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1942

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

INDEX

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

23 November 1946

MEMO-00

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Records

TO : The Adjutant General  
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Attached hereto are (2) copies of Report of USAFFE and USFIP Operations in the Philippines 1941 - 1942 with Annexes I to XVIII inclusive, with the exception of Annex XI.
2. Annex XI, Operations of Visayan - Mindanao Force, is not attached because distribution of this Annex has been made previously. The distribution shown for Annex XI is one (1) copy to The Adjutant General, U.S. Army and one (1) copy to the Historical Division, U.S.A.F.

FOR ORIGINAL REPLY/NOTICE:

*John V. Buddy*  
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1st Lt., Col. George  
1st Lt. 424 223 2nd

2 Copies  
As stated above

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I. INTRODUCTION.

The data for the compilation of this report has been gathered from the following sources: Reports rendered by the separate force commanders after the war; official notes and extracts taken from the G-3 journals which were forwarded from the Philippines while the campaign was still in progress; notes made by officers while prisoners of war and events still fresh in their minds, and conferences of officers assembled at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, by War Department Orders to draw up the historical report of the Philippine Campaign.

This report is historically accurate. The main battle lines are shown, engagements and main phases of the Philippine Campaign recorded, i.e., the Beach Defense; the Withdrawal to Batuan; the Batuan Defense; the Defense of the Fortified Islands and the Defense of the Southern Islands by the Visayan-Mindanao Force.

The mission assigned to American Forces on Luzon, as laid down by the War Department for the Defense of the Philippine Islands, was to hold Manila, thus denying to the enemy the use of Manila Bay.

The immediate pre-war preparation for the Defense of the Philippines is included because of the fact that the efforts made to improve existing conditions during the months immediately preceding the inception of hostilities had an important bearing on the conduct of the actual battle campaign.

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The following table lists units and the annex which covers in

detail the operation of a particular unit.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ANNEX</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>THEATER OF</u> <u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DATE OF OPERATION</u>
11th Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 24, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Jan 24, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
21st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
31st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 14, 1941
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Jan 14, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 21, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 14, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
41st Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 22, 1941
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 23, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
51st Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	North Luzon Force	Jan 10, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
61st Division (PA)	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	XI	Visayan Mindanao Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
71st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 19, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Jan 6, 1942 to Jan 7, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
81st Division (PA)	XI	Visayan Mindanao Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
91st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 23, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942



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101st Division (PA)	XI	Vietnam-Indochina Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
1st Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 22, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense	Dec 27, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
3d Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 26, 1941 to Jan 1, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 20, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
Philippine Div (PW)	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 24, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	XII	Philippine Division	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
Armored Group	X	Armored Group	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
	IX	Operation 200th CA	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade 200th CA (AA) & 819th CA (AA)	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
36th Cavalry (PW)	V	Bataan Defense Force	Jan 6, 1942 to Jan 6, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 9, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Apr 6, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Apr 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 23, 1941
36th Field Artillery (PW)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 23, 1941
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 26, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 27, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 26, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
301st Field Artillery (PA)	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 24, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
Provisional Air Corps Regiment (Infantry)	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942

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Provisional Battalion (274) Tm	IX	North Luzon Force	Dec 15, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 22, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Jan 6, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 15, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
Philippine Coast Artillery Command & Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays	VIII	PCAC & Harbor Defense of Manila & Subic Bays	Dec 8, 1941 to May 6, 1942
4th U.S. Marine	VIII	PCAC	Dec 24, 1941 to May 6, 1942
Philippine Army Air Corps	VIII	PCAC	Dec 25, 1941 to May 6, 1942
	IV	North Luzon Force	Jan 26, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
26, 17th, 54th Par. Bn., 2nd Inf Command (Infantry Troops)	IV	I Corps	Jan 26, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942

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## II. THE-3RD PREPARATION.

### A. COMBINED STAFF USAFFE.

On July 26, 1943, General Douglas MacArthur, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, retired, and on duty in the Philippine Islands as Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, was appointed by the President of the United States as Commanding General of all United States Army Forces in the Far East, and authorized to mobilize the Philippine Army.

General MacArthur began at once the task of forming a staff. Under his command were several officers of the United States Army who had been detailed on special duty, as assistants to aid in the training of the Philippine Army. These officers were used to form the nucleus of the USAFFE Staff. Additional officers, who were on duty with Philippine Scout units and familiar with conditions in the Philippines and with Filipino personnel, were selected and asked for by name early in August to complete a small but highly efficient staff.

The Headquarters staff, Philippine Department, was left intact.

A tremendous task confronted General MacArthur and his newly formed staff. Available housing facilities would not house more than one-third of the strength of the reserve Philippine Army divisions. Suitable cantonment areas had to be selected and housing facilities constructed for each of the ten reserve divisions before mobilization could be completed. War plans and training schedules had to be completed. Supply requirements studied and plans completed for securing and storing supplies. The small staff worked practically day and night.

For the USAFFE STAFF (See Annex 1)

### B. COMBAT AND STAFF HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT

The Headquarters Philippine Department continued its normal function, and in addition was given the mission of drawing up the training schedule for the Philippine Army, to conduct the training of the Philippine Army and to establish supply depots in areas closer to each mobilization district than Manila. The Quartermaster, Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Officers worked in a dual capacity, as special staff officers USAFFE Headquarters and special staff officers Headquarters Philippine Department. Upon the movement to Davao the Headquarters Philippine Department staff became the Service Command Staff and, initially, in addition to its normal duties of service command functions, was given the responsibility of the beach defense of the southern portion of Luzon. For list of Headquarters Philippine Department (See Annex III).

### C. SCHOOLS

Upon the beginning of Mobilization of the Philippine Army, schools were established in order to give concentrated training to selected key enlisted personnel and to officers of all units of the Philippine Army. The mission of the schools was to train the Philippine Army officers in the functions of command and in the training of their units, and the key enlisted personnel in the functions of supply, mess, administration and combat training of units. This would materially aid in the training of the Philippine Army units when mobilization was completed. The schools were conducted by American officers detailed for this specific duty. The following schools were established:

1. The Command and Staff School, Dagupan, Luzon. The students at this school were a few American Colonels, who had been selected to

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take command of Philippine Army Divisions; Division Commanders of the Philippine Army, and selected key staff officers of the Philippine Army Divisions. The purpose of the school was to train officers in command and staff procedure of higher units. The school was under the supervision of USAFFE Headquarters.

2. Schools for training infantry cadres were established in each division mobilization district. American officers were detailed as instructors with specially selected enlisted personnel from American and Philippine Scout units detailed as assistant instructors. The students at these schools were officers of the Philippine Army and key enlisted personnel of the companies of an infantry division. This cadre included regimental staffs, battalion staffs, company commanders and platoon lieutenants. The enlisted cadre consisted of first sergeants, mess sergeants, supply sergeants, platoon sergeants, cooks, runners, and company clerks. All were required to take basic infantry training in addition to their specialties. The officers and platoon sergeants were given training in combat principles. Along with their basic infantry training, each student was specialized in the particular function according to his assignment in the Philippine Army.

3. The engineer schools were established to train the engineer officers and selected enlisted personnel of the engineer battalions of the Philippine Army Divisions, similar to the cadres shown in paragraph 2 above. These schools were conducted similar to the infantry school, except in addition to combat infantry training the cadres were also trained in all engineer functions pertaining to combat engineers. Engineer officers and selected enlisted personnel were detailed as instructors from the engineer regiment (20) of the Philippine Division. (1st Engineer Battalion, 20).

4. A signal school and a medical school were established at

Fort William McKinley, under the supervision of the commanding general,  
Fort William McKinley.

a. All officers and key enlisted men assigned to the signal companies and to the signal section of all units of the Philippine Army Divisions, with the exception of the communications details of the Field Artillery and Coast Artillery Units, who were to train at the artillery schools, were selected to attend the signal school. Officers and enlisted personnel, selected from signal units or communication sections of American and Philippine Scout units were detailed as instructors.

b. Officers and key enlisted personnel of the medical battalions and medical detachments of the infantry regiments of the Philippine Army Divisions were ordered to the Medical school. Instructors were detailed from the American and Philippine Scout medical units.

5. Another medical school was established at Camp Murphy with Major Jack W. Schwartz, MC, USA, as commandant. Selected American Medical officers were detailed in addition to their regular duties to give specific lectures on various phases of medical field training. Specially qualified medical enlisted personnel were detailed to assist the commandant of the school. The purpose of this school was to train officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army, who were not assigned to divisional units, in the establishment of field hospitals, medical supply functions and medical administrative matters in performance of duty under field conditions in war time.

6. A Quartermaster Motor Transport School was established in the Fort Area under the supervision of Brigadier General George Parker.

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USA, with Major Michael A. Quinn, GSC, as senior instructor. The cadets selected to attend the school were officers and key enlisted personnel assigned to the Quartermaster Transportation Units of the Philippine Army. The purpose of the school was to train officers and enlisted men in convoy duty, passenger car and truck driving, and the responsibilities of first, second, third and fourth echelon maintenance functions. In addition, the cadets were given the basic training of a soldier.

7. Coast Artillery Schools were established at Fort Mills and Fort Wint. Available space and housing necessitated the establishment of two schools. The student body consisted of officers and key enlisted personnel of the Coast Artillery, Philippine Army. Four hundred twenty-eight students attended the school at Fort Mills and three hundred and sixty-five attended the school at Fort Wint. At Fort Mills, the cadets were divided between the 91st and 90th Coast Artillery Regiments for supervision and training. The training at Fort Wint was under Colonel Napoleon Boudreau, CAS, and his American staff. The training consisted of all phases of the school of the soldier and of coast defense artillery.

8. The Philippine Army had established a field artillery training center at Camp Dan, Jampaga, near Fort Diocesanburg where all trainees assigned to the field artillery were sent for five and one-half months training. Headquarters USAFFE after considering and checking available quarters and training facilities decided to continue the use of Camp Dan as an exclusive training center for field artillery. One of the deciding factors in this decision was the availability of the Fort Diocesanburg field artillery ranges and the personnel and material of the Philippine Scout Field Artillery units.

The following field artillery personnel of the ten Philippine Army Reserve Divisions were ordered mobilized 1 September 1961, inducted into United States service and moved to Camp Dan for field artillery instruction:

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All officers

All non-commissioned officers

All clerks

All cooks

Complete signal communication units of all the field artillery units.

The training was under the supervision of the Commanding General, Fort Stotsenburg. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Hiroch, FA, who had formerly been on duty at the Philippine Army Training Center at Camp Iba, was designated commandant and senior instructor. American Field Artillery officers, Philippine Scout non-commissioned officers and key Philippine Scout enlisted men at Fort Stotsenburg were made available for full or part time duty as instructors. Units of the Philippine Scout Artillery, complete with personnel, material and equipment, were made available for tactical training and practice range firing.

#### D. CADRE TRAINING

The cadres as outlined in paragraph C, (schools) above began reporting to mobilization induction areas September 1, 1941. After induction they were immediately dispatched to the specific school according to the school schedules. The cadres were being trained as fast as could possibly be done under the tremendous difficulties imposed by the following factors; language difficulties (in one division eleven different dialects were spoken) far too few instructors; lack of proper housing conditions and canteen areas, necessitating the shifting of troops; lack of equipment to train personnel; difficulties of travel for cadres to reach mobilization and induction areas which meant a great deal at this time, as each day lost was a large handicap at the schools. On the outbreak of the war December 8, 1941, the cadre schools were closed and steps were taken to have all cadres rejoin their organizations. This was accomplished with few exceptions. The artillery cadres of the artillery units assigned to the Visayas-Mindanao



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Force could not be sent back to their units.

C. UNIT TRAINING

1. Coast Artillery Units, Philippine Army, had received no unit training and were organized into regiments after the outbreak of war. (See Annex X, Report of Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays)
2. The Field Artillery Units, Philippine Army, had not been mobilized at the outbreak of war and school cadres from each unit were still undergoing instruction at Camp Don. Personnel belonging to reserve field artillery units had been ordered after the outbreak of hostilities, 8 December, to report immediately to their mobilization districts for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States. The 301st Field Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army, was formed after the outbreak of war from two groups of volunteer Filipinos, five hundred in the first group and two hundred in the second, and equipped with sixteen 155mm World War I, wooden wheel, slow speed guns and two 155mm howitzers, same type. (The only howitzers in the Philippines)
3. School cadres from each of the Infantry Regiments, Philippine Army, had not completed the cadre school course of instruction. One regiment per reserve division inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States 1 September had completed basic training of the soldier and had started combat training of smaller units, when war began. The second infantry regiments inducted on or about 15 November had not completed basic training and had not started any combat training for even smaller units. Personnel belonging to the third regiments had been ordered after the outbreak of war to report to mobilization districts for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States.
4. School cadres from the Divisional service units and communication companies of infantry regiments had not completed cadre schools, and had received no organizational training.

### III. ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR DEFENSE.

#### A. INITIAL MISSION

The initial mission assigned to all force commanders, harbor defense commander and to USAFFE reserve units was to repel any enemy landing attempt, but if the landing was successful then to defeat the enemy at the beach by attacking and destroying the landing force.

#### B. THE DEFENSE AREAS

The following forces were organized:

The North Luzon Force, organized November 5, 1941

The South Luzon Force, organized November 5, 1941

The Visayan-Mindanao Force, organized November 5, 1941

The Philippine Coast Artillery Command, organized in August 1941

The USAFFE Reserve

1. Sector assigned to the Commanding General, North Luzon Force: the area north of the general line - Setaan Peninsula (inclusive) Lubao (inclusive) - San Fernando (inclusive) - Marikina (inclusive) - Manila Bay (exclusive) - Infante (exclusive). (See map)

2. Sector assigned to the Commanding General, South Luzon Force: the area bounded on the north by the general line - Puranque - Pasig - Mandalay - Infante, (all inclusive) and bounded on the south by the general line - Igonoc - Mindoro - Santa Rosa, Mindoro - Pinagabangan, Mindoro (all inclusive) - Bungeo, Mindoro (inclusive) - Mridinaga Island (inclusive) - Surias Island (inclusive) - Tison Island (exclusive) - Samar Island (exclusive). (See map)

3. Sector assigned to the Commanding General, Visayan-Mindanao Force: the area of Philippine Islands south of the general line - Igonoc, Mindoro - Santa Rosa, Mindoro - Pinagabangan, Mindoro (all exclusive) - Bungeo, Mindoro (exclusive) - Mridinaga Island (exclusive) - Surias Island (exclusive) - Tison Island (inclusive) - Samar Island (inclusive). (See map)

4. The Philippine Coast Artillery Command, with Headquarters in

Manila was assigned the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays. The MACM was given the mission of protecting the Philippine Island Group. Its main mission was to protect the entrance of Manila Bay and to deny the use of Manila and Subic Bays to the enemy.

5. The area assigned for use of the USAFFE Reserve was the Pangasinan Valley south of San Fernando to include the city of Manila and Fort William McKinley.

C. ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS OF THE DEFENSE AREA

1. The following organizations were assigned to the Northern Luzon Force under the command of Major General J. M. Wainwright, AUSA:  
 11th Division, MA - Brigadier General H. E. Hrougher, AUSA, Commanding.  
 21st Division, MA - Brigadier General Walter Cepicpis, MA, Commanding.  
 31st Division, PA - Brigadier General Clifford Blumel, AUSA, Commanding.  
 26th Cavalry, 28, Colonel Gideon A. Pierce, AUSA, Commanding.  
 23d Field Artillery (28), Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Lindsay, Commanding.  
 66th Pack Troop, Quartermaster Corps (28), Captain V. F. Sayre, Commanding.  
 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Lathrop, USA, Commanding.

2. The following organizations were assigned to the Southern Luzon Force under the command of Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr., AUSA:

41st Division, MA, Brigadier General Vincente Lim, PA, Commanding.  
 51st Division, PA, Brigadier General A. M. Jones, AUSA, Commanding.

3. The following organizations were an integral part of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays under the Command of Brigadier General George F. Moore, AUSA, and were assigned to the Philippine Coast Artillery Command:

59th Coast Artillery (28) Colonel Paul D. Eubank, Commanding.  
 60th Coast Artillery (AA)(28) Colonel Theodore M. Chase, Commanding.  
 91st Coast Artillery (28) Colonel Joseph P. Ehn, Commanding.

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USA Coast Artillery (US) Colonel Napoleon Soutres, Commanding.  
1st and 2d Regiments Coast Artillery, Philippine Army (organized at outbreak of war).

Harbor Defense Headquarters.

Military Police, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Chemical Warfare, and Engineer Detachments, and Army Mine Planter Service.

100th Coast Artillery, Army of the United States, Colonel Gordon Sage, Commanding, with headquarters at Fort Stotsenburg. Not an integral part of Harbor Defense but assigned to FMAC.

4. The organizations held directly under control of USAFFE:

Philippine Division (less 3d Battalion, 48th Infantry) Brigadier General James S. Lough, Commanding, located in vicinity of Fort William McKinley and Manila.

