

PHOTOSTATIC COPY OFFICIAL REPORT
OF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL EVERETT LAUMAN
WARNER, 0125573
(Deceased)

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Authority NYP 65307b

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Authority: MP 000000

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Authority NND 893078

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4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq, , dated

Unit

Period of Recog.

Grade

NO. PHS-50M PERIODIC PLATT-3-43- 30 M

CERTIFICATE - REPORT

I CERTIFY THAT I AM EVERETT MAUMAN WARNER FA (O-125,573)
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FIELD ARTILLERY, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES
THAT I CERTIFY TO THE FOLLOWING REPORT WHICH PURPOSES
TO GIVE ALL THE FACTS CONCERNING MY MOVEMENTS AND ACTIONS
BEGINNING WITH MY ARRIVAL IN THE PHILIPPINES AUGUST, 1941 AND
WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO SAME BEGINNING WITH THE OUTBREAK
OF WAR - DECEMBER 8, 1941 AND CULMINATING WITH MY RETURN TO
AMERICAN PRISON CAMP IN THE PHILIPPINES NUMBER ONE,
CABANATUAN NUNIA FROM DECEMBER 6, 1942.

THAT AS CAPTAIN FIELD ARTILLERY, I ARRIVED IN MANILA, PHILIPPINES
ON ABOVE DATE MENTIONED FROM DUTY AT THE UNITED STATES ARMY
QUARTERMASTER DEPT (PREVIOUS) FRONT ROYAL VIRGINIA, AS PER
PARAGRAPH 29 GENERAL ORDER NUMBER (I BELIEVE 119) THE ADJUTANT
GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON D.C. DATED MAY 26, 1941

THAT BY SPECIAL ORDER NO. 177, HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE
DEPARTMENT AUGUST 1, 1941 I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVISIONAL FIELD
ARTILLERY BRIGADE (PHILIPPINE 300TH) COMMANDED BY COLONEL LOUIS R.
DOUGHERTY FA. AT FORT STDENBURG PI. THAT COLONEL DOUGHERTY
ASSIGNED ME TO COMMAND BATTERY 'D' 85TH FIELD ARTILLERY (PS)
AND THAT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1941 I WAS GIVEN COMMAND OF THE
SECOND BATTALION 85TH FIELD ARTILLERY (PS). THAT ON OR ABOUT OCTOBER 27TH
1941 THE ARRIVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES OF SIX LIEUTENANT-COLONELS
FA MADE IT NECESSARY FOR COLONEL DOUGHERTY TO REPLACE FOUR
OF US SIX BATTALION COMMANDERS JUNIOR TO THESE OFFICERS.
THAT LIEUT-COLONEL JOHN R. GALL FA. BECAME MY NEW
BATTALION COMMANDER AND DESIGNATED ME AS HIS EXECUTIVE
OFFICER.

THAT EARLY IN NOVEMBER 1941, HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE
DEPARTMENT ORDERED FORT STDENBURG TO FURNISH ONE OFFICER
FOR DETAIL TO CAMP JOHN WAY PI. TO REPLACE MAJOR

(OVER)

(SEE NPH - PAGE 2)

FRANCIS E. FELLOWS 2nd FA (FS) DUE TO RETURN TO THE
UNITED STATES THAT I WAS SELECTED BY GENERAL WILLIAM R
KING THRU CAPTAIN DAGHERTY FOR THIS DETAIL AND THAT
I RECEIVED ORDERS FROM HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE
DEPARTMENT ON NOVEMBER 10, 1941 TO REPAIR FORT DUTY
AT CAMP JOHN HAY, THAT I PROCEEDED TO AND ARRIVED
THERE ABOUT MID NOVEMBER 11, 1941.
THAT BY SPECIAL ORDERS NUMBER 93, HEADQUARTERS
CAMP JOHN HAY I WAS DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (S) AND
PROVOST MARSHAL, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, SUMMARY COURT
OFFICER, SURVEYING OFFICER, POST SCHOOL OFFICER, ASSISTANT
FIRE MARSHAL, CLASSIFICATION OFFICER, MORALE OFFICER,
OFFICER IN CHARGE POST KITCHEN, ENTERTAINMENT AND
RECREATION OFFICER, RMP OFFICER IN CHARGE ENLISTED MEN'S
DORMITORY. THAT I FUNCTIONED IN THESE ASSIGNMENTS UNTIL
CAMP JOHN HAY WAS ORDERED ABANDONED AND WAS ACTUALLY
EVACUATED DECEMBER 24, 1941. THAT I WAS PROMOTED TO
MAJOR FIELD ARTILLERY, DECEMBER 17, 1941 WHILE AT CAMP
JOHN HAY.
THAT ON DECEMBER 8, 1941 AT 8:15 AM, 1 DAY AFTER AN
OFFICERS MEETING CALLED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN PHORAN
TO DISCUSS WAR PLANS A BOMBING ATTACK BY 17 AND 1 =
EIGHTEEN JAPANESE PLANES HIT CAMP JOHN HAY INFlicting
CASUALTIES TOTALING ELEVEN (11) KILLED AND APPROXIMATELY
40 INJURED - SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS. THAT IN THIS RECEIVED
SLIGHT INJURIES OF THE FACE, ARM AND LEGS.
THAT THERE WERE DROPS APPROXIMATELY 117 BOMBS IN THE
ATTACK THAT TWO BOMBS FOUND BY ME WERE 50 KILOGRAM
BOMBS 29 INCHES LONG AND 12 INCHES IN DIAMETER. THAT
IN THIS PAID THERE WAS ALSO DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS
AND UTILITIES.

CERTIFICATE

PAGE 2

REPORT OF LT. COL. EVERETT L. HANMER - FA (O-175,572)
THAT LT. COLONEL MORAN ORDERED ME TO IDENTIFY AND BURY THE
MORTALITIES WHICH I DID IN CEMETERY NUMBER TWO.

THAT TWICE MORE, DECEMBER 13TH AND DECEMBER 15, 1941, CAMP
JOHN HAY WAS BOMBED, ON THE 13TH WITH 7 PERSONS INJURED
(ONE SOLDIER, SCARBOROUGH COOKS AND ONE CIVILIAN FILIPINO CHILD) THAT
THE MAIN CAMP QUARTERMASTER GARAGE WAS NEARLY DAMAGED, THAT
IN THESE LAST TWO ATTACKS APPROXIMATELY 40 BOMBS WERE DROPPED.

THAT MY DUTIES NOW AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND PROMOT
MARSHAL ALONG WITH OTHER DUTIES ORDERED BY MAJOR-GENERAL
MORAN, KEPT ME QUITE BUSY, THAT I FREQUENTLY KEPT UP
LIAISON FROM CAMP JOHN HAY WITH OUR 43RD INFANTRY UNIT
OUTPOSTS ON THE MASHUAN ROAD AND LATER CONDUCTED PHILIPPINE
ARMY UNITS MOVING THRU BAGUIO TO OVERNIGHT BIVOUAC POSITIONS IN
AND AROUND BAGUIO.

THAT IT SEEMED DIFFICULT TO GET ANY INFORMATION OR ORDERS ON
WHAT MIGHT BE ANY PLAN TO DEFEND OR TO EVACUATE BAGUIO
AND THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE NO EFFORT MADE TOWARD AN
ADEQUATE DEFENSE OF CAMP JOHN HAY.

THAT ON THE AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 24, 1941 I RECEIVED
ORDERS FROM THE CAMP JOHN HAY ADJUTANT TO BE READY TO
EVACUATE - THAT THE CAMP PERSONNEL WOULD EVACUATE AT
NIGHT BY WAY OF ANTIPOLO, BOLD FIELDS AND TWIN RIVERS.
THAT AFTER DARK I WENT TO TWIN RIVERS IN A CAR WITH
FIRST LIEUTENANT SILVIO GASPERINI AND THERE SAW MAJOR-GENERAL
JOHN P. MORAN DIRECTING THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY ROLLING
STOCK AND OTHER EQUIPMENT BY HAVING SAME PUSHED OVER
A STEEP EMBANKMENT AND INTO A RAINE GIFF - A BLIND-END
ROAD AT TWIN RIVERS, THAT WE ALL WERE TOLD THAT 10,000
JAPANESE TROOPS WERE APPROACHING BAGUIO VIA THE KENNAN
ROAD AND WOULD ARRIVE BY MIDNIGHT.

THAT AFTER THE ATTEMPT AT DEMOLISHING EQUIPMENT THE
CAMP JOHN HAY PERSONNEL WAS ORDERED TO MOVE EASTWARD.

(TURN OVER)

3

Line No. Page No.

2. Reconstructed Revision Roster

Line No. Page No.

REMARKS

ON FOOT OVER THE MOUNTAIN TRAILS. THAT THE
 INFORMATION I WAS ABLE TO GATHER WAS THAT WE WERE
 TO TRY TO MAKE IT THRU TO OUR LINES IN THE SOUTH.
 THAT THE FIRST STOP WAS KUSOP SAN WITH ABOUT
 30 KILOMETERS EAST OF ANTIKAK.
 THAT IN ORDER TO GET INFORMATION ON JAPANESE ENTRY
 INTO GAGUO I REMAINED OVER NIGHT AT ANTIKAK AND RETURNED
 THE FOLLOWING MORNING. (DECEMBER 25, 1941) TO GAGUO. THAT
 NO JAPANESE ACTUALLY CAME IN BEFORE DECEMBER 27th 19
 41.
 THAT ABOUT 11 O'CLOCK AM ON DECEMBER 25, 1941 I LEFT
 TWIN RIVERS AND MOVED ALONE WITH 2 FIJING CHANGIPEE GUIDES
 TO KUSOP SAN. WILL ARRIVING THERE AFTER DARK. THAT THE
 FOLLOWING DAY DECEMBER 26th I ASKED LIEUT. COLONEL HORAN
 FOR HIS ORDERS CONCERNING ME. THAT LIEUT. COLONEL HORAN
 GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING VERBAL ORDER, OVERHEARD BY
 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ALBERTO HORN # 10304960 - 88th FIELD
 ARTILLERY (PS) - MY FORMER DRIVER AT FT. STANTON.
 THAT COLONEL HORAN'S ORDER TO ME WAS - QUOTE
 "PROCEED TO NATIONAL ROAD NUMBER FIVE AND LET
 ME KNOW WHETHER IT IS OPEN AND CLEAR TO THE SOUTH. ALSO
 IF THERE IS TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE AND HOW MUCH." UNQUOTE
 THAT I ASKED IN REPLY "AT WHAT POINT ON ROAD FIVE,
 ALBERTO?" THAT COLONEL HORAN REPLIED. QUOTE "YES, AND
 YOU HAD BETTER MOVE QUI. IT IS NOT WELL FOR TOO MANY OF
 US TO MOVE OVER THE TRAIL TOGETHER" UNQUOTE.
 THAT IN THE EVACUATION OF CAMP JOHN MAY THERE WAS
 MUCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION DESTROYED AND ABANDONED.
 WHICH EQUIPMENT ALSO INCLUDED SOME OF THE REMAINS OF
 SELF PROPELLED MOUNTS 75 MM FIELD ARTILLERY THAT LIEUT. COLONEL
 JOSEPH GANANT F.A.U.S.A. (% DR. HANNAH - CLEVELAND NEWS, CLEVELAND, OHIO -
 OR 2880 CHADWANE ROAD, SHAKER HEIGHTS, CLEVELAND, OHIO) AND

CERTIFICATE
REPORT OF LT-COLONEL EVERETT L. WARNER FA (0425572)
C.M.D.C. 14TH INFANTRY P.A.

CAPTAIN E. W. JONES FA - 2843 E. THIRD STREET, TUCSON ARIZONA,
CAN GIVE MORE ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THIS THAN I, ALSO MAJOR
FRANCIS E. FELLANS FA.

THAT UPON RECEIVING COLONEL MORAN'S VERBAL ORDER
DECEMBER 26, 1941 TO PROCEED TO ARITAO ON NATIONAL ROUTE #5
I STARTED FOR THAT POINT ABOUT 3 O'CLOCK P.M. WITH PFC ALFREDO REYES.

THAT ON THE NIGHT OF DECEMBER 27, P.M. HE ARRIVED AT
KAYARA NUEVA VISAYA AND THE FOLLOWING MORNING I SUCCEEDED IN
GETTING MAJOR MARTIN MOSES ^{MAJ} ON THE TELEPHONE IN ARITAO - 65 KILOMETERS
AWAY. MAJOR MOSES COMMANDED THE 12TH INFANTRY P.A. THAT MAJOR MOSES
INFORMED ME ROUTE #5 WAS OPEN AND CLEAR OF ENEMY TO THE SOUTH
AND THAT THERE WAS AMPLE MOTOR TRANSPORTATION AT ARITAO FOR
MANY TROOPS. THAT THERE WERE MANY FILIPINO SOLDIERS IN ARITAO THAT
I RETURNED THIS INFORMATION BY WRITTEN MESSAGE TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL
MORAN BEHIND ME ON THE TRAIL.

THAT PROCEEDING TOWARD PINGKIAN NUEVA VISAYA EN ROUTE TO ARITAO
I MET SEVERAL GROUPS OF PHILIPPINE ARMY SOLDIERS, SOME WITH
ARMS AND EQUIPMENT AND SOME WITHOUT. THAT THESE MEN TOLD
ME THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS HAD BEEN DISBANDED BY THEIR OFFICERS
AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO PROCEED TO THEIR HOMES.
THAT I DUBAIED THIS AND INSTRUCTED THE MEN TO FOLLOW US TO
ARITAO. THAT UPON REACHING PINGKIAN I MET A FILIPINO NAMED
APONIO BALIC, BORN OF PINGKIAN WHO WAS GATHERING U.S. ARMY
RIFLES AND AMMUNITION REPORTED TO BE THROWN AWAY BY TROOPS
OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY. THAT BALIC CLAIMED TO BE A
VETERAN OF WORLD WAR #1 IN EUROPE AND SAID HE
HAD SERVICE WITH THE 36TH INFANTRY IN THE UNITED STATES.

THAT I INSTRUCTED BALIC TO CONTINUE GATHERING ARMS,
AMMUNITION AND OTHER SCATTERED U.S. ARMY EQUIPMENT
AND TO TURN IT OVER TO THE POLICE CHIEF AT PINGKIAN

5

TURN OVER

SEE NEXT SHEET (P-4)

THAT I ALSO INSTRUCTED THE BENGAL BOMB CHIEF (DESIGNATED 'SERGEANT') TO COLLECT AND HOLD FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM OUR FORGES, ALL ARMS EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION KNOWN TO BE DISPOSED OF BY USAF Troops.

THAT I PROCEEDED TO ARMO NUEVA VISCAYA, ARRIVING THERE ABOUT 4 P.M. - MONDAY DECEMBER 29, 1941. THAT THERE I MET CAPTAIN MANUEL P. ENRIQUETA, GSC (PA) ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE (G-2) OFFICER 11th DIVISION Philippine Army (COMMAND) LED BY GENERAL BRUNER) AND OTHER OFFICERS (Philippine Army) INCLUDING 2d Lt. EDUARDO G. NAVARRO INF (Dist. HORS) 1st Military District, 2d Lt. MELITO P. BUTAN INF (Dist. HORS) 1st Military District, 3d Lt. HONORIO QUINES (INF) (REPORTING FOR DUTY THE ADJUTANT GENERAL DEC. 28, 1941) (Adj. Gen.) MANUEL T. NERY (REPORTING TO 1st REGULAR DIVISION DEC. 28 AND RESERVE OFFICERS) (Full Names NOT ALL HERE ADAPTABLE) REGIMENTS TODAY, TURKMAN, EVANGELISTA, VALDEPENIA, PALAYAN AND PAGALILAWAN, HERNANDEZ, YEA, VALDES, ASCUNCION, BAGUIRAN AND GERVAZIO REYES. THAT IN ADDITION WERE ENTERED PERSONNEL OF DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS FIRST MIDDLE DISTRICT THE ENRIQUETA, TWELFTH, THIRTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH AND SEVENTY-FIRST INFANTRIES AND ELEVENTH ENGINEERS, PHILIPPINE ARMY. THAT CAPTAIN ENRIQUETA REPORTED THAT ALL WERE PROCEEDED AS ORDERED TO MANILA BUT HAD BEEN DELAYED BY JAPANESE ACTIVITY IN SAN JOSE NUEVA ECUA. THAT I IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED THIS REPORT OF JAPANESE ACTIVITY SOUTH OF US AND FOUND THAT LARGE JAPANESE FORCES HAD OCCUPIED SAN JOSE AND TEMPORARILY AND WEST OF SAME ABOUT MIDNIGHT DECEMBER 28, 1941. THAT THIS MORN I SENT BACK BY WRITTEN MESSAGE AND MESSENGER TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOBAN WHOM I REQUESTED TO BE FOLLOWING WE HEAT ON THE TRAIL TO ARITAO.

THAT FURTHER, I SUCCEEDED IN GETTING A TELEPHONE CONNECTION WITH KAYAPA WHERE I GOT THE POLICE CHIEF ON THE TELEPHONE TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO COLONEL HORAN. THAT THE CHIEF INFORMED ME THAT ON THE PREVIOUS DAY - DECEMBER 28, LT-COLONEL HORAN HAD WITH HIS TROOPS OF THE 43RD INFANTRY (PS) MOVED SOUTH TOWARD IMUGAN, SANTA FE AND BELETE PASS TO ROAD NUMBER 5. THAT HE SENT ME NO WORD OF THIS.

THAT BELIEVING THEREFORE I WAS GOING TO SEE COLONEL HORAN LATER COMING NORTH, I DECIDED TO TEMPORARILY TAKE COMMAND OF THE ARRITO SITUATION, AND WITH THE AID OF CAPTAIN ENRIQUÉZ, PROCURED RATIONS FOR THE APPROXIMATELY 200 OFFICERS AND MEN ^{WHICH} WHO HAD FEW EMERGENCY RATIONS. THAT WITH THE HELP OF CITIZENS AVAILABLE WE PROVIDED SUFFICIENT SUBSISTENCE FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND IMMEDIATELY ORGANIZED AND SENT OUT DETAILS FOR ADDITIONAL FOOD SUPPLIES. THAT ON THE SAME NIGHT (DECEMBER 29TH) I LOADED ALL TROOPS AND SUPPLIES MOVED OUT TO BARRIO COMAN 3 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF ARRITO TO REORGANIZE TROOPS THERE.

THAT MY PURPOSE FOR REORGANIZING THESE TROOPS WAS THREE FOLD, NAMELY,

- (a) TO KEEP UP THEIR MORALE AND THE MORALE OF FILIPINO CITIZENS WHO FEARED THAT DISBANDED TROOPS MEANT A LOST CAUSE
- (b) TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER AND TO PREVENT ARMED DISBANDED SOLDIERS FROM DEMANDING INDIVIDUALLY, FOOD AND SHELTER FROM THE POPULACE AND BEING TEMPTED TO LOOT.
- (c) TO PUT UP THE BEST DEFENSE WE COULD IF JAPANESE FORCES PROCEEDED NORTH, FROM SAN JOSE.

