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GRLA UNITS

INVESTIGATION OF

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC
G-3 Guerrilla Affairs Section

APO 500
23 November 1945

Pursuant to paragraph 4, Special Orders No. 142, Headquarters U. S. Army Training Group, dated 25 October 1945, the undersigned proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga, on 27 October 1945.

Conferences with leaders of the Hukbalahap were held at the home of the Mayor of San Fernando on 29, 30, 31 October, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 16, and 19 November 1945. Among those present at the conferences were Vivencio Guyugan, Mayor of San Fernando, Luis Taruc, Commander-in-Chief of the Hukbalahap, Sergio Cayanang, Chief of Intelligence, Peregrino Taruc, a political advisor, and several of the Regional Commanders.

Field trips were made to Arayat, San Luis, Mexico, and surrounding barrios in Pampanga, and to Cabanatuan, Province of Nueva Ecija.

As a result of these conferences and field trips the following information was obtained.

THE HUKBALAHAP

The term "Hukbalahap" is an abbreviation of the Tagalog term "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon" meaning "Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army". The Hukbalahap was the standing Army of the United Front during the war.

ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND

In October 1941, the AMF or "General Union of Workers" and the KPMP or "National Confederation of Peasants" distributed circulars throughout Central Luzon among labor unions, peasant groups, and all anti-Facist groups exhorting them to be prepared to unite in every barrio and town for the purpose of resisting Facist aggression should the occasion arise. It was intended as a mental preparation of the populace to induct in them a spontaneous desire to defend their homeland in the event of attack by an enemy inimical to their interests. Once instilled with this idea they would be better prepared later on to organize and support guerrilla units for their own defense after the outbreak of war which they believed to be inevitable.

On 10 December 1941, after the outbreak of the war, a memorandum was sent to American High Commissioner Sayre by one Pedro Abad Santos, National Chairman of the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands, and one Crisanto Evangelista, Vice Chairman, both of whom were captured by the Japanese in January 1942, and died later. In essence the memorandum set forth the following principles: (1) Anti-Facist and Anti-Japanese, (2) Total support to the Governments of the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth, (3) Promise to fight for the expansion of democracy, (4) Unrelentless and

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HUKBALAHAP - ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND (Continued)

uncompromising struggle against traitors and spies, (5) A United Front Movement of all races and creeds for the accomplishment of the first four principles. This memorandum was submitted to clarify the stand of various labor and peasant groups including the Communist Party, who were later to be absorbed into a movement called the United Front. From this memorandum was born the idea of creating the United Front and the Hukbalahap at a later date, as related in subsequent paragraph of this report.

In February 1942, a conference consisting of representatives of the provinces of Central Luzon met at Bawit, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, and organized the Provisional National Committee of the United Front. It was at this time that the United Front came into existence as such. It was a consolidation of various groups including Communists, Socialists, AMT or General Union of Workers, KPMP or National Confederation of Peasants, CAWAL or the Labor and Peasant Union, Civil Liberties Union, League for the Defense of Democracy, Popular Front, Philippine Youth League, KAP or Philippine Trade Unions, and other anti-Fascist elements. The Provisional National Committee consisted of twelve members, three of whom were designated as a Military Committee to organize the Military Department of the United Front. The original Military Committee consisted of Luis Taruc as Chairman, Castro Alejandrino, and Silverio Guina. It was in reality the General Headquarters of the Hukbalahap which was to come into being sometime later. It established the by-laws of the Hukbalahap, principles of guerrilla tactics, adopted the principles of "Fundamental Spirit" to be adhered to by all members, and set forth the principles of discipline for the Huk. The main functions of the Military Committee were to recommend appointment of leaders, to supervise organization of the Army, to adopt plans and operations, and to see that the by-laws and principles were carried out. The Military Committee also established the Military Department which in turn had two sub-departments originally. One sub-department was known as the Warfare Department and was originally under the leadership of a woman named Felipa Culala, more commonly known as Dayang Dayan, (meaning "Morro Princess" or "Brave Woman"). (She was later executed in the belief that she was serving only her own personal selfish interests rather than those of the United Front and the Hukbalahap.) The other sub-department was known as the Economics or Supply Department under the leadership of one Emiteris Timban who was also Military Treasurer. In December 1942, the Military Committee was increased to five members and in 1944 two additional sub-departments were added to the Military Department, namely, the Intelligence Division and the Communications Division.

Prior to the actual inauguration of guerrilla units under the name Hukbalahap two battles took place between the People on the one side and Japanese and puppets on the other. The puppets consisted mainly of members of the Center Police with headquarters at the Provincial Capital of Pampanga. The Center Police were organized originally in 1938 by the Provincial Governor of Pampanga at that time to act as a check against the activities of those groups which formed the United Front after the outbreak of the war. After the Japanese invasion the puppet Governor who succeeded the former Governor recalled the Center Police to serve as guides for the Japs.

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However, not all of the original members aided the Japanese. The details of these two battles are not considered important enough to be included in this report. These encounters were considered significant by the United Front because they indicated the desire of the people to fight the enemy from the very start in conformity with the principles as set forth in the memorandum sent to American High Commissioner Sayre.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT

On 29 March 1942, at the center boundary of the three Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, in a mangrove forest known as Batibat, the official inauguration of guerrilla units under the name Hukbalahap took place. At that time the organization consisted of approximately five thousand men ready and willing to fight, but most of them lacked arms and ammunition. The supply of arms at that time consisted of approximately one hundred weapons. They were the personal property of the individual members. The five thousand men at that time served as reserves in their respective barrios and were known as the Barrio United Defense Corps or BUDC. Approximately five hundred men were kept on active duty at all times through rotation.

