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John H. ...
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HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
ADVANCE BACHELON

REPORT ON EX - USAFFE PERSONNEL ONW IN THE "C" CO, MP BN, USAFIP, NL WHO SAW
ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES BETWEEN DECEMBER 8/41 - MAY 9, 1942

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SAC

Name (Report of Off & E/M Separately)	Induction By Whom	Where	When	Rank	Inclusive date of Service	ORGANIZATION Or Unit to Which assigned	Place or Sector of Action	REMARKS (State reasons for inability to reach disti- nation of Unit
<u>First Sergeant</u>						7		
Urbano, Atinid oro U.	Unknown	Bogalton Pangasinan	12/17/41	1st Sgt	12/17/41 to April 9, 1942	Btry. 8B, 1st Div. PA	Pangasinan & Bataan	
<u>SERGEANTS</u>								
Oateo, Paterno	Major Noble	Mabilao, Sn Pangasinan	12/18/41	Sergeant	12/18/41 to 4/9/42	13th Inf, 11th Div. Pa Co, 2d Bn	Pangasinan to Bataan	
Velasco, Gavino	1st Lieut. I. Carlos	Bontoc, Bontoc Mt. Prov.	12/8/41	1st Class Private	12/8/41 to 5/9/42	Bontoc Co, PC Prov.	Bontoc, Mt. Prov.	Blocked by Enemy
Gelano, Anselmo	Major Noble	Vigan, Ilocos Sur	12/8/41	Sergeant	12/8/41 to 1/Unknown/42	"M" Co, 3d Bn, 13th Inf	Baroro, Bacnotan	Blocked in Tarlac
Vinluan, Napoleon	Lt. C. Banal	Sn Pdo, La La Union	12/8/41	Corporal	12/8/41 to 1/2/42	La Union Co, PC Union	Bausang, La Union	Blocked in Kiancan, Mt Pr
Bernardo Suarez	Major Hidalgo	Port Area, Eof Manila	12/20/41	Sergeant	12/20/41 to 4/9/42	1st Bn, 2d CA C, AA Reg't	Bataan	
<u>CORPORALS:</u>								
Moreno, Fermin L.	Captain Lyliard	Camp Murphy, Quezon City	12/19/41	Corporal	12/19/41 to 4/9/42	"E" Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf, 1st Div	Tayabas to Bataan	
Oliva, Ciriasco	Lt. Cabalab, Mariano	P.A.T. Ma- rivallas	1/8/42	Corporal	1/8/42 to 5/9/42	"M" Co, PA, 2d Regt, 2d Div	Bataan	
Lopez, Jaime	Lt. Myer	Maguilain, La Union	9/1/41	Corporal	9/1/41 to 4/9/42	"C" Co, 1st Bn, 102d Inf, 21 Div	Pampanga- Bataan	
Guleb, Atilano	Lt. Perez	Carayan, Mi- samit Oriental	12/14/41	Corporal	12/14/41 to 5/9/42	"F" Co, 102d Inf 1st Div	Bataan	Unit asgd to Mindanoo
Simbajon, Pedro	Unknown	Bacolod, Neg- ros Occidental	8/28/41	Private	8/28/41 to 12/22/41	"A" Co, 1st Bn, 71st Inf, 71 Div	Bausang, La Union	Blocked by Enemy

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Name (Report of Off & E/M Separately)	Induction	Rank	Inclusive : dates of : Service	ORGANIZATION : Or Unit to : Which Assigned	PLACE or : Sector of : ACTION	REMARKS : State reasons for : inability to reach : Distribution of Unit
Bravo, Donato	: Lt Philipps : Neguillian, : 9/1/41 : Myers : La Union :	: Corporal :	: 9/1/41 to : : 5/9/42 :	: "C" Co, 22d Inf : Bausang, : 21st Division : La Union :	: Disbanded at Bag- : uio :	
Florentino, Vibente	: Unknown : Baroro, Bac : 12/8/41 : noton, LU :	: Corporal :	: 12/8/41 to : : 1/Unknown/42 :	: 13th Inf, 11th : Baroro, Bac : Div. (PA) : noton, L.U. :	: Blocked by the : Enemy & WIA. :	
Depdepen, Moises	: Capt. : Camp Murphy : 12/15/41 : Mendoza : Quezon City :	: Corporal :	: 12/15/41 to : : 3/Unknown/42 :	: 1st Inf, 1st Reg MP in Ma- : Div (Atchd) : nila :	: Unit dispersed in : Manila :	
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS:						
Delit, Raymundo V.	: Capt. : Leoag, Ilocos : 11/1/41 : Primrose : Surig :	: Pvt 1st :	: 11/1/41 to : : 1/26/42 :	: "M" Co, 3rd Bn, : Cagayan to : 12th Inf, 11th : Pampanga :	: Blocked by the : Enemy :	
Ibay, Valentin	: Unknown : Neguillian, : 9/1/41 : La Union :	: Pvt 1st :	: 9/1/41 to : : 4/9/42 :	: 22d Inf, 21st : Bataan : Div. (PA) :		
Millo, Mariano	: Capt. : Camp Crane, : 10/15/41 : Felix : Quezon City :	: Pvt 1st :	: 10/15/41 to : : 4/9/42 :	: "L" Co, 3rd Bn, : Bataan : 1st Inf-PC, 2d Div :		
Oribio, Amado	: Lieut : Camp Murphy : 12/22/41 : Fernandez : Quezon City :	: Pvt 1st :	: 12/22/41 to : : 4/9/42 :	: 202nd Engineer : Bataan : Regiment, PA :		
Sucsit, Adriano	: Capt : Camp Santo : 12/18/41 : Mendoza : Ilocos, Quezon City :	: Pvt 1st :	: 12/18/41 to : : 4/9/42 :	: "B" Co, 1st Inf : Tayabas : 1st Reg Div : Bataan :		
Salmingo, Fernando	: Capt Roger : Camp Olivas : 12/15/41 : : : :	: Private :	: 12/15/41 to : : 4/9/42 :	: 1st Corps Hq : Bataan : Motor Pool (PS) :		
Feng-ot, Herminio	: Capt : Camp Murphy : 12/15/41 : Mendoza : Quezon City :	: Pvt 1st :	: 12/15/41 to : : 3/Unknown/42 :	: 1st Inf, 1st : MP Manila : Reg Div :	: Dispersed in : Manila :	
Lucero, Santiago	: Major Noble : Baroro, Bac : 12/14/41 : noton, L.U. :	: Pvt 1st :	: 12/14/41 to : : 3/12/42 :	: "K" Co, 13th : Baroro, Bac : Inf, 11th Div : noton, L.U. :	: Disbanded in Na- : guillian, L.U. :	
ardonez, Rosendo	: Lieut : Camp Tinio : 10/1/41 : Quintana : Quezon City :	: Pvt 1st :	: 10/1/41 to : : 4/9/41 :	: "B" Co, Engr Bn : Bataan : 21st Div. :		
PRIVATE S:						
Mina, Moises	: Major Noble : Vigan, I.S. : 11/22/41 : : : :	: Private :	: 11/22/41 to : : 1/3/42 :	: "D" Co, 1st Bn : Bataan : 13th Inf, 11 Div :		
Labarrete, Servillano	: Major Noble : Baroro, Bac : 12/14/41 : noton, L.U. :	: Private :	: 12/14/41 to : : 1/3/42 :	: "K" Co, 3rd Bn, : Baroro, Bac : 13th Inf, 11 Div : noton, L.U. :	: Blocked by the : Enemy :	
Labarrete, Juanito	: Major Noble : Baroro, Bac : 12/14/41 : noton, L.U. :	: Private :	: 12/14/41 to : : 1/1/42 :	: "K" Co, 3rd Bn, : Baroro, Bac : 13th Inf, 11 Div : noton, L.U. :	: Disbanded in : Baguio :	
Lambinico, Inocencio	: Major Noble : Baroro, Bac : 12/12/41 : noton, L.U. :	: Private :	: 12/12/41 to : : 5/9/42 :	: "M" Co, 13th Inf : Banger & B- : 11th Div : noton, L.U. :	: Disbanded at Na- : guillian, La Union :	
Somera, Ariston	: Lt. Col. : Ft. Wint, : 12/1/41 : Bedrough : Zambales :	: Private :	: 12/1/41 to : : 5/9/42 :	: Anti-Aircraft : Zambales, : Det (Atchd) - PS : Bataan, Corrigido		
Archeta, Leonardo	: Lt Philipps : Neguillian, : 9/1/41 : Myers : La Union :	: Private :	: 9/1/41 to : : 4/9/42 :	: "A" Co, 1st Bn : Tarlac, Pas- : 22d Inf, 21 Div : Pangasinan & Bataan		

