No. 9

HISTORICAL DATA

45th INF. P.S.

EXTRACT OF REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF 41ST REG. F.A.
(by Capt. Mariano Robles)

The 41st Div to which we were part was assigned the center of the East Bataan defenses. In addition to giving support to our own Division, we were to support also the 51st Div on our left. For this purpose, the 1st Bn, 21st FA and the 1st Bn, 51st FA were attached to our Regiment and a groupment resulted. The first shot was fired on 3 Jan 1942 by "A" Btry against 3 armored vehicles reported by an observer. While no hits were registered they all scattered. Evening 6 Jan 42 the Japs delivered their first major attack on the 57th Inf CT Sector on our Right. In three hours the line was thrown back by approximately 2000 yards. Our 1st Bn was ordered to fire continuously on the gap created until units of the 21st Div came up to help recover part of the lost ground. From then on to about 15 Jan 1942, the Japs delivered three separate and vigorous attacks on the three regimental fronts of the 41st Div. In each case they were badly beaten back by artillery fire. About 16 Jan 1942 on the 51st Div Area, the Japs were able to break the line and it was only with the help of the 45th-57th (PS) and 31st Inf (US) that the line was recovered three days later. In the evening of the break-through reports from patrols 43rd Inf stated heavy reinforcement coming into an area were poised to take advantage of the gap. The entire 41st FA groupment fired on this area indicated at 12:00 midnight of the 16th or 17th Jan causing heavy casualties laterreported to be about 38 truckloads of killed and wounded passing San Fernando, Pampanga. The following day the Japs gave up the attack and passing over the higher elevations of Natib Mts. 6,000 of them were reported 6 Kms on our left rear on the Abo-Abo river on 22 Jan ' 42. On 24 Jan ' 42 our Abucay - Natib line was abandoned and a new line established at Pilar-Bagac Road. Inspite of transportation difficulties, the Regiment was able to move its armaments and men to the new line and a defense again established on the East side of Mt Samat on 26 Jan 42. The engagement were very hot this time. On 17 Feb 42, the Regiment completed establishing positions west of Mt. Samat which we continued to occupy until the surrender. The positions occupied were in the forest and it required the blowing up of big trees to clear the field of fire. With excellent field of fire and an observation post that controlled the entire west sector of II Corps, we maintained superiority over the Jap ground forces until 2 April '42. About the 2nd week of March the Japs pulled back and gave our men respite and time to organize.

HISTORY
SECOND BATTALION 45th INFANTRY (P. S.)
December 8, 1941--April 9, 1942
By Captains Ralph Amato, Jr. and Louis F. Murphy

Dec. 8, 1941--Roster of Battalion Officers:

1st Lt. Arthur C. Biedenstein	--Bn. Executive (actg. Bn. C. O.)
1st Lt. John W. Long	--Bn. Supply Officer
1st Lt. Basil B. Dulin	--Bn. Surgeon
1st Lt. Louis F. Murphy	--C. O. Co. E.
1st Lt. Ralph Amato, Jr.	--C. O. Co. F.
1st Lt. William B. Davis	--Ex. Officer Co. F.
2nd Lt. Frederick H. Freund	--C. O. Co. G.
2nd Lt. James O. Hase	--C. O. Co. H.

The 45th Inf. (less 1st Bn. which was in Bataan) was ordered to move to "B" range, Ft. William McKinley. The 2nd Bn. (less CO. F) completed the move to "B" range by 3 p.m. Co. F. remained at Ft. McKinley as antiparatroop guard under Philippine Division control.

Dec. 9--Major Hindman joined battalion and assumed command. Co. F. was relieved from Anti-paratroop guard at 7 a.m. and ordered to join battalion on "B" range. Move completed 10:30 a. m.

Dec. 10--Major Hindman relieved from command. At 11 a. m. warning orders received from regiment to be prepared to move to entrucking area near post motor pool for move north--exact destination unknown. Bn. ordered to move to entrucking area shortly after noon. Heavy air activity--bombers and escorts--forced bn. to take cover in vicinity of post cemetery. Air activity ceased about 2 p.m. No casualties in bn. The battalion's main transportation, civilian busses which were being brought in from Manila, was badly disorganized as many of the busses were held up in Manila and nearly all of the civilian drivers of the busses on the post had fled during the air raid. Drivers were recruited from men in companies who at best had little experience in driving. The bn. was ordered to embuss and move to the post base-ball diamond. It was not until 1 p.m. that enough busses had arrived to move the bn. By 11 p.m. the bn. with transportation was a assembled on the post baseball diamond, loaded and equipped to take the field. The regiment was ordered to move to the vicinity of Olongapo, the 2nd bn. to follow the 3d bn. The bn. moved at 12 midnight with most of the officers driving busses.

Dec. 11--6 a.m. bn. arrived at the De Oro lumber mill, barrio Balete, on the Dinalupihan-Olongapo road. The bn. was ordered to organize a position astride the road facing west toward (Olongapo). Mission: to defend the road against enemy attack from the west. Co. F (1 section regtl. Anti-Tank guns and 3rd platoon Co. H. 30 cal. machine guns attached) ordered to occupy positions on left flank of bn. on a hill 150 yards south of the road and across

the iver which paralleled the road. Co. G (2nd Platoon) Co. H 30 cal. guns and 50 cal. and 81 mm mortar platoons Co. H attached) ordered to occupy position on high ground north of road. Co. E (1st platoon Co. H. 30 cal. guns attached) ordered to occupy position 200 yards in right rear of Co. G. The Bn. C. P. was located in the lumber mill. See overlay No. 1. Bn. was in position by 8 a.m.

Dec. 12--Further reconaissance of sector and improvement of position. Dec. 13-- same as 12.

Dec. 14--Company commanders, supervised firing and adjusting of new Browning Automatic rifles.

Dec. 15--Lt. Colonel Ross B. Smith joined bn. and assumed command.

Dec. 16--Sgt. Batalla, Co. F, shot in foot by accidental discharge of pistol when he fell in river. He never returned to the bn. and no record of him could be found.

Dec. 17--Shortly afterwards the bn. received warning order from regt. to be prepared to move into Bataan to a bivouac area on Mariveles cut-off. Bn. c.o. and Executive left to make reconaissance of route and select bivouac area. Bn. moved at dusk reaching bivouac area 1,000 yards northwest of Cabcaben at 1 a.m. Dec. 18.

Dec. 18--Bn. now operating as a separate unit under division control. Mission: to outpost and defend the costline of Bataan from Limay to Aglaloma Bay. One rifle platoon and one machine gun platoon was ordered to proceed at once to aglaloma bay and relieve the Constabulary unit there. Mission: to observe for enemy activity and defend the bay against attack from the sea. Lt. Davis with one platoon Co. G and one platoon Co. H proceeded to Aglaloma bay at 6 a.m. Bn. c.o. assigned sectors to the Co's as follows: Co. E from Limay south to Bayakaqoin point, Co. F from Los Cochinos point to Biaan river (inclusive) Co. G (less one pl.) and Co. H. (less one pl. 30 cal.) from Biaan river to Aglaloma bay (exclusive). The co. commanders were ordered to make a reconnaissance of their sectors, select o.p.'s and c.p.'s, and move their units into position as soon as possible, each company keeping its transportation. By nightfall all units were in position as follows: (see overlay No. 2) Co. E command post 1,000 yards northwest of Cabcaben dock. Co. E outposts as (1) Quitang pt. (2) Lamao Dock (3) Lokanin Pt. (4) Cabcaben dock (5) Bay Aquin Pt. Supply and communication were difficult over this 25 km. sector. Co. F and Bn. c.p. and aid station located at KP 178 on east side of road. Co F outposts and (1) Longaskawayan pt (2)
(3) mouth of Biaan river. G and H. Co. outposts at (1) Vigia pt. (2) Basay bay (3) Guay pt. C. P. on east side of road at km. 188. Communication with division and between companies and OP at Aglaloma by wire. Communication to regtl, CP located east of Bagac where 1st and 3rd Bns were, initially by 131 radio, later by wire. OP's were on 24 hour watch and were relieved at regular intervals from co. CP's where main bodies of companies remained. One pl. Co. B. 14th Engineer (PS) commanded by 1st Lt. Jennings attached to Bn. Rations and supplies

delivered daily by Lt. Long from regt.

Dec. 19-23--Extensive reconnaissance by Co. co's and non-coms of sectors. Gun positions prepared at op's and defense plans for sectors set up. Trails leading from op's east to main road organized for defense.

Sgt. Castro, Co. F, burned by exploding field range. He never returned to bn. and no record of him could be found.

Dec. 24--Bn. c.p., aid station, and Co. F c.p. moved to an area 150 yards west of main road at KP 179.

Dec. 25-Jan. 1-1942--Usual OP duties. On Dec. 28 Capt. William B. Donovan, MC, joined on and took over as senior surgeon.

Jan. 2, 1942--Following officers accepted promotions with rank from Dec. 19, 1941:

From 1st Lt. to Captain:
Arthur C. Biedenstein
John W. Long
Louis F. Murphy
Ralph Amato, Jr.
From 2nd Lt. to 1st Lt:
James O. Hase
Frederick H. Freund

Jan. 3--Officers from 2nd Bn. and 2nd PC reconoittered sector preparatory to relieving 2nd Bn. 45th.

Jan. 4--Bn. was relieved by 2nd Bn. 2 PC and ordered to join the regt. on Pilar-Bagac road. Bn. hq's and med det. moved about noon. Each company and plat. of engineers was ordered to move separately from its respective sector, keeping its transportation well scattered because of enemy air activity. Route: Bn. (Less Co. E) moved north on the west road to Bagac, thence east to Km. 149 where bivouac area was established. Co F was the last to arrive over his route, reaching bivouac area at dusk. Co. E moved via Limay, Pilar, thence west to bivouac area, arriving at dusk.

Jan. 5--Bn. was given mission of organizing a sector of a previously selected defense line. Co. E was assigned a sector from the junction of Trails 5 and west road, east to junction of Bagac and Sinapsap rivers. Co. F's sector extended from Co. E 600 yards east. Co. G's sector extended Co. F east to Caliwaw (?) river where 1st Bn. 45th joined. (See overlay No. 3). Co. H was attached by platoons to the rifle companies and aided in selecting and preparing mg and mortar positions. Co. officers sent the day reconoittering their sectors with n.c.o.'s.

Jan. 6--Lt. Col. Smith and the co. officers reconoittered the bn. sector selecting co-ordinating gun positions. The ration was cut to two meals per day, breakfast at 8 a.m. and supper at 4 p.m.

Jan.7-16--During this period the bn, assisted by Lt. Jennings and his platoon of B Co. 14th Eng. (PS) was engaged in organizing its sector. The work was exhausting as all barbed

wire and tools had to be carried by hand on trails through rugged jungle terrain to the position. About Jan. 12 Lt Col Rodman, co, 91st Inf (PA) and a party of his officers reconoittered the bn. sector with Lt. Col. Smith and his co. commanders preparatory to taking over and completing the organization of the position. Units of the 91st Inf. (PA) assisted the 2nd Bn. from Jan. 13 until the 2nd Bn. 45th moved north on Jan. 16. On Jan. 10 Co. F was given the mission of defending Battery B, 92 CA (PS) commanded by Capt. R. J. Lawlor which was located near the junction of west road and Pilar-Bagac road in case the enemy landed at Bagac bay. Capt. Amato and Lt. Davis with nco's reconoittered battery area and submitted defense plants to regt. About Jan. 10 bn moved to New Bivouac 1 km south of 1st bivouac on P-G rd.

Jan. 16--About 3 p.m. bn. received warning order from regt. to be prepared to move north. About 5:30 p.m. the bn. co. was ordered to regtl. hq. to receive orders for move. The 2nd bn., as part of the regt., was ordered to proceed to vicinity of Abucay-Hacienda. Mission: to be in readiness to counterattack enemy who was making some gains. At dusk the bn. marched north from its bivouac via on unnumbered, trail to km. 149 on the Pilar-Bagac rd. where it loaded on buses. Order to march: Bn. Hq, "E", "G", "H", Companies. Bn. proceeded via motors to km 142 where troops debusses and marched north via Abo-Abo cut-off-Engineer road to a bivouac area near Bani, arriving early morning of the 17th.

Jan. 17--Bn. remained in regtl. bivouac area under cover of low thorny bushes until dark. Resumed march and at dawn of the 18th bivouacked near junction of Toyo river and Back road.

Jan. 18--about noon the 45th Inf. was ordered to move to vicinity of Abucay-Hacienda and attack the enemy. The regt. moved off across country with 3rd Bn., 2nd Bn. 1st Bn. in that order. Very little was known about the enemy. The terrain was unfamiliar and the route unknown as far as the bn. was concerned. The 2nd bn. was merely following the 3d bn. across country in a northwesterly direction. About 8 p.m. before reaching the Hacienda the regt was halted on a narrow trail. Remnants of a company of the 31st Inf. (US) came down the trail reporting an enemy break-through. The 3rd bn. remained in position awaiting orders. The 1st and 2nd bns. were ordered to return to point of departure and proceed to the Hacienda via back road, and Hacienda Road. The men were extremely fatigued due to the succession of long marches with heavy loads. The rate of march back across the rugged jungle terrain in the dark was very slow. Control was extremely difficult. As the return march was made by dead reckoning CO's E and G reached the starting point about midnight. They were fed and immediately ordered to move to the Hacienda via Back road Hacienda road. Co's H and F had become separated from rest of Bn. during counter march. The Bn, less Cos F and H, arrived at a position 1700 yards east of the Hacienda on the south side of the Hacienda Road at sunrise of the 19th.

Jan. 19--The dispositions of friendly and enemy troops in the general area of the Hacienda is shown by overlay #4. The 2nd bn. less Cos. F and H remained in bivouac. About 1 p.m. orders were received to attack and re-establish the line formerly held by the 41st PA, about 800 yards north northwest from line of departure, 1st bn. 45 on left, 2nd Bn. less F and H companies enclosed to right rear. Contact between bns maintained by E Co. Co. G in rear of Co. E. The attack started at 3 p.m. and about 2:30 p.m. contact between them was lost. Night found Co. E disorganized on north very deep ravine. Part of Co. G and Bn. hq. were then in bottom of the same ravine. About 5 p.m. Cos. F and H rejoined the Bn. and were placed in Bn. reserve 300 yards south of deep ravine. Shortly after dark contact with 1st Bn. regained. 1 plat. Co. F sent forward to fill gap between bns. Intermittent small arms fire continued throughout night.

Jan. 20--Bn. reorganized at a light. Co. E lost 1 man KIA by sniper. Shortly after noon the 1st and 2nd Bns were ordered to continue the attack. During the morning it was discovered that the position of the 1st and 2nd bns was about 800 yards south of the line that had been broken. The 2nd bn. 31st Inf (US) was in position on the left of the 2nd bn 45th about 75 yards south of deep ravine. They were encountering enemy resistance to their immediate and left fronts north of deep ravine. Efforts to cross ravine had failed. The 2nd Bn. 45 was now operating on unfamiliar terrain. No time was available for ground reconnaissance and the existing maps were small scale and did not accurately show the tails. 2 bn 45 attacked about 1:30 p.m. with Co. E (plus 1 plat Co. H) and Co. G. (plus one plat. Co. H) in assault with Co. F (plus 1 plat Co. H, Co. H (less three 30 cal. plats) and 1 sect regtl. Anti-tank Co. in reserve. Major Edgar Wright, regtl S-3, personally led the attack which consisted of advancing in column of files over an unknown trail toward the enemy. The 1st bn. followed the 2nd bn. The bns encountered no resistance and reached a position on a bluff overlooking river about 4 p.m. 1st bn. came up and took position on right of 2nd bn. Co. F received sniper fire from rear. Enemy artillery shells were observed landing 1,000 yards to right flank and slightly to north of bn. position. Enemy foot and horse troops observed on road 2,000 yards in front of bn. position moving west toward mountains.

Reconnaissance to east and west disclosed no friendly or enemy troops to east of bn. 400 yards was a heavily shelled position and large quantities of small arms ammunition. This was area that 1st PA had withdrawn from. Night found 2nd Bn. in position with E and C cos, plus Co. H attachments, on river bluff with Co. F (plus 1 plat Co. H) Co. H (less attachments and Anti-Tank section in reserve. Bn. received intermittent rifle fire from rear (sw) during nights.

Ration party unable to find Bn. so troops went without supper.

Jan. 21--2 bn. remained in position. About 10 a.m. the bn. communication chief reported being fired on at mango grove 500 yds in rear (SW of bn.) and prevented from laying wire to reg. Lt. Col. Smith ordered Lt. Lavis to take one pl. Co. F and one pl. Co. H and investigate. Lt. Davis returned to bn. cp about noon, reporting that enemy held strong point on high ground to sw which overlooked bn's position. Two pls. Co. E and one sect. LMG Co. F were added to Lt. Davis's force. Capt. Murphy, Lt. Davis and Lt. Hase moved out with the troops Capt. Murphy was in command of the composite force. Ordered to contact enemy and drive him out. Comm. with bn. through SCR-195. Unit engaged enemy. Lt. Davis WIA returned to bn. aid station for treatment, and then returned to scene of action taking 81m mortar of Co. H with him. The bn's. present position was about 411 yds. north (or in rear) of the left flank of main enemy eveloping force. Orders received from reg. for a coordinated attack at 3 pm. 2nd bn. 31st Inf. (US) was to attack from sw. a unit of 41st Inf. (PA) from east, and 2 bn. 45th was to move south to contain enemy in position. Bn. was not to fire unless enemy attempted withdrawal as it was feared bn's fire would be into 31st Inf. zone. A 15 minute mortar preparation by 81mm mortars of Co. H and 2bn 31st was to precede attack. The 2bn 45th, with E and F Co's supported by Co. H, advanced to within 200 yds. of enemy. The attack by 31st and 41st units failed and enemy turned on 2 bn. 45th force with heavy small arms and mortar fire. E and F Co's. forced to withdraw with H Co. covering. Lt. Freund with 2 pls. Co. G sent up and covered withdrawal of 2bn. attacking force. Capt. Murphy and Lt. Freund WIA by mortar fragments. 2bn. reformed in circle defensive formation with Co. F and 1 pl. Co. H out posted toward enemy to sw. Casualties (exclusive of officers): Co. E, 1KIA; Co. F, 5WIA; Co G 4WIA; Co H, 2WIA. No ration party reached bn. Jan 22 - Ration party reached bn. this day. Water was secured from a spring 600 yds east of river bank. Carrying party was escorted by armed guards. At noon after following various trails from se. Bn. ate first meal since breakfast on Jan. 20. Enemy did not press attack. Co F received 2 casualties WIA from sniper fire. Shortly after noon bn. ordered to move 1,000 yds. to se. Wounded were sent to rear with ration party and bn. moved. The map coordinates radioed to bn. were either received incorrectly or orientation of maps and ground incorrect. Bn. was found at dusk by Major Wright and ration party.

