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TITLE : History of Bury "C", 60th CA containing some data of death
ORIGIN : S/Sgt. Bernard O. Hopkins
DATES : 1 Nov. 41 to 5 May 42
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passed

Summit

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"CH I C A G O"

PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL NOTES OF -----

BERNARD O. HOPKINS - S. Sgt - 6944374

Btry C 60th CA (AA)

Home Address:- 18 Bryant St., Leaksville, North Carolina

NOTE: - This book contains valuable records of Battery C,
60th CA (AA) of no value to foreign governments or
individuals other than the owner.

BATTERY ROSTER

(1)

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DUTY</u>
Capt	AMES, GODFREY R. S. S. - 4-12-42, Par. 3, FCAC #29; PH 4-12-42, Par 7, FCAC #29; Note 1 WDO Camp #1	0-20671	Btry, Commander
Capt	CORNWALL, PAUL R. Trfd to Denver, 5-1-42, Note 4 WDO - Camp #1	0-21156	Btry, Executive
1st LT	FORTNEY, THOMAS H. Assgnd 5-2-42 Japan?	0-340841	Btry, Executive
1st LT	HUMPHREY, BENNICE F. S. S. 4-12-42, Par. 3, FCAC #29; O. L. 4-23-42-Note 4 Asst Bks Ldr-Camp #1	0-362485	Range Officer
1st LT	FACE, HERBERT E. Jr KIA 4-26-42-Note 2-Buried by QM on Corregidor Grave:- Plot E-Row 1 Grave #7	0-22914	Asst. Btry, Exec.
2nd LT	PHILLIPS, JAMES A. Assgnd 4-27-42 Japan?	0-412159	Ass t. Btry, Exec.

(2)

2nd LT	CHANCY, YANCK B. Assgnd, 4-23-42; S. S. 4-23-42; O. L., 5-6-42: Note 4 Utilities-Camp #1	0-890557	Asst. Range Officer
1st Sgt	BERMAN, WILLIAM E. SS., 4-12-42; Note 4 Japan	R-725735	First Sergeant
St Sgt	Davis, Paul B. SS Note 3	6274674	AA Fire Control
St Sgt	HOPKINS, BERNARD O. S. S. - Note 3	6944374	Supply
Sgt	CARLETON, ALBERT B. Japan?	6257310	Gun Commander

(Continued)

Sgt	DURAN, FRED	6253871	Mess Sergeant
(3)			
Sgt	GAJDANOWICZ, BRONISLAW S. S. -5-6-42 Note 4	6145151	AA Director Sgt
Sgt	HOWELL, PAT R. Hosp Camp #1 Dysentery	6276572	Chief of Range
Sgt	HUMER, GLEN R.		
Sgt	INGHAM, ALEXANDER M.	6272338	Gun Commander
Sgt	PERRY, EDWARD J. S. S. Par 3, PCAC #29, 4-12-42; Note 4	6879678	Gun Commander
	Mess Camp #1		
Sgt	REVEGLIA, ARMANDO J. Note 4	6904188	Gun Commander
(4)			
Sgt	SMITH, GORDON C. S. S. 4-12-42, Par 3, PCAC #29; WIA 5-6-42; Note 4	6257387	Ht. Finder Sgt
	BARBER* Nichols #field		
Sgt	SWANSON, EDWARD J. KIA 4-12-42-Buried by CM on Corregidor Grave:- Plot C-Row 3, Grave 100	19054281	Gun Commander
Sgt	WOODRUFF, RICHARD A. Detail 7-22-43	6832776	Chief of AA Mg's
Cpl	ARMSTRONG, RALPH E.	6995999	Gunner
Cpl	BAERTZ, RICHARD W. S. S. 3-26-42; O. L. 4-12-42; Note 4	6578025	Chief of Comm.
	Japan?		
Cpl	DAVIS, WILLIAM E. Note 4	6396247	Gun ner
(5)			
Cpl	JARVIS, THOMAS L.	6345801	AA Mg Cpl
Cpl	KENNA, ROBERT N. Guard Hosp-Camp #1	12004314X	Btry Clerk-Gunner
Cpl	KOCEVAR, MICHAEL J., Jr	7020087	Gun ner

(Continued)

S. S. 4-12-42, Par 3, FCAC #29; O. L. 5-6-42: Note 4
 Palawan?

	Cpl	MORRISON, BOB E. S.S. - MIA, Cavite Prov., 2-17-42		Motor Cpl.
	Cpl	REEFF, JOHN P.	19017075	Inst. Cpl.- Director
		Hosp-Camp #1		
	Cpl	SCOTT, ERNEST J.	16013593	Gunner
(6)	Cpl	SOUTHWELL, EARL W. P. H. 3-26-42	19056394	Gunner
		Detail 7-22-43		
	Cpl	WALDRON, BENNIE D.	18018183	Gunner
		Camp #1		
	Cpl	WOOTEN, GENE W.	19052041	Inst. Cpl- Director
	Pvts 1cl	BATNE, HARRY M.	5cl 6568911	Elev. Setter
	Pvt 1cl	BRACKIN, ADRIAN C.	3cl 17001753	Power Plant Op.
	Pvt 1cl	BROWN, CHARLES M.	18000394	Cannoneer
(7)				
	Pvt 1cl	CHAMBERS, EDWIN C. S. S. 4-11-42, Par 3, FCAC	19032475 #29; O. L. 5-6-42; Note 4	Chauffeur
		Detail 7-22-43		
	Pvt 1cl	CHILDERS, ROY R. Camp #1	6828741	Observer
	Pvt 1cl	CODY, JOHN E. P. H. 4-12-42	3cl 17018045	Cook
		Hosp-Bilibid		
	Pvt 1cl	ENEERAD, EDDIE F. Palawan?	5cl 19042058	Bagler
	Pvt 1cl	FOLK, LOUIS E. Detail 7-22-43	5cl 19019056	Chauffeur
	Pvt 1cl	GORMAN, HENRY R.	5cl 6951331	AA MG-Gunner

(Continued)

(8)				
Pvt 1cl	HOLM, HOLGER L.	5cl	17027393	Clerk-SWBD OP
	S. S. 3-28-42; O. L., 4-12-42; Note 4			
Pvt 1cl	OLSON, EDWIN W.	5cl	17029551	AA MG-Ammunition
Pvt 1cl	RUBA, MATHIAS M.	3cl	17003884	Cook
Pvt 1cl	Detail 7-22-43			
Pvt 1cl	SCHWAB, CHARLES F.	5cl	15017150	Clerk-SWBD OP
	S. S., 3-26-42; P. H., 4-12-42			
	Palawan?			
Pvt 1cl	SCOTT, HOMER D.		18015207	Cook
	DS 74th Sep. Baking Co (FS), Bataan			
Pvt 1cl	SHIFLENT, CLIFFORD		14043786	Observer
	Note 4 Dynamite Crew-Nichols Field			
Pvt 1cl	SMITH, CHARLES H.	5cl	14047104	Cook (Student)
Pvt 1cl	STANDEFER, DAVID G.		18038649	Cannoneer
Pvt 1cl	STEELE, EARL E.		18015239	Cook
	D. S. 74th Sep. Baking Co (FS), Bataan-			
Pvt 1cl	STRAUSS, NATHAN		17015786	Elev. Set-Gunner
	KIA 4-12-42; Buried by QM on Corregidor Grave:- Plot C, Row 3, Grave 101			
Pvt 1cl	SUMROW, CLOYD W.		18036299	Cannoneer
	S. S., 4-12-42. Par 3, PCAC #29; WIA 5-6-42; Note 4			
Pvt 1cl	SWICKARD, WILLIAM E.	5cl	15061856	Stereoscopic Obs.
	P. H., 3-26-42			
(10)				
Pvt 1cl	THOMPSON, NILES R.		19056313½	Gunner
	WIA, 5-6-42-Note 4 Camp #1			
Pvt 1cl	TYRELL, EDWARD W.		17018585	Observer
	Hosp-Billibid-Dysentery			
Pvt 1cl	URLING, RICHARD H.		17017235	SWBD Operator
	S. S. 3-26-42; P. H. 4-12-42 Camp #1			