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NAME	REPORT OF OFFER E/M: Separately	Induction	Rank	Inclusive Date of Service	ORGANIZATION Or Unit to Which Assigned:	Place or Sector of Action	REMARKS (State reason for inability to reach Destination
	By Wh om	Where	When				
<u>PRIVATES (Cont'd)</u>							
Acosta, Emilio B.	Unknown	Camp Murphy	12/15/41	Private	12/15/41 to: 1st Chemical Co. 1st Reg. Div	Bataan	
Almoite, Florendo	Major Pargas	Kinely Fld	11/1/41	Private	11/1/41 to: Btry "C" CAC	Corregidor	
		Philippines			5/7/42 : FA 92d Div		
Lopez, Lucio	Col Horan	Bontoc,	12/8/41	Private	12/8/41 to: La Union Co., Phil Cons	Baroro & Bayang, L.D	Blockaded by the Enemy
		Mt. Prov.			3/10/42 : Phil Cons		
Fabro, Aurelio L.	Capt Flor	Camarines Sur	11/1/41	Corporal	11/1/41 to: "E" Co, 2nd Bn., 13th Inf, 11 Div	Bataan	
Valdez, Laureano	Lt. Latchec	Lingayen,	11/1/41	Private	11/1/41 to: "I" Co, 3rd Bn, 21st Div	Pampanga & Bataan	
					4/9/42		

Date Submitted 10 October, 1945
 /flm


 E. E. VERBARA
 1st Lieut, Inf. PA
 Commanding Officer
 "C" Co, MP BN, USAFIP, NL

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HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUSON
ADVANCE SECTION

REPORT ON EX-USAFIP PERSONNEL NOW IN THE 66th Infantry REGIMENT WHO SAW ACTION IN
THE PHILIPPINES BETWEEN DECEMBER 9/41 -MAY 9, 1942

NAME	INDUCTION			Rank	Inclusive Dates of Service	Organization or Unit to which assigned	Place or Sector of Action	REMARKS (State reasons for inability to reach destination of unit)
	By Whom	Where	When					
1. 1st Sgt. Deagalis, Domingo	1st. Faypoom	13th Inf., PA	12/14/41	Pfc.	12/14/41 to 12/21/41	13th Inf., PA	Baroro Br.	
2. Chalpas, Patricio - Sgt.	Capt. Luis	32nd Inf., PA	12/20/41	Pvt.	12/20/41 to 1/15/42	32nd Inf., PA	Camp Murphy	
3. Cpl. Basilio Bontag	1st. Andres	E-Co 3rd Reg., 13th Inf., PA	11/24/41	Pvt.	11/24/41 to 12/21/41	E-Co 3rd Reg., 13th Inf., PA	Camp Sabileo Pangasinan Baroro Bridge	
4. Juan Visaya -Cpl.	1st. Andres	E-Co 3rd Reg., 13th Inf., PA	11/24/41	Pfc.	11/24/41 to Jan, 1942	E-Co 3rd Reg., 13th Inf., PA	Baroro Br.	
5. Pfc. Eugenio, Asencio	1st. Jose	I-Co 13th Inf., PA	11/24/41	Pvt.	11/24/41 to Jan, 1942	I-Co 13th Inf., PA	Baroro	
6. Pfc. Lacuarin, Cesero	Capt. Blasco	11 Signal Co, 11th Div.	9/1/41	Sgt.	9/1/41 to 11/9/41	11th Signal Co, 11th Div.	Trot Batana	
7. Pfc. Arcenio M. Valdez	1st. Leo	a-Co 1st Regt, 1st Div, Regt Div	12/15/41	Pvt.	12/15/41 to 1/4/42	Co. 4, 1st Inf, 1st Div	Dagao Pt Trail 5 Batana	

NAME	RESIDENCE			GRADE	Inclusive Dates of Service	Organization or Unit to which assigned	Place or Sector of Action	REMARKS (State reasons for inability to reach destination of unit)
	City	State	Area					
8. Pfc. Andres, Policarpio	St. Isidoro	Nov. 15,	1941	Sgt.	11/15/41	Co. F, 2nd Inf.	Camp Salas	
	Malinao	11th Div.	1941		to	11th Div.		
					14/9/41			
9. Pfc. Mayo, Felix	Manawa	Co. E 16th Inf.	12/13/41	Sgt.	12/13/41	Co. A 16th Inf.	Camp Murphy	
		Inf., Pa.			to	PA	Malinao, Luzon	
					1/11/42		Manawa, Luzon	
							Dr. Sulsona	
10. Pvt. Bugtan, Lamagnay	St. Ysabel	Co., 11th Inf.	12/18/41	Pvt.	12/18/41	Co. B, 11th Inf.	Manawa,	
		Inf., Pa.			12/17/41	Inf., Pa.	Manawa, Luzon	

L. Bugtan

11th Div., Luzon
2nd Lieut. Inf., PA
Co. B, 11th Inf.
1st Company, 3rd PA, 66th Inf., PA

Exhibit-H

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EXCERPT

FROM

" THE LEGIONER "

OFFICIAL ORGAN -C- PHILIPPINE LEGION
Manila, Philippines -- July, 1947
Vol. I, No. 4

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" AMONG OUR RESISTANCE LEADERS "

Third of a Series of Thumbnail Biographies of the
Daring and Valiant Men Who Refused
To Give Up The Fight

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DOROTEO SORIANO
Colonel
Mindanao Guerrillas

Major Doroteo Soriano, Chief of the Division of Forest Engineering of the Bureau of Forestry, was called to active duty in September, 1941, to be one among the 126 Regular and Reserve Officers selected to attend the General Staff School at Baguio. In a mass induction on 1 October 1941, he was inducted as Capt. Infantry into the USAFFE.

This Officers' class, headed by the late General Lim, General Capinpin and many high ranking Filipino Officers, was the only one created of its kind in the Philippines in preparation for the coming of the Pacific war. After graduation on 13 November 1941, Major Soriano was assigned to the 101st Division in Mindanao.

While fighting was going on fiercely in Bataan and in the Digos Front in Davao, Mindanao, Major Soriano was one of those officers who believed that organized resistance against the Japanese could not last indefinitely. So in March 1942, he secretly organized a Bolo Battalion among the native Manobos with the intention of using his small force to harass the Japanese in case of surrender.

When the inevitable took place on 10 May 1942, Major Soriano refused to obey the order of surrender issued by General Sharp, but instead implicitly followed the order of General MacArthur to General Sharp (which leaked out) to disband the force and engage the Japs in guerrilla warfare. Because of severe asebic dysentery, he was prevented to carry out his plan to begin attacking Jap outpost on 25 August 1942, and also because of the advise of his subordinates that it was not yet an opportune time but to wait until the Japanese occupation forces had relieved the invasion forces.

Dysentery and lack of food reduced Major Soriano to almost a skeleton but when he received an invitation from Salipada K. Pendatun to join his force in attacking Malaybalay, Bukidnon, he unhesitatingly reported for duty on 29 December 1942. The next day he was given the rank of Major to command a battalion composed mostly of natives who did not know how to salute but only knew how to shoot.

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When his battalion was ready for action, he was pulled out from his command to take charge of supplying and feeding the men, numbering about 2,000 by relieving the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4, Colonel Tomas Cabili, who was given an important job of coordinator between the Army and civilian authorities.

The task of supplying and feeding an army of guerrilleros who were practically clothless and hungry, composed of Filipinos and more than 50 Americans, was no small task and it was something different and unheard of in Luzon and elsewhere. Because of the implicit confidence of the Commanding Officer of the Force reposed in the then just promoted Lt. Col. Doroteo G. Soriano, he was given a blanket authority to solicit cash loans and to procure supplies on credit. With this authority, Col. Soriano was able to borrow more than P50,000.00 cash from civic-minded citizens of Bukidnon and incurred for the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force a total obligation of P201,806.90 used for feeding and supplying the needs of about 2,000 men from December 1942, to June 1943. Major Soriano has been in constant contact with the Claims Service, PHILRYCOM for the redemption of the said obligation.

When the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force joined the Command of Fertig, Lt. Col. Soriano was given in August, 1943, the command of the 1st. Bn., 117th Inf., 109th Division with the rank of Major.

In September, 1943, the Commanding Officer of the 117th Inf., Major Salipada K. Pendatun, was designated Commanding Officer of 118th Inf., 106th Division and Major Soriano was one of the officers who went with him to Cotabato. He was given the command of the Hqts. Bn., but when the staff of the 106th Division was organized, Major Soriano was appointed Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4. He occupied this position until 8 May 1945, when he received an order to proceed at once to the 10th Military Dist. Hqts. at Parang, thence to Leyte, and finally to Manila, reporting to the Adjutant General, Philippine Army, on May 25, 1945.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
: S.S.
QUERZON CITY)

Exhibit - I

A F F I D A V I T

I, DOROTEO G. SORIANO, of legal age, married, formerly Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, of the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force and later Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, of the 106th Division, 10th Military District, Mindanao, until 8 May 1945, and presently employed as Chief of the Division of Forest Engineering, Bureau of Forestry, Manila, after having been duly sworn to according to law hereby make the following statements on the military and civil achievements of Senator Salipada K. Pendatun from the day I met him in the General Headquarters of the 101st Division at Malaybalay, Bukidnon on 6 January 1942 to the day he was elected as Senator of the Philippines on 23 April 1946. The statements are made according to the best of my knowledge and belief and I sincerely hope that whoever will happen to read them and will find that some facts worth mentioning are still lacking will please attribute to nothing else but to my shortcomings. I am making the statements for whatever value that they may offer in evaluating the military achievements and public career of Senator Salipada K. Pendatun, because I am one of the counted few among his former comrades-in-arms who can speak with some authority about him.

