col Pedro SERRAN, PA	148	2,035
3D Combat Team	CO Maj FB OSMAN	73	1,340
63D Combat Team	CO Lt Col Julian C CHAVES, PA	190	3,258
64th Combat Team	CO LT Col Leopoldo RELUNIA, PA	282	4,055
65th Combat Team	CO Lt Col Braulio F VILLASIS, PA	139	2,075
66th Combat Team	CO Lt Col V V GRASPARIL, PA	192	3,321

The above figures are dated September - October 1944

As of the end of October 1944 the 6th MD reported having the following arms and ammunition:

<u>ARMS</u>		<u>AMMUNITION</u>	
81 mm mortars	10	81mm mortars	449
Cal 50 MG (unserviceable)	10	Cal 50 MG	3,194
Cal 30 MG	18	Cal 30 MG	158,519
Cal 45 TSMG	576	Japanese mortars	7
BAR & MR, Cal 30	156	Cal 45	34,560
Japanese mortars	2	Cal 30 Enfield	252,900
Japanese MR, Cal 25	2	Cal 25	1,457
Cal 30 Enfield Carbine	3872	Shotgun	6,495
Cal 30 Enfield	3,012	sidearms	1,086
Cal 30 MI Garand	21	hand grenades	2,431
Cal 30 Springfield	7	Rifle grenades	412
Cal 25 Jap Rifles	30	Cal 30, MI	271,040
Cal 22 Rifles	14		
Shotguns	71		
Sidearms (var Cal)	501		
Cal 25 Japanese MG	1		
77mm Gun	1		

Arms sent by SWPA were mainly carbines, assorted machine guns, tommy guns, a few mortars, etc. Early in November 1944 reserved stocks of ammunition were being expended freely and ammunition stocks as given above have probably been considerably reduced.

SECTION IV. THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT ON FREE PANAY:

Panay is divided into three provinces, Antique, Capiz and Iloilo, each with a separate governor before the war. After the Japanese invasion, the governors of Antique and Capiz surrendered; Tomas CONFESOR, Governor of Iloilo, refused to surrender and went to the hills with the guerrillas.

In early 1943 he was officially recognized as Governor of Panay and the Romblons.

CONFESOR is 45-60 years of age, native of Iloilo Province and active in government affairs for many years. He is impetuous and was known as the "stormy petrel" of Philippine politics because of this trait alone. Since 1942, he has maintained a free government on Panay without compromise to the guerrilla army, even under considerable pressure. His support of the democratic cause has become a password in Filipino minds. In January 1943, Fermin CARAM, puppet governor of Iloilo, wrote CONFESOR a long letter in which he pointed out that resistance and hardship were foolish and needless. CONFESOR's long reply was reproduced and circulated widely in Manila:

" . . . I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders, in this their darkest hour, to teach our people to avoid sufferings and hardships at the sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life. On the contrary, it is their bounden duty and responsibility to inspire our people to willingly undergo any kind of difficulties and sacrifices for the sake of noble principles, ~~and to maintain their patriotic ardor, the people should be inspired to be brave and courageous under all kinds of hardships and difficulties in defense of what they consider righteous and just. We shall never win or deserve the esteem and respect of other nations if we lack principles, and if we do, we do not possess the courage and valour to defend these principles at any cost . . . "~~

His resistance and continued freedom have been an inspiration to the people of Panay. His popularity has sent the Japanese hunting on numerous campaigns to capture him. That they have not succeeded has been a further encouragement to the people to resist the Japanese.

CONFESOR was in southern Iloilo during most of 1942. He reorganized the civil government there and apparently was responsible for restoring most of the functions of civil government throughout Panay at that time. He has always kept a radio and distributed news to the people and since communications were slow, deputy governors have been appointed with full power to administer their respective areas. The reorganization was complete by late 1942.

As soon as reorganization commenced, the army and the civil government began competing for recruits, arms and supplies. The civil government maintained a local police force and messenger service known as the Provincial Guards. CONFESOR set about reorganizing this body in mid-1942. This rivalry opened a controversy between the army and the civil government that has underlain all disputes since. PERALTA is young and strong headed; CONFESOR set and impetuous; and neither has conceded a point to the other since the dispute began. Both are equally to blame for the

prolongation of the controversy. Other subjects of dispute were martial law proposed by FERALTA in 1942, and the printing of money.

The Provincial Guards have been a constant bone of contention with FERALTA. The guards are armed and they represented a potential threat to his organization. FERALTA has several times claimed that the guards were not required since the army did the policing. He claimed that employment of personnel in the guards lessened the effective potential strength of the army and of the organization producing for the army. CONFESOR has nonetheless maintained the guards and several times has owed his life to their activity against approaching enemy patrols.

Recruiting personnel for the guards, guarding against infiltration, army commandeering, guarding rights of the people, printing money and maintenance of an armed force outside the army are the main issues of the dispute. Other issues have arisen mostly as a result of animosity already created. CONFESOR has maintained his position without thought of compromise even when a concession would have been beneficial.