(Continued)

Pvt 1cl	WATERSEY, MICHAEL	17017248	Observer
Pvt 1cl	WATSON, WILLIAM J. Note 4	19054413	Observer
Pvt 1cl	WILLIAMSON, VERNON J.	18099019	Fuze Setter Op.
(11) Pvt 1cl	WRIGHT, GRAHAM E.	1cl 14046186	Stereoscopic Obs.
Pvt	GALLEN, BRUCE	5cl 17016179	Fuze Setter Op.
Pvt	CAMPBELL, MICHAEL V.	19019899	Basic
Pvt	GREBOY, ROY E. P. H., 4-13-42, Par 3, PGAC #24; S. S.,	5cl 19019937	Cannoneer 5-6-42; Note 4
Pvt	DAVIS, HAROLD S. Camp #1	4cl 19020504	Artillery Mechanic
Pvt (12)	DEE, GEORGE H.	5cl 17029533	Painter-Cannoneer
Pvt	DOMINIKOWSKI, ALEX D. S., Hosp-Bataan; died 7-12-42, Cab. Burial Plot #817	6133458	Basic POW Camp #1, Dysentery;
Pvt	FREEMAN, GEORGE W. Jr. MIA 5-6-42; died fr wounds 5-7-42; note	19013511	Cannoneer 4; left in Wheeler Tunnel
Pvt	GALARDI, FRED V.	16013043	Cannoneer
Pvt	GALLAGHER, JOHN T.	16041134	Cannoneer
Pvt	GASTELUM, JOSE R. Executed by Jap at Cab POW Camp #1.	4cl 19013521	Cannoneer-Mech 6-26-42; burial Plot #415
Pvt	GOODRICH, CHARLES S. S. 5-2-42; Note 4	19048352	Cannoneer
(13) Pvt	GOBLE, RAY D. Note:- Pvt. Goble has not been seen or heard of since when he was last seen at "Ilibid, Manila.	18050107	Cannoneer 5-28-42
Pvt	GRIFFIN, HERBERT C.	18042248	Basic
Pvt	HAYNES, CHARLES W.	18001666	Cannoneer
Pvt	HOUSE, SWEELING P. H. 3-26-42; MIA 5-6-42; Note 4	5cl 18048695	Fuze Setter Operator
	Cook at Lupa		
Pvt	HINSON, OMTS J. A. S., 5-2-42; Note 4	18042284	Cannoneer

(Continued)

Pvt	HUSTED, ROBERT S. S. S. P. H., 4-12-42	36035374	Observer
(14)			
Pvt	KNOWLEN, WILLIAM	37046772	Cannoneer
Pvt	KUHN, RAYMOND	7022524	AA MG-Gunner
Pvt	LEWIS, KENNETH L.	11007542	AA MG-Amunition
	Injured, Not in action, 4-12-42		
Pvt	Feppler, John B. D. S., Bataan Hosp. -Died 4-20-42-Hosp # 2		Basic - Bataan
Pvt	ROBBINS, RONALD R. Trfd to Chicago fr Hartford 4-1-42	6567624	Cannoneer-Cook
Pvt	SERNA, FERNANDO Note 4	18048794	Cannoneer
(15)			
Pvt	SEYTERGREN, ROBERT A. Died Cab. POW Camp #1, 11-23-42, Dysente ry	19017425	AA-MG-Amunition
Pvt	SHAUGHNESSY, PAUL J. Wounded, not in action, Jan or Feb 42-	19056412	Basic
	Detail 7-22-43		
Pvt	SHOOK, ROBERT M. KIA 5-6-42; Buried in his foxhole, Morri son Hill, Corregidor-	18048927	Bugler
Pvt	SLOOP, GILBERT L. Died, Cab. POW Camp #1, 11-3-42, Dysentery.	17023848	AA MG-Amunition
Pvt	SMITH, GEORGE J. Note 4	1600856 4	Cannoneer
Pvt	SPEAKER, JOHN M. Jr.	14038326	Cannoneer
(16)			
Pvt	Spencer, James W. D. S., Bataan; died, Camp O'Donnell, 5-8-42, Malaria- Grave #971- O'Donnell	16017990	Basic
Pvt	SPRUILL, DEWEY L. D. S., 74th Sep. Baking Co (PS), Bataan.	180380 84	Cook
Pvt	STANWILL, EMMETT D. MIA 5-6-42; Note 4; died, Cab. POW Camp #1, 1-6-43, dysentery and Amunition.	5cl 19044306	Cannoneer

(Continued)

Pvt	STEELE, ARTHUR A.	15017133	AA MG-Ammunition
Pvt	SUTTLE, MERVIN H.	18036248	Cannoneer
Pvt (17)	TAYLOR, PAUL G.	15017351	Cannoneer
Pvt	TEEL, JAMES O.	18038692	Cannoneer
Pvt	TIDWELL, JAMES T.	18038607	AA MG-Ammunition
Pvt	TOWNEY, ROLAND K.	18048698	Cannoneer
Pvt	TRAMMELL, ELLIS I. Camp #1	5cl 17044153	Observer
Pvt	TRAUT, WILLIAM	6066082	AA MG-Basic
Pvt	TRISSELL, CARL B.	37007027	Basic
(18)			
Pvt	TURNER, JOHNNY P. Note 4	18060286	AA MG-Ammunition
Pvt	UNDERWOOD, EUGENE L. S. S. 5-6-42; Note 4	17016351	Cannoneer
Pvt	URBAN, ELMER J.	16008536	Cannoneer
Pvt	VARGO, STEVE	16003899	Basic
Pvt	VIGIL, SAMUEL	18016882	BASIC
Pvt	WALDRIP, LEON	18036385	Basic
Pvt (19)	WALLER, JOSEPH D. S. S., 4-12-42, Par 3, FCAC #29; P. H., 4413-42, Par 3, FCAC #29	14046063	Observer
Pvt	WALSH, PATRICK H. Died, Cab. POW Camp #1, 10-21-42	15061805	Observer
Pvt	WASSON, PAUL W.	5cl 18043757	Ch of Ammunition
Pvt	WHEAT, JOE H.	15061833	Observer
Pvt	WHITECOTTON, HORACE	18043825	Student Cook
Pvt	WHITECOTTON, HORACE	4cl 18043818	Cook
(20)			
Pvt	WILKINSON, HOWARD D.	17027420	Cannoneer
Pvt	WILLIAMS, GEORGE L.	18048862	Cannoneer

(Continued)