I. That in March 1942, we in Mindanao who were fighting the Japanese along the Digos Front began to think of what we were going to do in case Bataan and Corregidor were going to fall. The majority preferred to continue the fight even though hoping against hope that the promised American aid would soon come to our rescue, because we thought that, even with the lost hope of American aid, to continue fighting was better than to lay down our arms for fear that to do so would mean perpetual conquest of everything in the Philippines.

Since the entire command of the Philippine Armed Forces was placed under the Americans, we then began to canvass who among the ranking Filipino Officers should lead us in our slim chance to continue the resistance. General Fidel Segundo loomed in the horizon as the most logical man, but how could we bring him down to Mindanao, when he was badly needed in Bataan. Col. Eustaquio Bacig being already in our area came next. But because of certain obvious reasons since the declaration of war, we had little faith in pinning our hope in his military leadership. Who then should answer our hope for military Filipino leadership? Fortunately, while we were raking our brain for a leader, Brigadier General Roxas, who was then a full Colonel arrived in our area from Bataan. By unanimous secret approval he was the very man. His replies to several questions about Bataan gave us momentary encouragement, but in pondering in minute detail his evasive answers, there was, however, no doubt of the inevitable outcome. In short, Bataan fell on 9 April 1942 and Corregidor surrendered on midnight 6-7 May 1942.

Then came the sad news of the compulsory order of general surrender of all armed forces in the Philippines. With this order, conflicting opinions arose as to the validity of the order. In the evening of 6 May 1942, we were given a secret tip about the order of General MacArthur to General Sharp to

break his forces to small units and engage immediately the Japanese in a guerilla warfare. Because it was an order of MacArthur, we secretly thought that Generals Sharp and Vachon would not vacillate in obeying the order. But to our surprise, after the evening broadcast of General Wainwright on 7 May 1942, a crashing information came to us for an unconditional surrender. This information that infiltrated with lightning speed into the ranks of our fighting men had caused a pandemonium. Many deserted their posts. But when an order came from General Vachon to continue the fight, the men gladly returned to their posts to be demoralized later when in the morning of 10 May 1942, a threatening order came for the general surrender. With this order, we lost all hope to be able to conduct an organized resistance against the enemy.

Because of our undying faith in America and love of our own country, we who choose to disobey what we considered unlawful order to surrender, had to abandon our posts on that same day or on the next day 11 May 1942.

Among those who did not surrender but preferred to forego ease and comfort rather than stay with the enemy in the darkest days of our history, it is easy to single out one, because his name spread like wild fire as the standard bearer of Filipino leadership in our unequal fight for freedom. To the natives of Mindanao, the word Salipada means more than a mere name, it means swordsman. And to the Maguindanaos the first name of this young leader is the one that is widely known as it is more colorful than the surname Pendatun. So I am going to use the name Salipada more often than the surname Pendatun.

When Attorney Salipada K. Pendatun, with his armed force composed of Christians and Maguindanaos, initiated the open resistance against the Japs by attacking Fort Pikit, Cotabato, in September 1942, which nearly fell into his hands, he unknowingly made himself the undisputed Filipino leader. Many names should be mentioned with Salipada in his initial campaign, but because of short memory only few could be mentioned which are Datu Udtog Matalan, Datu Mantil, Datu Midpantao, Datu Manaluba and Lt. F. Buyao. Determined to impress the Japs that Salipada had a good sized force, he next attacked Kabacan, which also nearly fell into his hands. Because of this attack the Japanese made this stronghold one of the strongest in Mindanao.

II. That Attorney Salipada K. Pendatun, now Senator Salipada K. Pendatun, is a Reserve Officer of the Army of the Philippines presently holding the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Upon the declaration of war in December 1941, as a First Lieutenant Infantry P.A. Reserve, he immediately reported to active duty with the 102nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Division, Visayan-Mindanao Force, with Headquarters in Cotabato, Cotabato. From January 6, 1942 to March 15, 1942, he was assigned as Staff Officer of the Digos Force, Davao Province, and at the same time acted as Liaison Officer of the 101st Division of the Bolo Battalion which was composed of all Moros who were inducted to the USAFFE by Brigadier-General Joseph Vachon, Commanding General of the 101st Division, Visayan-Mindanao Force. As Liaison Officer and actual commander of the Bolo Battalion occupying the Digos Front, Davao, he had shown exemplary ability in leading his men. He maintained the high morale of the Moro members of the Bolo Battalion in the front lines who were then posted in both flanks of the Digos Force for the purpose of getting enemy

information and counter-espionage. It was then extremely difficult to get the unqualified cooperation of these untrained Moros in view of our inability to equip them and at the same time give them sufficient supplies. But inspite of these lamentable and hopeless conditions, Lt. Pendatun, with the firmness of his leadership established, was able to make them hold their lines in the Digos Front and succeeded in maintaining security patrols within the enemy areas and getting vital enemy information. Also, it can be said that in view of the assignment of a considerable number of Moros in the Digos Front, the enemy stopped sending patrols far into the interior of the right and left flanks. Thus we were able to maintain the front lines of the Digos Force from January 1942 to April 1942, inspite of the enemy's constant attacks, bombings and pressures.

In April, 1942, Lt. Pendatun was re-assigned from the Digos Front to the 102nd Infantry Regiment at Cotabato Sector as Regimental S-3 (Plans and Training Officer) and acted in this capacity until the date of the general surrender on 10 May 1942. The 102nd Infantry Regiment, upon receipt of the order to surrender from the Commanding General of the 101st Division, (by virtue of an order from Major-General William Sharp, Commanding General of the Visayan-Mindanao Forces), was still intact and holding its lines against enemy advances. On May 1, 1942, Brigadier-General Joseph Vachon inspected our front at Cotabato, Cotabato, specifically at Kilometer 22 of the Cotabato-Davao National Highway where we transferred our front command post as the enemy had already landed on the municipalities of Cotabato and Parang the night previous. During this inspection of General Vachon, he issued a verbal order to Colonel Russel J. Nelson, Commanding Officer of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, to hold the line. General Vachon had also instructed Lt. Pendatun to give his fullest cooperation to Colonel Nelson in view of his indisputable knowledge of the terrain and his complete knowledge of the situation. In that inspection and after General Vachon gave the order to hold the line, Lt. Pendatun had informed the General that there was a possibility of the enemy penetrating the upper valley of Cotabato by way of the Rio Grande de Mindanao on barges if they find it difficult and dangerous to advance by land, and, for being the Regimental S-3, he had directed the Constabulary Companies at Maganoy, Buluan, Suayan and Upi to proceed to the municipality of Dulawan to establish a delaying position. This order of Lt. Pendatun was disapproved by General Vachon in view of the belief that the enemy could not pass through the Rio Grande de Mindanao to break our lines on barges because we had bombers still present at the Maranag Airfield, Bukidnon Province. These bombers were believed to be ready to sink the barges in case the Japs would attempt to pass through the Rio Grande de Mindanao. Early in the morning on 2 May 1942, the enemy, in five (5) landing barges went up the Rio Grande de Mindanao towards Dulawan and Pikit unopposed, as this avenue of penetration was left defenseless. In view of this penetration of the enemy, the position of the 102nd Infantry Regiment at Simuay, Cotabato, along the national highway was threatened and eventually be enveloped if the Regiment would not withdraw to a better strategic position.

In the face of the standing instruction of General Vachon to hold the line, Colonel Nelson, Commanding Officer of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, could not give the order of withdrawal despite the fact that the enemy had already penetrated our line through the Rio Grande de Mindanao and could envelope our regiment the next day. Because of this critical situation,

NOTARIAL
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Colonel Nelson made Lt. Pendatun decide and to take the responsibility of the movement of the regiment. So Lt. Pendatun, as S-3 of the Regiment ordered immediate withdrawal of our unit to Libungan, Midsayap, Cotabato, a more strategic position so as to be able to hold the enemy coming from Pikit, Midsayap, Libungan-Toreta and from Cotabato through the Cotabato-Davao National highway. This withdrawal was completed at about four o'clock in the morning of 3 May 1942, and at 6:00 A.M. the enemy arrived from Pikit and Cotabato, meeting at Libungan which was encountered by the 3rd Bn., 101st PA, already assigned with the 102nd Infantry Regiment. If the regiment was not withdrawn on time it would have been completely encircled and as a consequence, annihilated. The enemy had penetrated through the Rio Grande de Mindanao and landed part of its troops at Dulawan and the rest at Paldo-Palangi and converged towards Midsayap meeting the troops coming from Cotabato and Libungan-Toreta. The 102nd Infantry Regiment held the enemy in this new established position up to the date the order of general surrender was received by our unit on 10 May 1942, and continued to remain intact up to that date.

