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REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF
NORTH LUZON FORCE &
I PHILIPPINE CORPS
IN THE
DEFENSE OF NORTH
LUZON AND BATAAN

FROM

8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 9 APRIL 1942

Annex IV

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INTRODUCTION

On June 10, 1942 the Japanese had assembled, at Darlan, P.I., all the American General Officers and Colonels who had been captured on Batavia and Corregidor. Among these were the commanders or staff officers of all the larger units of the North Luzon Force and 1 Philippine Corps.

I requested these officers to submit reports covering the operations of their units on North Luzon and Batavia. These reports were submitted and a summary of them was prepared. The individual reports were confiscated by the Japanese, but the summary was preserved and forms the basis of this report. It is accurate in its main features and should form a good basis for further research should official documents be recovered from the Japanese or found in the possession of survivors of this campaign.

This summary tells the story of a force attacked during mobilization. Initially lacking organization, training and equipment, it developed into an efficient fighting force in a remarkably short time. It resisted the best troops of Japan until casualties, sickness, lack of food and dwindling supplies forced it to yield to superior force.

ORGANIZATION OF NORTH LUZON FORCE

On November 20, 1941, I relinquished command of the Philippine Division, proceeded from Fort McKinley to Fort Stotsenburg, and assumed command of the North Luzon Force, which at this time was in the process of mobilization.

Initial Mission

The initial mission assigned the North Luzon Force was to prevent a landing. In the event a landing was made, it was to attack and destroy the landing force.

The Defense Area

The defense area assigned the North Luzon Force included all of Luzon north of Manila except that portion of the Panganga Valley between Manila and San Fernando, Panganga, which was designated, "The Reserve Area" and remained under control of USAFFE.

The area was about one thousand kilometers in length measured along a smooth curve and not following the numerous indentations of the coast line. It measured two hundred kilometers across its widest part. Mountain ranges paralleled the coast, leaving a narrow corridor along the west coast and none along the east coast. The only sizeable gap in these ranges was in the Lingayen Gulf area. This gap offered the best approach to the Panganga Valley and Manila. An east and west mountain range separated the Cagayan Valley from the Panganga Valley.

These terrain features divided North Luzon into the following compartments:

- a. The Ilocos Peninsula.
- b. The Eschalee Coast from Olango to Lingayen.
- c. The Ilocos, La Union Coast.
- d. The East Coast from Aparri, inclusive to Infante, exclusive.
- e. The Cagayan Valley.
- f. The Panganga Valley, or Central Plain of Luzon.

The road net in general was good. A road suitable in the dry season for heavy military traffic ran along the west coast. There was no

good road along the east coast. A good road, Highway No. 6, extended from Aparri to Manila, passing through Balete Pass. On the west, Highway No. 2 traversed the Pangasinan Valley from Lingayen Gulf to Manila passing through San Fernando, Pangasinan. San Fernando was connected with Ilocos by an excellent road, Highway No. 7. Second and third class roads provided good lateral communications in the dry season north of San Fernando. South of San Fernando these communications were broken up by the Cordoba and Cagaya Swamps. The Pura-Dinalupihan Road was suitable for military traffic during the dry season only.

The Cagayan, Agno and Pangasinan were the principal rivers. These rivers were unfordable throughout most of their extent. Some deep ferds were located, but were not suitable for motor traffic. All other streams were easily fordable in the dry season. The dry season extended from November 1st to May 15th, except along the east coast, which had heavy rains during this period.

Troops and Initial Assignment to Sectors

The troops assigned to the North Luzon Force on December 8, 1941, were: The 11th Division, PA, Brigadier General Dwyer, AUS, Commanding; 21st Division, PA, Brigadier General Capinpin, PA, Commanding; 31st Division, PA, Brigadier General Alwood, AUS, Commanding; 20th Cavalry, (PS) Colonel Pierce, AUS, Commanding; Battery A, 204 FA, (PS) Captain Fitch, Commanding; 64th Tank Troop, 21st, (PS) Captain Bayre, Commanding. One battalion of the 48th Infantry, (PS) was assigned to the 21st Division for the defense of the Bague Bay area only. 168mm guns under USAFFE control were assigned to the defense of Lingayen Gulf, Olungapo and Bague Bay area. The guns of Corregidor covered the southern part of the west coast of the Ilocos Peninsula.

The 1st Division, Brigadier General Bellect, Commanding, in the vicinity of Irigaeta; the 31st Division, General Stevens, Commanding, at Cabanatuan; The Philippine Division, less one battalion, 48th Infantry (PS); and one Battalion Philippine Scouts, less two companies, at Baguio, were in USAFFE Reserve.

The Air Force located principally at Clark Field and Nichols Field was under USAFFE control. Naval forces based on Orote and Olongapo cooperated with the army.

Sectors were assigned as follows:

- a. The 31st Division, with one battalion 4th Infantry attached; Iatanan and the west coast to Daol Bay, inclusive.
- b. The 31st Division: from Daol Bay, exclusive, to include the southern half of Lingayen Gulf.
- c. The 11th Division: The remainder of the defense area.
- d. The 24th Cavalry, less Troop F (at Nichols Field) and detachments at Dingalan Bay, Imler Bay, and battery A, 2nd FA, were in force reserve at Fort Scotsburg.

On December 14, 1941, the 31st Division with attached troops was removed from control of the North Luzon Force, and I was relieved from responsibility for the sector assigned this unit. No contact had been made with the enemy by the 31st Division up to this time.

The disposition of troops was affected by the fact that the divisions were still in process of mobilization and the organizational training of units from companies to divisions had just begun. The 11th Division was disposed to cover the west coast from Lingayen Gulf to San Fernando, La Union. North of San Fernando, La Union, only small patrols were used. One battalion of the 11th Division was assigned to Obagayan Valley. This battalion, less one company, was stationed at Tuguegarao. One Company was stationed at Aparri.

Mobilization Status on December 8, 1941

Personnel

Headquarters North Luzon Force Staff, consisted of Lt Col W. F. Fisher, CDT (FA), Chief of Staff; Lt Col Giles Merrill, CAV, G-1 and G-4; Captain J. R. Pugh, CAV, G-2, in addition to his duties as aide; Lt T. Dealey, CAV, aide; Capt J. L. Chabot, Inf, assistant G-2; Col Frank Nelson, CAV, G-3; Major E. R. Montgomery, Inf, assistant G-3; LtCol A. DeLeon, Q. C., Quartermaster; Lt Col E. A. Sherry, CE, Engineer;

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14 Col J. A. Stansell, MC, Signal Officer; Major A. E. Oldenburg, AGH, Adjutant General; Lt Smith, AGH, Assistant Adjutant General; Major R. Casbell, MC, Surgeon. Only a small pool of clerks were available to assist the General and Special Staffs. No Force troops were available to perform the Engineering, Signal Communication and Medical functions of this Headquarters. The 60th Truck Troop, QM, and a portion of Company B, 12th QM Regiment, which had been attached to the 20th Cavalry for the transportation of animals, were the only units available to perform supply functions. A motor pool of several sedans was the only other transportation available. No equipment was available for service elements. These elements were to be formed from troops expected to arrive from the United States, suggested by Philippine Scouts.