THAT MANY OF THE TROOPS, COLLECTED HAD THROWN AWAY THEIR BLANKETS AND OTHER ARMY EQUIPMENT, FEARING IDENTIFICATION AS SOLDIERS BY THE ENEMY IF CAPTURED (TURN OVER)

1. Initial Reconnoitered Troop Location:

REMARKS

ORGANIZATION

NAME

8 - 5 - 55

THAT I IMMEDIATELY GAVE ORDERS TO ALL THE PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT I COULD CONTACT OF NUEVA VISCAYA TO GATHER AND HAND IN OUR COLLECTION FOR USARV ARMY. MUNICIPAL AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE REHANDLED OR DISPOSED BY TROOPS. THAT WE MADE A CHECK-UP OF TROOPS AS WELL TO GET INFORMATION ON THIS AND FOLLOWED UP COLLECTION OF THAT WHICH WE LOCATED THAT WE PROCEEDED TO ORGANIZE INTO A PROVISIONAL BATTALION OF INFANTRY AND I DESIGNATED CAPTAIN ENRIQUEZ AS MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER THAT WE LOCATED AND BROUGHT BACK OUT OF HIDING. GOVERNOR PERMIRO QUIRINO OF NUEVA VISCAYA AND HAD HIM CALL A MEETING OF PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER, AND SYSTEMIZING OUR PROCUREMENT OF FOOD AND SUPPLIES FOR OUR TROOPS. THAT WE IMMEDIATELY PUT A STOP TO LOOTING WHICH HAD BEGUN TO TAKE PLACE IN CONSIDERABLE PROPORTIONS, AND THAT WE TOOK OVER THE COMMISSARIY IN BAYBANDING UNDER CAPTAIN C.T. BONDREY AND REORGANIZED VOLUNTEER SQUADS FOR GOVERNOR QUIRINO'S PROVINCE (NUEVA VISCAYA) AND IMPROVED MUNICIPALITIES THEREOF, ALSO MUNICIPAL POLICE - ASSURING THEM ALL OF OUR ASSISTANCE WHEN NEEDED, THAT LATER WE DID THIS SAME THING FOR THE GOVERNOR AND PROVINCE OF ISABEBA - ALSO OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNOR MARCELO APDUN OF CAGAYAN PROVINCE THAT LATER ALSO AFTER WE PROCURED AND SET UP OUR RADIO TRANSMISSION AND RECEIVING SET WE SENT AND RECEIVED NUMEROUS MESSAGES BETWEEN AND FOR PRESIDENT QUIRINO AND GOVERNORS QUIRINO OF NUEVA VISCAYA, VASAYA OF ISABEBA AND APDUN OF CAGAYAN. THAT IN ONE INSTANCE WE WERE ABLE TO GET A VACANT MANAGER MEMBERSHIP FILLED IN ISABEBA PROVINCE BY PRESIDENT MANUEL A. QUIRINO. THAT I WAS ANXIOUS TO HELP THE ESTABLISHED PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS FUNCTION NORMALLY WITHOUT

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DECLARING AND PLACING THEM UNDER MARTIAL LAW, THAT I ANNOUNCED THIS POLICY TO THE GOVERNORS AND PLEDGED OUR ASSISTANCE TO THEM TO KEEP THEIR GOVERNMENTS FUNCTIONING. THAT ON THIS SUBJECT GOVERNOR MARCELLA ADDURN OF CAGAYAN PROVINCE ESPECIALLY DESERVES TO BE COMMENTED, THAT WITH CONSIDERABLE JAPANESE FORCES CONSTANTLY IN HIS PROVINCE AT APAKI AND TUGUEGUAO, HE WAS STILL ABLE TO CARRY ON AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, HELPFUL TO OUR CAUSE.

THAT IN EARLY JANUARY 1942 WHILE WE WERE ORGANIZING AND GROWING IN STRENGTH OF PERSONNEL, THE TWO PROVINCIAL ENGINEERS, A. J. ZARATE OF NUBIA VISDAYA AND BARTHOLOME PUZON OF ISABELA WERE OF UNESTIMABLE VALUE TO US BY THEIR UNSELFISH AND EFFICIENT SERVICES AND THEIR UNTIRING ENERGY IN PROCUREMENT FOR US AND FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE PROVINCES.

THAT ON OR ABOUT JANUARY FIRST 1942 IN THE LATE AFTERNOON CAPTAIN ENRIQUEZ WAS ON A MISSION IN NEARBY ARITAO (WE WERE IN BARRIO COMAN) WHEN LT. COLONEL JOHN P. HORAN WITH CAPTAINS LEO GITTEZ AND CAMERON STARNES CAME THRU UP NATIONAL ROAD FIVE HEADING NORTH AND WITH TWO TRUCKS FILLED WITH SOLDIERS OF THE 43RD INFANTRY (PS) - ABOUT 60 TROOPS THAT CAPTAIN ENRIQUEZ REPORTED MY PRESENCE NEARBY TO LT. COLONEL HORAN AND ASKED THE COLONEL IF HE DESIRED ME TO REPORT TO HIM. THAT HE (COLONEL HORAN) REPLIED "NO" AND SAID THAT HE WAS IN A GREAT HURRY. THAT ACCORDING TO ENRIQUEZ, COLONEL HORAN SENT ME HIS REGARDS AND TOLD ENRIQUEZ THAT HE WAS GLAD I WAS IN CHARGE. PLUS A FEW COMPLIMENTARY REMARKS. THAT CAPTAIN ENRIQUEZ REPORTED LT. COLONEL HORAN HAD NOT STATED HIS EXACT DESTINATION.

THAT ON OR ABOUT JANUARY FIFTH 1942, CAPTAIN GUILLERMO NAKAR, 71ST INFANTRY P.A. WITH ABOUT 150 OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE FIRST BATTALION 71ST INFANTRY REPORTED TO JOIN US. THAT NAKAR REPORTED THAT AFTER HEAVY FIGHTING AT BAWANG, LA UNION, HE HAD BEEN CUT OFF AND HAD Fought HIS WAY

- OVER -

1. Initial Reconstructed Troop Roster:

REMARKS

ORGANIZATION

NAME

SEE PAGE 6

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SOMETIMES THRU HEAVY OPDS TO NUOVA VISCAYA. THAT HIS UNIT WAS ALL THAT REMAINED OF THE FIRST BATTALION 7TH INFANTRY THAT CAPTAIN MAKER'S MEN HAD MOST OF THEIR ARMS AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT IN FACT.

THAT AT THIS TIME AND SINCE DECEMBER 30, 1941, CAPTAIN RALPH G. ROBERTER, 26TH CAVALRY (PS) WITH FIRST LIEUTENANTS WARREN A. MINTON AND THOMAS S. JONES AND ABOUT 75 ENLISTED MEN OF TROOP "C", 26TH CAVALRY (PS) WERE IN PANBANG, NUOVA VISCAYA ABOUT 6 KILOMETERS NORTH OF ARIADO. THAT THIS UNIT, RECENTLY ON PATROL DUTY ON THE KENNON AND MAGUINDAN ROADS NEAR BAGUIO, HAD BEEN ORDERED BY LT-COLONEL HOBAN TO MOVE OUT AND HAD ALSO BEEN ORDERED IT WAS REPORTED TO DESTROY 3000 ROUNDS OF 50 CALIBRE AMMUNITION & AIR-COOLED MACHINE GUNS AND 17 GROUND REFS. THAT ON JANUARY 3, 1942, CAPTAIN ROBERTER AND HIS UNIT PREPARED TO MOVE INTO ISABELA PROVINCE AND NOW TRANSFERRED TO SANTIAGO. THAT I SENT AN INVITATION TO CAPTAIN ROBERTER AND TROOPS TO JOIN OUR FORCES IF I COULD GET PERMISSION FROM HEADQUARTERS PARTICIPATE DEPARTMENT TO ORGANIZE TROOPS NEARBY.

THAT CAPTAIN ENRIQUETA, NOW REPORTED TO ME THAT WE COULD ACQUIRE A 171 RADIO TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING SET WITH OPERATORS FROM BANANG AND I ORDERED HIM TO DO SO. THAT BY JANUARY 9, 1942, WE HAD THE SET ERRECTED IN THE DAYMANSUNG HOSPITAL AND OPERATING THAT THE CHIEF OPERATOR WAS STARR - SERGEANT JOSE GONZALEZ S.C. AND HIS ASSISTANT WAS CORPORAL EPALIANO - BOTH OF FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT BA. THAT GONZALEZ WAS LATER PROMOTED TO THIRD THEN SECOND LIEUTENANT THAT WE SET UP THE TRANSMITTERS

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IN BAYOMBING IN ORDER TO USE THE TOWN POWER, MEANTIME TRYING TO LOCATE A POWER ENGINE AND GENERATOR FOR USE IN OUT-OF-THE-WAY PLACES.

THAT OUR FIRST MESSAGE AFTER CONTACTING U.S.A.F.F. HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 9TH 1942 WAS TO REPORT IDENTIFIED OFFICERS AND TROOP UNITS IN MY VICINITY THERE AND THAT I ASKED HEADQUARTERS PERMISSION TO ORGANIZE A PROVISIONAL REGIMENT WITH ENRIQUEZ AS EXECUTIVE AND PRAEGER AND NAKAR AS BATTALION COMMANDERS OF FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS RESPECTIVELY. THAT FURTHER I ASKED IF PLANE COULD BRING US AMMUNITION TO BAGACAG AIRFIELD.

THAT ON JANUARY 13TH I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY - QUOTE

1-10/JC 620P 61 KZWX 1-13-42

MAJOR F.L. WARNER KZFG

OUR MAIN FORCES HOLD ONLY DATAN PROVINCE AND CORREGIDOR ISLAND WEST MANILA PERIOD STAYING IN HILLS CONTINUE TO OPERATE SUPPORT TRENCHES PLEASE SEND AS MUCH INFORMATION ANY POSSIBLE MEANS STOP NOT PRACTICAL AT THIS TIME TO DROP ANY SUPPORT FROM PLANES BUT WILL DO SO WHEN POSSIBLE STOP. ORGANIZE YOUR FORCES TO MEET YOUR NEEDS END

MACARTHUR 740 P

THAT ON THE AUTHORITY OF THIS TELEGRAM I AGAIN REQUESTED CAPTAIN PRAEGER TO JOIN US. THAT BECAUSE CAPTAIN PRAEGER DELAYED ACCEPTING I THEN ASKED HIM TO SEND ME LT LIEUTENANT WARREN A. MINTON AND AS MANY TROOPS AS HE COULD SPARE. LIEUTENANT MINTON ACCEPTED WITH PRAEGER'S APPROVAL AND BROUGHT 40 PHILIPPINE SCOUTS OF TROOP 'C' 26TH CAVALRY (PS) AND ABOUT 260 OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY THAT SOME

(OVER)

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at page 7

THE ATTACK

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE WORK PREPARATORY TO
 PRAGER AND 1ST LIEUTENANT WARREN A MINION ON THE 6 DAY
 REPORTED BY ME TO HEADQUARTERS USAFET THAT ON TRAIN
 CONSTRUCTION BARBERS AT TIGUIGARAO THE RESULTS WERE
 RAISING ATTACK ON THE AIR FIELD AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED
 AND MEN OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY CONDUCTED A SUCCESSFUL
 WILLIAM F ROWEN, SIXTY PHILIPPINE SOLDIERS AND 28 OFFICERS
 PRAGER, FIRST LIEUTENANT AND JONES WITH TECHNICAL SERGEANT
 THAT ON JANUARY 13, AT 2 AM CAPTAIN RAYMOND B

SO SIG 300P

MACHANNUK

INADVISABLE TO SET LIMITATION AMOUNT AUTHORIZED END
 (REIMBURSED) IN CASH AT EARLIEST DATE (STOP) IT IS
 YOU ON PAYMENT OF LEGITIMATE EXPENDITURES WILL BE
 TO MAKE WHETHER (STOP) CHIPS ISSUED BY

MAJOR WARREN KZPC

" 1 13/10 235P KZPC JANUARY 29 1942

FOLLOWS - QUOTE

AUTHORIZED ANY SET OF KILLED AMOUNT THE REPLY TO THIS WAS AS
 NECESSARY SUPPLIES FOR MY TROOPS I FURTHER ASKED IF I WOULD BE
 ASKED PERMISSION TO REQUESTION AND SIGN FOR SUBSTANCE AND OTHER
 THAT MY SECOND RADIOGRAM TO USAFET HEADQUARTERS
 WAS LIMITED.

IN FACT THE MAJORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY
 PERSONNEL HAD BEEN MAIN CALLED TO THE COOPS
 BUILT UNABLE TO REPORT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS
 BEFORE THIS THAT THE TRAINING OF SOME OF THESE

PAGE-7 (7)
THAT CAPTAIN PRAGER WITH TROOP C 26th CAVALRY (PS) HAD
NOW MOVED TO SANTIAGO ISADRA.

THAT AGAIN AND AGAIN WE REQUESTED FROM USAFFE
HEADQUARTERS, AMMUNITION, TO BE SENT TO OR DEPOSIT AT
BACABAG AIR FIELD NUEVA VISCAYA AND ON OR ABOUT
JANUARY 18th RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING RADIOGRAM FROM
GENERAL MACARTHUR -

L/JC 10⁵A KZHY JAN. 19 1942

MAJOR WARNER - KZPG

REGRET EXCEEDINGLY THAT I HAVE NO WAY OF
SENDING YOU AMMUNITION STOP. AVOID ANY MASS BATTLE
ACTION AGAINST YOU WHICH MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO EXHAUST
OR DESTROY YOUR FORCES STOP HARASS BUT DO NOT REPEAT
DO NOT FIGHT THEM STOP FOR PRESENT YOU JUST RELY ON
YOUR OWN FORCES STOP YOUR ENERGETIC ACTION HAS PLEASED
ME GREATLY AND I COMMEND YOU AND YOUR ENTIRE COMMAND STOP
BE CAREFUL AS TO MESSAGES YOU DISPATCH ME AND HOLD
THEM TO A MINIMUM END

MACARTHUR H²²A

THAT ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 20, 1942, CAPTAIN
CAMERON STARNES, INFANTRY REPORTED FROM LIEUT-COLONEL
HORAN TO MY HEADQUARTERS NOW IN BAYOMBANG STATING
THAT HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM COLONEL HORAN FOR ME
TO SEND TO USAFFE HEADQUARTERS. THAT THE MESSAGE READ:-

"COMMANDING GENERAL
USAFFE

DATED (JAN 20th)

LIEUT-COLONEL HORAN, MAJOR WARNER, CAPTAIN SITTER
AND CAPTAIN STARNES, ALL SAFE AND WITH TROOPS.

(SIGNED) HORAN

THAT CAPTAIN STARNES STATED LIEUT-COLONEL HORAN
HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO WAIT FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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OF RECEIPT BY USARF HEADQUARTERS OF THIS MESSAGE AND THAT IT REPLY DID NOT COME BY THE FOLLOWING NIGHT (JANUARY 21ST) HE (STARNES) HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY LT-COLONEL HORAN TO SEND A SECOND MESSAGE THAT THE SECOND MESSAGE TO USARF WAS TO CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING -

COMMANDING GENERAL
(TO BE DATED) USARF

IT IS REPORTED THAT LT-COLONEL HORAN WITH 600 (SIX HUNDRED) HEAVILY ARMED TROOPS IS GROUNDING AT STRATEGIC POINTS, ALL ROADS AND PASSES LEADING TO KANGSAN. (THAT I WAS REQUESTED TO SIGN THIS MESSAGE "WALKER")

THAT I REQUESTED TO SEND THIS MESSAGE ON THE GROUNDS THAT I KNEW THE INFORMATION TO BE INCORRECT THAT I KNEW LT-COLONEL HORAN NOW IN KANGSAN, HAD DISMISSED ABOUT HALF OF HIS TWO 4TH INFANTRY (AS) COMPANIES AND HAD NO MORE THAN SEVENTY SOLDIERS (WITH HIM. THAT WHEN I ASKED CAPTAIN STARNES LT-COLONEL HORAN'S REASON FOR SENDING SUCH A MESSAGE STARNES REPLIED "COLONEL HORAN BELIEVES THAT THE JAPANESE ARE INTERCEPTING YOUR MESSAGES AND HE WISHES TO MIS- INFORM THEM". THAT I ADVISED CAPTAIN STARNES THAT USARF HEADQUARTERS WAS EXPECTING ME TO SEND TRIVIAL INFORMATION AND THAT THE MESSAGE WOULD MISLEAD THEM ALSO. THAT CAPTAIN STARNES HERE ADVISED THAT COLONEL HORAN WOULD ORDER ME TO SEND THIS MESSAGE AND I REPLIED "NOT OVER MY NAME". THAT I WAS LATER INFORMED THAT LT-COLONEL HORAN WAS ANGRY WITH ME ABOUT THIS.

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THAT NOW ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 21, 1942, MY HEADQUARTERS WAS AT BAYOMBONG WITH THE MAIN BODY OF HEADQUARTERS TROOPS NUMBERING 165 OFFICERS AND MEN AT SANTA DOMINGO - 7 KILOMETERS SOUTH NEAR BATO FERRY ON THE MAGAT RIVER, AND ^NBAYOMBONG, SOLANO AND BACALANG AIR FIELD 10 KILOMETERS NORTH. THAT CAPTAIN NAKAR'S 160 MAN BATTALION, THE SECOND, WAS AT DUPAX - 30 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF BAYOMBONG AND PL LIEUTENANT MINTON'S, THE FIRST BATTALION AT SANTIAGO ISABELA, STRENGTH 302 OFFICERS AND MEN - 25 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTHEAST. THAT ALL TROOPS WERE AVAILABLE TO AND FROM MAIN ROADS. THAT ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 24, 1942 I MOVED MY HEADQUARTERS TO BACALANG NORTH OF BAYOMBONG AND MOVED MY HEADQUARTERS TROOPS FROM SANTA DOMINGO TO THE SAME PLACE. MY SECOND BATTALION AT DUPAX UNDER CAPTAIN GUILERMO NAKAR WERE MOVED TO DAMCANG, THEY NUMBERED 147.

THAT ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 25, 1942 CAPTAINS NAKAR AND ENRIQUEZ WERE IN COMPLIANCE WITH MY REQUEST, PROMISED TO ^{THE} MAJORS OF INFANTRY AND GENERAL STAFF CORPS RESPECTIVELY.

THAT ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 25TH 1942 JAPANESE FORCES BEGAN PURSUING US FROM THE SOUTH ON OR ABOUT THAT DATE WE ENGAGED AND DEFEATED AN ADVANCED DETACHMENT OF APPROXIMATELY 150 ENDEAVORING TO ENTER DAMCANG WITH THE SLEIGHT LOSS OF ONE MAN KILLED. THIS WAS REPORTED. THAT ON JANUARY 26TH WE AGAIN REPULSED AN ATTEMPTED CROSSING OF THE MAGAT RIVER NEAR BATO FERRY.

THAT THE ENEMY FORCES NOW IN ARMING SOUTH OF US NUMBERED ABOUT 2000. THAT WE HAD AT THE SAME TIME PLAIN CLOTHES INTELLIGENCE PATROLS IN THIS PLACE AND RAIDING PATROLS BEYOND TO THE SOUTH, ALSO TO THE NORTH AND EAST. THAT MASTER - SERGEANT RESOLVO F. TEJIAN, FORMERLY IN THE ENGINEERS (PA) WAS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE ON INTELLIGENCE.

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WORK IN PAIN CLOTHES.
 THAT ON JANUARY 27, 1971 I GAVE ORDERS FOR THE ENTIRE
 REGIMENT TO ASSEMBLE ON THE SCHOOL HOUSE GROUNDS IN DONGDAD
 ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 29th THAT ON THAT DATE THE
 FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS PLUS HEADQUARTERS TROOP ASSEMBLED
 AND I ORDERED THE ENTIRE REGIMENT TO MOVE INTO ISADAH
 FROM THE ROAD FROM DONGDAD NEAR VISAHA.
 THAT THIS MOVEMENT BEING MADE BEGAN THE SAME
 DAY THE REGIMENT MAKING IN SECTIONS, BECAUSE IT WAS
 NECESSARY TO CROSS THE MOKAI RIVER. USING RAFTS THAT
 WE HAD CONSTRUCTED TO CARRY SUPPLY TRUCKS AND CARS
 OUR TOTAL STRENGTH NOW WAS ABOUT 627 OFFICERS AND MEN.
 THAT WE PLACED A REAR GUARD DETACHMENT OF 35
 MEN UNDER MAJOR NOKAR ARMED WITH DYNAMITE-DANBDO
 BOMBS IN DONGDAD AND ABOUT 250 OFFICERS AND MEN
 TO A DELAYING REAR GUARD THE SAME WITH AUTOMATIC
 WEAPONS EXTENDED OVER A DISTANCE OF ONE KILOMETER
 AND PLACED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD MIKI ORIMONG
 PASS. THESE TROOPS ALSO UNDER MAJOR NOKAR'S COMMAND.
 THAT THESE PRECAUTIONS BECAUSE WE FEARED THE
 JAPANESE FORCES WOULD SOON ENDEAVOR TO PURSUE US IN
 EFFECTIVE NUMBERS WHICH PROVED TO BE TRUE.
 THAT OUR MOVEMENT EASTWARD COVERED ABOUT 24 HOURS
 IN ORDER TO CLEAR ALL UNITS FROM DONGDAD.
 THAT ABOUT 8:30 O'CLOCK ON THE MORNING OF
 JANUARY 30th - JUST AFTER OUR LAST SUPPLY UNIT HAD
 CLEARED, SEVEN JAPANESE BOMBING AND ONE PURSUIT PLANE
 APPEARED FROM THE SOUTH AND MADE AN ATTEMPT TO
 DESTROY US. THAT THE SCHOOL BUILDINGS WERE ALL DEMOLISHED
 IN DONGDAD BY BOMBS THAT ALSO WERE TWO BUILDINGS
 6/6

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JUST NORTH OF SOLANO N.V. WHERE WE HAD ABOUT 30 MALARIA CASES. DESTROYED. SEVERAL BOMBS WERE DROPT ON BAYOMBONG AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO SMASH MY FORMER HEADQUARTERS AND TRANSMITTER STATION ON THE BAGABAG FERRY ROAD ABOUT ONE KILOMETER EAST OF THE SCHOOL PROPERTY. THAT JUST PRIOR TO OUR MOVEMENT EASTWARD JAPANESE PLANES HAD DROPT PRINTED PAMPHLETS ADDRESSED TO ME AND MAJOR ENRIQUEZ LABELLING US "BRAVE AND CLEVER" BUT URGING OUR SURRENDER AND STATING THAT IT WAS "FUTILE" TO RESIST JAPAN.