When General Vachon, Commanding General of the 101st Division, transmitted the order of General Sharp, Commanding General of the Mindanao-Visayan Force to surrender, Lt. Pendatun refused to surrender. He asked Colonel Nelson, his Regimental Commander to allow him not to surrender in order that he could operate a guerilla warfare against the enemy and maintain resistance until the arrival of the American Forces to recapture the islands from the enemy. Colonel Nelson rejected Lt. Pendatun's request and insisted that he must obey the order to surrender, in spite of the reasons adduced by Lt. Pendatun in discussing the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Forces, as in the case of Korea, Formosa and Manchuria, where the Japanese showed no respect for International Laws of War, Lt. Pendatun had the firm and unshaken conviction that to surrender to the Japanese would place the entire Filipino people in the cruel grips of their hands. Moreover, Lt. Pendatun believed that an act of mass or wholesale surrender might be construed to mean that the Filipino people were disloyal to the cause and to America and that even if the Philippines were in the future recaptured from the hands of the enemy by the American forces, it was necessary that either active or passive resistance must be maintained so as to gain the respect of the Filipino people by the United States and other allied powers. The wisdom of his belief was subsequently borne by later events. Colonel Nelson, who was at first reluctant for the non-surrender attitude of Lt. Pendatun, subsequently gave way in the fact of the soundness of the view entertained by the latter. So he finally agreed to allow Lt. Pendatun not to surrender.

The first step thereafter which Lt. Pendatun took was to go and contact Datu Udtog Matalam, then Commanding Officer of the Bolo Battalion (Datu Udtog Matalam was a Major in the guerilla and currently Provincial Governor of the Province of Cotabato) with a view of gathering all the Bolo Battalion officers and enlisted men under him and to continue the operation against the enemy in guerilla warfare. On 14 May 1942, the contact was made and immediately thereafter both men established headquarters at Maridagao, Pikit, Cotabato. Lt. Pendatun, therefore, ordered the calling of officers and enlisted men of the Bolo Battalion under Datu Matalam to report to that Headquarters. From May 1942, to August 1942, Lt. Pendatun conducted elementary military training and at the same time started espionage work and began collecting firearms and ammunitions from the civilians

and from the hands of the vacillating USAFFE's. Because of the effectiveness of the propaganda of the enemy at the time to effect the surrender of USAFFE officers and enlisted men with their arms, strengthened by the influence of some Filipino leaders who were rapidly embracing the cause of the enemy, and augmented by the measure of massacre ruthlessly adopted by the Japanese to Filipino military leaders who had commanded units that inflicted heavy casualties to said enemy, Lt. Pendatun had to order the commencement of active operations in September 1942, although it was quite untimely, as a sort of retaliation to the atrocities practiced by the enemy and also so as to discourage and give a halt to further surrender of USAFFE personnel and arms. Upon the resumption of this active operation against the Japanese in September 1942, the news of the attack made against the enemy in Pikit, Cotabato, spread like wild-fire not only in the province of Cotabato but in all the provinces in Mindanao and Sulu. That fateful event marked the initial active operation against the enemy. USAFFE officers and enlisted men who were still in hiding and did not surrender were attracted and immediately joined the force of Lt. Pendatun and those who could not join him in other places immediately organized active guerrilla resistance.

III. That before Lt. Salipada K. Pendatun actually commenced his active operation against the Japanese Imperial Forces, different missions were sent to his headquarters by the enemy and other leaders in Mindanao who were in connivance with the enemy with no other purpose than to persuade him to surrender with the promise to allow him to possess and hold all his arms and ammunitions. He was also offered a responsible position by the Japanese Imperial Forces. One of those missions sent by the enemy to contact Senator Pendatun was personally represented by the then Captain Gumbay Piang, presently Congressman for the province of Cotabato. In all conferences, Lt. Pendatun refused to surrender. Instead, he became more determined to advance the cause of the resistance movement under his command and spared no sacrifice, however great, to push more vigorously his well laid out plan and objective. Because of the intensity of our activities against the enemy as we had completely blockaded the Cotabato-Davao National Highway and sabotaged several enemy depots and installations, the enemy against Capt. Gumbay Piang. Besides being armed with various letters from the enemy pleading a halt of the operation against him, we were given the assurance that even if we had already killed several officers and enlisted men of the Japanese Imperial Forces and destroyed some of their properties and installations, Lt. Pendatun and all his officers and enlisted men would be pardoned by the enemy. Furthermore, Lt. Pendatun would be given the highest position in Mindanao subject to his selection. In this conference, Lt. Pendatun told Capt. Gumbay Piang that there was no use of asking him to surrender because he and his men were not fighting against the enemy for influence or power but to prove their unswerving loyalty to the Commonwealth Government and to the United States of America. Lt. Pendatun strikingly made of record the belief that when the Americans come back to the Philippines, they cannot say that the Filipinos were disloyal to their government. Accordingly, Lt. Pendatun told Capt. Gumbay Piang that instead of advising him and his men to surrender, it was better for him to join the resistance movement and he would be given a unit to command, and, in case he did not feel accepting the offer he would rather not come back anymore for the same mission otherwise Lt. Pendatun would be compelled to take the Captain as a hostage. That was the last time Capt. Gumbay Piang contacted Lt. Salipada K. Pendatun and

his men to surrender. President Laurel also contacted Lt. Pendatun by telegram when the young leader and his men were already fighting in Bukidnon in January 1943. The telegram which was coursed through the Provincial Governor of Cotabato at that time, asked Salipada K. Pendatun to come to Manila for a very important conference and that if he was willing President Laurel was going to send an airplane either to Bukidnon or Cotabato to bring him to Manila. To this, the young leader Salipada again refused.

IV. That early in December 1942, he decided to march his forces toward the concentration camp at Malaybalay, but had to fight his way at Kitao-cao. In this fight, he was already joined by some USAFFE Officers and some ground crew of the Air Corps. The first casualty in this fight against the Japs was Lemao-lamac, and a camp along the way near Maranag was named after him. The success in this fight spread like wild-fire and had attracted the attention of all of those heading small forces, especially, those who were in hiding nearby and posing as civilians. The march of his success continued to Valencia where he was joined by more USAFFE Officers and enlisted men. Prominent among them was Capt. Tomas Cahili who rose to the rank of full Colonel and now Senator Tomas Cahili of the Philippines. This march should not stop for a while here, but it was necessary to contact first the grand old man of Bukidnon, the former Governor and Assemblyman, Manuel Fortich. In the interview, the grand old man, impressed by the imposing personal appearance of young Attorney Salipada in closed-long beard, agreed to give his whole-hearted support morally and financially in the campaign in Bukidnon against the Japs.

Toward the end of December 1942, more USAFFE men and Americans joined him at Bankod, Mailag, about 20 km. South of Malaybalay. Among them were Major Edwin Andrews of the Philippine Air Corps and Major Frank McGee, a retired US Cavalry Officer on active duty. These two Majors, by far out-ranked Salipada who was only a 1st Lt. of the 102nd Inf., 101st Division before the general surrender. Salipada, being the actual commander of the fighting force, was placed in an embarrassing situation to accept under him officers who out-ranked him. In order to extricate himself from the temporary dilemma he was in, he intimated his desire to be addressed Attorney Salipada and that in all correspondence, "by order of Salipada K. Pendatun, Commanding Officer".

The Filipino Officers now with him, desiring to maintain Filipino leadership, held a meeting and passed a resolution elevating the rank of Salipada to that of Brigadier General. The reason was that if Major Frank McGee styled himself in Kamanglisan with less than a hundred armed natives and few Americans, a Brigadier General, before joining Salipada, and Captain Wendell Fertig breveted himself Brigadier General with just several hundreds of men with him in Oriental Misamis, why can not Salipada be also elevated to the rank of Brigadier General, when the latter had more than two thousand supporters?

On December 29, 1942, Captain Wilson came to Bukidnon to inspect our area. The impression we gathered in the way he conducted himself was that he was the Acting Secretary to the President of the Philippines, and, therefore, technically he was the Acting Little President of the Philippines in the absence of President Quezon. Of course, with reluctance, we had to be silent on this score so as to avoid dissention. A meeting was held in the house of Dr. Carlos Fortich at Loregan to decide who

should conduct the operation against the Japs in Malaybalay, taking into consideration that a small organization formed at Keaton headed by a Captain Alipio Juntilla, who also styled himself Brigadier General, was also in secret operation against the enemy. The decision in this meeting in favor of Salipada with the sanction of Captain Wilson should have been final and binding on both sides, had it not been for another leader, Major Robert Bowler, claiming jurisdiction over Juntilla and the whole province of Bukidnon. As Bowler and Juntilla were in secret communication, the latter was also showing arrogance and independence of action. Salipada, for the sake of unity, had to send a sufficient force to the area of Juntilla at Alanib under Col. Frank McGee to take over the command of Juntilla's sector. Salipada having now the entire control of Bukidnon began to carry on his plan of an all-out attack against the Japs. in the concentration camp. The Japs taken by surprise of the daring, unexpected plan of an all-out attack, had decided to evacuate on 10 January 1943 all prisoners of war who did not care to stay in Malaybalay to a safer place at Cagayan. So that in the attack of 15 January 1943, during which the grand old man of Bukidnon insisted to be an ocular spectator, the Japs, without much opposition, retreated to the town of Malaybalay.

This 15 January 1943 was a fateful day for Brigadier General Salipada K. Pendatun, Commanding Officer of the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force. Because of the excitement that the grand old man had in the front line, it was the immediate cause of his death, while asleep, early in the morning of the next day in the house of his son, Dr. Carlos Fortach. Thus, we lost the most enthusiastic supporter in our fight for freedom.

