EXIBACI
From
NOTEBOOK NO. 1

DIARY OF MAJOR WM. J. PRIESTLY

(History of 41st Div. (PA)

. 53





EXTRACT FROM NOTEBOOK #1 - DIARY OF MAJOR Wm J. PRIESTLEY

South Luzon Force - Bataan Force - II Philippine Corps

Brief Outline of Activities Prior to and During War

Frior to the outbreak of hostilities on about Sept 1 a SEP Eq in skeleton form was created and functioned briefly. This Hq constanced of Brig Gen. Geo Parker, it. Ool. 0 Silmon, it. Ool. H. O. Johnston, Goth. Arthur Caristensam and Capt. Reser Below. Union to be included under this command were not induced until convening Labor and the troops thus received practically no trainsometime Labor and the troops thus received practically no training the contract of th

The elements of the command were drawn up as follows:
Nov 1 - (lat & Sist Infa: mobilized and started training, Nov.
2(th - 43rd & 53rd Infa: Alat F. A and Alat & 51st Infa: On Dec 1 the Alat and 53rt Hod. Enc. Signal Cos, Ng & Ho Cong & GU
Souvice Co. so that on Dec 8 the state of the SEF was Alat
My complete less 1 Anit Insa En Jist Dy complete less 1 Anit Table
Na & Sist F. A. and Alat & 2d P. C. (Inducted in Mid. Nov
and sanigned for training only released at beginning of war.

The Alot & Siet Dive, were inducted and trained in S. Lucan what little training they did have and at the outbreak they were sent to their defensive positions on the beaches. The boundary between division running along a general line thru Lemery & Fenchitt Re, — Id. in Juke Canl — Taggytay and Les Flans inclusive to the 41st Div. The rest of the constitue was defended by the first Div with the Hanila sector unoccupied due to location of the fortified Ids. On Dec 29th the lat lag Div was assigned to the beaches netween Infants & Mauban inclusive and was figure the read net in rear of it.

On about hee 12 the Japanese Landed at Leganyl ofter previously booking Davao, Leganyl, Mishola Field Cavite and sections in the EEF territory and started to move M towards the main part of Luono by well & by read. Dails of the Schol Inf were sent 5 to meet them - one Co. along the road and one Bm was split up - its elements being drawn and given different missions - to entact and delay the enemy as long as possible, desirey bridges and military eq 19, and and impact the progress of the enemy as much as they were able.



The Second Phase of SLF activities began on <u>Dec 22</u> when the enemy landed in force at Atimonen and Mauben. The units of the 52d ent is oncountered anny adventures of war not covered hore, some being cut off and broaking thru - pthers making their way N to



join their organization later. On the afternoon of Dec. 24 Gen Parker's Hq. was moved to Bataan and the Bataan Force consisting of the 31st Div, 41st Div, parks of the Phil Div, Hq and other misc. units. Gen Jones took command of the SIF upon Gen Parker's departure (Mis Div. the 41st having reverted to the Bataan Force).

By the night of Bec 24th the "Je" had crossed the Mis. at Atimonan to Mailchy and at Nawhan had reached the zig-zar at Sammaloc. The enemy from Atimonan advanced in successive states and by nightfall of the 27th were at Jucong, Tayabas, 25th Candaleria, 27th Tinong and on the night of 27-26 contact was broken in that area as the troops were ordered to Bataan. At Mawhant the last Inf less 1 En retreated to positions on the Larune-Tayabas boundary night of Dec. 25, Louisians 36th broke contact on the 27th Manina. One En at Tignauan remained there until the 26th with no contact and withdraw on the 27th. The regiments in the SIF were reshuffled on the night of the 27th and were shuttled into Bataan no contact being made with the enemy, by Dec 31th Gen, Jones and his Hg, had arrived at Plaridel & contacted Gen, Talumyidit, By order of URAFTS Gen Jones was not in command of remains of the 27th at the contact and of the allows and the state of the contact and the state of the contact and the state of the contact of the state of the contact and the state of the contact of the contact of the contact and the state of the contact and the state of the contact and the state of the contact of the contact

As part of the 3d Phase of the SIF the Bataan Force existed from Dec. 24-Jan 6 its function having been to organize the position in Bataan and assist in their occupancy.