THAT IN THE COMING ATTACK WE RECEIVED THREE SOLDIERS SLIGHTLY INJURED - ONE MAN AT THE TELEPHONE SWITCHBOARD IN BAGABAG AND TWO MEN NEAR BY HIM WATCHING THE PLANES AND REPORTING THEIR MOVEMENTS TO THE TELEPHONE OPERATOR TO BE RELAYED ON TO MAJOR NAKAR AT A POINT IN NORTH BAGABAG. THAT THESE MEN REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS IN THE FACE OF GREAT DANGER TO THEIR LIVES. THAT THIS WAS LATER REPORTED TO HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT, WITH THE MEN'S NAMES AND RANK. THAT AFTER THE COMING THE ONE JAPANESE PURSUIT PLANE LOCATED AND MACHINE-GUNNED A SECTION OF OUR SUPPLY TRAIN GOING EAST ON ROUTE #5 BUT DID LITTLE DAMAGE.

THAT WE ARRIVED AND ESTABLISHED REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS SETTING UP THE RADIO IN JONES ISABELA THIS SAME DATE - JANUARY 30, 1944. THAT THE MAIN BODIES OF OUR TROOPS WERE MOVED ACROSS THE CAGAYAN RIVER TO PALAGAO BARRIO SOUTH OF JONES AND TO DALIGEN BARRIO 12 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF JONES ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE CAGAYAN. THAT ON FEBRUARY 3, WE MOVED ALSO MY HEADQUARTERS AND THE RADIO TO PALAGAO.

THAT ON FEBRUARY 11 1944 AS WE HAD EXPECTED

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A CONVOY OF TRUCKS LOADED WITH JAPANESE SOLDIERS
 FILLED UP THE CORRIDOR ATTACK THAT THESE SOLDIERS
 TO SEARCH AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE SCHOOL YARD.
 MY FORMER HEADQUARTERS LOCATED EAST OF SCHOOL WHERE
 THEY BURNED THE HOUSE ON THE PROPERTY AND DID CONSIDERABLE
 DIGGING AROUND APPARENTLY EXPECTING TO FIND VALUED RECORDS.
 THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 1000 ENEMY TROOPS IN THIS
 BODY AND WHILE THEY WERE APPARENTLY DECIDING WHICH DIRECTION
 TO PROCEED FROM THERE OUR 35 MAN DETAIL JUST TO THE NORTH
 WEST OF THE TOWN BECAME ACTIVE FIRING A NUMBER OF
 ROUNDS AND EXPLODING DYNAMITE-GAMBO BOMBS FOR A
 LIMITED TIME THEN WITHDREW INTO THE WOODS TO AVOID
 RESULTS. THIS FIRE DREW THE JAPANESE TO THE NORTH WHERE
 THEY DEPLOYED ABOUT 200 MEN WITH RIFLES MACHINE GUNS
 AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND MORTARS AND ADVANCED TOWARD THE
 POSITIONS OUR TROOPS HAD OCCUPIED OUR DETAIL WITHDREW
 THAT THE JAPANESE FORCES LATER WITHDREW ENROUTE AND
 PROCEEDED NORTH TOWARD KINANGAN. THAT WE HAD SENT
 WARNINGS TO MAKE OTHER TROOPS TAKE THE NEARBY (PS) TO
 BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR A NORTHWARD MOVE BY JAPANESE
 FORCES. THAT THE TROOPS ON MAJOR OTHER WERE READY AND UNDER
 CAPTAINS WILLIAM JONES AND GEMERAL STANLEY THEY MET THE
 ENEMY AT LEARN PASS AND INFlicted HEAVY CASUALTIES THEREIN.
 THAT OUR DETAIL REPORTED FOURTEEN TRUCKS OF ENEMY
 CASUALTIES RETURNED AND IT WAS REPORTED TO ME BY CAPTAIN
 MURTON AFTER SURRENDER THAT JAPANESE OFFICERS ADMITTED
 LOSSES OF 272 KILLED IN THIS FIGHT.
 THAT NOW WITH THE MAIN BODIES OF MY TROOPS AT PANGAO
 AND PATRICK ALSO AT BARRIS ROAD, BUON AND IPI, I ENROUTE
 18
 I MADE MY HEADQUARTERS ON THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 3rd ABOVE

THE CAGAYAN RIVER TO PALAGAO - SOUTH OF JONES. THAT I IMMEDIATELY DECIDED AFTER THE BOMBINGS OF BAGABAG SOLANO AND BAYAMPONG TO MOVE OUR TROOP OFF THE MAIN ROADS AND TO BUILD OUR OWN CAMPS IN WOODS AND BAMBOO GROVES NOT TOO NEAR BARRIOS - THIS IN ORDER TO NOT ATTRACK BOMBINGS AND OTHER ATTACKS ON THE BARRIOS BY THE ENEMY. I CHOSE THE CAGAYAN VALLEY BELOW JONES ISABELA TO ESTABLISH OUR MAIN BASES - THESE TO BE CLOSE TO THE CAGAYAN RIVER.

THAT ON FEBRUARY 6TH 1942 FIRST LIEUTENANT WARREN A. MINTON WAS PROMOTED TO CAPTAIN CAVALRY.

THAT ON FEBRUARY 9, I TOOK CAPTAIN MINTON AND WE MADE A RECONNAISSANCE TRIP ON HORSEBACK SOUTH IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY OVER A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 40 KILOMETERS TO SELECT BATTALION CAMP SITES ON THE EAST AND WEST SIDES OF THE RIVER. THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY CHOSEN FROM COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY MAPS CERTAIN SITES THAT WE WANTED TO SEE ACTUALLY.

THAT FOR THE FIRST BATTALION, COMMANDED BY MINTON WE SELECTED FOR HIS BATTALION CAMP A HUGE BAMBOO GROVE COVERING APPROXIMATELY THREE ACRES NEAR BARRIO SINUANGUAN NORTE - THIS PLACE BEING ON AN ISLAND BOUNDED BY THE CAGAYAN, DUBUAI AND PALATIAN RIVERS, APPROXIMATELY 39 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF JONES, AND DIRECTED CAPTAIN MINTON TO MOVE THERE AND TO PLAN HIS CAMP. THAT THIS HE DID, PLANNING AN EXCELLENT CAMP LAYOUT AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CONSTRUCTION OF SAME AT THE BAMBOO GROVE. THAT THE GREATER PART OF THIS WORK WAS DONE BY CAPTAIN MINTON'S SOLDIERS OF TRN WORKING WATE INTO THE NIGHT, AND THAT CAPTAIN MINTON PERSONALLY TOOK OVER THE PLANNING AND SUPERVISION OF THE WORK. THAT THE CAMP WAS COMPLETED ON OR ABOUT MARCH THIRD AND IT'S COMPLETION CELEBRATED BY A BIG BATTALION FIELD DAY MARCH 4TH ATTENDED
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BY OVER 8000 CITIZENS, RELATIVES AND FRIENDS OF THE TROOPS. BY ME, EXCELLENCE COMPETITIVE DRILLS AND DEMONSTRATIONS, HORSE RACING AND ATHLETIC EVENTS, THAT THE EVENT IN ITSELF WAS A VALUABLE MORALE BOOSTER FOR THE SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS FOR WHICH CAPTAIN MANTON PREPARED PRAISE.

THAT THE CAMP ITSELF WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY FINE JOB OF APPROVED THE PHILIPPINE ARMY CONSTRUCTION BUREAU OF COURSE FROM BAMBINO GRASS, NIP AND RATTAN WITHOUT WILL BEING LUMBER, THERE WERE IN ALL 35 BUILDINGS ALL HIDDEN FROM AIR OBSERVATION IN THE BAMBINO GROVE, INCLUDING BARBERS, STORAGE BUILDINGS, HOSPITAL KITCHENS, LATRINES, THAT RIMMING THE CAMP WAS A STRONG BAMBOO PICKET FENCE 12 FEET HIGH REINFORCED 3 FEET THICK INSIDE WITH LIES, AND GAMING TABLES FROM OUTSIDE OBSERVATION. BY GAMING TREES, THAT INSIDE BENEATH AND FOLLOWING THE FENCE WAS A PARAPET TRENCH FROM WHICH EFFECTIVE RIFLE FIRE COULD BE OPENED ON AGENTS ATTACKING GROUND FORCES. THAT THERE WAS AN ^{UNDERGROUND} TUNNEL EXIT PASSAGE FROM WHICH THE CAMP COULD BE EMPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST APPROACHING AN ADVISORY POSITION, THAT TWO HEAVILY REINFORCED GATES SERVED AS SURFACE ENTRANCES AND EXITS, THAT OUTSIDE THE MAIN GROVE AND ABOUT 200 YARDS AWAY UNDER NATURAL WOODS AND BOUTER SHELTER WERE EXCELLENT STABLES WITH INDIVIDUALLY COMPLETE STALLS FOR 300 HORSES, THAT WE HAD IN THE REGIMENT ABOUT 50 HORSES, 300 OF WHICH WERE IN THE FIRST BATTALION WHERE CAPTAIN MANTON PLANNED AND EQUIPPED THEM FOR USE AS A REGIMENTAL PICK UP.

TRAIN TO HAVE READY FOR USE AS OUTLINED HERE LATER. THAT IN ADDITION TO THESE INSTALLATIONS CAPTAIN MINTON HAD CONSTRUCTED A LARGE GROUND FLOOR RECREATION AND DRILL HALL CAPABLE OF DRILLING 600 TROOPS WITHIN AT CLOSE ORDER DRILL AND OTHER INSTRUCTION - A VALUABLE ASSET IN ARMY WEATHER TRAINING.

THAT I NAMED MINTON'S CAMP AFTER AND FOR HIM "CAMP MINTON" AND THAT HE DESERVES COMMENDATION FOR THE EXCELLENT PLANNING, EFFICIENT CONSTRUCTION AND LONG HOURS OF HARD WORK PUT IN IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.

THAT IN ADDITION TO THIS CAMP, MINTON DID ADDITIONAL VALUABLE CONSTRUCTION LATER OUTLINED, AT THE SAME TIME CARRYING ON AN EFFECTIVE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR HIS OFFICERS AND MEN NUMBERING AT ONE TIME 800 BUT A LARGE NUMBER - ABOUT 600 - OF THESE WERE ORIGINALLY RESERVISTS AND UNTRAINED FILIPINOS REPORTING FOR ARMY SERVICE AND THAT CAPTAIN MINTON THROUGH ENERGETIC EFFORT TRAINED THEM INTO A SPLENDIDLY DRILLED UNIT WITH AS MUCH FIELD TRAINING AS IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT BECAUSE USAFFE HEADQUARTERS LATER LIMITED OUR STRENGTH TO 900 PHILIPPINE ARMY (TWO BATTALIONS) PLUS ATTACHED TROOPS CAPTAIN MINTON WAS OBLIGED TO DISCHARGE ABOUT 500 MEN WHICH HE DID, GIVING EACH A CERTIFICATE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOLDIER HAD REPORTED FOR SERVICE AND DUTY AND HAD BEEN TRAINED FOR THE PERIOD HE HAD BEEN SO ENROLLED, WHICH WAS CERTIFICATED STATED

THAT IN ADDITION TO CAMP MINTON, CAPTAIN MINTON COMPLETED A VERY SATISFACTORY AIR LANDING FIELD NEAR PALATIAN AND SIVUANBUAN SUR ABOUT 4 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF CAMP MINTON. THE FIELD 1400 METERS IN LENGTH BEING DRAGGED AND WELL PACKED BY 100 LOG ROLLERS CARAGAO DRUMS. THAT THIS FIELD WAS 400 METERS IN WIDTH HAD HANGARS CUT OUT IN THE IMMENSE BAMBOO GROVE

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AT THE SOUTH END SUFFICIENTLY LARGE TO HOLD 3-13-17
 PLANS THAT THERE WERE WIND COMES AND REMOVABLE GARRAGES
 IN THE FORM OF IMITATION HOUSES AND GRASS SHACKS THE REMAINS
 AND REPLACEMENT OF WHICH WAS HANDLED BY OUR DETACHMENT
 STATIONED THERE PLUS THE CITIZENS OF 2 NEARBY BARRIOS IF
 CALLED UPON UNDER RESPECTIVE (ARRIO) WEATHERMAN'S IN CONTACT WITH
 ONE OFFICER IN CHARGE THAT WE NAMED THIS FIELD "GEORGE FIELD" FOR
 COLONEL GEORGE OF OUR AIR CORPS.

THAT WE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO GETTING A PLAN TO VISIT US
 FIRST IN ORDER TO SEND IN ROsters PERSONNEL RECORDS COPIES OF
 ORDERS AND MAIL TO HEADQUARTERS AND SEND TO DONK IF POSSIBLE
 A STAFF OFFICER FROM HEADQUARTERS WHO COULD SEE AND
 REPORT ON OUR SET-UP, OUR PLANS AND OPERATIONALS IN ORDER
 THAT OUR G-2 AND G-3 COULD EVALUATE BETTER AND ADVISE
 IF WE WERE MAKING A WORTHWHILE EFFORT THAT WE REQUESTED
 MANY TIMES A PLANE TO LAMP AND BRING A STAFF OFFICER
 WHO WERE ADVISED TO PREPARE FOR A NIGHT LANDING WHEN THE
 FALL OF BATAVAN APPARENTLY CHANGED THE PLAN OF OUR
 HIGH COMPANY

THAT SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE BUILDING OF CAMP MINIMAL
 AND GEORGE FIELD, MAJOR ENRIQUEZ SELECTED WITH ME A
 HEAVILY WOODED AND BOULDERED HILL SITE BETWEEN BARRIOS
 PEPIS AND MASHO ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE GUYANAN RIVER
 FOR THE SECOND BATTALION CAMP. HERE A VERY SURPRISE
 CAMP WAS CONSTRUCTED UNDER 1ST LIEUT. MANUEL T. MERY. THE
 BUILDINGS WERE BEING OF APPROVED PHILIPPINE ARMY TYPES
 HERE WE DID NOT CONSIDER TRENCHES, SLOPES AND
 BOMB SHELTERS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE BARRIAGES TO
 HAND ATTACK OFFERED BY HIGH BOULDERS AND TREES AS WELL
 AS SOME AIR ATTACK PROTECTION BY THE SAME.

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THAT MAJOR ENRIQUEZ CONSTRUCTED ALSO A SECOND CAMP IN THE HILLS ABOUT 17 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF SANTIAGO ISABELA THIS TO BE USED AS AN OPERATIONS BASE, NAMED CAMP ST. FRANCIS.

THAT BUALA ISABELA IN THE FOOTHILLS OF THE SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS ABOUT 9 KILOMETERS EAST OF CAMP MINTON AND GEORGE FIELD, CAPTAIN MINTON CONSTRUCTED OUR FOURTH CAMP - NAMED CAMP WARNER THAT THIS WAS USED AS AN OVER-NIGHT TERMINAL FOR THE FIRST BATTALION ON HIRES AND FIELD MANEUVERS AND FOR RECREATION FOR THE ENTIRE REGIMENT

THAT BEGINNING MARCH 1ST I MOVED MY HEADQUARTERS FROM CAMP MINTON WHERE I HAD BEEN DURING CONSTRUCTION OF SAME TO DALGEN THEN ON MARCH 10TH TO PARRIO OSAL ON THE EAST BANK OF THE CAGAYAN RIVER 15 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF JONES. THAT AT THIS TIME I CHANGED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS ALSO RELIEVING MAJOR ENRIQUEZ AND PLACING HIM IN COMMAND OF THE SECOND BATTALION AND SWIKHING MAJOR NAKAR FROM THE SECOND BATTALION TO THE REGIMENTAL STAFF AS EXECUTIVE AND IN COMMAND OF HEADQUARTERS TROOPS. THAT I MOVED THE RADIO

TRANSMITTER ACROSS THE RIVER FROM MASANA WHERE IT HAD BEEN PLACED FEBRUARY 7, 1942 TO ^{DIBULUAN} ~~OSAL~~ THAT FUEL SHORTAGE

FOR OPERATING THE GENERATOR ENGINE WAS BEGINNING TO HAMPER US AND IN DIBULUAN I WAS ABLE TO PRODUCE POWER FROM A CHINAMAN'S CRUDE OIL RICE MILL ENGINE. THAT NOW

THE RADIO TRANSMITTER AT DIBULUAN WAS ABOUT 3 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF MY HEADQUARTERS AT OSAL. THAT AT DIBULUAN WE

ERECTED A RADIO STATION WITH AERIALS WELL PROTECTED FROM AIR OBSERVATION AND HERE IN ADDITION TO THE SIGNAL DETACHMENT

WE PLACED A GUARD DETACHMENT WITH STRICT ORDERS TO KEEP UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS AWAY FROM THE STATION. THAT IT WAS ALSO

NECESSARY TO ORDER THAT MILITARY NEWS FROM HEADQUARTERS BE NOT REPEATED NOR DISCUSSED OUTSIDE BY THOSE RECEIVING AND RECORDING SAME - OR TRANSMITTING.

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THAT WE WOULD PUBLISH A DAILY NEWS BULLETIN FOR THE
PEOPLE OF NEWS BROADCAST FROM THE UNITED STATES.
THAT IN EARLY MARCH WE AGAIN CALLED TOGETHER ALL OUR
HEADQUARTERS THE GOVERNOR OTHER IMPORTANT PROVINCIAL AND
CHIEF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE PROVINCES OF CAGAYAN,
ISABELA AND NUEVA VISCAYA. THAT THIS MEETING WAS FOR
THE PURPOSES OUTLINED BELOW -
FIRST - TO ORDER ON LAW AND ORDER IN THE PROVINCES
AND TO OFFER OUR ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING SAME
ENFORCED.
SECOND - TO CHECK UP ON OUR SUBSISTENCE STATUS
MAKING SURE THAT FOOD SUPPLIES WERE
BEING DEMN WITHOUT HARDSHIP ON THE
PEOPLE OF ANY ONE OR MORE COMMUNITIES.
THIRD - TO URGE FARMERS IN THE TOBACCO GROWING
SECTIONS, PARTICULARLY OF ISABELA TO PLANT
LESS TOBACCO AND MORE FOOD SUCH AS
UPOND RICE, CORN, CABBAGES, SUGAR CANE AND
OTHER FOOD CROPS, AND TO OFFER SOME ASSISTANCE TO HELP
THAT I HAD BEEN PROMOTED TO MAJOR - COLONEL FIELD
BATTERY AS PER PARAGRAPH 4 SPECIAL ORDERS 22 HEADQUARTERS
U.S.A.F.C. DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1942, AND ASSIGNED TO BATTAL
FEBRUARY 12, 1942.
THAT FOLLOWING OUR WITHDRAWAL OF MAIN FORCES
FROM NUEVA VISCAYA INTO ISABELA IN JANUARY JAPANESE
FORCES MOVED INTO BAYAMBONG N.V. UNDER A JAPANESE RESERVE
OFFICER - 1ST LIEUT. H. YAMAMOTO - WHO HAD BEEN FOR THE
PAST TEN YEARS A PHOTOGRAPHER OF BAYAMBONG, THAT MYMOTO
HAD UPON ENTERING BATTAL ENDEAVORED TO HOLD MEETINGS OF
FILIPINO CITIZENS URGING THEM TO GET THEIR FRIENDS

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RELATIVES AND FORMER NEIGHBORS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND STORES OUT OF EVACUATION PLACES, THAT MIYAMOTO ASSURED THE PEOPLE THAT THE JAPANESE WERE THEIR FRIENDS.