Jan 23--Reconnaissance of ground. Bn. not committed. After dark Bn. moved to sw.

Jan 24--At sunrise bn. reached original position of night of Jan 19 bn. put in position with Co. F, plus 1 pl Co H, on left flank tied in with 2 bn. 31st Inf; Co E, plus 1 pl. Co H, in center north of deep ravine; Co. G., plus 1 pl Co. H, on right flank in contact with 1st bn. 45th Position faced nw. See overlay #5. Pos-

ition and rear area received heavy shelling and dive bombing in late afternoon. 2nd bn. 45 received orders to withdraw to old 41st div. c.p. (control point) at dark where transportation would take them to vicinity of Bani. One co. was to remain as shell (covering force) to withdraw at 3 a.m. Jan 25. Tanks were to patrol the Hacienda road and withdraw with covering forces. Co. F was designated as shell. Lt. Col. Smith, and Capt. Donovan, with small medical detachment, remained with shell. 2nd Bn, less shell, withdraew at dusk. Order to march Co. H, E, Co. G. Route of withdrawal: south from position to train 200 yards north of Hacienda road, then east on parallel trail for one-half mile at which point trail joined road. During the march Co E & G were struck by spent bullets from mg fire to the west. No casualties. At 9 p.m. 2nd Bn., less shell, cleared the control point on Hacienda road. Orders were received to proceed to Km 148 on Pilar-Bagac road. No transportation available. Bn. force-marched via Back road, Bani, Abo-Abo cut off, and Pilar-Bagac road to Km 148, arriving 9:30 a.m. Jan. 25. See overlay No. 6. Men were in a state of exhaustion.

Action of shell--Capt. Amato contacted the shell of 2nd bn. 31st Inf and the co-ordinated withdrawal of the two covering forces was arranged. At 1:30 a.m. Jan. 25 a visiting patrol from Co. F reported that the 31st Inf. covering force was not in position. Contact between the units was never regained. At 3 am. Co. F withdrew south toward Hacienda road. The night was pitch dark and it was impossible to see more than a few feet. The shell reached the trail 200 yards north of Hacienda road which paralleled the road. Small armsfire was heard to the east and cane fields to the south were ablaze. It was evident that the enemy had pursued the withdrawing troops and was now between the shell and friendly troops. Tanks could be heard some distance to the east on the Hacienda road. Rather than proceed east in single file by trail through dense jungle, it was decided to march north to Hacienda road and proceed east on the road where the surrounding terrain afforded opportunity for deployment. The shell moved north, crossed a deep ravine, and reached the Hacienda at a large mango grove. The shell reorganized and marched east on Hacienda road. Lt. Davis with 2nd Plat Co. F (plus 1 section light machine guns) formed the advance guard, followed by co. hq. and Lt. Col. Smith, 3rd plat Co. F, Capt. Donovan and his med. det., and 1st plat Co. F (plus 1 sect mg) which was ordered to act as rear guard. The shell proceeded east for 200 yards when point was fired upon. Lt. Davis deployed the advance guard and overcame the enemy resistance. Shell continued until point was again brought under fire by rifles and mg. The advance guard deployed and 3rd plat. was committed on south side of road. After brisk fire fight the enemy was overcome and shell continued advance with fixed bayonets. About 300 yards father east shell received heavy fire from Hacienda road and from cane field to south of road. Enemy was using rifles, mgs, and mortars. Capt. Amato deployed shell on both sides of road. After a half hour's fighting shell was unable to advance and casualties were increasing. Dawn was about one hour away, and it was decided to attempt to reach contact point by moving east across country north

at Hacienda road and coming in on Hacienda road behind enemy. Orders were issued for the move: advance guard to remain in position and keep enemy under fire while 3rd plat., med det. and 1st plat., moved ne. Lt. Davis and 2nd plat. to then follow and become rear guard. Capt. Amato led the movement, keeping direction by compass. After moving cross country for nearly an hour, the shell reached the Hacienda road behind the enemy. Contact between platoons was broken during the move. Capt. Amato and Capt. Donovan with med det. and part of 35d plat. Co. F continued east and followed tank tracks to vicinity of Beni where transportation was secured from a civilian and the officers proceeded the regtl hqs on Pilar-Bagac road reporting that position and condition of remainder of shell was unknown.

Lt. Col. Smith, who with Lt. Davis and remainder of shell, reentered friendly lines on Jan. 31 after being cut-off for 6 days, gave the following account: "After shell started moving cross country it was fired on by enemy from direction of Hacienda road. In the darkness and thick jungle contact with the lading platoon was lost. I proceeded east with a small group and about daylight contacted Lt. Davis and a group of soldiers who had also lost contact. We had out 40 men and started moving east. Enemy dive bombers were bombing old artillery positions. We came in sight of Manila Bay, but enemy troop movements to the east and south were too heavy for us to reach the bay. At one point we came upon an enemy field artillery position of 2 batteries. An enemy patrol came after us but we eluded them. An enemy observation plane followed our movements, but it was eluded. The group had no food except sugar cane and green papayas. Water was obtained from irrigation ditches and streams. I gave the men permission to drop out, secure civilian clothes, and work their way south back across the lines. Only a few dropped out. The group worked wet, resting in the day and moving at night, continually dodging enemy troops and patrols. The group became exhausted. On Jan. 31 we struck a wide trail leading south and came upon a PA detachment in front of the MLE (north of Pilar-Bagac road at Trail 7). Party was taken to PA hqs where we slept and ate. On Feb. 1, the group went to Service Co., 45th Inf. via regtl hqs and on Feb. 2 rejoined the Bn. Casualties in Co. F were 10 KIA, 17 MIA, See Overlay No. 7.

Jan. 25--2nd Bn. 45, less shell, Capt. Biedenstein in command, marched at noon to a bivouac area at junction of trails 5 and west road. This position was on reverse slope of the ridge on north side of Tiis river. Capt. Amato and Capt. Donovan with the men of the shel who returned with them joined the bn in the early evening. Bn. was acting as 1st Corps reserve.

Jan. 26--In the morning suitable shelters made and position reconnoittered. About sundown orders were received to move south on west road to bivouac on Saysain river, east of west road. As the troops prepared to leave the bivouac, the PA, in position on ridge south of Tiis river, opened fire with mg. One scout from Co. H and one scout from Co G were wounded. Both men died in hospital from loss of blood. After much waving of white handkerchiefs and undershirts, the Bn. was permitted to pass along the west road. Through the PA position. The bn. reached Saysain river bivouac about 1:30 p.m.

Jan. 27--Men were told to wash their clothes and clean up equipment. It was hoped that the men would able to enjoy a rest and recuperate from the hardship of the previous week. This was denied the, however, as orders were received just before noon to

proceed at once to Km 199 on west road and drive out 30 or 40 Japs who had landed at Saliam Bay. Bn. was operating as a separate unit under General Pierce, cg south sub-sector, I Corps. Bn. started marching shortly afternoon, but was shuttld, due to efforts of Capt. Long who somehow got some buses, to Km 206 where Bn. was ordered to bivouac. Capt. Amato was sent to South Sub-Sector Hq. as Liaison officer. Men of Co. F were attached to Co. H.

Jan. 28--Situation about midnight Jan. 27-28 at Km 199 very confused. Enemy snipers reported on west road. Gen. Pierce decided to move 2nd Bn. 45 to Km 199. Capt. Amato dispatched with transportation to 2nd Bn. bivouac at Km 205 with orders to move 2nd Bn. 45 to Km 199 before daylight. Move accomplished by 5:30 a.m. and 2nd Bn. made contact with one Bn. 1 PC and 17th Pursuit Squd. (Provisional Infantry) at Km 199 on Trail 1. (note: The trail numbers used in the following account do not coincide with actual trail numbers which are not known. See overlay No. 8). Capt. Biedenstein put in charge of operations and ordered to drive to the beach and re-establish the defense line in the Saliaam bay area from which the Constabulary had been driven. The 17th Pursuit Squadron had attempted a counter attack on Jan. 27 but was unsuccessful.

First attempt to contact enemy made 8 a.m. A reconnaissance patrol was fired on 300 yards from west road on Trail 1. Shortly after, the Bn. of Constabulary attacking west, formed skirmish line to n-s, center of line on Trail 1. 2d bn. 45, less shell, was in line in rear of 1 PC with 17th Pur. Sqd. in reserve. Units advanced about 300 yards to the fork in Tr. 1, where 17th PS had suffered casualties on Jan. 27. No contact with enemy. Area considered difficult to consolidate and units withdrew to original position for the night. Co. G. 45 spent night astride Trail I facing west. No contact with enemy during night.

Jan. 29--Units again attacked 6 a.m. Constabulary on left of Trail 1, 2nd Bn. 45, less shell, on right of Trail, 17th Pur. Sq. in rear of Constab. Trail junction reached and units ordered to half. A patrol of officers from 17th Pur. Sq. and Capt. Biedenstein went forward on left fork about 200 yards, then cut south to Anyasan river and west to beach. Enemy in large group seen on north side of Anyasan bay. Patrol returned bringing order from Bn co to send 2 mg. plats. Co. H 45 were ordered by Bn. c.o. to beach--no rifle protection. Sgts. Ritona and Cotaran with the 2 plats. proceeded west on left fork of Trail I, and as they reached place where officer patrol had cut south, unit was cut up by enemy mg fire at close range. Lt. Hase went forward suffered casualties: 6 KIA, 2 WIA. Units withdrew again to east of trail junction and at sundown an attempt was made to form a circle bivouac. An enemy sniper armed with machine rifle penetrated bivouac area and opened fire. Casualties: Co. E, 1 KIA, 3 WIA, including 1st Sgt. Villanueva, who did not report flesh wound in leg because he did not want to leave the co. All units then withdrew about 200 yards where they were

reorganized and security established.

Jan. 30--two enemy scouts approached position in early morning. They were discovered by a PC machine gunner who destroyed them, using 4 belts of ammunition before he was silenced. Units attacked again about 8 a.m.; 2nd Bn. 45 in lead, followed by 1 PC, with 17th PS in rear. The trail junction was reached and PC took up position on left (south) fork. 2nd Bn. 45 advanced west on right (north) fork. 17th PS guarded line of communications of 2nd Bn. 45 east to trail junction. 1 KIA, 1 WIA. Co. G deployed on right of Co. E. Position held and remainder of Bn extended east along trail to the function where contact with PC was established. The 17th PS moved east and extended along trail 1 east from junction keeping line of supply and communication open. 2nd Bn. 45 attempted to contact by patrol a bn. of the 12th PA that was on with 12th PA was secured through South Sub-Sector hqs.

Jan. 31--Units now had support of 2nd Bn. 88th FA (PS). Artillery preparation called for in front of 2nd Bn. 45. Position of bn's front line incorrectly given or plotted and artillery fell in Co. G area. Casualties: 4 KIA, including 1st Sgt. Jacob, 16 WIA. Lt. Freund reorganize Co. G and in the afternoon he led his co. in a spirited attack and advanced to the beach at Saliaam bay. Co. E followed and took up position on right of Co. G with its right flank on Saliaam river. Position faced west and covered 300 yards of front. 17th PS followed 2nd bn. 45 and covered line of communications. Major Johnson, S-3, 57th Inf. (PS) took command of operations of units in Silaam area relieving Capt. Biedenstein.

Feb. 1--Capt. Irwin W. Gamelgaard, 88th FA (PS) reported as liaison officer from 2nd Bn. 88th FA (PS) and established OP on north point of Silaam bay. About 40 men from Bn. shell (CO.F) returned to bn. They have even led thru enemy territory for 5 days by 1st Sgt. Ricardo Villarina. Capt. Amato relived as liaison officer to South Sub-Sector H2. and joined bn. reorganizing Co. F, which was placed in bn. reservie, with 1 sect Co. H. atchd. Co. H sent 1 plat. 30 cal mg to Co. G., 1 sect. 30 cal. mg to position on north point of Saliaam bay, and 1 plat. 30 cal. mg and 81 mm mortar was kept in reserve. Enemy graves which were found near mouth of Saliaam river were opened and papers sent back to G-2. Contact with 12th PA north of Saliaan Bay was gained. Enemy attempted to land reinforcements night of Feb. 1-2. Enemy troops were in barges towed by a power launch. 2nd bn. 45 sent 12-30 cal. mg to beach near Saliaam bay and 17th PS sent 3 fifty cal. mg. Artillery fire was directed at the barges, which were also brought under heavy fire by mgs. Two U.S. P-40's intercepted barges and strafed them. Landing repulsed with heavy losses to enemy.

Feb. 2--Lt. Col. Smith and Lt. Davis rejoined bn. 3 Bn 57th Inf (PS) passed through PC and proceeded toward Anaysan bay on Trail II. 2nd Bn. 45 moved s.e. along trail II toward right flank of 3d bn. 57. 2nd bn. 45 CP established on trail 300 yards east of Saliaam bay. (see overlay No. 9). 1 sect. 30 cal. mg of Co. H attached to Co. E. One enemy landing barge, riddled by mg washed ashore in Saliaam bay. Some enemy rations taken. Enemy attempted to supply its troops in Anyasan-Saliaam area by plane. 12 enemy

parachute packages, containing food, medicine, ammunition, and maps, captured and sent to sub-sector Hq. (more below under Feb. 5).

Feb. 3--2nd Bn. 45 had no contact with enemy. Constant communication with 3rd Bn. 57 by runner.

Feb. 4--3d Bn. 57 abreast of 2nd Bn. 45 with right flank of 57th about 160 yards south of Co. E. 17th PS moved into Pos. on R.T. flank of Co. E.

Feb. 5--No change in situation. Add to Feb. 3--in the afternoon 26 enemy soldiers were seen through artillery scope swimming north about 1500 yards off Saliaam bay. A small lifeboat containing a life preserver marked "U. S. S. Merritt" washed ashore at Saliaam bay. Late in the afternoon an enemy soldier was seen swimming 500 yards out from Saliaam bay. Three scouts who volunteered set out in the lifeboat to pick him up. As they approached the enemy he discarded his life jacked and went under. When the Scouts returned they reported that the Japanese had said, "No surrender-suicide."

Feb. 6--No change in enemy situation. G. & E cos. straigthtened positions to consolidate with 3d Bn. 57th which was moving against enemy resistance. The bn. of the 12th PA which was in position on the beach north of Saliaam bay was ordered out, and the 17th PS moved north and took over the position. 1 rifle plat. Co. F and 1 sect. mg Co. F plus 1 plat 30 cal. Co. H moved in and occupied position vacated by 17th PS on rt. of Co. E.

Feb. 7--Enemy made another attempt to land troops from barges during night of Feb. 7-8. Two U.S. P-40's again strafed barges which were also brought under mg fire by 2nd Bn and 17th PS. Attack repulsed. 3 enemy captured by 17th PS & 2d Bn 45 at different points north of Saliaam bay. Enemy soldiers wore nothing but Gee-Strings. Two of them were wounded. Apparently they had been attempting to swim north to Bagac.

Feb. 9--2nd Bn. 57 relieved 3d Bn. 57th. 2d Bn. 45 shifted south about 200 yards until actual physical contact was gained with 57th. The units of the 57th had advanced in their area against stiff enemy resistance. A gap of about 100 yards now existed between Co. E and the platoon of Co. F 91 plat Co. H attached) which was ordered to keep its right flank anchored at Saliaam Bay. This gap could be covered by patrol only. The enemy attacked Co. G and then Co. E in the late afternoon. Lt. Freund was wounded in the arm during the action. Lt. Davis relieved from Co. F and assigned as c.o. Co. G.

Feb. 10--during the morning enemy attacked line at junction of 2nd Bn. 45 and 2d Bn. 57. The attack was repulsed after heavy fighting. The enemy was desperate. Efforts to reinforce him by sea and supply him by air had failed. He had to break through the line that had encircled him or driven back in to the sea. In afternoon enemy combat patrols attacked Co. G and Co E feeling out the line. Capt. Murphy requested reinforcements on his right flank. 1 squad Co. F and 1 sec. G. Co. sent from bn. reserveand put into position in the gap between E & F companies. (see overlay no. 10).

Feb. 11--Enemy attacked in force at dawn and broke though gap between E & F companies. Enemy moved north to Saliaam River, then started moving east, following the river through the jungle. Enemy attacked c.p's of 17th PS and Co. F 45 at mouth of Saliaam river.

Capt. Sloan, c.o. 17th PS, wounded and died on way to hospital. 17th PS forced north on tail toward Canas pt. Capt. Amato proceeded east to Bn. CP reporting enemy break through. Lt. Col. Smith requested aid from 3d Bn. 57th. Capt. Murphy pulled his right flank back and extended it north to Saliaam river. Capt. Amato with 1 sq. of Co. F, the bn. reserve, proceeded toward beach. Unit was out off by enemy mg fire across trail from south about 75 yards from bn. c.p. Squad deployed on trail and all available men from bn. hq's were brought up and put in position defending the trail and bn. c. p. Enemy was held off until 3d Bn. 57th arrived about 10 a.m., although Bn. c.p. came under heavy enemy mg fire. Sgt. Villena, Co. E, re-established communication between Co. E and bn. c.p. by carrying wire from Co. E across Saliaam river in front of enemy to bn. c. p. He was under heavy enemy fire. Co. L and Co. I, 57th Inf. (PS) formed skirmish line across trail. Co. L extended from trail (inclusive) south to Saliaam river where contact was gained with right flank of Co. E 45. Co. I extended from trail (exclusive) north 100 yards. The two companies moved to position held by 2d Bn. 45 reserve and attacked about noon. One plat. Co. F 45, at first cut off on beach by enemy break through, circled enemy rear and entered lines through Co. E and Co. G. One plat. Co. F 45 attached to Co. I 57 to protect right flank of Co. I and gain contact with 17th PS. Attack progressed steadily but slowly through dense jungle. Enemy resistance stiff but spesmodic as enemy apparently was disorganized. Attack stopped 5 p.m. and units dug in. (overlay No. 1)

Feb. 12--Attack continue at 6 a. m. and all units pushed through to beaches by 3 p.m. Continuous contact established from Canas pt. to Quinauan pt. The beach was littered with enemy equipment and clothing indicating many of enemy had taken to the water. Enemy casualties estimated 250. Casualties 2d Bn. 45 since Jan. 28: Co E, 4 KIA, 9 WIA; Co. F 3 KIA; Co. G, 5 KIA, 16 WIA; Co H, 14 KIA, 13 WIA. Total enlisted men, 26 KIA, 41 WIA. Officers, Lt. Freund, WIA. Bn. moved 5 p. m. to bivouac area at junction of trails I & III. 2nd Lt. James D. Kell joined bn. and assigned to Co. H.