By the night of Jan 5-6 the last elements of the NLP had withdrawn into Batsan leaving the covering force at Layas Jot. exceed to the enemy. Organized from right to left in line the post contained the Jint Div. 31st Inf (US), and 26th Cay, At 8:00 A Jan 6 our art'y sighted the enemy and began to register on them and at 9:00 AJ. art'y appeared on the road to be reinforced by other art'y units soon thereafter and a fierce art'y dual ensured. The "Jat" also bombarded portion of the Jist and with superior fire and by nightfall the right of the 31st and part of the superior fire and by nightfall the right of the 31st and part of the superior fire and by nightfall the right of the 31st and part or a state of withdrawal behind the Abusay position which avecant was executed in great confusion. The 26th Cay, not receiving the order was cut off and withdrawal brough the Nts. One Bn of the (23d) F.A. was belly shot up and lost all but one gun. The lst

The Main Battle Position previously organized, was occupied

originally by the II Philippine units from right to left 57th Inf, 41st Division and 51st Miv. the 57th turning its flank on the beach at Natabang and the 51st Div tiefing in with the I Corps at Ms. Natib This position was shelled almost constantly daily particularly on the left flank of the 41st Div. and the right of the 51st Div. The Js effected a penetration in that sector and between the 61st Div. The to counter attack at Abucay hackeda, the 21st Div being sent in to counter attack at Abucay hackeda, the 21st Div being sent in attack was successful, heavy casualties being inflicted on the enemy and morphing up operation were in progress when the retreat in the I Corps Sector made a withdrawal from the Main Battle Position to the Freezeve Orton-Barag pos. necessary. Some 5 had inflitted thru the II Corps, however, and it is probable that they might have cut thru the reserve frient-Barag pos. had the withdrawal not been made.

The withdrawal was accomplished with a considerable confusion during which aggressive action by "J" art'y, afr corps and ground troops might have ended the war before the end of January, The postion was occursed and divided into subsectors as follows from the beach near Limay-North to Orion - to the Fantingan: SS-A under Col. Irwin -Jist Inf. PA, PA Air Corps Bn, and PA Training Cadre; SS-B - Col Doanes - Prov. Regt. U. S. A. Air Corps, SS-C-Gen Bluemel - 41st Inf to March 1) Jist Div less lists 4 37d Infs. 71st Combat team, SS-D- den Iough - 21st Div on Right - 41st Div. on left and 37d Inf on extreme left flank prior to Mar. 1 after which it become Corps reserve and the 41st Inf went from SS-C to SS-D. The Philippine Division, natt of which was to have occupied the front line was broken up as Corps and Army Reserve and was employed piecemeal wherever necestly dictated. Its Hg continued to exist under Cen. Lough but never until the final Tutile effort was it bought together in any attempt at concerted effort.

The Reserve Battle Position was further prepared and fortified after occupancy - lowlands flooded, trenches dug, camcuflage created barbed wire strume etc & patrol action was constant but not pressure was exerted until the first of April. Here as in the I Corps the "Vs" entrenched and awaited reinforcements.

Toward the latter part of March enemy truck, tank and artillery columns were sighted on the roads and near areas and it was obvious that an offensive had been planned. This push came beginning April 3 at about 8 A with intensive shelling, dive bombing, high level bombing and a general attack in the 42d Inf areas and by hightfall these units are retarted in convision down trails #6 and #29 to trail #8, the 42d Inf completely disintegrating and disappearing. The 42d Inf was contacted by Gen Lough and ordered to reorg, and moved back up #6 on April 4. Rowever, it was again hit by mass artillery, broke up and disappeared. The 41st Inf. not so hard hit moved N along the road and was not attacked in force. On the night of April 4, the 31d Inf for Corps Res. Along Tr

#44, about 1 km N of #6 & 44 was order N to reinforce the line, but was not heard from thereafter. On April 44 m 37 tanks appeared along the Filer-Bagac road, some started down trail #28 and went back, and a number worked down the Filer-Bagac road being the Hill of the Plat. Div. along the Talisay F. The glat hiv then withdrew under pressure to the FIT on the slopes of Mt. Sammi. In the face of these attacks and withdrawal by the night of Apr. 4 the line existed with a large salient in SS-D and units were located as follows: 4 jaki. Inf on extreme left attribution in 1829, a large Jap on its 18 m for prov. All meeting the trip A AC Ba and the PATC. The list inf OS had been ordered from its bivous area to Jot of tra #2 & #10 on April 4 and was in that area that night.