CONFESOR has also championed the rights of the people against the inroads of the army, has championed them when the army did them wrong, and has attempted to organize food and supply programs to satisfy the demands of the people and the army. The civil government has transported food from the grower to the nearest army units. Money has been advanced for the development of crops. Taxes have been collected by local civil treasurers and 3/4 of the proceeds turned over to the army.

SECTION V. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INFLUENCE ON MASBATE, MARINDUQUE, ROMBLON, MINDORO, AND PALAWAN:

Masbate:

Information on Masbate has come largely from Col FERALTA on PANAY who controls the island, and may be biased. There were three guerrilla groups originally, led by ROSEL, Capt DONATO and Capt VILLOJADA. DONATO was a Lt in the USAFFE and founded his organization in October 1942. The leaders of the three groups combined into a bat talion. Later VILLOJADA seems to have become powerful and overthrown DONATO's control and then TANSIONGCO was sent from Panay by FERALTA in July 1943 to install himself as the island commander. ROSEL has not been heard of for some time.

The VILLOJADA group of "The army of the Free People", as it was called, was located mainly in the Milagros area and the peninsula to the southwest and was reported to have been a bandit army outfit of about 400 half-armed civilians with a socialistic civil government under the leadership of Juan VILLOJADA. Later when the organization was dispersed, VILLOJADA is said to have fled to Luzon to seek help from a parent communistic society. It appears that "bandit" refugees from Samar and Capiz Province, Panay, together with citizens of Masbate formed the membership of the group. By mid-1942 VILLOJADA seems to have been influencing or controlling most of the guerrilla activity on the island and was definitely anti-6th MD, and is reported to have received cooperation from the EC's

He took from the wealthy and gave to the poor, especially cattle and land, and controlled all sailboat communications on the south coast. He also printed more than P10,000 paper money. This money was forced on the people and the Philippine Treasury Notes received in exchange are said to have amounted to P6,225 which VILLAGADA is reported to have kept himself.

Three brothers were the backbone of the unit, Juan VILLAGADA, leading, and the two other brothers leading two of the five smaller groups operating under VILLAGADA. The brothers were actually Jesus, Mariano and Isaac AZACARRA BUT went under the assumed names of Capt Juan VILLAGADA, Lt Roland BUSTAMANTE and Lt Nicolas FERMIN respectively. The total strength of the guerrilla unit was reported to have been 400 with about 60-70 arms.

TANSIONGCO came from Panay in July 1943 to establish 6th MD AUTHORITY on Masbate with a Composite Company which was to include guerrilla forces to be organized. The company, under the command of Capt. Leon GAMBOA, left Panay in September 1943 with 180 men, and landed on SW Masbate. Between September and November, TANSIONGCO reorganized his scattered men and then attached them to the Composite Company. Capt GAMBOA split the company into three groups and the parties proceeded north along the peninsula to the Milagros area, destroying VILLAGADA's boats, killing and capturing VILLAGADA's officers and men as they went. By February 1944, the VILLAGADA brothers and a small group retreated to the hills north of Milagros. Juan then fled to Luzon and was captured with his son, Estacilito SANTIAGO (alias) and reported killed by the Japanese in Lucena, Tayabas. The others brothers were killed on Masbate shortly after. The Panay elements of the Composite Company then returned to Panay leaving Masbate under command of TANSIONGCO and the 6th MD.

PERALTA assigned Masbate to the 2d Combat Team on northeastern Panay under Lt Col Pedro SERRAN. This team was composed of two battalions of which Masbate was the second. The organization and personnel of the Masbate Battalion in March 1944 is as follows:

Headquarters, Tagaytay, Masbat:

Commanding Officer	Maj Vicente A Tansiongco
Executive Officer	Capt Manuel DOMATO
S-1	1st Lt Resurreccion OPTIGAS
S-2	1st Lt Clemente V BAJAR
S-3	1st Lt Vito SARAGOSA
S-4	1st Lt Felifranco AVENIDO

"E" Company, Southeastern Masbate:

Commanding Officer	Capt Tomas MEDINA
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"F" Company, Central Masbate and Ticao Island:

Commanding Officer	Lt Wilfredo S BANAAS
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"G" Company, Northwest Masbate and Burias Island:

Commanding Officer	Lt Felix SALVACION
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"H" Company, Southwestern Masbate:

Commanding Officer	Capt Francisco YUSON (Also CO, Masbate Concentration Camp)
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In August 1944, the strength of the 2D Bn, 2D Combat Team, was 59

officers and 943 enlisted men.

It was important to FERALTA to have Masbate under his control. For intelligence purposes in southeastern Luzon and the eastern Visayas, Masbate was a vital link. With TANSIONGCO in command, weekly courier has been operating between the Bicol, Samar, Lerte, Masbate and Panay. In mid-1944, a radio was established, probably in the vicinity of the Battalion Headquarters to speed up flow of intelligence through Masbate. FERALTA was never officially authorized to assume command of Masbate nor has official disapproval been voiced. No other guerrilla leader has taken an interest in the area and FERALTA has acted in his own interests and has undisputed control over the area.