Pvt	WILLIAMS, LAWRENCE G. S. S. 3-26-42	19054307	SWBD Operator
Pvt	WILLIAMSON, GEORGE H. P. H., 3-25-42	16008660	Cannoneer
Pvt	WINNEKINS, ALVIN A.	16008694	Cannoneer
Pvt	WORMAN, RALPH G. Also served with Hq IInd Corps in G-4 Section D. S., 42nd Inf (PA) since prior to war- Died 6-9-42-Malaria-C'Donnell	15017141	Clerk
Pvt	WYSE, LEROY Camp #1	18049009	Cannoneer
Pvt 1cl	TEUFMAN, FRANCIS R. 4cl KIA 5-2-42; buried by JM on Corregidor; Grave; -Flot G-Row 5-Grave #88	18038736	Cannoneer

ATTACHED PERSONNEL

Fr Hq Btry., 60th CA (AA); Atchd about 2- 15-42

Cpl	Bressi, Arthur	7021306	3 rd AA-CH of Amn.
Pvt 1cl	Van, Charles E. Hosp-Camp #1 - Dysentery	18016884	Clerk-SWBD OF
Pvt	GIBBS, ANDREW R. Died at Bilibid Hosp (on Nipp. Work Detail) 10-7-42; of cerebral hemorrhage-reported to have been beaten.	6863412	Cannoneer

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Pvt 1cl	MARTIN, GALEN L. S. S., 4-12-42; Note 4 Cook-Lips fr 12th Medical Regiment (RS) (Philippine Division)	3cl 18048716	Cook
Pvt 1cl	Sucbiron, Note 4		First Aid man
Pvt	MANACOP, fr headquarters battery, 200th CA (AA): Atchd 4-12-42		First aid man
St/Sgt	Gannon, Harold J.	20842678	Observer

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	Fr Battery A, 200th CA (AA): Atchd 4-12-42		
Cpl	HAYS, JOSEPH	20842710	Communication

(Continued)

Pvt lcl	TAYLOR, WILLIAM R.	38012396	Cannoneer
Pvt	ANTONIO, SAM J.	38012665	Cannoneer
Pvt	Gata, Jose I.	38012060	Observer
Pvt	FOSTER, HENRY B.	38012070	Cannoneer
(24)			
Pvt	LOWE, HAROLD S.	38012585	Cannoneer
	Fr Battery F, 515th CA (AA): Atchd 4-12-42		
Sgt	KNIGHT, ROBERT J.	20843715	Cannoneer
	Fr Headquarters, Battery, 1st Bn, 515th CA (AA): Atchd 4-11-42		
St/Sgt	SMITH, CLARK G.	20843493	Motor Mechanic
	Fr Headquarters Battery, 515th CA (AA): Atchd 4-12-42		
Pvt lcl	GARDNER, LEE J.	20842507	
(25)			
	Fr Battery B, 515th CA (AA): Atched 4-12-4 2		
Pvt lcl	GAYORD, CHARLES B.	20842474	
	Fr Battery G, 515th CA (AA): Atch 4-12-42		
Pvt lcl	WALLACE, IRA D.	38031097	Observer
Pvt lcl	JENSEN, BILLY E.	20843964	Student Cook
Pvt lcl	STEVENS, DORRIS	36106752	

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NOTES

1. - Dates shown, on preceding roster, are date of action or of wound, not date of order-G. O. #24, FGAC, was published April 14, 1942; GO #29 FGAC, was published April 24, 1942.

2-Lt Lieutenant Herbert E. Pace Jr. was killed in action on April 28, 1942- He was recommended for a Silver Star for Gallantry in action on April 12, 1942; he was again recommended for citation (Oak Leaf Cluster) for gallantry in action on April 28, 1942-Both recommendations were approved by Bn and Regt'l commanders and forwarded for final action to FGAC-favorable action is known to have been given there. However, the undersigned saw no order published awarding the medals-the surrender of Corregidor intervened.

3-Staff Sergeants Paul B. Davis and Bernard C. Hopkins and Pvt lcl Galen L. Martin were

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(Continued)

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recommended for citation for gallantry in action on April 12, 1942-Letter was returned for correction, delayed in transmittal and although approved by Regt'l Co. C. was not published prior to surrender-these soldiers are highly deserving of the awards-See Note 5.

4-A number of awards are due men in the Battery for gallantry in action and for wounds received in action-these were not previously awarded for reasons indicated below:-

A-Not previously recommended due to oversight:-

- 1-Captain Paul R. Cornwall, Silver Star, for succoring wounded, extinguishing fires, etc., after bombing and during shelling on 4-12-42.
- 2-First Sergeant William E. Begman, same as for Captain Cornwall, above.
- 3-Corporal Richard W. Bartz, Oak Leaf Cluster for succoring wounded, extinguishing fires and re-establishing

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communications, on 4-12-42.

B-Not previously recommended due to oversight:-

1. 1st Lieutenant Bernice E. Humphrey, Oak Leaf Cluster, for going to succor of injured Corporal Earl W. Southwell during terrific shelling, on 4-23-42.
- 2-2nd Lieutenant Yancy B. Chancy, Silver Star, for same as Lieutenant Humphrey, above.
- C-Recommended previously but not published prior to surrender:-
- 1-Private Charles L. Goodrich, Silver Star, for going to aid of Private First Class Teurman during terrific shelling on 5-2-42.
- 2-Private Odis J. Hinson, same as for private Goodrich, above.
- D-Previous recommendation impossible due to surrender:-
- 1-For succoring wounded amidst artillery

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barrage and under threat of bombing, strafing and sniping, on 5-6-42:-

- Oak Leaf Cluster To:-2nd Lieutenant Yancy B. Chancy, Sergeants Edward J. Perry and Gordon C. Smith, Corporal Michael J. Kocovar Jr., Privates First Class Holger L. Holm and Cloyd W. Sumrow-
- Silver Stars to:-Sergeant Bronislaw Gajdanowicz, Corporal William E. Davis. Privates First Class Clifford Shiflett, William J. Watson and Graham E. Wright, Privates Fernando Serna, George J. Smith and Johnny P. Turner.

E-Previous recommendation impossible due to surrender:-

- For refusing aid-telling men he was all right-in spite of mortal wounds received during artillery barrage 5-6-42:-Private George W. Freeman.
- F-For wounds received in Action:-
- 1-Sergeant Armando J. Reveglia, 4-4-42, Purple

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heart, not previously reported for award.

(Continued)

2- Sergeant Gordon C. Smith, Privates First Class Niles A. Thompson, Lloyd W. Sumrow, Privates Emmett D. Stanfill and George H. Williamson, 5-6-42, Purple Hearts, too late for report prior to surrender.

3-Private First Class Holger L. Holm 5-6-42, Oak Leaf Cluster to Purple Heart. Too late for report prior to surrender.

5-Letters recommending citations for the cases described above are separately prepared/

6-One copy of G. O. #29, FCAC and a true extract copy of G. O. #24, FCAC, are in the possession of Captain Godfrey R. Ames, Battery Commander, Chicago.

The above information was compiled from memory and by check of all available records, as well as by interview of nearly every enlisted

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men in the organization, whether at Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp No 1 or at Camp No 3. Interviews conducted by Captain Ames, Lieutenant Chancy and the undersigned.

/s/BERNARD O. HOPKINS
S/Sgt-60th CA (AA)
Battery -Supply

C H I C A G O ' S L A S T S T A N D

The narrative of Chicago's last hours on Corregidor, prior to the surrender, is contained in the letter which follows:-

BATTERY C, 60th CA (AA)

in American POW Camp #1, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, P. I.