The General Headquarters of the Hukbalahaps was the Military Committee as previously stated. They had no central or stationary location and traveled throughout the zone of operations to avoid detection and capture by the enemy. Paper work was held to a minimum. What necessary papers and documents were kept by the General Headquarters were hidden in the forests. It is the claim of the Huk that most of them were burned by the Japs who suspected the existence of such papers and used flame throwers to burn out suspected areas. This made it impossible for even the Huk to relocate most of the hidden papers.

The basic fighting unit of the Huk was the squadron, consisting of approximately one hundred men. The squadron was further subdivided into platoons and squads. A squad consisted of not less than twelve men. Two or more squads formed one platoon, and two or more platoons formed one squadron or basic fighting unit. Two or more squadrons formed one battalion and two or more battalions, a regiment. The use of battalions and regiments was held to a minimum. The Huk usually fought as squadrons although occasionally they employed platoons or squads for harassing movements and ambushing. The ranks held by the leaders of regiments, battalions, squadrons, platoons, and squads were commensurate with those of other armies. A chart of the primary units in the military organizations is submitted herewith as inclosure 1.

The intelligence system originally put into operation by the Hukbalahap was not centralized. Each squadron had its own intelligence section and intelligence chief. Information obtained by one squadron would be relayed to others most concerned with that information. Not all reports reached General Headquarters. Enemy information was obtained usually through operators who worked for the Japanese in the Government offices as civilian employees, and through others who served as cooks and mess attendants for the Japanese. Information was also obtained through civilians living near Japanese installations. Sometime in 1944, the

HUKBALAHAP - Military Organization and History of Development. (Continued)

intelligence system was centralized with the creation of the Intelligence Division and a Communications Division as part of the Military Department. Subsequent to the establishment of these two divisions all intelligence operations were centralized. The Communications Division operated a courier system which rendered it possible for all squadrons to send their intelligence reports to the Intelligence Division for evaluation and dissemination to other units.

At the time of the actual inauguration of the Hukbalahap on 29 March 1942, five squadrons of one hundred men each were activated. They formed the nucleus of the Army and were located in various areas throughout the three Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija. Weapons consisted of one hundred arms of various types not equally distributed among the five squadrons. This unequal distribution is attributed to the fact that there was a friendly competition among the five squadrons in an effort to propagate and form larger units and that at the time weapons were secondary importance. Squadrons 1 and 2 were organized and operated in the vicinity of Candaba, Pampanga, Squadron 3 was organized and operated in the area from the foot of Arayat Mountain, Pampanga, to the North and West. Squadron 4 was organized and operated in the area from San Luis, Pampanga, to the vicinity of Bataan and the entire Manila Bay Area. Shortly after the activation of the first five squadrons a unit which had been organized in the vicinity of San Fernando, Pampanga, requested recognition by the Military Committee. Recognition was granted and the unit was designated as Squadron 6. At the same time another unit was activated in the vicinity of Lubao and Florida Blanca, was recognized, and designated as Squadron 13. The numbers assigned to squadrons were not in numerical sequence, the idea being to deceive the enemy as to the actual number and strength of guerilla forces. From these original squadrons selected cadre were sent out to recruit and organize additional squadrons. As others were organized they in turn sent out cadre to form more squadrons so that by September 1942, there were thirty squadrons or about three thousand men on active duty. Fire power consisted of approximately twenty small arms weapons per squadron, or a total of six hundred. The supply of ammunition was limited to one hundred rounds per weapon. The majority of weapons over and above the original one hundred which they possessed in March 1942, were obtained between that time and September 1942, by infiltration on Bataan, ambushing of Jap patrols, and by donation of personal weapons by members who were recruited during this period.

In September 1942, in the vicinity of Arayat Mountain another conference was held by Squadron Leaders, the Military Committee, and the Chairman of the United Front. As a result of the conference five Military Districts were created for the three Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija. The geographical boundaries were defined not according to any given number of squadrons per district, but rather according to the potential ability of these districts to organize and support additional squadrons. A District Commander was appointed for each Military District. No given rank was bestowed on these commanders at that time since it is a Huk theory that ability and not rank is the guiding principle and that therefore rank is

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HUKBALAHAP - Military Organization and History of Development. (Continued)

relatively unimportant. Military District 1 was commanded by Jose Banal, now a Colonel in the Philippine Army. Military District 2 was commanded by Felipa Culala, a woman, who was also head of the Warfare Department under the supervision of Military Committee. She was later executed as previously stated and was replaced by Delfin Malatumbaga. Military District 3 was commanded by Pacific Briones, now an officer in the Philippine Army. She was adjudged as a traitor and was later replaced by Eusebio Aquino. Military District 4 was commanded by Abelardo Debu. There was also a Sub-military District for Southern Luzon commanded by a man whose assumed name was Hashim, and whose real name is believed to be Villegas. After the landing of American forces on Southern Luzon his unit was attached to the 11th Airborne Division, United States Army, and it is believed that Villegas is now in the Philippine Army.

From September 1942, to December 1942, the Hukbalahap engaged in continuous operations against the Japanese. During this period they acquired additional arms through attacks on Jap garrisons, patrols, convoys, and Philippine Constabulary, and by March 1943, they possessed over two thousand weapons although as a result of these engagements they admit having lost some previously possessed.