On 23 January 1944, TANSIONGCO and several of his leaders, including GAMBOA from Panay, met Masbate puppet government officials and representative from ~~the Japanese garrison~~ the Japanese garrison and made an agreement that the Japanese and the BC would have complete freedom of movement between garrisons while the guerrillas would have freedom of movement within the garrisons. This agreement was to hold until VILLAJADA was liquidated, when there would be a new conference; other reports indicate that TANSIONGCO would then surrender to the Japanese. This is an interesting sidelight on the enemy pacification program. It likewise shows the weakness of Masbate guerrillas.

In early 1944, Maj LAFUS, a guerrilla leader in Sorsogon, fled to Ticao Island as a result of a dispute with a rival leader there. Shortly after, in April 1944, a Japanese patrol went to Ticao Island possibly to capture LAFUS and his followers. LAFUS, as well as a coastwatcher party on Ticao Island moved to Masbate to escape the Japanese patrol. The Japanese patrol continued to Masbate, LAFUS escaped, and has since apparently returned to Sorsogon. The Japanese patrol surprised the coastwatcher party, however, and captured some of the party members, Armando SANTIAGO, and some of the equipment, and dispersed the other members of the party. Some of the equipment was saved by Lt ABAN of the Masbate guerrillas and used by him.

The same SANTIAGO is reported to have promised Capt DONATO supplies and GHQ recognition as island commander. DONATO undoubtedly retained a grudge for having been supplanted as leader by TANSIONGCO. He had further had previous negotiations with Capt ZARAT in the Bicol over the matter of Masbate command. DONATO gathered his men together in July 1944 and drew up a declaration, separating them from the 6th MD and TANSIONGCO's command. Guerrilla activities since continue under DONATO. BCs and Reservists joined this group, civilians were inducted, and DONATO claims that in October 1944 his Masbate Battalion became a Regiment and a free civil government established. Both are independent of FERALTA's influence. TANSIONGCO is now on Panay with guerrillas there and Masbate is no longer part of the 6th MD organization.

MARINDUQUE:

When the Japanese landed on Marinduque on 7 July 1942, Lt Sofronio

T UNTALAN, the PC commander at Poac, went to the hills with his men. He surrendered to the Japanese shortly afterwards and left the island 20 July 1942. Sgt Charles H HICKOK (American radio technician) was on the island at the time of surrender and in September 1942 organized the loyal Filipinos into a guerrilla band of about 30 men. About November 1942, contact was made with FERALTA, Commander of the 6th MD, who sent instructions on organization and intelligence and later sent Filipino officers, among whom was Capt A CUDILLA, to take command. HICKOK left in February 1943 and went to Tablas Island with the intelligence center there. He returned to Marinduque in April 1943 at the request of Lt Col JURADO to organize the guerrilla organization. Lt Col Enrique JURADO was then Romblons commander and FERALTA's Luzon intelligence penetration chief. He was anxious to improve the Marinduque situation so that step-overs could be arranged for agents coming to and from Luzon and Panay.

When HICKOK returned to Marinduque, he found that UNTALAN had left the Japanese and returned to the hills. He had probably seen FERALTAIN the meantime, since he claimed on January 1943 to be CO M Company, 60 th Inf IV Philippine Corps and was made Captain, February 1943. He made trouble and HICKOK left after a short stay. UNTALAN is still commander of the island under Lt Col GARCIA of Panay. HICKOK reports UNTALAN to be not very intelligent and not reliable under pressure. The present organization numbers about 400 men divided into four companies with some 90 arms and 5,000 rounds of ammunition. It is able to do little harm to Japanese or puppet activities and installations on the island.

In January 1944, UNTALAN met the Junior PC of Marinduque, Lt Rudolph TECSON. They agreed not to molest each other and TECSON IS believed to be cooperating with the guerrillas.

Staff of Marinduque guerrillas under UNTALAN in March 1944:	
Commanding Officer	Capt Sofronio T UNTALAN
Executive Officer	2 nd Lt Juan B CARVAO
CC "A" Company	3D Lt Arturo MAMRIL
CC "B" Company	Santiago OLIVES
CC "C" Company	3D Lt Bernardo SARILE
CC "D" Company	3D Lt Paterno CONSTANTINO

Reprts of March - April 1944 indicate that UNTALAN may have taken over command of the Romblons.

ROMBLON:

Guerrilla organization in the Romblons has been weak and relatively unimportant. It has been under the control of the 6th MD in Panay since 1942, and its chief importance has been as a base for intelligence penetration into Luzon, during most of 1943.