24 January, 43

SUBJECT: Narrative Report of Action.

TO: WHOM it may concern.

1. The following narrative report of action for "Chicago" (Battery C, 60th CA (AA), covering the period 6:00 p.m., 5 May, 1942 to 12:00 noon, 6 May, 1942, is submitted.

The Battery Commander, Captain Godfrey R. Ames, The Range Officer, 1st Lieutenant Bernice F. Humphrey and the Asst. Battery Executive, 2nd Lieutenant James A. Phillips (Air Corps Atchd)

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had left the Battery position to visit Malinta Tunnel on official business shortly before 6:00 p.m., 1st Lieutenant Thomas H. Fortney (Battery Executive) and 2nd Lt Yancy B. Chancy (Asst. Range Officer) were present at Morrison Hill. All

(Continued)

enlisted personnel except detached, hospitalized, etc., were present.

In accordance with instructions issued by Capt. Ames prior to his departure. The battery was employed in repair of splinter proofs and improving the other protective measures in the battery area- emphasis is this night was put on revetting the top of the ventilation shaft to Chicago Tunnel and an approach trench thereto. Work was started at nightfall and continued until the moonlight became very strong-about 10:00 p.m. Intermittent enemy artillery fire-about 15 minutes each hour-had been falling in the area.

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The Catholic Chaplain (Capt. Bauman, 91st CA (IS)) was at the Battery. He held confession in the evening and mass at midnight. Catholic personnel was released from work to attend. A light midnight lunch was served the battery.

While midnight mass was still in progress a message was received at Chicago C. P. informing the battery that an enemy landing had been made near the eastern end of the island, but had been repelled. Orders were also received at the same time (from 1st Bn C. P. - "Cambric" to Standby, prepared to man local defense positions-foxholes and ground M.G.'s-the equipment and ammunition were checked and the men told to get as much sleep as possible-about 4:00 a.m. a double portion of hot breakfast was served.

About 4:30 a.m. orders were received from

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Cambric to man local defense positions-Lt Fortney and Lt Chancy checked the men into their foxholes and M. G. positions-Lt Fortney then returned to the Chicago C. P. where he could have telephonic contact with Cambric and other Hdqrs. Orders were issued to men in local defense positions to maintain contact between foxholes and to attempt to establish contact with Marines on the right and left. (Local defense plans called for Marines to occupy positions adjoining Chicago's when situation called for Chicago to occupy local defense lines) no contact with Marine troops could be established. As day broke it was evident that no Japanese were between Chicago's lines and the still intact water's edge lines from which the Marines had not withdrawn.

About daybreak an intense enemy artillery barrage fell directly on Chicago's lines. About

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15 minutes later Sergeant Gordon C. Smith (M. G. Section Leader) reported that shells were falling directly on foxholes, that a number of men were injured. Lt. Fortney issued instructions to withdraw the men from the foxhole lines, and called Cambric 2, telling him of the action taken. Col. Breitung okayed the withdrawal and issued orders to keep the men under cover until further orders-Withdrawal was made about 6:00 a.m. Communication section was sent but to find the trouble and repair lines. Repairs completed about 8:00 a.m. Dive bombers were overhead almost continually, and two or three flights of heavy bombers passed over, bombing Corregidor.

At about 11:00 a.m. a message substantially

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As follows was received from Cambric-"Enemy shellfire will cease at 12:00 noon-You have until then to destroy your equipment." Clarification

(Continued)

of this order could not be obtained. Order was interpreted to mean "Surrender imminent, destroy equipment." Demolition crews were ordered to work at once-Director and Power Plants were thoroughly dynamited. Fragile parts of the guns ("Clocks", cables, etc) were smashed; Firing locks were removed and flung away; Dynamite was set off in the chamber of each gun-(Height finder previously put out of action by shellfire and was, at that time, at the Ordnance Repair Shop-

All telephone communication failed again about 11:15 a.m. Men were held under cover until about noon, then allowed to draw Class G Ration and prepare packs for departure. Battery was marched to Middleside Tunnel

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About 1:00 p.m. where it was later surrendered along with other troops in that Tunnel.

The following men were casualties during this period:

Sgt G. C. Smith-shell fragment-slight
 Pfc N. R. Thompson-same as Smith
 Pfc C. W. Sumrow-same-hospitalized
 Pvt E. D. Stanfill-same as Sumrow
 Pvt G. W. Freeman Jr--shell fragment, mortal, died 5-7-42
 Pvt S. House-shell fragment-slight
 Pvt R. Shook-killed by direct shell hit.

Above narrative is as near correct as possible-

/s/ BERNARD O. HOPKINS
 STAFF SERGEANT
 BTRY C, 60th CA (AA)

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BATTERY C, SIXTIETH COAST ARTILLERY (AA)

POW Camp, Cabanatuan, N. E., P. I.
 Narrative Report of Action
 Period November 1, 1941-May 5, 1942

5 February 1943

TO:- Commanding Officer, 60th CA (AA)

1-In order to make a matter of record the wartime action of Battery C, 60th CA (AA) (hereafter to be referred to as "Chicago")- The following informal narrative history is submitted-

November 1, 1941 to November 27:- Pursuant to the provisions of War Plans of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays (AAA Emergency Defense Plan). Chicago was on "Full alert status" during the entire month of November, 1941- All men lived in bivouac at their hathways war position, all housekeeping

(Continued)

arrangements were installed, and the battery prepared tactically-with high explosive 3" AA ammunition at each gun-

(40)

-to fire at a moment's notice-emphasis was placed on training of personnel, on organization-fortification and camouflage-of the position and in preparation for the forthcoming target practice seasons-A new, excellent height finder position was built-splinterproofings, for the protection of personnel and equipment, was continually improved-after 2 years of intensive organization of the position, chiefly by makeshift methods in the absence of funds and proper equipment, during all of which time the undersigned was with the battery, the Chicago position was shaping up nicely into a war position worthy of its name-the 3" AA guns were given complete and very thorough(overhaul by the H. D. Ordnance Office, and all ammunition was checked round by round-by the battery officers-Chicago's position, which had previously been the scene of moving picture news reel activity and had been visited by numerous military and civilian notables, was this month visited by Mrs. Luce (Claire Boothe) of "Life Magazine"-

November 28

Orders were received on the morning of this day for the return on November 29th to normal peacetime garrison duty of Battery C-another battery would replace it on alert-at about 7:00 p.m. the battery commanders was notified by the Regimental Executive and plans and training officers that the

(42)

entire regiment was alerted and that Chicago would not move from Morrison Hill on the 29th but would remain on alert indefinitely-
November 29th 30th:-

Others H. D. Units were alerted and moved to battle stations, supplies, ammunition, movements of troops to other islands and Battery given consideration-
December 1st-4th:-

Chicago, as well as other AA units, was kept on vigorous alert status, "Airguards" were increased-Gun drills, inspections of armament, tests of AAA intelligence system (warning net work) were conducted-Everything was put in intense readiness for any eventuality

(43)

December 5th:-

Late in the evenings on this day AATS and command phone notices were received the effect that foreign planes with known intentions had been located 50 miles to the northward-Chicago (and all AA units) ordered to maintain instant readiness to fire on any unidentified planes at night.

(Continued)

December 7th:-

Chicago furnishes post interior guard duty detail of two officers and about 40 MM-another warning of foreign planes to northward. Orders to fire on unidentified planes at night, on day issued.