The fall of the concentration camp was fruitful to us because we were able to salvage some important papers regarding the controversy as to whether or not our action against the enemy was being sanctioned by General MacArthur. The following quoted radiograms will speak for us on this point:

6 May 42

"To Sharp: All Forces in the Philippines except those on fortified Islands at entrance to Manila Bay are hereby released to your command stop Inform all concerned stop Report at once to MacArthur for orders stop I believe you will understand the motive behind this order stop

Wainwright

6 May 42

"To Sharp: Wainwright has surrendered stop from now on communicate on all matters direct with me stop Have you communication with Chynoweth query

MacArthur

"BNLDVNDN MRI most immediate GRB4, AG 676 9/5 AG 676 Orders emanating from General Wainwright have no validity stop If possible separate your force into small elements and initiate guerilla operations stop you comma of course comma have full authority to make any decision that immediate emergency may demand stop keep in communication with me as much as possible stop you are a gallant and resourceful commander and I am proud of what you have done stop

MacArthur 0445 Z/9

As the fall of Malaybalay seemed to be imminent, the next step taken by Salipada was to organize a new provisional Provincial Government, and Dr. Carlos Fortich was selected as the Governor, Mr. Paulican of Maramag as Deputy Governor and Dr. Felipe Ceballos of the Managok National Agricultural School as the Provincial Treasurer. The selection of Fortich instead of Mr. Damascus caused the first open conflict between Salipada and Bowler with Fertig supporting the latter. Because of this conflict, Major Bowler and Father Hagarthy came to our area on an appeasement mission. The royal reception given by the Fortich in their house changed the opinion of Bowler about him. But this favorable change to the Governor was, however, unfavorable to Salipada as Bowler now not only wanted to covet the latter's sector but decided to have Salipada as his Regimental Commander. Not courageous enough to tell Salipada about this, he tried to drop a trial balloon to Andrews by offering Andrews to be his Regimental Commander. This action of Bowler prompted Salipada to accuse him of "intruding thru the back door."

On 19 February 1943, Fertig, being already designated by MacArthur as the Commander of the 10th Military District, sent to Salipada his congratulation to the brilliant showing of his force and at the same time notifying him of the official recognition of the unit. Everything went well for a while until an order came placing Bukidnon under Bowler, who was designated by Fertig as Division Commander and Salipada to be under Bowler as Regimental Commander. In the meeting of the Staff members, composed of Brigadier General Salipada K. Pendatun, Commanding Officer, Col. Edwin Andrews, Chief of Staff, Capt. Adolfo Galang, AC of S, G-1, Col. Tomas Cabili, AC of S, G-2, Lt. Col. Nicolas Gabutina, AC of S, G-3, Lt. Col. Dorooteo Soriano, AC of S, G-4, absent on procurement, Col. Frank McGee, Inspector General, Salipada submitted for consideration the order coming from Fertig. As no Filipino Officer would dare to say anything that might suggest defiance of the order, Col. McGee voluntarily gave his opinion to radio back Fertig in this tenor, "Release my unit from the 109th Division as we prefer to operate independently under you". Because of this controversy, Commander Chick Parsons, SW Pacific observer from Australia, came to our area with Bowler in the middle of May 1943. With the coming of Commander Parsons everything was patched up, including the sending to the Headquarters of Fertig, Colonel Tomas Cabili and Colonel Edwin Andrews with their necessary assistants.

After the fall of the concentration camp, Salipada's next objective was Malaybalay. In the first push toward the town, our men succeeded in surprising the Japanese and the "Brown Japanese" Constabulary under Capt. Alvear and Capt. Pasco. Had it not been for the loyalty of these officers to the Japanese, Capt. Yushioka, Malaybalay would have fallen in the hands of Salipada. Since then the constabulary men fought to the bitter end on the side of the Japs. Because of this failure, Salipada ordered the immediate siege of the town, advising the civilians to get out, especially those parolees who pretended to know us as mere "Tulisafes" (meaning Tulisanes or Highway Robbers) and not USAFFE.

In all operations made by Salipada against the enemy, all the civilians staying within the enemy occupied area and all others whose lives might have been endangered as a result of the operations were properly notified in advance of the attack in order to give them ample time to get out of the area covered by the operations or seek cover so as not to be involved

in the fight.

Before the launching of the attack at Malaybalay, he addressed letters to all provincial and municipal officials and also to the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Imperial Forces thereat informing them that an attack would be made by his unit and that all the civilians must be evacuated from the town of Malaybalay by the Japanese to avoid them from being involved in the fight. After about a week of continuously giving notices to all civilians inside of Malaybalay, Salipada started the offensive and in no time his unit captured the concentration camp at Kasiazang where he was able to free several prisoners of war. After two weeks of continuous attack launched by the unit against the enemy, Malaybalay prisoners of war who were paroled by the enemy and were loyal to the cause dashed for freedom and as they came to our area, they joined us and assisted in common operations against the Japanese. Some, however, although they had time to run away, stayed in the enemy territory, accepted commission in the Japanese Bureau of Constabulary and fought against us. It was these constabulary officers and men who went to the side of the Japanese that caused heavy casualty on the guerilla unit operating at Malaybalay. By the time Salipada's men arrived at Malaybalay, General Roxas was no longer there as he was brought to Davao by the enemy before the guerilla unit could reach Malaybalay.

In the siege that followed, the American enlisted men who were all now commissioned by Salipada, were valuable in the reconditioning of our calibers .30 and .50 machineguns, in the preparation of home-made hand grenades, and in the maintenance of about 15 cars and trucks. They also took charge of the Signal Company which was able to install radio transmitter, receiver, and telephone lines. With the latter's facility, Salipada had all the time an hourly front line situation, right at the Headquarters, so that whenever fighting became lively, he always rushed to the front to direct the fight personally. At first the Japanese did not give importance to the siege, but when our men began serenading them with about 300 hand grenades nightly and our five caliber .50s made regular hourly outbursts, they then realized that Salipada had under him a well-trained force equal to the task. When supplies were becoming scarce inside, some civilians and parolees had to sneak out through our line, and the Japs inside had to be supplied by their own comrades by airplanes. As this method was not so successful as they expected, they changed the tactics in that instead of supplies, they really dropped bombs on our front lines. The bombing took place for three successive days, but at last the Japs inside had to request the air men to stop because the bombs had then been dropping indiscriminately as our nearest front line was only about 30 meters from that of the Japs.

Because of the whole-hearted support given by the constabulary and Governor Rubin and some civilians to the Japs, Salipada ordered the destruction of some buildings including the constabulary barracks. Early on 14 February 1943, Salipada ordered the assault of Malaybalay. Our men penetrated the town but because of accurate shooting of the enemy and no doubt of the "Brown Japanese" constabulary, our men had to withdraw with some casualty.

The Japanese command in the Philippines could not ignore the siege of Malaybalay because radio Tokyo was already mentioning it over the radio. The immediate result of it was the Jap

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aid that came from Cagayan on 7 March 1943. Because of superior fire power supported by big caliber guns, our men were forced to withdraw. The withdrawal would have precipitated a general retreat had it not been for the leadership of Salipada that manifested itself in the midst of the crisis. The result was the withdrawal to 14 kilometers South of Malaybalay. Many of us did not realize the gravity of our situation until the next day when Col. Andrews gave a remark about a brother officer in this tenor, "Although I am also a coward, but I am not as yellow as he is".

V. That Salipada had also other problems to solve besides the front line. Among these was about supplies, especially salt and sugar. These commodities could be secured from Cotabato. But the salt area of this province, besides being largely controlled by the Japs, was also under the control of another leader who styled himself as "Major" Matas. Therefore, in order to procure freely from Cotabato it was necessary to convince Matas to join his force to Salipada. In this mission, Colonel Frank McGee was designated to contact Matas. Salipada made the wrong choice, because in the conference that ensued instead of earnestly working for the success of his mission, he allowed the creation of a wider gap and at the same time gave apparent insinuation that he was willing to accept the command if it were offered to him. By this action of Colonel McGee, he had unmasked himself as ambitious to supplant Salipada. This assertion is conclusive when we take into account the fact that he was the one who suggested to defy Fertig's order. Subsequent events unerringly followed the course toward this end.

Because of the departure of Colonel Andrews and Colonel Cabili to Fertig's Headquarters, Salipada had to take other officers for his staff. Salipada again made a wrong choice of his Chief of Staff, as will be demonstrated later on.

Since there was then no enemy activity in the front line, Salipada was able to obtain permission from Bowler to go to Cotabato. He left with a good number of escort. His departure caused a real dissension in the front, because many officers, and men had expressed their desires to go to Cotabato to visit their families. The command then was left to the Chief of Staff, Lt. Colonel Nicolas Gabutina. For his lack of tact, many of the civilian volunteers left even with their guns. The situation in the front became acute when rumors spread that Salipada would no longer return to Bukidnon. Even the Americans in the Ordnance, Signal, and Motor Pool began making preparations to go back to the forest. This state of affairs was aggravated by the news that Talakag was invaded, and that Bowler's whereabouts was not to be revealed because of the presence of several transports at Cagayan bringing 75,000 Japs.

The tense situation eased up when Salipada returned before the end of June 1943. The men in the front became jovial as their morale went high.