THAT IN BAYOMBONG MIYAMOTO APPOINTED AN ACTING GOVERNOR FOR THE JAPANESE FORCES - A MR. JOSE C. AGUILA. THAT HIMSELF AFFECTED WITH LUNG TROUBLE, LIEUTENANT MIYAMOTO, APPEARED TO BE RELIEVED OF FIELD DUTY WITH THE JAPANESE FORCES AND CONTINUED TO LIVE IN BAYOMBONG.

THAT HERE HE ^{ARRAIGNED} A NUMBER OF CITIZENS SOME OF WHOM HE CHARGED WITH UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE JAPANESE AND THAT HE ASSESSED ALL CHINESE STORE KEEPERS AND OPERATORS OF ANY TYPE BUSINESS A WEEKLY INDEMNITY OF FIFTY PESOS.

THAT SOON MIYAMOTO NEEDED A HOUSEBOY AND WE FURNISHED HIM ONE IN THE PERSON OF AN INTELLIGENT SERGEANT - THRU "CHANNELS". THAT THIS SOLDIER FURNISHED US WITH INFORMATION VALUABLE TO US FROM TIME TO TIME REPORTING TO US WHEN THE JAPANESE OFFICER SAT UP AND OPERATED A RADIO TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER AND WAS ABLE TO DECODE OUR MESSAGES SENT BY OUR OLD CODE WHICH WE KNEW WAS CAPTURED AT VIGAN. THAT WHEN OUR HEADQUARTERS SENT A CIPHER DEVICE AND CODES BY PLANE AND DROPT SAME AND WE WERE ABLE TO CHANGE CODES - OUR SERGEANT REPORTED THAT MIYAMOTO COULD NO LONGER DECODE OUR RADIOGRAMS.

THAT ALL IN ALL WE WERE ABLE TO GET VALUABLE INFORMATION AT TIMES FROM OUR ARRANGEMENT AND I GAVE ORDERS FOR THE TIME BEING NOT TO DISTURB LIEUT. MIYAMOTO, THAT BAYOMBONG AT THE TIME WAS IN THE OPERATIONS AREA OF MAJOR FARIBURG, COMMANDING MY SECOND BATTALION, THAT FUNCTIONING IN CHARGE OF OUR CONSTABULARY DETACHMENT COVERING BAYOMBONG WAS CAPTAIN S. L. PRUDENCIADO, THAT PRUDENCIADO HAD FOR SOMETIME PREVIOUS TO THE WAR

(OVER)

Sincerely
Demetrio Quindo

PEOPLE OF NUBIA VISCAYA FOREVER
ENRIQUETZ ARE DEEPLY IMPRESSED ON THE HEARIS OF THE
YOUR NAME AND THAT OF MAJORS
ARE DRIVEN OUT TO STAY
DRIVING THE JAPANESE OUT OF NUBIA VISCAYA. I HOPE THEY
MADAMMY, CONGRATULATIONS FOR

Dear Colonel Warner-

LT. COLONEL. ERBERT L. WARNER, COMMANDING
FOURTEENTH INFANTRY

MARCH 17, 1942

THE FOLLOWING LETTER - QUOTE

907 I RECEIVED FROM GOVERNOR QUINDO OF NUBIA VISCAYA
PHILIPPINE AND AMERICAN FLAGS. THAT ABOUT MARCH
OF BY US AND MAJOR ENRIQUETZ RAISED AGAIN THE
DEATH THE FEW JAPANESE REMAINS WERE TAKEN CARE
WEEKLY INDEMNITY OF \$500 PER M. THAT AFTER MYMOTO'S
BOMB WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO PAY MYMOTO A
VISCAYA TO BE RETURNED TO CHINESE MERCHANTS IN GRAYM-
TURNED OVER TO THE PERSONAL TREASURER OF NUBIA
CONCEALED SOME INCLUDING ABOUT PAGO MARCH I ORDERED
ENRIQUETZ THEN TOOK CHARGE OF MYMOTO'S EFFECTS AND
FIGHT ENDED AND LIEUTENANT MYMOTO WAS KILLED THAT MORNING
KILLED THE JAPANESE OFFICER'S QUARTERS TO HURT HIM. A RUN
LATER DETERMINED TO BE DIRECTED BY CAPTAIN BRUNYARDO
MOST OF HIS BODYGUARD, A DISTINGUISHED DETACHMENT
FEW JAPANESE TROOPS IN BATAVIA AND MYMOTO HAD RETURNED
THAT ONE NIGHT IN EARLY MARCH WHILE THERE WERE
BEEN UNRESTFULLY WITH MYMOTO

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THAT ALONG WITH THIS LETTER CAME A MESSAGE SIGNED BY GOVERNOR QUIRINO TO BE SENT TO PRESIDENT MANUEL L. QUEZON OVER OUR TRANSMITTER. WHICH MESSAGE STATED THAT OUR MAJOR ENRIQUETA HAD "RECAPTURED" NUEVA VISCAYA FROM THE ENEMY. THAT WE SENT THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT QUEZON JUST AS THE GOVERNOR HAD WRITTEN IT BUT ALONG WITH IT SENT TO OUR USAFFE HEADQUARTERS A SUPPLEMENTAL RADIOGRAM REQUESTING ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE WAS MISLEADING IN THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FIGHT WITH JAPANESE OCCUPYING TROOPS. THAT WE PROOCCUPIED AND NOT RECAPTURED BAYOMBONG AFTER THE JAPANESE FORCES OF ADEQUATE SIZE TO DEFEND IT HAD VOLUNTARILY MOVED SOUTH.

THAT UPON JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL FROM OUR TERRITORY TOWARD THE SOUTH I NOTIFIED OUR HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF THIS STATING THAT I BELIEVED THEY WERE MOVING TO BATAAN.

THAT WHILE IN BAYOMBONG THE JAPANESE OFFICER MIYAMOTO HAD BEEN ACTIVELY BEHIND CONSIDERABLE PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT ME AND OUR FORCES. THAT ONE MESSAGE TO ME WAS THAT I COULD EXPECT 2000 JAPANESE TROOPS ON ME IN FOUR HOURS IF ANYTHING HAPPENED TO MIYAMOTO. ANOTHER WAS THAT THERE WAS A \$40,000 REWARD OFFERED FOR MY CAPTURE, \$30,000 FOR THAT OF MAJOR ENRIQUETA AND \$20,000 FOR CAPTAIN MINTON'S. THAT SEVERAL TIMES OUR MESSENGERS RODE IN TO MY HEADQUARTERS AT NIGHT EXCITEDLY REPORTING THAT LARGE JAPANESE ATTACKING FORCES WERE APPROACHING OUR POSITIONS ON HORSEBACK FROM JAPANESE BASES WHERE WE KNEW THERE WERE ENEMY TROOPS.

THAT AT ALL TIMES OUR INTELLIGENCE AND RAIDING PATROLS WERE DISPATCHED WHERE THEY COULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE AND IN SOME CASES THE CITIZENS AND VOLUNTEER GUARDS WOULD ASSIST THEM OR EVEN FUNCTION SEPARATELY UNDER THEIR DIRECTION. THAT TWO INSTANCES OF THIS WERE VOLUNTEER GUARDS OVERTURNING

(OVER)

REMARKS

ORGANIZATION

NAME

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BANCHES FIGHTER WITH JAPANESE TROOPS AND MACHINE GUNS
IN THE GAGHAN RIVER NEAR TAYAGAN WHICH INSTANCES WERE
REPORTED TO OUR HEADQUARTERS.
THAT CONTINUOUSLY I REQUESTED HEADQUARTERS FOR
AMMUNITION AND PARTICULARLY FOR A PLANE TO COME
DRAINING A STAFF OFFICER SO THAT HE COULD
REPORT ON OUR SET-UP AND WE COULD BE ADVISED WHETHER
WE WERE EXPANDING THE UNIT THAT OUR BELIEF WAS
THAT HELP WOULD COME FROM THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT
WE WERE DOING WOULD BE OF VALUE AT A LATER TIME AS
MET AS TO US AT THE PRESENT.
THAT IN ADDITION TO OUR FOUR CAMP CAMP
MINTON, CAMP NEAR ST. FRANCIS, AND CAMP WALLETS
AT SANJUAN NORTH, BARRIO SAN OF SANTINO AND
BILATA RESPECTIVELY AND GEORGE AIR LANDING FIELD NEAR
PALATIAN-SIMANGUNAN BUT WE PLANNED AND BOUGHT A
SECOND AIR LANDING FIELD NEAR CASIGUAN TAYAGAN,
125 KILOMETERS EAST ACROSS THE SIERRA MADRE
MOUNTAINS THAT IN ADDITION WE COMPLETED A SHIP
DOCK IN THE CASIGUAN BAY NEAR THE ROAD TO CASIGUAN
THE DOCK HAVING BEEN STARTED BY CIVILIAN JAPANESE
WHO OWNED AN ADJACENT LUMBER CONCESSION PRIOR
TO THE WAR. THAT THESE PROJECTS WERE COMPLETED
WITH THE PURPOSE OF OUR GETTING AMMUNITION AND MEDICAL
SUPPLIES AS WELL AS ARMS, BY BOAT OR PLANE, THAT WE
PLANNED ALSO TO BLAZE ACROSS THE SIERRA MADRE
MOUNTAINS TRAILS THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED BY ANIMALS
AND WERE GOING TO PUT TO WORK 500 SOLDIERS ON
THESE. THAT WE HAD A PACK TRAIN OF 300 PONIES
WITH PACK CARRIERS ALL READY TO OPERATE.

(17)

THAT UNTIL NOW NO TRAILS CROSSING THE SIERRA MADRES ABOVE DALER WERE NEGOTIABLE BY ANIMALS - CARGODORES USED BEING FOR THE MOST PART NEGritos BETWEEN PALANAN AND SAN MARIANO AND FILIPINOS BETWEEN PINAPPAGAN AND CASIGURAN.

THAT WE BEGAN WORK ON THE ABOVE INSTALLATIONS IN FEBRUARY 1944 COMPLETING THE PROJECTS IN APRIL. THAT IN LATE MARCH I RADIOED HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT ASKING PERMISSION TO MAKE A RECONNAISSANCE OF SOME OF THE UNEXPLORED TERRITORY AND AN INSPECTION OF THESE ^{COASTAL} INSTALLATIONS ^{TO BE} ~~PRESENT~~ ^{ABSENT} FROM THE REGIMENT FROM 15 TO 30 DAYS EFFECTIVE APRIL 15TH AND LEAVING ^{TO LEAVE} NAKAR IN COMMAND DURING MY ABSENCE. THAT THIS PERMISSION WAS GRANTED BY GENERAL WAINWRIGHT EARLY IN APRIL. THAT WE HAD FROM THE FIRST (CAPTAIN MINTON'S) BATTALION A DETAIL OF 45 MEN UNDER AN OFFICER (FILIPINOS) AND ACTING SERGEANT HENRY RUSCH (AMERICAN) ON DETAIL IN CASIGURAN TO HANDLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ~~DOCK AND~~ AIR FIELD SINCE FEBRUARY. ACTING SERGEANT RUSCH REPORTED TO US THE FORMER JAPANESE LUMBER CONCESSION THERE - ALSO THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL JAPANESE OWNED MOTOR LAUNCHES CONNECTED WITH IT IN THE VICINITY.

THAT UP UNTIL FEBRUARY 14, 1944 WE CALLED OUR UNIT THE FIRST GUERRILLA REGIMENT WHEN ON THAT DATE A RADIOGRAM FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR ORDERED IT'S DISUSE AND DESIGNATED US THE FIFTEENTH INFANTRY. THAT WE HAD USED "FIRST GUERRILLA" BELIEVING THAT TO BE OUR CORRECT DESIGNATION BECAUSE OUR PLANE IN FEBRUARY HAD ~~DRIFT~~ ADDRESSED TO "MAJOR EVERETT L. WAGNER, COMMANDING, FIRST GUERRILLA REGIMENT" IN FEBRUARY, A CIPHER DEVICE AND CODES FOR US AND FOR KARUBAO WHICH WE DELIVERED THERE THRU 2d LT. FRANCIS CAMPA.

29 (OVER)

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SEE PAGE 75

THAT IN THIS CONNECTION PLANES CAME FROM BEHIND OUR LINES
 TO VISIT US ON FOUR OCCASIONS BUT DID NOT LAND. THAT
 THE PLANES DROPT US FIRST THE GRENAD DEVICE, CODES
 AND MEDICINE SOME OF WHICH DROPT IN LAOS, SECOND
 TRIP THE PLANES DROPT SHOES FOR MINTIN AND ME AND
 MEDICINE, THE THIRD AND FOURTH TRIPS 4 BOXES OF RIFLE SO
 CALIBRE AMMUNITION WERE DROPT ABOUT HALF OF WHICH
 WENT UP UNTIL FOR USE THAT THE LAST WILL BY PLANES
 WAS AFTER THE FALL OF BATHAN ABOUT APRIL 15 IT
 THAT PRIOR TO THE JAPANESE DRIVE ON BATHAN IN APRIL
 WHEN WE WERE EXPECTING ONE OF OUR PLANES TO LAND
 AT BATHAN I HAD RAISED GENERAL MAINTENANCE EXPLAINING
 THAT TRAINED IN THE FIELD ARTILLERY I BELIEVED MYSELF TO
 BE OF MORE VALUE TO THE SERVICE IN THAT AREA THAN AS
 AN INFANTRY COMMANDER AND I ASKED IF OUR PLANE SHOULD
 GOVERN IF I COULD TURN OVER MY COMMAND TO MAJOR WARNE
 AND COME TO BATHAN FOR A FIELD ARTILLERY ASSIGNMENT.
 GENERAL MAINTENANCE REPLIED THAT IT WAS DESIRED THAT
 I REMAIN WHERE I WAS.
 THAT ORDERED BY USAFRE HEADQUARTERS IN MARCH TO REDUCE
 TO TWO PHILIPPINE ARMY INFANTRY BATTALIONS PLAS ATTACHED
 TROOPS (PHILIPPINE SPOOTS AND AMERICANS) HE AS MENTIONED
 BEFORE IN THIS REPORT WE REDUCED OUR STRENGTH FROM
 MORE THAN 1600 OFFICERS AND MEN TO LESS THAN 1000.
 THAT SOME OF MY MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AMONG
 THE TROOPS WAS TO IMPRESS UPON THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF
 MAINTAINING SECRECY OF MILITARY INFORMATION, THAT MATTER
 WAS THE NECESSITY OF KEEPING ALWAYS ON THE ALERT ON
 OUTPOST DUTY BEING IMPRESSED ON THEM AND THAT PUNISHMENTS
 FOR STEPPING ON OUTPOST DUTY WERE SOMETIMES NECESSARY.

THAT IN MARCH 1942 I WAS VISITED BY TWO GROUPS OF OFFICERS FROM LT. COLONEL MORAN'S HEADQUARTERS (THE 131ST INFANTRY) THE ONE GROUP BEING CAPTAIN'S GEORGE N. STEVENS AND STANLEY F. JOHNSON, AND ~~JAMES NEEDHAM~~, AND THE OTHER, CAPTAIN GEORGE T. SCHOLEY, FIRST LIEUTENANT DEAN NICHOLSON AND ACTING SERGEANT HARKAWAY (FORMERLY AIR MAILING SERVICE). THAT THE FIRST NAMED GROUP WAS ON A MISSION FROM LT. COLONEL MORAN WHICH MISSION WAS TO FIND OUT FROM US THE TABLES OF ORGANIZATION OF PHILIPPINE ARMY INFANTRY - AND TO LEAVE WITH US CERTAIN DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY MAJOR WALTER CUSHING WHICH WE WERE TO SEND IN TO HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT BY PLANE IF SAME CAME TO LAND ON OUR GEORGE FIELD.

THAT IN THIS CONNECTION I LEARNED THAT LT. COLONEL MORAN INSTRUCTED CAPTAIN STEVENS - NOT YET ACTUALLY COMMISSIONED - AS FOLLOWS, QUOTE - "I AM MAKING YOU A LIEUT. COLONEL ON THIS TRIP SINCE I DO NOT DESIRE THAT YOU BE OUTRANKED". THAT THESE OFFICERS IN ADDITION WERE INSTRUCTED TO LOOK OVER OUR SET-UP WHICH THEY DID - CAPTAIN SCHOLEY'S GROUP JOINING THEM FOR VISIT TO CAMP MINTON AND GEORGE FIELD. THAT SCHOLEY AND STEVENS BOTH STATED TO ME - QUOTE "YOU HAVE A REAL SET-UP HERE," UNQUOTE.

THAT I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THESE GENTLEMEN FROM LIEUT. COLONEL MORAN'S COMMAND, QUITE FAVORABLY, AND WHEN I LEARNED FROM THEM THAT THEIR COMMISSIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN ACTUALLY CONFIRMED I RADIOED HEADQUARTERS USAFFE AND REQUESTED THAT THIS BE DONE. THAT EARLY IN APRIL THE MEN NAMED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH WERE COMMISSIONED IN THE RANKS MENTIONED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE NAMES.

THAT LATE IN MARCH OUR PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS RADIOED A "WARNING" TO ME TO "STOP SIGNALING" LIEUT. COLONEL MORAN'S MEN. THAT WHOEVER MADE ACCUSATION THAT

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IMPORTANT INFORMATION, AND KEEPING IT FROM PASSING THROUGH
FROM GASE CAMPS IN ORDER TO SPEED UP GETTING IN
TO USE AS CARBONERS FROM OUR INTELLIGENCE DETAILS OUT
IN GETTING ABOUT TO YOUNG PIGEONS WHICH I HOPED
THAT ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF MARCH I WAS SUCCESSFUL
THE INFORMATION STATED BY MARSHALL AND QUINCY WAS TRUE
SCHOOL OF ALI-U-GONNELL HOGAN'S FORCES THE 11TH INFANTRY STRAID LATER
ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH ABOUT THEM AND THAT CAPTAIN GEORGE
NAME STAY THAT I PERMITTED THE MEN TO REMAIN UNTIL I GOULD
MARSHALL IN FEBRUARY AND QUINCY IN MARCH, BUT EACH WITH THE
ON THEIR OWN, THAT THESE SOLDIERS CAME AT SEPARATE TIMES
AND THAT THEY (MARSHALL AND QUINCY) WERE NEW
WHERE HIS HENQUARTERS WOULD BE, THAT FOOD WAS SCARCE
HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE (LT-COLONEL HOGAN) DID NOT KNOW
REPORTED TO MY HENQUARTERS AND STATED TO ME THAT COLONEL HOGAN
ESPECIALLY AIR WARNING, BOTH RECENTLY WITH LT-COLONEL HOGAN
LATER PRIVATE JOHN R. MARSHALL GIVE 672913 AND CORPORAL QUINCY
THAT I SHOULD BE PLEASD TO HAVE HIM UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT
ME THAT I REPLIED BY LETTER TO SERGEANT MANTECASTRO STATING
CASTRO) DID NOT DESIRE TO BE INACTIVE BUT DESIRED TO JOIN
SERGEANT HOGAN WAS DISBANDING HIS TROOPS AND THAT HE (MANTE-
(SERGEANT P.S.) A LETTER IN WHICH MANTECASTRO STATED THAT HE
ALL WITH MALAKIA I RECEIVED FROM MAJOR-SERGEANT MANTECASTRO
THEM, THAT THE ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS WAS IN JANUARY 1972 WHEN
ME ASKING TO JOIN MY FORCES AND IN ALL BUT ONE CASE I REFUSED
REQUESTED BY ME TO BELONG TO ALI-U-GONNELL HOGAN'S TROOPS WERE
ANYBODY THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OFFICERS HAD ENLISTED WITH
AT ANY TIME MADE ANY ATTEMPT TO "STEAL" OFFICERS OR MEN FROM
MADE BEEN ACCUSATION UNLAWFULLY AND WITHOUT GROUNDS, THAT I WOULD
SUCH A THING AS "STEALING" COLONEL HOGAN'S MEN HAD HAPPENED

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FILIPINO BARRIADS AND THE POPULATION. THAT AS MENTIONED BEFORE, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KEEP MILITARY INFORMATION AWAY FROM THE FILIPINO POPULACE WITH MY SOLDIERS, AND ONCE OUT, A PIECE OF INFORMATION WOULD FREQUENTLY BE GOSSEPPED AND TWISTED, ALSO I SUSPECTED ONCE OR TWICE, SUTTER INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY.