During March 1943, the Japanese took strong countermeasures to combat the guerrilla activities of the Hukbalahap. The Japs employed tanks, heavy machineguns, artillery, and planes, and inflicted heavy casualties on the huk, although they were not successful in their attempt to clean up the guerrillas. As a result of the losses suffered by the Hukbalahap its forces were forced to adopt a "lie-low" policy until August 1943, except in the Province of Pampanga, so that they could reorganize. Rejuvenation progressed rapidly between August 1943, and December 1943, and there were minor engagements with the enemy in far flung places. The Huk forces expanded their zones of operations and penetrated south as far as the boundary of Bulacan and Rizal and to the north as far as the boundary of Tarlac and Pangasinan.

In December, 1943, a reorganization of the overall commands was effected. The five Military Districts and the Sub-military Command of Southern Luzon originally established in September 1942, were converted to Regional Commands. Military Districts 1 and 5 were united and formed Regional Command 7 under the command of Abelardo Dabu. Military District 2 became Regional Command 8 under Capuli. Military District 3 became Regional Command 3 under the command of Eusebio Aquino. Military District 4 became Regional Command 4 commanded by Jose De Leon. The Sub-military District of Southern Luzon became Regional Command 11 under Hashim. In November 1944, Regional Command 4 and Regional Command 8 were consolidated and became Regional Command 9 in an effort to increase efficiency of operation within these commands. The organization of these Regional Commands was based on: (1) Capabilities and coordination of leaders and members. (2) The number and size of squadrons in each and the ability of the people to maintain them, (3) Geographical location. The commanders of these Regional Commands were called Field Commanders and were given the rank of

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HUKBALAHAP - Military Organization and History of Development. (Continued)

Colonel. (The Commanders of the former Military Districts were not bestowed with any rank as stated previously.) These new Regional Commands in turn formed Military Districts within their own areas, not be confused with the former Military District which the Regional Commands replaced.

From January 1944, to September 1944, there was continued expansion and strengthening of penetration into areas reached in the latter part of 1943. After the first American bombing of Central Luzon on 21 September 1944, the morale of the Japanese forces and collaborationists was low. The Hukbalahap took advantage of this opportunity to engage in widespread operations, including political and economic warfare, against the enemy. They claim to have helped harvest the Fall crop and to have kept it from falling into the hands of the enemy.

From the initial inauguration of the Hukbalahap in March 1942, until December 1944, they claim to have had difficulty in submitting intelligence reports to Allied Forces. They possessed no means of transmitting these reports themselves and relied on USAFFE guerrilla units to send out their reports, since they have radio contact with Allied forces outside Luzon. However, because of friction and misunderstanding between the Huk and USAFFE units they believe that their intelligence reports were not transmitted or credited to them. It was not until late December 1944, that they could be certain that their intelligence reports were being sent out. At that time an agent from the Allied Intelligence Bureau set up a radio at the headquarters of the Huk Intelligence Division, located in San Juan, San Luis, Pampanga, and remained there for approximately one month.

After the landing of American forces on Luzon many Huk units aided them in the liberation of enemy-held territory. In Central Luzon it is claimed that the Huk completely liberated Tarlac. (Tarlac), San Fernando (Pampanga), Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija), and adjoining small towns prior to the arrival of American forces in these areas and turned them over to the Americans upon their arrival. Huk forces also claim the liberation of Santa Cruz (Laguna) on Southern Luzon, and assistance in the liberation of American prisoners of war from a Japanese prison camp in that area. While some Huk forces were fighting side by side with American forces others were engaged in mopping up operations, cleaning out small Jap pockets by-passed in the main drive. Still other units were deactivated and their members returned to private life in February 1945, after the incarceration of Luis Taruc - Commander-in-Chief of the Hukbalahap, Castro Alejandrino - a member of the Military Committee and GHQ, Sergio Cayanang - Chief of Intelligence, and other leaders. During their imprisonment a temporary Military Committee was established. When they were released from prison in September 1945, Luis Taruc was again appointed Commander-in-Chief. The Military Committee or General Headquarters still exists in a reserve capacity with Luis Taruc as Chairman and Commander-in-Chief.

The maximum number of squadrons in existence during the peak of the organization was sixty-seven with ten to twelve thousand active regulars.

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HUKBALAHAP - Military Organization and History of Development. (Continued)

A maximum of six thousand men could have been committed to battle at any given time with an equal number in reserve. The total number of arms was one thousand.

Upon termination of the Luzon campaign in July 1945, all active Huk units were deactivated and returned to civilian life.

Rosters of various units of the Hukbalahap are submitted herewith as a group under inclosure 13. These rosters are made up according to the actual military structure of the Hukbalahap which differs in some respects from U.S. Army organization. Squadrons and companies are one and the same. The squadron rosters are grouped under their respective battalions and regiments which in turn are listed under their respective Regimental Commands. Since many members of the Hukbalahap used assumed names some of the names are indicated as assumed. Time did not permit contacting each individual to determine his correct name, and the leaders cannot remember the real names of all those concerned. Some rosters contain the names of officers only but the names of enlisted men will be submitted later. With some squadron rosters are histories of their activities in combat and some have supporting maps. Regional Command 7 contains four regiments. Regional Command 3 has one regiment, and there are two in Regional Command 9. One regiment has already been recruited and processed from Regional Command 7 under Colonel Banal, and the numbers of Regional Command 11 on Southern Luzon have been processed under Villegas. There is a total of approximately ten thousand members remaining. Roster of arms inventories are not included since many of the Huk records were taken by CIC. These rosters will be submitted at a later date after sufficient time has been allowed to make a physical inventory of arms in each unit.

SPIRIT AND DISCIPLINE

The Hukbalahap was a revolutionary army, because its principles of organization and discipline and basis for existence differ from those of conventional armies. Political and military aspects were inseparable. Their theories are better explained and defined in their own words in inclosures 2, 3, and 4, of this report.