Capt Constantino C RAVAL, a former Captain of the Philippine Merchant Marine and at one time in the employ of the Army Transport Service, is known to have been working for the 61st Division, PA, USAFFE, on Panay as early as March 1942, and in November 1942 organized the first guerrilla organization

in the Romblons, probably for FERALTA, who was at that time developing his Panay organization. In February 1943 FERALTA removed RAVAL from the Romblon Command for incompetence, replacing him with Lt Col (then Major) Enrique L JURADO. His further movements are not exactly known, but it is certain that he has since acted as an intelligence agent for FERALTA in Manila. He was reported shot in an affray at the Malacanang Palace in mid-1944.

JURADO was placed in command of the Romblons by FERALTA in February 1943, chiefly for the purpose of maintaining a base and radio message center for FERALTA's intelligence channels to southern Luzon. Capt Mario GUARINIA, a former attorney of Guimbal, may have had pretensions to the guerrilla command; at any rate he was JURADO's executive after February 1943. The organization is reported to have been weak and inefficient; the officers were lazy, there was considerable commandeering of goods from civilians, and loose control of officers and men from the top. GUARINIA is reported to be a politician closely allied with Lt Col GARCIA in northern Panay and concerned mostly with his own personal power and profit; he did not work together well with JURADO. American civilian and military refugees were inducted, and the organization was expanded to include SIBUYAN Island in a more closely knit unit than before. Strength about 700 in July 1943.

The Japanese anti-guerrilla raids on Panay reached Tablas in late November 1943 and Sibuyan a week or so later. Many of the Romblon guerrillas surrendered at this time; JURADO was able to escape to Mindoro with others. The guerrilla organization was effectively broken up for the time being; equipment captured or destroyed. JURADO was made commander of Mindoro in March 1944, and moved his intelligence center there. GUARINIA remained as commander in the Romblons, now attached to the 1st Combat Team commanded by Lt Col GARCIA in Panay.

Reports of March and April 1944 indicate that Capt UNTALAN, commander of the Marinduque guerrillas, may have taken over the Romblon command, also under GARCIA. Guarinia was to have gone to GARCIA on Panay, but is known to have surrendered to puppet officials on Sibuyan about this time and gone to Manila. His motive for this is not known.

Strength of remaining unit not known; arms, 13 of all types in July 1944.

MINDORO:

There was no USAFFE garrison on Mindoro at the outbreak of the war. With the first Japanese landings on the island, most of the small Philippine Constabulary garrisons fled to the mountains with what arms they could muster, and carried on guerrilla resistance. Some informal civilian guerrilla bands also arose, and an influx of civilian volunteers with additional arms strengthened the constabulary units. Weaker organizations merged with more powerful ones, and by late 1942, several moderately strong bands had emerged.

Many reports on guerrilla activities in Mindoro are unclear or ambiguous, but it is clear the conflicting ambitions of guerrilla leaders have led to increasing friction between groups and have prevented effective unification of command. In an effort to extend their powers, guerrilla leaders have inducted civilians to a point where they have been unable to arm, feed or pay them. As a result the civilian population has carried a heavy

burden; in some areas willingly, in others under compulsion.

Col FERALTA, commander of the 6th MD on Fanny, has treated Mindoro as one of his spheres of influence, with neither the approval nor disapproval of SWPA. Local representatives of GHQ have also had limited effect on the development of guerrilla organizations on the island.

GARCIA Group: In the latter part of 1942, Jose GARCIA, a civilian, organized a guerrilla group of about 100 men in the vicinity of Bulalacao. The band was moderately active until May 1943, when a report indicated it had been partially disbanded. In July 1943, GARCIA placed all of the force left to him under the command of Capt Esteban P. BELONCIO.

ROMERIUS Group: A resident of Tamaraw Junction named ROMERIUS, possibly the former Chief of Police of San Jose, is reported to have organized a guerrilla band in mid-1942, and to have destroyed considerable enemy equipment and supplies around San Jose. He is described as an expert shot, speaks English, Spanish and the dialect, and knows Mindoro well.

RUFFY Group: Maj Jose M RUFFY, a veteran of 26 years service with the Philippine Constabulary and pre-war Senior Inspector of the Romblon Mindoro District, organized a guerrilla force of 60 men, apparently all constabulary troops, shortly after the surrender. Headquarters was near Pinamalayan and the unit was reinforced with civilian volunteers to a strength of 250, about half armed. There was considerable friction between this group and the BELONCIO group, the only other guerrilla force of Mindoro of comparable size.

In November 1942, Maj Lawrence H. PHILLIPS arrived in Mindoro on a special mission from SWPA. Both RUFFY and BELONCIO looked to him for a solution of their differences and PHILLIPS, acting on his own judgment, brought the two leaders together for a conference at Mamburao in December 1943. After three days negotiations, both leaders agreed to a provisional organization in which RUFFY was named Commanding Officer of guerrilla forces on Mindoro, with Beloncio as the Executive Officer.