THAT A PARTICULAR AND PECULIAR INSTANCE OF NEWS HEARING INTO JAPANESE HANDS IS THE FOLLOWING. THAT IN EARLY FEBRUARY OUR PATROLS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTED HEAVY INFANTRY TROOP GROUPS IN TURUEGUARAO AND ARITAO. THAT UPON CONFIRMING THIS NEWS I RADIOED OUR HEADQUARTERS ASKING THAT WE BOMB THESE PLACES FROM THE AIR. THAT FOUR DAYS FOLLOWING MY REQUEST - FOUR BOMBS WERE DROPT BESIDE THE ROAD JUST SOUTH OF ARITAO - BETWEEN THERE AND BONE TO THE SOUTH. THAT ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY A DIVE BOMBER DIVED DOWN (IDENTITY REPORTED AMERICAN TO ME) ON YUGUEGUARAO WITH ONE BOMB. THAT FILIPINOS SEEMED OVERJOYED AT THESE ACTIONS WHICH OUR PATROLS AND FILIPINO CIVILIANS REPORTED. THAT UPON THANKING OUR HIGH COMMAND FOR THIS ACTION - OUR HEADQUARTERS DENIED HAVING ORDERED ANY SUCH BOMBING. THAT INVESTIGATING FURTHER I WAS ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE FOLLOWING. THAT FILIPINOS HAD GOT HOLD OF THE NEWS FROM OUR TRANSMITTING STATION DETAIL AND PASSED IT ON THAT WE HAD REQUESTED THE PLACES MENTIONED BE BOMBED. (THIS WAS LIKELY NOT DECODED BY THE ENEMY FROM THE AIR BECAUSE WE NOW HAD THE NEW CIPHER DEVICE AND CODES). THAT RECEIVING THE INFORMATION FROM FILIPINOS THE JAPANESE FORCES FAKED A BOMBING THEN POINTED OUT TO FILIPINO CITIZENS THAT OUR FORCES WERE WILLING TO BOMB AND DESTROY THEIR TOWNS BUT THAT WE WERE POOR MARKSMEN, IN THAT

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(over)

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq, _____, dated _____

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NO DAMAGE WAS DONE TO INTENDED OBJECTIVES.
 THAT AS POINTED OUT BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
 HEADQUARTERS INFORMED AS TO ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES IN
 MY READER-ESPECIALLY THE POSITIONS OF NINE EIGHT NINE
 VISAGA, ISABELA AND CAGAYAN THAT WE FREQUENTLY ASKED FOR
 AMMUNITION MOVING IN LAKE MARCH NOT MORE THAN 500 ROUNDS
 OF RIFLE AMMUNITION FOR THE ENTIRE REGIMENT AND 3 DEWARDS
 HEAVY 30 CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS THAT FORMED FIRST CLASS
 ALBERT S. HENDERSON AND PW YANO TONY MANGIMELLI
 WHO HAD REPORTED TO US FOR DUTY IN MARCH 1974 AND SENT
 BY ME TO LOCATE 2 MIS-COLORED 50 CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS
 WHICH THEY REPORTED HEAVY-GORGED MORAN HAD ORDERED
 BURIED AND 500 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION FOR SAME -
 HENDERSON AND MANGIMELLI INSISTING THAT THEY
 KNEW THE LOCATION OF THIS EQUIPMENT - DID NOT RETURN
 BUT REMAINED OUT AT KUBUJ SAW WILL AND MADE
 THEMSELVES GENERALLY THOROUGHLY THERE IT WAS
 REPORTED TO ME, IN LATE MARCH THERE I DIRECTED AND
 SENT MAJOR MANUEL ENRIQUEZ TO PICK UP HENDERSON
 AND MANGIMELLI AND THEIR EQUIPMENT AND TO TAKE
 CHARGE OF THEM THAT ENRIQUEZ DID ACCOMPLISH THIS
 BUT DID NOT GET HENDERSON BACK UNTIL ABOUT THE
 MIDDLE OF APRIL.
 THAT CONTINUALLY WE RAISED BY INTERIMS REQUESTS
 PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS FOR AMMUNITION A PERIODIC
 RADIO SET - WHICH HEADQUARTERS PROMISED TO SEND TO US -
 AND FOR A STAFF OFFICER TO COME TO LOOK OVER OUR
 SETUP AND REPORT TO HEADQUARTERS SO THAT HQ COULD
 ADVISE THAT WE COULD HAVE RAISED, HOUVER AND FED
 AN ENTIRE DIVISION PROVIDED WE COULD GET PLANS AMMUNITION

FOR SOME, AND BELIEVING AS WE WERE PROMISED, THAT HELP WOULD COME, WE BELIEVED - I DID - THAT A DIVISION ALREADY TO GO INTO ACTION IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE AND EVEN PARTS OF THE SIERRA MADRES AS WELL AS THE CARRAGALLAS COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE TACTICAL VALUE. THAT FURTHER WE FELT THAT THESE MOUNTAINS HAD GREAT STRATEGIC VALUE IF OUR HIGH COMMAND CHOSE TO USE THEM. THAT AS POINTED OUT, THE SECOND AIR-LANDING FIELD AT CASIGURAN AND THE SHIP DOCK IN CASIGURAN BAY WERE CONSTRUCTED BY US AT CONSIDERABLE EFFORT, CHIEFLY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SUPPLYING ORGANIZED FORCES. THAT WE PLANNED AND COULD HAVE CONSTRUCTED ROAD TRAILS FOR PACK TRAINS ACROSS TO CASIGURAN BAY FROM VARIOUS FAVORABLE DUMP POINTS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PROTECTED IF HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT HAD SO ORDERED.

THAT REALIZING ALSO THAT OUR RADIO NUMBER 171 TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING SET WAS TOO SENSITIVE TO ERROT IN THE BEST SPOTS FROM TIME TO TIME AS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT POSSIBILITY OF BREAKAGE AND DIFFICULTY IN TRANSPORTING SAME, WE CARRIED ON CONSIDERABLE RADIO CONVERSATION WITH H.I.P.D. CONCERNING GETTING THE PORTABLE SET. THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO GET THE SET AND AS WE HAD STATED, WERE PROMISED IT, BY HEADQUARTERS THAT FINALLY WHEN WE KNEW THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY CHANCE TO GET THE PORTABLE SET FROM HEADQUARTERS WE SEIZURED THE PORT RADIO SETS AT CASIGURAN AND PAMANAN. THAT OUR MAIN REASON TO HAVE PORTABLE SETS WAS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT BETWEEN BATTALIONS IF SPREAD OUT AND TO KEEP ONE SET CONSTANTLY SAFE FOR CONTACT WITH HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT THAT WE FEARED CAPTURE OR DESTRUCTION BY AIR BOMBING OF OUR 171 SET IF LOCATED BY THE ENEMY AND THAT SEVERAL TIMES JAPANESE SPOTTING PLANES CAME OVER OUR LOCATIONS BEING WE BELIEVE FOR OUR RADIO AND FOR OUR CAMP LOCATIONS. THAT THESE PLANES HOVERED ESPECIALLY

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(OVER)

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

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OVER BARCELONA - THE LOCATION OF OUR RADIO FROM
 FEBRUARY 7 TO MARCH 10 AND OVER MARPA WHERE THE
 MAIN SECOND CRYPTANAL (MAJOR FAHNGUEIT'S) WAS LOCATED
 THAT I CONSIDERED IT GOOD POLICY TO MAKE MY RADIO
 STATION AT FREQUENT IRREGULAR INTERVALS ALLOWING FOR
 THE TIME THE ENEMY WOULD TAKE TO FOLLOW UP HIS RADIO
 DETECTOR INFORMATION. THAT IN THE CASE OF CAMP HENRY
 IT WAS PROBABLY TOO WELL HIDDEN TO BE SPOTTED FROM
 THE BIG BUI. I REALIZED THAT SINCE MAJOR FAHNGUEIT HAD
 CHOSEN TO USE QUICKLY CHANGING LOCATIONS IN ITS OPERATIONS - SOME
 OF THESE CHANGING HAD GIVEN THE CAMP'S LOCATION TO THE
 JAPANESE FORCES. THAT ALSO WE WERE VISITED BY SPIES IN
 THE JAPANESE SERVICE (FILIPINOS) TWO OF WHOM WERE CAPTURED
 BY COURT MARTIAL AND EXECUTED.
 THAT BACK IN FEBRUARY WHEN THE FIRST US JAPANESE
 BATTLE WAS TAKEN FROM IN CANTON I HAD A REGIMENTAL OFFICER
 MEETING FOR THE PURPOSE OF PLANNING A WAY TO BRING MY
 ENTIRE REGIMENT - THEN NUMBERING 1600 GAI WITH LITTLE
 AMMUNITION - TO CANTON BUT MY TWO PRINCIPAL REGIMENTAL ARMY
 MAJORS - NAKA AND ENGLISH, STRONGLY ADVISED AGAINST
 SUCH A MOVE AND FINALLY CONVINCED ME THAT WE COULD NOT
 SURVIVE OVER THAT DISTANCE WITH SO MANY ENEMY FORCES
 TO PASS. MAJOR NAKA ESPECIALLY REMINDED ME OF
 GENERAL MAJORS' RADIOGRAM OF JANUARY 18 - QUOTE
 ABOVE - WHICH ORDERED ME NOT TO CONTACT OVERSEAS
 ENEMY FORCES - WOULD TO DESTROY WINE. THAT ON THE ADVICE
 OF MAJOR NAKA AND MAJOR ENGLISH I DECIDED NOT TO UNDERTAKE
 HEADING MY FORCES TO CANTON ABOUT 230 MILES (380 KILOMETERS)
 THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE AND COMBAT PATROLS CONTINUED TO
 FUNCTION AND WE REPORTED THEIR ACTIVITIES AS WE WERE ABLE TO
 THE 1300 19

THAT AS BEFORE MENTIONED, I HAD RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM GENERAL WAINWRIGHT TO MAKE A RECONNAISSANCE AND INSPECTION TRIP INTO THE UNEXPLORED TERRITORY AND TO THE NEW SHIP DOCK AND AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTED BY US NEAR CASIGURAN - THIS TRIP TO LAST FROM 15 TO 30 DAYS EFFECTIVE APRIL 15TH. THAT IN ADDITION I WAS ABLE TO NOW GET AND SET UP AT ANOTHER LOCATION, THE PORT-RADIO TRANSMITTING SET OF CASIGURAN AND PALANAN SINCE IT APPEARED DUBIOUS THAT I WAS GOING TO RECEIVE THE PORTABLE SET PROMISED ME BY HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT. THAT NOW EARLY IN APRIL THE INSTALLATIONS MENTIONED WERE READY FOR USE THAT THE JAPANESE FORCES IN OUR AREA HAD MOVED OUT IN LARGE NUMBERS AND THAT WE NOTIFIED HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT THAT WE BELIEVED THE ENEMY TO BE REINFORCING FOR ANOTHER BIG EFFORT ON BATAAN. THAT I WANTED TO EXPAND INTO THE UNEXPLORED TERRITORY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BLAZING ANIMAL TRAILS ACROSS THE ZECRA MOUNTAINS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN (CASIGURAN BAY - NATICAN BAY AND PALANAN BAY).

THAT BEGINNING APRIL 4, 1942 WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE JAPANESE FORCES ^{WERE} BEGINNING AN ALL-OUT ATTACK ON BATAAN, EACH DAY INCREASING IN INTENSITY. THAT ON APRIL 10TH 1942 ABOUT SEVEN O'CLOCK P.M. MAJOR NAKAR RETURNED TO HEADQUARTERS FROM OUR TRANSMITTING STATION AT DIBOLUWIN 25 KILOMETERS ^{AWAY} SOUTH WITH A KGEI (SAN FRANCISCO) NEWS BROADCAST - TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAD ^{BY} LOST THE PHILIPPINES BUT WOULD REGAIN THEM. THAT INCLUDED IN THE BROADCAST WERE STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY OF WAR STIMSON, GENERAL MACARTHUR AND COMMISSIONER ELIZABETH WASHINGTON. THAT IN ADDITION TO THE NEWS BROADCAST MAJOR NAKAR REPORTED FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN FORCES, THE FOLLOWING: QUOTE: 9/420 10⁰⁰A APRIL 1942
 AT-CORDELL WARREN LAST - KINS SURRENDERED BATAAN YESTERDAY TO ENEMY DIVISION'S STOP. THEY WILL PAY MORE ATTENTION TO YOU NOW. END. WAINWRIGHT

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(OVER)

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OF THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISAYA HAD IN MARCH 1942 OFFICIALLY NAMED AND RECORDED THE VALLEY OF THE ARAJAN RIVER - FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE KANG KONG VALLEY - THE "WARNER VALLEY" IN MY HONOR. THAT DISPERSING THE TROOPS IN THIS MANNER THROUGH POINTS WOULD ACCOMPLISH

1. THE SUBSISTENCE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED IN THAT THE MEN COULD SHARE PROPORTIONATELY THE FOOD OF THE BARBERS AT THE SAME TIME ASSISTING THE FARMERS
 2. BY DISPERSING LARGE GROUPS OF SOLDIERS THERE WOULD BE LESS ATTRACTION TO LARGER BODIES OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN ATTACK FORMATION (THO WE COULD HAVE TAKEN CARE OF A CONSIDERABLE ATTACKING FORCE HAD WE AMMUNITION)
- (B) TO OPERATE THE FM RADIO SET AS LONG AS IT COULD BE REACHABLY OUT OF THE WAY OF CAPTURE OR DESTRUCTION BY THE ENEMY BUT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A MORE EASILY PORTABLE SET - ONE FROM CAGUIVAN OR PANAYAN

(C) TO MAINTAIN A HIGHLY PORTABLE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

(D) TO CALL AT ONCE A MEETING OF THE REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION STAFFS FOR PURPOSES OF IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ABOVE PLAN AND TO ORDER SOME EFFECTIVE AS OF APRIL 11

THAT ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 11 OUR HEADQUARTERS RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM PATROLS IN SAN JOSE NUEVA BILHA THAT APPROXIMATELY 3000 JAPANESE HAD ARRIVED THAT DATE IN SAN JOSE HEADED FOR NUEVA VISAYA AND ISABELA

THAT OUR REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION OFFICERS MEETING WAS CALLED FOR 10 O'CLOCK AM ON THE 11TH OF APRIL BUT PRIOR TO ITS CONVENING ANOTHER IMPORTANT EVENT TOOK PLACE - AN EVENT WHICH CAUSED ME TO SOMEWHAT CHANGE MY PERSONAL PLANS AND TO ORDER THE AMERICANS IN THE REGIMENT WITH ME FOR WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE END OF THE EMPLOYMENT'S MARCH

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(OVER)

THAT AT OUR OFFICERS' MEETING WHICH FOLLOWED AND AT WHICH MAJOR ENRIQUEZ OF OUR SECOND BATTALION WAS NOT REPRESENTED I GAVE THE FOLLOWING VERBAL ORDER.

1. ALL AMERICANS - OFFICERS AND ENLISTED IN THE FIFTEENTH INFANTRY WOULD IMMEDIATELY ACCOMPANY ME - AND IN CASES WHERE THEY WERE OUT ON DETAILS INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR NAKAR WERE FOR THEM TO FOLLOW ME - FIRST TO PINAPPAGAN THENCE ACROSS THE SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS EAST TO CALIGUIDAN OR THE BARRIOS NEAR THEREBY.

2. CAPTAIN MINTON (FIRST BATTALION) WOULD SEND HIS BATTALION OVER THE SAME ROUTE AND PLACE IT DISPERSED IN THE CASIGUIDAN BAY BARRIOS.

3. MAJOR NAKAR WOULD REMAIN IN THE CASIGUIDAN VALLEY IN COMMAND OF HIS AND MAJOR ENRIQUEZ TROOPS AND THE RADIO AND WOULD UPON APPROACH OF THE ENEMY DESTROY OR BURY THE RADIO AND SCATTER THE TROOPS THROUGHOUT THE BARRIOS IN THE LOWER CASIGUIDAN AND WEST THROUGH THOSE OF WARNER VALLEY, THE RADIO TO BE THROWN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

4. ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR HARASSING OR DELAYING ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY WOULD BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF.

5. UPON EVACUATION OF THE BASE CAMPS NEAR SINGANGALAN (N) AND DAPDAP (CAMP MINTON AND MARY) WERE WOULD BE DESTROYED.

5. I WOULD CONTACT MAJOR NAKAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AT A LATER DATE WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

WITH THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD I LEFT HEADQUARTERS AT 0200 HOURS AFTER MIDN APRIL 11, 1951 AND PROCEEDED TO CAMP MINTON AT SINGANGALAN (N). THERE WITH CAPTAIN MINTON WE PREPARED THE FIRST BATTALION TO BEGIN ITS MOVEMENT TO PINAPPAGAN THE FOLLOWING DAY.

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

11-16

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AND I WAS HONORARY MEMBER AND MY MESSAGES TO HRD
 JAPANESE CONTROL AS FILIPINO TROOP HAD IT THAT IT WAS
 OR NOT OUR HEADQUARTERS AT CONSIDER WAS ACTUALLY UNDER
 STATES AND AUSTRIA. THAT NOW I WAS SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER
 MADE SETS ON DISCREPANCY. INTENDING TO TALK WITH MAIN THE UNITED
 REACH POSTAL. AFTER I HAD FIRST SET UP ONE OF THE PORTABLE
 TO YOUR CHANGE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN GYM OR EVEN VENTURE TO
 SEAWORTHY I WOULD CONSIDER TAKING THE AMERICAN AND MAKING EFFORT
 OF THE JAPANESE LAUNCHES REPORTED AT GOSIGNANT TO THE
 ESSENTIAL WAS FOR TWO PURPOSES, FIRST THAT IF I FOUND ONE
 THAT MY PERSON WAS MENTIONING "TRY TO JOIN UNITED STATES
 WARREN"

LEADER.
 WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. OUR ASSEMBLY POINT WILL BE JOINTS
 INSPECTION TRIP AUTHORIZED BY YOU, LEAVING NOKAI IN COMMAND
 ESSENTIAL. MENTIONING WILL NOW LEAVE ON RECOMMISSANT AND
 REGIMENT TO JOIN ME. AND WILL TRY TO JOIN UNITED FORCES AND
 ALSO FOR THEM TO ASSIST "PARADES" WITH OTHER AMERICANS IN
 ACUTE. AN SQUADROUS TROOP AMONG OTHERS TO EMER SITUATION
 SUSTAINANCE PROBLEM WITH US NOW LIKELY TO BECOME
 PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT

11 April 1942

"Commanding General"

THE MESSAGE QUOTE

HAVE IN ORDER TO CONSERVE FUEL)
 OPERATED THE FOLD OVER APPROXIMATELY TWO HOUR PERIODS
 INSTRUCTED OTHERS BY HEADQUARTERS. PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT, WE
 THE NEW OPERATING HOURS OF OUR RADIO (THAT UNLESS WE HAD
 LEFT SAME WITH MEAN WHILE INSTRUCTING HIM TO SEND IT DURING
 MESSAGE TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT AND
 THAT PRIOR TO LEAVING HEADQUARTERS AT CAGAY WROTE OUT THE FOLLOWING

MIGHT BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS RECEIVED, IN FAKE, AND THAT MESSAGES TO ME LIKEWISE SENT DIRECTLY UNDER ENEMY OBSERVATION AND COMMAND. THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE BOMBARDMENTS OR AIR-BOMBINGS OF CORREGIDOR OUR SIGNAL DETAIL HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAKING RADIO CONTACT - ONCE REPORTING TO ME THAT CONTACT WITH THE UNITED STATES HAD TO FIRST BE MADE TO CONTACT CORREGIDOR. THAT THE SECOND REASON WHY I WORDED MY MESSAGE "TRY TO JOIN UNITED FORCES ELSEWHERE" WAS TO MISLEAD IN INFORMATION LEAKING OUT TO THE PUBLIC AS TO MY WHEREABOUTS. THIS IDEA WORKED FOR A WHILE BUT IN 4 DAYS AFTER I REACHED PALANAN BAY ALL OF ISABELA PROVINCE KNEW IT I LATER DISCOVERED.

THAT ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 13th AT PAWPPANGAN I RECEIVED THE FIRST NEWS MENTIONED BEFORE IN THIS REPORT - THAT 3000 JAPANESE TROOPS WERE IN NUEVA VISCAYA AND ISABELA.