Feb. 13--Bn. moved at sunrise to regtl bivouac area. The first 10 days were used for general recuperation and reorganization. Men were allowed to rest. Clothing, equipment, and armament were replaced and repaired and companies reorganized. A regtl. training program from 9-12 a.m. was then put into effect. Strategy and tactics of previous battle were discussed with object of improving general fitness and team work of units. Special emphasis was placed on the operation of squads and similar small units in the jungle. The offensive and defensive tactics used by the enemy were analyzed and an effort was made to see that every soldier knoew how to deal successfully with them. Training with tanks in offensive operation in the jungle was also held. On Feg. 16 Capt. Murphy was sent to medical collecting company suffering with dysentery. Capt. Biedenstein assumed command of Co. E in addition to his other duties.

About Feb. 20 the following scouts who held commissions in the Organized Reserve Corps, U. S. Army, was called to active duty and assigned to their arganizations; as Second Lieutenants: Sgt. Aurelio, Co. F, Sgt. Sanchez, Co. G, Sgt. Penaserrada.

On Feb. 24 Lt. Col. Smith was sent to the hospital suffering from diarrhea and general run down condition as a result of spending

6 days behind enemy lines at Abucay.

About Feb. 28 the bn. received about 129 replacements from the Philippine Army. They were attached for rations and training as follows: Co. E, 26; Co. F, 54; Co. G, 26; Co. H 23. An intensive training program for the new men was started. The men were from various branches of the service and held ranks from 1st Sgt. to private. At the end of the training program the best men were to be kept and enlisted as privates in the Scouts. A firing range was impovised on the beach near Bobo pt. and the men put through a range course.

About this time the bn. officers as parts of regtl. groups, reconnoittered the beaches and trails leading to the beaches from Anaysan pt. north to Saysain pt. Tentative plans of action were drawn up in case enemy attempted landings in this sector.

Mar. 5--Capt. Murphy returned from collecting co. and took command of Co. E.

Mar. 7--Lt. Freund returned from hospital and was assigned to bn. headquarters.

Mar. 10--Capt. Long sent to hospital suffering from yellow jaundice. Lt. Freund took over Bn. S-4 job.

Mar. 14--The Regt. was put in 1st Corps reserve and one bn was ordered to move north to a bivouac area on Trail 9. The 2nd Bn. was ordered up and marched at dark to a bivouac area on Trail 9,200 yards east of 91st Div (PA) c.p., arriving early morning Mar. 15. Capt. Murphy sent to Hosp. #2 with severe recurrence of dysentery. Capt. C. W. McKinley was transferred to 2nd Bn. from 1st Bn. and took command of Co. E. Patterson joined Bn, Co. H; Kell and Freund trfd. to 1st Bn.

Mar. 15--April 4--Bn. remained in bivouac area. The 1st Bn moved into area east of 2nd Bn. during night of Mar. 17. Training was continued and new men were given another opportunity to fire mg and rifles on a small range which was constructed in the jungle. A chemical warfare course was given.

Mar. 18--Capt. Andrew B. Zwaska was assigned to the Bn. and assumed command.

Mar. 20--Capt. Murphy returned to bn. from hospital and took command of Co. E vice Capt. McKinley who returned to 1st Bn.

Mar. 21--Lt. Col. Smith returned to bn. from hospital and assumed command. Capt. Zwaska became bn. executive vice Capt. Biedenstein who took command of Co. G vice Lt. Davis who remained with Co. G as executive.

Mar. 23--Capt. Donovan, bn. surgeon, sent to hospital with malaria.

Mar. 25--Lt. Dulin surveyed the bn. to determine if anyone was showing marked effects from malnutrition. The physical condition of the officers and men was rapidly growing worse due to sickness, hot weather, and insufficient food.

Mar. 27--Lt. Grimes relieved from Co. G and assigned as Bn. S-4 vice Lt. Freund. Capt. Donovan returned to bn. from hospital. He was then ordered to regt and assigned as regtl. surgeon. Capt. Walter Kosteki, MC, joined

bn and became chief bn. surgeon.

Mar. 30--Lt Col. Smith was sent to hospital. Capt. Zwaska took command of the Bn.

Mar. 31--Capt. Amato relieved from Co. F and assigned to Bn. hqs. as Bn. ex. Lt. Davis relieved from Co. G and assigned as c.o. Co. F.

April 2--Capt. Zwaska promoted to Major. Lt. Davis promoted to Captain. About 93 PA men were recommended for enlistmen as privates. Co. E kept 13 men; Co. F, 39; Co. G 20, Co. H 21.

April 3--Bn. alerted 3 p.m. enemy artillery fell in bn. area about 5 p.m. No casualties.

April 3--Bn. ordered to move as part of regt. east on Trail 9 to vicinity of Trail 29. Bn. received buses just after dark and moved out. Order of march, Bn. Hq, E, F, G, H, Med, det. Bn. debussed in vicinity of 11th Div (PA) c.p. and proceeded on foot, arriving at regtl. bivouac area on Trail 29 just after day break April 4 (see overlay No. 13). The organic transportation of the bn suffered heavily on this move. Many trucks broke down on the way and did not arrive at bivouac area until the afternoon of April 5. Chow was delayed several hours.

April 4--Regt. now operating under 2nd Corps. Orders were received to attack north on Trail 29. Mission: to drive north to Pilar-Bagac road and re-establish line which was broken. At 3 p.m. a reconnaissance party of regtl. officers proceeded north on Trail 29 by motors. About 4 km from bivouac area party was fired upon by the enemy who was putting in an anti-tank gun on the trail. The party escaped safely and returned to bivouac area. Co. I was ordered to move north on Trail 29 to keep contact and contain enemy in present position. At 6 a.m. the regtl attack order was issued. Troops were to be fed at midnight April 5-6 and attack started at 2 a.m. April 6. 2nd Bn was to follow 3d Bn. on Trail 29. Boundary upon deployment was Trail 29; the 2nd Bn. to be committed on of trail. Line of departure was position astride trail 29 held by Co. I.

April 5--Bn. moved off at 2 a.m. Order of march, bn. hq, Co. F, E. G, H (less 3-30 cal. plats which were attached to E, F, & G). Med det. It was very dark and the rate of advance very slow along the trail. The line of departure was reached about 4 a.m. and the bn. moved into the jungle on the right of the trail about dawn. Co. F was in position on immediate right of Trail 29 and maintained contact with Co. K on immediate left of trail. Co. E was on right of Co. F and Co. G was in support in rear of Co. E. Bn. c.p., aid station, and Co. H (less 3 plats) was on Trail 29. Contact by walkie-talkie from Bn. c.p. to Co. E. Shortly after daylight the advance through the jungle continued. Enemy situation was obscure as contact had been broken during previous night. The attack progressed readily through the dense jungle. At 10:30 a.m. Co. F contacted the enemy who were taken by surprise and withdrew, slowly after attempting to deploy. The sound of enemy bugles could be heard. Enemy resistance in front of Co. F grew stronger, but bn. continued to push forward slowly, Co. E supporting Co. F by firing across its front from high ground on right of Co. F about 1 p.m. Co. E. became engaged with enemy who was moving toward 2d Bn. right flank. Co. G was ordered to guard the flank and prevent envelopment. By 3 p.m. Co. F had

encountered heavy resistance and the pressure in front of Co. E had increased. Enemy held strong position on ridge astride Trail 29. The 3d Bn. was also engaged on left of Trail 29 as was the 1st Bn. which was wet of the Pantingan river. Forward progress stopped and the 81 mm mortar of 3d Bn. was put in action against enemy positions in front of Cos K & F. About 4 p.m. bn. ordered to hold and dig in. Bn. c. p. moved off trail into jungle 200 yards in rear of Co. E. Wire was laid to companies and Regt. Patrols from Co. G had been attempting to contact a bn. of the 33d Inf. (PA) which was supposed to be on 2nd Bn. right. Patrols went east to Katman river and reported seeing enemy patrols but no sign of friendly troops. Bn. was fed and 5 p.m. and each man issued 1 pack Camel cigarettes. About 6 p.m. bn. was ordered to withdraw at once to former bivouac area on Trail 29 and await further orders. E was ordered to cover withdrawal of Bn. and to pull out at 8 p.m. withdrawal accomplished successfully. Capt. Murphy with covering force arrived at bivouac area about 10 p.m. Casualties from day's action Co. E, 3 WIA, Co. F, 3 WIA, Co. H, 2 MIA.

April 6--At 1 a.m. bn. was formed on Trail 8 near junction of 8 and 29 prepared to move east. (The bn. medical truck and the two bn. surgeons were missing. Due to a misunderstanding the two surgeons had proceeded east on Trail 8. Near the junction of Trails 8 and 6 their truck was stopped by a road block and an enemy mg opened fire on them. Capt. Kostecki was captured by the enemy. The fate of the driver is unknown. The above account as related by Lt. Dulin who took to the jungle and joined the bn. late in the afternoon on Trail 8 at the Pantingan river.) The regt. was ordered to proceed east on Trail 8 to Trail 6, thence south to join the 57th Inf. (PS). The 2nd bn. was designated as advance guard. The 3d bn. went into position north of the junction of trails 8 and 9 to keep Trail 8 open to me west in case regt was unable to force its way through to Trail 6. Co. F with 1st plat. Co. C, 194 Tank Bn. (2 tanks) was advance party, followed by Co. E, H, G, bn., H, regtl hqs. The bn started moving at 3 a.m. with 1 plat Co. F and 1st Plat Co. C, 194 Tanks (2nd Lt. F. E. Riley commanding), as the point. About 5 a.m. just west of junction of Trails 8 and 6 the point encountered an enemy road lock. The leading tank was knocked out at once and the advance party came under heavy enemy fire. Lt. Riley related that he saw the Scouts in front of his tank hit the ground. He immediately started to back his tank onto the side of the trail. There was a terrific explosion and the next thing he remembered was lying on the trail with someone working over him. The second tank was followed by a jeep containing Lt. Col. E. B. Miller, c.o. 194 Tank Bn., Lt. Col. Edgar Wright Hr., ex. officer, 45th Inf., Maj. A. B. Zwaska, c.o. 2nd Bn, 45., Capt. Jerry G. Toth, c.o. Hq. Co., 45, Capt. Louis F. Murphy, c.o. Co. E, 45, and 1st Lt. Benjamin E. Gwynn, 194 Tank bn. who was driving the jeep. Lt. Gwynn gave the following account of the action: "Shortly after rounding a curve in Trail 8 near Trail 6, I heard the Scouts in front of us call out "Anti-Tank gun!" The officers riding with me jumed out of the jeep and hit the ground. Col. Miller went forward behind the second tank. The enemy anti-tank gun opened up. The first round hit the leading tank, putting it out of action. The second round went over my head. I backed the jeep up, attempting to

turn it around on the side of the trail. The third round hit the jeep in the right front wheel. I was stunned but uninjured. The enemy kept firing with his anti-tank gun and small arms. All around me was noise and confusion. I lay on the trail and shortly after the Scouts opened up on the enemy position with rifles and mg. The enemy fire became spasmodic and we were able to get the men in the leading tank out. The second tank had not been hit. I assisted Capt. Murphy, who was wounded, back up the trail. Others were later received to move back to Trail 29."

The enemy had selected an excellent position for an ambush. Trail 8 at this point wound around the side of a high hill and afforded one-way passage only. To the right of the trail rose the steep hill covered with thick vegetation. To the left there was a large deep ravine heavy with jungle. The enemy could enfilade the bn. which had no room to maneuver.

When the enemy first opened fire on the bn., Maj. Zwaska and Capt Murphy were wounded and Capt. Davis reported KIA. There was for a time much disorder and confusion in the leading cos. Lt. Hase went forward and managed with great difficulty under enemy fire to get some mgs and rifles in action against the enemy positions. Capt. Amato came forward and succeeded in getting parts of Cos. E & F which had lost their c.o.'s in action against the enemy. Lt. Hase had nearly all the mgs in Co. H and every rifleman he could find firing at the enemy. The enemy fire became spasmodic under this heavy concentration of fire power, and control was gained in the bn. Col. Doyle, c.o. 45th Inf., came forward and shortly afterward the bn. was ordered to withdraw west on trail 8 to the Pantingan river. A turn around for the transportation was found where the tanks came under fire and the bn with its transportation made a successful withdrawal at dawn. The enemy was kept under mg fire during the movement. (See overlay #14). Casualties: the enlisted casualties are not accurately known. Co. H reported 4 MIA; the bn. Sgt. Major, T. Sgt. Guzman, was missing; 1st Sgt. Villarina, Co. F, WIA. Further casualties unknown. Among the officers, Maj. Zwaska and Capt. Murphy, WIA, Lt. Col. Wright, Capt. Davis and Capt. Toth, MIA. Capt. Kostecki, after the surrender of Bataan, reported that he saw two bodies which he believed to be Capt. Davis and Capt. Toth, the morning after he was captured by the enemy.

The 2nd bn. reached the Pantigan river about noon April 6, The regt. assembled at the Pantiggan and about 5 p.m. was ordered to go into position on the west bank of the Pantingan to protect the right flank of the 1st Corps. The 2nd Bn. was astride Trail 8, flanked by the 1st Bn. on the left and the 3d bn. on the right. Co. F was on the right flank of the bn; Co. H was in position covering Trail 8, Co. E was on Co. H's left, and Co. G was on left flank of bn. There was a temporary reorganization in the bn. 1st Sgt. Ramon Villanueva took command of Co. E, Lt. Aurelio took over Co. F, and Capt. Russell Patterson, being the senior officer, left in the bn, took charge. 1st Lt. Wm. DeBaker, MC, joined bn, as surgeon replaceing Capt. Kostecki, MIA. April 7-9 improved position.

April 8--Bn improved position of April 7. About noon the regt. was ordered to withdraw at dusk and proceed to the Quarantine

dock at Mariveles. Order of movement was 3d Bn, 1st Bn, 2d Bn, which was rear guard. Troops were to march to vicinity of 11th Div (PA) hqs. where buses would be waiting to take them to Mariveles. The withdrawal was accomplished according to order. Troops was issued one day's type "C" ration. The busses which were to transport the regt. to Mariveles failed to arrived, having been dispatched to the 1st Regular (PA) division instead of Philippine Division. The regt. started marching west on Trail 9 toward the west road. After several hours enough busses were secured to transport the 3d and 1st Bns. The 2nd Bn. continued on foot, and daylight April 9 found the bn. still on foot at the junction of Trail 9 and the west road. Here the officers heard rumors of a surrender. The bn. was marched south of the west road to Km 212 where a bivouac was established. Capt. Patterson and Capt. Amato proceeded south in a command car to try to contact regt. for orders. They met Capt. Conn, c.o. Service Co., 45, who informed that negotiations for a surrender were under way and that regtl. hq. and the 3d bn, were in Mariveles and the 1st bn. was strung out on the road north of Mariveles. Capt. Conn had the regtl. kitchen train assembled on a trail west of km 2-5 and he suggested that the bn. move there until further orders would be secured. This plan was approved and the officers of the 2nd bn. started to patrol the west road to commandeer transportation. When enough trucks and buses were secured the bn was moved to km 2-5, kitchens set up and a bivouac established. Water was secured by truck from the Binuanguan river. Lt. Dulin and Lt. DeBaker, with an ambulance full of wounded, were sent south to try to get to Hospital #1.

In the afternoon it was learned that Col. Doyle, c.o. 45th, had gone to Corregidor. Telephone communications with 1st Corps was established. The bn. was informed that 1st Corps was out of communication with Gen. King's hqs. As far as 1st Corps was concerned there was no surrender; and for the bn. to be prepared to defend to the south.

In the evening Capt. V. F. Sayre, c.o. 65 QM Pack train, and his officers, Capt. Mickelson, VC, 1st Lt. Berbert Ott, VC, and 2nd Lt. Wm. Duncan, joined the group of bn. officers. April 10--1st Corps notified the bn. that the surrender was official and to put a white flag up on the west road and wait for the Japanese. Capt. Sayre sent Capt. Mickelson and Lt. Ott to kill some mules belonging to his pack train. This was done and the bn. feasted on mule meat until taken over by the Japanese.

In the afternoon a Japanese motorcycle a patrol contacted Capt. Biedenstein who was posted on guard on the west road by the white flag. The Jap told Capt. Biedenstein to have the bn. start marching north toward Bagac, and then moved on. Since there were no officers in the Jap party and it was late in the afternoon, the bn. officers decided to wait till morning and contact some Japanese officers.

April 11--Capt. Conn and Capt. Patterson went to 1st Corps hqs. early in the morning. They returned to the bn. with two Japanese officers, who said to put all arms and transportation near the west road. The American and Filipino officers would go by motor to Mariveles. The men could march either to Bagac or Mariveles. Most of the men chose Bagac. Nearly all Co. F plus a few soldiers from

other companies chose Mariveles. 1st Sgt. Villarina, Co. F, was put in charge of those going to Mariveles and given a pass by the Japanese. No pass was necessary for those going to Bagac.

Capt. Conn had some type C Rations with the kitchen train. These were distributed, each man getting 3 days ration. The surplus was divided among platoon sgts. to use as the situation demanded. Officers and men parted at 1 p.m.

This history has of necessity been written entirely from memory. It is not, therefore, to be considered a complete or thoroughly accurate history. An effort has been made to check on dates and the dispositions of the bn. in action, and it is believed that the history is fairly accurate in those respects. It is is hoped that this account of the bn's activities can be used after the war as a basis for a more accurate and complete history.