As leader of the combined Mindoro guerrillas, RUFFY established headquarters near Naujan and immediately reorganized the units into a Bolo Battalion of four companies at war strength. As of February 1944 there were 23 officers and 600 men. With BELONCIO as the Executive Officer, RUFFY appointed Lt Gomerindo de la TORRE as Battalion S-2; Lt Prudente Mar Francisco in the dual capacity of S-3 and Commander of B Company; Lt DAGUINO as Signal Officer; Lts VASQUEZ, FORTUS, ANORQUEVO, and PALUSTRE were assigned as company officers and apparently shifted from one company to another at various intervals. Local civilian governments were established in guerrilla controlled areas, and in the more populated districts, volunteer Home Guards were formed. Liaison was maintained with Maj PHILLIPS, who gave the guerrillas all the assistance he could.

In March 1944, Maj PHILLIPS and several members of his party were ambushed by the Japanese and killed and the balance dispersed. The influence which unified the guerrillas no longer existed. Old differences between

BELONCIO and RUFFY immediately flaired up, and the old Battalion collapsed. BELONCIO, who had been in close contact with agents from Panay, broke away from RUFFY. Taking with him Companies A, C, and D, and put the units under the control of the 8th MD on Panay.

RUFFY with only Company B under his control fled to the forests of central Mindoro. Many of his battalion and staff officers remained loyal and accompanied him. To strengthen his depleted force, RUFFY set out to induct civilians, and it is believed that his force now numbers 3/400 men still in central Mindoro.

BELONCIO Group: In 1942, Capt Esteban P. BELONCIO organized a band of 250 civilians with about 150 arms into an aggressive guerrilla organization in the area around Lake Nujan. As outlined above, he joined forces with Maj RUFFY in December 1943 and acted as Executive Officer of the Bolo Battalion until after PHILLIPS' death in March 1944. BELONCIO had been in touch with agents from Panay and when he broke with RUFFY at the end of March 1944, his move was supported by Lt Col JURADO, who at that time was FERALTA's intelligence representative on Mindoro. BELONCIO remains as principal guerrilla commander on Mindoro.

Lt Col JURADO: Lt Col Enrique L. JURADO was a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, Class of 1934, and before the war was an officer in the Philippine Off Shore Patrol. He had joined the Panay guerrillas after the surrender and late in 1943 or early 1944 was sent to Mindoro by Col FERALTA, to establish observation posts covering Verde Island Passage and to establish a base for intelligence penetration into southern Luzon. To provide protection for these operations, FERALTA assigned a special unit from the first Combat Team in northwest Panay to JURADO. FERALTA has always had an interest in Mindoro and may have intended JURADO to coordinate and absorb the Mindoro guerrillas into this combat team; it is known that in May 1943 JURADO, while acting for FERALTA in the Romblons, made some attempts to organize the guerrillas on Mindoro for Col FERALTA. Some sources report that he was not well liked. He was killed in a fight with local guerrillas on Mindoro, November 1944.

JURADO established his intelligence base and coastwatcher posts successfully, receiving some assistance from BELONCIO. After PHILLIPS' death and the collapse of the combined Mindoro command, JURADO entered into Mindoro guerrilla affairs via BELONCIO: FERALTA promoted him to Lt Col and put him in charge of the Mindoro guerrillas for the 8th MD late in March 1944. RUFFY objected to JURADO's mixing into guerrilla affairs and ordered JURADO to leave Mindoro. JURADO then appointed BELONCIO commander of the Mindoro guerrilla forces and the Bolo Battalion dissolved, with 3 companies following BELONCIO and one following RUFFY. The bulk of the former Bolo Battalion was then controlled by JURADO through Beloncio as Commanding Officer, a new company was being formed to replace Maj RUFFY's B Company. It is believed that the strength of the Battalion was 600 or more with about 230 arms. A Company in northern Mindoro under 3d Lt Ruel G. BELONCIO. Battalion S-3 is 3D Lt Cladio FABELON, and Battalion S-4 is 3D Lt Florencio VASQUEZ.

Late Developments: In July 1944, Commander George F ROWE, USNR, arrived in Mindoro on a special mission from SWPA. He placed his headquarters in western Mindoro and established a radio net to cover Mindoro and to receive intelligence from the Manila area. Guerrilla groups have given him cooperation and assistance and have sought his advice, but ROWE has refrained from taking part in local political affairs.

Reports of October 1944 indicated that the RUFFY and the JURADO-BELONCIO factions have come to blows. Both groups have been advised to cease hostilities and concentrate their maximum efforts against the common enemy. The advice seems to have been disregarded. At any rate, JURADO was killed by Mindoro guerrillas in November 1944.