✓ The 20th Cavalry (RE) was organized under a special table of organization into a head-quarters troop, two rifle squadrons of three troops each, and one machine gun troop. Total strength present with Regiments: 20 officers, 699 enlisted men, 882 horses, and 101 mules. This was the only completely organized and trained element under my command, at this time.

The Divisions were in various stages of mobilization and training. The Infantry Regiments of the 11th, 21st and 22nd Divisions had been assembled at about two-thirds strength. One Regiment in each Division had been organized since September. The remaining Regiments had just been assembled and had no unit training.

The artillery of the 11th Division was in process of mobilization and had not yet joined the Division. The artillery of the 21st Division had joined the Division, but had no transportation. The artillery of the 22nd Division had not yet been organized. Eight British 75mm guns were available, but no trained personnel had been assigned. All units were short fire control equipment. Anti-tank units had not been organized.

The personnel of service elements had arrived, but had not been organized or trained as units. Transportation was practically non-existent. Sufficient vehicles were available to maintain routine supply of units in a mobilization camp.

Supply

Two separate supply systems were in operation. One for United States troops, another for Philippine Army troops. It was understood that these systems would merge into the one prescribed in Field Service Regulations, but orders had not been issued putting this plan into effect.

The Philippine Department was in process of establishing supply depots at Tarlac, San Carlos and Zamboanga. However the Department Supply Depots at Fort Stotsenburg and Manila continued to supply most of the North Luzon Force. Philippine Army units continued to purchase large quantities of supplies locally.

No steel helmets or individual entrenching tools were available to Philippine Army Troops. The uniforms habitually worn by Philippine Army Troops were light tropical helmets, fatigue clothes and canvas shoes. All men were equipped with M1 Garand Rifles, but very few spare parts were available.

Training

All personnel of the Philippine Army had received five and one-half months of individual training at some time during the preceding five years. In some respects this training was inadequate, particularly in rifle marksmanship and scouting and patrolling.

Unit training of battalions and regiments had not begun except in one infantry regiment in each division. Division training was not scheduled to begin until early in 1942.

OPERATIONS

Prior to December 15th

Enemy operations from December 8th to 15th were limited to air attacks on Clark Field, Nichols Field, Taguig and Da. After December 15th, our ground troops were without air support.

On December 8th, Troop 4, 20th Cavalry (TG), with one section of scout cars attached, was sent to cover Dingalan Bay and Ibalay Bay.

On December 10th, a section of scout cars under Lt Cunningham, 20th Cavalry, was sent to Cagayan Valley to provide radio communications with troops in that area.

Troop I rejoined the 10th Cavalry from detached service at Nichols Field.

Many reports of enemy paratroop landings were received, but upon investigation, all proved to be without foundation.

On December 14th, the 21st Division was relieved from assignment to North Luzon Force and I was relieved from responsibility for the center assigned to that unit.

North of the Agno River

On December 12th, patrols from the 11th Division reported a Japanese Force of about 3000 at Vigan. Enemy transports were reported off the coast and the Commanding General, 11th Division, placed the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, under Major Noble, at San Fernando, La Union; the 12th Infantry, less one battalion and one company, under Major Hesse, at Tausog; and one company, 12th Infantry, at Zamartiz. Two Batteries of 75mm SMO's, under Major Dasehl, were attached to the 12th Infantry.

On December 14th, two bus loads of Japanese Troops from Vigan were ambushed at Tagulin by a platoon of the 12th Infantry, under Lt Williams. The 11th Division Commander reported that this force was destroyed.

The mission of the North Luzon Force was changed to require the company to be held north of an east and west line through San Fernando, La Union.

The Japanese Force at Vigan advanced down the coastal road and on December 11st, encountered one battalion of the 12th Infantry (Noble) and one battalion of the 12th Infantry (Hesse) at Barro River, north of San Fernando. The Japanese attacked at night and outflanked our forces, which were dispersed and cut off from the main body. Major Noble and Major Hesse, making their way through the mountains, succeeded in joining their Division about two weeks later.

By this time USAFFE had authorized us to use the 71st Division in case of emergency. Because of the serious situation in the 11th Division caused by the loss of two battalions at Barro River and the continued pressure of the enemy along the coastal road, the 71st Infantry was immediately attached to the 11th Division. The 71st Division, less 71st

Infantry, was ordered to be prepared for immediate movement to the North.

On December 21st, the 21st Infantry (Bomast) was ordered to Magallan and Bawang. One battalion, with one battery of 21st's attached, was ordered to move up the coast road and attack the enemy force moving south from Barera River. The 2d Battalion was to move north from Magallan, via San Gabriel, and attack the enemy east flank. Buses were used in this movement.

During the night, December 21st-22d, information was received of a major landing in the vicinity of and south of Bawang. On the morning of December 22d, our units at Bawang and Magallan were attacked. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (Nicker), was ordered to withdraw via the coast road to Malillo, leaving one company to reinforce the company of the 12th Infantry at Maricita. Major Bomast was ordered to withdraw his battalion at Magallan, with remnants of the 12th Infantry and 15th Infantry from the Barera River fight, by way of Saguis to Masang (CP 11th Division), clearing Camp One on Emayon Road before dark December 22d.

Bomast's forces stopped at Saguis the night of December 22d-23d, were cut off from the main body, and never did rejoin as complete units.

During the operations just described, the command post of the North Luzon Force moved first to Sanlan (December 18th), and then to Alonda (December 19th). The 20th Cavalry was moved to Pinaloa in Force Reserve. The 60th Co. Tank Troop was ordered to join by 0600L. One battalion, 21st Infantry, was placed in Force Reserve. Battery A, 23d FA, was ordered to derive from Stebensburg, but aircraft was relieved from assignment to North Luzon Force and ordered by 0600L to join the artillery of the Philippine Division. Twelve 75mm guns on self-propelled mounts were attached to the Force.

The 192d Tank Battalion was ordered to support the North Luzon Force. The Tank Group Commander (Weaver) and his Liaison Officer reported at North Luzon Force Headquarters. Individual tank companies had been assigned missions by the Group Commander. This battalion was never placed under my command. The Tank Group had a very small headquarters with inadequate facilities for liaison, as a result, the maximum effective use

of this force could not be made.

On December 10th, Troop C, 26th Cavalry, was dismounted and sent to Lurice in buses in order to cover the approaches from the west to the Ogayan Valley and from the north via Sagulo. This movement would not have been made if the troops at Sagulo had been placed at my disposal. While Troop C was enroute to Lurice, the troops at Sagulo were assigned to the North Luzon Force, but shortly thereafter were cut off from the main forces.

On December 22d, the 26th Cavalry, less detachments, which at this time was at Pucorubin, was ordered to concealed bivouac at Rosario where it arrived at 10:00 AM. Immediately upon arrival it was ordered to Demeritis with orders to hold that town until forced to withdraw. When forced to withdraw, it was to move via Rosario and prevent the enemy from advancing south of the Ismeritis-Rosario Road. It was in position at Demeritis by 1:00 PM, when it was attacked by enemy infantry, tanks, and bombers. At 4:00 PM, the regiment withdrew to its first delaying position east of Demeritis. Two infantry companies, one from the 12th Infantry, and one from the 71st Infantry, participated in the defense of Demeritis. The latter units suffered heavy casualties and only a small number were able to rejoin their regiments.