11st Division, PA, Brigadier General Clyde A. Collich, AUS, Commanding, located in vicinity of Urdaneta.

51st Division, PA, Brigadier General Luther E. Stevens, AUS, Commanding, located in vicinity of Cebu.

USAFFE Air Force, Major General Louis H. Brereton, AUS, Commanding with Headquarters at Nielson Field, Manila, Philippine Islands.

Headquarters Philippine Department, Brigadier General Allan C. McBride, U. S. Army, Commanding, located in Fort Santiago, Philippine Islands.

8th Field Artillery in direct support of North Luzon Force and South Luzon Force.

Headquarters Philippine Army, located in Manila.

5. The following organizations were assigned to the Visayan-Mindanao Force under the command of Brigadier General William F. Sharp, AUS:

61st Division, Philippine Army, Brigadier General Bradford A.

Cuyunoth, AR, Commanding.

81st Division, 7th Brigadier General Guy C. Fort, Philippine Army, Commanding.

101st Division, 2nd Brigadier General Joseph F. Vachon, AR, Commanding.

D. COORDINATION WITH NAVY

Closest cooperation and coordination was maintained with the 16th Naval District and the Asiatic Fleet. The 16th Naval District planned and completed a number of operations: (1) Drydock Dewey moved from Ciangape to Mariveles, and an anti-submarine net installed across entrance to Mariveles Harbor (2) Contact mine fields laid in accordance with plans approved by Navy and War Department, so as to tie in with the Harbor Defense controlled mines. This completely closed the entrance to Manila Bay. (3) Radio intercept tunnel completed and equipped on Corregidor. (4) Naval Headquarters installations prepared on Corregidor (5) Torpedo Deposition Depot established on Corregidor.

Plans were drawn up, Army and Navy cooperating for defense of the Philippine Islands. Close coordination was maintained between inshore patrol (Army) and offshore patrol (Navy).

Naval Liaison Signal Detail was placed on duty with Headquarters Philippine Department, to maintain close contact with the Air Warning Service set up by Headquarters Philippine Department.

Frequent visits were made by both Army and Navy Staff Officers to each Headquarters to iron out difficulties in order to insure very close cooperation in the formation of a smooth functioning joint plan that would immediately go into effect upon any emergency.

The Navy Radio Intercept Station was functioning at Corregidor and was keeping in close touch with the Harbor Defense Commander and his staff at Corregidor. In fact this station intercepted a radio message at 3:40 AM 8 December 1941 stating that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and immediately notified Brigadier General George F. Moore, Commanding General of the PCMC and Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays.

IV. Mobilization Status on 8 December 1941.

A. PERSONNEL

Congress, the latter part of January, 1941, authorized an increase of six thousand enlisted men for the Philippine Scouts. This increase doubled the strength of the Scouts, but by 8 December approximately two thousand three hundred of the older and well trained scouts, mostly non-commissioned officers, had been attached to the various units of the Philippine Army as instructors, and remained with these units throughout the entire campaign.

The Philippine Army Air Corps and only one infantry regiment and school cadres from the other regiments and divisional units of the ten Philippine Army reserve divisions had been inducted into the service of the United States on 1 September 1941. The mobilization of the second infantry regiment of each of the divisions and the induction of these units into the Armed Forces of the United States had been initiated on 1 November.

The mobilization of the division headquarters and service elements of the Philippine Army divisions and the induction of these units into the Armed Forces of the United States had been completed by about 20 November.

The mobilization of the third infantry regiment, and the artillery regiments of each division and the induction of these units into the Armed Forces of the United States was completed after the outbreak of hostilities.

Because of the difficulties of travel and communications, it generally took a period of from several days to two weeks for the personnel to arrive at the mobilization centers.

The Philippine Army division as planned would have consisted of the following:

Three (3) Infantry regiments (approximately 1,400 each)	4,200
One (1) Artillery regiment	1,000
One (1) Anti-tank battalion	600
One (1) Engineer battalion	600
One (1) Medical battalion	500
One (1) Quartermaster battalion	500
Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company,	
Signal Company, Ordnance Company (I.M.), Motor	
Transportation Company	500
Total	8,200

However, because of the sudden outbreak of war, there was not a single division that had all of its units. The anti-tank battalion was never organized because no equipment was available. The 61st, 61st and 101st Divisions because of lack of equipment organized the artillery units as infantry battalions. The 31st Division for the same reason organized one of its artillery battalions as infantry. The 21st Division, 71st Division and the 51st Division had only two battalions of artillery. The 11th Division and 41st Division had three (3) battalions of artillery assigned.

### 3. TRAINING

At the outbreak of war there was not a single division of the Philippine Army complete with its personnel and equipment.

The American officers who were detailed on duty with the Philippine Army were as a group assigned as advisors and instructors. Only in a few exceptions were American officers actually assigned as commanders of Philippine Army units.

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1. The Coast Artillery Troop, undergoing instruction at Fort Milla, had been organized at the outbreak of war into the First Coast Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army. Headquarters Battery and Batteries A, B, C and D constituted, with Headquarters Battery assigned twenty-eight men and the lettered gun batteries one hundred men each. The Troop at Fort Milla had been organized into an identical regiment, designated as the Second Coast Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army, with twenty-five men in Headquarters Battery and eighty-five men each in Batteries A, B, C and D. Both these units were commanded by native Filipino officers.

By 8 December, instruction at the cadre schools, unit training of the smaller organizations of the mobilized infantry regiments and the training of service elements had been progressing satisfactorily. However, not even the mobilized infantry regiments had received any regimental training. Not one of the ten reserve divisions had been completely mobilized, therefore had not received any training in divisional maneuvers. Personnel belonging to units not yet mobilized continued to report to their mobilization centers for about two weeks after the conflict started. Some of the personnel reporting to mobilization areas in the Cagayan Valley, North Luzon, had been cut off and unable to join their units. The 71st and 91st divisions never received their third infantry regiments. These two infantry regiments, because of the shortage of water transportation had to be left in the southern islands, and were assigned to the commander of the Visayas-Mindanao Force. The entire artillery units of the 61st and 81st divisions had to be converted to infantry for the same reason. The 11th Division Artillery did not join the division until after the division had occupied a position on Cebu-Davao line.

The Philippine Army Air Corps, completely mobilized, had been satisfactorily training under USAFFE supervision, even though training had been conducted with an obsolete low speed (maximum 150 miles per hour).



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biplane type fighter plane, which in combat was no match for the new high speed fighter plane in use at that time in all modern armies.

The divisions at the outbreak of war had been in the process of mobilization and only the smaller units had started organizational training. Force commanders had started the movement, in accordance with approved plans, of mobilized units to their respective defensive sectors. Details of this phase covered by the reports of Force Commanders attached hereto as annexes.

2. The preceding paragraphs on the pre-war training and mobilization states on 8 December has covered the training and induction of the Philippine Army. To complete the picture it is necessary to include the training of the regular American and Philippine Scout organizations. The training of these units had continued at a stepped up pace. The strength of the Philippine Scouts had been doubled by act of Congress the latter part of January, 1941. This necessitated an intensive recruiting campaign, as only the best of the Filipino applicants had been selected for enlistment. The Scout organizations had a high morale and were proud of their record and up to this time had maintained their strength of six thousand by a priority list, it had been considered and deemed a very high honor to any Filipino to be selected for enlistment in any of the scout organizations.

It had been necessary with the increased strength to reorganize all scout units. Tables of organization had been drawn up similar to the new T/O's under which the United States Troops in the states were being organized, but due to the strength of scout units, organizations could be formed at only two-thirds T/O strength. A request had been forwarded to the War Department for approval of special T/O's for all scout organizations.

The 26th Cavalry (PS) with its proportionate strength increase consisted of eight hundred and eighty-nine men, however with the furnishing of cadre instructors to the Philippine Army, it had an actual combat strength

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of six hundred and eighty-two men as compared to a modern cavalry regiment of twelve hundred fifty-one men.

The Philippine Scout infantry regiments had a strength of two thousand two hundred men, however after furnishing cadre instructors to the Philippine Army, actual combat strength dropped to between seventeen hundred and eighteen hundred men.

The Philippine Scout Engineer regiment in process of reorganization when the war broke had been reduced to an engineer battalion. The surplus personnel had furnished most of the cadre for the medical detachments of the infantry scout regiments.

The increase allotted to the field artillery enabled a reorganization into a provisional field artillery brigade as follows:

23d Field Artillery, FG, from one pack battery into a three battery battalion with a small headquarters detachment. Approximate strength: 300.

24th Field Artillery, FG, remained a regiment of two three battery battalions, but Headquarters Battery had been transferred complete as Provisional Brigade Headquarters Battery. Approximate strength: 700.

58th Field Artillery, FG, activated as a light regiment of two three battery battalions without a regimental headquarters battery. Approximate strength: 500.

64th Field Artillery, FG, activated as a separate 155mm gun battalion, two batteries and a battalion headquarters battery. Approximate strength: 300.

Provisional Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Approximate strength: 150.

The trained and experienced men of the 23d and 24th Field Artillery regiments had been allotted proportionately to all the brigade units, and likewise the new recruits had been allotted to each unit. Thus, each unit

of the brigade had a framework of well trained men for key positions and experienced non-commissioned officers.

The Coast Artillery regiments had received their proportional share of the increase. For details see Annex VIII attached hereto.

The service elements also received their proportional increase.

The training of the Philippine Scout Organizations had been intensified in order to bring the state of training of the newly enlisted recruits up to standard. A large number of reserve officers, mostly in junior grades, reported from the United States and were assigned to scout units. Most of these young officers commanded scout units throughout the campaign as a majority of the older officers were assigned as instructors for the Philippine Army, to the staffs of larger units, to Force Commands and to USAFFE Headquarters.

The 11st (US) Infantry (America) had been authorized an increase in strength and just prior to the war had received about three hundred recruits, bringing its strength to approximately eighteen hundred men. After furnishing instructing cadres for the Philippine Army, its actual strength present with the organization at the outbreak of war was approximately fourteen hundred.

The Air Corps was undergoing rapid expansion. Training had been intensified and new fields were being prepared. However, funds for the construction of new fields had not been appropriated until September 1941, therefore new fields in process of construction were unserviceable when war started. The Air Corps was at a distinct disadvantage by having only three fields, Clark, Nichols and DelMonte, available for use of bombardment squadrons, which meant no dispersion for the bombardment units. The parent squadrons on Luzon could use Nichols, Clark, and Iba. The Philippine Army Air Corps could use numerous small fields because of their low speed planes.

For details on the Amvored Group as to its strength and state of training, see Annex I attached to this report.

For details on the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) as to its strength and state of training see Annex IX attached to this report.

The American and Philippine Scout organizations were fit, and trained in combat principles and ready to take the field in any emergency.

#### C. SMOGLY

The D-4 section, USARAF Headquarters, had been initially set up with two officers and a small clerical force, an entirely inadequate staff to conduct the business of a newly organized Army Headquarters. But even the formation of this staff nucleus, as well as that of the several other sections of headquarters, had placed a tremendous strain on the units from which such personnel had necessarily been drawn.

Fortunately, this small staff was highly trained, regular army personnel, of considerable experience in Philippine Island operations and with reasonable knowledge of the methods of procedure of the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff. Much of the lost action and uncertainty that otherwise might have been expected had been accordingly eliminated. Close and constant contact with the civil government, the Philippine Army, civilian agencies and combat troops and services had been rapidly established, and business therewith smoothly and promptly dispatched.

Speed in planning and operations had been most essential in order to keep ahead of mobilization. There were two main requirements; current operations and long-range planning to utilize all available resources in the Philippine Islands, as well as those that could be made available by the home nation, which had a multitude of other problems to be reconciled with local needs. A strain had been placed upon the small section by the initial and justifiable centralization of policies, pending the working out and delegation of responsibilities to the staff sections.

Another officer had been about to the 0-3 section in early November, which eventually lightened the load being carried by the section. Drill lanes, with the loosening of additional personnel on the last transport from the station, the effect had been further suggested by officer and enlisted personnel.

The agreement covering of facilities between the newly established 0407th and the Intelligence Department Headquarters had been coordinated by placing policy making in the hands of the former and operation, with certain restrictions, in the hands of the latter.

8 December 1942 witnessed a sudden transition in method of procedure. Instructors piece-time performance and recording had been classified; characteristics speedily adopted; property occasionally abandoned and freedom of expenditure authorized.

Special shortages of needed supplies with which to conduct a campaign in location extended. The scores of transporters and freighters scheduled to arrive in the next month had to be diverted elsewhere. Only stocks actually on hand, military and commercial, were available from this date forward.

All conceivable items of a commercial nature had been quickly purchased or largely confiscated, certain exceptions being granted for the preservation of life and comfort of highly essential business among the civilian population.

The decision to move to Britain speeded up the requisitioning of supplies and their shipment by vessel, barge, rail and truck to that point; the destruction of all non-transportable supplies that would be of value to the enemy; the utilization to the fullest of the means available transportation in absolute operation to transfer troops and supplies and the final destruction of communication systems in the face of the enemy.

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Upon the transfer of USAPV Headquarters to Corregidor, an advance echelon remained in Manila and later assumed a similar function in Batan.

As supplies rapidly diminished, greater ingenuity had to be exercised to pursue every possible source of replacement. Some insignificant quantities of food had been obtained from adjacent islands before the tight embargo placed by enemy land, naval, and air operations had completely dried up even these meagre sources.

Constant touch by radio had been maintained with Australia, China, Hawaii and the War Department in order to exploit every possible source, but distance and enemy embargo nullified all such effort.

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V. CONTENTS OF THIS CAMPAIGN.

Only the orders issued by the Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and United States Forces in the Philippines that vitally effected the campaign are included herein. All details of the campaign are covered in full by the reports of force commanders and corps commanders and are attached hereto as annexes.

Details covered by annexes:

The beach defense period, 8 December to 23 December 1941 annex IV, operations of the North Luzon Force; Annex V, operations of the South Luzon Force and Annex X, operations of the Armored Force.

The period 24 December 1941 to 6 January 1942, the withdrawal to Bataan, annexes IV, V, IX, X and XII. These are the operations reports of the North Luzon Force, the South Luzon Force, the 200th Coast Artillery (AA), the Armored Force and the Philippine Division respectively.

The Bataan Defense, 6 January to 9 April 1942, annex IV, the operation of the I Philippine Corps which defended the western half of the Bataan Peninsula; annex V, the operation of the II Philippine Corps, which defended the eastern half of the Bataan Peninsula, and annex VI, operations of the Luzon Force, which was the higher headquarters charged with the defense of Bataan Peninsula from 11 March 1941.

Annex XIII, the operation report of the Philippine Division, 8 December 1941 to 9 April 1942 includes the complete operation of the division in all phases of the Philippine campaign.

The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, Annex VIII, 8 December 1941 to 7 May 1942, includes the operation of the forces on Corregidor and the other Fortified Islands.

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Reports of the Signal, Quartermaster, Medical and Finance activities as submitted by special staff officers of the United States Forces in the Far East and United States Forces in the Philippines are also attached hereto as annexes.

The Philippine campaign has been divided into the following sub-heads:

- A. Preliminary steps immediately preceding war
- B. Beach Defense
- C. Withdrawal into Bataan
- D. Bataan Defense
- E. Corregidor Defense
- F. Visayas-Mindanao Force

In order to maintain chronological sequence these sub-heads appear in the above order.

**A. PRELIMINARY STEPS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING WAR**

The first tactical command established by USAFFE Headquarters was the Philippine Coast Artillery Command (PCAC). USAFFE received authorization from the War Department to establish this command in August 1941, and immediately issued orders setting up the command with Headquarters in Manila under the command of Brigadier General George F. Moore, AGC.

The command was assigned the mission of the defense of Manila and Subic Bay Harbors. On September 1941, the 260th Coast Artillery (AA) New Mexico National Guard assigned to the PCAC.

Major General George Grunert, U.S.A., relieved from command of the Philippine Department 30 October 1941 and departed from the Philippine Islands for the United States.



On 1 November 1941 General MacArthur assumed command of the Headquarters Philippine Department and appointed Colonel Allan C. McBride as Chief of Staff.

On 5 November 1941 USAFFE Headquarters organized the following tactical commands:

1. The North Luzon Force
2. The South Luzon Force
3. The Visayan-Mindanao Force

Officers appointed to command these tactical units:

North Luzon Force, Major General Edwin F. King, Jr., U.S.A., who conducted the training and command functions from Fort Stotsenburg. Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, AGH, assumed command on 28 November 1941.

South Luzon Force, Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr., AGH.

Visayan-Mindanao Force, Colonel William F. Sharp, U.S.A.

The units, mission and areas of defense assigned to each force stated in general in paragraph III Organization of the Philippine Islands for Defense, and in detail in Annexes IV, V, and VI.