PALAWAN:

Early in 1942 the Japanese occupied Puerto Princesa, the capital and only town of importance in the province, and began the construction of an airfield there, using American PW (largely Navy and Marine personnel) brought from Manila. Occasional patrols on foot and by launch are sent out to the northern and southern parts of the island, and at harvest time occasional forays are made to seize the rice crop, but in general the Japanese have not bothered to keep areas outside of Puerto Princesa under control. Guerrilla activities have been limited to occasional abductions of Japanese patrols and, recently, some effort has been made to procure intelligence; however the chief function of guerrilla activities in the province has been to keep order, protect civilians from brigandage, and support the free civil government. In this it has been only partly successful, due largely to friction between rival commanders, often a product of personal and political ambitions.

BUSUANGA-CORON: When the Japanese occupation of the manganese mines on Busuanga in 1942, Carlos AMORES, a policeman at the mines, secretly organized a resistance force of over 200 men, largely workers at the mines. In September 1942 it became evident that the Japanese had discovered the existence of the organization and AMORES gave the signal for an uprising. Armed with clubs and rocks and a few pistols, the guerrillas killed all the Japanese at the mines and many in the town. The mine entrance was blown up with dynamite, and considerable stocks of ore were destroyed, before the guerrillas were forced to retreat by the arrival of Japanese reinforcements. AMORES went to Danlig in a captured Japanese launch to confer with the COBB brothers (see below); he then returned to Busuanga but was soon forced to leave by shortage of food and Japanese counter measures. No organized guerrilla is left on Coron or Busuanga, but there are thought to be intelligence contacts there, probably in infrequent contact with the ~~pre-~~ sent guerrilla organization on Palawan.

AMORES brought about 100 men to Sibaltan in northern Palawan when he was forced to leave Busuanga, and continued guerrilla activities there in conjunction with the COBB brothers. He is at present Commanding Officer of C Company, Palawan Special Battalion, in central north Palawan.

COBB Group: Alfred and Paul COBB, American mestizos, ran a cattle and ranch on Dumaran Island in northern Palawan before the war. In April

and May 1942 they organized a guerrilla Home Guard organization with headquarters at Danlig and covering Dumaran Island and most of the northeastern coast of Palawan. Since the Japanese occupation of Puerto Princesa civil government had collapsed, the constabulary had largely deserted, and the countryside was disorganized and at the mercy of brigand gangs. The COBES were able to restore order and set up local forms of government in their area.

In September 1942 Alfred COBB visited Cuyo Island and made contact with a number of American soldiers from the 48th Materiel Squadron, USAC, who had taken refuge there. Some of these Air Corps men accompanied AMOPES to Busuanga, and then to Palawan; many returned to Palawan with COBB and helped in the guerrilla organization. Food, arms, boats and supplies were collected, and plans were formulated to attack Puerto Princesa and liberate the American PW there. Though hindered by friction with local constabulary groups (see below), an organization of 150 men was developed by the end of 1942, possibly well supplied with food and transportation, though arms were scanty. Alfred COBB also found Gaudencio ABORDO, Governor of Palawan, in his evacuation place on the west coast of the island, and persuaded him to re-establish a free civil government for the province, guaranteeing him protection from Japanese raids. By December 1943, Governor ABORDO had reconvened his provincial government at Caramay with most official again active.

Among those who were active with the COBES were Sgt ANI, a veteran PC NCO, and Capt. Vicente RAJAR, a dentist from Cuyo and a survivor of Bataan, who arrived in Cuyo and Palawan in May 1942 and immediately joined the COBES. He was active with the expedition to Busuanga in September 1942. At present is believed to be with the Palawan Special Battalion. A Lt CACOLOR was with RAJAR in 1942 and is believed to have been with him under MANIQUE.

MENDOZA-COBB Group¹ Higinio MENDOZA, ex Governor of Palawan and a Captain in the PA Medical Reserve, made efforts to organize a guerrilla force in the southern half of northern Palawan while the COBES organized the northern half, but was defeated by shortages of food and men. In January 1943 the COBES joined MENDOZA at his headquarters at Tinitian for further guerrilla efforts. Trouble with Constabulary groups increased, and there were several ambushes between the two factions, one group disarming the other. The Constabulary groups gradually gained the upper hand, and in May 1943 the COBB-MENDOZA organization was forced to disband. Most of the Americans attached to the group went to Cuyo.

Capt MENDOZA was left on Palawan at this time, and was Commanding Officer of A Company, Palawan Special Battalion, early in 1943. He was reported captured by the Japanese, possibly through the instrumentality of Lt GARCIA (see below) in January 1944, and subsequently brought to Manila. Lt Glen was shot and killed by the Major of Cuyo, Pedro FONCE DE LEON, late in May 1943, in a disagreement with the American Air Corps group on Cuyo. Alfred COBB has been evacuated to SWPA, and Paul COBB is reported lost at sea in December 1943.

Constabulary Groups: With the Japanese occupation of Puerto Princesa the civil government of this province collapsed, the officials evacuating to the hills. Most of the Constabulary detachments followed suit, the officers for the most part evacuating to camps in the hills, and the men, at least to some extent, forming into bandit gangs.