On December 22d, at 2:00 PM, the 71st Division (Selleck), located in the Urkaneta area, was ordered to move on Demeritis via Rosario and prevent the movement of Japanese Forces to the south. The 26th Cavalry was attached to the 71st Division. The 71st Infantry was relieved from attachment to the 11th Division and returned to control of 71st Division Commander. All tanks in this area were to support this force.

While General Selleck was moving north, the 11th Division was ordered to take up a position along the Iwed River. The 26th Cavalry was attached to him. The 26th Cavalry was given the mission of covering the right flank of the 71st Division, and holding the junction of Highway No. 3 and the Old Manila Road to permit our forces at Sagulo to rejoin the main forces.

In the meantime enemy troops had landed unopposed at Ago and Aringay, and advanced south toward Demeritis, sending a flank detachment by way of

Force toward Rosario and Camp One. These forces later attacked the 26th Cavalry.

On December 22d, the 71st Division, less the 71st Infantry, which had not been able to rejoin the division as a unit, took up a position north of Sison astride Highway No. 2. The 72d Infantry and 71st Engineers were in the front line. The 26th Cavalry, which had suffered heavy casualties during the fighting on December 22d, was ordered to Hinalonan to reorganize.

The 61st Division at Cabanatuan was now attached to the North Luzon Force and the 61st Combat Team (Col Carter), using buses to transport infantry, was ordered north to support the 71st Division. Enroute, this unit was delayed by the bombing of the bridge over the Agno, at Villasis, and was forced to detour through Tayug.

At 4:30 PM, Colonel Carter, who had arrived with the advance elements of the 61st Combat Team, was directed by General Sheckel to occupy a position north of Pasorubite, astride Highway No. 2. Before the 61st Combat Team was in position, the 72d Infantry was attacked and a route ensued. The 61st Combat Team was attacked that night at Pasorubite and was also routed.

At daylight on the morning of December 24th, the Japanese forces attacked the 26th Cavalry at Hinalonan. After successfully checking the advance of the Japanese from daylight until 3:30 PM, this regiment withdrew late in the afternoon to Tayug. I was personally present during a portion of this fight and cannot speak in too glowing terms of the gallantry and intrepidity displayed by Colonel Pierce and all officers and men of the 26th Cavalry on this occasion. This devoted little band of horsemen; weakened by detachments, and by heavy casualties sustained at Zametis on December 22d; held up the advance guard and caused the beginning of the deployment of the enemy's main column. It effected a delay of nine hours and maintained the best traditions of the American Cavalry. I speak of this from the point of view of an eye witness.

Our tanks cooperated during the actions at Zametis, Rosario and Hinalonan, but their peculiar status resulted in their being used piecemeal

at the request of various commanders on the ground, and the maximum effectiveness of this force was never attained.

South of the Agno River and North of San Fernando, Pangasinan

The situation on December 12th, was such as to make defense of the Lingayen area impracticable and permission to withdraw was obtained from USAFFE. G-3 (Colonel Irwin) of USAFFE said over the telephone that S.F.O.-3 could now be considered effective. This plan called for withdrawal to Bataan. An order was issued accordingly, directing a withdrawal in five phases to the Sanben-Areyat position, which had to be held until the South Luzon Force had cleared San Fernando enroute to Ibaan.

The phase lines were:

11: Urdaneta - San Carlos - Aguilar

12: Line of the Agno River - Taya - Garman - Dagupan - Magatara

13: San Jose - Oritba - Orana - Sta. Ignacia

14: Cabaatuan - Zaragoza - Pu Pua - Tarlac - Medical Barracks
(on high ground east of Tarlac)

15: Aftal Springs - St. Areyat - Sanben - Foothills west of Sanben

Withdrawal to 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4 lines were according to a schedule. Lines 1-5 and 1-6 were ordered held until forced to withdraw.

The 10th Cavalry, which had suffered severe casualties, was ordered to Mexico to reorganize and equip. Troop C had rejoined the regiment from the Mingalan and Ialer Bay area on December 29th.

About December 13th, a convoy of ten transports was reported off Aparri. Later troops were reported landing about 30 kilometers east of Aparri. The battalion commander in the Cagayan Valley was ordered to attack this force and delay its advance. The company at Aparri however, withdrew to Tuguegarao. Later the battalion reinforced Tuguegarao and withdrew to a position in the vicinity of Ilagan.

Lieutenant Colonel Townsend was sent from the 11th Division to take command of forces in the Cagayan Valley, after their withdrawal to Ilagan. He organized local constabulary and recruited other personnel from that vicinity. Intensive patrolling to the north was initiated and several Japanese patrols were either annihilated or driven back. However, when

The situation on the western part of the front required the North Luzon Force to withdraw to the line of the Agno River, the Cagayan Valley Force was ordered to withdraw via Highway No. 5 and rejoin the main forces. The difficulty of supplying this force if cut off and the need for troops with the main body, made it inadvisable to leave it in this sector. The withdrawal was successful and these troops participated in the defense of the Zambo River line.

The Commanding General, 71st Division, was ordered to assemble the scattered remnants of his division and to reorganize and equip them at San Fernando, Panganga.

The 51st Division, which by now had only one infantry regiment complete (200 infantry, Rodman), was assigned the zone of withdrawal east of the Panganga River. The 11th Division, which had one complete infantry regiment and remnants of two others, withdrew in the center zone from Panganga River to Highway No. 5, exclusive. The 21st Division was on the left and included Highway No. 5 in its zone.

During the withdrawals to D-1, D-2 and D-3, actions were fought at Urdaneta, Santa Barbara, Dagup, Besales and Garwan. There was no contact with the enemy main forces on D-1 line. His patrols however contacted our front.

The enemy made contact with D-4 line and Cabanatuan on December 29th. The main pressure was at Cabanatuan. On December 30th, the Japanese forces attacked the 51st Division with tanks, infantry and cavalry, forcing it back to Dagup. Late in the evening it was attacked again and routed. One battalion withdrew by bus to Mallig. The Division Commander, General Stevens, decided to reorganize at Mallig and notified me of the situation.

Principally because of the situation on the right flank, a withdrawal to the D-5 (Zambo-Dagup) line was ordered on the night of December 30th-31st.

The battalion of the 11th Infantry from Cagayan Valley, with personnel from the 12th Infantry, 13th Infantry and other units, totaling about 1000 men, joined the 11th Division on the D-5 line.

The artillery of the 51st Division was ordered to Detran by USAFFE.

The North Luzon Force was ordered to protect the South Luzon Force from attack from the north until after it had cleared Calumpit.

South of San Fernando, Pangasinan and East of the Pangasinan River

The remnants of the 91st Division, which had been badly disorganized at Cabanatuan and Opan, were reorganized and placed in position along the river north of Ialing. The 1st Battalion, 91st Infantry, had about 280 men, the 92d Infantry had less than 200.