26 November 1941 the Commanding General North Luzon Force, Commanding General South Luzon Force, the Commanding General Philippine Coast Artillery Command, the Commanding Officer of the Visayan-Mindanao Force and commanders of units directly under USAFFE control were notified that diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating rapidly and that troops would be alerted and prepared to meet any surprise attack. General MacArthur talked to General Wainwright, who was commanding the Philippine Division with headquarters at Fort William McKinley, by telephone and instructed him to turn over the command of the Philippine Division as rapidly as possible to Brigadier General Shum B. Lough, and to assume command of the North Luzon Force at once.

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A copy of this evening message was transmitted to the Navy Headquarters.

Again late in the evening of 28 November 1941 USAFFE notified all force commanders and commanders of units directly under USAFFE control that negotiations with Japan were breaking down and that such measures as they saw fit to insure the readiness of their respective commands to meet any eventuality would be taken immediately.

All unit commanders responded at once to this alert order.

See reports of the various force commanders attached hereto as annexes.

From 29 November to 8 December 1941, all Forces and units were engaged in intensive training and preparations for any eventuality, or emergency, and were as ready for war as was possible with the means available.

The first information USAFFE had that hostilities had commenced was about 3:00 AM, 8 December 1941, when an associated press newsmen telephoned Major LeGrande Miller, Aide to General MacArthur, reporting to him that he had picked up an AP news flash which stated that Pearl Harbor had been bombed and that hostilities had commenced between the United States and Japan. Major Miller immediately called Brigadier General Rutherford, Chief of Staff, USAFFE, informing him of the message.

General Rutherford instructed Major Miller and Major James V. Collier, Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, USAFFE, to call all members of the General Staff Sections and to direct them to report to headquarters immediately to be prepared to notify all force commanders as soon as USAFFE could get verification from the War Department of this associated press report.

Verification that a state of hostilities existed came in by an official message from the War Department at 3:30 AM.

Immediately upon receipt of this message from the War Department, force commanders, all units directly under USAFFE, and the Navy were sent the following notification: "Hostilities has commenced by an air attack on Pearl Harbor and a state of war exists between the United States of America and the Japanese Empire."

### 2. BEACH DEFENSE

Beach defense plans had been prepared by Force Commanders and approved by USAFFE prior to the commencement of hostilities. Force Commanders had assigned sectors of defense to subordinates and available troops had occupied defensive positions since 29 November 1941.

#### 8 December 1941.

Headquarters Far East Air Force ordered a heavy bombardment attack on air fields and air installations on Peleiu. The attack formation, scheduled to take off at 2:00 PM, was prevented from carrying out the mission by a heavy Japanese bombing and strafing attack on Clark Field.

Magie bombed about 8:00 AM, the damage was slight.

Ilo and Clark Fields bombed from high altitude at about 10:35 PM. Immediately followed by a strafing attack by fighter formations, which destroyed many planes on the ground. The damage to planes and installations was heavy.

These early bombing attacks on our airfields dealt a disastrous blow to our air force and seriously crippled our defensive strength in the Philippine Islands. Enemy bombers came over at a high altitude, 23,000 to 25,000 feet. The time powder-train fuse with which the 20th Coast Artillery (AA) was supplied could not reach the planes. Shells exploded 2,000 to 4,000 feet below the attacking formations. Enemy fighters, following close behind the heavy bombers, came in low dropping light bombs and strafing the fields. The strafing attack inflicted the most serious damage to the B-17's, which were in splinter proof bays that did not provide protection against incendiaries and strafing. Thirteen B-17's were destroyed and severe damage inflicted on the fighter squadrons at Clark and Ilo Fields.

Fifty-six trucks and one hundred ninety-six enlisted men (truck drivers) detached from the 20th Coast Artillery

(AA), and used to help form the Provisional Battalions, Self propelled  
mounts (SA) (SPM).

200th Coast Artillery (AA) organized into two regiments. The  
second regiment temporarily designated; Provisional 200th Coast Artillery  
(AA) of Manila, was later officially designated as the 515th Coast Artillery  
(AA).

Headquarters Philippine Department enemy alien plan immediately  
put into effect. Japanese civilians living in the Japanese section of  
Manila ordered to remain in their homes. Military police took over the  
guard of this section.

9 December 1941.

Nichols Field bombed at 3:00 AM.

Enemy activity, 9 to 12 December, confined mainly to air attacks.  
After 12 December 1941 our ground forces were practically without air  
support.

10 December 1941.

Troop "F", 26th Cavalry, released from USMPC control and  
rejoined 26th Cavalry.

The Philippine Division ordered to proceed to the vicinity of  
Arayat to investigate a reported enemy paratroop landing and to reduce  
any hostile activity in that area; to take up a position on the Dabem-  
Arayat defensive line prepared to reinforce the North Luzon Force.

Investigation by the Commanding General, North Luzon Force,  
failed to verify the reported enemy paratroop landing at Arayat. Orders  
sending the Philippine Division to Arayat rescinded, and the Division  
ordered to occupy at once a position in the general vicinity of Laye  
Junction from which it could cover the withdrawal of troops to Dabes;  
resist hostile landings in the vicinity of Sibic Bay and prevent any  
advance of the enemy from that direction, or extend beach defenses from

Saga to Agulosa Bay.

Ovite bombed at noon by a formation of fifty-four heavy bombers. One submarine destroyed at the docks and naval installations so seriously damaged that Ovite was rendered practically useless. Nine bombers turned out of the formation and flew over the heart of the city of Manila, heading toward the port area and the inner harbor. Apparently, they had spotted the Marshal Joffre anchored in the harbor, from its peculiar superstructure it looked very much like a carrier or large naval vessel. The formation missed the French ship but sunk two small vessels anchored close by, no other damage. After one bombing run the flight rejoined the original formation in the attack on Ovite.

Dalison Field bombed and strafed.

Major General Lewis C. Brewster moved the Headquarters Far Eastern Air Force to Del Monte, Mindanao. The evacuation of specialists from 19th Bomb Group (H) and the 27th Bomb Group (L) and a selected group of fighter pilots inaugurated to Mindanao.

Enemy transports with naval escort reported in the vicinity of Aparri on the northeast tip of Luzon, and landing operations started thirty kilometers east of Aparri, landing force estimated as a regiment.

11 December 1941.

Enemy bombed Ovite and Nichols Field about noon.

Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.

12 December 1941.

Enemy transports with naval escort off shore in vicinity of Iqagapi, Rizal Peninsula, start landing operations, force estimated as a reinforced brigade.

Enemy bombed Nichols Field 4:00 AM.

Enemy bombed Fort Vint and Clangozo.

One enemy plane shot down by 40<sup>th</sup> Battery, 60th Coast Artillery (AA). Landings started at Vigan under cover of darkness. Japanese naval force reported off Pangasinan Province headed south.

December 11, 1941.

The Far East Air Force ordered to bomb the landing force in vicinity of Laganapi. The mission was accomplished, one transport sunk, others damaged, casualties inflicted on enemy unknown.

German, Italian, Japanese internees picked up by Philippine Constabulary under direction of Major Howard G. Beck, Headquarters Philippine Departments and sent to Los Baños. All forces notified that Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States.

Patrols from 11th Division reported the estimated strength of the force landed at Vigan to be about three thousand.

One Provisional Battalion, 75mm (SWS) attached to North Luzon Force. A flight of seventeen bombers flew over Corraçidor, but did not drop any bombs.

December 11, 1941.

The 31st Division (2A) and the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (80) removed from control of the Commanding General, North Luzon Force, and placed under USAFFE control.

Enemy air activity increasing over Corraçidor. The Port Area was bombed.

December 15, 1941.

An air attack, against Fort Vint dispersed by AA fire.

Many reports of enemy paratroop landings received in USAFFE. Most of these came in by phone. Upon investigation, these reports proved to be false. It is believed that civilians from a distance mistook the explosions of AA shells after the smoke had spread, for a parachute. Some of these telephone reports were probably made by 5th columnists. The Port Area bombed again.

December 16, 1941.

Two bus loads of Japanese troops ambushed at Dagudin by a patrol from the 11th Division and all reported killed.

Mission of the North Luzon Force changed to hold the enemy north of an east and west line thru San Fernando, La Union.

Daylight savings time ordered effective midnight 16-17 December.

Corregidor galle light authorized to be used to facilitate entrance of submarines into harbor.

Port Area bombed.

17 December 1941.

A demolition detachment of the 51st Engineer Battalion, preparing a railroad bridge near Nagay, Comineo Bay, for destruction, fired upon by a Japanese detachment. The fire was returned, the bridge demolished, and the detachment took up a defensive position on the near bank of the gorge. This was the first hostile contact in South Luzon.

At 12:30 AM, the USS Corregidor\* outbound from Manila for the southern islands loaded with civilian personnel, medical, artillery, engineer, signal and special troop cadres; 2.75 inch mountain artillery pieces and vital military supplies, including ammunition, for the Visayan-Mindanao Force, struck a mine and sank in two minutes. Only two hundred and eight survivors were rescued.

18 December 1941.

Cavite Navy Yard and Nichols Field heavily bombed.

Military supplies being transferred by boat to Corregidor for storage.

19 December 1941.

A Japanese force, estimated as a battalion of infantry, reached Sipicot. Enemy patrols pushed forward to Nagay and Deat, indicating a northward advance toward Manila.

Cavite again bombed heavily.

The 200th Provisional Coast Artillery Regiment of Manila redesignated as 515th Coast Artillery (AA).

20 December 1944.

Ovite bombed again. Enemy air activity over Luzon increased in intensity.

About 2:00 AM, 16th District Naval Headquarters called USAFVE by telephone to transmit the information that submarines had reported a large enemy convoy with naval escort about forty miles north of Lingayen Gulf.

The Japanese landed at Davao, south Mindanao, strength of landing force unknown.

A Provisional Battalion of 73mm (M73) attached to the South Luzon Force.

21 December 1944.

The 71st Division (TA) released to control of the Commanding General, North Luzon Force.

The enemy attacked our defensive forces at the Barro River position at night, outflanking our forces which were dispersed and cut off from the main body.

The enemy started landing in force at Davao from transports in Lingayen Gulf. Strength of this force unknown, but the enemy convoy consisted of eighty-four transports and a large naval escort, composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers.

Companies "B" and "C", 5th Infantry, South Luzon Force, ordered to move on Sipicot to stop the advance of the enemy in that vicinity.

Ovite bombed again.

Fort Wint bombed heavily, considerable damage and a number of casualties.

Enemy air activity over Mindanao increasing in intensity.

22 December 1944.

+ The 192d Tank Battalion ordered to support the North Luzon Force. General Weaver, Commanding General of the Amured Group, reported



at once to the Commanding General, North Luzon Force.

1st Infantry, 1st Division (PA), attached to the South Luzon Force.

The enemy landed at Agoo. Air reconnaissance confirmed the report that the enemy convoy consisted of eighty-four transports and a naval escort.

Company "B", 5th Infantry (PA) attacked near Tishayo. The enemy defeated and pursued ten kilometers. Company "B" suffered about 150 casualties.

All American civilians (mixing people) evacuated from Bisol Province to Manila.

Commanding General, North Luzon Force, after defeat of our forces in the vicinity of the Baroro River, ordered the 71st Division (PA) to move north by bus to attack the enemy advancing south on coastal road.

Orvite bombed.

An air warning service detachment in Bisol Province near Purecele, Comdrise Norte, withdrawn, but forced to destroy non portable equipment and transportation just west of Tishayo.

The 71st Division (PA) attacked at Bawang and Maguilan and forced to withdraw, one regiment cut off in the vicinity of Dogale.

21 December 1941.

The enemy landed at Man, and Company "B", 5th Infantry (PA) cut off from its regiment.

Twelve Japanese transports reported in the vicinity of Madan off the east coast of Balanga Province.

Forty Japanese transports reported in the vicinity of Antimonon. Enemy landing operations commenced at both Madan and Antimonon.

The Far East Air Force ordered to bomb the enemy convoy in the vicinity of Bawang.

The 71st Division (PA) attached to the North Luzon Force.

A Provisional Battalion, 75th (MP) ordered to move to the north.

The movement started immediately after dark. This battalion had been released from control of the South Luzon Force.

The Commanding General, South Luzon Force, ordered to assemble 1st Infantry, 1st Division (24) at Pagasjan for movement to North Luzon. Commanding General, South Luzon Force, requested that he be allowed to retain this force because of the landings at Sian, Madan and Antinoman. The request was not approved.

Devite had been practically destroyed and rendered completely useless.

The Commanding General, North Luzon Force, called USAFFE by telephone and stated, That further defense of the beaches in the Lingayen Gulf area was impracticable and requested permission to withdraw to a position south of the Agno River and to prepare a counter attack from that position. The request was granted.

USAFFE announced the decision to put WFO-3 (approved War Department plan for the defense of Manila) into effect, which called for all forces to withdraw into Batan. The Commanding General, North Luzon Force, assigned the mission of protecting the withdrawal of South Luzon Force into Batan.

The North Luzon Force withdrew to D-1 position night of 23-24 December 1941. (see map)

#### C. WITHDRAWAL INTO BATAN

##### 24 December 1941.

Headquarters Far East Air Force and all B-17's from Del Monte Field, Misamis, moved to bases in Australia and Netherlands East Indies. Special personnel from 19th Bomb Group and 27th Bomb Group also evacuated.

One Battalion T-10 (HW) (less one battery), which had started movement north, reattached to South Luzon Force.

General Parker, Commanding General, South Luzon Force, ordered to turn over command of the South Luzon Force to Brigadier General A. M. Jones, Commanding General, 51st Division (24), and to proceed with part of his staff to Batan to take command of the Batan Defense Force.

51st Division (24) ordered to move by motor to Shanny, Batan, at once, and the division assigned

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to the Batnan Defense Force.

The 1st Division (DA) assigned to the Batnan Defense Force and ordered to move from the Buhales Area to the vicinity of Bagno. The movement was completed December 26-27, 1941.

The Commanding General, Harbor Defense, ordered to evacuate Fort Hilt at once.

The Philippine Division assigned to the Batnan Defense Forces.

The G-1 section issued instructions to all of the special staff officers of the change in plan and instituted the previously developed plan to stock Batnan with supplies, to establish depots, and to move service troops to Batnan.

The movement of the 1st Division (DA) (less the 4th Infantry) commenced at 2:00 AM, 25 December 1941 and was completed by daylight 25 December 1941.

The 4th Regiment, United States Marines assigned to the command of the Commanding General, PCAC, and the first contingent departed for Corregidor by boat.

Manila declared an open city by the Commanding General, USAFFE.

Headquarters USAFFE moved to Corregidor leaving an echelon under Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall in Manila. This echelon out to minimum consisted of only one staff officer in each section, G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4.

President Quezon, his family and staff; High Commissioner Sayre, family and staff evacuated to Corregidor.

Enemy air activity increased in intensity.

The North Luzon Force withdrew to the D-2 position on the night 24-25 December 1941.

The 220th Coast Artillery (AA) ordered to Batnan with the mission of protecting bridges on the only road which troops could use in the withdrawal to Batnan from enemy air attack and on completion of this mission

to protect the Batuan Air Field in Batuan, which was in process of construction.

Headquarters Philippine Department moved to Corregidor.

The 519th Coast Artillery (AA) ordered to Batuan to protect the Miller and Grant Airfields, but to continue protection of the Galumpit Bridge over the Pangasinan River.

December 25, 1941.

Headquarters, USAPTC, command post established and opened in west end of Topside barracks on Corregidor, a large concrete building.

Enemy air activity over Manila and Batuan increased in intensity.

The newly organized Batuan Defense Force immediately started organizing the Masey-Mabon line and the Crion-Dagoc reserve line for defense.

Batuan Defense Force at this time consisted of the following units:

57th Infantry (PI) - detached from Philippine Division.

15th Infantry (PI) - detached from Philippine Division.

31st Division (PA)

41st Division (PA)

Provisional Air Corps Regiment (a newly organized unit composed of grounded air corps personnel without infantry training or equipment.)

Enemy activity, air, navy and ground, increased in the Visayan-Mindanao Area.

December 26, 1941.

About three hundred and seventy-five Philippine Scouts, Post Service Detachment, Fort William McKinley, under the command of Major MEESE attached to the South Luzon Force.

The 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment attached to the South Luzon Force.

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Manila, the Port Area and Morivales heavily bombed by numerous flights of enemy bombers.

American and Dutch planes appeared over Digos, Mindanao. Report from General Sharp stated that Japanese ships raised the American flag when these planes appeared.

The North Luzon Force withdrew to D-3 position on the night of 26-27 December 1941.

The Post Service Detachment attached to 1st Infantry (PA), Major McEee relieving Major Hambold as Commanding Officer. The 1st Infantry (PA), successfully blocked the enemy advance north on Route 23.

27 December 1941.

East sector, South Luzon Force, started withdrawing to the Tiang-Dolores position.

Two gun batteries of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) ordered to Calumpit Bridge to relieve units of the 515th Coast Artillery (AA).

The North Luzon Force successfully withdrew to the D-4 position night of 27-28 December 1941.

The enemy continued bombing vessels anchored in Manila Bay.