THAT ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 14th I PROCEEDED WITH CAPTAIN MINTON, ACTING STAFF SERGEANT COYLE, CORPORAL QUINLEY AND 150 OFFICERS AND MEN OF CAPTAIN MINTON'S (THE RED) BATTALION EASTWARD ACROSS THE SWIRL MADE MOUNTAINS TOWARD THE BARRIOS ON LAJON CASIGURAN BAY AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF CASIGURAN. I REACHED BARRIO DISAFODU ON THE 19th OF APRIL IN THE AFTERNOON. THAT CAPTAIN MINTON WITH APPROXIMATELY 75 OF HIS OFFICERS AND MEN CONTINUED ON INTO CASIGURAN. THAT ON APRIL 21st I MOVED FARTHER UP THE BAY TO BARRIO DINALANAN TAYADA. THAT THERE I PREPARED A MESSAGE AS TO MY WHEREABOUTS TO BE RAISED TO GENERAL WAINWRIGHT AND SENT SAME BY A CORPORAL TROOP OF 26th CAVALRY (PS) TO MAJOR NAKAR TO TRANSMIT. THAT I RECEIVED NO ACKNOWLEDGMENT NOR REPLY FROM NAKAR - IN FACT I DID NOT RECEIVE ANY WORD FROM HIM AFTER THE NEWS ABOUT THE 3000 ENEMY TROOPS APRIL 13th. IN HIS MESSAGE DATED APRIL 11th.

Line No. Page No.

2. Reconstructed Revision Roster

Line No. Page No. REMARKS

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INVESTIGATING HIM TO FIND OUT HOW HE GOT INTO THE AREA.
 22ND OF APRIL 1964. A FEW DAYS AFTER THE ARREST OF
 THEN AND THERE TO RIGHT WITNESSES AND ON THE MORNING OF THE
 THAT THINKING OVER SENELEY'S REPORT TO HIS SUPERIOR
 TO ADVANCE HIMSELF POLITICALLY.
 HIMSELF (MARK). THAT HE FEEL THAT MARK WAS TRYING
 AIN IN ORDER TO GET COMMAND OF THE REGIMENT.
 FRIEND JUAN SILVERIA, FINANCIAL TENDRER AND OF THE
 SENELEY, MARK HAD ARRANGED THIS MEETING WITH HIS
 FENG OVER THE PRESENCE OF AMERICANS, THAT HAD BEEN
 OF APRIL 17 DESCRIBED ABOVE HAD GAINED ON ME EXPRESSION
 HAD ENGINEERED THE MEETING IN WHICH THE QIVAN DETACHMENT
 HE DELIVERED MARK HAD PULLED A FAST ONE ON ME AND
 REMAIN WITH HIM. SENELEY ALSO REPORTED TO ME THAT
 AMERICANS FOLLOW ME AND WAS PURSUING SOME OF THEM TO
 THREE TIMES HAD GONE) WAS DEGRADING MY ORDERS THAT
 (SENELEY REPORTED THAT NATIVE'S PROMOTION WHICH I REQUESTED
 TO SENELEY WERE SOME AMERICANS, THAT LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK
 PROCEEDED TO OUR HEADQUARTERS AT THAT TIME WERE ACCORDING
 BUSSING HIS MEN, THAT CAPTAIN SENELEY AND COMPANY THEN
 ACCORDING TO SENELEY, GARY FIGHTED AND WAS DIS-
 HIS OFFICERS IN SENELEY'S MIND WISDOM. THAT BRUNQUET WAS
 WAY THEY HAD BEEN MY MAJOR MANUEL P. BRUNQUET AND SOME OF
 INFILTRATION, THAT THEY THEREFORE DECIDED TO JOIN US, THAT ON THEIR
 COLONEL HOBAN AND WERE CUT OFF FROM THEIR UNITS BY AMERICANS
 THAT THEY REPORTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN ON A MISSION FOR
 OF COLONEL V. P. HOBAN'S INFANTRY ARRIVED IN CASABLANCA
 HAWKAWAY (AW) AND A CHIEF SENELEY'S LAD HOBAN AND THE TWO ALL
 GEORGE T. SENELEY, AIRLIFTMAN (17) DEAN NICHOLSON, ACTING SERGEANT
 THAT ON OR ABOUT THE NIGHT OF THE 17TH OF APRIL CAPTAIN

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WAS REMAINING IN COMMAND AND HAD NO IDEA OF LEAVING THE ISLANDS UNLESS RELIEVED OR ORDERED TO DO SO BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. THAT HE (NAKAR) WOULD MAKE A FULL REPORT TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL H.P.D. BY RADIO, OF MY POSITIONS AND ACTIVITIES. THAT THIS ORDER TO NAKAR FROM ME ACCORDING TO LATER INFORMATION FROM LIEUT-COLONEL KALAKUKA C.M.E REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL WAINWRIGHT - WAS NOT CARRIED OUT THO IT WAS RECEIVED BY NAKAR. LIEUTENANT - COLONEL KALAKUKA INFORMED ME THAT NAKAR DID NOT RADIO IN TO H.P.D. THIS INFORMATION. THAT FURTHER ACCORDING TO COLONEL KALAKUKA A MESSAGE WAS SENT TO ME BY GENERAL WAINWRIGHT TO RETAIN COMMAND AND NOT TO TURN SAME OVER TO NAKAR. NEITHER DID THIS MESSAGE NOR ANY WORD OF IT EVER REACH ME THO LIEUT-COLONEL NAKAR KNEW AT ALL TIMES HOW TO REACH ME AND ALSO KNEW MY LOCATIONS.

THAT I HOWEVER, DID NOT RELINQUISH COMMAND OF THE ISLANDS AT ANY TIME AND FINALLY SURRENDERED THE ISLANDS IN COMPLIANCE WITH LIEUT-GENERAL WAINWRIGHT'S ORDER AS LATER HEREIN DESCRIBED, TO THE JAPANESE ARMY.

THAT AT CASIGURAN THE SHIP DOCK AND AIR LANDING FIELD WERE COMPLETED AND PASSED INSPECTION - THE CREDIT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THESE ALSO GOING TO CAPTAIN WARREN A. MINTON COMMANDING MY FIRST BATTALION.

THAT ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 24 ONE OF THE LAUNCHES SIZED FROM THE JAPANESE LUMBER COMMISSION COASTED DOWN THE CASIGURAN BAY AND ANCHORED OFF MY HEADQUARTERS AT DIMALANAN, TAYRAS. THERE WAS ON BOARD CAPTAINS MINTON AND SCHOLEY, FIRST LIEUTENANT DEAN NICHOLSON, ACTING SERGEANT HARKAWAY, SERGEANT LEO HONG AND TEN TEN CORPORAL QUINLEY, CORPORAL LUMPHAN AND PRIVATE BURCH THAT IN THEIR POSSESSION WAS THE PORT RADIO

(over) 45

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

Unit

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TECHNICIAN FROM SOUTH BAY WITH GENERATOR - SOME BOATS
 PROVIDED GREAT HELP. I DECIDED THAT WE WOULD GO TO PALANAN
 AND THERE I WOULD OBTAIN THE PALANAN POST RADIO AND
 THAT SOMEWHERE NEAR A SUITABLE PLACE WE WOULD
 ERECT AN OPERATING ANTENNA AND OPERATE A RADIO WITH
 WHICH WE COULD CONTACT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
 THAT BEFORE LEAVING I ADVISED SEVERAL FRIENDS L. GEORGE
 TO FOLLOW ME UP TO PALANAN AND WITH ACTING STAFF SERGEANT
 JAMES R. COFFE AND CORPORAL JOSE ALVARO IN ADDITION TO
 THE NINE OFFICERS AND MEN ALREADY ON THE LAUNCH I BOARDED
 AND WE MOVED OUT THE CASIGURAN BAY AND HEADED
 NORTH. BEFORE LEAVING I INSTRUCTED SEVERAL GROUPS TO BRING
 GUNNING WITH THEM APPROXIMATELY 30 NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
 AND PRIVATES FOR GUARD AND PATROL WORK NEAR HEADQUARTERS
 THAT ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 2 WE MOVED INTO DISTANT
 BAY AND SPENT THE DAY REPAIRING AND TRYING TO RESTART
 THE ENGINE WHICH WAS RUNNING FOR TOO MUCH TIME AND
 NOT RUNNING SMOOTHLY. AT DARK WE MOVED INTO THE BAY AND
 AGAIN HEADED NORTH. THAT EVENING WE ANCHORED IN
 PALANAN BAY ABOUT 8:30 P.M. APRIL 2ND. HERE WE MOORED
 THE BOAT INTO ONE OF THE ESTUARIES OF THE PALANAN RIVER
 AND SET UP TEMPORARY HEADQUARTERS ON SWAMP ISLAND
 AT THE MOUTH OF THE PALANAN RIVER AND BAY.
 THAT HERE WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN PREPARATIONS TO
 SET UP AND GET INTO OPERATION THE RADIO - BUT OUR FIRST
 DELAY WAS THE LACK OF A 110 VOLT GENERATOR - THAT
 CENTER OF THE PALANAN POST RADIO HAVING REPORTED
 TO BE BROKEN IN THE BAY AND THE MAIN OF ILIGAN TO

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BE REPAIRED IN MANILA SHORTLY AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. THAT THIS GENERATOR IT WAS REPORTED WAS IN ILAGAN, STILL BROKEN, ITS PASSAGE TO MANILA HAVING BEEN DELAYED BY WAR. THAT ITS LOCATION IN ILAGAN WAS BELIEVED TO BE KNOWN AND I DECIDED TO TRY TO GET IT AND REPAIR IT OURSELVES.

THAT WE HAD ALSO ALONG WITH US A COMMERCIAL-RADIO RECEIVER AND SIX THREE CELL BATTERIES ALL NEARLY RUN DOWN. THAT WE DID SUCCEED IN GETTING A SMALL ONE CYLINDER GASOLINE ENGINE WITH WHICH I HOPED TO CHARGE BATTERIES AND OPERATE THE RADIO UNTIL WE COULD LOCATE AND BUILD A DAM AND WATER WHEEL FOR GENERATING POWER. THAT ON MAY FIRST I MADE A RECONNAISSANCE FOR SUCH WATER POWER SITE AND LOCATED AN EXCELLENT ONE NEAR BARRID DIMATCAN ABOUT 20 KILOMETERS SOUTH WEST OF SUBANG, PAST PALANAN - WHERE A STREAM AT THE BASE OF THE MOUNTAINS (SIERRA MADRE) MET THE PALANAN RIVER FROM THE NORTH WEST.

THAT NOW MAY 6th I SENT CAPTAIN WARREN MITCHELL IN CHARGE OF A DETAIL CONSISTING OF CORPORAL QUINBY, CORPORAL LIMPANAN, PRIVATE RUSH AND ABOUT FIFTEEN VOLUNTEER GUARDS ACROSS THE SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS WEST AND SOUTH FOR TWO PURPOSES - FIRST TO LOCATE, OBTAIN AND RETURN TO US IF POSSIBLE THE GENERATOR (110 VOLT) SAID TO BE IN ILAGAN - SECONDLY TO GO TO MY HEADQUARTERS UNDER LT-COLONEL NAKAR IN THE LOWER CAGAYAN VALLEY, SEND OVER OUR BIG RADIO WITH HIM A REPORT OF OUR OPERATIONS TO HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT AND TO BRING TO MY NEW HEADQUARTERS AT DIMATCAN (TO BE) THE GENERATOR AND TUBES OF THE BIG 175 RADIO SET AFTER NAKAR HAD SENT IN MY REPORT AND NOTIFICATION OF WHAT I WAS DOING IN CHANGING THE RADIO.

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(OVER)

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq.,, dated

Unit

171 SET
 50-225

THAT I HAD PLANNED ORIGINALLY TO HAVE RADIOS
 OPERATING BETWEEN MY KAY AND TWO BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
 BUT NOW DECIDED THAT DUE TO LACK OF GENERATOR THAT
 IT WOULD BE OF MORE VALUE TO OUR SERVICES TO HAVE AT
 MY HEADQUARTERS A PORTABLE SET WITH WHICH TO CONTACT
 I.P.R. AND THEN LATER IF POSSIBLE THE UNITED STATES
 HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA. THAT FROM THE HEAVY BOMBING OF
 CORRECTOR REPORTED OVER RADIO BROADCASTS I EXPECTED
 CORRECTOR TO FALL BECAUSE I FEEL AND BELIEVE THAT
 THE JAPANESE FORCES WOULD ATTEMPT A TROOP LANDING
 THERE.
 THAT IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF MAY 7 I HEARD RADIO
 BROADCAST THAT OUR FORCES WERE OVERTAKING TO NEGOTIATE
 WITH THE JAPANESE UNDER A WHITE FLAG, THAT ON MAY 8
 I HEARD THE VOICE OF WHOM WAS CLAIMED TO BE GENERAL
 VERNON M. WAINWRIGHT CALLING FOR THE SURRENDER
 OF GENERAL SWAMP IN MARIANA, COLONEL J. R. HERRAN IN
 MOUNTAIN PROVINCE AND LIEUTENANT GUILLERMO NAKAS TO
 SURRENDER MY FORCES. THAT THIS HAPPENED AS I PLANNED
 IT TO BE THAT I RETAINED COMMAND BUT WAS POLITELY
 "OUT OF THE PICTURE" AND I DETERMINED AT THIS POINT
 NOT TO SURRENDER. THAT ALSO I DID REALIZE BY NOW THAT
 ANAKI WANTED TO KEEP ME OUT OF THE PICTURE IN ORDER
 TO HIMSELF "BE THE HERO" OF WHAT WAS TO LATER HAPPEN.
 THAT AFTER BEING CONVINCED OF THE SURRENDER OF
 CORRECTOR I SENT A SPECIAL MESSENGER AFTER CAPTAIN
 MINTON WITH THIS NEWS. MINTON ALSO CAPTAIN MINTON TO
 CONTACT ANAKI IF POSSIBLE WITH THE NEWS AND TO BRING
 BACK THE RADIO GENERATOR TO ME FROM OUR REGIMENTAL

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THAT I HAD HEARD FROM AN OFFICER PASSING THRU PALANAN ON EMERGENCY LEAVE A FEW DAYS PRIOR TO SURRENDER THAT LIEUT. COLONEL NAKAR HAD ON ABOVI MAY FIRST DISCONTINUED TO OPERATE HIS RADIO FOR FEAR OF ITS DESTRUCTION OR CAPTURE.

THAT ON ABOVI MAY 10th I RECEIVED A REPLY FROM CAPTAIN MINTON ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF MY INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS. THAT WE CONTINUED WITH AND COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION OF THE DAM AND WATER WHEEL AND ESTABLISHED HEADQUARTERS AT PIMATICAN.

THAT ON SUNDAY MAY 24 CAPTAIN MINTON RETURNED TO ME WITH THE FOLLOWING REPORT:

(A) THERE WERE ABOUT 3000 JAPANESE TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE CAGAYAN VALLEY WITH MAIN BODIES AT HAPAN, ENRABUE AND JONES.

(B) THAT HE (MINTON) HAD GONE SOUTH NEARLY AS FAR AS JONES WHERE HE MET A DETACHMENT OF NAKAR'S SOLDIERS WHO INFORMED HIM THAT LIEUT. COLONEL NAKAR HAD DISBANDED HIS TROOPS AND HAD HIMSELF GONE TO MOUNTAIN PROVINCE - EXACT SPOT NOT KNOWN.

(C) THAT FURTHER EFFORT TO CHECK ON THIS INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BROUGHT CAPTAIN MINTON THE SAME STORY.

(D) THAT FROM WHAT HE COULD LEARN ABOUT THE SUBJECT FROM RESPONSIBLE SOURCES - LIEUT. COLONEL NAKAR HAD SINCE CAPTAIN MINTON'S AND MY MOVEMENT TO THE EAST COAST, NOT CARRIED OUT MY ORDER TO HAVE ALL AMERICANS FOLLOW AND JOIN ME BUT HAD RATHER ENCOURAGED THEM - IF THEY WERE LOWER THAN HIS OWN RANK - TO REMAIN WITH HIM UNTIL ABOVI MAY 31 WHEN THEIR PRESENCE MADE HIM FEARFUL - THEN NAKAR ENDEAVORED TO GET RID OF THEM.

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REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., _____, dated _____

I, THAT IN THIS CONNECTION CAPTAIN MINTIN HEARD THAT MAJOR E. C. JACOBS (MCJUSN AND CAPTAIN ARMED AND MARCHING SERVICE HAD JOINED TROOPMASTER NAKAR IN APRIL. (THAT I HAD EXPEDITED MAJOR JACOBS ARRIVAL AND WILL REPORT ON HIS EXPERIENCES BELOW). THAT ALSO TROOPMASTER NAKAR PAID TO GOOD TROOPMASTER HARLEY HEIRD AND FRANCIS CAMP TO REPORT TO THE EAST COAST.

(E) THAT HE (CAPTAIN MINTIN) HAD SENT CORPORAL THROU SIMPSON TO ILAIGN TO GET THE GENERATOR REPORTED THERE AND AFTER 10 DAYS SIMPSON HAD NOT RETURNED. (CAPTAIN MINTIN BELIEVED HIM CAPTURED BY THE JAPANESE.

(F) THAT CORPORAL QUINCY AND PRIVATE RYAN HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN NEAR SAN MARIANO FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING AND RETURNING TO US FURTHER INFORMATION OF VALUE.

(G) THAT DUE TO THE REPORT THAT GRANT NAKAR HAD GONE TO MOUNTAIN PROVINCE (WHICH I DID NOT BELIEVE BECAUSE I KNEW TOO WELL THAT NAKAR WANTED TO GET A HERO IN INDIA OR NEVA MISCHY) AND BECAUSE OF THE LOCATION OF JAPANESE FORCES IN NUMBER BETWEEN CAPTAIN MINTIN FELT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LOCATE THE RADIO SET AND THEREFORE DID NOT GET THE GENERATOR FOR OUR USE.

THAT ON MAY 19TH WHILE IN PALMARIAN CAPTAIN GEORGE T. SMOLEY #0-890-260 AND FIRST LIEUTENANT DEAN WICKHAM #0-890-370 PURCHASED FOR PARTS OF THEIR OWN FUNDS A LARGE BATTERY RANGE WITH CONTROLS WITH WHICH THEY ARRANGED THEIR IRRADIATION OF MAKING A GERMANY TO THE CHINA COAST OR AUSTRALIA AND INVITED ME TO JOIN THEM. (I WANTED OUT SINCE CAPTAIN

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MINTON DID DESIRE TO GO I ASKED THAT HE BE TAKEN ALONG. THAT WITH CAPTAIN MINTON I PLANNED TO SEND TO USAFFE HEADQUARTERS COPIES OF OUR ROSTERS, ORDERS AND A FULL REPORT OF OUR LOCATIONS AND ACTIVITIES AND CAPTAIN MINTON'S MISSION WAS TO REACH FRIENDLY TROOPS IF POSSIBLE WHERE THESE PAPERS WERE TO BE SENT FORWARD. THAT MEANTIME I WOULD BE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO LOCATE A GENERATOR FOR OUR PORTABLE RADIO.