The units of the 71st Division, undergoing reorganization at San Fernando, were ordered to proceed at once to Ialing by buses, where they were attached to the 91st Division. The units of the 71st Division relieved the remnants of the 91st and 92d Infantry north of Ialing, and the 91st Division units were placed in reserve south of Ialing.

During the morning of December 31st, Brigadier General A. C. Jones, Commanding North Luzon Force, was placed in command of troops in the Ialing area. The troops included the 82d Infantry, which had reached Floridel during the morning of December 30th, Company G, 10th Tank Battalion, and two SPW's (Dabock), supported the defense. At 10:30 AM, December 31st, the Japanese attacked, but were unable to cross the river north of Ialing.

The withdrawal of the South Luzon Force was proceeding rapidly and it was decided to withdraw the units of the 91st Division and 71st Division, so as to clear the Calumpit Bridge at 4:00 AM, January 1, 1942. The 91st and 92d Infantry were to withdraw by buses to Oanga about noon. The buses were to return, pick up the 71st and 72d Infantry, and clear the Calumpit Bridge at 4:00 AM, January 1st. This order was misunderstood by the 71st and 72d Infantry and they began their withdrawal about 1:00 PM. The movement of the 71st Division units was halted about 4:00 PM, and an outpost line was established about 6 kilometers north of Floridel, covering the 82d Infantry at Floridel.

The Commanding General, 91st Division, with his staff, were directed to proceed to Calumpit, assemble the stragglers of the 91st and 71st Divisions in that vicinity and cover the crossing of the river at that point. About 200 riflemen with one machine gun were assembled and took

up a position on the north side of the river at Calangit. This position was held during the night December 31st - January 1st. I was present when the South Luzon Force completed the crossing of the river at Calangit, and personally ordered the destruction of the bridges. This was accomplished by the North Luzon Force Engineers at 0415 AM, January 1, 1962.

One battalion of the 23d Infantry and one battery, 21st FA, was sent to Apalit to assist in delaying the enemy advance on San Fernando. During the morning of January 1st, all troops in the vicinity of Apalit and Calangit were bombed and strafed. At 1420 Z, the enemy attacked and forced a crossing in the vicinity of Calangit. They were held south of San Fernando until the North Luzon Force cleared about midnight January 1st - 2d, enroute to the Otagua-Poreo position. The 91st Division and 71st Division were so badly disorganized and in need of equipment, that they were sent to Ibaan to reorganize.

During the withdrawal from the Apao River to the Ibaan position, the Command Post, North Luzon Force was moved from Alcala to Panchon on night December 28th - 29th, and to Basolor on December 29th.

South of San Fernando, Panganga and West of the Panganga River

The troops on the Arayat-Ibaan position were ordered to withdraw to the Otagua-Poreo line on the night of January 1st - 2d. The 21st Division occupied the left sector, the 11th Division the right.

The Command Post, North Luzon Force, moved to SP 107, South of Saroman on January 1, 1962.

The 26th Cavalry, reorganized with one horse squadron, one motorized squadron, and one Headquarters Troop, was ordered to San Jose in North Luzon Force Reserve, with the mission of protecting the left flank of the force.

On January 2d, the enemy attacked at Pio on the left and Otagua on the right. Otagua was outflanked by way of Saroman. The 21st Infantry and 23d Infantry suffered heavy casualties at Pio.

As a result of the engagement at Otagua, the 21st and 11th Divisions were ordered to withdraw to a previously reconnoitered position, following

the general line of the Comain River, on the night of January 24th - 25th. Most of the 11th Division withdrew by way of Florida Blanks, where buses met some of the units, and proceeded via Dimalupitan and Highway No. 7 to their position.

Enemy pressure continued during January 25th, and on the night of January 25th - 26th, the North Luzon Force withdrew to Etanan. The 21st Division covered the withdrawal of the 11th Division. The 26th Cavalry covered the 21st Division in the movement through Laysa Junction.

On January 26, I was ordered by USAFFE to organize the defense of the Laysa Junction position and to turn it over to the Commanding General, Etanan Force, when organized. The troops allotted were: The 31st Infantry (Steele), remnants of the 71st Division, and the 26th Cavalry after it had covered the withdrawal of North Luzon Force. General Belleok was placed in command of this force.

On January 26th, I notified USAFFE that the Laysa Junction position had been organized and turned over to Major General Parker, Commanding Etanan Force.

Engineering Operations

The demolitions accomplished under supervision of the North Luzon Force Engineer, Colonel Perry A. Sherry, was an important factor in delaying the advance of the Japanese Forces on North Luzon.

~~157~~ Bridges were destroyed, many of them of substantial steel and concrete construction. Dynamite was the only explosive obtainable in large quantities and most of it was transported from the mines near Nagulo just before that area was cut off.

The 21st Engineers were used as Force Engineers to supervise demolitions. Over 2000 Philippine under civilians District Engineers cooperated in this work.

Signal Communications

Only sufficient wire and telephones were available initially to provide communications within the command post. Wire communications with Divisions was maintained through commercial circuits. Civilian operators were reliable for the most part, but the system was inadequate under the circumstances.

The radio set was borrowed from the 200th AA Regiment and the 20th Cavalry provided one scout car equipped with radio. This was the total mobile radio equipment of Headquarters North Luzon Force for the first few weeks.

Because of inadequate wire and radio communications, limited communication personnel and the large frontage involved, liaison with the Division was extremely difficult. It was maintained only through the tireless day and night efforts of all the personnel of North Luzon Force Headquarters in establishing personal contact with all parts of the front in spite of the limited transportation available.

CHANGE IN DESIGNATION OF FORCE HEADQUARTERS TO HEADQUARTERS I PHILIPPINE CORPS*

In compliance with orders from USAFFE, I proceeded, on January 24th, with Headquarters North Luzon Force to the West Coast of Ilocos and assumed command of the Western Sector of Ilocos. Headquarters North Luzon Force was redesignated "Headquarters I Philippine Corps", and the command post was established at KP 212, West Road.

MISSION OF I PHILIPPINE CORPS

The mission assigned the I Philippine Corps was the defense of the Western Sector of Ilocos, as far south as the Paganan River. The Commanding General, Service Command Area, was responsible for the defense south of this line.

The boundary between the I Philippine Corps and II Philippine Corps was: Mt. Natib - Ialdico River - Pantingan River - Mt. Mariveles (all to I Corps). The I Corps was to maintain contact with II Corps.

Area assigned for Defense

The terrain of the I Corps Sector was very rugged. A mountain range ran along the east boundary from Mt. Natib to Mt. Mariveles. The ground sloped abruptly to the west coast, was heavily wooded and cut up by many ravines through which flowed shallow streams. These streams emptied either directly into the China Sea or into the Pagac River, which emptied into the sea near Pagay. The Ialdico River drained the south slope of Mt. Natib. The Pantingan River drained the north slope of Mt. Mariveles. Both these streams joined rivers, which eventually emptied into Manila Bay.