DIFFERENCES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH OTHER GROUPS

For several years before the outbreak of war the labor and peasant group movement, which later formed the United Front, had been sternly opposed by other groups such as the "CAWAL ng Kapayapaan" or Knights of Peace" under the leadership of S. Balayat, then Provincial Governor of Pampanga and now Secretary of Communications in the Philippine Government, the "CAWAL ng Bayan" or Knights of the Nation" (strong in Nueva Ecija), the Falangista Espanol under the leadership of Andres Soriano, and by other small groups. The Communists and Socialists mingled with the peasant and labor groups in an effort to strengthen their own position. For this reason the opposition groups indulged in "red baiting", and termed all labor and peasant groups as communistic, and exerted every effort to break

DIFFERENCES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH OTHER GROUPS (Continued)

up their mass meetings. These opposition groups were supposedly backed by the monied interests in the Philippine Islands who feared that the success of the labor and peasant groups, who claimed to have been demanding only better wages and living conditions for the poorer class of laborers and peasants, would place their interests in jeopardy. The labor and peasant groups termed themselves "progressives" and the opposition groups "reactionaries" afraid to accept changes in the social and economic structure. The ideas of the progressives and the reactionaries could not be reconciled.

When the United Front was first organized in February 1942, it is admitted that many Communists and Socialists joined the movement. However, this was supposedly unavoidable due to the fact that the United Front called for union of all groups regardless of race, color, creed, or political belief, to resist a common enemy, and no particular group such as the Communists could be prevented from joining the movement. When the Communist Party sent the memorandum to High Commissioner Sayre after the outbreak of the war (memorandum referred to previously in this report) it was also sponsored by the labor and peasant groups, who agreed to the policies set forth in the memorandum. It was agreed that the memorandum should be submitted by the Communist rather than by any of the other groups, since the Communists had always mingled with the other groups and were considered the least likely to support the war effort. Since, through this memorandum, the Communists were pledging full support and demanding a United Front, it was intended as a means of clarifying the stand of the other groups as well who although opposed by the oppositionists previously mentioned, were not considered so radical. Therefore, if the Communists were giving their support it was to be understood that all labor and peasant groups would also. In short, it is claimed that each particular group could have sent the same memorandum to High Commissioner Sayre, but it would have been unnecessary duplication.

In the early stages of Japanese occupation there was little opposition to the United Front. It is claimed that actually some of the pre-war oppositionists joined the United Front. What opposition did exist was sponsored by the Japanese puppets who, before the war, were the most steadfast opponents of the Progressive elements.

The United Front did not accept the "lie-low" policy, except for a short period in 1943, during which they were reorganizing. Their Hukbalahap claims to have engaged the enemy at every opportunity. Their actions were not acceptable to other groups who had their own guerrilla units but who believed in the "lie-low" policy until the opportune time for action because they feared Jap reprisals and retaliations with which they could not cope. In defense of the refusal to adopt the "lie-low" policy the Huk claims that in the final analysis there were less Jap atrocities committed in places where the Huk was active, than in places where the "lie-low" policy was kept in effect by other guerrilla forces. The Japs probed only

HUKBALAHAP - Differences and Misunderstanding with other groups (Continued)

where they would be sure of encountering the least opposition and, according to the Hukbalahap, it is in those areas that the final results indicate the most Jap reprisals. Since other guerrilla units resented the activities of the Huk, on several occasions they went so far as to ambush Huk units to prevent them from engaging the Japs. The leaders of the Hukbalahap claim that all clashes between their forces and other guerrilla forces were localized and that actually the leaders of the units involved in such clashes did not counsel them. Attempts were made from time to time to contact various leaders to negotiate agreements and solve differences. However, no contacts were accomplished although the Huk leaders claim to have been present at appointed meeting places but that the leaders of other guerrilla units never appeared. With reference again to localized clashes it is claimed that individual members of various units precipitated these clashes without the knowledge of the leaders. It is admitted that in many cases individual members of the Hukbalahap were the initiators but in such cases it is claimed that it was only in retaliation and self defense in order to wreak vengeance for previous offenses committed against them by members of other guerrilla units.

The leaders of the Hukbalahap claim that friction and differences between their forces and other units would never have occurred had Lt. Col. Thorpe, U. S. Army guerrilla representative, lived. In support of this claim they desire to submit a copy of a memorandum they sent to Colonel Thorpe, a copy of a letter to Colonel Thorpe dated 21 May 1942, a copy of Colonel Thorpe's reply dated 2 June 1942, and a copy of the minutes of a conference held 5 and 7 July 1942, between representatives of the Hukbalahap and Colonel Thorpe's guerrilla forces. These documents are submitted herewith as inclosures 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively. After Colonel Thorpe's death in August 1942, the individual guerrilla units, which he had been attempting to coordinate each went their respective ways, and coordination was never accomplished. Many of these guerrilla units were under American commanders and were known as USAFFE guerrilla forces originally under the overall command of Lt. Colonel Thorpe until his death. These forces included the USPIF or United States Philippine Island Forces under Colonel Merrill, the Luzon Guerrilla Forces commanded by an American named Ramsey (rank unknown), the ROTC Hunter Guerrilla Forces under one Terry Magtanggol, the Blue Eagles under Alabastro, the PQOG or President Quezon's Own Guerrilla Forces commanded by Usali, and the Ball Division commanded by Alejo Santos, present Governor of Bulacan. The only one of these groups whose leaders were openly antagonistic toward the Huk was the Ramsey group.