December 8th:-

War! Battery alerted, standing by guns, at 4:45 am (Note: December 7, noon, in Hawaii)

(44)

was December 8, early a.m., in P. I. (Heard radio reports of Pearl Harbor attack-heard President's speech, declaration of War by Congress December 9th:-

First enemy action in Manila Bay Area-3:00 a.m. flight of planes over Cavite Province-Nichols Field bombed- AA Searchlights did not pick up targets-for out of range-no firing-Manila Area and Cavite Naval Yard bombed just before noon on this day-

December 10th:-

Chicago's first action! Fired on 26 Japanese heavy bombers flying westward out North Channel on their return to Formosa (Taiwan) after bombing Cavite and Manila-Chicago's bursts short of target due to error in AA data computation

(45)

system-error found, eliminated immediately-Planes did not attempt to attack Corregidor-this was the first time many of Chicago's men had seen or heard guns fired-It was the first time service of the piece with live ammunition had been carried out-only a very little firing needed to produce veterans.

December 13th:-

Chicago in action again! Light of 17 planes returning from Manila bombing approached Corregidor from east. Split into 9 and 8; 9 go out North Channel, Chicago engaged these-bursts looked very good-two planes believed downed, one more crippled, formation broken up. Globe fired on several after Chicago. Other batteries fired on 8 planes.

(46)

Over South Channel-Navy reported 10 planes failed to return to Formosa. Lack of confirmation rendered regiment unable to award credit. Nevertheless Chicago was it got two, if not there, pla----

December 14th-24th:-

Enemy planes obviously avoided Corregidor, landings credence to belief that we took heavy toll on 13th-Chicago man chafed for a fight, Looted and jeered at many planes which very clearly stayed out of range of our guns-

(Continued)

We were forced to sit by idly while Manila and Cavite were bombed apparently with impunity-Very little was seen of friendly planes-drills, tests, inspections hold-the continual improvement of Chicago's tactical effectiveness was the driving

(47)

ambition of every man-After the firings on the 13th Chicago's men were cool, smoothworking veterans-The Air Guard system, carried over from peacetime alert status, was tightened and expanded-One officer, one NCO, two observers, and one switchboard operator were vigilant night and day-The Battery Commander realized that Battery Funds might soon be unavailable if left in Manila Banks. In addition men were unable to get to the Post Exchange now-So practically all the available funds were turned over to the undersigned to be spent for foods, soft drinks, etc., for the general benefit of the entire battery-(this later was shown to have been a wise course-when Manila was taken

(48)

by the Japanese, Chicago had less than ₱46.00 in the bank-some others batteries had as much as ₱1200.00 frozen) on December 15th the H. D. went on Field Ration December 25th:-

Lieutenant Herbert E. Pace Jr. donated a small Christmas tree and other decorations. Prior to a turkey dinner at noon a short formation was held during which the Battery Commander spoke to the men and at the end of which "God Bless America" was sung-The turkey dinner was intercepted by Japanese planes over Manila Bay-For one half hour the battery stood by to fire, but the planes left without ever coming in range.

December 26th-28th:-

Enemy bombers in huge flights of

(49)

27,54,81, etc., bombed Cavite, Manila Port Area, Nichols Field, Olongapo, and Mariveles, but stayed just clear of Corregidor Bombers attempted to destroy naval vessels in Manila Bay without success.

GENERAL INFORMATION:-

Chicago's personnel and equipment were as follows:- 4 officers and 115 EM. The Officers were:- Battery Commander-Captain Godfrey R. Ames; Battery Executive Captain Paul R. Cornwall; Range Officer-First Lieut-Bernice F. Humphrey; Assistant Battery Executive-First Lieutenant Herbert E. Pace Jr. All officers were of the CAC-Lt Humphrey was a review officer-The others were regular Army officers and West Point graduates-The battery was equipped with 4-3" AA guns M-3 on

(50)

Mounts M2AZ, Director M4 #72, Height Finders M1, two power plants and complete data transmission system M4. Ammunition was 3" AA MK IX with MK III

(Continued)

Scowl (Powder train) fuze-Local defense weapons were 1 -50 caliber AAMG on Mount M1 and 4-30 caliber AAMG's on 1918 (angle iron) AA mounts-additional local AA defense was afforded Chicago by a platoon of Indiana (Battery 1, 60th CA (AA), 50 caliber AA MG's) which disposed 4-50 caliber AAMG's in the vicinity-at this time only one battery, Boston, was furnished with mechanical fuze ammunition, which enabled that battery to "reach" farther up and farther out than could batteries equipped with the less modern powder train fuze ammunition for 3" AA guns-the stereoscopic

(51)

height finders observers had just completed a thorough and intensive 10 weeks course of instruction under 1st Lt B. F. Humphrey and were at the peak of training. RCS readings were taken every half hour with ut fail and also at the beginning (or between flights) of each enemy attack. This system of constant check and ----- of RCS and other settings on the instrument proved to be very effective in producing good altitude readings.

December 29th:-

Combined air attack on Corregidor! The Japanese radio had boasted several times that Corregidor had already been levelled, but heretofore it had not been touched-bombers arrived at about

(52)

12:15 p.m., dive bombers hovered about for an hour or more and finally swung in to strafe Corregidor- First flight of bombers approached from Cabacben, the alarm was given suddenly-Chicago was in action and firing in less than one minute. First bombs struck Corregidor-Chicago's bursts were very good, planes come in at 4300 yards altitude but next flight-after some delay-come in at 6800 yards. None come in lower than 7000 yards thereafter-Chicago's M 4 director jammed as first flight was carried overhead-Adjustment required Ordnance experts according to existing post regulations. Battery Commander issued instructions to Staff Sergeant Paul B. Davis to go

(53)

ahead with repairs he had volunteered to make. Side Platus (on director) removed and in spite of two or more bombings of Corregidor while work went on, St. Sgt. Davis made adjustments and repairs-Battery returned to action and fired effectively on later flights. One plane claimed destroyed, too damaged by Chicago. Between 65 and 95 bombers participated in this particular attack. About 25 dive bombers-dive bombers strafed the island from several directions-They didn't return-bomb screech was terrifying at first, but became familiar and almost commonplace soon. No bombing damage at Chicago-Great

(54)

non military damage on Corregidor, but military effectiveness hardly scratched-

(Continued)

even though air raid lasted 3 hours-

December 30th-31st:- No air attacks-evacuation of Manila took place-
Hq USAFFE, AHC Sayre, President Quezon, Vice President Osmena, and others
notables now on Corregidor. Waters near Corregidor docks crammed with
shipping of all types and sizes. Bn Co instructed Chicago to be especially
ready to engage planes attempting to bomb the shipping on piers. F-40's
appeared on friendly Bataan fields. Marine Corps dynamited Cavite Naval Yard-
huge gasoline fire observed in Manila.

January 1st, 1942:-

No air attacks on Corregidor-

(55)

Post utilities repaired-Chicago enjoyed another Turkey dinner.