Mt. Matib and Mt. Mariveles sloped abruptly to the Pilar-Dagao Road, leaving a broad gap in the mountain range along the highway. The Pilar-Dagao Road was an all-weather road. A good dry weather road (the West Road) ran from Mariveles to Horn. This latter road was steadily improved and on January 6, 1942, a small portion of it was already an all-weather road. No other roads existed, except narrow trails. Horn was connected with Olango by a trail along the coast.

Organization of Defensive Line

The I Philippine Corps Sector was organized into: (1) A main battle position, (2) A reserve battle position and (3) The beach defenses. The main battle position was occupied by the 1st Division, (IN) (Segundo) and covered the approaches from the north. An outpost line crossed the Maron-Dagao Road near RP 176, and extended from the sea to a point about half-way to Mt. Silangan. A main line of resistance extended from the beach north of Nauban to Mt. Silangan. The regimental reserve line was astride the Maron-Dagao Road at Nauban point. A detachment of one company was stationed at Horn.

The 2d Infantry occupied the outpost line and main line of resistance from the beach to a point about half-way to Mt. Silangan. A battalion of the 21st BA, equipped as infantry, extended the line of the 2d Infantry to Mt. Silangan. One battalion, 1st Infantry, occupied the Regimental Reserve line on Nauban point. The 1st Infantry, less one battalion, was in division reserve in the vicinity of RP 208. The front of the 2d Infantry was protected by a double apron barbed wire obstacle. The remainder of the sector was unprotected by obstacles other than the natural jungle.

A detached post was established between Mt. Silangan and Mt. Matib with the mission of maintaining contact with the 21st Division (II Corps). This detachment had to be supplied by pack mules and cargadores.

The weakness on the right of this position from the West Road to Mt. Silangan was obvious and the Corps Commander attached the 6th Infantry (Infantry), less one battalion, to the 1st Division. The Division Commander was directed to strengthen his right. Contact with the II Corps was never satisfactorily established, owing to the difficult ter-

rain. It took two days to travel from the occupied portion of the I Corps front to the left flank of the 51st Division, traversing deep gorges and dense jungle streams.

The 1st Infantry had arrived in Latake December 20th, after having been disorganized in the fighting in South Luzon. The 7th Infantry had arrived in Latake December 21st. It had not yet been in action.

The supporting artillery consisted of one battalion, 2nd BA (Vitch) (8 - 2.80's); one battalion of 7 - 76mm guns (Fowler); and one battery of self-propelled 75's (Corgan). Two 180mm guns were in position on Maban Point. In order to furnish close support to units on the right of the position it was necessary to place all the 75's on Maban Point. The 2.80's had to be placed well forward because of their short range. Further echeloning of artillery in depth was impracticable.

The reserve battle position at this time was scarcely more than a line of the map. The 48th Infantry, which was in USARP reserve, had been directed to lay out and organize this line under supervision of the I Corps, but the difficulties of the terrain were such that only a small portion of the position had been outlined before the 48th Infantry was ordered to the II Corps on January 19th. The position was to be generally parallel to the Pilar-Lagao Road and south of it. In several places it crossed the road.

The Beach Defense Positions extended from Maban Point to Lobo Point (both exclusive) and was manned by the 51st Division (Stevens). This division had been on Latake since December 27th and had not been in action. A provincial battalion, 800 GAC (Hall), manned 180mm SP's on Maban Point, Lagao and Lobo Point.

The Corps Reserve consisted of remnants of the 51st and 71st Divisions, located south of the Pilar-Lagao Road between EP 147 and the West Road. These units had been badly disorganized in the fighting in South Luzon and were in the process of reorganization. They were finally combined into one unit, the 51st Division (Stevens). The headquarters 71st Division, (Delbec), half the artillery of the 71st Division, the 71st Medical Battalion, and the 71st Engineer Detachment were sent to the West Sector of the Service Command Area. This reorganization was complete about Jan-

vary 19th.

On January 9th, the 10th Cavalry joined the I Corps after having completed a very difficult withdrawal from the Lages Junction position. It was bivouacked near NP 156 Horro-bugas Road. This unit had been engaged almost continuously since the first contact with the enemy on December 19th. It had suffered heavy casualties in personnel and animals. As no replacements for animals were in prospect, and the supply forage limited, it was decided to organize the unit into a motorized squadron (riflemen transported in buses) and a mechanized unit consisting primarily of Iron Carriers and scout cars. This organization was completed prior to January 20th. The horses were sent to the Service Crossed Area and were eventually consumed for food.

OPERATIONS OF I PHILIPPINE CORPS

The Defense of the Lubon Position

On January 15th, a Japanese landing was reported at Binanga. Philippine civilians reported a detachment of about 300 moving south on trail along the coast leading to Joron. The 1st's on Lubon Point fired on Fort Binanga using nap data. A diary captured later indicated that this fire caused some Japanese casualties and destroyed some small boats.

A battalion from the 11st Division was sent to contact the force moving from Fort Binanga. A flank guard was sent from the 1st Division to a trail junction about four miles northeast of Joron to cover the approaches from the direction of Orani.

By January 16th, the battalion of the 11st Division returned and reported that the enemy had withdrawn to Fort Binanga. Later developments proved this report to be false. The flank guard was ordered to withdraw to the main battle position. On the night of January 16th, the detachment at Joron was withdrawn.

On January 16th, Japanese troops were reported in Joron. About 2400 AM, January 16th, I organized and directed an attack on Joron. The troops used were: 1st Infantry (less one battalion) (Major McCallum); and one troop 10th Cavalry with a section of machine guns attached. The attack was successful and the enemy driven across the river north of Joron. Major McCallum was wounded and evacuated.

On January 17th, the Japanese troops were reinforced and counter-attacked the 1st Infantry, enveloping the east flank. Our troops withdrew to the main battle position. The 1st Infantry went into position on the right of the 5th Infantry, connecting that unit with the battalion of the 1st TA on Mt. Silangan area.

By this time the situation on the front of the II Corps (Parker) had become critical and constituted a serious threat to the I Corps east flank. On January 18th, the enemy had penetrated the front of the 51st Division. The penetration had reached Cuzol on the right rear of the I Corps by January 17th.

The 48th Infantry had been sent to the II Corps on January 18th. On January 17th, the 51st Division was ordered to join the II Corps. The newly organized 51st Division took over the beach defense. This caused a serious weakening of the beach defense because of the great difference in combat strength between the 51st and 52nd Divisions. This was especially the case with automatic weapons.

The exploitation of the penetration in the II Corps continued. I was informed that the II Corps would refuse its left flank and prevent an enemy advance to the east.

To meet this situation the 1st Infantry was shifted from beach defense to a position astride the Miller-Wages Road facing east behind the Waldron and Santiago Rivers, with the mission of protecting the right flank of the Corps. The 26th Cavalry extended the flank of the 1st Infantry to the north as far as the regional reserve line of the 1st Division.

I was now faced with the problem of facing threats from both flanks and meeting an attack on my north front. The much depleted, and recently reorganized 51st Division had the three fold mission of protecting both flanks and organizing the reserve battle position.