War Prisoners Concentration Camp # 1
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, P. I.
December 9, 1942

History and approximate diary of the 3rd battalion, 45th Infantry (P.S) during the Philippine campaign (December 8, 1941 to April 9, 1942).

At the beginning of the war, December 8, 1941, the organization and strength of the 3rd battalion 45th Infantry (P.S.) was approximately as follows: The battalion consisted of three rifle companies, one machine gun company, attached headquarters personnel from headquarters company, and a medical detachment. The total strength of the battalion as stated above, present for duty, was approximately 520 men (Philippine Scouts), and 10 American officers.

The officer personnel of the battalion was as follows:-

Major Dudley G. Strickler	Battalion Commander
Captain Clifton A. Croom	Battalion Adjutant
Captain Alvin J. Bethard	Battalion Supply Officer
1st Lt. George B. Moore	Company I (Comdg)
2nd Lt. Raymond H. McCarthy	Company K (Comdg)
1st Lt. Henry J. Pierce	Company L (Comdg)
2nd Lt. A. M. Ulrich	Company L (Comdg Officer)
Captain Louis A. Bosheck	Company M (Comdg)
1st Lt. Ralph A. Berkelhamer	Medical Det. (Comdg)
1st Lt. William de Baker	Medical Det.

Immediately upon receiving information that a state of war existed between the United States and Japan, the battalion was ordered to make preparations for an immediate move to the field. Necessary preparations were made and at about 2:00 PM the battalion moved to a bivouac area approximately 250 miles southeast of the Fort William McKinley Cemetery. At this position the remainder of the day, December 8, was spending ammunition, individual equipment, and digging fox hole or protection against expected enemy aircraft.

There was no enemy activity during the day, but at about 1:10 AM December 9th the battalion received word that every planes were approaching from the north, and that they were within the 30 minute band. Approximately 1 1/2 hours later the roar of motors were heard in the general direction of Cavite. The planes came almost directly toward us and after bombing Nichols Field they continued on over McKinley and destroyed a radio station just off the post and 200 yards west of the road to Manila.

December the 9th and 10th was spent drawing and issuing equipment, such as service gas masks, loading machine gun belts completing the drawing and issuing of ammunition to be taken with the battalion into the field, and getting together necessary civilian transportation to move the battalion as part of the regiment. (Our army transportation was inadequate.)

Enemy planes straffed the area during the day of December 10 but no casualties resulted. At about 6:30 P.M. orders were received for the regiment to move north, with the probable destination being Aparri, and the first bivouac being made in the vicinity of Angeles.

1st Lt. Croom was directed to take a driver and two runners and proceed immediately to the vicinity of Angeles to locate and organize a bivouac area for the 45th regiment which was expected to arrive there at midnight. This mission was accomplished, but the plans for the movement were changed in the vicinity of the zig-zag south east of Olongapo. The move accomplished with the regiment arriving at the destination about daylight the morning of December 11.

The 3rd battalion moved on to the zig-sag and was ordered to organize and prepare a defensive position astride the road at the zig-zag.

The period December 11 to December 17 was spent organizing reconnoitering trails of probable enemy approach, cutting off ( ) tops, and in general getting ready for battle. Many lights of heavy bombers, dive bombers, and scout planes were observed from one bivouac area during theis period but we were not bothered by any of them at this point. ( ) the afternoon of December 16, 1st Lt. Croom assumed command of C. I ( ) to his duties as battalion ( ) relieved of his command and ( ) as second command of Co. I. This was only change in the officer personnel of the battalion up to this time.

At daylight the morning of December 17 a detachment of about seven, a civilian guide, and 1st Lt. Moore, who was in command left for a reconnaissance trip by foot over the Tanig-Moron Trail to Moron. The detachment had instructions to join the battalion by way of Bagac as soon as the mission was completed.

At 4:30 P.M., December 17, the battalion was ordered to prepare to move, as part of the regiment, to Bataan in the vicinity of Bagac. Preparations for the move were completed and the battalion moved as part of the regiment at 7:00 P.M. due to the movement being made after dark and without lights two buses were wrecked. Co. I losing one while crossing a narrow bridge, injuring about 10 men but killing none, Co. I, losing one when it ran off an embankment and turned bottom side up injuring slightly 4 men including the 1st Sergeant. Therest of the trip was made with only minor mishaps. The battalion arrived at its bivouac area, KP 147, Bagac-Pilar road, at approximately 4:30 A.M., December 18. Due to fatigue of the men and the darkness, no great attempt was made to organize the area. The transportation was moved off the road and the men were permitted to get us much sleep as possible. As daylight came, the transportation was moved deeper into the woods for cover against enemy aircraft and breakfast was served at about 7:30 A.M. After breakfast, Major Strickler ordered a check-up on all equipment and transportation to ascertain their condition after the night move.

At 11:30 A.M., December 18, 1st Lt. Croom was ordered to get ready to move 1 rifle platoon com "I" and 1 machine gun platoon co. "M" to Moron for beach defense in that vicinity. Preparations were made and the force moved out at 12:15 P.M. for Moron with 1st Lt. Croom in command.

At 1:30 P.M. the same day, a similar detachment of 1 rifle platoon Co. "L" and 1 machine gun platoon Co. "M", with 2nd Lt. Ulrich in command, was sent to Kaibobo point to guard the beach area in that vicinity against an enemy landing. This force arrived at its destination and reported in to the battalion by telephone upon its arrival. No enemy activity was noted in the Kaibobo area and this force was relieved by a unit of Philippine Army and joined the battalion a few days later.

The distance from Bagac to Moron is only 25 km., but due to bus trouble the Moron detachment was delayed and did not arrive at its destination until 4:30 P.M. A hurried reconnaissance was made and after placing lookouts along the beach, the rest of the force was ordered to eat and get as much rest as possible. The night passed without event. The next day, December 19, was spent in organizing the position and making plans for defense in case of an attempted enemy landing. Major Strickler arriver at 4:30 PM, bringing with him 1st Lt. Moore who took command of the detachment. 1st Lt. Croom returned with Major Strickler and rejoined his company which had been moved, along with the rest of the battalion, to a bivouac area just off the Bagac-Pilar road southeast of the river crossing (KP) 151.5.)

On the morning of December 20, the battalion was ordered to begin preparations for defense of the beaches including Bagac beach, Pusinay beach, and Sasayan beach, with Bagac and Pusinay beaches getting the priority. Co. "I" (Less 1 platoon) and Co. "L" (Less 1 platoon) were assigned to Pusinay beach while Company M (Less 2 platoons) and Co. K were assigned to Bagac beach.

Work began immediately on the preparation of these positions. The Moron detachment was relieved a few days later by Co. "K" which was in turn relieved a short time later when a Philippine Army Division moved into the Moron sector.

The period December 20 - January 16 was spent generally in preparing defensive positions in the Bagac area. The company officers and platoon sergeants were taken on reconnaissance hikes by the battalion commander all during this period. Each company in the battalion was marched over the main trails in the rear area of the positions in order to familiarize each men with the "key" trails to be used in case of an attack. 12/20 - 1/16

On the afternoon of January 16 the battalion received orders to move to the front. Everything was ready as we had been expecting the move for about 4 days. The first stage of the move was by bus and this started just after dark. At KP 142, Bagac-Pilar road, we unloaded and started hiking along a trail northeast toward Bani. The hike was slow as the trail was very rought at places, and the weapon carriers of the whole unit were continually getting stuck in mud holes that appeared as soon as only a few vehicles passed over the trail. The battalion finally went into bivouac at 5:45 AM, approximately 3 KM. southwest of Bani.

After a very trying hike, made more so by the troops having to help pull and push vehicles through the mud all night. The battalion spent the day resting after digging fox holes for protection against aircraft which were continually flying over us trying to locate anything that presented a target.

Details were sent back to get vehicles which were stuck so bad that they could not be pulled out in the darkness of the night before.

At about 4:30 PM, January 17, the battalion received orders to continue the move, as part of the regiment, toward the front with the probable destination the Abucay hacienda. The battalion moved out at dark and marched until 5:30 AM, January 18. Due to the lack of previous reconnaissance and as the guides sent out by the regiment did not know the trails, only about 5 1/2 miles were covered that night. This resulted in the battalion marching back and forth over unknown trails, only actually covering little ground. When we finally halted at 5:30 AM, it was necessary to at least partially dig in as enemy planes began to circle our area right after daylight. The battalion was fed and ordered to get some rest, but enemy bombers kept flying over our area, and occasionally dropping bombs just at random it seemed, as no casualties resulted from the bombing. 1/18

At 10:30 that morning, orders were received to proceed on toward the hacienda, and to be ready in position to jump off for the planned attack at 4:00 P.M. The battalion made ready to move and at 11:30 A.M., moved out across country carrying weapons by hand. The order of March being Co. "I", Co. "K", Co. "L", and Co. "M". The going was very rough and frequent rest stops had to be made and stragglers rounded up.

Dark came and the battalion was still quite a long distance from its 4:00 PM objective. Just at twilight we were met by some guides from a Philippine Army Units which were to direct us into our position. Due to darkness and having to traverse three very steep ravines in which it was necessary to hold on to a wire line (Telephone line), and feel your way along step by step. Progress was slower than ever, and upon coming out of the last ravine into a cane field it was decided to post local security and get a rest. By the time the stragglers caught up it was 4:30 AM January 19th, and it was also found that only companies "I", "K", and part of "L" were present. The remainder of the night was a nightmare for about the time we settled down to rest "fire crackers" began to pop all around the area, and it seemed at first we were being attacked from all sides. As time sent by no bullets were heard nor casualties reported and it was decided that patrols would go out for a short distance from the area to try to ascertain that was causing all the noise. It was discovered that at last we were victims of a much heard of "fire cracker attack", the crackers probably having been dropped the evening before by enemy planes. While back in rear areas many rumors drifted back about such enemy tactics and during our battles in Abucay we had "fire crackers" practically all the time to contend with. 1/19

Company "M" and the remainder of Company "L" joined the leading part of the battalion just after dawn. The battalion commander returned from the regimental C.P. at about 7:00 A.M. and issued orders to eat class "C" rations and prepare for the attack at 10:00 A.M. The order of March was company "L" advance guard, followed by companies "I" and "K" with one machine gun platoon company "M" attached to each rifle company and the 81mm mortar section attached to company "I". Thebattalion moved through the cane field to the hacienda road and headed northwest. As the point of the advance guard reached a point along the road about 350 yards northwest of the hacienda, fire was received from the right flank, killing one man instantly. This was our first casualty of the war from rifle fire, and the battalion halted for further developements. As soon as Major Strickler looked the situation over, orders were issued to attack the right on an azimuth of about 10" with the south bank of Alongon (?) river as the objective. The attack started and due to heavy bamboo thickets along with a deep ravine which ran diagonally across our front, there was a tendency for the units on the right flank to shift to the left, causing quite a bit of confusion, also some units had easy terrain to cross while others had to look for trails down into the ravine in order to get across to the other side.

1/19 1ST CASUALTY

As the first units of the battalion reached the objective, orders were received from regimental headquarters to withdraw to the hacienda road. These orders were transmitted to the companies of the battalion and the withdrawal started immediately. Before the withdrawal was completed, orders were received from General Lough directly to the battalion for the battalion not to withdraw but to attack, so as soon as the company commanders were contracted and the units turned about, we attacked again over the same area. This time the battalion fron was from left to right, Companies "K", "L" and "I", Company "K" having been pulled from the right flank and put in on the left flank. The objective was obtained with little trouble. Companies "K" and "L" had several casualties, and one machine gun squad from company "M" attached to Company "L" was almost entirely wiped out and its gun lost due to shots which hit the water jacket.

The battalion position was along the south bank of the Alongon (?) river, with the first battalion of the 31st Infantry on our right flank. The afternoon was spent improving the position for a defensive stand.

About dark when a party of three men were going to the rear on their way to the battalion C.P., it was found that some enemy snipers were in rear of our line, and we had to put up with this situation for the remainder of the time that we were in this position. The night passed slowly as the battalion was unable to get much rest due to the explosion of "fire crackers" which were gong off all around us at irregular intervals all during the night. The explosion of these "fire crackers" sounded like the fire of the enemy rifle and machine guns. At times a form of tracer projectile would come sailing from almost any direction, over our position. No casualties resulted, and the men soon got used to having a battle of "fire crackers" raging on all sides at different times during the day and night.

The 81 mm mortar was set up and at different intervals the area in front of our position was "worked over" with mortar fire just to be sure that the enemy did not concentrate for any attack against our line.

The day of January 20 was spent further improving the battalion position. Dive bombers dropped bombs all around our area, but no casualties resulted. The situation seemed to be that the enemy planned to launch an attack but was not quite ready, so we just held our own and waited for developments.

NO CASUALTIES

On January 21, there was an increase in enemy activity, more bombers came over our position, and patrols reported the enemy moving into position in front of our area in large numbers. The "fire crackers" continued and when some of our troops became careless and left cover, well hidden snipers would pick them off. It was impossible to locate the snipers because of the noise similar to small arms fire being made by the exploding "fire cracker".

During the late afternoon, it became evident that the enemy was concentrating for an attack around our left flank. Scouting patrols sent out reported the enemy in large groups with more moving in all the time. At about 4:00 P.M., the enemy put down mortar fire on our general position, with only two or three slight casualties resulting. The 31st Infantry battalion on our right received some almost direct hits, wounding several men, and at about 5:00 P.M., they were ordered to withdraw from the position, leaving our right flank exposed. Company "I" put our flank security immediately and the battalion held fast awaiting orders from battalion headquarters.

At about 6:00 P.M., Captain Croom received orders from Major Strickler to pull the battalion back to the hacienda. The order of withdrawal was: Company "I", Company "K" and Company "L" with machine gun units attached. The mortar section came out with Company "I". During the pull back of about 500 yards, the shell units of the battalion received some small arms fire but no casualties resulted. All ammunition and equipment belonging to the battalion was brought out with us, plus some 81 mm mortar ammunition, loaded machine gun belts, hand grenades, and several cases of rifle ammunition which had been left behind by other units during their withdrawal.

Upon our arrival at the hacienda, Major Strickler directed the battalion to a bivouac area in a cane field about 1,000 yards southeast of the hacienda and about 300 yards west of the main road.

The bivouac area was organized and all companies were ordered to dig holes and put our local security. The battalion at this time became part of the reserve.

The battalion spent January 22 resting, digging fox holes, etc. Company "I" sent out a patrol commanded by 1st Lt. Moore, and Company "L" sent out a patrol commanded by 2nd Lt. Ulrich. These patrols worked along the trails going into the hills on the west flank of the general defensive position, and upon their return, both patrols reported enemy concentrations in front of our left flank. All thoughout the day, the battalion bivouac area was subjected to artillery fire and dive bombing, with no casualties resulting.

On the morning of January 23, Company "I" and Company "L" again sent out patrols which reported enemy movement to our left flank. In the early afternoon, Company "K" was moved to the front and put into position between Companies "A", 31st Infantry and "K", 31st Infantry. During the late afternoon, Company "L" was moved to the northwest edge of the cane field about 500 yards behind the front line and with its right flank on the hacienda road. The mission of Company L was to be in close support and to be able to move right into the line in case the enemy tried a break-through along the hacienda road. Company "I" and Company "M" remained on the alert as battalion reserve in the bivouac area.

All during the day, the bivouac area was subjected to bombing and artillery bombardment; no casualties resulted. The night was spent with both companies ready for a movement at a moment's notice, but daylight, January 24, came and still the big enemy offensive had not started. During the early morning, the enemy began to exert more pressure on the front line and in the early afternoon, Company "I" was ordered to move toward the front to a position in a ravine behind Company "A", 31st Infantry and Company "K", 45th Infantry. About 5:00 P.M., the 1st platoon, Company "I", was pushed into the front line to fill a gap which was developing between Companies "A" 31st Infantry, and "K", 45th Infantry.

At about 6:00 P.M., orders were issued that a withdrawal was to be made, with units of the 31st Infantry furnishing the shell to cover the withdrawal. Company "L", 45th Infantry, was to held the line along the northwest edge of the cane field west of the hacienda road until the main units came thru, then to withdraw itself under cover of the shell which was to pull out at 7:30 P.M.

About 6:45 P.M., the sector occupied by company "A" 31st Infantry and 1st platoon, Company "I", 45th Infantry and Company "K", 45th Infantry, was subjected to a heavy concentration of enemy mortar and artillery fire. It seemed that all units tried to pull out together. Company "I", 45th Infantry, which was supposed to pull out beginning at just before 7:00 P.M. and which was prevented from doing doing so until about 7:10 P.M. by the heavy shelling found itself actually between the enemy and the shell covering force, which came out too early. Company "I" then fell back to the west corner of the cane field about 700 yards behind and slightly to the right of its original position in the front line, and then due to the fact that some remants of friendly troops had no reached a point of safety and that the enemy was in hot pursuit, set up a delaying position. This position was held for approximately thrity minutes. And then Company "I" with the exception of one officer and 16 men was directed to fall out of the position and sent sent to the rear under direction of the first sergeant. The small covering force remained in position for approximately twenty minutes and then pulled back to the hacienda road.

Upon reaching the road a unit of the 31st Inf, of approximately the same size as our force, was contacted; and delaying position was organized.

The enemy, which was in hot pursuit, soon came along the road and was ambushed, causing at least a momentary halt in their advance. The covering force, composed of the unit of Company "I" 45th Inf., and the unit of the 31st Inf., was pulled back along the road a distance of approximately 200 yards and immediately set up a second delaying position. This delaying action was repeated five different times, at which time the covering force gained contact with friendly troops which were organizing a holding position across the hacienda road. Major Strickler was directing the troops at this point and as Captain Croom came through the position with this covering unit he was directed to continue to the rear, organize the battalion, (with the exception of Company "L" which was being put into position along with units of the 31st Infantry, at this point) and march it to KM.P. 142 on the Bagac-Pilar road, at which place Major Strickler would rejoin the battalion.

Major Strickler stayed at the holding position with Company "L" and at three o'clock the following morning, January 25th, this force was loaded on buses and transported to a bivouac area at KM.P/ 147 Bagac-Pilar road. Major Strickler met the marching unit of the battalion at KM.P. 142 Bagac-Pilar road and this unit joined Company "L" in the bivouac area. 1/25

The battalion was fed and at 1:00 P.M. orders were given for the battalion to march via trail 7 to trail 5 and then west along trail 5 to a vibouac area about 1500 yards from the junction of trails 5 and 7. This march was made while enemy planes were continually circling overhead and was very slow because of the necessity of taking cover from the dive bombers as we went along.