VI. That before the end of July 1943, Bowler, with Father Hagarthy and other assistants, came to supervise personally the reorganization of the force of Salipada. Bowler, as Commanding Officer of the 109th Division and Salipada, as Commanding Officer of the 117th Infantry Regiment which consisted of more than one-half of his original force. The remainder which was less than one-half, as the 118th Infantry Regiment to be the nucleus of a new division, the 106th. It seemed that this reor-

ganization was already prearranged in the Headquarters of Lt. Col. Bowler in Talakag, when Lt. Col. McGee went there to see Bowler, while Salipada was in Cotabato.

The first action that Bowler did when he arrived in Bukidnon was to check up on the issue of supplies obtained by direct purchase and on credit since the organization of the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force. He directed the Provincial Auditor, Mr. Maceren, to do this for him. The Auditor went over all the records of the G-4 and Division Quartermaster to find if they tallied with the report of the then Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4. It took Mr. Maceren and his assistant more than one week to audit. After Mr. Maceren had certified to the correctness of the report, Bowler then assumed all the responsibility in the payment of the obligation amounting to about ₱212,000.00 covering the period from December 1942 to 30 June 1943.

The second action taken by Bowler was the issuance of a general order for the permanent rank of all officers now under him. With this order no rank higher than Major was made. So, Brigadier General Salipada K. Pendatun became only Major and three Lt. Colonels also Majors.

His third action, after praising the 117th Inf. Regiment as the best in Mindanao, was to notify Salipada to be the Commanding Officer of the 118th Infantry under Lt. Col. Frank McGee, who would be the Commanding Officer of the 106th Division. This was a stunning blow to Salipada. After long and several discussions, he acceded, provided that he could take along with him several officers and men who were Majors Teodoro Garcia and Doroteo G. Soriano, Captains Alfredo Bustamante and Melecio Orbase, Lt. Arlindo Angeles, Lt. Adolfo Galang, Lt. Antonio Reyes, et al.

When the news became public that the above men were going with Salipada to Cotabato, 90% of the Officers in the front line also wanted to go with Salipada. Even civilians expressed their desire to go to Cotabato. Salipada had everything to gain to go to Cotabato as the bulk of his supporters were from there, but because of his promise to the late Don Manuel Fortich to defend Bukidnon to the last, if possible he would not go away, even though he knew that the 117th Inf. would soon face a formidable Japanese Force.

The day of departure of the party came on 19 September 1943. In the Headquarters, except for a counted few, the men were all sullen with tears in their eyes, because to lose Salipada as their commander, they had the presentiment that the Japs would again take full control of Bukidnon.

Arriving in Bulanan, Midsayap, Cotabato, on 30 September 1943, Salipada immediately began the organization of the 118th Infantry with Major Teodoro Garcia, Executive Officer, Major Doroteo G. Soriano, Commanding Officer of the Headquarters Battalion, Capt. Melecio Orbase, Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., Captain Udog Matalan, Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn., and Lt. Mantil Dilangalen, Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn.

The 106th Division was expected to compose of the 116th Inf. under Major Page at Glan, 118th Inf. under Major Salipada K. Pendatun at Bulanan, and 119th Inf. under Capt Gumbay Piang at Mt. Perez, Cotabato.

As expected, Major Matas would not budge an inch to give the command of his Battalion to Capt. Orbase as Lt. Col. McGee, the Division Commander had to reduce the rank of Matas to 2nd Lt. with the position of Executive Officer in accordance with the directive from higher headquarters. Several negotiations were made by McGee himself, but of no avail. The seed of discord that McGee planted in the area of Matas for Salipada to reap proved a boomerang for McGee himself. Nevertheless, Salipada being kind hearted and broad minded, did not lose hope to be able to come to mutual understanding with Matas. So that his treatment of this Bn., although Matas was still in command, was as if it were already under him by giving all possible cooperation and aid whenever needed by Matas and his men.

Of course the presence of Salipada in Cotabato could not be kept a secret from the public, much less from General Paulino Santos, who had many agents everywhere in our area. So, as if by magic, a letter was delivered to Salipada from the General. We read the letter and the tenor of it was no doubt entirely of General Santos' style, telling among other things about the arrogant assumption of American superiority over the Orientals. By this letter we were convinced that General Santos was a sincere collaborator with the Japs. In Salipada's reply to the General, he stressed the fact that there was better order and government in our area than in the area under the control of the Japs.

VII. That as 14 October 1943 was approaching, Salipada's mind was perturbed about the possible consequences that would result in the proclamation of the Japanese sponsored independence of the Philippines. He was fearing a sort of civil war among the Filipinos. His fear was accentuated by the proclamation of a general amnesty, because many officers and men deserted us and went voluntarily to the Japs to serve in the Bureau of Constabulary or to be voluntary informers of our activities.

We consider this as the second phase of the darkest period in our fight for freedom. This period served to be the real test of the caliber and mettle of the officers and men who remained with us, especially those in the regiment of Salipada. Those who remained with him were not only veterans of many fights, but also were veterans of all kinds of sickness and in the scarcity of food. In the menu of this Regiment, there were three kinds of rice, namely palay-rice, corn-rice and memo-rice, and in spite of the unwelcome intrusion of the last, the men were truly loyal to Salipada thru thick and thin.

Since the arrival of Salipada in Cotabato, several smushing engagements only took place in different points within the regimental sector. Lack of ammunitions, order of general attack in all fronts could not be issued, and besides, there was a standing order from higher headquarters not to initiate a fight unless attacked. But the Japanese sensing that we were lacking ammunitions, initiated an all-out campaign by attacking Salipada's headquarters and the 3rd Bn. at Bulanan about the end of November 1943, then made a smashing attack against the 2nd Bn. at Mlang on 8 December 1943. In these two attacks, although the two battalions had to withdraw, some units of 3rd Bn. were able to inflict damage against the enemy on their return to their barracks. The first Bn. still under Matas was left uncollected, because the Japs and the "Brown" Japs in Cotabato were then making a friendly negotiation for the surrender of Matas and his men.

Knowing the country and at the same time knowing who were the men that he could trust in Cotabato, Salipada instead of going further from the Japanese transferred his Headquarters to Tomado, just about 7 kilometers from the strong Japs outpost at Fort Pikit. In this new Headquarters, which was kept a secret from the Japs for a long time, Salipada prepared his open letter to the Bureau of Constabulary by discussing the chaotic conditions then existing because of the existence of the unconstitutional Puppet Independent Philippines, especially the uncompromising attitude of the Constabulary officers in favor of the Japs in the guise of enforcing law and order for the Puppet Government.

Lt. Col. Frank McGee with proper escort went to the Headquarters of Col. Bowler, our then "A" Corps Commander in the middle of November 1943 and returned to Duñgos, Nlangu, the Headquarters of the 2nd Bn. in the latter part of February 1944, bringing with him emergency notes, ammunitions, and some carbines. As soon as Salipada was notified of the arrival of McGee, he immediately came with two crack platoons to escort the Division Commander from Duñgos to his Headquarters at Tomado. The going of Col. McGee was necessary, because of the imminent surrender of Matas to the Japs or his joining Salipada's regiment.

The return of Salipada to his headquarters in the middle of March 1944, was well advertised to the Japanese by his civilian sympathizers, who publicized that the white men brought with him for Salipada plenty of automatic arms and ammunitions. This propaganda had a good effect in keeping up the morale of our men and civilians, but in reality, it worked hardship against us, because the Japanese had to tighten up their vigilance. This unexpected arrival of Col. McGee precipitated the sending by the Japs of their ultimatum to Matas to surrender within 10 days or face annihilation. Matas, realizing the coming soon of American aid, could not now gamble his future with the Japs. He sent his emissary to McGee offering the fusion of his battalion with the 118th Inf. under Salipada and agreed the position of Executive Officer provided he should be given the rank of 1st Lieutenant.

Capt. Orbase, after receiving detailed instruction from Salipada, hurried immediately to Denspaco to take over the command. At the expiration of the ultimatum about the end of March 1944, the Japs attacked the 1st Bn. by driving the men up to the mountains; also, they attacked the 3rd Bn., probably to prevent the sending of reinforcement to the 1st Bn. Our position in Tomado, became known to the Japs at Pikit, so that an expeditionary force was sent to trap Salipada and McGee. Fortunately, the guide selected by the Japs happened to be one of our former officers, who was forced to surrender because of sickness, led them to another place, while we evacuated to a place which most likely the Japs would not suspect. So reasoned out Salipada. This place was nearer to Pikit, because it was only about 5 kilometers. The next morning Salipada ordered the moving further into the forest according to him, but in fact the place selected was till nearer Pikit. As Salipada went nearer the Japs, the people became more secretive because of their implicit loyalty to him. Once, when he was asked why he was not afraid to go nearer, his immediate reply was, "A manobo would never betray a Maguindano Datu", a fact which has been a tradition from time immemorial.

But at last he could no longer stay nearer the Japs,

because of difficulty of procuring food supply. Consequently, he transferred to the 2nd Bn. area of Captain Udtog Matalam at Duñgos, Misamis.