One Battalion, 31st Division (PA), with an engineer company of the 31st Engineer Battalion ordered to the Bag-Bag on the Clongapo - Dinakulapitan Road to prepare Bag-Bag for destruction in order to deny the use of this road to the enemy.

28 December 1941.

The second contingent of the 4th United States Marines moved to Corregidor.

The enemy continued to bomb port area and Manila Bay.

The South Luzon Force successfully completed its withdrawal to the Tiang-Dolores position.

Commanding General, South Luzon Force, ordered to speed up the

withdrawal of his forces in order to keep abreast of the North Luzon Force.

29 December 1944.

5th Infantry (PA), South Luzon Force, moved by bus to San Fernando, Pangasinan.

1st Brigade, Philippine Constabulary (less 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment) attached to South Luzon Force.

The 4th Infantry (PA) completed its movement into Ictan.

Heavy bombers, dive bombers and fighter planes attacked Corregidor from 11:45 AM to 2:15 PM. This was the first major attack on Corregidor and severe damage was inflicted on all installations, particularly on the Topside Area.

Corregidor AA shot down thirteen enemy planes.

USAFPTC command post moved to lateral 3, Malinta Tunnel.

30 December 1944.

The Commanding General, South Luzon Force, ordered to withdraw only if forced to do so by hostile pressure, and to delay the hostile advance to the utmost.

The enemy made a heavy coordinated attack against the North Luzon Force, the main effort in the vicinity of Cabaatuan forced the 91st Division back to Capan. Late in the evening the 91st was attacked again and was completely routed. This left the right flank of the North Luzon Force open and in a very precarious situation.

This rapid change in the situation in the north endangered the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force. USAFPTC immediately informed the Commanding General, South Luzon Force, of the situation and ordered the South Luzon Force to expedite the withdrawal in order to insure that the entire South Luzon Force would clear the Culupit Bridge over the Pumpango River not later than 6:00 AM, 1 January 1945.

Headquarters Philippine Department moved from Corregidor to  
Batnan and Designated Philippine Department, Service Command.

Seven hundred cadets, Philippine Army Air Corps, departed from  
Manila for Corregidor, arriving at 9:00 PM and assigned to Commanding General  
Philippine Coast Artillery Command to be organized into an infantry battalion  
for beach defense.

The 11st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) ordered to the vicinity  
of the Hag-Bag on the Chicago - Hinalapitan Road to cover flecks of troops  
withdrawing to Batnan from central and South Luzon.

The Philippine Division (less 11st Infantry - less 1st Battalion)  
organizing the main and reserve Battle Positions in Batnan.

December 31, 1941.

All service troops notified to clear the Columbus Bridge not  
later than 6:00 AM 1 January 1942, at which time the bridge was scheduled  
for destruction.

At about 10:00 AM General Wainwright, commanding North Luzon Force,  
telephoned Brigadier General A. M. Jones and directed him to take command  
of all forces east of the Pompaig River.

Colonel Collier, Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
dispatched to Headquarters, North Luzon Force, to secure information in  
regard to the order in which units of the force would withdraw into Batnan;  
with orders to the Commanding General, North Luzon Force, to hold the enemy  
north of Laysa Junction until forced to withdraw; to insure that all units  
of the South Luzon Force had cleared the Columbus Bridge before it was  
destroyed and also to insure its destruction.

A tank attack, supported by T5m (GM's), against the enemy in  
+ Baling was launched at about 5:00 PM. The attack was followed by a  
concentration of artillery fire on Baling which lasted until nearly dark.  
This attack caused such serious damage and demoralization to the enemy that he  
made no further attempt to advance until about 4:00 AM 1 January 1942.

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Commanding General, North Lauen Force, in order to prevent the withdrawal of the South Lauen Force, ordered the 1st Division, to reorganize at the Perambak, Pangasinan, and to proceed by bus without delay to Malinao at which point it was attached to the 1st Division. The remnants of the 1st Division had been reorganized and placed in position along the river north of Malinao, North Lauen Force, later issued orders for the 1st Division and 1st Division to withdraw from Malinao in time to clear the Chingit bridge by 4:00 AM, 1 January. The 1st Division however was withdrawn by bus about noon to Pangasinan. The buses were directed to return to the 1st Division in time for that division to clear the Chingit bridge by 4:00 AM, 1 January. This order was misunderstood by the 1st Division and it began withdrawing about 1:00 PM. The Commanding General, North Lauen Force, noted the withdrawal about 4:00 PM and established an outpost line about six kilometers north of Piarada, in order to cover the 1st Infantry at Piarada.

The Commanding General, North Lauen Force, then ordered the Commanding General, 1st Division, to proceed with his staff to Chingit, assemble the remnants of the 1st and 1st Divisions in that vicinity and cover the crossing of the river at that point. This position was held during the night December 31, 1951 - January 1, 1952.

During this very precarious situation, the South Coast Artillery (AA) rendered very effective support, and prevented the enemy from effectively bombing and averting the highway bridge and railroad bridge at Chingit.

General J. M. Malvar, commanding North Lauen Force, was present when the South Lauen Force completed the crossing of the river at Chingit and personally ordered the destruction of the highway and railroad bridges, which was accomplished by the North Lauen Force Engineers at 6:15 AM, 1 January 1952.



Very close cooperation between the Commanding General, North Luzon Force and the Commanding General, South Luzon Force in the vicinity of Calumpit resulted in the successful accomplishment of a very difficult mission. The Calumpit Bridge was a bottleneck and a serious obstacle to the successful withdrawal of the South Luzon Force to Bataan.

The USAFFE Headquarters echelon left in Manila, 28 December, departed at 2:00 AM by boat, "The SS Don Isidro", for Corregidor.

Military stores in the port area that could not be evacuated were totally destroyed by burning. These fires continued to burn for several days after the evacuation of Manila.

Gasoline in tanks and drums of the Pennsylvan Oil Company that could not be evacuated destroyed.

The South Luzon Force had effectively destroyed railroad and highway bridges, which prevented the enemy in the south from effectively pushing his attack against the South Luzon Force, and prevented hostile entry into Manila the night of 31 December 1941 - 1 January 1942.

An engineer company from the 31st Engineer Battalion (PA) destroyed the Hig-Dag on the Clongapo road.

The enemy landed north and south of Digos, Misamis.

1 January 1942.

At 6:20 AM, Headquarters South Luzon Force, after the last troops had cleared Calumpit Bridge, ceased to exist. Headquarters, 31st Division (PA), closed at Calumpit 6:00 AM and reorganized on trail leading west from Limay, Bataan at 10:00 AM. All units of the South Luzon Force assigned to the Bataan Defense Force upon arrival in Bataan.

The North Luzon Force continued to delay the hostile advance. The enemy launched an attack at 1:30 PM and forced a crossing of the river in the vicinity of Calumpit. This force was held until the North Luzon Force cleared the vicinity about midnight, 1-2 January, enroute to the Ouzga-Puras delaying position.

One enemy fighter plane shot down over Kinley Field, Corraçidor. Colonel William F. Morse, USA, with six hundred air corps personnel, (USA) arrived in Mindanao from Detasen.

2 January 1942.

The Commanding General, North Luzon Force ordered to organize the Laya Junction position for defense, preparatory to turning it over to the Commanding General, Detasen Defense Force.

Commanding General, Detasen Defense Force, given a warning order that the Laya Junction defense position would be turned over to him, and that the position must be held until a coordinated enemy attack forced withdrawal.

North Luzon Force on delaying position D-5 withdrew to the Ouzga-Puras position the night of 1-2 January.

The Command Post of Visayas-Mindanao Force moved from Cebu to Del Monte, Mindanao.

Corraçidor bombed.

3 January 1942.

A heavy, coordinated enemy attack turned the North Luzon Force right flank on the Ouzga-Puras line and forced a partial withdrawal. The 21st and 22d Infantry Regiments (PA) suffered heavy casualties at Pic. Sixty-five enemy bombers attacked Corraçidor. Japanese activities on the Island of Jolo intensified.

4 January 1942.

Forty-two bombers attacked Corraçidor for three hours, six enemy

bunkers shot down.

The enemy continued outflanking maneuvers against the Comma-Force line positions, forcing the North Luzon Force to withdraw to a previously reconnoitered line behind the Gumain River.

5 January 1962.

Heavy enemy pressure continued against the North Luzon Force, and well supported, coordinated infantry attacks forced withdrawal to Datan.

Datan positions bombed, and Corregidor heavily bombed for a hour. Demolitions accomplished by the North Luzon Force Engineers assisted in delaying the advance of the Japanese Forces.

The 31st Infantry (US) (Less 1st Detachment) moved from the Sig-Dag to a defensive position on west side of the (Dagapo-Dinalupihan road near Laysa Junction.

An echelon of USAFFE Headquarters, composed of representatives from each of the General Staff Sections, moved to Datan to establish an advance command post in the vicinity of Signal Hill. This advance Command Post in Datan provided close cooperation between USAFFE and headquarters I Corps, II Corps, and Service Command.

All troops on Luzon and Corregidor, in order to conserve and prolong the dwindling food supply, placed on one-half ration. Actually, troops on Datan received about one-third of a ration.

Three enemy planes shot down, two over Corregidor and one over Mirivales.

6 January 1962.

Corregidor bombed heavily.

The Commanding General, North Luzon Force, notified USAFFE that the Laysa Junction position had been organized and turned over to Commanding General, Datan Defense Force.

The Commanding General, North Luzon Force, with his staff, proceeded to the west coast of Datan to assume command of the I Philippine

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Corps and the west sector of Betasan.

The 200th Coast Artillery (AA) and 515th Coast Artillery (AA) occupied positions to protect the Betasan Air Fields, except Marivales Air Field, and the bridges from Layac Junction south along route of withdrawal. An antiquated Marine (AA) battery covered Marivales Field.

The enemy attacked Layac Junction positions at 10:00 AM. Pressure increased steadily all day. Enemy massed artillery fire to support his infantry. The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, was driven back. A counter attack launched by 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, restored the line. The 23d Field Artillery (FS), supporting the 31st Infantry, subjected to heavy counter battery fire and dive bomber attack, all guns, except one, put out of action.

At 10:00 PM, the Commanding General, Betasan Defense Force, ordered the withdrawal of troops from the Layac Junction position.

The 71st Division (DA) and 26th Cavalry, upon completion of the withdrawal, assigned to the I Philippine Corps.

This concluded the second phase of the Philippine Campaign, "The Withdrawal to Betasan".

The success of this operation was entirely due to the leaders in the field, the almost superhuman efforts of the few American officers and enlisted men on duty with the Philippine Army as well as the Philippine Scouts attached to the Philippine Army. These individuals, by exposing themselves recklessly in order to set an example for the Philippine Army, officers and enlisted men, exerted a very steady and strong influence on the untrained Filipino soldier.

D. BATAAN DEFENSE

7 January 1942.

Headquarters North Luzon Force redesignated "Headquarters I Philippine Corps".

Units assigned to the I Philippine Corps;

1st Division (7A)

3rd Division (PA)

71st Division (PA)

91st Division (PA)

26th Cavalry (PO)

204 Field Artillery (PO), including Battery "A" (Peak)

Provisional Battery, 75mm (RPO)

65th Quartermaster Peak Troop (PO)

201st Ordnance Company (MO) (PA)

Headquarters Betan Defense Force redesignated "Headquarters II Philippine Corps". Units assigned to the II Philippine Corps:

11th Division (PA)

21st Division (PA)

41st Division (PA)

51st Division (PA)

Provisional Group Field Artillery, 75mm (RPO) (2 batteries)

61st Quartermaster Peak Troop (PO)

301st Field Artillery (155mm guns) (PA)

06th Field Artillery (105mm guns) (PO)

202d Ordnance Company (MO) (PA)

57th Infantry (PO)

The Service Command (044 Philippine Department) assigned the beach defense of the area south of the combat zone; the area south of the general line Pasuan River - Alangan River, except the Naval reservation in the vicinity of Marivales which was under the control of the Navy and defended by naval troops.

Units assigned to the Service Command:

28 Division (PA)

\*34th Pursuit Squadron (AM)

\*5th Interceptor Command (AM)

\*36 Pursuit Squadron (AM)

\*17th Pursuit Squadron (AM)

PAAC (about 300 cadets Philippine Army Air Corps)

Note: Air Corps units used as Infantry on beach defense.

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All service command troops ordered to be prepared to reinforce beach defenses in addition to their normal duties of service command functions.

Brigadier General Allan C. McBride, USA, Commanding General, Service Command (Philippine Department), supervised and instituted beach defense installations in the entire Service Command area.

The Air Corps worked feverishly preparing air fields at Mariveles, Obooben, Batuan Air Field and Piler Field on the Piler-Sageo Road.

A fire of the harbor defenses, 200th Coast Artillery (AA) and the 515th Coast Artillery (AA) had shot down a total of seventy-five enemy planes since 8 December.

Starting this date, Corregidor not bombed for one week. This respite allowed all utility sections to repair power, water, and communication lines.

The 31st Infantry (US) placed in USARV reserve after withdrawing from the Luyas Junction position.

The Philippine Division (less 57th Infantry) placed in USARV reserve.  
2-6 January 1945.

The enemy contacted our forces on the main Abney Battle Position, and started developing the battle line preparatory to an attack.

Very little enemy activity in front of I Philippine Corps and against Corregidor.

The enemy completed an air base on Jolo.

20-22 January 1945.

General MacArthur, Commanding General of the United States Forces in the Far East and his Chief of Staff, Major General Richard K. Sutherland, visited front line units in Batuan.

The enemy attacked in force two to three times daily, during hours of darkness, on the front of the 57th Infantry (PI). Beach attack repulsed with heavy losses had been made by fresh

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forces. At the end of four days the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry had been pushed back to the Regimental Reserve Line.

13 January 1962.

Colonel George Clark relieved from command of the 57th Infantry (P8) and Colonel Arnold J. Funk, GOC, ordered to temporary command of the 57th. Colonel Funk ordered a counter attack at 2:00 PM, and by 6:00 PM the original line had been restored.

The Japanese launched furious night attacks in an attempt to penetrate the 57th Infantry line, each attack was repulsed with heavy enemy losses. The enemy changed to infiltration tactics and considerable difficulties were experienced during the next two weeks in cleaning out snipers, hidden in rear of our front lines, with the apparent mission to snipe American officers only.

Enemy landings reported in Port Binang. The Commanding General, I Corps, moved troops forward to contest and contain this force.

14 January 1962.

The enemy bombed Corregidor at 12:30 AM.

The enemy shifted his attack against the Abuoy line to his right in an attempt to outflank our position.

The 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry relieved from beach defense, moved to KP 140.5 on Pilar-Bague Road and returned to regimental control. The 45th Infantry started organizing a defensive position on Trail No. 7.

15 January 1962.

The enemy started emplacing heavy artillery in defiladed positions between Sagong and Ternate in the Cavite Province.

The enemy attacked the 41st Division in force, the 42d Infantry broke and the 43d Infantry was pushed back. The 41st Infantry however held its ground. The 45th Infantry Combat Team moved from west to east sector and bivouaced in the vicinity of Band.

16 January 1962.

A heavy enemy infantry attack, supported by artillery, air and tanks, completely routed the 41st Division on the extreme left of II Corps line.

The 41st Division (7A) relieved from I Corps.

moved to the vicinity of Outil and assigned to the II Corps.

I Corps attacked the enemy in Hiron. The attack was successful and the enemy was driven across the river and to the north of Hiron.

The 43th Infantry Combat Team moved under cover of darkness the night of 15-16 January from Bani to an assembly area just east of Bani.

January 17, 1968.

The Philippine Division (less 57th Infantry) covered the left flank of the II Corps. The 31st Division (PA) held in Corps reserve in the vicinity of Outil.

The enemy attacked units of I Corps in the vicinity of Hiron, forcing withdrawal of 1st Infantry (PA) to its main battle position. The enemy invariably used flanking tactics.

January 18 - 20, 1968.

The Philippine Division (less 57th Infantry) counter attacked on the left of the II Corps. Severe fighting took place in the sector formerly held by the 51st Division (PA).

January 21, 1968.

During the night of 20-21 January, (I Corps front), the enemy infiltrated thru the sectors held by the 1st Infantry and the 31st Field Artillery Battalion (used as Infantry troops) and secured possession of the Hiron-Bugue Road in the vicinity of KP 167.

Pressure by the enemy increased against the Philippine Division on the left of the II Corps front. The 31st Infantry (US) engaged in heavy and prolonged combat.

The Commanding General, I Corps, had committed all his reserve in trying to dislodge the enemy which had penetrated in rear of 1st Division (PA).



22 January 1942.

The situation on the front of both Corps had become somewhat precarious and in order to get a clear picture of the situation the Chief of Staff USAFFE and one of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3, visited the command posts of I and II Corps, 57th Infantry and 11st Division. The Commanding Generals, I and II Corps, given warning orders to plan withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position, with a statement that written orders confirming withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position would be delivered that night.

Written orders directing the withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position, withdrawal to be completed by daylight, 26 January, delivered to the I and II Corps the night of 22-23 January.