Maj Guillermo MARAMBA, Provincial Inspector PC at Puerto Princesa, evacuated to the hills with his family and refused to take part in any guerrilla activity. He was shot and killed by one of the COBB brothers, in self defense, at Danlig in June 1943.

Capt Pedro MANIQUE, former Executive Officer to MARAMBA, was commander of the chief constabulary group active on Palawan from mid-1942 to mid-1943. His group numbered about 75 rifles, and was loosely intergrated; though there were attempts to coordinate his activities with those of the COBB organization, friction increased and by early 1943 the two groups were at odds. MANIQUE is reported to be a weak character, congenial but not intelligent and not respected by his men; he printed money in an effort to hold the loyalty of his men, but was not able to check their abuse of civilian rights and commandeering of civilian goods.

2D Lt Baldomero R. GARCIA, a constabulary officer and a cousin of Lt Col GARCIA of the 6th MD was in hiding on the west coast of Palawan until February 1943, when he appeared at Carabay. He soon joined MANIQUE as Executive Officer, but some time later he became ambitious for more power and did not cooperate well with MANIQUE. He is believed to have entered into ~~negotiations~~ negotiations with officers of the 6th MD, and when Col PERALTA appointed MANIQUE commander of the Palawan guerrillas in May or June 1943, his men had a meeting and elected to recognize GARCIA as commander in place of MANIQUE, whom they charged with misuse of funds and of food stocks.

GARCIA in July 1943 signed himself as a 1st Lt, Commanding Palawan for the 6th MD. In the same month he crossed over to Panay, and did not return until the Special Battalion was established. At that time he alone refused to recognize the Battalion authority, and continued to harass their operations. He was captured by elements of the Battalion in January 1944, and as of June 1944 was in guerrilla concentration camp, with his followers being used to procure food for the present organization.

Southern Palawan Group: In southern Palawan guerrilla groups gradually developed in the vicinity of Brooke's Point, around a nucleus of Americans. In August 1942 three US Navy men and three US Marines escaped from the Japanese PW camp at Puerto Princesa, and appeared at Brooke's Point, where they joined Americans living in a small settlement. The Japanese attempted a landing there in October, but were beaten off by a small guerrilla force organized by these men. One of these men was subsequently killed by a renegade Filipino, and the others dispersed to Tawà Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago.

However, guerrilla resistance was maintained at Brooke's Point by Mr Vena T KERSON, a Finn by birth and a former diver for the US Navy in Iloilo. With the help of Sgt TUMBAGA, PC, and the support of Mr Thomas EDWARDS, an American planter living at Brooke's point, and of Datu D. M JOLKIPLI Narrasid, the most influential Moro leader of southern Palawan and islands to the south, an organization was built up and a local civil government was established. A Bolo Battalion is organized in villages of the district to give warning of approaching Japanese patrols.

Reports indicate that TUMBAGA, as a 3D Lt, succeeded KERSON as commander in July 1943, perhaps in an effort to convert the guerrilla to an all-Filipino undertaking, and that TUMBAGA (drowned December 1943) was succeeded by a Lt ALEGRE.

Marasidad MAYOR, a lumberman from Balabac and Bugsuk Islands, was active with the organization at this time. He remains as present commander of the area (D Company) under the Palawan Special Battalion, and it is believed that the organization remains weak, ineffectual, and badly in need of arms and supplies.

Palawan Special Battalion: In October 1943 Lt GARCIA returned to Palawan from Panay with Maj Pablo MUYCO, of the G-3 Section, 6th MD, who was to take over command of the area and reorganized the guerrillas into a Palawan Special Battalion of the 6th MD. All guerrilla figures with the exception of MANIQUE (see above) assented, and the battalion was organized to cover Palawan, Balabac, Cuyo and Agutaya, Cagayancillo, Coron and Busuanga. The Cuyo group numbers 150, ineffective. Staff and organization are as follows (early 1944)

Commanding Officer	Maj Pablo MUYCO		
Executive Officer	Lt Baldomero R GARCIA		
Adjutant and S-1	1st Lt Vicente BAJAR		
S-2	3D Lt Juan C CONCEPCION		
S-3	Capt Alfredo de los REYES		
S-4	2D Lt Rodolfo PANDAL		
		<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
Headquarters at Caramay, strength:		21	59
CO A Company, Hq at Malcampo	Capt Higinio MENDOZA	6	148
CO B Company, Hq at Danlig	3D Lt Felipe BATUL	6	128
CO C Company, Hq at Taytay	Capt Carlos AMORES	6	130
CO D Company, Hq at Brooke's	Capt Marisidad MAYOR	4	82
Service Troops		17	140
Total strength, July 1944:		57	945

Total arms are believed to be about 300, of all kinds. Coverage of Balabac, Cagayancillo, Busuanga, Culion, and Coron is believed to be limited to occasional intelligence contacts. Dumaran Island is well organized with local guerrilla representatives in almost every town, and southern Palawan unit also controls the area of Alfonso Treize on the west coast. The unit is cooperating with coastwatcher parties sent in from SWIA to

Brooke's Point and Dumarán, under Sgts FLACIDO and CARAIS, respectively. Civil government has been maintained, with Datu JOLKIFLI named as Deputy Governor for southern Palawan.