No sooner was his arrival in the area of the 2nd Bn. at Duñgos known to the "brown" Japanese constabulary, than an intensive campaign by the latter against the procurement of palay by the former was initiated. For this purpose, the constabulary, with increased force, occupied Tacurong under the command of the then notorious Capt. Javelosa. Under the present circumstances Salipada could no longer avoid a fight between Filipinos. So, on 13 August 1944, he ordered a direct attack against Tacurong, and he himself directed the field maneuver of portion of the 2nd Bn. and his Combat Company. After more than 24 hours fighting, the constabulary surrendered less their Capt. Javelosa who escaped to report personally to General Santos at Koronadal the attack on and fall of Tacurong Garrison. Because of impending reprisal by the Japanese, Salipada sent a radio to Division Headquarters at Salsaman, Cotabato, for ammunitions. But, instead of infantry attack, six bombers came over Buluan on 19 August 1944, under the direction, according to report of our operator in Koronadal, of General Santos himself in person. The bombers mercilessly bombed and machinegunned civilians, because it was then market day. Army casualty was insignificant.

The report of Salipada on the attack of Tacurong to the Division Commander, Lt. Col. McGee, was forwarded to the Higher Headquarters with a mark in red pencil "Excellent".

VIII. That the handicap of Salipada in getting more arms and ammunitions from the Division Commander was his superiority complex over McGee for being the former commander of the latter. In spite of the repeated call of Col. Bowler that arms and ammunitions must be issued as war could not be won by keeping them in boxes, McGee tenaciously kept on with the idea of keeping them in reserve for future eventuality.

With the arrival in September 1944 and in January 1945 of arms and ammunitions McGee could no longer help giving Salipada all that the latter wanted for his regiment. McGee was stingy to the regiment of Salipada, but it was the best unit that he had in his division. The whole 118th Inf. Regiment now fully armed, the Japanese fearing attack at vulnerable points had to consolidate their forces in strategic selected places. So that when the Americans landed at Parang and Cotabato on 19 April 1945, they found these two places entirely abandoned.

Before the landing at Cotabato, Col. McGee received a directive from Fertig, prohibiting the former and his command to have a direct contact with the American Forces. But when the Americans came, they did not stop to inquire who they had to contact in Cotabato, but wanted who was the man who could give them enemy situation. The informer they found did not hesitate to name Major Salipada E. Pendatun. So a gunboat went up the Cotabato River immediately to get Salipada, whose Headquarters was transferred to Talitay near Fort Pikit and brought to the Headquarters of the "X" Corps Commander, Major General Sibert at Parang.

After all, when Fertig and Bowler could no longer pretend to ignore the growing importance of the 118th Inf. Regiment of Salipada, composed of the 1st Bn. under Major Alfredo Bustamante, the 2nd Bn. under Major Udtog Matalam, and the 3rd Bn. under Captain Mantil Dilangalen, in the coming mopping up operations

in cooperation with the American invasion forces, Salipada was promoted in May 1945 to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

IX. That from the commencement of the guerilla operation by Lt. Salipada K. Pendatun up to the date of the landing of the liberation forces in April 1945, his unit got the full support and cooperation of all civilians outside of enemy occupied areas both in the provinces of Cotabato and Bukidnon. This was so because of the discipline his officers and enlisted men had, for Salipada succeeded in inculcating in the minds of his officers and men to respect and protect the lives and properties of loyal civilians who were cooperating with the guerilla movement. Had it not been for the cooperation of the civilian populace in all the areas where Salipada's unit operated against the enemy, his guerilla unit could not have been successful because without them food would have been extremely difficult to procure and enemy information would have been impossible to be fully obtained. Salipada followed as closely as he can possibly do under the then existing circumstances, International Laws of War. Upon the arrival of the American Liberation Forces, he had well over eight hundred prisoners of war, most of them Filipinos and some of them Japanese soldiers and civilian citizens. It is safe to say that Salipada's unit was among the very few guerilla units in the Philippines that maintained a stockade for almost two years in spite of the difficulty of getting food supplies and of the dangers that could have resulted in view of the fact that it was quite difficult to avoid the men from escaping or from holding the lines against the enemy attack. But in order to convince the civilian populace and his men that he was only interested in fighting against the enemy and, as such, he had to keep in the face of all difficult situations, prisoners of war and treated them in accordance with the law of warfare. When the Americans arrived, Salipada turned over all his Japanese and Filipino prisoners of war to the American Army authorities.

At the time of surrender in May 1942, Salipada was a First Lieutenant, but in view of his splendid leadership, regular and ranking officers like Lt. Col. John D. McGee, Col. Edwin Andrews, Col. (now Senator) Tomas Cabili, Lt. Col. Dionisio Gutierrez, Major Teodoro Garcia, Major Nicolas Gabutina and Major Melencio Orbase, willingly and voluntarily submitted themselves under his command. These ranking officers were designated by him as members of his Staff and commanding field units. From the beginning to the end of his resistance activities, Salipada was able to maintain complete unity of his unit and jealousy among officers or even petty quarrels never took place because of the able, efficient and quality leadership he had shown to his subordinates.

Upon the arrival of the American Liberation Forces, they hardly encountered the enemy within the area occupied by the regiment under the command of Major Salipada K. Pendatun, in view of the fact that before the American came his unit was constantly engaging the enemy day and night, in order to clear the way for the Americans to land. The enemy never put up any real defensive positions within the areas occupied by his unit due to the effective intelligence reports he furnished American Forces before the actual landing took place. This unit was practically in control of the Cotabato-Davao National Highway at the time of the landing in Cotabato. Upon landing, Major Salipada divided his unit and attached them to different American divisions of the 10th Corps and acted as either guides or advance points of the American Forces in the offensive campaign towards Davao of

NOTARIAL
SEAL

the 24th Division and towards Bukidnon of the 31st Division. In view of the knowledge of Major Pendatun regarding the capabilities of the enemy and his familiarity with the terrain, consequently, in no time the Americans cleared the Cotabato-Davao and the Cotabato-Bukidnon highways from enemy resistance.

X. That upon the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in the province of Cotabato, President Sergio Osmeña of the Commonwealth of the Philippines appointed Salipada K. Pendatun, who was at that time a Lt. Colonel, as Provincial Governor of the said province. This appointment was made with the best of wisdom. The President had probably been convinced beyond any doubt that under an epoch of gigantic reconstruction and under the conditions and circumstances of disturbed peace and order brought about by the war, Colonel Pendatun was the best qualified man in the province to direct the affairs of a war torn people. The President was never mistaken in this particular choice because soon after Colonel Pendatun was inducted into office as Provincial Governor he immediately buried himself into work. With his dynamic leadership and meritorious qualities for administration he was able to bring about a situation in the province which later on became the precursor of achievements. During his incumbency as Governor, he had paved the way for the reconstruction of the province and the bringing to normal conditions of the peace and order situation. General Roxas might have followed the patriotic labors of Governor Pendatun during the hectic days of the resistance movement and he might have also learned the exceptional quality of his leadership and administration during his incumbency as Provincial Governor as well as his grasp of post-war problems, so, when the General chose to run for President of the Philippines and organized the Liberal Nacionalista Party, one of the happy selections of the General was Governor Pendatun to run for a seat in the upper chamber of the Congress of the Philippines. Governor Salipada K. Pendatun, with his fame as a guerilla leader and his renowned administrative quality as Provincial Governor of Cotabato, although new in National politics, his merits catapulted him to the Senate, when he was elected on April 23, 1946, as Senator of the Philippines.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name this 22nd day of November, 1947.

(Sgd.) DOROTEO G. SORIANO
 Lt. Colonel Infantry
 Asst. Chief of Staff
 Bukidnon-Cotabato Force
 (Major Inf. PA Res.)
 O-24010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
 QUEZON CITY) S.S.

In Quezon City, Philippines, this 22nd day of November, 1947, personally appeared before me, DOROTEO G. SORIANO, with Residence Certificate No. A-28705, issued at Manila on January 8, 1947, known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing affidavit and he acknowledged to me that the same is of his own free and voluntary act and deed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 22nd day of November, 1947.

Doc. No. 254
 Page No. 55
 Book No. II
 Series of 1947

(Sgd.) ELIGIO CORDERO
 Notary Public
 Until December 31, 1948

NOTARIAL
 SEAL

A TRUE COPY
 1/11/48 *[Signature]*

Exhibit - J

1214, Miguelin, Sampaoc
Manila
18 December 1946

SUBJECT : Non-payment of arrears in pay.

General Douglas MacArthur
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers
Tokyo, Japan

S i r ;

I am now a civilian, but I hope that I should still be given due consideration of being heard as if I were still with your Armed Forces.

It is a long story to recount here the fortitude and heroic stand that we Filipino soldiers and officers had shown before the eyes of our American comrades-in-arms in the unequal fight against the Japs. Was there any reason for making such a supreme sacrifice in the face of great odds? To answer this question is another long story to make, but I believe it is sufficient to state here that two words will disclose the feelings which we cherished the most in the battle field in the face of danger and death and they are the two most qualified and significant words that I can find in the dictionary, *FATE* and *LOYALTY*. Our faith in the ultimate triumph and goodness of America was unshaken even during the dark and hectic days of Philippine History as demonstrated by our unfaltering loyalty in defending the Constitution of the United States in the unconquered regions of the Philippines. In those dark days following the general surrender on 10 May 1942 in Mindanao, while hoping against hope, we who did not surrender had been obeying blindly your order to General Sharp to engage immediately the Japs into a guerrilla warfare. Your radiographic order of 6 May 1942 secretly leaked out in some way or another, so we who had knowledge of it had to obey without hesitation your order in defiance to the Court Martial threats of our superior officers for disobedience of what they considered their lawful order if we did not surrender.