On the night of January 20th - 21st the Japanese infiltrated thru the sectors of the 1st Infantry and the 51st TA Battalion. On the morning of January 21st, they had secured possession of the Form-Sage Road at KP 147, effectively cutting off the combat troops of the 1st Division from the main body.

Efforts to reduce this road-block were made from the north and south using all available reserves. The forces used on the south were: a detachment from Provisional Battalion, 92d AAC (Bull); detachments of 91st Division; 20th Cavalry; 16 Philippine Constabulary; and one platoon of tanks. Although drawn back a short distance initially, the enemy was steadily reinforcing and on January 24th, were still in possession of the road, advancing to KP 168. I personally directed these operations and spent most of my time with the forward elements of my troops.

On January 22d, during the operations against the road-block, the I Corps was ordered to withdraw to the reserve battle position, the movement to be completed by daylight January 20th. The 16 Philippine Constabulary was attached to the Corps on this date. The USAFFE withdrawal order stated that the 11th Division (Dwight) and the 46th Infantry (Doyle) would be sent to the I Corps by Commanding General, II Corps in time to occupy the reserve battle position by daylight January 20th. This order also extended the Corps rear boundary to the Hinunangan River and gave it the mission of defending the west sector of the Service Command Area.

On January 24th, the 1st Division was ordered to withdraw by whatever means and route practicable to an assembly area in rear of the reserve battle position. The withdrawal of all dismounted elements was accomplished by difficult trails along the beach. Since it was impracticable to move the artillery by this route, it was destroyed. Many of the Infantry heavy weapons were also destroyed.

The Withdrawal to Reserve Battle Position

The I Corps withdrawal order assigned sectors in the new position as follows: The 11th Division with 16 Philippine Constabulary attached, from the Hastings River to Trail 7, both inclusive; the 46th Infantry from Trail 7 to Gantles River, both exclusive; the 91st Division from Gantles River inclusive, to Dagas and the coast line from Dagas to the Hinunangan River inclusive. The Defense of the Service Command Area within the Corps Sector, was placed under General Pierce, who had at his disposal the 1st Philippine Constabulary, several service command units trained as Infantry, and a detachment of Air Corps equipped as

Infantry.

A Naval Force of about 450 sailors and marines co-operated in the defense of the sector. The 26th Cavalry and the 26 Philippine Constabulary were directed to cover the withdrawal, the Cavalry to revert to Corps Reserve upon completion of the movement. The 1st Division was directed to reorganize and equip its units as soon as practicable and be prepared to attach units by battalions to the 91st and 11th Divisions, as soon as available. As this division was without artillery and had lost most of its heavy weapons, it was not contemplated using it as a division for some time.

During the withdrawal the I Corps was informed that a small enemy landing in the west sector of the Service Command, which had been considered under control, had been reinforced and extended. As this constituted a serious threat to the withdrawal, the 26 Intelligence, Philippine Constabulary was directed to report to General Pierce at once.

Under these trying conditions the withdrawal was completed as scheduled, except that the 11th Division arrived, less the 12th Infantry and the 48th Infantry, and completed its movement late on January 26th. The latter unit arrived in a completely exhausted condition, having been heavily engaged in the Abney Sector of the II Corps until dark January 26th.

The salient features of the occupation of the reserve battle position were: (1) the main line resistance ran through dense jungles in rough country and, owing to the lack of time and personnel, had not been adequately outlined; (2) the pressure by the enemy on the north and on the beaches in the west sector service command area continued. The threat to the right flank grew more serious; (3) the arrival of the 11th Division, less the 12th Infantry; (4) the arrival of the 48th Infantry in an exhausted condition; (5) the order from USARP directing the 48th Infantry to be relieved from its portion of the front, 24 hours after it had occupied it; (6) the necessity of replacing the 48th Infantry with the hastily reorganized 1st Division, P.I.

Reorganization of Position on January 30, 1942

On January 30th, the I Corps Sector had been reorganized into a

Right Sub-Sector (Trougher); a left Sub-Sector (General A. H. Jones, who had joined the Corps on January 26th, with a portion of Division Headquarters, 51st Division); a South Sub-Sector (Pierces). The troops assigned to the Right Sub-Sector were: 11th Division with 26 Philippine Constabulary (less one battalion) attached, boundaries the same as those assigned to 11th Division in withdrawal order; Troops assigned to left Sub-Sector were: the 51st Division, 1st Division and a provisional battalion of stragglers from the 51st Division, who had crossed into the sector of I Corps after the penetration of the 51st Division front in the Mt. Natib area. The boundaries were those assigned originally to the 51st Division and 48th Infantry (PS). The South Sub-Sector had been reinforced by the 48th Infantry (less one battalion) and the 87th Infantry (PS). The boundaries of this Sub-Sector were the Hinangan River and the Paniklan River. The 11th IA with Infantry 7, 26th FA attached, supported the Right Sub-Sector; the 51st FA with detachments of the 71st FA attached, supported the left Sub-Sector; the 24th FA (less Infantry 7) and a group of six 160mm guns were in general support of the Corps. The Command Post, I Corps, was established at KP 210.9 West Road.

By this time the fronts of the Right and Left Sub-Sector were under constant pressure from Hagao to east of Trail 7, except in the Sectors of the 1st Infantry and the 11th Infantry, the MGR was intact. In the Sector of the 1st Infantry an enemy group had penetrated by way of the Ceter and Teol rivers to a point near the junction of Trail 7 and 5, where it was in contact by means of patrols with a group which had penetrated the front of the 11th Infantry by way of Trail 7. These forces were of undetermined strength, but were of considerable size. It was estimated that they totaled about a reinforced regiment. These forces were finally separated into two areas, the area in the Left Sub-Sector was referred to as the "Little Pocket", the one in the Right Sub-Sector as the "Big Pocket". (Note: Lt. Gen. Masaharu Yama, Japanese Imperial Army, testified on February 6, 1946, at his war crimes trial in Manila, "American artillery was very powerful and accurate and we suffered great casualties at Hagao. We met very stiff resistance and couldn't advance." Washington Evening Star, February 6, 1946.)

The Defense of the Beaches

The South Sub-Sector was heavily engaged. In addition to enemy landings on Longosawayan and Quinsuan points, a surprise landing had been effected between the Ayusan and Malatin Rivers. The situation in the South Sub-Sector threatened the Corps communications with the Service Command and Corregidor. The enemy had approached in some places to within a few hundred yards of the West head.

Simultaneous landings were made on Longosawayan and Quinsuan Points about 2:30 AM January 26. The landing at Longosawayan was unopposed initially. About 400 sailors and Marines under Commander Bridget attempted to drive off this landing force, but were unsuccessful. The 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry (TO) (Lt Col Greenberry), relieved Commander Bridget's force, and by January 29th, this area was reported cleared of Japanese Troops.

The landing at Quinsuan Point was initially opposed by the 24th Pursuit Squadron (acting as Infantry). This unit was surprised, overpowered and withdrew from the beach. Up to January 28th, efforts to drive the enemy out of this area met with little success. The troops used were not trained as Infantry and did a very creditable job of holding the enemy and preventing cutting of the West head. The troops used were: 24th Pursuit Squadron; 1st Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary; Philippine Army Air Corps (disarmed); Company A, 808th Engineers; and 8th Interceptor Command (equipped as Infantry).