The disagreement concerning the "lie-low" policy was not the only cause of misunderstanding and friction. The USAFFE guerrilla units resented the penetration and expansion of the Hukbalahap into what they considered USAFFE territory. The Hukbalahap claimed that military warfare is inseparable from political warfare and is actually subordinate to it. The expansion and penetration of the Huk was political. The USAFFE forces wanted no part of politics whereas the Huk was looking ahead to the future to strengthen the political foundation of the organizations within the United Front. The Hukbalahap does not claim that all other guerrilla units were opposed to it politically, even if at the same time these forces did not agree with the political beliefs of the Hukbalahap.

HUKBALAHAP - Differences and Misunderstandings With Other Groups. (Continued)

When the American forces first landed on northern Luzon the first guerrilla forces to contact them were USAFFE units. Because of the differences between them and the Hukbalahap, the latter claims that the USAFFE guerrillas gave the organization a bad name and influenced American forces to take action against it. The Counter Intelligence Corps proceeded to round up the leaders of the Huk and on 24 February 1945, they raided the intelligence headquarters of the Hukbalahap at San Juan, San Luis, Pampanga. Among those taken by the CIC were Luis Taruc, Alejandrino, and Sergio Gayanang. Jose Banal, Regional Commander of Regional Command 7, could not understand the reason for the incarceration of the other leaders. On 28 February he presented himself at CIC headquarters and asserted that if they had been reason to round up the other leaders that he too should be taken for the same reason, since all members of the Huk should share the good and the bad alike. Consequently he too was incarcerated by the CIC. On 5 March 1945, Roman Malivat, Intelligence Chief of Regional Command 3 was taken, and on 4 June 1945, Jose De Leon, Regional Commander of Regional Command 9 was taken. All were imprisoned at Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan. On 7 March 1945, Taruc and Alejandrino were released. Taruc was instructed by the CIC to contact all leaders of the Hukbalahap and order them to turn in all arms in their units. He contacted all leaders but did not order them to turn in all arms, claiming that as Commander-in-Chief he could not order them to do so but could only pose the problem before them to make their own decision. They decided against surrendering their arms. Taruc accepted this decision because in the Hukbalahap the leaders only represented the wishes of their subordinates and he acted accordingly. He was consequently retaken by the CIC on 8 April 1945, for failure to comply with the request for surrender of all arms. Four days later, on 12 April 1945, Jose Banal was released on the promise that he would disarm the units under his command in return for recognition and processing into the Philippine Army. From among the units in Regional Command 7 he recruited those members most closely associated with him and formed his own regiment. They surrendered arms in their possession and were processed into the Philippine Army under his command. However, he did not succeed in disarming all units in Regional Command 7. The remaining leaders of the Hukbalahap could never understand the motives behind the offer of the CIC to release Banal under the conditions just stated. They claim that under the same conditions, that is, recognition and induction into the Philippine Army, all units would have been willing to turn in their arms. They intimate, but do not attempt to emphasize, that the distinction made between Banal's forces and the other forces of the Hukbalahap was made in an attempt to divide and conquer and to make it appear to outside observers that there was dissention and disunity in the Huk which would cause the organization to lose the support and trust of the people backing it.

Many oppositionists have testified to the alleged predatory actions of the Huk in seizing and destroying private property. It is admitted that much property was seized and destroyed but that the motive behind such actions is grossly misrepresented by those who would suppress the progressive movement. They claim that these people who are presently branding them as vandals because of their actions during the war are the very people who

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HUKBALAHAP - Differences and Misunderstandings with Other Groups. (Continued)

aided the Japs and puppets by selling their goods to them, often at a loss in fear of displeasing the puppet authorities and the Japanese. In such cases where they could prevent such transactions it is claimed that members of the Huk did so. They admit having destroyed entire crops and in some cases they harvested them themselves to keep from the Japs. Threshing machines and other farm machinery were destroyed because their owners were allegedly playing into the hands of the Japs who would wait until these machines produced what they were intended to produce and would then appear on the scene and seize the products or force the producers to sell at low cost. The Huk fighters felt that they were justified in destroying such sources of supply to the Japanese. However, before they actually destroyed such property they claim that they tried to persuade the owners to hide it from the Japs. In cases where this was not done they destroyed it so as to render it useless even if it did involve destruction of private property.

In clarification of the stand of the Hukbalahap and cause for differences a memorandum was sent to General MacArthur and President Osmena by the GHQ of the Hukbalahap. A copy of this memorandum is submitted herewith as inclosure 10.

INTERNAL DISSENSION

It is admitted that discord existed within the Hukbalahap. Most of the differences were minor. Only three cases of major difficulties are cited.

There is the case of Felipa Culala, the woman leader of the Warfare Department who was executed because she was adjudged to have been serving only her own interests instead of those of the cause.

In the case of Pacifica Briones, former Commander of Military District 3, and now an officer in the Philippine Army, the Huk adjudged her as a traitor to the cause. In instances where her units were detailed to hijack trucks bringing supplies to the Japs, and in cases where they were ordered to destroy crops and machinery to keep them from Jap hands. Briones accepted bribes and didn't carry out her missions. She was accused of capitalizing for her own personal gain and was summoned many times by the GHQ and told to mend her ways. Instead of complying with the request of the GHQ she resigned from the organization and tried to promote hard feelings among members of the Huk. No aggressive action was taken against her.