The bivouac area was reached at about 5:00 P.M. and the men who by this time were almost completely exhausted, from loss of sleep for several nights and having to march approximately 32 miles during the past 18 hours, settled down to get a night's rest.

The morning and early afternoon of the following day, January 26th, was spent cleaning weapons and equipment. At 4:00 P.M. the battalion received orders to move at once by foot to a bivouac area just east of the Mariveles road and on the south bank of the Sasayan river. The battalion promptly moved out and began the march via trail 5, 7 and 9 to the new bivouac area, arriving at about 12:30 A.M., January 27th. The battalion was ordered to get some rest and at daylight to dig foxholes.

At about 10:00 A.M. January 27th orders were received for the battalion to move south along Mariveles road to the vicinity of KM.P. 191, at which place a guide was to meet the battalion and direct it into an area where it was reported that from 17 to 25 enemy snipers had landed from the sea, and were causing quite a bit of trouble. The battalion made ready to move, transportation was secured, and we moved out immediately. The order of march was Company "I", Company "K", Battalion Headquarters, Company "L", and Company "M". Captain Croom, Company "I", commander was taken with Major Strickler in a command car, and went on ahead of the battalion to locate the guide. The guide met us at KM.P. 193.4 approximately, and as soon as the leading unit of the battalion ar ived at this point it was unloaded and continued on foot down the Quinanan Point Trail.

A guide was left at the road junction to direct the other units as they arrived. Major Strickler contacted Major Sherry, who was the commander of the troops that were at the time in contact with the enemy, at his C.P. Major Strickler made a reconnaissance along the front line, accompanied by the three battalion officers who had arrived by this time, and it was decided that our battalion would not relieve the present attacking force composed of units of: Headquarters Squadron 5th Intercepter Command, Headquarters F.E.A.S.C., 19th Bomb. Sq., 27th Bomb. Sq., Air warning detachment, P.A., P.A.A.C., and Constabulary, until the following morning, as some units of our battalion did not arrive until after dark. The above force totaled between 525 and 550 men. Major Sherry was in command of the total force of Philippine Troops while the American air force units (148) men commanded by Captain Greeley was attached to him for duty. All companies of our battalion were ordered to feed and get some rest in preparation for the action planned for the next day.

At daylight the morning of January 28th the battalion was fed and made ready to move into position. The plan of action was as follows: The front line was approximately 900 yards from beach to beach, and as it was necessary to cover each yard of the line with fire, a skirmish line was formed from left to right Company "K", Company "I", Company "L" with a machine gun platoon from Company "M" attached to each rifle company. The companies were moved into position about 25 yards behind the front line forming a line of askirmishes from beach to beach, with machine gun units in position along the line of points where it was felt that the worst enemy resistance was to be offered. The beaches on the battalion flanks, which were below the cliff line, were protected by the air corps units, commanded by Captain Greeley, which were attached to our battalion, having been relieved from the Philippine Army Force.

At 8:30 A.M. the attack started. As soon as the 45th Inf. attacking force passed through the P.A. units which were being relieved, the relieved units were withdrawn and assembled, the relief having been completed.

The attacking force met heavy enemy resistance and casualties became numerous. Due to the density of the woods, which presented limited visability to the attacking force; having to go against an enemy which was dug in, and had many snipers in trees along the front, the advance was very slow, and the casualties high. At about 10:30 A.M. Captain Besbeck, "M" company commander who was acting as assistant to the battalion commander, was seriously injured by enemy small arms fire while making a reconnaissance for the battalion commander along the front line. At this time Captain Croom, "I" company commander returned to duty with battalion headquarters, and 1st Lt. Moore, assumed command of Company-"I".

The entire battle line was in a dense jungle, visibility was poor, the fighting was at a very close range, and our attacking force could not move without making a noise, which apparently let the enemy know where they were. The enemy, from their concealed positions, took advantage of any "give-away" movements made by our troops, and casualties occurred all along the line.

Many times casualties occured and the nearest man to the casualty was unable to locate where the fire was coming from. The enemy never made any movements or signs of attacking our force, but just lay in wait for us to make a move and when we did casualties occurred and we still could not see even one enemy. At this point it was decided to use machine guns against snipers in trees. The guns were set up just in rear of the front line and trees that might offer any cover to snipers were "shot-up" from top to bottom. This was a slow process and each morning for a few days more snipers were in the trees to bother us.

The advance made by the battalion during the day was small, at some points the total advance was only from ten to fifteen yards (see overlay map), while both flanks of the battalion were able to move forward a distance of about a hundred yards. During the day Major Strickler decided that the enemy force was many times the number first reported, and that an additional force was needed to carry on the attack properly. Company "B", 57th Inf., commanded by Captain Anthony, was attached for duty and joined the 45th Inf. battalion after dark.

At about 5:00 P.M. the attack was stopped and orders were issued for the battalion to dig in for the night. During the night it was necessary to keep almost every man awake and at his post because of the possibility of the enemy truing to slip through our lines under cover of darkness, and then having to find out too late that the area behind our line was infested with snipers.

Just before daylight the following morning, the troops were brought back in small groups to a position just in rear of the front line and fed.

Major Strickler made a reconnaissance of the entire battalion front line, and just after daylight, January 29th, that the attack was resumed, with two platoons of Company "B" going into position on the battalion right flank. The machine gun platoon and one rifle platoon of Company "B" were held in battalion reserve.

Due to the heavy casualties which were occurring, it was decided to use mortar fire in front of our front line at points where the enemy resistance appeared strongest. The mortar squad had been working on a position for the mortar and by this time it was ready for use. Major Strickler directed Captain Croom to put the mortar into use against the enemy position as soon as possible. Each company area was checked as to location of probable targets, a walkie-talkie radio was put at the mortar location and Captain Croom took one with him along the front line so that it was possible to direct each shot that was fired.

At 5:00 P.M. the attack stopped and the battalion dug in for the night. 1st Lt. Chaney and three members of Company "B", 57th Inf., were missing in action while making a reconnaissance along the right sector of the line. The 3rd battalion casualties were heavy again during the days fighting. The progress during the day was about the same as the first day, with the flanks being able to advance while the center of the battalion was facing heavy resistance, and having numerous casualties.

They left flank of Company "K" had reached the edge of a ravine along the cliff line and it was decided that they would hold this position until the battalion line could be straightened out, with the other units of the company advancing with the left flank of the company as a pivot while keeping in contact with Company "I" on its right.

The battle went on the 30th and 31st almost in the same manner as described above, with the exception that Major Strickler personally pushed Company "B" forward until its right flank was at white rock (see overlay), with the hopes that such a move would force the enemy to pull back to protect his flank. The enemy held and we continued to advance slowly and with heavy casualties.

Just about dark the night of January 31st some members of Company "I" observed enemy movement in front of the second platoon. Sergeant Cabiles and three members of his platoon jumped from their foxholes and made a dash over to the observed enemy positions and at this point killed or wounded several of the enemy and returned to their own positions with three enemy rifles, a helmet, and several of the enemy flags. The surprise was complete and none of the attacking party were injured. (Sgt. Cabiles later received a silver star for gallantry in action during this episode.)

At daylight the morning of February 1st heavy mortar fire was put down on the area in front of Company "I" and Company "L". Some advance was made by moving forward just as soon as the mortar fire was lifted. Major Strickler made a trip along the front line about 9:00 A.M. to observe the effects of the mortar fire, and returned to his C.P., upon completing his inspection, at about 10:30 A.M.

At about 12:00 noon, Major Strickler went to the front again accompanied by his runner. Upon his arrival at the front the runner was sent on a separate mission, and Major Strickler continued on along the battle line alone. The last place that he was observed was at about the middle of the Company "B" Sector. After the Major had failed to return to the C.P. in a reasonable time, and all efforts to locate him had failed, it was felt that he had probably either been killed or wounded by an enemy sniper as he went through the woods alone. A search was made all along the front line and along trails leading from the C.P. to the front, but no trace of Major Strickler was found.

Captain Croom assumed command and the battalion prepared for the night in the usual manner. Regimental headquarters was notified by phone that Major Strickler was missing.

About dark word was received that a group of enemy landing barges were being moved south from the vicinity of Olongapo, and a probable enemy attempt to reinforce that unit on the points was to be made. Upon receiving this information plans for the defense of our point were made and the companies issued orders as to the action to be taken in case an enemy landing on our rear flank was successful. At about 8:30 P.M. several heavy shells were fired by enemy naval craft into our positions, but no casualties resulted.

The telephone system at the point was hooked up and all lines were left open to the following units: One phone on south (left) flank of Company "K", one phone on white rock (right flank of Company "B"), one phone on north cliff line of Quinauan peninsula, one phone on Aglaloma Point, and one phone at General Pierce's Headquarters (for directing artillery). As the enemy attack commenced we had direct observation for the artillery, and the fifty caliber machine guns on the cliff edges on both the north and south sides of the Peninsula were able to fire right into any barge that came in their zone. The thirty caliber machine guns at white rock and on the left flank of Company "K" were able to take care of any attempted landing directly on the point. We also had the help of a P-40 which was strafing the barges as they neared the shore line. The combination of all this was enough to keep the enemy from being successful in his attempted landing at our position. As each attempt was beaten off. Our troops in the front line were able to maintain their position even though the enemy which were already on land put up a real battle while the landing was being attempted.

On the morning of February 2nd the acting battalion commander checked the front line, and the attack continued. The battalion by this time was only about half strength due to casualties, and the men were dead dired from loss of sleep and exposure. During the attack the night before it was necessary to send headquarters and Mess personnel to the battle line to help contain the enemy while the attempted landing was being staged.

At 4:00 P.M. Captain Croom called General Pierce and made a request for some tanks with hipes that with his help we would be able to continue the push successfully. This request was granted and three tanks of Company "C", 192nd tank battalion, under command of Second Lieutenant Hay, were sent to our position, arriving at about 5:15 P.M. After a hurried reconnaissance made by the tank platoon commander it was decided to drive the tanks into the edge of the enemy position and spray the area with machine gun fire. This was done but the tanks soon beat a hurried retreat when an enemy 37 mm gun was observed right in front of the leading tank. (This gun was out of order due to our mortar fire, but this was not know at the time.) After quite a discussion, 2nd Lt. Hay decided to have a second try the morning of February 3rd. The battalion was then ordered to dig in and prepare for the night.

Colonel Donald Hilton, Executive Officer of the 45th Infantry Regiment, joined the battalion late that afternoon and assumed command.

Early the morning of February 3rd the tanks returned to our position and after a thorough reconnaissance by the tank commander, it was decided to begin the attacks again. The tanks pulled into the front line and sprayed the area with machine gun fire, while the troops moved forward. Some progress was made all along the left half of the battalion during the day. The progress was very slow as the area was covered with stumps and trees cut down during battle, this forcing the tanks to be careful in their movement for fear of getting stuck on a stump or log. During the afternoon it was decided to get a radio control car for the next day to work in conjunction with the tanks, as control of the tanks was very

difficult. At about 5:00 P.M. the battalion dug in for the night and plans were made for the following day.

A detachment of approximately 70 men from the 21st pursuit squadron, commanded by Captain Dyess, was attached and joined the battalion at about 11:00 o'clock that night in order to assist in the following day's battle.

Just after daylight the morning of February 4th the battalion made ready for the attack. The reinforcements which had joined the battalion the night before were divided into two groups (A group and B group) of about 35 men each. Group "A" went into the line with the left platoon of Company "I" while Group "B" went into the line between the first and second platoons of Co. "L". 5 tanks and 1 radio car arrived for the attack at about 8:30 A.M. and after a reconnaissance pulled into position along the battalion line. The tanks were assigned numbers from left to right (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and by using walkie-talkie radios right along with the troops and having one radio back with the radio control car it was possible to direct each tank in its movements. Progress was made all along the line and when the attack was halted for the day the enemy was pushed back almost to the cliff line (See Map).

The casualties for the day were heavy both among the scout troops and attached air corps troops. Captain Croom was wounded by small arms fire, but was able to remain with the battalion.

The following morning, February 5th, the attack was resumed in approximately the manner as the previous day. The cliff line was reached by noon, but attempts to send patrols down the ravine to the beach or around the points along the beach in order to finish off the enemy resulted in casualties. The enemy was hid from view and held positions which commanded any approach to their position below the cliff line. During the afternoon the tanks returned to their command as no further use of them was required. The battalion dug in along the cliff line and put out patrols down along the beach to prevent any enemy from escaping through or around our lines.

The following day, February 6th, was spent trying to induce the remaining enemy below the cliff to surrender but to no avail. Grenades, smoke rags soaked in oil, etc., were thrown over the cliff but only one enemy soldier came out to surrender and that was in the late afternoon. This soldier reported that he was the last left alive below the cliff but any attempt to go below the cliff resulted in casualties. Late that afternoon Col. Hilton contacted General Pierce's Headquarters and it was decided to get a gun boat to come up from Mariveles and shell the cliff from the sea side in order to drive the enemy, which were in the caves below the cliff line out. Captain Croom accompanied by Lt. Lackey was sent to General Pierce's Headquarters to get instructions and to go on to Mariveles that night and come up with the boat the following morning, to help direct the shelling of the cliff line. A boat was not available for use the next morning, so after a discussion with Col. Sherry, engineers officer for the sector, it was decided to try dynamiting the cliffs the next day, and see if that would close the caves.

The following morning, February 5th, the attack was resumed in approximately the manner as the previous day. The cliff line was reached by noon, but attempts to send patrols down the ravine to the beach or around the poines along the beach in order to finish off the enemy resulted in casualties. The enemy was hid from view and held positions which commanded any approach to their position below the cliff line. During the afternoon the tanks returned to their command as no further use of them was required. The battalion dug in along the cliff line and put out patrols down along the beach to prevent any enemy from escaping through or around our lines.

Early the next morning, February 7th, Engineer Personnel under the direction of Col. Sherry proceeded to Quinan Point and the morning was spent lowering charges of dynamute over the cliff in front of the caves with ropes. We don't know how much damage this did but enemy were still present and fired on any patrols which attempted to go below the cliff. That afternoon the area was dive bombed and several casualties resulted.

The following morning, February 8th, boats came up from Mariveles and after shelling the cliff line at close range two groups in boats under command of Captain Dyess came ashore and assisted by patrols sent down from the cliff above the last enemy resistance was wiped out. Just after the boats had finished shelling the cliff enemy, dive bombers came and bombed the area killing 5 and wounding several of our troops. The boats were also straffed and bombed.

With the job finished the battalion made ready to move to a bivouac area to reorganize and get some rest. The burial detail came in during the afternoon and began to clear up the area. Just before dark Captain Croom was detailed to proceed to the vicinity of the Mariveles Road Bobo Point Road junction and organize a bivouac area for the battalion. The final units of the battalion arrived in the selected area around 11:30 P.M. that night.

The following morning, February 9th, the battalion bivouac area was organized, equipment cleaned, and the battalion settled down to get a couple of days of much needed rest.

The losses sustained by the 3rd battalion during the Quinanan Battle were 74 killed and 234 wounded, many of them permanently out of a total battalion strength of about 495. The know enemy losses were 408 killed and 6 taken prisoners, only one of these were uninjured.

The period February 10 to February 25 was spent resting, getting equipment in order, and training. During this period Captain Besheck returned to the battalion and was assigned as battalion executive. Captain Croom took over command of Co. "K", 1st Lt. McCarthy was relieved of Command of Co. "K" and assigned to Co. "M", while Captain Wallace joined the battalion and took command of Co. "M". Lt. Ulrich was relieved from Co. "L" and sent to the rear to join a rear echelon unit. The other officers of the battalion remained as before.

Along about February 26th soldiers from Philippine Army units were sent to join the Scout Units and an intensive training period was started in the battalion which lasted until the final days of the Bataan stand.

On March 18 Lt. Col. Leslie T. Lathrop joined the battalion and assumed command. Col. Hilton was sent to hospital due to an old illness. Major Van Oosten came with Col. Lathrop as battalion executive officer, 1st Lt. Roberts, 1st Lt. Daily, and 1st Lt. McGrew came to the battalion with Col. Lathrop. Captain Besheck was relieved and joined 1st BTN 45th Inf., Captain Pierce was relieved and joined 1st BTN 45th Inf., Lt. Roberts took command of Co. "L" assisted by Lt. Daily while Lt. McGrew was assigned to Co. "I". Col. Lathrop left the 3rd battalion March 28 to report as Commander of the 3rd Inf. Regiment, 1st Regular Division, P.A.

On April 3rd the battalion was ordered to the front in the vicinity of junction of trails 29 and 8 with the mission to stop

an attempted break through in that area. The battalion was made ready for the move and moved by buses the afternoon of April 3rd arriving at a bivouac area approximately 1 kilometer north of junction of trails 29 and 8 at 3:00 A.M. April 4th. This was a very hard trip due to the fact that about 20 kilometers were made on foot over trails that were steep going up and going down. April 4th was spent resting and getting ready to move at a moments notice. At 4:00 P.M. the officer of the battalion started north along trail 29 in a reconnaissance mission in preparation for a planned counter attack against an enemy force which were reported to have forced the front line back at a point in front of our position. While riding along trail 29 approximately 3 1/2 KM behind the supposedly front line we encountered a group of enemy with a small cannon covering the road, the surprise was so complete on both sides that we were able to get the 3 vehicles turned around in a very close area, and retreat without a casualty on our side, while the enemy were being held under cover by our rifle fire.

The reconnaissance party returned to the bivouac area and Company I was immediately sent along the trail to stop any enemy advance toward the bivouac area.

The battalion was fed at 12:30 A.M. the morning of April 5th and immediately moved forward for the attack at daylight. The order of March was Co. K in the advance guard with the mission to obtain contact with the enemy and then to deploy and advance along the trail covering an area 100 yards to the right and left of the trail, Company "L" went in on the left flank of Co. K as soon as contact was obtained. Company M was split up with the rifle companies, and Co. I went into battalion reserve as soon as the attacking units passed through its position. The 2nd battalion 45th Inf. followed the 3rd battalion and as soon as contact was obtained with the enemy they went in on the right flank of Company K.

Major Smothers joined the 3rd battalion at about 3:00 A.M. and assumed command. The attack went on all day through the dense jungle and even though some heavy resistance was met the battalion advanced steadily and by 6:30 P.M. when the attack was halted we had driven the enemy back an estimated kilometer.