THAT ON OR ABOUT MAY 27 I SENT AN INTELLIGENT FILIPINO CITIZEN, TRINITARIO PINTANG OF PALANAN (A SENIOR INSPECTOR WHO HAD A PERSONAL MISSION IN JONES, ISABELA) TO TRY TO CONTACT LIEUTENANT COLONEL NAKAR IF HE WAS ANYWHERE IN THE LOWER CAGAYAN OR WARNER VALLEYS. MY INSTRUCTIONS TO PINTANG WERE TO GO FIRST TO PINAPAGAN FOR INFORMATION AS TO NAKAR'S LOCATION, TO PINTANG I GAVE, FOR DELIVERY BY NAKAR, LIEUTENANT COLONEL TREGGERS KALAKUKA'S TRUE COPY OF GENERAL WAINWRIGHT'S ORDER TO SURRENDER, ALSO A MESSAGE FROM MYSELF IN CODE, AND COLONEL KALAKUKA'S PERSONAL APPEAL TO NAKAR. THAT THESE MESSAGES FROM KALAKUKA TO NAKAR HAD BEEN WRITTEN BY KALAKUKA AND SENT BY HIM TO A LIEUTENANT ORCINA WHO TURNED THEM OVER TO ANOTHER FILIPINO AND THEY REACHED CAPTAIN MINTON OUTSIDE JONES, AND MINTON RETURNED THEM BACK TO ME. THAT LIEUTENANT COLONEL TREGGERS KALAKUKA O-16841 WAS GENERAL WAINWRIGHT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ASSIST IN BRINGING ABOUT THE SURRENDER OF MY FORCES AND HAD ARRIVED AT CASHING AIRFIELD (WITH COLONEL GULBERTSON WHO WAS AFTER COLONEL HANAN'S TROOPS) IN A JAPANESE PLANE ON MAY 9th. KALAKUKA LATER WENT ALL THE WAY TO PINAPAGAN FOR NAKAR AND WE AFTERWARDS LEARNED NAKAR WAS THERE AT THE SAME TIME, BUT FILIPINO

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(OVER)

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PROTECTED AND HELP HIM AND DENIED KNOWING OF HIS
PRESUMED THAT MY INTERESTS TO PUTTING WING WAS TO
NOW ATTEMPT TO CONTACT MARKS WAS TO DISCUSS
HIS MISSION OF DELIVERING THESE MESSAGES WITH NO ONE
WANT TO LOCATE MARKS AND GIVE THE MESSAGES TO HIM
PERSONALLY
THAT ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 5, CORPORAL THOMAS LIMPHAN
RETURNED FROM LEARN TO CAPTAIN WINTON, NOW WITH
CAPTAIN JERRY AND LIEUTENANT NICHOLSON IN MALAYA
PREPARING THE OUTRANAY BOAT FOR A 90 DAY VOYAGE.
THAT CORPORAL LIMPHAN HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN HONGKONG
AND ESCAPED - UNABLE TO LOCATE ANY GENERATOR THAT
IN RETURNING THRU SAN MARIANO ISLANDS TO RENCH CAPTAIN
WINTON LIMPHAN HAD THERE CONTACTED LIEUTENANT KATHAM
WHO WAS IN PHAPPAH LEARNED OF MY POSITION AND
HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT YAMITAMA AT
RECHANG TO CONTACT ME THAT THE JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE
HAD NOW LEARNED MY POSITION ALSO BELIEVING THAT MAJOR
ALBERT G. JACOBS WAS WITH ME. MAJOR JACOBS WAS
SUGGESTED WAY TO JOIN ME AND THE STORY OF HIM WILL FOLLOW
IN THIS REPORT.
THAT IN SAN MARIANO CORPORAL LIMPHAN WAS ORDERED
BY LIEUTENANT KATHAM, REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL WAIN-
WRIGHT TO DELIVER TO ME A COPY OF GENERAL WAINWRIGHTS
ORDER TO SURRENDER ALSO A LETTER WHICH HE - KATHAM
WAS EXPLAINING AND ANNOUNCING; FIRST THAT THE UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER OF GENERAL WAINWRIGHT HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT HE (LIEUTENANT
KATHAM) HAD PERSONALLY SEEN THE PROGRAM. SECOND - THAT
MY FAILURE TO SURRENDER WOULD BE THE CAUSE OF THE

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SURRENDER OF GENERAL WAINWRIGHT BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL
 IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES, THAT INSTEAD OF SURRENDER TERMS
 BEING GRANTED THERE WOULD EXIST A STATE OF CESSATION OF
 HOSTILITIES. THAT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT OUR SURRENDERED
 TROOPS WOULD BE HELD AS CAPTIVES AND NOT ENTITLED TO
 THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS-OF-WAR, AND THIS WOULD LIKELY
 LEAVE 'LOOP-HOLES' FOR THE MISTREATMENT OF OUR SURRENDER-
 ED TROOPS. THAT TO DATE THE JAPANESE FORCES WERE
 LIVING INVOLVING UP TO THEIR AGREEMENT TO GUARANTEE THE
 LIVES OF THOSE SURRENDERED AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO
 IF THE SURRENDER BECAME COMPLETE. THAT THUS THE
 PERSONAL LETTER OF LT-COLONEL KALAKUKA TO ME, ALSO ONE
 FROM LIEUTENANT ZIEGLER, WHO KNEW ME AND WHO WAS
 ASSISTING KALAKUKA, INFORMED ME.

THAT UP TO NOW I HAD DETERMINED NOT TO SURRENDER
 BUT HAD PLANNED TO EGGET ON DIRECTIONAL ANTENNAE AT ALL
 COSTS ONE OF THE PORTABLE RADIOS WITH WHICH I COULD TALK
 TO THE UNITED STATES. THAT NOW HAVING BELIEVED THAT THE
 PLAN OF OUR HIGH COMMAND WAS NOT TO CONTINUE THE WAR
 IN THE PHILIPPINES I FEEL THAT MY NEXT OBLIGATION WAS
 TO MY FELLOW SOLDIERS NOW SURRENDERED AND I EVALUATED
 THAT MY REMAINING OUT COULD DO LITTLE GOOD FOR THE
 CAUSE WHEREAS IT MIGHT EVEN BECOME HARDSHIP AND
 SUFFERING TO FILIPINO CIVILIANS AS WELL AS TO MY
 FELLOW SOLDIERS. I THEREFORE DECIDED THAT I WOULD
 SURRENDER. I HAD HEARD GENERAL WAINWRIGHT CALLING
 FOR LT-COLONEL NAKAGI TO SURRENDER MY TROOPS AND
 HAD SEEN A TRUE COPY OF HIS ORDER AS DESCRIBED
 ABOVE. I LEARNED LATER FROM LT-COLONEL KALAKUKA THAT
 GENERAL WAINWRIGHT HAD RADIOED ME A REPLY TO MY
 LAST MESSAGE TO HIM BUT THIS MESSAGE NEVER REACHED
 ME TOO AT ALL TIMES ANAGI KNEW MY LOCATION.

(OVER)

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THAT TOGETHER CAPTAINS MINTON SCHLEY AND I DISCUSSED
 THE MATTER OF SURRENDERING AND TOGETHER WE AGREED TO
 SURRENDER. THAT I WROTE A LETTER STATING OUR DECISION
 ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 5TH ADDRESSING IT TO LIEUTENANT
 KANEKA. AWAITING MY REPLY IN SAN MARIANO ISABELA.
 AND STAYED IT OFF TO HIM THE FOLLOWING MORNING, JUNE 6TH
 135 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM MY POSITION BY CAPTAIN MINTON.
 THAT IN MY REPLY TO LIEUTENANT KANEKA I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD
 BE IN SAN MARIANO IF POSSIBLE BY THE NIGHT OF JUNE 13TH.
 ACCOMPANIED BY THE REMAINING OFFICERS AND MEN NOW
 NOW PRESENT WITH CAPTAIN MINTON.
 THAT ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 6TH I ANNOUNCED TO ACTING
 FIRST SERGEANT GOROSP AND THE 30 FILIPINO ENLISTED MEN OF
 HEADQUARTERS COMPANY THAT WE WOULD SURRENDER. THAT BY
 NIGHTFALL ALL BUT FIVE HAD LEFT - DESERTED. THAT 6 DAYS
 LATER SERGEANT GOROSP WAS TOO ILL WITH MALARIA TO
 GO ON FURTHER AND I LEFT HIM OUTSIDE SAN MARIANO WITH
 THE PROMISE THAT HE WOULD TURN IN AN EXCHANGE THAT
 GOROSP'S HUSBAND, ALVARADO, AND PRIVATE FIRST CLASS
 GUYSA AND VANDERIS CONTINUED IN WITH US. THAT WE LEFT
 DOMATEAN JUNE 7 AND BARBAND JUNE 9 - CAPTAIN SCHLEY
 LIEUTENANT NICHOLSON ACTING SERGEANT HADAWAY AND
 THE TWO CHINESE SERGEANTS PRECEEDING US BY SIX
 HOURS. THAT WITH ME WERE BEING SENT SERGEANT
 JAMES A GOYLE OMC AND THE FILIPINOS NAMED ABALDE
 THAT ON THE LATE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 10TH I RECEIVED
 A NOTE RECEIVED FROM CAPTAIN MINTON ASKING SINCE THAT
 HE HAD CONTACTED AND WAS WITH LIEUTENANT KANEKA
 WHO HAD CONTACTED ME IN SAN MARIANO.

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WE WERE AT THE EASTERN BASE OF THE HIGH MOUNTAINS OF THE SIERRA MADRE RANGE. I MET CAPTAIN SMOLEY AND PARTY WHO HAD REVERSED THEIR DIRECTION AND WERE NOW RETURNING TOWARD PALANAN. THAT SMOLEY NOW INFORMED ME HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT GOING IN WITH LIEUT-COLONEL KALAKUKA AND NOW SAID THAT THEY WANTED TO TAKE THEIR BOAT UP TO APARRI AND SURRENDER IT - ASKING ME TO GIVE HIM PERMISSION TO DO SO. THAT THIS I REFUSED TO DO STATING THAT I COULD NOT COUNTER-MAND GENERAL WAINWRIGHT'S ORDER. SMOLEY HOWEVER WITH NICHOLSON, SERGEANT HARREWAY AND THE TWO CHINESE CONTINUED THE JOURNEY TOWARD PALANAN THAT I FELT CONVINCED THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF SURRENDERING UNLESS CAPTURED.

THAT I WITH SERGEANT COYNE AND THE FILIPINOS MENTIONED CONTINUED ON TOWARD SAN MARIANO REACHING THERE JUNE 11TH WHERE WE MET LT-COLONEL KALAKUKA, CAPTAIN MINTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALBERT S. ZIEGLER [WHO HAD SURRENDERED FROM COLONEL JOHN P. HOGAN'S TROOPS (THE 12TH INFANTRY) AND WAS ASSISTING KALAKUKA] AND A MR. ROY FUXMAN CIVILIAN AUSTRIAN RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES WHOM COLONEL HOGAN HAD RECOMMENDED FOR COMMISSION BUT AS YET NOT COMMISSIONED - BUT ALSO SURRENDERED TO LT-COLONEL KALAKUKA.

THAT HERE IN SAN MARIANO, LIEUT-COLONEL KALAKUKA HAD, BEFORE MY ARRIVAL, SUCCEEDED IN LOCATING AND GETTING TO SURRENDER ON OF MY PHILIPPINE ARMY OFFICERS OF THE REGULAR ARMY - FIRST INFANTRY MELITO P. BULAN - INFANTRY. THAT BULAN HAD BEEN MY ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND I HAD LEFT HIM TO WORK WITH MAJOR NAKAR. THAT HE HAD BEEN ON DUTY NEAR SAN MARIANO AND HAD COME TO VISIT HIS FATHER EX-GOVERNOR BULAN DE ISABELA NOW ALSO IN SAN MARIANO.

THAT IN SAN MARIANO WE RESTED OVER NINE 15TH (OUR)

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THAT AT NOON ON JUNE 16TH WE PASSED THRU SAN ANTONIO
 TOWARD ITAGAY.
 I HAD BEEN AND AT THAT PLACE WE WERE JOINED BY
 MAJOR EUGENE G. JACOBS, Medical Corps, USA, THAT THE
 STORY IN REVEAL OF MAJOR JACOBS'S EXPERIENCES FOLLOW
 THAT MAJOR JACOBS HAS BEEN IN CHARGE OF THE
 STATION HOSPITAL AT CAMP JOHN WAY AND GAVE FIRST TREATMENT
 THERE TO ALL SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS INJURED IN THE BOMBINGS
 BY JAPANESE PLANES ON DECEMBER 8TH AND DECEMBER 13TH
 THAT ON DECEMBER 23RD WE ALL AT CAMP JOHN WAY WERE
 ORDERED TO EVACUATE THE CAMP AND DID SO ON THE MORNING OF
 THAT DATE. THAT AT NIGHTFALL OF THE SAME DAY SOME
 OF US WERE ORDERED TO RETURN TO CAMP JOHN WAY AND DID SO.
 THAT MAJOR JACOBS REMAINED CONTINUED ON WITH ONE AMERICAN
 AND FOURTEEN PHILIPPINE SCOUT MEDICAL DETACHMENT SOLDIERS
 AND THE TWO CAMP JOHN WAY ARMY NURSES. SCOUT LEADERS
 RUDY RUMBLEY AND RICHARD CHAMBERS. THAT MAJOR
 JACOBS'S MISSION WAS TO RISE OVERLAND FIRST ACROSS
 THE MOUNTAINS TO NATIONAL ROAD NUMBER FIVE THEN TO PEOPLE
 SOUTH AND VAN OUR TRAPS IN THE LINE, THAT MAJOR JACOBS
 LEFT THE TWO NURSES, MISSISS RUMBLEY AND CHAMBERS.
 AT FUSED JOHN WAY ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS EAST OF
 BALBON AND CONTINUED ACROST WITH THE MEDICAL CORPS
 MEN, THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS WAS PT (PARA COMPANY) RYAN.
 THAT ABOUT TEN O'CLOCK A.M. ON DECEMBER 29TH
 AFTER HAVING JUST PASSED THE BELLE PASS AND
 STILL ON ROUTE 5 GOING SOUTH MAJOR JACOBS AND
 PARTY RAN DIRECTLY TOWARD THE MOUNTAINS.

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HE AND HIS TROOPS ENCOUNTERED FIRST THREE JAPANESE OFFICERS IN A CAR FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY THREE LIGHT TANKS AND THAT THESE TANKS MACHINE-GUNNED MAJOR JACOBS AND HIS MEN THAT MAJOR JACOBS AND HIS MEN WERE ABLE TO TAKE COVER IN THE FOOTINGS OF THE CARRABALO MOUNTAINS EAST OF ROUTE 5 AND HERE JAPANESE TROOPS AFTER DARK HUNTED THEM FOR SOME HOURS BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THAT NOW MAJOR JACOBS ESTABLISHED A TEMPORARY POSITION ON THE TOP OF ONE OF THE HIGH MOUNTAINS AND FROM HERE COULD SEE CONSIDERABLE ENEMY ACTIVITY TO THE SOUTHWEST AND SOUTH INCLUDING THE BURNING OF PART OF SAN JOSE, AND AT NIGHT BUN FLASHES OVER IN BATAAN. THAT SOON JAPANESE FORCES WERE ON THE NORTH SOUTH AND WEST OF HIM AND HE REALIZED THAT HE COULD NOT MOVE FAR TO THE SOUTH.

THAT, CUT OFF FROM THE SOUTH, MAJOR JACOBS HEARD THAT I WAS NORTH OF HIM AND SO DECIDED TO JOIN ME. THIS HE SET OUT TO DO BUT HE WAS FORCED TO MOVE NORTH, AWAY TO THE EAST OF ROAD FIVE SINCE AFTER EARLY JANUARY JAPANESE FORCES WERE ON THAT ROAD NORTH OF HIM.

THAT TRAVELLING AT NIGHT MAJOR JACOBS WAS ON OR ABOUT APRIL 11TH, ABLE TO REACH OSAL, THEN MY HEADQUARTERS BUT A FEW HOURS AFTER CAPTAIN MANTON AND HIS BATTALION HAD GONE WITH ME TO PINAPPAGAN. THAT HE REACHED HERE ALSO JUST AFTER HE HAD LEFT PINAPPAGAN FOR CAGURAN AND HERE HE WAS TAKEN WITH MALARIA, RETURNING TO OSAL FOR REST AND TREATMENT HE REMAINED WITH LIEUT-COLONEL NAKAR UNTIL ABLE TO MOVE ON. THAT LIEUT-COLONEL NAKAR REPORTED HIS PRESENCE.

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(OVER)

BY RADIO TO HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
 AND THAT COLONEL MORAN, LEARNING OF MAJOR
 JACOBS' PRESENCE WITH MY TROOPS REQUESTED THAT
 HE GO OUT WITH HIM. THAT THIS MAJOR JACOBS ATTEMPTED
 TO DO BUT THE CONDITION OF HIS HEALTH
 INTERFERED AND HE WAS MADE TO STAY ABOUT
 MAY 30 AND ABOUT THIS TIME LIEUTENANT COLONEL NAHAR
 WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE AMERICANS SEPARATE FROM
 HIM. THAT EARLIER WHILE MAJOR JACOBS WAS ILL,
 PRIVATE RYAN MC KEITH LEFT HIM AND CONTINUED TO
 JOIN COLONEL MORAN THAT MAJOR JACOBS LATER
 REPORTED TO ME THAT DUE TO EXCESSIVELY HEAVY
 TRAINING OF CORPORALS, LT COLONEL NAHAR
 WAS FREQUENTLY UNABLE TO CONTACT HEADQUARTERS
 PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT BY RADIO SO THAT
 METHODS EXISTED WITH NO RADIO COMMUNICATION WITH HEAD-
 QUARTERS. THAT SHORTLY AFTER REACHING OSAI MAJOR
 JACOBS LEARNED THAT I WAS IN PALANAN, THEN WHEN
 AFTER MAY 30 HE WAS MADE TO TRAVEL HE WAS
 CUT OFF FROM REACHING COLONEL MORAN BY JAPANESE
 TROOP INFILTRATION BETWEEN AND HE THEREFORE
 DECIDED TO JOIN ME NEAR PALANAN. THAT STILL TRAVEL-
 ING AT NIGHT AND DETOURING JAPANESE DETACHMENTS
 ON CONTACT DAILY HE WAS MADE TO REACH SAN ANTONIO
 ISABELLA, PLANNING TO CONTINUE OVER THE SIERRA
 MADRES TO JOIN ME THAT IT WAS HEARD THAT I TOLD
 HIM THAT I HAD RECEIVED ORDERS TO SURVEILLOR AND
 WAS ON MY WAY TO TECHAUQUE TO DO SO. THAT MAJOR
 JACOBS HAD JOINED OUR PARTY PROCEEDING TO

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THAT ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 17TH WE ARRIVED AT THE FIRST JAPANESE DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS AT HAGAN WHERE THE FILIPINO SOLDIERS WITH US HAD THEIR BAGGAGE REACHED AND HERE WE TURNED OVER OUR RIFLES TO THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES. THERE HAD BEEN TEN RIFLES AILING US, AND LESS THAN 100 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION.

THAT THE FOLLOWING NIGHT WE SPENT IN CAUAYAN AND ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 19TH ARRIVED AND SURRENDERED AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF JAPANESE COLONEL YOSHIZAWA IN ECHAGUE. THAT THERE WERE ALREADY SURRENDERED IN ECHAGUE, PRIVATES JOHN R. MARSHALL AND JOHN HENRY RUSCH ATTACHED TO MY FORCES AND CORPORAL QUINCY OF COLONEL HERRAL. AS MENTIONED HEREBEFORE QUINCY HAD JOINED US SOME TIME BEFORE (AS HAD MARSHALL). THAT MARSHALL SURRENDERED IN JONES ISABELA MAY 9TH OR 10TH AND QUINCY WHO HAD GONE WITH US TO PALMAMAN AND THEN BACK WITH RUSCH UNDER CAPTAIN MINTON WHEN THEY MOVED WEST AND SOUTH FROM MY PALMAMAN LOCATION IN ORDER TO GET GENERATORS AND CONTACT LT. COLONEL NAKAKI, HAD SURRENDERED ABOUT MAY 19TH.

THAT UPON SURRENDERING, THE JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS INTERVIEWED. LIEUTENANT SAKKI INFORMED ME THAT LIEUTENANT JAMES ANDREW GREEN AND FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM C. BURCH OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY HAD SURRENDERED TO THEM SEVERAL DAYS PREVIOUSLY AND HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOMES.