In the case of Banal they hold no grudges. He was always considered as an outstanding leader and during the Japanese occupation was one of the most active members of the Huk. They regret the fact that he, of his own initiative, disarmed some of his units and formed his own regiment for induction into the Philippine Army without the common consent of the other leaders. In this they see what they term an innocent victim of the CIC's attempt to create disunity in the Hukbalahap. They do not dispel the possibility that some of the lesser leaders may still bear grievances against Banal, probably because he did not include them in his plans. However, the most prominent leaders such as Taruc and Alejandrino claim to be on friendly terms with Banal and meet with him occasionally.

HUKBALAHAP - Internal Dissension (Continued)

In various other cases leaders were replaced from time to time by others deemed to be more efficient and capable. Such actions sometimes caused hard feelings among those replaced but there were no major disturbances from this cause.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

In any report on the activities of the Hukbalahap its political aspects cannot be excluded. It was an armed force with a political motive which was considered equally important with actually military action against the Japanese. It was the strong arm of the United Front which foresaw possibilities of strengthening its position during the Japanese occupation in the hope that they would one day be driven away. When that day would come the United Front could say that through the Hukbalahap it had proven itself to be one of the foremost militant groups against aggression and dictatorship as well as to be one of the most anxious to see the return of democracy to the country. Through the Hukbalahap they fought openly against collaboration and did not recognize the puppet government as the legal government of the Philippines. They hoped that through their actions they would eventually be able to bargain for better living conditions for the peasants and laborers, a goal which they had been striving to attain for many years before the war.

They have been accused by opposition groups to be demanding the abolition of large private land holdings in Central Luzon, to be distributed equally among the people. This they deny emphatically stating that there are many land owners who were prominent members of the Hukbalahap and the United Front and still support the movement. They claim to be asking only a better share of the profits for the peasants and laborers. They don't think that such a demand is unreasonable and that by comparison they are asking for approximately one-half of what similar movements in other democratic countries such as the United States have obtained by demand in the past.

They refer to the present economic and social structure in Central Luzon as feudal serfdom, where a few possess all the holdings and the masses are their slaves. They are campaigning for the abolition of this feudal serfdom and recognition of the laborers and peasants as brother workers with capital and management rather than their slaves. They desire to correct the state of illiteracy and ignorance now claimed to exist among the masses in that area. Many of those who were members of the Hukbalahap are illiterate and many do not speak English. In general it is admitted that many of those who were members and constituents of the Hukbalahap and the United Front are of the lowest class because they have never been given the opportunity to prove their equality with others. In many cases in the past and also in the present where disturbances such as banditry and murder have taken place it is admitted that members of the Hukbalahap were or are responsible. The leaders do not sanction such actions and claim to be continually campaigning among the people to help, rather than hinder, the maintenance of law and order.

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HUKBALAHAP - Political Aspects - (Continued).

The results of meetings and conferences with the people are not always too effective because of the alleged state of illiteracy and ignorance of many of them. They admit difficulty in impressing many of the people that lawlessness hinders rather than helps the cause. Some are in dire need of food and clothing and in desperation they procure these commodities by any available means, fair or foul. The leaders emphasize the fact that they entirely disapprove such actions and do not attempt to justify them in any ways. However, they feel justified in pointing out such actions as glaring examples of the product of the feudal caste system, claiming that granted better living conditions and opportunities they would be no dissatisfaction among these people and that incidents of lawlessness would never occur.

Although they have not been openly accused of being anti-American they claim that the opposition does not credit them as being pro-American. In contradiction they assert that their movement considers the democratic form of government in the United States as the only acceptable form of government, and one to be emulated by any freedom-loving people. They attribute the misinterpretation of their attitude toward the democratic form of government in the United States to the fact that they do admit bearing grievances toward certain American interests in the Philippine Islands and accuse them of exploitation for their own personal gain without regard for the welfare of the people. The opposition, whom they claim to be backed by the big interests and opportunity to seek in their attitude toward these interests an opportunity to propagandize and label their movement as anti-American. They emphasize strongly that they do not desire the liquidation of foreign interests and capital. They claim that in fact this capital is necessary for the development of the economic security of the people, and that all they desire is a better share in the profits enjoyed by these interests.

In rebuttal to accusations branding them as anti-Commonwealth Government they maintain they have always, and always will profess great faith in the form of government but have a shaken confidence in some of its present administrators whom they accuse of having been collaborationists during the Japanese occupation. They can see no justification in retaining certain of the present government officials who collaborated openly or secretly with the Japanese. These individuals are accused of having been the greatest thorn in the side of the progressive movement during the war and they fear that through their retention in office attempts will be made to suppress the labor and peasant movements. They desire only to see the ouster of these certain officials by democratic processes of law and justice and replacement with more capable leaders who can be relied on to serve for the betterment of the interest of the people.

They acknowledge the possession of many weapons among their people. They are not able to justify continued possession of these weapons. A feeble attempt at justification is presented in their argument that the people have the right to protect themselves against murder and banditry. The leaders state that many individuals now possessing arms contend that they are their

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HUKBALAHAP - Political Aspects (Continued).

legal property because they were obtained in battle or by personal donation and that none were supplied by the U. S. Army. (It is known that there many U. S. Army weapons in their possession.) They do not intend to comply with Proclamation Number 17, promulgated by the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, demanding that all arms be surrendered. The deadline for the Province of Pampanga is 23 November 1945. The fact that they insist on retaining these arms has cause them to be distrusted and accused of planning civil war. In refutation they demand that this situation be adjudged logically. Admitting that they do possess fire arms they claim that common sense dictates that it would be suicidal for them to instigate armed revolt against lawful authority. With the few thousand weapons they possess they couldn't attempt to compete against even the Philippine Army forces who are much better trained and equipped and outnumber them many times.