On January 27th one battery (2-100mm How) and two 81's were attached to South Sub-Sector.

On January 29th the 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry (Maj Strickler [?]) relieved all troops on Quinsuan Point except 8th Interceptor Command.

Company B, 57th Infantry was attached to 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry on January 29th. A platoon of tanks was attached to this force on February 1st. A series of coordinated Infantry and Tank attacks extending from January 28th to February 7th, succeeded in clearing this area. On February 6th, Engineers assisted the attacking troops by demolishing cliffs along the beach, trapping many Japanese who were holding out in the numerous small caves in the area. On February 7th two Armed Navy Lances assisted in the operations. Major Strickler was killed in these operations.

During the operations just described, the Japanese made a surprise landing between the Angasin and Salatin Rivers about 1400 AM, January 27th. The 2d Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary, on beach defense in that area were overpowered and withdrew in disorder. On January 28th, one battalion Philippine Constabulary, with 17th Pursuit Squadron attacked and reached the beach on the south flank, but after dark the constabulary withdrew. On January 29th, the 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry (Captain Hiedenstein) was assigned to this sector and Captain Hiedenstein placed in charge of operations. The 1st Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary, was attached to 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry.

On January 30th, Colonel Lilly, 87th Infantry was placed in command of operations and the 87th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) reinforced. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry attacked in line and reached the beach at Omas Point and Quinsuan River encircling the Japanese force. An attempt by Japanese to reinforce this area on the night of January 30th - 31st was repulsed. On February 2d, about 1230 AM, a strong Japanese force of about 14 to 20 barges attempted to land at Aglalom Bay, was repulsed and turning north tried to land between Angasin and Salatin Rivers. This attempt was frustrated by fire of beach guns, 75mm guns and 100mm howitzers on Quinsuan and Sobo Points. P-40's attacked landing force, dropping bombs and strafing barges.

Coordinated attacks by 87th Infantry reinforced, supported by one platoon of tanks and artillery, succeeded in clearing this area by February 13th. Japanese elements, on February 10th, dropped messages directing survivors to swim north to Harau. On February 11th, planes dropped messages directing them to assemble on beaches and use rafts and barges to make their escape. None of these efforts to withdraw was successful. Many swimmers were shot or drowned.

The so-called "Pocket" Fights

During the operations on the beaches, troops on the north front of the I Corps were engaged in a critical series of combats, which were sometimes referred to as the "little pocket" and "big pocket" fights. The corps was threatened simultaneously with a penetration of its front, which would necessitate a withdrawal, and the beach attacks, which if

successful, would prevent such withdrawal. At this time the Corps was holding about 40,000 yards of front. The maximum density of the defending troops did not exceed one man per yard at front. This density existed at a few critical points only. At some places the density did not exceed one man per ten yards of front. The frontage was great, the terrain rough, heavily wooded with few trails, and lateral communications were very limited. The only road (West Road) connecting the South Sub-Sector with the two sectors at the north was under constant observation and frequently bombed. For these reasons, reserves not located close to their probable place of employment were bound to arrive too late. Therefore the 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry, was placed in Corps Reserve near the junction of Trails 7 and 9. Later it was attached to the Commander of Troops in "pocket fights". The 48th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) was placed in reserve south of the Hinangan River, later it was attached to South Sub-Sector for use against beach landings. The 17th Infantry was initially in Army Reserve, was later assigned to I Corps for use in South Sub-Sector and was immediately attached to South Sub-Sector, as soon as released to my control. The 26th Cavalry was placed just north of the Hinangan River west of the West Road. The procurement and movement of reserves was one of my prime concerns during this trying period. The peak of the fighting on beaches was reached about February 6th, at which time the fighting was also intense in the areas of the "pockets". After February 6th, the situation on the beaches had turned definitely in our favor and the bulk of the Corps Reserve was shifted to the north. One battalion of the 15th Infantry and one battalion of the Philippine Constabulary were attached to Right Sub-Sector, while the 26th Cavalry and 48th Infantry were moved to Trail 9 area, east of West Road. The operations on the beaches cleared up progressively from south to north. Longbeachway Point was cleared of enemy troops January 29th, Quinsaman Point on February 7th, and the Anasin River area on February 12th. This permitted the Corps to concentrate on the "pocket fights".

During the period January 27th to February 6th, the "pocket" fights were conducted as separate operations under sub-sector commanders, except that the "big pocket" operations included parts of the area of the

right and left sub-sectors and had been placed under General Irrougher, using some troops from Left Sub-Sector, 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry and one platoon of tanks. The net results of the operations in the "big pocket" up to this time had been to drive enemy troops westward deep into the area of the Left Sub-Sector. By this time it was apparent that the "pocket" fights would have to be considered as one operation requiring one commander and all available reserves.

On February 6th, Brigadier General Jones was placed in command of operations in the sector of the "pocket fights" and all available reserves were placed at his disposal. Coordinated attacks were launched against both "pockets" and under the aggressive leadership of General Jones, both pockets had been practically eliminated by February 12th, when he was evacuated to the hospital. The enemy still maintained a narrow gap in the main line resistance of the 11th Division, which had been connected with the "big pocket". The operations from February 12th to February 17th consisted in trying to close this gap and annihilate the enemy troops in this corridor. Efforts to close the gap before the withdrawal of Japanese troops in the corridor were not completely successful. Some of the troops in the corridor finally escaped north through the gap in the main line of resistance. The bulk of the enemy forces, however, was believed to have been annihilated. This was accomplished by a series of attacks launched principally from the south and west. The troops on the east continued their activities to efforts to close the gap in the main line of resistance and prevent the movement of enemy to the east. On February 17th, all operations had been completed and the gap in the main line of resistance closed.

The morale of troops in the I Corps reached its peak at this time. The fighting on the beaches and in the "pockets" had been hard, grueling, close range combats. The limited amount of reserves did not permit relief of units. The fighting was practically continuous day and night. Supply of troops on the front lines was very difficult and rations were very limited. In spite of these difficulties all troops responded to all demands. This was the first time during operations in the Philippines that a Japanese Force of considerable size had been decisively defeated.

by offensive action on the part of a force consisted for the most part of Philippine Army Troops. While the 40th Infantry and 87th Infantry were the back-bone of the offensive fighting, the Philippine Army Troops could be justly proud of the part they played.

Activities of the Corps from February 17th to March 12, 1942

The necessity for using all available troops in the beach and pocket fights retarded work on the improvement of the various defensive positions. After February 17th, work on organization was resumed. Strenuous efforts were made to meet the inevitable offensive indicated by arrival of Japanese reinforcements and general enemy activity.