SECTION VI. LUZON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

General: In December 1943, FERALTA was instructed that "as our intelligence unit covering the maximum territory you can perform great service". He immediately commenced organization of an intelligence net in the Visayas and northwards to Luzon. The Visayan activities have already been covered (see Section II). FERALTA's thrust towards Luzon has been a more difficult venture but the net result both on Luzon and in the Visayas is striking in the completeness of the area covered.

There are two approaches to Luzon, one via the Bicol and the other via southwestern Luzon and Batangas. Both are equally accessible from Panay and FERALTA has been attempting to develop both these channels since early 1943. Regular courier service has been inaugurated between intelligence centers and as radios have become available they are pushed out into this net.

Eastern Approach: To establish the eastern channel FERALTA used Masbate as an intermediate link. The disputes among guerrilla leaders on Masbate which have threatened the freedom of movement of agents between Luzon and Panay, and FERALTA's attempts to organize these guerrillas have been covered in SECTION V. Weekly courier has been operating between the Bicol, Samar-Leyte. Masbate and Panay since mid-1944 and within the past two months a radio has been established on Masbate.

FERALTA has also been active among the Bicol guerrillas, attempting to develop contacts and spheres of influence. The story of these guerrillas and FERALTA part in their activities is told in the Bicol Resistance Movement, CHAPTER IV.

A 6th MD report of April 1944 will give more idea of the extent and activities of this eastern net on Luzon:

6TH MD LUZON INTELLIGENCE PENETRATION VIA MASBATE

Contact Area	Contact Agent
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NORTHERN LUZON:

Cagayan	Capt ALBORNOZ
Ilocos	Lt LAMONTE
Isabela	Lt VITO
N Ecija & N Tayabas	Sgt PARRENS
Nueva Vizcaya	Pvt GUERRA

MANILA
 BATAAN
 CORREGIDOR
 CAVITE

Lt FUGNE
 Lt GALAN
 Lt PABILICO
 Lt Mationg (Captured April 44)

SOUTHERN LUZON:

SOUTHERN LUZON:

Laguna	Lt RAYOLA
S Tayabas	Lt MOSQUELA
Camarines Sur, Albay, Sorsogon	Lt MANAFSAL
Camarines Norte	M Sgt FRIVALDO

Total Monthly Operating Expenses of this net: P100,000.00
 Type of money used:
 (Panay) Emergency Currency P 25,000.00
 Jap Military Currency 75,000.00

Includes P10,000 aid to LAPUS, MERRITT, SABAT and MIRANDA guerrilla leaders in the Bicol and to Laguna and Isabela guerrilla units.

This network is under the supervision of Lt Col Pedro SERRAN, CO of the 2D Combat Team in northwestern Panay. Capt HONTIVEROS operates the unit and prepares reports. The net is working fairly well, reporting information largely from southern Luzon and the Bicol. No radio contacts have been established beyond Masbate.

Western Approach: The picture on the western approach to Luzon is more obscure. The center of this network was Tablas Island, under JURADO, until the Japanese raided the intelligence center in December 1943 and capture the equipment and some personnel. From this center an advance radio post had been sent first to Middoro, then to Marinduque and then to the northwestern tip of Mindoro. This was captured in the Japanese raids in that area in March 1944. The two raids disrupted the western Luzon intelligence system entirely. Lt Col JURADO was sent to Mindoro in mid-1944 to re-establish the center, under the 1st Combat Team in northwestern Panay. Progress in establishing the new base has not been reported, but intelligence was flowing through Panay, when JURADO was killed by Mindoro guerrillas in November 1944.

FERALTA's Luzon contacts are legion and his channels parallel and overlap to a point of confusion. The object has been to introduce an element of competition between agents and to cross check information received. The contacts extend from within the puppet government to Japanese installations and the street corner. The main funnel on Luzon to the western channel is an intelligence center known as the intelligence Echelon, 43D Division, Free Luzon Area, located in the mountains near Tanauan, Tayabas. Other agents come direct to Mindoro or to Panay. Capt Ildefonso FERNANDEZ, Alias H. J. HOOSON, was in command of this unit in March 1943; reported captured in April 1944. A capt V. A. ALABASTRO (possibly alias Capt V. ANDAL) seems to have gone to Panay in June 1943 and persuaded FERALTA to allow him to take over FERNANDEZ's position. ALABASTRO returned to Luzon and assumed command in August 1943. Luzon was divided into eight sectors with about 30 men per province in each sector. Staff and known contacts of this group are the same as that used by FERNANDEZ except that FERNANDEZ became Executive Officer to ALABASTRO.

Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer

Capt V. A. ALABASTRO
 Capt Ildefonso FERNANDEZ

Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands

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