At about 6:45 P.M. orders were received by battalion headquarters that a withdrawal was to be made immediately, the order of withdrawal being 2nd battalion with 3rd battalion as rear guard, the 3rd was to have the support of a platoon of tanks after they had passed a position about 1000 yards to the rear of the present battle line. Major Smothers issued orders for the withdrawal of the battalion, the order of march being Company I, Company L, Machine gun units of Company M, and Company K acting as rear guard. The units moved out on time but as the rear unit of Company K broke contact with the enemy Captain Croom received orders from the Regimental Commander that he would hold his present position till 10:30 P.M. at which time he would break contact and pull back under cover of the tank units which were supporting him.

Companies I, L. and M proceeded on back along the trail to the junction of trails 8 and 29 while Company K remained to fight rear guard.

The night was very dark and it was impossible to see more than a few feet ahead, so the trip out after breaking contact was very slow. Company K, picked up about 70 stragglers and approximately 20 machine guns on the way out. These stragglers were mostly from the 2nd battalion.

The enemy it seemed had broken through at several places along the main line and units on the east coast of Bataan were fighting trying to establish a line, but the situation was bad.

The 2nd btn 45th Inf. went along trail 8 to the east trying to cut through and establish contact with the 57th Inf., if they were successful the 3rd battalion was to follow. If the 2nd battalion couldn't get through, the trail junction must be keep open so that both units would have a way to get out. The 3rd battalion was put into position at trail junction of 29 and 8 with Companies L, M, and I in position along trail 8 while Company K reinforced with 2 tanks from the 194th tank Btn was sent back down trail 29 for a distance of about 1 kilometer to stop any enemy threat that came on up that way.

During the early morning of April 6th Company K advanced further down the trail to the old bivouac area and got out 2 truck loads of cal. .30 ammunition (Both machine gun and rifle). The company then pulled back and made ready for any enemy attack at its selected position. There was no enemy activity that day until about 4:20 P.M. at which time the enemy advanced guard attacked the Company K position. The enemy point was ambushed along with some of the connecting groups; but the enemy deployed and soon went into action. Both flanks patrols of Company K which were out about 350 yards were fired upon within 15 minutes and in short order mortar fire was falling in the Company position along the trail. Two shells landed within 5 to 10 yards of one of the tanks, and the fighting was going on both sides of the trail. The 2nd Btn 45th Inf. came back along trail 8 headed west and as soon as the rear units had passed the junction, Company K was given orders to pull back to the junction and west on trail 8 following the other units of the 3rd Btn which were in rear and following the 2nd Btn. One platoon of Co. I was at the trail junction of trails 29 and 8 and as Co. K pulled back to the junction the combined force composed of Co. K and the platoon of Co. I pulled out and followed the other units of the battalion with several tanks following in our rear. The enemy during the meantime had cut across country and was trying to cut us off on trails 8, but after quite a lot of firing on both sides we were able to force on through and ( ) trail west toward the Pantangen River. ( ) went ( ) trail of about 3/4 Km. ( ) 29 and 8 ( ) they held this position until Co. K pylled through them. Co. L at this time became the rear guard company and assisted by the tanks acted as rear guard until the Pantangin River was reached.

Upon our arrival at the Pantangen River crossing at about 6:00 P.M. the battalion received orders to organize a holding position along the west bank of the river in conjunction with the 1st and 2nd battalions, 45th Inf. Our position was to be the

( ) - Illegible

right flank of the holding force. Immediate preparation of the position was begun and by shortly after dark, all units of our battalion had been assigned at least temporary positions for the night. The battalion was fed and the men were permitted to get some rest by taking turns at standing watch.

At daylight the morning of April 7th the position was reorganized and the battalion set to work preparing its position for an expected attack probably that day. Patrols were sent across the river and out from our right flank, but ne enemy activity was reported during the day. By night the battalion was pretty well organized and after putting out the necessary putposts we settled down to try to get some much needed rest.

The night passed without incident and at daylight April 8th the battalion continued putting the finishing touches on our position. This position was a natural, and all the officers and men looked forward eagerly to an enemy attack, on the position. Information as to how the troops on the east side of Bataan were making out was almost nil.

During the early afternoon (April 8th) the battalion was ordered to prepare to withdraw as part of the 45th Regiment. At 4:00 PM units of the Philippine Constabulary came in and took over our positions, and the battalion pulled out as part of the regiment and marched west along trail 8, then trail 9 to a location almost midway between the junctions of trails 8 and 9, and trails 9 and 17 at which place we were to be embussed to Mariveles.

The battalion reached its area at about 9:30 PM and everyone settled down to get some rest while waiting for the buses to arrive. The buses were delayed due to some mix-up back at higher Headquarters causing the buses to be sent to the wrong location. The birst buses to reach our area arrived at about mid-night. These buses were immediately loaded with Headquarters Personnel, anti-tank company personnel, and one company from our battalion (Company I). The remainder of the third battalion remained in the area waiting for its transportation which finally arrived just before daylight. Shortly after midnight there was quite an earthquake, but even though some dead limbs fell in the battalion area, no one was injured. Immediately upon the arrival of the buses the remainder of the battalion was enbussed and the trip toward Mariveles began.

The entire trip was made in daylight while enemy planes were flying overhead, but they seemed contented to let us continue on our way unmolested, as the convoy was not bombed or straffed a single time.

The head of the battalion reached Km 188 (approximately) at about 8:30 AM April 9th and at this point we were halted and informed that the Bataan forces surrendered. This was a heartbreaking surprise for us, for though the situation during the past two or three days had been obscure, none of us felt that anything like a surrender had even been considered.

Mere words cannot express the feelings and disappointments that every officer and man in the battalion felt. The Scouts were great soldiers and every officer with them was proud to have had the opportunity to fight with and lead troops of such caliber.

The buses were unloaded and the men were told the situation. A Major from General Headquarters (Name not remembered) came by as we were unloading, and instructed the battalion commander to

have his battalion unload all guns and march towards Mariveles displaying the white flag with all rifles pointing towards the ground. This was done for a distance of about one half kilometer, during this time reports came to us from Philippine Army stragglers who were all along the road going in both directions that the surrender had not been accepted, and that the Japanese were still firing at our troops white flag or not. The battalion was turned around and marched north to an area at Km 189.8 at which place we went into bivouac to await orders ss to exactly what the situation was. Later in the day orders were received that all fighting was over and that the surrender was complete.

At this time most of the company commanders informed their men that their duties as soldiers, for the time being, were over, and that two courses could be taken, either turn in to the Japanese or go to the hills and hope to be able to hide out and eventually get back home until the U.S. Forces were ready to fight again. This last was especially ideal for the Philippines, as they had at least a chance of getting through the hills and living as civilians until they were called. At this time many soldiers went to the hills while others remained until the Japanese separated us.

During the late afternoon the officers in our group went to General Pierce's Headquarters (KM 191, Approx.) and while there were informed that our forces should make a taken surrender. This was next to impossible as it was only a short time before darkness and our arms and equipment were broken up and scattered all over the area.

The night was spent without incident but with many rumors coming from Philippine Army stragglers who were still going and coming along the main road by our bivouac area.

Shortly after daylight the morning of April 10th word came back, unofficially, that the Japaneses Forces had still not accepted our surrender and that we might be attacked anyway. At this time Captain Croom secured a weapons carrier and picked up several ncos from the battalion and began getting together all the rifles and ammunition that could be salvaged along the road and around the bivouac area. The men of both the third battalion and A and B Companies from the first battalion which were at our bivouac area were rounded up and sent back about one half kilometer to a vibouac area which was occupied by Philippine Units under Command of Lt. Col. Alexander. The men were divided into platoons and squads and immediately put to work getting the equipment ready for battle in case we were to fight again. Major Smothers was trying to get information as to the exact situation and what was to be our part if any action occured.

While the arms were being cleaned Captain Croom located a truck driven by a member of the battalion which contained several cases of canned milk, approximately 90 cans of bacan, and miscellaneous foodstuffs. This was immediately sent to the battalion bivouac area. Captain McKinley, Company A, secured some food from various sources and word was sent back for our kitchen trucks to come forward to the bivouac area. By 8:30 AM there were approximately 200 rifles (M-I) and 20 automatic rifles ready for use. Organization of troops continued and at about 9:30 AM the men were fed and the second meal started.

At approximately 10:30 AM orders were received officially that the surrender was complete and that all arms and equipment were to be stacked and that we were to wait at our present location until the Japanese forces came for us. Major Smothers issued the necessary orders and all arms were stacked and the men informed as to the new turn in the situation. An American soldier (Name unknown) who was in the bivouac area knew the location of a supply dump, which according to him, contained "truckloads" of class C rations. A truck was secured and sent to the location for the food. Enough class C ration was obtained to given each Scout soldier present at this time 12 cans of ration.

The noon meal was served at approximately 2:00 PM with about 285 men present. A Japanese force composed of one officer, one interpreter, and about 20 men came to our area just as we were finishing the meal. The Japanese officer was very courteous and after an exchange of cigarettes asked questions about our force and was shown the stacked arms and equipment. Permission to distribute the class C rations to the men, and for the American Officers to be permitted to drive vehicles which were in the bivouac area was obtained. We were given two notes, one for the driver of each command car that the officers of the 45th Infantry present were to drive. (The one note given to me and which was later translated stated, "No one will take this car", signed by the Japanese Officer, who was a 1st Lt). We were directed to start the men marching toward Mariveles and that the American Officers would proceed on towards the east until directed otherwise. The Japanese Force then moved out of our area, leaving us alone with everything just as it was when they entered our area.

The men were lined up, goodbyes said, and the men filed by for their 12 cans of class C rations. This was really then "tough spot", for the ties between some of the officers and men were very strong, and many tears were shed shameslessly by both. Very few of the Scouts have been heard of since as we were separated at all times.

There were 13 officers of the 45th Infantry Regiment present at this time and we started a trip to the rear at about 4:30 PM in two command cars. The following Officers were present:

1. Major Smathers - Commanding 3rd Battalion
2. Major Van OOsten - Executive 3rd Battalion
3. Major Uglow - Commanding 1st Battalion
4. Captain Besheck - Executive 1st Battalion
5. Captain Croom - Commanding Company K
6. Captain Berkelhamer - Surgeon 3rd Battalion
7. Captain McKinley - Commanding Company A
8. Captain McMasters - Commanding Company C
9. Captain Bianchi - Commanding Company D
10. Captain Levitt - Surgeon 1st Battalion
11. 1st Lt. Freund - ?
12. Second Lt. Steward - Company C
13. Second Lt. Kell - Company D

(Note: The following information is given showing only the actions of the officers and does not include anything about the Scouts. No definite information is available at this time as to how they made out.

All we have are unconfirmed rumors about many of them dying of sickness in prison and of starvation and fever on the hike back to the different concentration camps.)

As we drove along towards Mariveles we passed many marching Filipino Troops all going towards Mariveles. There was no order as they were just streaming back. Countless vehicles which had run out of gas were standing beside the road, many of them burned and quite a few having been pushed over the cliff were laying as wrecks below. After we had driven about 12 kilometers we met many Japanese soldiers scattered along the road. They were looting one and all as they came along. We were stopped many times by them and they always managed to find a few things which we were trying to keep until we reached the proper authorities. The movement was very slow, and we never reached the Mariveles Airport until just at dark. At this point we ran into some Japanese soldiers who were really acting tough. These men were with animal pack units and the whole north end of the airport was crowded with animals. After about an hour of being continually threatened by these men we got through to about the middle of the Airport at which place we were halted for the night. Japanese sentries checked on us every few minutes throughout the night, and the whole thing was a nightmare.

At daylight April 11th, we started to move out but a Japanese soldier wanted to drive one of the Command cars, for the fun it seemed; so we lost the car and as we left he was racing up and down the Airport as fast as he could go. We continued on through Mariveles reaching Balanga at about noon. We were stopped many times and things were pretty tough.

As we reached Balanga we were stopped and the car was taken away from us, as well as some of our clothes, money, and valuables. We were fed rice about 2:30 PM and immediately were put on a bus to Orani arriving just before dark. Two nights were spent in this Hell and on the morning of April 13th we started marching toward San Fernando. The night of April 13th was spent at ( ) and was the wrost night of the entire trip.

On the morning of April 14th at about 4:00 AM the march into San Fernando began. This was made alright even though all of us were pretty weak from lack of food, having only had from small portions of poorly cooked rice since the final can of Class C ration eaten in the morning of April 11th. The night of April 14th was spent at San Fernando, and we were fed rice during the afternoon.

Before daylight the morning of April 15th we were marched to the railroad station and loaded into box cars (standing room only) for the trip to Capas by train. Along the way Filipinos threw food and sugar cane into the car doors for us. Upon arrival at Capas we were unloaded, formed into columns and marched to Camp O'Donnell. All the officers that left Bataan together in our group made the trip to O'Donnell.

Many men died on the hike out of Bataan but all the officers of the Third Battalion with the exception of 1st Lt. Daily who was in the hospital of the time of the surrender, and 1st Lt. McCarty, Company M, who was last seen when a group of Japanese took him supposedly to the Quinauan Point area, were accounted for at O'Donnell and were moved from there during the period June

1 to 4th 1942. We are now waiting impatiently for the "Yanks and tanks".

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

s/t/ J. F. CUSHMAN
1st Lt, FA

ANTI-TANK COMPANY 45TH INF. (PS)

December 8th. Ft. McKinley, alert. Anti-parachute defense patrols through 45th Inf. area and guard at post telephone central.

December 9th. Ft. McKinley. Joined Regiment at B range on the Alabang trail.

December 10th. Left Ft. McKinley after dark.

December 11th. Pinulot. First platoon (1940 guns) attached to third battalion on Olongapo zigsag. Second and Third Platoons attached to Second Battalion in position near Pinulot.

December 17. Moved to vicinity of Bagac. Company prepared positions for defense of Bagac beach. Installed seven naval "three pounders" and two "one pounders".

January 15. Moved to vicinity of Barre. Bani?

January 18-24. Abucay Hacienda. Second and Third Platoon attached to First and Second Battalions. First Platoon remained with Regimental Headquarters as guard.

January 25. Vicinity of Trail No. 5. Company outposted regimental sector on MLR.

January 26. Vicinity of Km 210.

February 1. Company assumes position on Saysain Ridge to defend against tanks coming from Bagac.

February 2. Second Platoon joins First Battalion on Trail No. 7 near Trail No. 5. Tual River battle.

February 6. First Platoon attached to 11th Inf. (PA) on MLR near Trail 7.

February 17. Company into rest area on Bobo Point.

March 17. Trail No. 17. First Platoon in position with 72nd Inf (PA) on Tus River. Third platoon on MLR with First Division at Trail No. 7.

April 3. Company attached to Hq. I Phil. Corps C. P. on Trail No. 9 near 11th Division.

April 6. Company assembled at junction Trails No. 8 and 9.

April 8. Position with regiment defending Pantingan River at Trail No. 8.

April 9. News of surrender received at Bobo Point (Km 205) while enroute to Quarantine decks at Mariveles. Company bivouaced on Signal Hill under Brig. Gen. Lough.

Description of combat follows ----------

ANTI-TANK COMPANY, 45TH INF (PS)

I. Participation in attack at Abucay Hacienda, January (18-27)??
The Second and Third Platoons attached with the First and Second Battalions, moving "by hand" over difficult terrain. Both platoons supported by firing at enemy positions, the abortive attack on a strong combat position near the much mentioned "mango grove". Approximately fifty pounds of H. E. were fired and several enemy machine guns were silenced. However, enemy mortar fire, heavy and accurate, prohibited the success of the attack.

II. Action in the Tual River battle.
The Anti-Tank Company was called upon to assist in overcoming the stubborn resistance of the entrenched enemy who had repulsed every attempt to advance. The Second Platoon joined the First Battalion and wiped out several machine gun nests. Because of the dense under growth, the only means of fire direction was to bare sight. Firing was conducted at ranges varying from 25 to 50 yards. In one particular skirmish when tanks supported our attack, the Second Platoon fired 75 rounds of H. E. and silenced the positions in front of it. One man, an automatic-rifleman, was accredited with demolishing a machine gun by crawling within throwing distance of the gun and tossing two grenades into the foxhole. This platoon supported the First Battalion until the enemy penetrated was annihilated.

The First Platoon was called upon to assist the 11th Infantry in its attempt to close the gap in the MLR which had occurred when the enemy penetrated our position near the Tual River. By direct laying, at a range vaying between 50 and 100 yards, the platoon brought heavy fire to bear upon the enemy machine gun positions which were holding up an attack. Over 100 rounds of A. P. were fired, and the successful negotiation of the attack credits the effective support of the platoon.

History of First Battalion, 45th Inf. (PS)
By Maj. Adrianus J. Van Oostin, Exec.

On Dec. 8, 1941 the 1st Bn., 45th Inf. (PS) proceeded to its war position, i.e., the defenses of the beaches of Bataan from Moron to Limay, inclusive. A small guard was left at Camp Limay, the home station, until it was turned over to medical and quartermaster personnel. Of the battalion, Co. A was on guard at the ammunition area at Little Baguio, and Co. C was performing similar duties at Base Camp, Mariveles, and a section of guns from Co. D was at each outpost, Agloloma, Bobo and Bagac points. The Lumber Theft Control Patrol was relieved and Co. A assumed the guard duties at all Manila Bay area stations. Co. C joined the battalion which had taken its principal defensive position at Bagac Beach by 11 a.m. the 8th. Riflemen were attached to the CP's and communication by telephone and radio was maintained. Fox holes were dug and machine gun emplacements prepared in previously selected positions both for day and for night defenses. Various units of the 31st Div. PA and Constabulary units (which also replaced the ammunition guard) relieved the battalion at the various positions ending on Jan. 7, 1942.

We were in mobile reserve to repel any landing attempt on the Bataan peninsula. Several alerts were necessary for reports of ships and fleets. Flights of enemy planes made frequent daily trips over Bagac en route to Corregidor and return. One plane fell in the sea west of Moron about the first of January, having dumped parts of radio, machine gun and personal armor and preservers near the barrio.

The battalion joined the regiment Dec. 17, 1941, having been on DS from it since Aug. 9, 1941 to Camp Limay.