There was an alarming increase in the number of ineffectives. This was due to a number of causes, among which were:

- (a) Decline in quantity and quality of rations. This reached as low as one-third the normal ration.
- (b) Reaction after stimulation of combat.
- (c) Lack of necessary medicines. Quinine could not be obtained for prophylactic use. Malaria, dysentery, beriberi, dengue and effects of malnutrition were rampant. Most of Philippine Army Troops had hook-worms in addition to other ailments. Their weakened condition precluded treatment for hook-worms.
- (d) Lack of adequate shelter and clothing. There were insufficient shelter halves, blankets and raincoats to provide each man with at least one of these items.
- (e) Frequent bombings and artillery firing, especially in the Solo Point and Saguin Ridge areas.
- (f) Intensive labor on construction of defensive works.

It was estimated that at least 75% of the command was inoperated to some extent. Most of these men remained with their organization as adequate treatment was not available in rear establishments, which were crowded, short of medicine and had not the food supplies necessary to build up cases of malnutrition. Collecting stations and convalescing stations were established in divisions, regiments and battalions. Efforts were made to give men at these stations slightly more than the regular issue of rations. This increase had to come from the food issued to the command

as a whole. By March 12th offensive action on a large scale by this command was impracticable, due to exhausted condition of the troops, as well as lack of transportation and supplies. However, constant patrolling was maintained and day and night artillery interdiction of enemy areas was continued.

Enemy air and artillery activity increased. During Japanese artillery firing, their bombs flew over our artillery positions. Any attempt at counter-battery on our part was met by instant bombing of battery firing. These bombs operated without opposition from our air forces, and very little from the limited anti-aircraft which was reduced by sickness to the amount necessary to man one battery of 25mm guns.

During this period small detachments of Japanese troops, which had worked their way inland from beaches unobserved, tried to rejoin their forces north of Ilog. This resulted in numerous small encounters in the rear of our front lines. The last of these groups, a force of about 200 men, was destroyed in the rear of the 61st Division WLB in the Ilog Sector. During these fights Major Dealy, Infantry, and Captain Noble, 20th Cavalry were killed.

Summary of Operations from March 12, 1942 to April 3, 1942

On March 12th Major General Jones succeeded me in command of the I Corps. He energetically continued the plan of reconnaissance and re-organization, which had been initiated. The front of the 11th Division was shortened and strengthened. As it was estimated that the enemy main effort would be to separate the I and II Corps along the Pantigsa River, four switch positions were organized in that area. Extensive mining operations were completed. In the Tila River area, near Ilog, and in the 1st Division area, near Trail 7, 300 pound depth charges were placed, modified so as to explode on contact or as desired by local detachment commanders. The anti-tank defense of the Tila River Valley was strengthened by the addition to the Corps of some naval 3 inch guns and one battery of self-propelled mounts. In addition the artillery of the Corps was organized to concentrate its fire promptly in areas suitable for tank attack.

On April 3d, a major offensive was launched by Japanese forces

against the II Corps. On this date the Reserve of the I Corps consisted of the 20th Cavalry and the 46th Infantry.

On April 6th the 46th Infantry (less one Battalion) with platoon of tanks was ordered to report to II Corps at junction of Trails 29 and 8. On April 6th, the 20th Cavalry was ordered to the II Corps and on April 7th the 1st P.C. was taken from the South Sub-Sector and assigned II Corps.

On April 7th, Headquarters Sector "D" (Headquarters Philippine Division) (General Lough), the 46th Infantry (less one Battalion) and detachments of the 41st Infantry, Philippine Army, after being repulsed in a counter-attack northward on Trail 28, was again attached to the I Corps in the vicinity of the junctions of Trails 29 and 8.

This force pursuant to orders from Headquarters Luzon Force, was ordered to attack along Trail 8, make contact with units of II Corps, whose locations were unknown, and hold the line of Trail 8. This attack was launched under General Lough, but made no head-way, and on April 8th, a double envelopment by a Japanese Regiment forced these troops to retire to the west of the Pantingan River. General Lough's command was then ordered to defend a sector of the Pantingan River astride Trail 8. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, was attached to this command at this time.

About noon, April 8th, the I Corps received orders to relieve the 46th Infantry by dark and have it proceed after dark to Mariveles. The 11th Division was ordered to relieve the 46th Infantry, and the necessary transportation was requested from Headquarters Luzon Force. This transportation was not made available at the time and place scheduled.

The right flank of the 11th Division by this time had fallen back to switch positions. The remainder of the Corps remained in original positions until night of April 8th-9th, when all units withdrew to a line north of Trail 9 and in general parallel to it. The Corps C.P. did not change its location. The withdrawal was made to protect the right flank of the Corps.

As information of the surrender did not reach the Corps until late April 9th, dispositions were made for the all around defense of the Corps Sector.

Late on April 9th, the I Corps was notified that the Iatan Force had been surrendered and that all troops would assemble near their C.P.'s

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and stock arms.

On April 9th, the 11th Division, which had complied with these instructions, was attacked by Japanese Troops, who had crossed the Pantingan River on Trail 8. This attack was finally halted when the Japanese were informed of the surrender.

On the morning of April 10th, a Japanese Force attacked the front of the 1st Division. This attack was finally halted by the intervention of the Japanese Commander, who had crossed the Pantingan.

Late in the evening a Japanese Staff Officer arrived at the Corps Command Post and accepted the surrender of the Corps Commander, directing him to report to the Japanese Army Commander next morning.

J. M. Morrison
J. M. MORRISON
General, United States Army
Formerly Commanding
Seventh Signal Force and
I Philippine Corps

Fort Sam Houston, Texas
April 12, 1942

Appendices:

- No. 1 - Citations
- No. 2 - Operations North Luzon
- No. 3 - Situation 19 January 1942
- No. 4 - Situation 26 January 1942

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Authority NND 59-3079

CITATIONS

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 14

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, March 9, 1942

.....

The North Luzon Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action. Attacked on December 23, 1941, when in a state of partial mobilization and training, in the vicinity of Lingayen Gulf, Pangasinan, Philippines, the North Luzon Force withstood repeated assaults by greatly superior forces. When forced to withdraw by sheer pressure of numbers, despite the very heavy casualties inflicted upon the enemy, this Force maintained complete cohesion while executing difficult delaying action under heavy ground attacks supported by continuous bombardment from unopposed sea bombers. Losses in some organizations exceeded 50 percent, but the undaunted valor of the depleted command made possible the successful withdrawal into the Ilocos Peninsula on January 6, 1942.

.....

The I Philippine Corps, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action. Attacked on January 21, 1942, in the Ilocos Peninsula, by Japanese forces that were superior in numbers, training and equipment, and with complete superiority in the air, its units maintained position through sheer tenacity despite penetrations in its front and left rear. Skillfully executed counterattacks drove home with magnificent courage on part of the troops resulted in the isolation of four hostile elements and their consequent complete annihilation, thus restoring on February 14, 1942, the integrity of the corps front.

.....

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

O. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
J. A. CLIP
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 22

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, April 20, 1942

Citation of units of both military and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments. - As authorized by Executive Order 9028 [see 11, Stat. 11, U. S., 1942], a citation in the name of the President of the United States, as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction, is awarded to all units of both military and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments, engaged in the defense of the Philippines since December 7, 1941.

.....

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

O. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
J. A. CLIP,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Appendix No. 1
Report of North Luzon Force and I Philippine Corps

26

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Authority: NA 286307F