The Second Philippine Constabulary Regiment moved from east coast beach defense and assigned to I Corps.

The 11th Division (24) and 15th Infantry (26) detached from II Corps and assigned to I Corps, movement to be effected by the Commanding General, II Corps, in time for these units to be in position on Reserve Battle Position by daylight 26 January. The I Corps rear boundary extended to the Binuangan River.

Reasons for the withdrawal:

1. Disintegration of the 51st Division had left a gap open on the left flank of the II Corps for several days through which Japanese had been able to push troops.
2. Wide gap between I and II Corps, (1st Hattib Area) had been further widened by the disintegration of the 51st Division (28).
3. Failure of the Philippine Division due to superior enemy strength to reestablish the front line.
4. All reserves of the I Corps had been committed.
5. All reserves of the II Corps had been committed, except the 13th Infantry (24). (An untried regiment)

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6. Japanese Force, estimated as a regiment, established in rear of the 1st Division (JA).

21 January 1942.

Withdrawal of the I and II Corps had started the night of 20-21 January, with displacement to the rear of artillery units.

The Japanese landed on the west coast of Betuan at Quinson Point and Longshawyan Point.

22 January 1942.

I and II Corps (JA) continued withdrawal to the reserve battle position.

Commanding General, Service Command, in conjunction with the 1st Battalion at Marivales, attempted to dislodge the enemy from Longshawyan Point.

23 January 1942.

I and II Corps (JA) continued withdrawal to the reserve battle position. The Commanding General, Service Command, stopped the enemy advance on west coast. Beach defense responsibility removed from the Service Command and given to the Commanding Generals of the I and II Corps in their respective areas.

24 January 1942.

Commanding General, I Corps, designated the beach defense area taken over from the Service Command as the South Sub-Sector and placed Brigadier General C. A. Pierce in command. Commanding General, II Corps, placed the Philippine Constabulary Division, commanded by General Francisco (JA), on beach defense in the II Corps area. Withdrawal to the reserve battle position completed by both corps by daylight. Battery Geary from Corregidor fired sixteen rounds, seven hundred pound shells with point detonating fuses on enemy at Longshawyan Point. 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry attached to I Corps. The Commanding General, I Corps, ordered

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the 26 Battalion, 57th Infantry to relieve navy units on Longosakwayan Point, and to push the attack vigorously. One howitzer battery, 155mm, (two guns) attached to I Corps.

During the withdrawal of the II Corps, attached tank units supporting the covering force along the Wam-Capang-Sani-Catol line, reinforced by a Provisional Battalion self propelled artillery, subdued an enemy force, estimated as a regiment, inflicted heavy casualties and stopped the hostile advance. The tank unit had been the last element of the covering force to withdraw.

Advanced elements of the enemy forces reached the new Main Line of Resistance at about 7:00 AM. An attack, launched soon after dark, repulsed with heavy enemy losses. An enemy force, estimated as a battalion, entrenched astride Trail 2.

27 January 1965.

Howitzer Battery (155mm) (two guns) arrived in South Sub-Sector Area.

1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (2A) and 5th Interceptor Command launched an attack against enemy on Quinsona Point. The 26 Battalion, 57th Infantry pushed the attack on Longosakwayan Point. The enemy landed on west coast in the Angasin-Bilalim area. 17th Pursuit Squadron, armed as infantry, ordered from South Sector Reserve to reinforce 3d Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment. The 26 Battalion, 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment attached to south sub-sector by Commanding General, I Corps. Battery Geary fired twenty-four rounds (some type shell used on 26 January) on enemy at Longosakwayan Point. Enemy penetrated I Corps front between the 11th Division (2A) and 1st Division (2A), with the bulk of the penetration through the 1st Division (2A) sector.

28 January 1965.

26 Battalion, 57th Infantry, pushed back the enemy on Longosakwayan Point. The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry relieved all

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troops on Spinson Point. I Corps stopped the enemy penetrations in the 1st Division (JA) sector and almost completely isolated the enemy by preventing enemy reinforcements getting through. Captured diaries clearly stated that the 122d Infantry (Japanese) had been ordered to reinforce the penetration.

The 11st Infantry (JA) relieved the 2d Battalion, 101st Infantry (JA) (less Company "H") in the II Corps sector. During the night, 28-29 January, after an artillery preparation of about one hour, the enemy launched an attack in force supported by artillery, machine gun and mortar fire with the main effort directed at Trail 3. Fighting was intense and at close quarters. Every hostile attempt to penetrate the Main Line of Resistance repulsed with heavy enemy losses, fighting continued throughout the night. This attack developed into a main effort in an attempt by the enemy to penetrate the II Corps front. Captured documents indicated that elements of three infantry regiments, reinforced with supporting arms, had been employed, and that the direction of the attack was southwest with the mission of driving our forces into Shulla Bay near Lamey.

29 January 1945.

Propaganda leaflets dropped by Japanese planes over Batuan and Corregidor urged Filipinos to kill their American officers, and to surrender, assuring them that they then would be given food, freedom and money and sent home. Battery Geary fired sixteen rounds (some type shell used on the 26th) during the morning on Longosomayan Point.

The enemy on Longosomayan Point completely annihilated. The enemy attacked and gained ground in the Agusan-Silain sector. The Commanding General, I Corps, ordered the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, to this sector with the mission, "to annihilate the enemy".

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20-31 January 1942.

The I and II Corps improved defensive installations on the reserve bottle position. Continued attacks slowly pushed the Japanese toward the sea on Quinson Point. The Commanding General, I Corps, attached the 57th Infantry (reinforced) (less 2d Battalion and Company "B") to south sub-sector. The 57th Infantry (RG) attacked enemy forces in the Agusan-Silain sector at 11:00 AM, and definitely located enemy strong points and secured the beaches north and south of the Japanese positions. A Japanese attempt to reinforce their beach head repulsed with heavy losses.

1-4 February 1942.

Troops at Quinson Point and the Silain-Agusan sector gained ground slowly. The Japanese resistance was very stubborn. Attacks against the enemy penetration in I Corps met with some success. 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry and a platoon of tanks assigned to pocket (penetration) fight by Commanding General, I Corps. Seacoast batteries on the Fortified Islands fired counter battery against Japanese emplacements in Ternate near Cavite on the south shore of Manila Bay. 2 February, the enemy attempted to land strong reinforcements at Quinson Point and in the Agusan-Silain sector. This attempt completely repulsed and the landing force annihilated. Street fire by naval guns installed on Bobo and Quinson Points, 7-40 planes bombing and strafing enemy barges and landing boats, and accurate firing by 75mm gun batteries and 155mm howitzer battery sank every enemy landing boat or barge. 3 February, U.S. submarine arrived at Corregidor bringing 2,750 rounds of such needed 3 inch AA mechanical fuse ammunition. 4 February, forces on Panay and Mindoro relieved from command of the Commanding General, Visayan-Mindanao Force, and placed under direct control of USAFFE. The II Corps reestablished its original out-post line of resistance.

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5 February 1942.

Brigadier General Jones placed in command of operations in the sector of the pocket fights by the Commanding General, I Corps. Coordinated attacks by infantry and tanks gained ground at Quinsuan Point, the enemy driven to within 100 yards of the sea. Repeated attacks gained ground slowly in the Agusan-Dilatim sector. The Commanding General, Philippine Coast Artillery, informed that in the event of the collapse of Betan the Philippine Division would be brought to Corregidor, and instructed to maintain on Corregidor food for 20,000 men, on the basis of one-half ration per man per day, to 30 June 1942.

6-7 February 1942.

Enemy on Quinsuan Point completely wiped out. Our attack gained ground slowly in the Agusan-Dilatim sector. Attacks against the enemy in the Toul pocket progressed under the aggressive leadership and direction of Brigadier General A. M. Jones.

8-17 February 1942.

During this period activity along the II Corps front had consisted of daily skirmishes along the out-post line of resistance. The enemy tried to penetrate the out-post line of resistance to locate the main defensive position. Repeated attacks in the Agusan-Dilatim sector slowly dislodged the enemy and drove him into the sea. The enemy had made several unsuccessful attempts to supply this force with food by parachute. 10 February, the enemy dropped messages to this force, stating that it had been impossible to land reinforcements and for survivors to swim north to Moron. Operations by our forces completed 13 February, with the enemy annihilated. Many had been shot while attempting to swim north toward Bagan and Moron. Operations against the Toul pocket consisted in closing the gap in the Main Line of Resistance and annihilating the enemy troops which had penetrated into this corridor.

The effort to close the gap had not been entirely successful and some of the enemy troops escaped to the north by infiltrating back through the heavy jungle. The bulk of the enemy force however was believed to have been annihilated. All operations had been completed on 17 February and the gap in the Main Line of Resistance completely closed. The Fortified Islands had been under constant fire for several days from Ternate, and naval vessels such as gunboats and small launches had been moved from south harbor to near the Bet-an shore to avoid this shelling.

CHAFFE, 9 February, ordered an aerial photograph taken of the enemy gun positions on the Ternate shore. This mission accomplished by a Philippine Army pilot in a Philippine Army plane protected by five P-40's. The P-40's on returning to the field had been engaged in aerial combat by six zero fighter planes, one P-40 and pilot lost; all six of the Japanese planes shot down.

About 0400 PM, 16 February, an enemy raiding party from Saragha destroyed a section of the Fort Frank fresh water line below the Calumpas dam.

The Army Transport Service had started functioning on or about 9 February at Cebu City, operating inter-island supply boats.

10 February to 12 March 1942.

During this period combat activity on the fronts of I and II Corps had consisted of patrolling and sharp skirmishes along the out-post line of resistance. The Japanese had been very aggressive, and it required continuous combat to hold the out-post line. G-2 information had indicated that the Japanese were not considering an immediate attack but were awaiting reinforcements.

Artillery fire from Ternate had continued against the Fortified Islands. A volunteer detail from Fort Frank, 15 February, replaced the section of water line destroyed 16 February, after a brisk fight with an enemy detachment. The enemy lost twenty-five to thirty killed.

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Our small force was assisted in this skirmish by 75mm fire from Fort Frank.  
20 February, President Quason and Vice President Comans of the Philippine Commonwealth, together with the private and official family of the president departed from Corregidor by submarine for Cebu.

2 March, the ration reduced to three-eighths rations.

The enemy landed in Zamboanga.

On the afternoon of 4 March, our four remaining P-40's, equipped with improvised bomb racks, raided the enemy base in Subic Bay. One tanker sunk; two other cargo vessels left burning and sinking; several other vessels damaged and fires started on the Glasgow dock and on Grande Island. One plane failed to return and two others overshoot the field and crashed up while landing. This raid reported by Japanese radio to have been made by a large number of B-17's from a secret base.

4 March: the Visayas-Mindanao Force terminated and two forces constituted: The Mindanao Force; Brigadier General William F. Sharp, commanding and the Visayas Force; Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynoweth, commanding.

11 March:

1. Luzon Force constituted, Lt-Joy General J. M. Heimerwright, commanding. (assumed command, 12 March)

Units assigned to the Luzon Force:

I Philippine Corps (PA)

II Philippine Corps (PA)

5th Interceptor Command (AM)

Provisional Tank Group (AM)

Service Command (Philippine Department)(AM)(PA)(AM)

Air Transport Service (PA)

1st Infantry (US) (Force Reserve)



37th Infantry (HG) (Force Reserve)  
80th Engineer Battalion (Avn)(less Company "A")  
200th Coast Artillery (AA)(assigned March 21)  
515th Coast Artillery (AA)  
Battery A, 2d Coast Artillery (AA)(PA)  
Provisional Signal Battalion, USMVF  
Two Battalions (Provisional) SFM 75mm

No change in assignment of troops to JGAC, except Company "A",  
80th Engineer Battalion (Avn) attached.

The I and II Corps (PA) intensified the training of troops  
in offensive and defensive tactics and improved battle positions. Troop  
training and all work was carried on under increasing difficulties, due  
to the alarming increase in the number of ineffective caused by  
starvation rations, lack of medicines and lack of clothing. Shortage  
in material and equipment curtailed effective defensive works.

13 March to 2 April 1944.

The heavy artillery bombardment from the Ternate shore continued  
against the Fortified Islands. Two guns each at Battery Frank North  
(155mm) and Emma (3 inch AA) destroyed, the other two guns in each  
battery damaged, but repairable. Seven out of eight mortars at Battery  
Hessler put out of action temporarily.

The I and II Philippine Corps (PA) continued to improve battle  
positions, constructed obstacles and other anti-tank defenses. Constant  
patrolling maintained day and night. Artillery fired interdiction  
concentrations on enemy assembly areas and targets of opportunity.

The enemy installed artillery on barges from which they shelled  
the east coast of Batan from Manila Bay. Enemy air and artillery

activity increased in intensity over all our positions.

General MacArthur, staff and family departed by plane 18 March for Australia. President Quezon and party arrived on Mindanao 20 March.

The 200th Coast Artillery (AA) relieved 21 March from assignment to the PCAC and assigned to the Luzon Force.

Major General J. M. Wainwright on 21 March promoted to Lieutenant General, AUS, and in compliance with orders from the War Department assumed command of the United States Forces in the Philippines and established his headquarters on Corregidor.

USAFPH discontinued and USMFP constituted. Major General Edward P. King Jr., assigned to command the Luzon Force.

By 23 March it had been evident that the enemy was building up his strength in Isona. All indications pointed to his main attack being launched against the center of the line, probably in the sector of the II Corps.

Instructions received from General MacArthur, 1 April, and transmitted to General Moore, directed that the one-half ration per man to be maintained for all troops on Corregidor to 30 June 1942, be changed to one-half ration per man to 1 June 1942.

The Japanese had announced over the radio, 2 April, that: "We are starting an all out offensive in Isona".

Our forces in Mindanao conducted a successful raid on Zamboanga on 2 April.

#### 1 April 1942.

A major offensive launched against the II Corps, in Sub-sector "D". The drive had been directed against the 4th Infantry of the 41st Division (PA). An infantry attack launched about 3:00 PM had followed the heaviest artillery preparation to date and had been immediately preceded by heavy bombing and strafing attacks along the entire front line of II Corps. Heavy artillery, registered on the front lines, lifted to the

regimental reserve lines and to counter battery as the infantry attacked. The 424 Infantry pushed back to its regimental reserve line.

This attack developed into an all out offensive. Only minor actions took place on the front of the I Corps.

5 April 1968.

The enemy launched another fully coordinated attack, preceded by a heavy bombing, strafing air attack along the entire front line and a heavy artillery preparation, through the gap created by the rearward movement of the 424 Infantry. The 424 Infantry and the 434 Infantry, which had also broken, completely routed by 9:00 AM. By noon the 21st Division (PA) had refused its left flank and had become partially disorganized.

The 24 Philippine Constabulary Regiment on the front of the I Corps abandoned a portion of its Main Line of Resistance under mortar shelling and bombing, but reestablished the line when enemy fire lifted.

The 31st Infantry (US), which had been moved to the vicinity of the junction of Trails 20 and 7 by the Commanding General, Lason Force, released at 10:00 AM to the II Corps.

The Provisional Tank Group (less two companies) placed in direct support of the II Corps.

The 45th Infantry (PG) (less one battalion) relieved from assignment to I Corps and ordered to move east along Trail 8 to junction of Trails 8 and 29, where it was released to the II Corps.

The 57th Infantry (PG) ordered to move under cover of darkness to the vicinity of Lason.

803d Engineer Battalion (less Company "A") and 44th Engineers (PG) ordered to assembly areas and to be prepared immediately for combat.

The I Corps refused its right flank by placing the 24 Philippine

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Comatrolary Regiment on a switch position extending to the southeast.

5 April: Hostile pressure continued, direction of attack southeast. The 11st Division which had withdrawn, broke in complete disorder and the entire Division ceased to exist as a unit.

The counter attack launched shortly after daylight in the vicinity of Trail 8 and 29 by 45th Infantry (PB)(less one battalion), the 306 Infantry (PA)(less one battalion) and the 11st Infantry (PB) was unable to advance more than a few hundred yards. All contact with the 306 Infantry (less one battalion) lost and never regained.

The 57th Infantry (PB) released to II Corps.

The Commanding General, Lamon Force, ordered II Corps to hold the general line of the east bank of the San Vicente River.

The I Corps front inactive.

6 April: The enemy continued to push forward and advanced rapidly south up Trail 6. This forward advancement cut off the Commanding General and Headquarters Sub-sector "D", the 45th Infantry (PB)(less one battalion) and the remaining troops of the 11st Infantry (PA). The Commanding General, Sub-sector "D", ordered to attack east along Trail 8 and reestablish contact with the II Corps. After this attack failed, these units and Sub-sector "D" Headquarters were attached to the I Corps. The enemy attack had been in force with adequate reserves to keep advancing.

The Commanding General, Lamon Force, released the 60th Engineers (less Company "A") to II Corps and ordered the 26th Cavalry (PB) to move under cover of darkness to the vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2. The hostile attack continued with particular heavy pressure to the east. The 11st Combat Team (PB) and the 11st Division (PB)(less 11st and 33d Infantry) disintegrated and disappeared into the jungle.