On April 5 the enery moved down tr #6 and across the face of Sanat and by night they had control of trail #64 to the CF of the 21st hix, and were working up the E slope of Mt. Samat. The extent of the pencity of the "Te" was not known exactly and a counter at the pencity of the 45th Inf (EE) up Trail #29 with tank support and the 21st Inf (EE) up satisfied #4, thence up #64 to #44 - then up #4 to reinforce and establish the line. Before this could be accomplished in April 6 remaints of the 21st hix case thru the 31st Inf pos. and heavy fire was received from the enemy on Mt. Samat, Heavy pressure on the front and left of the 31st Inf forced its withdrawll to the S. bank of the San Vicente by nightling for the 6th. The enemy also forced his way up trails #6 #44 in April 6, the lat Inn 57th having been order to 1st #8 #44 to be at disposal of Gen. Lough. Before the 57th Bn could reach Gen Lough, however, his H was cut off by the enemy on Trail R and the Bn of the 52th was forced to take up a defensive position behind the San Vicente R. at the 1st #M & 46f. The tank support of the 45th Inf arrived late and that unit was forced on trail #29 and into the I Corps sector.

Thus by nightfall of April 6th situation was almost hopeless. On the extreme left the 4th Inf counter offensive up to #29 was nipped and it, with Gen Lough's Hig, was cut off from IL Corns. The "Js" had routed the 41st Div and followed it up trails #6 6844 where the 1st Bn 57th encountered the enemy and held them N. of the San Vicente at Trail Jcts #6 2 #46. On the San Vicente a large gap existed and then the 11st Inf (US) had gone into pos. connecting with the 51st CT of Gen Bluese) on its right flank. Our art'y had been overwhelmed and silenced and the 41st FA guns had all been captured.

On April 7 and attempt was made to organize a defensive line along the Patce trial (#46) with 201st and 202d Engrs filling the gap between the 57th (2d Bm.; in pos. with 1st Bm night of April 6) and 31st Inf (US) and SS-C units, The 26th Car and 14th Energ also moved up, the 26th at edc. #26 #10 being turned over to Gen. Elumel & the Energy, to Col. #11ly who was with the 27th Inf CF and its 3d En. attached to SS-C and Gen Elumen; I me "Use" followed up their aggressive move of the 6th and not only out trail #46 but staged a separate attack in the 32d Inf area in the right half of SS-C forcing the withdrawal of the 1st Cf, along with the 31st [US] to the 3 bank of the San Yicento and extend a line with the 31st [US] to the 3 bank of the San Yicento and extend a line with the 31st [US] but for a bank of the San Yicento and extend a line with the 31st [US] to the 3 bank of the San Yicento and extend a line with the 31st [US] to the 3 bank of the San Yicento and extend a line with the 31st [US] and the yield a superior of the San Yicento and the San Yicento and

April 8th found the line hold behind the Alangan E. in a contrued state due to hearly retreat and safetien routes of withdrawal. It was obvious from the outset that this position was untenable, All 37 mm guns and automatic weapons had been lost, nearly all 155 mm, were of ammunitions, In addition the men were almost completely exhausted by the long marches and days without food, The 25th Gay, which had moved from \$2 & \*10 to \$2 & 406 covered the withdrawal of other units & then withdrawe to the above pos. Itself

It was intended that new position would be occupied with the 26th Cay, 57th Inf and 31st Inf in line & the 14th Pages in reserve, but due to a mistake in retiring between new and old trails #20 a scramble ensued and the line was established with the 26th Cay and 4th Pages, astride Trail #20, 31st & 77th to E of 01d #20 - a big gap to the 803t Pages, PAG, 31st Inf PA and the 4th PC, (the 4th PC and 303d Bages baying been brought buy during the night)

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

s/ Ruth H. Essary t/ RUTH H. ESSARY Captain WAC

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Authority N.J. 28308

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South Lazon Force - Bataan Force - II Philippine Gorps

Brief Outline of Activities Prior to and During War

Frier to the outbreak of howilities on mbout Sept 1 a SLF lip in skaleton form was created and frontioned briefly. This is consisted of Engle One, One Parker, 16. 'Ol. O Wilson, 16. Ool. H. D. Johnston, Gapt, Arthure Obrittenan and Capt. Homes Updow. Units to be included under this command wave not inducted until secondard later and the troops thus received practically no training before the war observed. Only few regiments the Mind & Sci Liffs, were inducted on Sept 2 and no others insafitately thereafter.