THAT IN OUR PARTY, BESIDES LT. COLONEL KALAKUKA AND HIS ASSISTANTS LIEUTENANT ZESLER AND MR. FURMAN, WERE MAJOR E. S. JACOBS, CAPTAIN W. A. MINTON AND STAFF SERGEANT JAMES R. COYNE WITH ME - FOUR FILIPINO SOLDIERS ARRIVING ON FOOT FROM HAGAN ONE DAY LATER. THAT ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 19TH I WAS PERMITTED TO STAY WITH LT. COLONEL

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(over)

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REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

Unit

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KARAKURA AT THE HAGIENDA OF SENIOR GUEP AFTER
 FIRST BEING THOROUGHLY QUESTIONED AS TO MY MOVEMENTS
 SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE AND THE PRESENT SITUATION
 PART OF MY REGIMENT. THAT I WAS IMMEDIATELY
 QUESTIONED ABOUT MY RAPID AND I REPLIED THAT
 I HAD LEFT IT AT SAKI BARRAKA THAT I VOLUNTEERED
 TO GO PROBABLY AFTER ELEMENTS OF MY REGIMENT
 IF PERMITTED TO GO WITHOUT JAPANESE TROOPS
 THAT I WAS TOLD THAT I MIGHT BE CALLED ON
 TO DO THIS LATER - AND WAS LATER AS WILL BE
 SHOWN. THAT ON JUNE 29 I WAS SENT WITH ALL OTHER
 PRISONERS OF WAR, AMERICAN AND FILIPINO, EXCEPT
 THOSE ON DUTY AS DRIVERS FOR THE JAPANESE FORCES
 IN ECHAGUE - TO THE BARRACKS OF THE SECOND BARBERA
 CAMP NEAR ECHAGUE NOW OCCUPIED BY A BATTERY OF
 THE 1ST JAPANESE FIELD ARTILLERY UNDER CAPTAIN
 MICHIMURA. THAT HERE WE WERE TREATED KINDLY. THAT
 ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS I WAS CALLED BACK INTO
 SENIOR YOSHIZAKA'S HEADQUARTERS ECHAGUE FOR QUESTION-
 ING AND TWICE JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
 CAME TO THE BARRACKS AND QUESTIONED ME CONCERNING
 THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT OF MY REGIMENT.
 THAT FURUTANI - COLONEL THEODORE KARAKURA WAS
 CAPT IN ECHAGUE STRIKE IN SENIOR GUEP HAGIENDA
 AND AVAILABLE TO THE JAPANESE COMMANDER COLONEL
 YOSHIZAKA'S ORDERS.
 THAT ON OR ABOUT JUNE 23rd I ASKED FURUTANI
 KARAKURA TO MAKE EFFORTS TO CONTACT MY FORMER
 REGIMENTAL S-3 FIRST FURUTANI LEONARDO ROSARIO
 IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS BEING NEAR HIS HOME

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IN ARIAO NUEVA VISAYA. THAT COLONEL KALAKUKA DID CONTACT ROSARIO WHO ON MY ORDER SURRENDERED AND LATER ASSISTED KALAKUKA TO GATHER IN ABOUT 200 OF MY OFFICERS AND MEN. THAT TO DATE THERE WERE STILL REMAINING OUT APPROXIMATELY 750 OF MY OFFICERS AND MEN

THAT ON OR ABOUT JUNE 21ST THE JAPANESE COMMANDER ASKED ME TO WRITE LETTERS ORDERING SURRENDER TO LT-COLONEL GUILLERMO NAKAR AND MAJOR MANUEL P. ENRIQUETA WITH THEIR OFFICERS AND MEN THAT I WAS INFORMED THAT MANY COPIES OF THESE LETTERS WOULD BE MADE AND DISTRIBUTED IF POSSIBLE SO AS TO REACH THE OFFICERS CONCERNED THAT I WROTE THESE LETTERS SIGNING ABOUT 20 COPIES OF EACH. THAT LATER WHEN THE JAPANESE FORCES CAPTURED LT-COLONEL NAKAR HE HAD, I WAS INFORMED, MY LETTER ORDERING SURRENDER IN HIS POSSESSION.

THAT ON OR ABOUT JULY FIRST WORD CAME THAT SECOND LIEUTENANT FRANCIS A. CAMP OF LT-COLONEL NAKAR'S TROOPS HAD MADE A RAID ON JAPANESE TROOPS NEAR TUAO INCLUDING SOME CASUALTIES. THAT JAPANESE COLONEL YOSHIZAWA HAD ALREADY SENT TWO AMERICANS A SERGEANT DARNHOUSE AND PRIVATE DARCY TO BRING CAMP IN AND THAT CAMP HAD REPLIED THAT HE HAD CAPTURED THESE SOLDIERS AND INTENDED TO CAPTURE OR KILL ALL ADDITIONAL AMERICANS SENT TO CAPTURE HIM. THAT NOW COLONEL YOSHIZAWA NOTED THAT LT-COLONEL KALAKUKA BRING CAMP IN AND THAT KALAKUKA NOW DETAINED, WITH JAPANESE APPROVAL CORPORAL QUINLEY AND MR. FURMAN - BOTH OF WHOM CLAIMED TO KNOW CAMP TO NEGOTIATE HIS SURRENDER. THAT NOW STILL ANOTHER RAID BY CAMP WAS REPORTED

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(OVER)

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., _____, dated _____

Unit _____

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AND JAPANESE COLONEL YOSHITAMA DESIGNATED
 LT-COLONEL KAKIKUKA MINORU TO GO, THAT ON JULY 10th
 LT-COLONEL KAKIKUKA TOOK WITH HIM APPROVED BY
 COLONEL YOSHITAMA - SECOND LIEUTENANT ALBERT S.
 ZIEGLER (GPO 522) WHO STATED THAT HE KNEW CAMP
 WELL AND BELIEVED HE COULD NEGOTIATE HIS SURRENDER, THAT
 HE LEARNED LATER THESE OFFICERS ENTERED LIGHT CAMP
 BUT WERE UNABLE TO INDUCE HIM TO SURRENDER -
 THAT AS A MATTER OF FACT THEY WERE VERY NEARLY
 KILLED OR CAPTURED THEMSELVES BY HIM, THAT THIS WAS
 DUE TO ME ON LIBI-CAMP, KAKIKUKA.
 THAT ON OR ABOUT JULY 17th 1945 JAPANESE STAFF
 LIEUTENANT AND INTERPRETER SASAKI CAME TO THE CAMP
 OFFERS TO INTERVIEW THOSE OF US WHO REMAINED THERE
 TO GET INFORMATION ON OUR US ARMY STAFFS, THAT AT THIS
 TIME LIEUTENANT SASAKI ALSO INFORMED ME THAT I WOULD
 NOT BE ASKED FURTHER TO ASSIST IN ENGAGING IN MAKING
 AND ENGINEER BUT THAT THIS WOULD BE DONE BY
 JAPANESE TROOP, THAT ACCORDING TO SASAKI, WE
 WOULD ALL GO TO DARGUI, THEN TO DROAN CAMP
 AND LATER TO JAPAN
 THAT ON JULY 19th WE PRISONERS OF WAR
 WERE TOLD THAT WE WOULD LEAVE FOR DARGUI THE
 FOLLOWING DAY, THAT HERE I WROTE A LETTER TO
 THE COMMANDING GENERAL IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES
 IN THE PHILIPPINES REQUESTING HIM TO CONSIDER
 THE FOURTEENTH BIRTHDAY (SANDY VALLEY FORCES)
 SURRENDER - THIS IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT
 FULFILLMENT OF GENERAL MAHARAJA'S SURRENDER
 AGREEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE

HIGH COMMANDER HANDED THIS REQUEST BECAUSE PAGE 32 (53)
SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL AT CADANATUAN PRISON CAMP
WE WERE NOTIFIED THAT WE PRISONERS WERE ON FULL
PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS THAT WE ARRIVED IN PRISON
CAMP JULY 21ST - THE AMERICANS REMAINING AT CAMP No 1
CADANATUAN AND THE FILIPINOS BEING TAKEN ELSEWHERE
- PROBABLY TO CAMP O'GARNEL.

THAT ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 5, 1944 CAPTAIN
MINTON AND I WERE CALLED TO JAPANESE CAMP
HEADQUARTERS WHERE WE WERE AGAIN QUESTIONED
AS TO ALL OUR MOVEMENTS AND INFORMED THAT AT-COLONEL
NAKAR WAS NOW OPERATING MY RADIO AND TALKING WITH
AUSTRALIA. THAT AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 10TH AND THE
THIRD TIME, SEPTEMBER 12TH WE WERE AGAIN CALLED IN ON
THIS SUBJECT. THAT CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE THIRD QUESTIONING
MINTON AND I WERE ORDERED TO JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS WITH
BAGGAGE THAT WE WERE TAKEN TO CADANATUAN
SEPARATED AND FURTHER QUESTIONED BY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS. THAT THE FOLLOWING DAY SEPTEMBER WE WERE
TAKEN TO ECHAVE IN A LONG TRUCK CONVOY WHICH
INCLUDED THE CAR AND PRESENCE OF JAPANESE
LIEUT-GENERAL NARA AND SOME APPROXIMATELY 400
FILIPINO MEMBERS OF G.O.N.P. THAT MINTON AND
I WERE TOLD THAT WE WERE GOING TO HUNT NAKAR
AND THE RADIO.

THAT WE ARRIVED IN ECHAVE ABOUT 10³⁰ PM
SEPTEMBER 13TH AND ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE
FOURTEENTH MINTON AND I WERE SEPARATED, I AGAIN
BEING SENT TO CAPTAIN MURAMURA'S 14TH FIELD ARTILLERY
AT THE CADRE BARBERS, AND CAPTAIN MINTON BEING
SENT TO JONES ISADELA ABOUT SEPTEMBER 19. THAT HERE
I WAS KEPT MORE OR LESS IN ISOLATION FOR NEARLY

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(OVER)

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

Unit

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ONE MONTH TWO I WAS SENT TO THE JAPANESE NAVY
 IN SCHAARU SEPTEMBER 20 TO 22 FOR
 TREATMENT FOR BILIOUS DYSENTERY WHICH I HAD
 CONTRACTED AT BRUNN GUMP AND HAD SUFFERED WITH
 SINCE ABOUT 1952. THAT I REALIZED I WAS BEING
 HELD AS HOSTAGE AT THE GARDI PRISONS THE I WAS
 TREATED KINDLY AND WITH RESPECT. THAT TWO
 JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WERE QUARTERED
 NEAR ME FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS AND ENGAGED
 IN FRIENDLY CONVERSATION WITH ME FROM TIME TO
 TIME.
 THAT ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 21 I SAW THE
 BRIG OF MY REGIMENT WAS FOUND WITH SOME OF OUR
 RECORDS OF JAPANESE FORCES, QUARTER NEAR
 PINAPAGAN. THAT I LEARNED LATER, ENPANO
 CITIZENS THERE HAD DISCLOSED THE RADIO HIBING
 PLACE THAT ON SEPTEMBER 28 I MET COLONEL NAKAG
 WAS CAPTURED IN A GAVE NEAR BARRO MINORI ABOUT
 40 KILOMETERS FROM PINAPAGAN TO THE NORTH AND
 EAST. THAT THE FILIPINO BRIG CHIEF OF JAMES DARRA
 RECEIVED THE FIRM REWARD BY THE IMPERIAL
 JAPANESE FORCES FOR DISCLOSED NEARS HIDEOUT
 AND THIS BRINGS ABOUT HIS CAPTURE THAT AT THIS
 TIME THE JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE HAD CAPTAIN
 MINION BRING WITH THEM IN THE BARBERS OF THE LOWER
 GAGAYAN VALLEY BUT CAPTAIN MINION WAS UNABLE TO
 GIVE INFORMATION AS TO WHERE NAKAG MIGHT BE. THEY
 HAD NOT COMMUNICATED ACTUALLY SINCE APRIL 11 1945.
 MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS PREVIOUSLY.

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THAT CAPTAIN MINTON WAS BROUGHT IN TO JONES WITH THE TROOPS WHICH BROUGHT IN MAKAR AND LATER MINTON WAS TAKEN TO BAHUID AS WAS COLONEL MAKAR ALSO. THAT ON TWO OCCASIONS MINTON WAS ABLE TO TALK WITH MAKAR WHO GAVE MINTON A BRIEF RESUME OF HIS (MAKAR'S) ACTIVITIES SINCE THE SURRENDER. THAT CAPTAIN MINTON WAS RETURNED TO PRISON CAMP AT CADANAUAN ON NOVEMBER 24th.

THAT ON OCTOBER 9th AFTER LT. COLONEL MAKAR'S TRANSFER BY THE JAPANESE GUARD TO ECHABUE I WAS MOVED TO JONES ISABELA WHERE I WAS INTERVIEWED BY JAPANESE CAPTAIN FUJITA, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF COLIDER IDE, SUCCESSOR TO COLONEL YOSHIZAWA, THAT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY I WAS TO TAKE CHARGE OF A DETAIL OF AMERICANS CONSISTING OF LT. COLONEL THEODORE KALAKUKA AND 2nd LIEUT. ALBERT S. ZIEGLER AND THAT IT WAS OUR MISSION TO GATHER " IN ADDITIONAL UNSURRENDERED FILIPINO AND AMERICAN TROOPS.

THAT IT WAS REPORTED THERE WERE THREE AMERICANS - CAPTAIN ARNOLD AIG WAGNING, 2nd LIEUT. HARLEY T. HIED FORMERLY COLONEL NARES STAFF MY REGIMENT AND CORPORAL TONY MANDAMILL - ACTIVE IN THE LANEZ BAGAYAN VALLEY AND THAT ANOTHER TRANSMISSION RADIO WAS BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING NEAR PINADAGAN.

THAT THE FOLLOWING MORNING, OCTOBER 10th JAPANESE COLIDER IDE MET AND GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCATE THESE AMERICANS AND TO BRING THEM IN, ALSO TO LOCATE AND BRING IN UNSURRENDERED FILIPINOS OR THE USAFFE NOW IN THE AREAS TO WHICH WE WERE TO BE SENT. THAT I ASKED THE JAPANESE COMMANDER IF WE COULD GUARANTEE THE LIVES OF BOTH AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS WHO VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED AND THAT HIS REPLY WAS

YES

(OVER)

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

THAT WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW THE COURSE
 OF THE ABOGAM RIVER TO PINNACAPAD IN THE
 WARNER VALLEY AND AT THAT PLACE TO
 CONTACT JAPANESE CAPTAIN SHOJIMA FOR
 FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. THAT WE WERE FURTHER
 GIVEN A JAPANESE FLAG AND A WHITE FLAG
 OF TRUCE AND TO GO TO RESURE TO DISPLAY
 THESE SINCE JAPANESE TROOPS IN THE VALLEY
 MIGHT NOT KNOW OF OUR MISSION AND
 IN ADDITION WERE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR
 THREE AMERICANS. THAT APPROXIMATELY
 PARO ON OCTOBER 15 THE JAPANESE CAPTAIN DID
 NEARLY MISTAKE US FOR THE THREE AMERICANS
 SAID TO BE IN THE VICINITY. THAT AT PINNACAPAD
 JAPANESE CAPTAIN SHOJIMA SENT US ON TO PAMPAPAD
 TO INTERVIEW JAPANESE MAJOR KANEDA. THAT WE
 ARRIVED AT THE MAJOR'S HEADQUARTERS ABOUT
 DARK OCTOBER 17 AND THERE DISCUSSED PROBABILITIES
 OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE THREE AMERICANS IN
 QUESTIONS AS WELL AS EMPLOYING SOLDIERS
 THAT WERE BEING SENT BY DETAIL WAS
 DIRECTED TO GO IN A HOUSE IN PAMPAPAD
 OPERATED BY THIS TROOPMENT LEANED ROSARIO. PREVIOUSLY
 MY STAFF NOW DETAINED BY THE JAPANESE AUTHORITY
 AS PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLICE FOR NUBAN VISAYAS
 THAT ROSARIO MET WITH NOW DETAINED IN SITING
 IN APPROXIMATELY 50 MORE OFFICERS AND MEN
 OF THE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS. THAT MOST OF THESE
 WERE NOW IN HIS CHARGE IN PAMPAPAD THAT THE
 MAJOR SAID THE WHEREABOUTS OF ALL ABOUT 700
 OF THE FOURTH DIVISION.

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TO PROCEED TO THE BARRIOS TO THE SOUTH, SOUTHWEST AND WEST OF PINAPPAGAN THERE TO SEARCH FOR UNSURRENDERED SOLDIERS. THAT HERE IN BARRIOS TANCHI, SANTA NINIO, CALALCANGAN, DAPIPIN, DAILY SEARCHES WERE MADE BY JAPANESE TROOPS ACCOMPANIED BY SURRENDERED FILIPINO TROOPS AND LT. COLONEL KALAKUKA AND LIEUTENANT ZIEGLER. THAT I WAS NOT FORCED TO GO BECAUSE BY THIS TIME I DID HAVE ACUTE DYSENTERY VERY BADLY AND WAS QUITE THIN AND WEAK. THAT IN ADDITION TO THE BARRIOS ALL KNOWN CAVES AND POSSIBLE MOUNTAIN HIDEOUTS WERE SEARCHED, BUT NO PROVEN CLUES TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF BARRIOS COULD BE FOUND. NEITHER WAS ANY OTHER RADIO LOCATED ACCORDING TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

THAT ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 23RD THE JAPANESE TROOPS IN THE LOWER CABAYAN AND WARNER VALLEYS BEGAN TO MOVE NORTHWARD WITH THE FILIPINO SOLDIER PRISONERS AND WITH US - MY DETAIL. THERE HAD BEEN AND WAS DURING THE TRIP HIGH RAIN SO THAT RIVERS AND STREAMS WERE DIFFICULT TO CROSS. THAT THE FIRST DAY WE COVERED ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS OVER RUGGED HILLY AND WOODED COUNTRY - THE WEST SIDE OF THE CABAYAN RIVER. THAT WE WERE WET AND SOMEWHAT COLD MOST OF THE TIME.

THAT UPON ARRIVAL AT JINEL ISADIA ON THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 24TH - LIEUT. ZIEGLER WHO WAS SUFFERING OF MALARIA CHILLS WAS SEPARATED FROM LT. COLONEL KALAKUKA AND ME AND WITH JAPANESE TROOPS AND FILIPINO SURRENDEREES WAS TAKEN TO RUMAH. THAT KALAKUKA AND I REMAINED WITH JAPANESE FORCES UNDER LIEUT. KITURA AT JINEL. THAT WE BOTH FELT MALARIA PAINS, I IN ADDITION TO THE DYSENTERY, NOW WORSE.

THAT ON OCTOBER 28TH WE LEFT JINEL WITH

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(ORA)

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr. Hq., dated

Unit

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Japanese Troops in Truce, slept over night
 in Santiago Isheim and arrived in Enayama's wagon
 on the afternoon of October 29th 1941. Tr. Captain
 Kankura and I were both very ill and the Japanese
 doctors on the way planned on RST and treatment
 for us in Enayama's.
 That upon arrival in Enayama's we were made
 in comfortable quarters in the home of Dr. Miguel Alvarez
 and given excellent medical treatment by Filipino doctors
 under Dr. L. Y. Leon whom I had known. That Captain (Dodon)
 Kiyomichi of the Japanese Army Medical Corps and
 Lieutenant Saito, staff officer and interpreter were
 responsible for this camp camp approved by General
 Ike.
 That on the night of October 30 Colonel Kankura took
 classification and was moved to the Japanese Army
 Hospital nearby. That there the following medical officers
 Kankura and of General Nakamura. That both Japanese
 and Filipino doctors diagnosed our illness - Kankura
 and mine as General Malaria. That the second night
 following - on November 8, my Japanese officers staff
 in to inform me that Lieut. Albert S. Ziegler had also
 been moved to the Japanese military hospital. In
 Enayama's from Enayama with General Nakamura
 as of November 11th and had my other malaria
 that both General Nakamura and Lieutenant Saito
 were having with General Saito and Lieutenant Saito
 in Enayama's. Saito started the doctor in Enayama's
 officers were reported by the Japanese forces
 who made public expression to Saito.
 That I was permitted to remain there. I was
 under treatment for both malaria and typhoid.

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UNTIL DECEMBER 6, 1944 WHEN I WAS RETURNED TO PRISON
CAMP NUMBER ONE, CAGAHATUAN, NURVA, CEBU.

- SUMMARY -

THAT IN SUMMARY I WISH TO CERTIFY AND SAY THAT AT
ALL TIMES AND IN ALL MY PLANS AND MOVES I CONSIDERED
ONLY TWO THINGS,

FIRST - THE GOOD OF THE SERVICE AND USARAF.

SECOND - THE GOOD OF THE PHILIPINO CITIZENS WHO

SUPPORTED US AND WERE LOYAL TO OUR CAUSE.

THAT WHEN I REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT I COULD NO
LONGER BE OF HELP TO THE ARMY DESPITE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
BEYOND MY CONTROL, I THEN PUT ASIDE ALL PERSONAL
SELFISH DESIRE NOT TO SURRENDER, SOLELY AND ENTIRELY TO
PREVENT IN SO FAR AS I COULD ANY UNNECESSARY SUFFERING
OF MY FELLOW SOLDIERS WHO WERE THEN NO FAULT OF
THEIRS - ALREADY CAPTURED.

Everett Lavan Warner

EVERETT LAVAN WARNER

WRESTLING CHAMPION

WRESTLING CHAMPION - PA - 30 JUNE 1944

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Authority NAJO 035079

REMARKS

4. Individual Recognition:

Ltr, Hq., dated

Unit

Period of Recog.

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