7 April: The hostile attack continued and a trunk the 201st and 202d Engineer Battalions, both battalions disintegrated and completely disappeared. The 57th Infantry (PB), enveloped from the left (west) flank, forced to withdraw to vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2.

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The 14th Engineers (PS) and the 26th Cavalry (PS) reassigned to II Corps. All Philippine Army troops west of Sub-sector "D" were in complete rout or had disappeared.

The Commanding General, USMIP, at about 4:00 PM ordered the Luman Force to attack with the 14th Division (TA) due east across the Pantingan River. After conference with the Commanding General, I Corps, the Commanding General, Luman Force, telephoned the Commanding General, USMIP, and the attack was left up to the discretion of the Commanding General, Luman Force. It was not executed as 14th Division troops were so weakened by sickness and malnutrition that it would have been impossible for them to walk across the Pantingan Gulch unopposed, and due to the rugged, forested terrain the attack could not have been given any artillery support. Hostile pressure continued against the Iloilo River position by superior enemy forces, which enveloped the left (west) flank, necessitating a withdrawal under cover of darkness 7-8 April to the Alangan River line.

I Corps, because of its exposed right flank, ordered to withdraw to the Binasagan River.

All reserves of the Luman Force, I Corps and II Corps had been committed by dark.

8 April. By 3:00 AM the 31st Infantry (US), 57th Infantry (PS), 26th Cavalry (PS), 14th Engineers (PS) and parts of the 80th Engineer Battalion and a few remnants of Philippine Army troops had occupied the Alangan River line. By 3:00 PM, the left (west) flank had been enveloped by a strong enemy column, the east center penetrated by infantry supported by tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment and our troops forced to withdraw.

The Commanding General, Luman Force, placed the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C", in direct command of all front line troops on the Alangan River position, and ordered him to occupy and hold a defensive position along the Luman River. He had at his disposal the 57th Infantry (PS) 500; 26th Cavalry (PS) 300; 14th Engineers (PS) 400; 31st Infantry (US) 160; total approximately 1360 officers and men.

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Let Philippine Constabulary Regiment ordered to move immediately after dark from beach defense positions on the west coast to Gaboben, where it was to be released to II Corps. The Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) ordered to destroy all anti-aircraft equipment not practical for use as infantry weapons, form as infantry and occupy and defend the high ground immediately south of the Batuan Air Field.

The I Corps attacked early in the morning east along Trail 8 with the 45th Infantry (IS) reinforced, but had been stopped by a double envelopment.

The Luma River position, the last attempted defensive line in II Corps sector, turned and all units forced to withdraw in disorder. Organized resistance in II Corps sector ceased to exist.

At about 11:30 PM the Commanding General, USMIP, in compliance with a directive from General MacArthur, ordered the Commanding General, Luzon Force, to attack with the I Corps in the direction of Clompopo. The attack could not be launched. The I Corps had been in process of withdrawing and the half starved troops were physically exhausted.

The 45th Infantry (IS) and the 2d Battalion, 60th Coast Artillery (AA) (less batteries "F" and "H"), with Battery "C", 31st Coast Artillery (IS) attached, ordered to withdraw from Batuan and move by boat in time to arrive at Corraquidor prior to daylight. The 45th Infantry could not be extricated from combat in time to comply with the order.

Battery (Bears) at Corraquidor fired upon call from the Commanding General, Luzon Force, road interdiction on Batuan roads along west shore of Manila Bay.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, at 1:30 AM ordered the destruction of all artillery, tanks, ammunition, engineer material, radio

9 April, 1947

equipment, and other military supplies on Iwasa. Destruction to be completed by 6:00 AM, 9 April, at which time a flag of truce was to be sent forward to the Japanese lines. The Commanding General, USVP, informed of the action taken by the Commanding General, Lash Force, immediately disapproved of the action and directed that there would be no surrender.

During the last hours of Iwasa, the Commanding General, USVP, knew, at least, that he had the support of his Commander in Chief. President Roosevelt advised General MacArthur asking him to relay to the Commanding General, USVP, an expression of his (President Roosevelt's) support, "if you (MacArthur) concur both as to substance and timing." The message received on Corregidor read:

"Am keenly aware of the tremendous difficulties under which you are waging your great battle. The physical exhaustion of your troops obviously precludes the possibility of a major counterstroke unless our efforts to run food to you should quickly prove successful. Because of the state (over) which your forces have no control I am modifying my orders to you as contained in my telegram to General MacArthur February nine and repeated to you March twenty-three (the so-called or note).

My purpose is to leave to your best judgment any decisions affecting the future of the Iwasa garrison. I have nothing but admiration for your soldierly conduct and your performance of your most difficult mission and have every confidence that whatever decision you may sooner or later be forced to make will be dictated only by the best interests of the country and of your magnificent troops. I am still hopeful that the efforts of the Navy to supply you by submarine will be effective and in time and that at least one or more of the surface vessels attempting to run the blockade will reach you shortly.

Nevertheless I feel it proper and necessary that you should be assured of complete freedom of action and of my full confidence in the wisdom of whatever decision you may be forced to make.\*

Just before the Commanding General, USMIF, received the above message, he had transmitted to Mr. Roosevelt the dreadful news that Bataan had fallen.

Mr. Roosevelt promptly replied back:

"I am hopeful that you will be able to hold Corregidor. However, you are assured of complete freedom of action and my full confidence in your wisdom in whatever decisions you may make. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

The following reply was received from Corregidor to the White House:

"The confidence your Excellency places in my judgment in this desperate situation as well as the kindness of your message merit my heartfelt gratitude. I have done all that could have been done to hold Bataan, but starved men without air support and with inadequate field artillery support cannot endure the terrific aerial and artillery bombardment that my troops were subjected to. Enemy has emplaced heavy artillery on south shore of Bataan and now keeps Corregidor under constant artillery fire as well as air bombing.

Report received this morning that enemy is now landing in considerable force on the island of Cebu. Due to difficulties of communication I have no further information on the progress of this landing. Obviously if hostile troops take the island of Cebu it will no longer be practicable to ship the supplies which have been assembled there. An unusually large number of hostile warships and transports have been reported operating in waters adjacent to southern islands during the past two days. It appears that the enemy will next direct his attention to other islands of the Visayan Group.

Communications with Bataan troops is severed so I have no information of terms arranged by General King.\*

The Commanding General, USMIF again requested bombers for the



their killing into enemy hands.  
 Corregidor, under protection of bombers from Australia, turned to general  
 several ships loaded with food preparatory to sending the blockade to  
 The Japanese landed on Oahu, estimated strength, 12,000.  
 Many observations balloon observed in the vicinity of Iloilo.

IN APRIL 1942

with artillery emplacements.  
 occupied by our Base Hospital No. 2, and proceeded to ring this hospital  
 The Japanese utilized many artillery positions in the valley  
 situation against the Purified Islands.  
 Fort Hughes, and concentrated his entire air force on numerous fully  
 forward and into fortified positions from which to pound Corregidor and  
 Instead captured, the enemy lost no time in moving artillery

K. THE BARRAGE OF CORREGIDOR

this fire until captured troops cleared them.  
 Commanding General, Philippine Coast Artillery Command, from answering  
 our own captured troops assembled on the Bataan roads, prohibited the  
 The Commanding General, USMC, informed of the large number of  
 Corregidor during the afternoon of 9 April.

Many artillery batteries in position on Bataan fired on  
 pursuing the blockade from the Visayas to Corregidor.  
 specific mission of protecting a convoy of ships loaded with food in

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Corregidor subjected to six separate bombing attacks and shelled intermittently from vicinity of Ternate.

11 April 1942.

Enemy continued bombing Corregidor, striking Topside, Morrison Hill, Middle-side and Bottom-side. Five enemy landing barges, sighted near Horns Point at about 5:30 PM heading for the inner bay, fired upon by Batteries Rock Point, Sunset and Hanna. The barges retreated out of sight around Horns Point.

Enemy landed on Cebu at Cebu City, Toledo, Arago, Pimmangajan, Naga and Talisey, supported by naval craft and dive bombers.

The enemy continued to strengthen the Bigas Front.

12 April 1942.

More separate bombing attacks on Corregidor, and continuous artillery fire from Betasan and Ternate.

Betasan appeared to be clear of our own captured troops, except for Base Hospitals No. 1 and 2, therefore Commanding General, USMCP, authorized counter battery fire against definitely located enemy targets.

General Joyce arrived on Mindanao with bombers from Australia.

13-17 April 1942.

Seventeen bombing attacks on Corregidor, four on Hughes and two on ships in south harbor, which had been moved from anchorage off the southern tip of Betasan.

Artillery fire from Betasan almost continuous. One gun at Battery Hyatt destroyed on the 15th. The remaining gun removed and replaced with one from Battery Ordnance Point, in position Gaffland from Betasan near Ordnance Point Cemetery. Batteries Morrison, James, Sunset, Rock Point and Hanna subjected to accurate artillery bombardment.

Several guns damaged but all repairable. Ordnance personnel maintained guns in firing condition with the greatest difficulty.

A special observation section, with officer observers, organized to locate enemy batteries in Davao for counter battery fire targets.

Authority requested from General MacArthur's Headquarters to send to Australia on return trip of General Joyce's B-17's, certain air corps pilots and key personnel and the General Staff journals covering the action up to the fall of Davao. Request granted.

Journals and other data, addressed to Major General Richard K. Sutherland, Australia, turned over to the Adjutant General, USDP, for transmission to General Joyce in Mindanao.

11 April, Japanese force landed on the island of Pansy.

The Wasaya Force assigned to the control and command of Major General Sharp, Mindanao Force.

17 April, a flight of General Joyce's bombers, three B-17's, bombed Nichols Field causing severe damage to buildings, personnel and planes.

Batteries Geary, Rock Point, Sunset, Jones and Morrison damaged by enemy artillery fire but repairable.

Ten seacoast batteries in action against enemy targets in Davao, Cavite and Manila Bay fired effectively, two ammunition dumps hit, fires started in two enemy tank and truck columns and counter battery fire neutralized four enemy batteries.

Communication with our forces on Cebu cut since 11 April.

A report received that an enemy cruiser, Washima class, had been sunk by PT boat off Cebu on 8 April.

Communications established with our guerrilla forces in the Davao Area and Dagupan Valley. Instructions given them to restrict and hamper

enemy activities as much as possible.

Guerrilla activity from 9th to 14th very intensive. Raiding parties from Isabella Province, Northern Llanos, raided Yatividad, San Nicholas, and Tayug and inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy. Enemy patrols occupied Santa Fe and Arriba. Colonel Moran in Boston requested additional ammunition. No means available to fulfill the request.

15-20 April 1942.

The enemy moved his 240mm howitzers on Terote to the southern tip of Betanc. These howitzers had immediately fired on our 12 inch mortar pits.

Every installation on Corregidor, visible from Betanc, continuously subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire. Our counter battery fire brought overwhelming enemy retaliatory fire down on the firing battery. Having gun batteries, 100mm guns, designated by name of officer commanding the battery, constituted and placed in defiladed positions and moved each night, proved effective counter battery weapons, and avoided hostile retaliatory fire.

The enemy shelling and air attacks continued daily on the Fortified Islands. Battery Crockett (two 12 inch guns) severely damaged by 240mm fire.

Reports received indicated that the enemy might be assembling a landing force on the east coast of Betanc. The Engineer Launch "Hightask", dispatched on night reconnaissance, searched for landing craft or concentrations of troops along Betanc Coast. Contacted a small boat off Lameo and took two prisoners, continued north and off Limpy, contacted a 120 foot vessel. The "Hightask" opened fire immediately, set fire to the boat and apparently killed most of the crew, and had been forced to abort the two Japanese prisoners, who attempted to jump overboard during this action. The "Hightask" attached a line to the burning vessel in an attempt to tow her back to Corregidor, but enemy boats approaching from the shore, forced the "Hightask" to cut loose and run for it. The "Hightask" returned to Corregidor at 5:00 AM.

Two navy boats directed to take station, one 3,000 yards east of Fort Hughes, the other 5,000 yards northeast of the east tip of Corregidor, in order to give timely warning of the approach of any landing barges or craft.

War Department requested a report on incendiary bombs and smoke used by the enemy, and a detailed report if gas was used at any time.

Our AA very effective, enemy bombers kept at high altitudes and heavy damage continuously inflicted on Japanese Air Craft.

Del Monte, Mindanao bombed several times.

Our forces continued to resist the enemy advance on Cebu, and had destroyed military supplies and stores in danger of falling into enemy hands on that island. By 23 April, the enemy had occupied towns from Cebu City to Dalaguete on the east coast and from Toledo to Danao on the west coast.

An enemy force, estimated at about 8,000, landed on Panay with cavalry and tanks. Japanese on Panay effected a junction of two columns, south of Danao. One column advanced south from Cuyayan and the other advanced north from Iloilo. Our forces continued to resist Japanese advances in the hills in northwestern Panay.

25 April 1942.

Continuous artillery fire from Batuan and Ternate directed against Corregidor. One 240mm shell exploding in the midst of a large group of personnel outside west entrance of Balista Tunnel had inflicted approximately fifty casualties.

Our batteries fired against numerous targets in Batuan and Cavite. Truck convoys had been dispersed, ammunition dumps set on fire and at least seven enemy batteries silenced. Japanese patrols had been driven from the coves along the Cavite shore and dispersed by effective fire from Fort Frank.

Panay and Cebu areas remained quiet.

26 April 1942.

Harassing fire from enemy batteries in Batuan fell on Corregidor intermittently during the night. No aerial activity over the Fortified

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**Islands.**

Seacoast batteries from Corregidor and Fort Drum returned the enemy fire during the night and morning. Results undetermined.

The enemy started a systematic invasion of the Cagayan Valley. A force of about 1,500 pushed north from Batac 7e, while another force attacked southward from Tuguegarao.

All quiet on Panay. The enemy holding all road terminals and towns has made no attempt to push into the hills against our forces in northeastern part of the island.

Some slight enemy activity on the Digos front.

27 April 1942.

Intermittent fire from Betan continued to harass Corregidor during the night and morning. Malinta Hill, 90th Coast Artillery area and revolving battery Purris (150mm) heavily hit during four bombing raids.

Our AA still effective, keeping enemy bombers at high altitudes. One heavy and one light bomber hit.

The enemy apparently content to hold his gains in Panay.

In Mindanao our patrols entered Embongco City which resulted in several sharp clashes. Our harassing patrols continue to press forward on other fronts.

28 April 1942.

Corregidor experienced its 100th bombing since the fall of Betan. Five bombers also attacked boats in the harbor.

Cross fire from Betan and Ternate harassed Corregidor during the night and morning.

Battery Way, four 12 inch mortars, out of service for several years, named by Battery "E", 60th Coast Artillery when that battery returned from Betan, reconditioned and ready for action. Our seacoast batteries interdicted critical roads, fired on truck columns and executed counter battery missions. Three fires started in Betan, a truck column destroyed

and at least three batteries silenced.

Quiet prevailed in Puncu and Obova.

Our patrols clashed with the enemy near Diges, Labak, Oshoto, reported bombed by Japanese planes 27 April. Six hostile transports, escorted by two destroyers, moved east off Basilan Island.

28 April 1942.

Heavy attacks by enemy air craft and artillery against Corragidor and other Fortified Islands continued throughout most of the day, twelve separate bombing attacks on Corragidor alone. Heavy artillery fire, included all calibers, 75mm to 240mm. A number of our observing stations destroyed. The power plant for number 4's, fixed searchlight, hit and burned. The 1.1 quadruple mount wrecked, three 75mm beach defense guns destroyed and two ammunition dumps burned.

Seacoast batteries on all the Fortified Islands effectively replied, neutralized four enemy batteries, fired one ammunition dump and interdicted critical roads and troop areas.

Two navy PT's from Australia, via Mindanao Island, loaded with medicines and seven hundred forty (740) mechanical fuses for 3 inch AA ammunition, landed in South Bay.

One seacoast battery secured five direct hits and set fire to the Coast Guard Cutter ups near Coboebes, which the Japanese had been trying to salvage.

Our AA shot down two light bombers, set one on fire and hit at least two others.

The PT's, loaded with fifty selected passengers (including about thirty-eight American throes), took off for Mindanao.

Heavy enemy shelling had cut practically all lines of communication to beach defense troops and gun batteries; destroyed the power plant for AA guns; damaged height finder instruments, and put Battery Oary out of action.

The Japanese landing in Purang and Cotabato opened up another front in Mindanao.

30 April 1942.

The heavy air and artillery offensive launched against the Fortified Islands continued with undiminished intensity. The whole island of Corregidor raked with artillery fire until 10:35 PM, the heaviest concentration striking Battery Way, which received 100 hits. Battery Geary received additional damage. Battery Crockett damaged and Battery Byrne put out of action (150mm roving battery). One anti-aircraft gun damaged. Communication lines continually cut.