January 2nd:-

Sneak Raid! Bombers arrived somewhat earlier, coming in over China Sea
above solid overcast of clouds and dropped one load of bombs through a tiny
momentary hole which then closed up-Planes cruised back and forth for an
hour above clouds and then left, one flight dumping its load in Mariveles
barrio area-No AA batteries fired-planes were never seen-

January 3rd:-

Bombers returned! Delivered furious attacks from altitudes very high
for our equipment (7400-8500 yards) - attacks lasted for 5 hours; Chicago's
fire good- One plane destroyed (official credit)

(56)

and one claimed as damaged-Bombs landed on all sides of - - - of Morrison
Hill, but Chicago still unharmed-morale and fighting trim inspiring-

January 4th:-

Very heavy bombings continued. Chicago men acted like hardened veterans-
They could tell where bombs would fall by listening to the screech of the
bombs as they came down-ten or twelve bombs landed atop Morrison Hill-none,
however, within our position-smoke from rice harvest fires in Cavite and
other provinces made for great laziness, smoke from burning barges, ships
and oil tanks also made observation of planes very difficult-despite this
Chicago's fire was effective-we saw

(57)

two planes, damaged by our fire, limp away.

January 5th:-

Bombings attacks were somewhat lighter this day. One bomb landed in
a tree rear #2 gun. It exploded 10 feet above the ground and 20 feet from the

(Continued)

small splinterproof shelter inside which were Captain Cornwall and Lieutenant Face. They were untouched. Privates Waller and house were slightly injured by fragments. No damage to material. Lt Face's automobile taken over by battery as an organic vehicle, was destroyed. By this time we had really come to swear by our splinterproofs-planes flew at altitudes from 7200-8500 yards-usually above 7800 yards-Chicago was unable

(58)

to fire on a number of flights which were too high to come in range.

January 6th:-

Last and heaviest day of continuous bombing. 40-50 planes dropping 300-500 lb. bombs repeatedly crossed over the island. General Moore visited Chicago-men pleased. Chicago was still undamaged. Very high altitudes continued to be the rule this day. Chicago several times forced to watch bomber come over and bomb - - - - opening "in range"-However, the last flight came over at 7800 yards. We put one of our high explosive shells right into the bomb bay of the middle plane of three (the three we were shooting at)- this plane-bombs and all-exploded and destroyed not only itself but the planes on each side of it-Chicago got official credit for 3 planes. All destroyed with one round. Chicago now had the AA batteries of the fortified islands-a lead it never lost (Globe and Cebu by virtue of dive bombers bagged over Bataan-dive bombers avoided Corregidor-later got ahead of Chicago in total planes destroyed)-However, Chicago's planes were all high flying heavy bombers. AA batteries on the fortified islands proper never caught up to Chicago-In justice to other outfits, Chicago admits that mechanically-fuzed ammunition which arrived later on, helped her to maintain the lead-by this time it was apparent to all that

(60)

Corregidor's AA fire was very effective-

GENERAL INFORMATION:-

(1) Work on maintenance of equipment, ammunition, etc., went on daily and with intensity despite bombings-Splinterproofs and camouflage were constantly improved-It was no longer difficult to persuade men that more sandbags should be filled. It was hard to find an empty sandbag! NCO's were schooled in how to fire the battery in case officers should become casualties. This training was intensified later on.

(2) Japanese bombers were of the Mitsubishi 97 type heavy bombers- They also used some old Mikado type planes. These planes had to fly all the way from Formosa and return. If damaged,

(61)

even a little, it was improbable that they could return to their bases without great difficulty-they would probably crash in the sea. Hence many planes, we are sure, were destroyed by us by reason that we (the Corregidor AA batteries) rendered them unable to fly home. However we only got credit for thrice-

(Continued)

confirmed destruction clearly resulting from our fire.

(3) With powder train fuzes our ammunition was effective only up to about 8900 yards altitude. However, local meteorological conditions gave us a bonus of 125 to 150 yds of additional altitude in the form of higher than standard muzzle velocity. We used this to engage planes up to just over 8400 yards. When they came in range at such altitudes planes

(62)

were very nearly overhead already, and bombs had already been dropped-if they come in above that altitude we were unable to fire.

(4) Our guns can also only be elevated to about 80 degrees. In the tropical sky glare and haze let alone smoke from fires-we could seldom see the planes until they were on their "way in" (all courses at Corregidor were "coming in" courses), and up to about 45° - the guns then pointed at about 60° to lead the planes. We would track the planes in, guns would be cranked up and up, bombs would come hurtling from the planes, guns would go higher and still higher-than, when almost at the maximum elevation stop off the guns, our data would show "in range"

(63)

and we would get off from 4 to 8 or 10 rounds - - gun before the guns hit the elevation stop-about this time bombs would land all about and we would crouch low in our splinterproofs-jumping up to engage new planes at once after bombs had fallen. If we had seen more planes coming prior to finishing fire on the previous course we would not take cover but would swing onto the new targets and bombs be down, we'd prepare to fire on those next planes.

(5) Japanese bombs varied in size from 100 to 500 to 1000 lbs. They were personnel and demolition. Fragmentation bombs were laden with all sorts of

(64) scrap metal, nuts, bolts, etc., and even with concret and ball of lead foil-

(6) Planes had numbered 25 to 75 or 80 per day, each one making at least two trips over the fortified islands.

January 7-13th:-

During this period Chicago augmented its ration stores from beached food barges along Corregidor shoreline (with permission from the HDQM)-Chicago Tunnel, later a great - - -, was begun on January 10th. The undersigned began publication of the "Morrison Hill Gazette"- a brief of radio news reports spiced by local news and altitudes-a great morale factor throughout the long months on Corregidor. Hongkong had already fallen, the battle of Malaya was on-we speculated on the absence

(65)

of Japanese planes, thinking they were in Malaya, or installing oxygen equipment so as to fly over and above us, or were reorganizing, etc.-We were happy about but many of the flattering opinion of the London Radio which said "the 60th CA (AA) had set the world's record for AA fire accuracy"-we weren't sure we had frightened the Japs.

(Continued)

January 14th:-

Return of bombers! They come down over the China Sea and circled, circled, apparently to gain altitude-and come in at great altitudes-8500,8800,8900 yards-Chicago unable to fire except at ones or two flights bet ween 8000 and 8500 yards, one plane claimed as destroyed and one as damaged.

(66)

Boston, with mechanical fuzed ammunition, have the brunt of the firing-We were "frothing at the month" at being unable to fire. "No damage at Chicago.

General Information:-

From January 15th to March 23rd a period of - - - - action prevailed-no heavy bombers appeared during this entire time, although a couple of flights of heavies did bomb southern Bataan once or twice late i n this quiet period. Only occasional AA firings on observation planes and dive bombers which ventured within range while performing their missions over Bataan. "Five bombers studiously avoided Corregidor except for once or twice to drop pamphlets-which blow out

(67)

to sea- and punctuate them with three or four bombs dropped at vessels around the island-An observation plane-nicknamed "Foto-Joe"-whi ch was very wily, flew around the area, around the island, back and forth, in and out of clouds, persistently We fired at him a few times-sometimes very nearly gutting him, but usually he maneuvered upon - - - - gun flashers and "wasn't ther e" when projectiles burst-we were prevented from frequent firings on "Foto-Joe" and dive bombers by orders to conserve ammunition-not to fire except on planes obviously threatening Corregidor. Ammunition was a very critical problem-In order to avo'ld waste of ammunition Chicago had upon its own initiative

(68)

established a maximum of 6 rounds per gun as normal for any firing course-reason as follows:-

- (1) With target altitudes as high, firing courses on Co rregidor seldom lasted more than 10. to 15 seconds.
- (2) 3" AA ammunition was a terrific shortage problem; expenditure at December 29th to January 6th rate would have exhausted supply in about 3wo months.
- (3) First 24 rounds fired if "on target" would probably accomplished all the results to be expected-If not "on target" more rounds w ould be wasted.
- (4) If first few rounds were not "on target" we wouldnot see bursts soon enough to make adjustments on these very short courses.