Because of our insufficient number, we had to recruit civilian volunteers who had the foresight of hiding unsundered arms and ammunitions and formed a small army to engage the Japs in frontal attacks and later, because of your order through Commander Chick Parson in the early part of 1943, had to resort to guerrilla tactics for then the important mission you gave us was to work on "intelligence".

Our force in Mindanao was formed in accordance with the Table of Organization and all military laws and regulations were obeyed as fast as we could inject them to our new civilian comrades-in-arms. In our organizational units, as far as I can remember, abuses by military personnel on the civilian population were reduced to the minimum or conspicuously absent. Colonel Wendell Fertig can vouch my statement that we never tolerated

abuses, and in practice we even went to the extent of missing many times our meals instead of depriving the civilians of whatever food they had. So the inevitable result of our continuous sacrifice for three years was that we were under-fed, under-nourished and ill-clothed, until liberation came to Mindanao.

In the midst of confusion, because of the order of demobilization, our hopes brightened when we were told that we should soon receive our "back pay". As time went on, back pay was no longer the talk, because "arrears in pay" was the logical one to be expected. As a matter of fact many USAFFE's had been paid of their back pay, but we do not envy them nor begrudge of the benevolence given them, even though they only served as USAFFE for a few days or not at all, because that was their good luck. However, we were told later that there was a mistake and because of that mistake the other USAFFE's who were on the waiting pay list had to go through the unusual subterfuge and many screening legal intricacies which resulted to just this, "all USAFFE's should be barred from receiving their arrears in pay simply for being USAFFE and only civilian recognized guerrillas should be paid of their arrears in pay". We are glad that our civilian guerrilla comrades-in-arm are now being paid because the payment is a fulfillment of our assurance to them when they were recruited and inducted to our units that they should be amply repaid by the United States for their military services if they remain loyal to America.

But what we can not understand is that USAFFE's who did not surrender and who organized guerrilla units and continued the fight to liberation day are now being included with those considered as undesirable USAFFE's. Is there anything wrong with being a USAFFE? The only wrong thing that I can see is that there were USAFFE's who faithfully served two masters in a military capacity, Uncle Sam and the Nippon Emperor and there were also USAFFE's who served only Uncle Sam as their master in a military capacity but whose loyalty is now being doubted of its authenticity. And why does not Uncle Sam now pick out those who faithfully served him and give what are due them as arrears in pay? The big question now, Sir, is who will act as Uncle Sam for them? The big answer too, Sir, is that there is only one who can do this for them, and this very one is no other than our former Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur.

As a part of this special appeal, Sir, permit me to quote hereunder my prepared three minute radio talk on the Guerrilla hour over KZRH on 27 December 1946 at 7:30 P.M. Manila time as follows:

"Good evening ladies and gentlemen of the radio audience:

"Only the fortitude and heroic stand of the Filipino soldiers against the Japs in Bataan had been memorialized in a lavish manner in the annals of contemporary history. So the majority of the Filipinos had no knowledge of the happenings in the other corners of the Philippines. From the unknown then, you are now going to hear the voice of the Digos Front of the 101st Division of Mindanao fame to the Japanese.

"In the early days of the war, this Filipino Division poorly equipped and armed, suffered its first and only set back when the force defending Davao had been routed and had to resort to a disorderly retreat.

through the mountain fastness as the Japs were effecting a landing in the Gulf of Davao. To cope with the critical situation the Commanding General sent another Filipino force to stop the advance of the Japs at Digos. And while in the front, the General observed the seeming apathy of the Filipinos to fight, so he had to order without delay the best available Westpointer, Lt. Col. John Macgee, to take over the Command in the front. This American knew the only solution, which was just this "to take the Filipinos into his confidence first, then let them fight better, later". This sympathetic approach worked wonder, as it was the balm that appeased the yearnings of discontented heart whose loyalty was at that time doubted by the Americans in Mindanao. The palpable outcome of such congenial understanding was the unbridled demonstration of loyalty and dauntless valor which made the Digos Front second only in fame to that of Bataan. So, when Bataan fell, the Filipino members of the 101st Division silently prayed almost simultaneously to this effect, "Thank God that the American aid did not come, and the failure, Oh Lord, is a blessing in disguise, because had it come we could not have fully demonstrated to the Americans our unfaltering loyalty to America. And although Bataan fell, it has however gone down in the annals of history as the bloodiest immortal battle of the Philippines. Give us courage, Oh Lord, and grant that the spirit of the Digos Front will be our beacon light that should guide us in continuing the fight for democracy and for freedom!"

"In spite of great odds, the Japanese were not able to break through the Digos Front. But, alas! on 10 May 1942, shortly after the succumb of Corregidor the Armed Forces of Mindanao surrendered in obedience to the compulsory order from Gen. Wainwright. Nevertheless, the spirit of the Digos Front urged the Filipino remnants of the 101st Division, who preferred to go to the mountains, to continue to fight in order to make patent to America, that although the Philippines was vanquished, it was however, not perpetually conquered.. Thank you."

I hope, Sir, that the spirit of X-mas will influence the better part of yourself in the consideration of this humble appeal in the name of thousands of your former USAFFE Officers and enlisted men.

Very respectfully submitted,

(Sgd.) DOROTEO G. SORIANO
Major Inf. PA Reserve
O-24010

A TRUE COPY
1/16/48/098

Exhibit-K

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Apo 500

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 853078*

2 January 1947.

Major Doroteo G. Soriano, Inf. PA Res,
1214 Miguelin, Sempaloc,
Manila, Philippine Islands.

Dear Major Soriano:

Your letter of 18 December 1946 addressed to General MacArthur, concerning recognition for guerrilla members of the Digos Front, 101st Division, has been referred to me for reply.

The Secretary of War has authorized the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, APO 707, to make determination of the status of personnel in the Philippine Islands during the period of the Japanese occupation and accordingly, your letter is being transmitted to him for due consideration and appropriate action with the request that he inform you as to the final outcome of the matter.

Since responsibility for administering the law has been placed upon the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, no action may be taken here. I want to assure you, however, that he will give your request every consideration consistent with law and regulations.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY
1/15/48/bp

PHILIPPINE ARMY CANTONMENTS

<u>Cantonment</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Unit</u>
Manaoag	Pangasinan	11th Div
Manaoag-Guesset	"	"
Umingan (Camp Gonzales)	"	"
Magbilao (Camp Tabu)	"	"
Lingayen (Camp Bugallon)	"	"
Malatiki (Malatique)	Tarlac	21st Div
San Marcelino	Zambales	31st Div
Tagaytay City	Cavite	41st Div
Santo Tomas	Batangas	51st Div
Santo Rosario	"	"
Lipa	"	"
Iloilo	Isle of Panay	61st Div
Camp O'Donnell	Tarlac	71st Div
	Isle of Cebu	81st Div
Cabanatuan	Nueva-Ecija	91st Div
Tankulan	Bukidnon	101st Div
Capt Tinio	Nueva-Ecija	PA Airfield

Some of the Project Engineers and paying officers were as follows:

<u>Cantonment</u>	<u>Proj Engr.</u>	<u>Finance Officer</u>
(11th Div) Camp Gonzales	Lt Oscar Santos	Capt G. Carson
(41st Div) Tagaytay City	Maj de Jesus	Capt Daniel Limbo
(51st Div) Santo Tomas	Lt. F. P. Javier	Lt. P. Tiongson
(71st Div) Camp O'Donnell	Lt. A. R. Santos	Lt. Miranda
(71st Div) Cabanatuan	Lt. Escobar	

INSTALLATIONS FROM ILOILO

Q.M.C. DEPOTS

LA PAZ
JARO
ILOILO CITY
BACOLOC (SUB-DEPOT)
CEBU CITY
ZAMBOANGA PORT

61ST DIV.

61ST SIGNAL CORPS
CHEM. WARFARE UNIT
CONSTR. USAFFE BARRACKS

LANDING FIELDS

AJUY LANDING FIELD	(BANA)
MANDURHIAO AIRPORT	(CABO)
1. MILT ROAD	
2. LANDING FIELD	
PILAR LANDING FIELD	(PANAY)
TIRING " "	(STA BARBARA)
DUMARAO " "	
DINGLE AIR STRIP	(PANAY)

MISC.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY - BACOLOD
POST OFFICE DEPT. - ILOILO CITY

CEBU PROJECTS NOT COMING UNDER PUBLIC LAW 490

82 Inf-81 Div
83 Inf-81 Div

1. US. Quarantine Sta.
2. Gasoline Storage
3. Guadalupe Tailoring
4. La Favorita Bakery
5. Baska Bolo Factory
6. Talisay Sugar Central
7. Jakoselem Shoemaker
8. Talisay First Aid Sta.
9. Emergency Hospital
10. Taller Hijos De F. Escano
11. Cebu Shipyard and Engineer
12. Cebu Portland Cement
13. KZRC Radio Station
14. Signal Corp
15. Standard Oil Co.
16. Long Distance Telephone Lines
17. Ammo Factory
18. Phil. Refinery

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Authority: 11/03/83