Our artillery batteries, assault and roving, answered with counter battery fire and defensive concentrations. A tug operating in Mariveles Harbor sunk; a boat or barge on the east coast of Davao set on fire; an enemy ammunition dump blown up; heavy explosions caused in one artillery position; three batteries neutralized and truck columns dispersed. Anti-aircraft hit and damaged one bomber.

Our forces in North Luzon, at Mount Dufa, attacked 29 April and driven back to Mbesay Gate, where they held. An enemy force estimated at about five hundred (with pack trains and horses) moved east toward Bay, Abra.

In the Visayas, hostilities in Cebu reported to have ceased, with General Chynoweth in the mountains with three hundred men and a six months food supply.

Our force on the Purang-Cotabato front forced back several kilometers by hostile aerial and naval bombardment in conjunction with infantry attacks, reorganized a defensive line near Aba. The 102d Infantry (PA) formed a new line at KP 30 to prevent envelopment of the left flank. The 2d Infantry (PA) covered Buldon. The 61st Infantry (PA) formed its main line of resistance to the rear of the Malabon Airport. Japanese launched a new offensive on the Digos front.



No activity on Pusan. The enemy bombed and strafed the airports at Onsoo, Leyte; Camp Carmon, Bohol, and Bacolod, Negros.

1 May 1952.

Corregidor and other Fortified Islands subjected to heavy pounding by enemy artillery from Batan and Tornado. The enemy, firing from many new positions, had kept up a relentless campaign in an effort to harass personnel, neutralize artillery batteries and destroy defenses.

Light and heavy bombers had also made thirteen separate bombing attacks against the Harbor Defenses. A total of 149 bombing attacks had been made against Corregidor during the twenty-three days since the fall of Batan.

Seacoast batteries on all the Fortified Islands continued counter battery fire and interdiction of enemy truck columns. Several enemy light bombers hit and damaged by anti-aircraft automatic weapons.

A convoy of enemy troop transports, escorted by naval ships, reported off Pontevedra and Binalbagan, Negros, by the Visayan-Mindanao Force.

No activity on Pusan.

The enemy reinforced the Cotabato front in Mindanao and advanced to Lake Dupon northeast of Misamis. Approximately 300 enemy troops in steel barges proceeded up the Jelaugui River to Dalaman. The Digos front bombed and strafed by the enemy.

The enemy had constructed bridges over Bato Ferry in North Luzon, nine kilometers south of Dagupan. No report had been received from Colonel Moran for several days.

2 May 1952.

Corregidor and the other Fortified Islands subjected to continuous shell fire, the heaviest concentration yet experienced by Corregidor, as the enemy covered the entire island with 240mm fire. During a five hour period, twelve 240mm shells had fallen per minute for a total of 3,600 hits in the

Geary-Crockett area at Topside. In addition the enemy made thirteen distinct and separate bombing attacks on Corregidor, using heavy and light bombardment planes.

Our assault batteries replied with counter battery fire, neutralizing at least three enemy batteries. Our antiaircraft hit and damaged one light bomber.

This intensive bombardment extracted a heavy toll on the defenses of Corregidor. Battery Geary completely destroyed; the number 2 gun in Battery Crockett permanently put out of action; Battery Craighill, two mortars damaged and put out of action; Battery James, one gun severely damaged and put out of action; assault searchlight number 1, 2 and 3 put out of action and the nine coastal group number 24 permanently put out of action.

Our antiaircraft defense severely crippled with five 3-inch antiaircraft guns put out of action; one height finder destroyed and two severely damaged; three caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns put out of action; enemy data transmission cable cut and all communication lines over the entire island damaged.

The beach defenses, which had been severely pounded, had four machine guns, one 37mm gun, and the engineer dock pill box destroyed. Beach wire, and beach obstacles considerable damaged.

No reports received on the situation in Northern Luzon.

The enemy appeared to be content with his gains on Peony. Situation in Isumo remained critical. An attack on Del Norte appeared to be imminent. Two destroyers and six transports headed for Honjalar Bay.

#### 1 May 1942.

Corregidor experienced its two hundred eighty-seventh bombing since the beginning of the war.

Artillery shelling of Corregidor and the other Fortified Islands

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continued with unabated intensity. Our antiaircraft defenses, already seriously crippled suffered additional loss of guns, height finders, and personnel.

Our roving 105mm batteries continued to fire counter battery fire.

At 10:00 PM the last admiral's departed from Corregidor with the following personnel: Colonel Boyle, 145th Infantry; Colonel Irwin, G-3, USFP, with complete rosters of all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel who were alive; Colonel Jenks, Finance Officer, USFP, with all money accounts; Colonel Hill, Inspector General, USFP; Colonel Savage, Air Officer, USFP; Colonel Wemy, Veterinary Officer, USA; five Naval Officers; thirteen or fourteen nurses, Army Nurse Corps; many USAFV and USFP records, orders, and several bags of mail. This was the last outgoing mail, personnel or orders to leave Corregidor.

At 3:00 AM, the enemy landed between Inigo and Pagolosa, in Manjalar Bay in Northern Mindanao. The enemy also effected a major landing at Daguayan, Mindanao. Our forces desperately opposed this landing and inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. The enemy's activity in Mindanao indicated preparations to launch an offensive on all fronts.

Our forces in Northern Luzon, except for resisting advances of the enemy, practically ceased activity due to the scarcity of ammunition.

#### 4 MAY 1942.

The enemy continued to pound Corregidor and other Fortified Islands. At 3:00 PM the heaviest general artillery bombardment of the campaign, consisting of all calibers, including 240mm, came down on Corregidor, literally a continuous drum-fire of bursting shells. The bulk of the enemy fire directed against beach defenses, especially at James Ravine, Foster Point Ravine, and the beach between North and Cavalry Points. Machine Gun emplacements and machine guns damaged and some 75mm guns put out of action. Corregidor subjected to its 29th bombing attack.

Our AA defenses had been so severely crippled that very little AA fire was available to oppose these bombing attacks.

Fort Erma and Battery Galick (firing 155mm) fire-counter battery at enemy positions near Caboben. Batteries Hoaje and Wright (firing 155mm, D-Flat) opened fire against Corde Point.

Our communication and entrance units constantly attempted to repair damages to material and communication lines.

All our forces kept on the alert for a possible enemy landing during darkness.

Our forces in the vicinity of Cagayan, Misamis, withdrew to the vicinity of Dalirig, blowing all bridges to delay the hostile advance. Our forces on the Migas and Cotabato fronts forced back, but delayed the hostile advance by destroying all bridges and using all possible delaying tactics. On the Migas front, the enemy advanced to Kilometer Post 103; troops organized a second position at Kilometer Post 125. On the Cotabato front, the enemy reported in Misayup and Pikit. All forces in Misamis depleted by desertions and sickness.

The Commanding General, USMIP, in reply to a radio from General Marshall 3 May 1942, asking for a fresh estimate of the situation in the Philippines, sent the following estimate of the situation to General Marshall in Washington:

"Hostile air force has bombed Cuzcolegui relentlessly since March 26, 1942. Enemy immediately employed artillery on south shore of peninsula following fall of Betan on 7 April 1942 and since then has subjected our defenses to artillery fire."

"Beginning 29 April 1942, the Emperor's birthday, hostile artillery fire increased in intensity and has continued at that tempo to the present. Hostile bombing has been relatively ineffective but artillery fire from large-caliber guns, 240mm, has destroyed large percentage of coast and beach defense artillery and small arms."

"Since 9 April 1942, continued bombardment has caused about six hundred casualties and has lowered the morale of troops. Difficult to maintain morale at best because troops have been under or subject to artillery or air attack constantly since 29 December 1941 and have received half of poorly balanced rations since 5 January 1942. Morale however, is amazingly good considering conditions under which troops are presently operating."

"Persistent reports from operatives indicate that the enemy plans to launch an assault against Corregidor. He has prepared a large number of motor boats with mounted weapons and constructed large number of smaller boats for troop transport. I have nothing on which to base an estimate of present hostile strength of troops on Luzon. However, the enemy, in taking Cebu and Jassy, used about 10,000 men in each operation. He is now engaged in attack on Mindanao. I estimate that at least 10,000 men are engaged at Mindanao."

"Unless Japanese troops have been withdrawn from the Philippines, I believe sufficient force is left on Luzon to undertake an operation against Corregidor. In my opinion the enemy is capable of making assault on Corregidor at any time."

"Success or failure of such assault will depend entirely on the steadfastness of beach defense troops. Considering the present level of morale, I estimate that we have something less than an even chance to beat off an assault. I have given you, in accordance with your request, a very frank and honest opinion on the situation as I see it."

5 May 1942.

Corregidor bombed, the 300th bombing attack since 8 December 1941.

The enemy continued heavy, relentless artillery fire, pounding all of the Fortified Islands. On Corregidor, James Bevis, the North Shore, and the tail of the island pounded terrifically. Communication lines cut, numerous beach defense guns and beach defense searchlights put out of action,

and a large number of beach defense land mines exploded.

USFV Headquarters received a message from a G-2 agent on Luzon stating that: "The Japanese are planning to land on Corregidor tonight". For the past ten days, since the start of the extraordinarily heavy artillery and bombing attacks, all forces had been alerted to guard against a landing. Not satisfied with this, the Commanding General, USFV, had personally gone to Harbor Defense Headquarters and talked over the situation with Major General George F. Moore, Commanding General, Harbor Defense, and had investigated conditions of the defenses; the feeding of troops; the morale of the troops; the priority plans for rapid counter attack in case a landing was effected and had satisfied himself that everything that could possibly be done to defeat the impending Japanese attack had been done.

Beach defense installations on the Northside of the island had become practically non-existent. Barbed wire entanglements and personnel obstacles and most of the 75mm guns had been destroyed. Trees and vegetation on the entire side of the island had been destroyed and the ground had been literally churned to powder dust. All wire communication had been shot away. Command could be exercised and intelligence obtained only by use of foot messengers, which medium was uncertain under the heavy and continuous artillery and air bombardment.

A message received at 10:30 PM from "H" station to Beach Defense Commander G-1, and MACP stated: "Enemy landing attack indicated".

A runner arrived at 11:50 PM at "H" station from North Point and reported the enemy landing at North Point. No warning had been received from naval vessels on watch. As nearly as can be determined the 1st wave of the Japanese landing attack hit the beach at North Point at 11:30 PM, 5 May 1942.

The second defense commander ordered to send personnel from

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Authority: AIA 28-5078

U. S. D. T. 59th Coast Artillery, manning Batteries Conroy, Wheeler, and Crockett, to positions in beach defense reserve; other Coast Artillery troops, manning several AA armaments, released to Beach Defense Commander in accordance with prearranged plan of priorities.

Very little activity on Gagegun front, demolitions effected by our forces prevented the enemy from a rapid advance.

No change in the situation on the Cotehate front.

No report received from Northern Lagoon Forces.

6 Mar 1942.

A messenger from Lieutenant Colonel Blagg, 92d Coast Artillery, received at about 12:50 AM, stated that he had formed a line across Kinley Field Water Tank Hill with batteries E and F, 92d Coast Artillery (FA), and that he was cooperating with marines in defense of the east sector.

One 75mm gun battery (2 guns) in position near the tail end of the island had not previously disclosed its position. It opened fire on the enemy landing force in a complete surprise attack and sank a number of landing barges and inflicted many casualties.

The few remaining searchlights attempted to go into action, but had been quickly shot out by enemy artillery fire from Betasan.

However by 1:50 AM the moon had risen so that effective fire could be placed on the landing party. All available artillery on the Fortified Islands opened fire and destroyed numerous landing barges and inflicted heavy casualties on the landing force.

The enemy landed in two waves. Information, received from Japanese officers after cessation of hostilities, indicated that the first wave consisted of 2,000 infantrymen, 800 of whom got ashore; the second wave of 10,000 and that enemy losses totalled about 4,100.

Uncoordinated fighting continued generally throughout the night. Battery Way (12 inch mortars) at Fort Hills; remaining 3-inch

AA batteries; Battery Quaghill (12 inch mortars) and 2 - 75mm beach defense guns on Fort Hughes, continued to fire on landing barges.

The Commanding General, USMC, received the following message from the President of the United States of America at about noon:

"During recent weeks we have been following with growing admiration the day-by-day accounts of your heroic stand against the mounting intensity of bombardment by enemy planes and heavy siege guns.

In spite of all the handicaps of complete isolation, lack of food and ammunition you have given the world a shining example of patriotic fortitude and self-sacrifice.

The American people ask no finer example of tenacity, resourcefulness, and steadfast courage. The calm determination of your personal leadership in a desperate situation sets a standard of duty for our soldiers throughout the world.

In every camp and on every naval vessel soldiers, sailors, and Marines are inspired by the gallant struggle of their comrades in the Philippines. The workmen in our shipyards and munitions plants redouble their efforts because of your example.

You and your devoted followers have become the living symbols of our war aims and the guarantee of victory. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

A third assault wave of landing boats, approaching Corregidor at dawn, broken up and practically annihilated by artillery fire from Fort Drum, Battery Stevedore (A-31st), Battery Wright (D-31st), Battery Dulick (G-31st) and roving 105mm gas batteries on Corregidor. Fire from these same units repulsed another landing attempt headed for Bottomside Dock area and Power Plant Bldg.

The Beach Defense Commander reported the situation under control but that landings which had been made behind our lines, near Infantry Point, necessitated withdrawal toward Malinta Hill.



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Authority: AUC 58-1072

The Beach Defense Reserve Battalion reinforced with personnel from Batteries B and C, 59th Coast Artillery, and all other available troops counter attacked at dawn in the East Sector, drove the enemy back for some distance and effectively stopped his advance toward Maliste Hill. However, the early morning light enabled the enemy to bring effective artillery fire from Betann to bear on our counter attacking troops, this in conjunction with attacks by dive bombers and heavy strafing by large numbers of enemy fighter planes, drove some of our troops back into Maliste Tunnel and pinned all other units to the ground on the final defense line east of Maliste Tunnel. Heavy artillery fire saturated the entire area of the island between Maliste Hill and Hindley Field Water Tank Hill (the latter held by the Japanese), and also thoroughly covered Bottomside and Topside. Our reserves suffered some casualties in passing through these barrages going to the East Sector.

The Commanding General, USMFP, made a clear cut estimate of the situation, sensed the seriousness of conditions on Corregidor and dispatched a radio message to Major General Sharp which released the Visayan-Mindanao Force from under the control of USMFP, and directed Major General Sharp to take all further orders from General MacArthur's Headquarters in Australia.

The enemy had landed and assembled by 10:30 AM a sizable tank force in the vicinity of Hindley Field. The Commanding General, USMFP, realized the hopelessness of the situation and that although he could hold during the day, the defending forces would certainly be over powered and over run during the coming hours of darkness. He called Generals Moore and Beebe and informed them of his heart breaking decision to surrender the Fortified Islands at noon, and directed Brigadier General Lewis G. Beebe, Chief of Staff, to broadcast at 10:30 AM a surrender message, which had been prepared in the event the Commanding General, USMFP, lost his life and could not be present when the broadcast had to be made, to

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Authority: NND 883027

General Hama or the commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, as follows, quote:

"Anyone receiving this message please transmit it to the commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces on Luzon.

For military reasons which General Wainwright considers sufficient to put a stop to further sacrifice of human life, the commanding general will surrender to Your Excellency today the four fortified islands at the entrance to Manila Bay together with all military and naval personnel and all existing stores and equipment.

At twelve noon, local Daylight Savings Time, 6 May 1962, a white flag will be displayed in a prominent position on Corregidor, at which time all firing from the harbor forts will cease unless a landing by Japanese troops in force is attempted without flags of truce, in which case they will be taken under fire.

If all of your firing and aerial bombardment has ceased at twelve noon local time the commanding general will send two staff officers by boat, flying a white flag, to the Oboobas deck to meet a Japanese staff officer, whom the commanding general requests that Your Excellency have there, empowered to name the time and place for the commanding general to meet Your Excellency in order that he may make the formal surrender and to arrange all details.

Upon the return of his staff officers the commanding general will proceed by boat, accompanied by some of his staff, to such place as may be designated by Your Excellency. The commanding general's launch will fly a white flag and his party will consist of five or six persons. He requests that motor transportation meet his party at the landing point designated by you." Unquote.

The destruction of all messages ordered in accordance with secret orders and plans which had already been given to regimental and Fort Commanders,

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Authority: 2508813027

destruction to be accomplished by noon, and if not completed by noon, nothing to be destroyed after that time. Plans called for the destruction of all armament above .45 caliber. The command instructed to lay down arms at noon. The flag on Corregidor ordered lowered and burned at noon and a white flag displayed. These instructions relayed to all concerned as rapidly and insofar as disrupted communications permitted. All units received the order in time to comply with instructions, except Fort Hughes.

UNSW General Staff sections and unit headquarters destroyed all current documents, maps and other papers of military importance.