(Continued)

(69)

(5) Flares would probably maneuver after first 24 rounds, so adjustments, if they could be applied, would probably be in vain.

Shortly after Chicago adopted the 6 round limit, the Regimental Commander ordered such a limit for all batteries-As practiced by Chicago the limit system was flexible, number of rounds could be decreased, or if more were desired. "Commence firing" was merely signaled a second time immediately at the end of the first string-the gun crews, under the efficient and excellent training of Captain Cornwall and Lieutenant Pace because remarkably well trained and able to act with great speed and accuracy.

(70)

The 1700 odd ----- of the tadpole-shaped island of Corregidor were already well dotted with bomb craters. Japanese at first used area bombing tactics, later they definitely picked out their special target. Their bombing was never too accurate-Interior portions of the islands were pretty well worked over, but the periphery which contained most of the military installations was nearly intact. A continued source of pleasant wonders was the fact that the power plant and cold storage plant escaped serious damage until April - the miraculous protection afforded by splinterproofing had become apparent-Everywhere - - - - -, sandbags, etc., arose. Chicago, having started splinter-

(71)

proofing a year earlier, was well (ahead of the game. When fairly well splinterproofed a piece of equipment and its crew were safe almost entirely from all but a bomb landings inside the splinterproof. In our cases, that of an AA battery. All these were open to the sky-bomb blast and flying fragments, the greatest threats of "rear misses", were practically nullified by splinterproofs. Downhard covering, unless tremendously thick and strong, would have been an added hazard.

Chicago tunnel progressed - - - -. Corporal Bob Morrison, Corporal (later Sgt) Edward J. Swanson, and Private Jose R. Gastelum were the engineers. They did a job truly worthy of experienced miners. This tunnel, in which was later

(72)

installed the battery mess, saved many a life, as later events will show-Material for timbering the tunnel was salvaged from the be aches of the island or obtained from the Engineers, who allowed us to use some of their scarce lumber. Other materials came from demolished buildings-salvaged by ourselves-From the demolished barrio structures came material to build one and two man shacks for individuals to sl----- in- here were spotted about the area so as to be near the equipment manned, dispersed so as to avoid undue losses, camouflaged, and in a number of cases, splinterproofed. These shacks were built to keep minds occupied and to provide shelter for the rainy season-There were no tents

(73)

or other shelters for sleeping purposes at Chicago, tents would have been too conspicuous unless erected where trees for cover were available-and this would be too far from the guns-Over man heed to sleep practicably at their equipment-We had no relief crews-the men we had were 24 hour soldiers for five months.

(Continued)

February 2nd:-

Submarines arrived at Corregidor direct from Hawaii, bringing mechanically fuzed ammunition-Chicago got most-Boston some to replace expenditures-great optimism at Chicago-we were now ready to "give em Hell"-sent a letter to Australia via the submarine, was assured that the letter would reach the US Via plane.

February 6th:-

Cavite shore batteries begin to shell fortified islands. Many authorities had opened Corregidor couldn't be shelled from there except by 8" guns or larger, the enemy used 105 mm guns on Corregidor and larger (howitzers) on the other islands. Captain Richard A. Ivey, 60th CA (AA), was called upon to go to Cavite and reconsider enemy territory so as to spot counter-battery fire.

February 11th:-

These dive bombers raided Corregidor-They came in from the south, passed over the island, - - - - - bombs and flying away when AA opened up.

February 12th:-

Corporal Bob E. Morrison left for

(75)

Cavite province to act as bodyguard for Capt Ivey. He was selected from among 9 NCO volunteers by the Battery Commander who was ordered to make selection.

February 15:- We observed intense enemy bombardment of Forts Drum and Frank lasted all day long. HD batteries - - - they fired counterbattery mission from time to time all during this period-but we were not able to observe the effectiveness of their fire.

February 17th:-

Corporal Bob E. Morrison reported as missing in action when many patrol attacks captain Ivey's OF-Cpl Morrison, first to be contacted by the enemy, believed to have been killed-Captain Ames visited Bataan peninsula for 17th & 18th Cornwall is C. O.

(Continued)

(76)

GENERAL INFORMATION:-

Chicago operated a mess for itself and a large number of attached personnel. The entire mess consisted of about 210 mouths. There were mess from 9 other organization attached for ration-The mess force did excellent work, despite hardships. Pfc Cody and Pfc Martin (the latter attached from Hq Btry 1st Bn) were especially brave. They refused to leave the stoves merely because bombers were over the island-when bombs seemed to be coming close they would then take momentary course.

The roster of Chicago included men attached from Hq Btry 60th CA (AA) and Hq Btry 1st Bn 60th CA (AA); those men were integrally absorbed into the battery and several of them distinguished themselves.

(77)

The platoon of Indiana and a command post detail of Catalog (Hq and Hq Btry, 3rd Bn 60th CA (AA) became almost like members of the organization-relations among the units were always the last-

Although this was a period of lessened action, it was not a period of idleness. Men worked day, night, and Sundays. Improvements without end were made. Rubber covered data transmission cables were replaced, to some extent, by salvaged submarine mine cable thereby making available sorely needed spare cables. The junction box-distribution heart of the data transmission system was put into an underground concrete box. Cables were laid in deep, narrow trenches. Trenches closed by 10 and 12 inch (powder cans filled with earth, so as to stop fragments and yet provide ease of access to callers- (78) we were equipped with mobile material, but we were fixed in position. There was nowhere else to go-and we had to protect our equipment-each man had a foxhole of his own, near where he slept, in which he could take shelter in case of emergency. In the last month of the campaign many men slept in these foxholes every night.

In case the enemy tried a landing and broke through the beach line defenses, we had a line of foxholes around the eastern slopes of Morrison Hill, organized by Chicago men, and coordinated with Beach Defense Plans of the 4th US Marines. (79) Captain Huddleston, (Co. F, 4th US Marines, and other officers of that regiment were our fellow workers in that endeavor. Chicago dug foxholes. Planned defense lines, built MG positions, laid barbed wires, cleared fields of fires.

All the above work and much more was done in addition to maintaining constant alert for enemy attacks-man stood by in the blazing "Hot Season" sun for hours, scanned skies, dashed out of herd at night to accompany of the air raid alarm to fire if necessary. We fired seldom for over two months, but we were ready at an instant's notice every minute of the time.

Water pipes to Morrison Hill had been bombed out and hauling details from battery waited for trucks for

(80)

long hours at night and then went long distances-to bottomside, to the power plant, to the bottom of James Ravine, etc. to get water. This duty cost the man 4 to 6 hours of needed - - - many of the nights. Electric power was off of course, but we operated our radio for a few short periods each day by means

(Continued)

of AA power units which were ----- and exercised as a routine practice.

February 24th:-

Captain Cornwall visited Bataan, towered positions of Cebu, Ivis, and other units.