The classants of the command were drawn up as follows: Nov 1 - List & Sist Infe. sobilished and stured training, Nov. 21th hird a Sird Infe, hist F. A. and List & Sist Engrs. On Boc. 1 the List and Sint Mad. Bus. Signal Oos, Ng & Ng Coop, & ON Service Oo, so that on Boc & the state of the Sir was: List Div. complete Lose 2 Anti. Tank in Sist Div. complete Lose 1 Anti-Tank In & Sist F. A. and Lat & 28 F. G. (Inducted in Mid. Nov and assigned for training only) released at beginning of war.

What is the fast bys, were inducted and trained in S. Lucon what is the termina they did have and at the outbreak they were embt to bheir defensive positions on the beaches. The boundary between division running along a general kine thru Lemeny & Panclipt Rs. — Id. in lake Teal - Tagaytey and lase Pinns inclusive to the like Div. The rest of the constiline man defended by the Sim Div. with Hamilia sector uncoupled due to Loncition of the Twethicle Ide. On Dec. 39th the late Reg Div was emigned to the beaches between infente & Hamilia inclusive end was given the reced met in rear of its.

On about Dec. 12 the degenese Landed as Legacji after previously boshing Davac, legacy, it include Fidel, daythe and sections in the DF territory and started to move it commands the main part of Lamon by realt and by read, Units of the E2nd Int were sent 5 to meet them one Co. along the read and one Bn was split up - its elements being drawn and given different missions — to contact and delay the enemy as long as possible, destroy bridges and military equipment and impede the progress of the enemy as much as they were alle.

The Second Phase of SLF activities began on Dec 2h when the enemy Landed in force at Atimonan and Mauban. The units of the Sci sent S encountered many adventures of mur not covered here, some being out off and breaking thrushess making their way I to join their

organisation later. On the afternoon of Dec. 24 Gen Perker's Hq. was moved to Bataan and the Bataan Force consisting of the Jist Lix, Alth Lix, perts of the Phil Dix, Hg and other misc units. Gen Jones took commend of the SEF upon Gen Parker's departure (his biv. the Alth having reworked to the Bataan Force).

By the night of Dec 24th the "Ja" had enossed the Mts. at Atimonen to Melichay and at Meuben had reached the sig-sag at Sampaloc. The enemy from Atimonan advanced in successive states and by nightfall of the 25th were at Lucena, Tayabas, 26th Gendaleria, 27th Tiaong and on the night of 27-28 contact was broken in that area as the troops were ordered to Bataan. At Mauban the 1st Inf less 1 Bn retreated to positions on the Laguna-Tayabas boundary night of Dec. 25. Louisians 26th broke contact on the 27th and withdraw to Betaan via Pagsanjan, Sta. Cruz, Los Banos and Manila. One Bn at Tignauan remained there until the 28th with no contact and withdraw on the 28th. The regiments in the SLF were reshuffled on the night of the 27th and were shuttled into Bataan no contact being made with the enemy. By Dec 31st Gen. Jones and his Ho. had arrived at Planidel & contacted Gen. Wainwright. By order of USAFFE Gen Jones was put in command of remains of the 71st & 91st Divs. then at Baliung and stayed there to cover the withdrawal of the SIF thru them Dec 31st - Jan 1. By morning of the 1st those units and Gen Jones arrived in Betsan and the SLF cassed to a wist. (Note: Assetd to SLF prior to this date and moved to Tagaytey pos. was the Prov. Constab. Brigade. Three days were absorbed moving in and thru more out -no contact being made with the enemy.)

As part of the 3d Phase of the SLF the <u>Ratann Force</u> existed from Dec. 24-Jam 6 its function having been to organize the position in Betaen and assist in their occupancy.

by the sight of in 2-6 the last element of the HIP had withdrawn into Betann leaving the covering force at "eyes Jet. exposed to the energy. Organized from right to left in line the post conteined the <u>Tet Piri, 73st in Fig. 18</u>, and \$50 th Car. At \$800 A Jen 6 our cutly sighted the energy and began to register on them and at 9000 A, arely appeared on the read to be reinforced by other artly units soon thereafter and a firred artly dual ensued. The wise tale bombered portion of the 13st 1nd with superior fire and by mightful the <u>right of the 13st 1nd</u> with superior fire and by mightful the <u>right of the 13st 1nd</u> per of the 73st 10st had pulled at the Absorp position which several man or which are the single process of the 13st 1nd and the Absorp position with several the order was confusion. The 25th Car, not receiving the order was cut off and withdraw through the Max. One No of the (23d) F.A. was badly short up and lost all but one gum. The lat in of the 65th FA retreated in order saving all gums.