About Jan. 15 the battalion proceeded by overland hike carrying all weapons and ammunitions for a day of fire from Bangcol to the Hacienda sector of the Abucay line. Attacks were carried out in the area between the existent front line and that from which the PA had departed some 1500 yards north. Food did not arrive from two days, as it, too, was carried over the deeply ravined terrain, instead of using the roads which would have saved the troops. Beside the hardships, there was lack of water and it became necessary to send armed patrols to a stream near Guitol to secure a half canteen full per man. The bent flanks of the PA unit (71st Inf.) were found and the battalion made contact with a view to re-establishing the old MLR. Heavy shelling and strafing broke the move any for the last few days of the fortnight of this activity. Lt. Edward W. Stewart was wounded in this encounter as were several enlisted men _____ were killed. Dysentery became a cause of concern.

On Jan. 24, 1942 the battalion received orders to withdraw as

the line was broken and new positions were to be adopted. Orders for a delaying action at Bangcol were revoked and the forced march continued to Trail 9. Co. C was shell with for the withdrawal and as was the case of the battalion was cut off by the enemy - each took diagonal cross country course and got away, however. Co. C lost several killed and wounded and 14 missing.

At the forward area it was found that the enemy patrols had tapped our wires and when this was noted in our conversations he cut them.

Upon arrival at the bivouac area a meal was ordered and this had to be rush for the battalion was again ordered into action at Trails 5 and 7 to eliminate about 17 snipers. (sic--about 3 days elapsed before action again). Lt. Col. Leslie T. Lathrop, c.o. checked in with Col. Glen R. Townsend of the 11th Inf. PA and was given command of the operation which became known as the Tuol River pocket by direct orders of Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, c.o. I Corps.

Co. C was committed to relieve the pressure on a casual detachment of the 51st Div under Capt. Gordon R. Myers. Twelve casualties were suffered in the first surprise burst of fire. All attempts to advance were quickly stopped by heavy enemy machine gun and small arms fire from carefully concealed fortifications, hidden still more by the dense bamboo growth. Chaplain John H. McDonnell attempted several times under persistent and heavy enemy fire to recover the body of Corp. Morandarte of Co. C. Slowly the unit made progress-the other sides of the pocket being maintained by holding attacks by units of the 11th Inf PA, 51st Inf. PA, 91st Inf. (PA) and 1st Inf. PA, and 2nd PC. With tanks attacking the enemy gun emplacements on Trail 7 the enemy still held his ground--untracking one tank and apparently placing an anti-tank round through the motor of another--which caused ammunition therein to explode and so heat the interior that the occupants had burning hair. At 75 mm gun fired 21 rounds at 100 yards to destroy the tank and deny it to the enemy.

The next day with infantry support the tanks tried again. Lt. Robert K. Roberts followed with riflemen and Lt. W. C. Bianchi voluntarily assisted in the destruction of an interconnecting group of three holes. The battalion advanced and cleaned up the south portion of the pocket in three more days. The PA and PC then forced the closing of the balance. Lt. Col. Lathrop's estimate of a reinforced battalion of enemy was proven conservative by 1400 dead counted in the pocket, 33 horses and mules captured, and some 15 animals dead. Considerable booty, including 3 field pieces, were taken. The 81 mm. mortar proved exceedingly effective in the jungle even through target correction was all by sound and 75% or more of the three-inch mortar shells failed to burst.

This action was closed on Feb. 17, 1942, the front line being reconstructed and returned to the care of the 1st Div. PA and the 11th Div. PA. From this point the battalion moved to rest and receive replacements on Bobo trail. Lt. Col. Lathrop and most of

his officers were exchanged with the other battalions on Mar. 18, 1942 and Capt. Homer H. Uglow, who had joined the regiment following his DS to Hq. II Corps, took command.

COPIED FROM PROJECT "J" ARCHIVES:

File:	999-2-214 Bk 1
Title:	Diary (War)
Origin:	Property of Major Calvin F. Chunn
Dates:	1942
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Pages:	58 thru 83

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T. H. MEHLER
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

REFERENCE TO

45th Infantry

Extracted from Vol. I of

"TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES"

But while December 7 meant "Pearl Harbor" to most of the world, it meant "Clark Field" to the Filipinos and the Americans in the Philippines — the date to them, halfway around the world and across the international date line, was December 8, 1941. At almost the same moment that the Japs hit Pearl Harbor, they made their attack on Clark Field in Central Luzon, only fifty miles from Manila. There they knocked out the American Far Eastern Air Force with almost the same devastating effect they dealt the U. S. Pacific Fleet 5,000 miles away.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 34

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The North Luzon Force, dispersed throughout the central and northern Luzon area,× was commanded by Major General Wainwright. It included two units of the Regular Army, the 31st Infantry Regiment and the 192d Tank Battalion, a former National Guard Organization, as well as six units of the Philippine Scouts. These were the 45th and the 57th Infantries, (PS); the 26th Cav. (PS) and the 23rd, 24th and 88th F.A. Regiments (PS). General Wainwright also had the following Philippine Army Divisions:

The 11th Reserve Division under Col. William E. Brougher, AUS

× 7-8 Dec 41

There were also elements of other divisions including the 2d Infantry, the 73rd Infantry and the 93rd Infantry.

The Harbor Defense Command, consisting of Corregidor and its satellite islands, was commanded by Brig. Gen. George F. Moore and was composed of two Regular Army Regiments, the 59th and 60th Coast Artillery; two Philippine Scout units, the 91st and the 92nd Coast Artillery Regiments, and the 4th U. S. Marine Regiment, which had just been moved in from Subic Bay.

Command headquarters feared that the single blow at Clark Field had virtually decided the course of the war in the Philippines. The 26th Cavalry, bombed out of Fort Stotsenburg, moved into the nearby mountains, prepared to strike at the first enemy beach landing wherever it might come. On December 9, Nichols Field, another key army air base at Manila was bombed almost to destruction. The Japs apparently hoped to catch that part of the FEAF which had gone there for refuge. Group installation destruction, however, was all they accomplished -- but that was complete.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 42, 43 & 44.

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--Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 12, 13 & 14.

45 Inf.

The Bataan Defense Force which was setting up the defense of Bataan,[x] consisted of the 31st and the 41st Divisions of the Philippine Army and the 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment, all under Major General George Parker.

The headquarters of the Philippine Department was converted into the Service Command for Bataan, under Brigadier General Allen C. McBride.

The NLF under General Jonathan M. Wainwright, at this point, had the 31st Infantry, Regular Army; the 45th Infantry, 57th Infantry, 26th Cavalry, 23rd Field Artillery, 24th Field Artillery, and 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts; the 11th Division, 21st Division, 71st Division and 91st Division, Philippine Army.

Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, commanding the SLF, had the 86th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, and the 1st and 51st Division of the Philippine Army, with artillery reinforcement.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 62 & 63.

[x] 24 Dec 41

The Bataan Defense Force which was holding up the defense of Bataan,x consisted of the 31st and the 41st Divisions of the Philippine Army and the 26 Philippine Constabulary Regiment, all under Major General George Parker.

The headquarters of the Philippine Department was converted into the Service Command for Bataan, under Brigadier General Allen C. Wolfride.

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Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, commanding the XIX, had the 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, and the 1st and 91st Divisions of the Philippine Army, with artillery reinforcement.

x 24 div 41

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 62 & 63.

45 Inf.

Once the new line from Abucay to Moron was occupied,[x] the Northern and Southern Luzon Forces ceased to exist. In their places were created the 1st and 2nd Corps respectively, the 1st under General Wainwright, who had commanded NLF, and the 2nd under General Parker, who had for a short time commanded the SLF. The Corps areas were divided by a north-south line drawn generally through Mount Natib and Samat. General Wainwright's corps took the left (West) half of the main line of resistance, its left flank anchored south of Moron on the China Sea, and its right on the slopes of Mount Natib. From Mount Natib eastward to a point below Abucay, General Parker's 2nd Corps held the front. Wainwright located his command post near Bagac, on the China Sea; Parker had his headquarters below Orion, on Manila Bay.

General Wainwright established the units on his 1st Corps line as follows:

The 1st Regular Division, Philippine Army, occupied the main battle position.

The 31st Division, Philippine Army, guarded the beaches from Moron southward to the vicinity of Caibobo Point.

The 45th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, was organizing a reserve battle position along the Pilar-Bagac Road, ten to twelve miles to the rear.

x c 5 Jan 42

The 91st Division, Philippine Army (to which were attached remnants of the 71st Division, Philippine Army, after it had been badly cut up at Layac Junction), was in Corps Reserve. It was reorganizing preparatory to relieving the 45th Infantry on the reserve battle position.

The 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, (cut off at Layac) was still working its way through the mountains to rejoin the 1st Corps. General Wainwright's 11th and 21st Divisions, Philippine Army, were given to the 2nd Corps. (The 11th was later returned).

On the other side of the peninsula, General Parker placed the 51st and the 41st Divisions, Philippine Army, in the main battle position, from left to right, with the 57th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, on the right flank to protect the beaches along Manila Bay.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 85, 86, 87.

45 Inf.

When the attacks at Abucay Hacienda had failed, the Japs again shifted their weight. On January 20 they smashed farther west at the Junction of the 51st and 41st Division, PA. The 51st, unable to withstand the devastating artillery fire and heavy infantry pressure, drew back half a mile, adding to the already existing gap on its left at Mt. Natib. Meanwhile, small Japanese elements had infiltrated across the western slopes of Mount Natib behind the 51st Division's main lines and were harassing rear area installations. The 31st Infantry, Regular Army, was thrown in and the 41st Division extended its lines to file the whole caused by the withdrawal of the 51st.

The 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, was moved from the I Corps Area, where it was in a defensive position near Moron, to reinforce the left flank of the 31st. In the dark the 45th took the wrong route and found itself on the right flank of the 31st instead of on its left. The 45th was withdrawn and moved up as initially planned. The situation was obscure; there was lack of contact between units. As a result, the adjacent flank elements of the two regiments became involved in a fire fight with each other. The fight lasted for more than an hour and a number of casualties were suffered. Once it was over, the two forces eventually succeeded in retaking the ground and reestablishing the II Corps lines. The reestablishment of this salient was one of the bloodiest fights of the campaign up to this time.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 98 & 99.

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 98 & 99.

45 Inf

The 51st Division was forced back from the Abucay line for the last time on January 25 by the Japanese who had infiltrated around its left flank and had completely disrupted communications and routes of supply. With some difficulty the division was later reformed into a combat team and employed on the Orion- Bagac Line. The Jap pressure by now was so great that it was deemed advisable to withdrew the whole II Corps line to the Pilar-Bagac Road.

General Homma in the meantime had turned some of his attention to the west flank of the Bataan Line, where General Wainwright's 1st Corps was so thinly stretched. The Corps' fifteen kilometers of jungle front was defended by only two battered regiments, the 1st and 3rd Infantries of the 1st Regular Division, PA, and by a few attached units, all of them ill-equipped. Troops of the Kimura Detachment, which had been landed at Port Binanga in the middle of January, coming down from Olongapo, had struck southward, crossing the Moron River, to hit the left flank of the 1st Regular Division. USAFFE artillery had shelled the Jap ships in Subic Bay but despite this fire the landing had been made.

When the 31st Division, Philippine Army, was taken from its beach defense position in the 1st Corps area on January 18 and moved across the peninsula to support the 2nd Corps against continuing Jap pressure, the 91st Division, PA, had to take over the defenses.

The 45th Infantry, formerly with the I Corps, had been transferred to USAFFE as force reserve, and then employed in the II Corps Area. There was no longer any I Corps reserve except for the remnants of the 26th Cavalry in bivouac at Bagac. The 26th was a cavalry unit in name only, for after its gruelling experience at Layac Junction, its remaining horses were sent to the rear to be slaughtered for food. From January 16 it was organized and employed as infantry.

When it was learned that the Japs were advancing toward Moron a troop of the 26th Cavalry and one battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment, PA, were moved forward from the main line of resistance, several thousand yards south of the Moron River, to hold the enemy. They cleared the advance enemy elements from Moron after a sharp battle and contained the main force.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 101 & 102.

45 Inf.

45 Inf.

General Wainwright's force on his new battle position were emplaced from east to west as follows: x

The 11th Division, Philippine Army.

The 1st Regular Division, Philippine Army.

The 92nd Infantry (to which were attached the remnants of the 91st Infantry).

Third Battalion Seventy-First Infantry.

Two battalions, Seventy-Second Infantry (at Bagac).

The rest of the 71st Div. was on beach defense while the 45th Infantry, PS, and the 26th Cavalry, PS, were in Corps' reserve. Air Corps units acting as infantry, protected the south and southwest beaches.

The First Corps area was divided into three subsectors:

The right subsector, comprising the 11th Division and the 2nd Philippine Constabulary Regiment after the end of January, under the command of Brigadier General William E. Brougher.

The left subsector, including the remnants of the 91st and 71st Divisions, and the 1st Regular Division, initially under the command of Brigadier General Albert M. Jones; placed under Brigadier General Luther M. Stevens when Jones became commander of the First Corps in March.

x 26-29 Jan 42

The south subsector, comprised of miscellaneous Air Corps ground units as well as the 65th Quartermaster Pack Train; the 12th Quartermaster Regiment, Philippine Scouts, the 2nd Anti-tank Battalion Philippine Army; and the 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment.* This was initially under the command of Brigadier General Clyde A. Selleck; who was later replaced by Brigadier General Clinton Pierce.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 111 & 112

* 26 - 29 Jan 42

45 Inf.

The entire Battle of the Points lasted from January 23, to February 13. Before it was over, Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units as well as the heavy mortar batteries on Corregidor were called upon to help wipe out the Japanese force. The weary 57th and 45th Infantries of the Philippine Scouts were pushed across Bataan from the Second Corps areas to help throw back the Japanese. A small detachment from the Fourth Marine Regiment, based on Corregidor was there too.

Smaller units from the Fifth Interceptor Command, the Second Philippine Constabulary Regiments, the Twelfth Infantry, Philippine Army; the 192nd Separate Tank Battalion, the Provisional Naval Battalion from the 16th Naval District, a company from the 803rd Engineers, Aviation, Regular Army, a battery from the 59th Coast Artillery Corps, Regular Army, crews from the USS Mary Ann, the USS Panay, the USS Canopus, the USS Fisheries II, and PT-35, worked to sten the invading tide. The three-weeks-long battle was a bloody and exhausting one for the Americans. For the Japanese it was a complete disaster.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 121

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 121

The Provisional Naval Battalion, initially charged with the task of driving off the Japs[x] was unable to carry out the mission. After four days the 2nd Battalion of the 57th Infantry arrived and was thrown into aid the Naval Battalion. Shortly thereafter, a part of the Forty Fifth Infantry arrived to help, along with the two Battalions of Field Artillery.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 123

[x] c 23 Jan 42

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 123

x G 2 3 Jan 42

Before the Battle of Pucot Hill was fairly well begun, another barge fleet landed a strong force at Agloloma Point at dawn on January 24. The initial landings at adjacent Quinauan Point were made at 2 A.M., on the twenty-fifth of January. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment, reinforced by a platoon of mortars, was successful in preventing immediate exploitation of the Japanese beachhead after their landing. For six gruelling days the Philippine Constabulary infantrymen were continually engaged in hand-to-hand combat. They were relieved by the 45th and the 57th Infantry Regiments of the Philippine Scouts.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 124

Before the Battle of Pusot Hill was fairly well begun, another large fleet landed a strong force at Agfalom Point at dawn on January 31. The initial landings at adjacent Quinsuan Point were made at 2 A.M., on the twenty-fifth of January. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment, reinforced by a platoon of mortars, was successful in preventing immediate capitulation of the Japanese beachhead after their landing. For six gruelling days the Philippine Constabulary infantrymen were continually engaged in hand-to-hand combat. They were relieved by the 4th and the 57th Infantry Regiments of the Philippine Scouts.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 128

45th Inf Regt

Although the artillery plan was the key to the success of the Battle of Agloloma Bay, the fighting there was not without cost to the Fil-American forces. During the fight,[x] the 3rd Battalion of the Forty-Fifth Infantry, alone was cut down from six hundred to two hundred and twelve men and its senior surviving officer-in-command was a second lieutenant. The other battalions of the 45th as well as those of the 57th also suffered severely in the close-in jungle fighting. But the cost to the Japanese was much heavier.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 126

[x] 23-27 Jan 42

45th Inf.

Anyasin Point served as the base of supply and operations for this northermost of the three Jap landings.x Their attempts to drive inland from it were never successful in getting even so far as the west coastal road. At Anyasin and Canas, the 57th Infantry bore the brunt of the fighting, as it had at Longaskawayan. It was supported by a battalion of the 45th Infantry, by the 17th Pursuit Squadron, AAP, fighting as infantry, and by a battalion of the 12th Infantry, Philippine Army.

The initial plan to drive the Japanese out of Canas-Silaiim-Anyasin area called for the 3rd Battalion of the 57th Infantry to strike along the Anyasin River Valley. The 1st Battalion of the 57th with an attached battalion of the Philippine Constabulary, was to move on the left of the 3rd Battalion through the jungle of Anyasin Point.

On the right flank of the 3rd Battalion the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry extended to the north far enough to sweep the enemy from the Silaiim Point. North of Silaiim Point to Canas Point a battalion of the 12th Infantry was designated to take back the beach and hold it.

At Canas, where a small pocket of Japanese was cut off from the other force, the 17th Pursuit Squadron consisting of a mere 135 men was assigned to mop up and protect the flanks.

x 27 Jan - 2 Feb, '42

The 2nd Battalion of the 57th Infantry was held in reserve. This Battalion had just rejoined the regiment after mopping up at Lonaskawayan Point. It had not been present at the Agloloma Bay Battle. Elements of Field Artillery and a few tanks from the 192nd Separate Tank Battalion were attached to the force. The tanks were used even though jungle conditions were unfavorable and the going was tough.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 127 & 128

45 Inf.

At the northern flank of the beachhead, other Japs fought stubbornly on. The morning after the "Swimming retreat" -- February 12 -- they tore a large gap in the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry. Nearly two hundred Japanese plunged through the hole. The reserve 3rd Battalion of the 57th Infantry, resting after its tough fighting all along the west coast, was called upon to keep the Japanese from taking the command post of the 57th. All but fifty to sixty of the Japs were slaughtered in the ensuing fight. Only one man of the Third Battalion was killed but when the fighting was over, his comrades found sixteen dead Nipponese soldiers in a semi-circle about his foxhole.