All gold bullion had been previously transported by submarine to the United States. Serial numbers had been taken on all paper currency, transmitted by radio message to Washington and the currency cut up and burned. Silver bullion had been crated, moved out into the bay and sunk, and its location transmitted by radio message to Washington. General Staff journals, orders and various official records had been sent out by submarine on night of 3 May 1942. A number of other documents not considered of historical value, of importance to the War Department, or of any value in continuing the campaign had been previously destroyed.

The surrender message broadcast repeated at 11:00 AM, and again at 11:15 AM.

The Commanding General, UNSW, transmitted by radio the following message, the first to the President of the United States of America and the second to General MacArthur in Australia, Cante:

"With broken heart and head bowed in sadness, but not in shame I report to Your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the surrender of the Fortified Islands of Manila Bay.

With many guns and anti-aircraft fire control equipment destroyed we are no longer able to prevent accurate bombardment from the air. With numerous batteries of heavy caliber emplaced on the shores of Batuan and

2-1  
99

Good-bye, General, my regards to you and our comrades in Australia.  
my.

Lingyon Gulf to Boston to Corregidor, always hoping relief was on the  
and but unknown. I have fought for you to the best of my ability from  
We have done our full duty for you and for our country. We were  
Philippine troops have engaged and held the enemy for nearly five months.  
without slaughter. There is apparently no relief in sight. American and  
I feel it is my duty to the nation and my troops to end this

quote:

The same message to General MacArthur, with these exceptions:  
Good-bye, Mr. President, "Ingrate."

I go to meet the Japanese Commander.

With profound respect and with exultant pride in my gallant troops  
effort to attain victory.

My God bless and preserve you and guide you and the nation in the  
have upheld the best traditions of the United States and the Army.

If you agree, Mr. President, please say to the nation that my  
troops and I have accomplished all that is humanly possible and that we

assertions.

and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and human  
been part. Without prospect of relief I feel it is my duty to my country

There is a limit of human endurance and that limit has long since  
overwhelmingly assaulted by Japanese troops on Corregidor.

prevent them from falling into enemy hands. In addition we are now  
put out of action by the enemy. I have ordered the others destroyed to

most of my batteries, mortar, anti-aircraft and field, have been  
our remaining guns.

While the enemy now brings devastating firepower to bear on us, extinguishing

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May God strengthen your arm to insure ultimate success of the cause for which we have fought side by side.\* Unquote.

The vigor and intensity of the Japanese attack continued.

The flag, which had been shot down and replaced twice under fire during the siege, lowered and burned at 12:00 noon by Colonel Paul D. Dwyer, Coast Artillery Corps, the second Defense Commander, and a white flag raised immediately thereafter.

The enemy disregarded the flag of truce, artillery fire, machine gun fire and dive bomber attacks continued unabated.

Brigadier General DeSoto repeated the surrender message again at 12:30 PM.

Captain Colland L. Clark, USMC, accompanied by First Lieutenant Allen S. Manning, USMC, with a flag of truce proceeded at about 1:00 PM toward the Japanese lines, contacted Japanese troops who conducted them to the senior Japanese officer. The Marine Corps officers returned in about thirty minutes to Marine Tunnel with a message directing the Commanding General, USMIP, to come to the Japanese Commander if he desired to discuss terms.

The Commanding General, USMIP, accompanied by Major General Moore, Lieutenant Colonel Fugh, Major Donley and Major Brown proceeded at 2:00 PM under a white flag by car to the foot of Kinley Field Water Tank Hill, where the party left the car and walked up the hill to meet the Japanese Commander. Arrangements, promptly completed, provided for the Commanding General, USMIP, and party to be taken to Estabro to meet General Hase. A Japanese Colonel, an English speaking Japanese Lieutenant, and the Commanding General's party started on foot for the north dock, but heavy Japanese ground fire suddenly opened up on the area just ahead of the party, and dive bombers strafed the area between the group and the dock.

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The Japanese Colonel declined to proceed any further in that direction, and accompanied by his interpreter, the Commanding General, USIP, and Major Dooley returned to the rear of the Japanese lines. The remainder of the Commanding General's party returned to Malinta tunnel. General Beebe, Lieutenant Colonel Fugh, Major Lawrence and Sergeant Corral immediately left the tunnel and proceeded to the dock, secured a motor launch and departed for Cebu, Batavia.

The Japanese moved into Malinta Tunnel and occupied Bottomside, at 4:00 PM, then advanced to Middleside and along South Shore Road. Topside bombed relentlessly throughout the afternoon.

The Commanding General, USIP, reached Cebu at 4:50 PM. Brigadier General Beebe's party joined him and the entire party continued by automobile to a house about three quarters of a mile north of Cebu where they waited about a hour for the arrival of General Hume.

The Commanding General, USIP, seated at a table facing General Hume handed him the formal signed surrender document, and, although he could read and speak English, General Hume did not look at the document, but handed it to Lieutenant Nakamura, his interpreter, who read it aloud in Japanese.

General Hume replied thru his interpreter that no surrender would be accepted unless it included all the United States and Philippine Troops in the Philippines.

After a very heated discussion and much hickering over the status of the forces in the Philippines, other than those on the Fortified Islands, General Hume replied very sharply:

"Hostilities against the Fortified Islands will be continued unless the Japanese surrender terms are accepted."

Again the Commanding General, USMIF, tried to confine the surrender discussion to the Fortified Islands, but General Honna jumped up from the table, strode angrily and haughtily to his car and drove off.

The party then got up and walked slowly down the steps. After some discussion, the Japanese Colonel who had brought the Commanding General, USMIF, to Detrom was asked, "What do you want us to do now?" He replied: "We will take you and your party back to Corraçidor and then you can do as you deem please."

In a further attempt to continue the discussion, the Japanese Colonel brusquely replied: "General Wainwright was given his opportunity and he refused it. We will continue our offensive against Corraçidor."

The Japanese Colonel, asked if an American Staff Officer could be sent by Japanese plane to General Shury's Headquarters in Mindanao, apparently assumed that this was the complete surrender replied: "I am not authorized to accept your surrender. Now that General Honna has gone you can surrender only to the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Imperial Forces on Corraçidor."

The party, driven back to Odeoben, embarked for Corraçidor, and landed at North Point after dark at about 7:00 PM. The Japanese shelling still continued on parts of the island. The enemy line had advanced to within 100 yards of the east entrance of Milinta Tunnel.

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Additional landings had been made and the Japanese controlled the area between the west entrance of the tunnel and Harrison Hill.

The Commanding General, USMIF, asked the interpreter to take him to the Japanese commander. The party, led around Malinta Hill to the west side and down to a little settlement named, "Bario San Jose", entered a partially destroyed Filipino market building to meet another Japanese Colonel, the senior Japanese officer on Corregidor.

The surrender document, drawn up and signed by midnight, and typed in stiff Japanese version of English read: Quote,

"Imperial Japanese Army and Navy are only prepared to accept surrender of all forces under your command. To troops operating in other part of the Philippine Islands the order shall be given to disarm voluntarily immediately and to take the understipulated steps.

Those remaining in Northern Luzon to assemble at Bayambang or Bostoc and the commanding officer to present himself to Japanese Army in Baguio and notify him of their surrender. Those remaining on Ponsoy Island to assemble northern environs of Iloclo City, on Pagosa Island in the vicinity of Bacolod City, and the commanding officers of both regions to present themselves to Japanese Army in Iloclo and notify of their surrender.

Those remaining on Schol Island to assemble in the vicinity of Real and the commanding officers to present themselves to Japanese Army in Cebu and notify of their surrender. Those remaining on Leyte Island and on Samar Island to assemble in the vicinity of Taloan and Catheragan respectively and the commanding officers to present themselves to Japanese Army in Legaspi and notify of their surrender.



Those remaining in the district of Lanao and Embouage in Mindanao Island to assemble in the vicinity of Iligan and those remaining in the district of Malaybalay and Agusan Basin to assemble in the vicinity of Malaybalay and Davao and their commanding officers to notify of their surrender.

Those in other islands not mentioned above to assemble at any convenient place and notify the nearest Japanese Army of their surrender. The order shall be carried out within four days.\*

\*(A) It is strictly prohibited to destroy, burn, or disperse arms, materials, vessels, and any establishments, either part or whole.

(1) Portable and easily movable weapons to be gathered all together in the vicinity of the assembling places of the troops.

(2) Heavy arms, materials, and equipment to be kept intact and the location thereof to be reported with a sketch.

(3) Vessels in waters other than Manila Bay to proceed to the port of Ogasan.

(4) Defense measures, especially those areas wherein land mines or sea mines were laid, to be reported with a sketch, and the actual position to be distinctly indicated by suitable means, if such is at all possible.

(5) Japanese prisoners of war, if any, to be handed over immediately.

(6) Further orders will be given if such is found necessary.

Japanese Army and Navy will not cease their operations until they recognize faithfulness in executing the above-mentioned orders.

If and when such faithfulness is recognized, the commander in chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines will order "Cease Fire" after taking all circumstances into consideration.\* Unquote.

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The Japanese landed and took over Fort Hughes at 11:30 PM.  
7 May 1962.

Japanese forces landed without opposition at Juma Navine and  
Powder Mill Navine at 3:00 AM.

Early in the morning, Colonel Hobe, General Staff, General  
Hume's Headquarters, conferred with the Commanding General, USMFP,  
reference the details of the surrender. The Commanding General, as the  
first and most important step toward carrying out these terms, prepared  
the following letter to Major General Sharp, Commanding General,  
Visayan-Mindanao Force. Quote:

Subject: Surrender.

To: Major General William F. Sharp, Jr., Commanding Visayan-  
Mindanao Force.

To put a stop to further useless sacrifice of human life on the  
Fortified Islands, yesterday I tendered to Lieutenant General Hume, the  
commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, the  
surrender of the four harbor forts in Manila Bay.

General Hume declined to accept my surrender unless it included  
the forces under your command. It became apparent that the garrisons of  
these said forts would be eventually destroyed by aerial and artillery  
bombardment and by infantry supported by tanks, which have overwhelmed  
Corregidor.

After leaving General Hume with no agreement between us I decided  
to accept in the name of humanity his proposal and tendered at midnight,  
night 6-7 May 1962, to the senior Japanese officer on Corregidor, the  
formal surrender of all American and Philippine Army troops in the  
Philippine Islands. You will therefore be guided accordingly, and will  
repeat will surrender all troops under your command both in the Visayan

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Islands and Mindanao to the proper Japanese Officer. This decision on my part, you will realize, was forced upon me by means beyond my control.

Colonel Jesse T. Traywick, Jr., G.S.C., my assistant chief of staff, G-3, who will deliver this letter to you, is fully empowered to act for me. You are hereby ordered by me as the senior American Army Officer in the Philippine Islands to scrupulously carry out the provisions of this letter, as well as such additional instructions as this staff officer may give you in my name.

You will repeat the complete text of this letter, and of such other instructions as Colonel Traywick may give you, by radio to General MacArthur. However, let me emphasize that there must be on your part no thought of disregarding these instructions. Failure to fully and honestly carry them out can have only the most disastrous results. Signed,  
Lieutenant General Johnathan M. Wainwright, \* Unquote.

The Commanding General, transferred to Manila, broadcast surrender messages to General Sharp and to Colonels John F. Moran and Guillermo Baker, commanders of small forces in Northern Luzon.

The following officers accompanied the Commanding General, USFP, to Manila:

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Pugh, Aide-de-Camp  
Colonel Jesse T. Traywick Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Colonel James C. Pilet, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
Colonel Elliott F. Galbraith, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Blalock, Assistant Quartermaster.

This group departed from Corregidor at 5:00 PM under Japanese Guard, and as they walked out of the west entrance of the tunnel car captured

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soldiers came to attention en masse and saluted, paying their respect to the Commanding General of the United States Forces in the Philippines.

The party arrived at the radio station in Manila about midnight, radio broadcast completed at 1:00 AM, and the entire party housed at the University Club, Manila.

8 May 1945.

Colonels Jesse T. Traywick Jr., and Homer G. Pilet departed at 8:30 AM in custody of Japanese guards for Nichols Field to fly to Mindanao. However, as the Japanese plane assigned this mission had room for only one passenger, Colonel Pilet returned to Manila. The plane left the field about 1:00 PM, arrived at Cagayan, Mindanao about 5:00 PM. Colonel Traywick's mission: To take the surrender message in person to Major General Sharp, to answer any questions relative to the surrender, and to insure the carrying out of the surrender terms.

Colonel Merrill F. Galbraith and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Bialucha sent by automobile to Baguio and vicinity to contact Colonels John F. Moran and Guillermo Dahn respectively, deliver the surrender message and insure compliance with surrender terms.

Colonel Traywick returned to the University Club in Manila late in the afternoon 11 May, and reported to the Commanding General, USFIP, that his mission had been successfully accomplished.

Brigadier General Lewis C. Soebe, Major Thomas Dooley, Major William Lawrence, and Sergeant Carroll arrived at the University Club from Corregidor.

The Japanese stated on 12 May that small detachments were

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still holding out in the Macol Peninsula and Palawan and asked why word had not been received from Colonels Moran and Baker in Northern Luzon. The Commanding General again reminded that his forces would not be recognized as prisoners of war until all opposition had ceased.

It was requested that Major General Guillermo Francisco, Philippine Constabulary, and First Lieutenant Robert C. Gilbey, (AMN), be brought to the University Club in order that they could be instructed to contact the Constabulary unit on Palawan and the small forces still holding out in Southern Luzon. These two officers, brought to the University Club on 23 May, and Lieutenant Colonel John R. Pugh, Aide-de-Camp, flew to Legaspi by Japanese plane and successfully contacted the forces on Palawan and in Southern Luzon.

Troops on Corregidor evacuated to Manila 28 May. American troops, disembarked in the water at Parangue, forced to march through Manila to Elliptical Prison. Filipino troops unloaded at docks in Manila Harbor and marched to Elliptical Prison.

Japanese authorities informed the Commanding General, USMIP, 9 June that: "All organized resistance has ended, your high command ceases and you are now a prisoner of war. You will be transported today to a prisoner of war camp for senior officers at Tarlac".

The Japanese used vastly superior numbers of veteran troops and units from China and Malaya, supported by overwhelming artillery fire and aerial bombardment, in the attack on Corregidor. Half starved, mentally and physically exhausted troops, experiencing their first combat action, held this force at bay in a gratifyingly obstinate resistance, which indicated splendid leadership and fortitude throughout all ranks of the defenders. The Japanese had been forced to defeat a field army in Bataan, to spend five valuable months softening the defenses of the Fortified Islands, and then to make a costly landing on Corregidor, in order to capture a few outmoded seacoast batteries, which had however

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denied the entrance to Manila Bay to the enemy throughout the period.

**F. VISAYAS-MINDANAO FORCE**

The Visayas-Mindanao Force consisted mainly of small units on separate islands and operations became more or less independent actions. Details of these actions are fully covered in Annex XI attached hereto.

#### VI. CONCLUSION.

This report covers a period in American History in which our defensive force was attacked during mobilization. Few units of any force had been completely mobilized and all lacked training and equipment. No Division or Force had been assembled or trained in unit maneuvers; staffs lacked organization and trained personnel. The one regular army unit, the Philippine Division, less than two-thirds strength, had only three (3) new 37mm automatic firing cannons, three (3) 60mm mortars per infantry regiment and no (0) 81mm mortars, and had just been recently reorganized from a Square Division into a Triangular Division. During this reorganization the Division had been called upon to furnish cadres of officers and enlisted men to train the Philippine Army. The Philippine Army Divisions with an organic strength of 8,200 mobilized at about two-thirds strength, and all units lacked even obsolete equipment and had no modern arms or equipment. Troops did not have steel helmets, entrenching tools, or in many cases, blankets or raincoats.

Even under these tremendous handicaps the U.S. Forces in the Philippines developed into a fighting army in a remarkably short time, and successfully resisted the best troops of Japan. The initial enemy force allotted to conquer the Philippines was so weakened and spent that by 14 February 1942 the enemy was forced to halt, reorganize and get replacements from Malaya and China. Even in the face of this fresh force our troops resisted until casualties, sickness, lack of food and dwindling supplies forced it to yield to a superior force.

Only by exceptional effort, exertion and will power of all officers and men was the rapid conquest of the Philippines thwarted. It is believed this campaign cost the Japanese Empire a tremendous expenditure in arms, ammunition and men, and frustrated any further immediate attempt the enemy might have planned for further conquest in that section of the globe.

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It can be truthfully said of the forces in the Philippines, "Even though conquered, a bitter and hard fight exceptionally well performed."

In view of the circumstances, it is believed that the action of all units and actions of all officers and enlisted men were a real credit to the armed forces of the United States, an inspiration to their allies, and a brilliant chapter in the annals of American Military History.

*J. M. Wainwright*

J. M. WAINWRIGHT  
General, United States Army  
Former Commanding General,  
United States Forces in the Philippines.

Fort Sam Houston, Texas  
Sep. 10. 1946

Appendices:

Annexes I - XVIII inclusive.



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