GENERAL INFORMATION:-

Cash on hand in the battery fund was used to purchase cigarettes, toilet articles, etc., which were resold to

(81)

enlisted men at cost. In this way a great morale factor. "The Morrison Hill Post Exchange", as we called it, with the undersigned a steward, was operated a library, stocked with volumes donated by the Chaplain and the Fort Mills Post Library was installed. Free issue under the supervision of Corporal Richard W. Bartz was the system in this "Bartz Memorial Library"--entertainment for the man was scarce. Card games, "Hell" session, and a "mountain music" orchestra of a "guitar, several harmonica and many voices served as a diversion. The intensity of work around the position tendered to prevent mental depression from illness.

(82) The Air Force, a few P-40's and some other planes, performed feats of daring under our gaze. Morrison Hill faces Bataan, and Chicago was in position on the slopes towards that peninsula. From there we could observe a panorama of 1800 to the north-from China Sea around to the city of Manila. The Air Force in it's mission of observation, escort, and occasional bombings, carried and despite frequent bombings of its fields-daily at the least-inspired us.

We heard heavy artillery barrages on Bataan. Of the action on the front lines we learned little, but we could see plenty of the dive bombers in action. We ----- for a chance at them.

General MacArthur left about

(83)

March 8th, and General Wainwright took command. Soon afterwards General Wainwright visited Chicago's position. General Moore, Harbor Defense Commander was an occasional visitor of Chicago's position. These visits were fine for the morale of the battery.

A better understanding of Chicago's position can be had by reference to the sketches on the following page--A ridge line runs from WNW to ESE then the sketch of the position. The highest point is about where Catal og is shown. Around slopes sharply from the ridges to WSW. It slopes quickly but not quite so sharply to ENE. The CP and Director were on a built-up mound. The Height finder also. Ammunition was

(86)

stored at the guns, in the Ammunition trench (inside the gun square) and in the Magazine (a bombproof-or ready so)-the tunnel had a vent flator and escape shaft just northeast of #4 Gun. At that point there were 30 feet of overhead cover (earth) above the tunnel itself. In April the kitchen was moved into the tunnel. The oilshed, alert shock, communication shock (marked MEG or sketch), tractor shed, Cabcan magazine, mess hall and meat house were all destroyed by bombings

(Continued)

in March and April.

In order to provide a place of safety for valuables, the battery fund safe was used to keep money and valuables for the EM. This safe was looted at surrender time and all in it was lost.

Filipino employees (K. P.'s etc) were ----- in the employ of the battery. On the whole they were loyal and reasonably brave. When issued gas masks they became very happy and felt safe from all harm.

After receiving mechanically fuzeed ammunition, we made every effort to avoid ourselves of all it's potentialities. This ammunition had a maximum effective altitude (at very close -in ranges) of about 9 100 yards. Our director was fitted to compute data only up to 8500 yards. 1st Lt B. F. Humphrey did an outstanding job of computing just what corrections in fuze range and quadrant elevation had to be applied to the director to enable us to hit targets at altitudes from 8500 to 9100 yards. The correction computed by Lt Humphrey and checked by the Battery Commanders worked very well.

(88)

well. No difficulty was encountered in applying corrections-and their effectiveness was indicated by planes actually destroyed. By making our equipment handle targets higher by 600 yards than the equipment was designed to handle, we were able to keep up with the increased altitudes at which enemy planes later flew. The Morrison Hill "Gazette" was published daily from January 6th until the last days of April. The undersigned, later aided by Pfc. Van, organized poems and essay contests, drew cartoons, gave out cigarettes, etc., as prizes. News, gleaned by monitoring worldwide newscasts, stories of men in the battery of people on the island. All made the "Gazette" popular with all who saw it. This popularity extended

(89)

to many persons in far corners of Corregidor and Bataan. The "Gazette" was a tremendous morale factor during the long siege.

March 15th:-

Cavite shore batteries shelled the fortified islands all day long.-Military damage very slight. Activities of Japanese naval vessels, reports of large flights of planes, rumors of action in Visayas and Mindanao all pointed to possible increased activity in our area.

March 23rd:-

Sometimes prior to this date we had heard a story that General Wainwright had been given, by the Japanese, until this date to surrender-"or else"-No surrender was given, and nothing extraordinary happened-

(90)

March 24th:-

Air attacks resumed! Planes were heavy bombers at great altitudes, 8950 to 9150 yards. Boston and Chicago, with "mech" fuzes, do most of firing. One flight drops bombs on ordnance magazine on Morrison Hill, 125 yards from Chicago. Ammunition exploded with machine gun rapidity, show ---- -- vicinity with HE shells

(Continued)

(many exploding in the air), shrapnel, fragments, etc., until evening. Chicago was forced to remain in splinterproofs or on "hords and knees" from 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. One man slightly injured. Flares were now swinging and dodging after having dropped their bombs. Nevertheless we punished them. Chicago claims one damaged and one downed. Flights were of 27, 18, 12, etc., altogether

(91)

about 60 planes in four raids on this day. First night raids! Chicago unharmed although bombs thoroughly sprinkled vicinity dive bombers particularly active over Bataan; they really bombed from a dive bomb.
March 25th:-

43 bombers in 5 day-raids. Shores in 4 night-raids. Enemy bombers now averaged 90 planes-trips per day over the island. Chicago gets official credit for one plane at night, damages one.
March 26th:-

Chicago bombed! In order to dodge AA fire enemy flights were reduced to 3 planes each-reappearing frequently but not in larger flights. At about 10:00 a.m. a flight from the N. W. dropped a 3 - bomb "yardstick" bad alongside Chicago's

(92)

position. Height Finders position bit-one bomb 10 feet behind it, one 3 feet in front of it. Crew and instrument miraculously saved by splinterproof. Oil shed, Cabacan Magazine, tractor shed (and tractor) all demolished. All communication cut-Battery out of action. Height Finders unable to function. With great rapidity on emergency line was laid to get altitude readings from Boston. Cables to guns were replaced. Battery restored to action in time to fire with excellent results on the very next flight of planes-less than 1/2 hour after the bombs landed. Pfc Swickard injured in bombing-he was later awarded a Purple Heart-Bombers continued the attack-Chicago's communication detail did a intrepid job of restoring the rest of our lines.

(93)

lines amid continued bombing; Cpl Bartz, Pfc's Holm, Schwab, Van, Valing, Pts. William, L. G., Tidwell, House all cited for gallantry in action and awarded Silver Stars. Ammunition trench also bit by bombs and about 25 rounds of HE destroyed. One of the planes which bombed us, we destroyed. We had seen the bombs leave the planes and watched them all the way down.
March 27th:-

Two raids during day, altitude 8400 to 8900 yards. Only one night raid. Chicago claimed one plane destroyed.

March 28th:-

Chicago bombed again! This day a flight of 3 planes put it's entire load right into the battery's position. A few bombs landed near the mess hall, destroying the meathouse, my model

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model A Ford: a few more landed near the east M. G. position; rest inside the gun square. Battery out of action for 4 hours. No casualties. No materiel damage-except to gun cables. One of the planes we shot down. Communication

(Continued)

section again excelled in work under bombardment-Chicago shelled for the first time from Cavite shore, 8-105 mm. Shells landed within 25 yards of 4 gun destroying showers. Battery on constant alert from 14 hours. Incendiary howls at night burn our barracks at M/S.

March 29th:-

4 daylight raids and 4 night raids. Chicago get official credit for destroying one plane, damaging one.

Information continued in another book:-

/s/ BERNARD C. HOPKINS

/t/ Bernard C. Hopkins

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