Admitting that there were Communist elements in the Hukbalahap they can not fully understand the reason for so much opposition to those elements. Their argument is that Russia was and is an ally of the United States and that she was given lead-lease. Therefore they claim that the United States tolerated Communism since it aided the country where that movement was born and developed. Such being the case they think it inconsistent to try to suppress those elements having Communistic learnings especially since they aided in the war against Fascism and agressor nations. In presenting this argument they do not mean to endorse the policies of the Communists but merely attempt to eliminate their presence in the organization as a basis for prejudice toward the entire movement. They state that a close study of the attainments in countries where Communism has flourished reveals that in those countries the people have gained only half the privileges and opportunities enjoyed by the citizens of democratic nations. Therefore, they argue that it is absurd to brand them as communistic when they realize that so much more can be obtained under the democratic system of government. It is stated further that Communists in the Philippines are not Communistic in the strict sense of the word as applied to Communists in Soviet Russia.

They profess profound faith in the Four Freedoms proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter but they claim that failure to alleviate conditions on Central Luzon has betrayed the intentions of applying the Four Freedoms to all people. Their protest is that for their people there is still no freedom from fear and from want and that freedom of assembly is frustrated at every opportunity by raids on their mass meetings.

The United Front movement is no longer known as such. It has been absorbed into movement known as the Democratic Alliance with membership throughout the Philippine Islands. Membership is obtained through individual application only. Members of the United Front were admitted as individuals and not as a group.

The name Hukbalahap is misapplied when referred to as a political party. The name has stuck because of its political activities in the United Front during the war. The claim is that actually the Hukbalahap no longer exists as such since it was a "People's anti-Japanese Army" and ceased to operate when Japan was defeated. The GHQ exists at present in a reserve capacity for the purpose of settling the question of recognition as a medium to represent the members in this quest. At such time as a decision may be reached relative to recognition the GHQ will cease to function entirely.

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HUKBALAHAP - Continued

GRIEVANCES

The members of the Huk felt that they have been treated as though they fought only as comunists whereas they considered themselves as having fought as allies or brothers-in-arms. Because of the present state of conditions on Central Luzon they feel they did not fight for themselves but only for the interests of others.

They are bitterly disappointed in having been overlooked relative to recognition for their services whereas other guerrilla forces have been praised and recognized. Although they refer to these other guerrilla units as "1945 Models" who came into action only when they were sure of American reoccupation they do not begrudge them the recognition they have received and claim not to be envious of their good fortune. They demand only equal consideration for the Huk forces for the merit of services rendered rather than prejudicial action against them.

They feel that if some recognition were granted and members of the Huk processed into the Philippine Army and assigned as Military Police in Central Luzon to work in cooperation with all lawful authorities that law and order would be more easily maintained. The People would feel that some of their won were entrusted with responsibility instead of being ignored. It would serve to instil in even the most fanatical extremist among the Huk a desire to cooperate more willingly instead of festering lawlessness and crime such as many are doing now. It is claimed that if this were done those incorrigibles who are presently evading the law could be apprehended since some of their own people would be among them as lawful authorities and could help locate them. Unlawful acts on the part of some of the members are admitted and regretted by leaders of the Hukbalahap and they claim that they can not control such individuals, and that they learn of these acts only after they have been committed. They assert that they do not hinder the prosecution of these individuals by due process of law and that everything in their power is done to assist in bringing these law breakers before the proper authorities. The leaders profess difficulty at present in their efforts to lecture among these people urging them to be law abiding citizens so as not to bring discredit to their organization. They attribute this difficulty to the fact that the less educated are impatient and somewhat disappointed in the inability of the leaders to obtain some recognition for the services these people rendered and that as a result their confidence in the leaders has been shaken. For this reason they are not always prone to follow the advice of the leaders.

On 14 November 1945, a conference was held at the Provincial Capital of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan, N. Ecija. Among those present were Juan Chioco, Provincial Governor, Colonel Castaneda, Philippine Army Provost Marshal for the Luzon Zone, and leaders of the Hukbalahap. The representatives of the Hukbalahap agreed to do everything in their power to help maintain law and order in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in general everywhere. They protested against newspaper accounts which accuse their organization of being responsible for all the criminal acts being committed in Central Luzon.

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HUKBALAHAP - Grievances (Continued)

Colonel Castaneda and Governor Chioco admitted that in general the newspaper stories are false and of no account and that if they believed these reports the leaders of the Huk would not be free men today. Colonel Castaneda admitted in fact that there is no proof against the Hukbalahap with relation to illegal acts. He encouraged the leaders in their right to hold meetings in behalf of the campaign for better living conditions so long as they are kept within the bounds of law and order. Colonel Castaneda stated, however, that in some instances the speakers are fostering the commission of illegal acts, especially concerning the surrender of arms. Such speakers must be purged and representatives of the Huk agreed to take necessary steps. Because classes are held in the barrios to correct the state of illiteracy and ignorance of the people the Huk spokesmen protested that due to the existence of these classes they are accused of sowing the seeds of civil war among their people. They asserted that such accusation is a malicious falsehood. Governor Chioco and Colonel Castaneda agreed that the sponsoring of such classes is legal and to be encouraged provided that they are held for the reason claimed. They stated further that they do not believe these classes are being used as a front with an ulterior illegal motive and that if they suspected such a motive classes would have been disrupted long ago. The undersigned, having been present during the latter part of the conference observed that in general a spirit of friendly cooperation prevailed among those present.

On 15 November 1945, a celebration commemorating the anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth was held in San Fernando, Pampanga. Representatives of the Hukbalahap participated in the celebration and offered a resolution promising cooperation in the preservation of law and order. A copy of this resolution is submitted herewith as inclosure. 11.