The Main Bathle Fostition proviously organized, was occupied orderedly by the IF fillippine units from right to left \$75h\$ infe, \$\frac{\text{Ast}}{\text{British}}\$ in the light \$\text{List}\$ is the left \$15h\$ infe, \$\frac{\text{List}}{\text{British}}\$ in the left \$1 \text{List}\$ in \$1 \text{List}\$ in the left \$1 \text{List}\$ in \$1 \text{List}\$ in

The withdrawal was accomplished with a considerable confusion during which aggressive action by "J" art'y, air corps and ground troops might have ended the war before the end of January. The position was occupied and divided into subsectors as follows from the beach near Linsy-North to Orion - to the Pantingan: SS-A under Col. Irwin - 31st Inf. PA. PA Air Corps Bn. and PA Training Cadro: SS-B - Col Doames - Prov. Rogt. U.S.A. Air Corps, SS-C-Gen Bluemol -Alst Inf (to March 1), 3lat Div. less 3lat & 33rd Infa. 5lat Comhat team, SS-D- Gen Lough - 21st Div. on Right - Alst Div. on left and 33rd Inf on extreme left flank prior to Mar. I after which it become Corps reserve and the 41st Inf went from SS-C to SS-D. The Philippine Division, part of which was to have occupied the front line was broken up as Corps and Army Reserve and was employed piecessal wherever necessity dictated. Its He continued to exist under Gen. Lough but never until the final futile effort was it brought together in any attempt at concerted effort.

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On April 5 the enemy moved down tr #6 and across the face of Samet and by night they had control of trail #64 to the CP of the 21st Div. and were working up the E slope of Mt. Samat. The extent of the penetration by the "Js" was not known exectly and a counter attack involving the 45th Inf (PS) up Trail #29 with tank support and the 31st Inf (US) up estrice \$44, thense up \$64 to \$44 - then up \$44 to reinforce and establish the line. Before this could be accomplished in April 6 rements of the 21st Div came thru the 31st Inf pos. and heavy fire was received from the enemy in Mt. Samat. Heavy pressure on the front and left of the <u>Slat Inf</u> forced its withdrawal to the S. bank of the San Vicente by nightfall of the 6th. The enemy also forced his may up trails #6 & #44 in April 6, the lat Bn 57th Inf having been order to Jet #8 & #44 to be at disposal of Gen. Lough. Before the 57th Bn could reach Gen Lough, however, his Hq was cut off by the enemy on Trail 8 and the Bn of the 57th was forced to take up a defensive position behind the San Vicente R. at the Jet #8 & #46. The tank support of the 45th Inf arrived late and that unit was forced S on trail #29 and into the I Corps sector.

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On April 7 an attempt use ande to organise a defensive like along the Tatoc trail (\$46) with Jolst and COR Engre filling the mp between the 57th (20 hm. in pes. with 1st hm night of April 6) and Sist inf(US) and SS-C units. The Meth Gry and 1th Hungs also moved up, the 26th at \$45. 22 \$470 being turned over to Gen. Bluesel 8 the Marra. to Gol Tilly who was with the 57th 1nf GP and its 3d hm. attached to SS-C and Gen Bluesel. The Jar followed up their aggressive move of the

5th and not only out trail \$\frac{\psi}{6}\$ but staged a separate attack in the 3cd Inf area in the right half of \$\frac{8}{-}\ellipset\$ foreign the withdrawal of the \$\frac{1}{2}\ellipset\$ to \$\frac{1}{2}\ellipset\$ being of the San Vicente and extend line with the \$\frac{3}{2}\ellipset\$ for \$\frac{1}{2}\ellipset\$ superior \$\frac{1}{2}\ellipset\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\ellipset\$ in \$\frac{1}{2}\ellipset\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\ell

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During the morning of the 8th Js boshed the line heavily and the 4th Ft and the 3ths in Ft pa Julied out. Ensay teaks 8 in followed up quickly down trail #20 and soon surrounded the position set that by the night of the 8th the untire line was untenable and further withdrawal become mecessary. Orders were confused as were the troops who scattered badly. The bulk of them scaeped down new #20 - others cross country. Col. 7311y, Col Bredy & Col. Saint of the 5Th inf Int inf & 4th himory respectively assayed to gather the following the scale of the

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s/ Ruth H. Essary t/ RUTH H. ESSARY Captain WAC

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