The Fifty-Seventh Infantry had put up a great fight but it was so badly exhausted from the siege at Longaskawayan, Agloloma and Anyasin, that it was sent to a reserve area at Signal Hill. There the remnants of the proud regiment spent seven weeks and a day as USAFFE reserve, a rest that was badly needed by the hungry, battle-worn and sick men.

Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 131 & 132.

45 Inf.

In the First Corps sector, a critical front, another major engagement had taken place. It developed into two related battles, both of which occured in the first half of February, at which time the Japs found the First Corps too tough to crack. The engagement became known as the Battle of the Pockets. One of the pockets was in the Tuol River Valley, the other in the valley of the nearby Cotar River. The whole operation developed as the result of the unsuccessful Japanese landing attempts on the west coast of Bataan. The Japanese attack which developed into the Battle of the Pockets was initiated by the commanding officer of the Jap infantry regiment involved in the Battle of the Points. He used his single remaining battalion in a foolhardy attempt to rescue the two other battalions on the west coast by trying to cut to them inland through the jungle.

This battalion penetrated the Fil-American lines in the vicinity of the limiting points between the 1st and the 11th Divisions, Philippine Army, about January 27, pushing 1,500 yards beyond the front lines. The penetration occurred not because the force of the Jap attack was overwhelming but because of the First Division was still in process of occupying its section of the line when the 45th Infantry, P.S., which had been holding that position, withdrew. The withdrawal, before the Eleventh Division was in position, left a gap which the Japs stumbled into by accident in their efforts to get to the cut-off battalions.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 133 & 134.

The 45th Infantry made an attack that evening[x] and succeeded in fighting along Trail 29 to a point 1,000 yards north of its junction with Trail 8. But, though the fighting continued until the following afternoon, the 45th was unable to advance further. Finally another Jap Regiment was thrown against it.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 172.

x 4 Apr 42

That morning,* the 57th Infantry was moved along trail 10 to attempt another new line along the Mamala River, which joins Manila Bay at Limay. Simultaneously, the 45th Infantry received orders to break contact with the enemy, withdraw by way of trail 8 and move behind the 57th Infantry, the 45th, however, was ambushed enroute and had to turn back again to the west rim of the Pantingan Valley. It remained there until the end.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 175

* 7 Apr 42

On April 8, General Wainwright sent two staff officers, Colonel Pete Irwin and Colonel N. F. Galbraith, to General King in Bataan to arrange for the 45th Infantry to be moved to Corregidor. This arrangement was made with the Luzon Force Headquarters and orders were issued, but the 45th, far north in the Pantingan Valley, was unable to move quickly enough over the badly clogged roads to get to Marvieles before the surrender.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 187

DECLASSIFIED
Authority _____

45th Inf

EXTRACT OF REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF 41ST REG. F.A.
(by Capt. Mariano Robles)

The 41st Div to which we were part was assigned the center of the East Bataan defenses. In addition to giving support to our own Division, we were to support also the 51st Div on our left. For this purpose, the 1st Bn, 21st FA and the 1st Bn, 51st FA were attached to our Regiment and a groupment resulted. The first shot was fired on 3 Jan 1942 by "A" Btry against 3 armored vehicles reported by an observer. While no hits were registered they all scattered. Evening 6 Jan 42 the Japs delivered their first major attack on the 57th Inf CT Sector on our Right. In three hours the line was thrown back by approximately 2000 yards. Our 1st Bn was ordered to fire continuously on the gap created until units of the 21st Div came up to help recover part of the lost ground. From then on to about 15 Jan 1942, the Japs delivered three separate and vigorous attacks on the three regimental fronts of the 41st Div. In each case they were badly beaten back by artillery fire. About 16 Jan 1942 on the 51st Div Area, the Japs were able to break the line and it was only with the help of the 45th-57th (PS) and 31st Inf (US) that the line was recovered three days later. In the evening of the break-through reports from patrols 43rd Inf stated heavy reinforcement coming into an area were poised to take advantage of the gap. The entire 41st FA groupment fired on this area indicated at 12:00 midnight of the 16th or 17th Jan causing heavy casualties later reported to be about 38 truckloads of killed and wounded passing San Fernando, Pampanga. The following day the Japs gave up the attack and passing over the higher elevations of Natib Mts. 6,000 of them were reported 6 Kms on our left rear on the Abo-Abo river on 22 Jan ' 42. On 24 Jan ' 42 our Abucay - Natib line was abandoned and a new line established at Pilar-Bagac Road. Inspite of transportation difficulties, the Regiment was able to move its armaments and men to the new line and a defense again established on the East side of Mt Samat on 26 Jan 42. The engagement were very hot this time. On 17 Feb 42, the Regiment completed establishing positions west of Mt. Samat which we continued to occupy until the surrender. The positions occupied were in the forest and it required the blowing up of big trees to clear the field of fire. With excellent field of fire and an observation post that controlled the entire west sector of II Corps, we maintained superiority over the Jap ground forces until 2 April '42 . About the 2nd week of March the Japs pulled back and gave our men respite and time to organize.

EXTRACT FROM NOTEBOOK #1 - DIARY OF MAJOR Wm. J. PRIESTLEY

South Luzon Force - Bataan Force - II Philippine Corps

Brief Outline of Activities Prior to and During War

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities on about Sept 1 a SLF Hq in skeleton form was created and functioned briefly. This Hq consisted of Brig Gen. Geo Parker, Lt. Col. C O Wilson, Lt. Col. H. D. Johnston, Capt. Arthur Christensen and Capt. Homer Uglow. Units to be included under this command were not inducted until somewhat later and the troops thus received practically no training before the war started. Only two regiments the 42nd & 52d Infs. were inducted on Sept 1 and no others immediately thereafter.

The elements of the command were drawn up as follows: Nov 1 - 41st & 51st Infs. mobilized and started training, Nov. 24th - 43rd & 53rd Infs, 41st F. A and 41st & 51st Engrs. On Dec 1 the 41st and 51st Med. Bns. Signal Cos, Hq & Hq Cos, & QM Service Co, so that on Dec 8 the state of the SLF was: 41st Div complete less 1 Anti Tank Bn 51st Div complete less 1 Anti Tank Bn & 51st F. A. and 1st & 2d P. C. (inducted in Mid. Nov and assigned for training only) released at beginning of war.

The 41st & 51st Divs. were inducted and trained in S. Luzon what little training they did have and at the outbreak they were sent to their defensive positions on the beaches. The boundary between division running along a general line thru Lemery & Pancipit Rs. - Id. in Lake Taal - Tagaytay and Las Pinas inclusive to the 41st Div. The rest of the coastline was defended by the 51st Div. with Manila sector unoccupied due to location of the fortified Ids. On Dec 29th the 1st Reg Div was assigned to the beaches between Infanta & Mauban inclusive and was given the road net in rear of it.

On about Dec. 12 the Japanese landed at Legaspi after previously bombing Davao, Legaspi, Nichols Field, Cavite and sections in the NLF territory and started to move N towards the main part of Luzon by rail and by road. Units of the 52nd Inf were sent S to meet them - one Co. along the road and one Bn was split up - its elements being drawn and given different missions - to contact and delay the enemy as long as possible, destroy bridges and military equipment and impede the progress of the enemy as much as they were able.

The Second Phase of SLF activities began on Dec 24 when the enemy landed in force at Atimonan and Mauban. The units of the 52d sent S encountered many adventures of war not covered here, some being out off and breaking thru - others making their way N to join their

organization later. On the afternoon of Dec. 24 Gen Parker's Hq. was moved to Bataan and the Bataan Force consisting of the 31st Div, 41st Div, parts of the Phil Div., Hq and other misc. units. Gen Jones took command of the SLF upon Gen Parker's departure (his Div. the 41st having reverted to the Bataan Force).

By the night of Dec 24th the "Js" had crossed the Mts. at Atimonan to Malicbay and at Mauban had reached the zig-zag at Sampaloc. The enemy from Atimonan advanced in successive states and by nightfall of the 25th were at Lucena, Tayabas, 26th Candaleria, 27th Tiaong and on the night of 27-28 contact was broken in that area as the troops were ordered to Bataan. At Mauban the 1st Inf less 1 Bn retreated to positions on the Laguna-Tayabas boundary night of Dec. 25, Louisiana 26th broke contact on the 27th and withdrew to Bataan via Pagsanjan, Sta. Cruz, Los Banos and Manila. One Bn at Tignauan remained there until the 28th with no contact and withdraw on the 28th. The regiments in the SLF were reshuffled on the night of the 27th and were shuttled into Bataan - no contact being made with the enemy. By Dec 31st Gen. Jones and his Hq. had arrived at Plaridel & contacted Gen. Wainwright. By order of USAFFE Gen Jones was put in command of remains of the 71st & 91st Divs, then at Baliuag and stayed there to cover the withdrawal of the SLF thru them Dec 31st - Jan 1. By morning of the 1st those units and Gen Jones arrived in Bataan and the SLF ceased to exist. (Note: Assg'd to SLF prior to this date and moved to Tagaytay pos. was the Prov. Constab. Brigade. Three days were absorbed moving in and thru more out -no contact being made with the enemy.)

As part of the 3d Phase of the SLF the Bataan Force existed from Dec. 24-Jan 6 its function having been to organize the position in Bataan and assist in their occupancy.

By the night of Jan 5-6 the last elements of the NLF had withdrawn into Bataan leaving the covering force at Layac Jct. exposed to the enemy. Organized from right to left in line the pos. contained the 71st Div. 31st Inf (US), and 26th Cav. At 8:00 A Jan 6 our art'y sighted the enemy and began to register on them and at 9:00 A.J. Art'y appeared on the road to be reinforced by other art'y units soon thereafter and a fierce art'y dual ensued. The "Js" also bombarded portion of the 31st Inf with superior fire and by nightfall the right of the 31st and part of the 71st Div had pulled back. At about 10 P. the entire line was ordered withdrawal behind the Abucay position which movement was executed in great confusion. The 26th Cav, not receiving the order was cut off and withdraw through the Mts. One Bn of the (23d) F.A. was badly shot up and lost all but one gun. The 1st Bn of the 88th FA retreated in order saving all guns.

The Main Battle Position previously organized, was occupied originally by the II Philippine units from right to left 57th Inf, 41st Division and 51st Div. the 57th turning its flank on the beach at Matabang and the 51st Div tieing in with the I Corps at Mt. Natib This position was shelled almost constantly daily particularly on the left flank of the 41st Div. and the right of the 51st Div. The Js effected a penetration in that sector and between the 41st Div. and 57th Inf left and the 31st Inf (US) and 45th Inf (PS) were sent in to counter attack at Abucay hacienda, the 21st Div. being sent in to reinforce the MLR on the front of the 41st Div. The counter attack was successfuly, heavy casualties being inflicted on the enemy and mopping up operation were in progress when the retreat in the I Corps Sector made a withdrawal from the Main Battle Position to the Reserve Orion-Bagac pos. necessary. Some Js had infiltrated thru the II Corps, however, and it is probable that they might have cut thru the reserve Orion-Bagac pos. had the withdrawal not been made.

The withdrawal was accomplished with a considerable confusion during which aggressive action by "J" art'y, air corps and ground troops might have ended the war before the end of January. The position was occupied and divided into subsectors as follows from the beach near Limay-North to Orion - to the Pantingan: SS-A under Col. Irwin-31st Inf. PA, PA Air Corps Bn, and PA Training Cadre; SS-B - Col Doanes - Prov. Regt. U.S.A. Air Corps, SS-C Gen Bluemel -41st Inf (to March 1), 31st Div. less 31st & 33rd Infs. 51st Combat Team, SS-D- Gen Lough - 21st Div. on Right - 41st Div. on left and 33rd Inf on extreme left flank prior to Mar. 1 after which it become Corps reserve and the 41st Inf went from SS-C to SS-D. The Philippine Division, part of which was to have occupied the front line was broken up as Corps and Army Reserve and was employed piecemeal wherever necessity dictated. Its Hq continued to exist under Gen. Lough but never until the final futile effort was it brought together in any attempt at concerted effort.

The Reserve Battle Position was further prepared and fortified after occupancy - lowlands flooded, trenches dug, camouflage created barbed wire strung etc & patrol action was constant but not pressure was exerted until the first of April. Here as in the I Corps the "Js" entrenched and awaited reinforcements.

Toward the latter part of March enemy truck, tank and artillery columns were sighted on the roads and near areas and it was obvious that an offensive had been planned. This push came beginning April 3 at about 8 A with intensive shelling, dive bombing, high level bombing and a general attack in the 42d Inf areas and by nightfall these units had retreated in confusion down trails #6 and #29 to trail #8, the 42d Inf completely disintegrating and disappearing. The 43d Inf was contacted by Gen Lough and ordered to reorg. and moved back up #6 on April 4. However, it was again hit by mass artillery, broke up and disappeared. The 41st Inf. not so hard hit moved N along the road and was not attacked in force. On the night of April 4, the 33d Inf.

in Corps Res. Along Tr #44, about 1 Km N of #6 & 44, was order N to reinforce the line, but was not heard from thereafter. On April 4th "J" tanks appeared along the Pilar-Bagac road, some started down trail #28 and went back, and a number worked down the Pilar-Bagac Road behind the MLR of the 21st Div along the Telissy R. The 21st Div then withdrew under pressure to the RRT on the slopes of Mt. Samat. In the face of these attacks and withdrawal by the night of Apr 4 the line existed with a large salient in SS-D and units were located as follows: 41st Inf on extreme left astride trail #29, a large Jap on its right to the 21st Div on the forward slopes of Mt. Samat, 51st CT, 32d Inf, Prov. AC Regt; 31st Inf PA AC Bn and the PATC. The 31st Inf US had been ordered from its bivouac area to Jct of trs #2 & 10 on April 4 and was in that area that night.

On April 5 the enemy moved down tr #6 and across the face of Samat and by night they had control of trail #64 to the CP of the 21st Div. and were working up the R slope of Mt. Samat. The extent of the penetration by the "Js" was not known exactly and a counter attack involving the 45th Inf (PS) up Trail #29 with tank support and the 31st Inf (US) up astride #44, thense up #64 to #44 - then up #4 to reinforce and establish the line. Before this could be accomplished in April 6 remnants of the 21st Div came thru the 31st Inf pos. and heavy fire was received from the enemy in Mt. Samat. Heavy pressure on the front and left of the 31st Inf forced its withdrawal to the S. bank of the San Vicente by nightfall of the 6th. The enemy also forced his way up trails #6 & #44 in April 6, the 1st Bn 57th Inf having been order to Jct #8 & #44 to be at disposal of Gen. Lough. Before the 57th Bn could reach Gen Lough, however, his Hq was cut off by the enemy on Trail 8 and the Bn of the 57th was forced to take up a defensive position behind the San Vicente R. at the Jct #8 & #46. The tank support of the 45th Inf arrived late and that unit was forced S on trail #29 and into the I Corps sector.

Thus by nightfall of April 6th situation was almost hopeless. On the extreme left the 45th Inf counter offensive up Tr #29 was nipped and it, with Gen Lough's Hq. was cut off from II Corps. The "J" had routed the 41st Div and followed it up trails #6 & #44 where the 1st Bn 57th encountered the enemy and held them N. of the San Vicente at Trail Jcts #8 & #46. On the San Vicente a large gap existed and then the 31st Inf (US) had gone into pos. connecting with the 51st CT of Gen Bluemel on its right flank. Our art'y had been overwhelmed and silenced and the 41st FA guns had all been captured.

On April 7 an attempt was made to organize a defensive line along the Patoc trail (#46) with 201st and 202d Engrs filling the gap between the 57th (2d Bn. in pos. with 1st Bn night of April 6) and 31st Inf (US) and SS-C units. The 26th Cav and 14th Engrs also moved up, the 26th at Jct #2 & #10 being turned over to Gen. Bluemel & the Engrs. to Col Tilly who was with the 57th Inf CP and its 3d Bn. attached to SS-C and Gen Bluemel. The "Js" followed up their aggressive move of the

6th and not only cut trail #46 but staged a separate attack in the 32d Inf area in the right half of SS-C forcing the withdrawal of the 51st CT, along with the 31st (US) to the S bank of the San Vicente and extend a line with the 3d Bn 57th Inf, & 21st & 31st Engrs. The 201st & 301st Engrs, had failed to arrive at their position on the Patoc Trail before the enemy cut it and those units were scattered & disintegrated . Thus Gen Bluemel decided to continue the withdrawal to the S bank of the Mamala R where, after consultation with commanders of the 26th Cav, 57th Inf. 31st Inf (US) and Engrs, he decided to withdraw all elements to the Alangan R. which long retreat was affected before dawn of the 8th.

April 8th found the line held behind the Alangan R. in a confused state due to hasty retreat and mistaken routes of withdrawal. It was obvious from the outset that this position was untenable. All 37 mm guns and automatic weapons had been lost, nearly all 155 mm. were of ammunitions. In addition the men were almost completely exhausted by the long marches and days without food. The 26th Cav. which had moved from #2 & #10 to #2 & #46 covered the withdrawal of other units & then withdrew to the above pos. itself.

It was intended that new position would be occupied with the 26th Cav, 57th Inf and 31st Inf in line & the 14th Engrs in reserve. but due to a mistake in retiring between new and old trails #20 a scramble ensued and the line was established with the 26th Cav and 14th Engrs. astride Trail #20, 31st & 57th to E of old #20 - a big gap to the 803d Engrs, PAC, 31st Inf PA and the 4th PC, (the 4th PC and 803d Engrs having been brought up during the night).

During the morning of the 8th Js bombed the line heavily and the 4th PC and the 31st Inf PA pulled out . Enemy tanks & Inf followed up quickly down trail #20 and soon surrounded the position set that by the night of the 8th the entire line was untenable and further withdrawal become necessary. Orders were confused as were the troops who scattered badly. The bulk of them escaped down new #20 - others cross country. Col Tilly, Col Brady & Col. Saint of the 57th Inf 31st Inf & 14th Engrs respectively managed to gather parts of their commands by the morning of the 9th. At 3 A, Maj. Christenson Ass't G-3 for II Corps met Gen. Bluemel at Jct #12 & #20 received order to surrender. Gen Bluemel was ordered to take up a position behind the Lamao R but instead he left a screen and moved troops the rear where surrender came later that day.

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s/ Ruth H. Essary
t/ RUTH H. ESSARY
Captain WAC

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M. B. Gabat

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