CONCLUSIONS

The political situation has been covered herein only because it is inseparable from the military activities of the Hukbalahap in the past and accounts for much of the differences and friction between that organization and other.

It is to be remembered that the foregoing report on the Hukbalahap is the story as presented by its leaders in defense and clarification of their stand.

The leaders presently do not seem to have the ability to control all individuals in the masses they represent, especially with reference to the surrender of arms. They condemn the unlawful acts committed but seem unable to take constructive action to prevent recurrences. However, in all probability the leaders are telling the truth when they claim to have no prior knowledge of criminal acts but learn of them only after the commission of such acts. Those who know of the commission of unlawful acts and know who is responsible are reluctant to admit such knowledge because of fear of retaliation by those accused. This is perhaps the main reason why lawful authority encounters difficulty in apprehending violators of law and order. This does not necessarily mean that these criminals are former members of the Hukbalahap.

HUKBALAHAP - Conclusion. (Continued)

The Hukbalahap was a fusion of all elements, good and bad, Undoubtedly this organization was very strong in Central Luzon, but many of its supporters were probably forced into the movement by threats and aided merely to protect themselves. Many people, innocent or otherwise, suffered personal loss because of the activities of the Hukbalahap.

The determination to retain arms is probably for the purpose of bargaining for recognition in return for their surrender.

Disregarding the political activity and present disturbed conditions which may or may not be attributed to former members of the Hukbalahap and considering only the military activities its services were of value in routing the enemy from Central Luzon. In terms of value in dollars and cents and American lives saved the work of the Hukbalahap compares favorably with that of other guerrilla units throughout the Philippine Islands.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the Hukbalahap be recognized as a legitimate guerrilla unit with the reservation that such recognition be granted only after the surrender of all arms now in the possession of its members regardless of whether all members now holding arms receive recognition. It is further recommended that of the 12,000 members only two regiments be recognized and adjusted to conform with U. S. Army T/O & E.

Without making any commitments, the undersigned has informed the leaders of the Hukbalahap of the requirement demanding total surrender of all arms and ammunition as a prerequisite for recognition.

EDMON P. RYAN
1st Lt., FA
Contact Team Leader

All Inclosures withdrawn
and filed this Hqs.

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Report on Soriano's 1st Independent Guerrillas

1 August 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer examined the unit history and interviewed members of the Soriano's 1st Independent Guerrillas, to determine whether the present date of recognition of this unit should be revised. Soriano's 1st Independent Guerrillas, were recognized by letter, Hq. USAFFE, FEPA 370.64, dated 1 April 1945. The effective date of recognition was 9 Jan 1945.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS: a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings:

Marcello Soriano	C.O. Soriano's Ind. Grilas.
Antonio Colonge	Ex.O. " " "

b. The subject unit was organized on 12 Sept 1942 by Marcello Soriano. The alleged area of operations of this unit were in the municipality of Rosario, La Union. The organization was completely independent of any other guerrilla units. The claimed strength of the unit in 1942 was 300 men. In 1943, and 1944 it decreased to 200 men. In January 1945 at the time of its attachment to the 43rd and 33rd Divisions, its strength was approximately 125 men.

Purported activities of the unit during the occupation are as follows:

1942 and 1943: a. Drilling of the men
b. Holding meetings
c. Instructing the men in military subjects
d. Sketching of Japanese gun emplacements

1944: Same activities as listed above, plus obtaining information on the Japanese fortifications on the road to Baguio.

When questioned why the unit strength dropped from 300 men in 1942 to 140 men in 1945, it was stated by Soriano and Colonge that the men lost interest in the guerrilla movement and decide to abandon it. It is apparent that a well organized unit did not exist in the years of 1943 and 1944. The claim of holding drills, meetings, and gathering the men together to instruct them on military subjects seems a remote possibility. Rosario La Union is a city of six to seven thousand population. The Japanese garrisons in Rosario totaled 30,000 men. Rosario was an important and highly secretive installation of the Japanese. The drilling and training of a group of guerrillas in the midst of 30,000 enemy soldiers, and at a highly secretive base, is a very remote possibility. In addition to this, a claim of guerrilla activity is not warranted because of meetings and alleged training by this unit. The unit C.O. claims that sketches were made of Japanese gun emplacements in Rosario. When asked what was done with these sketches Soriano stated that they were given to the liberation forces "after" they

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arrived in Rosario. In other words, sketches that were made between 1942 and 1944, were kept until the liberation forces had already neutralized the area. No attempt had been made to send the sketches out through a higher overall command so that they would have been of some value to the U.S. forces previous to the landing.

Soriano and Colonge stated that guerrilla members in their organization lived at home, and followed civilian occupations. Sixty men from the unit worked as laborers for the Japanese. The rest of the men were farmers.

The C.O. claims to have one man wounded in action, and a number of men that died in the line of duty. The man that was WIA, enraged a Japanese officer who in turn cut off the man's ear with a samurai sword. No mention is made that the attack occurred because the man was suspected of guerrilla activities. The men that died in the line of duty were working for the Japanese. Soriano stated that the Japanese did not furnish sufficient rations to the detriment of the health of the laborers, and by this action many of them contracted diseases and later died. It is well known fact that many people contracted diseases that subsequently caused death during the occupation. This in itself is not a basis for claim a guerrilla.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

a. This unit does not appear to have any political aspirations or affiliations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the Soriano's 1st Independent Guerrillas be not favorably considered for revision of its present date of recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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REPORT ON SQUADRON 399 (FILIPINO ATTACHMENT) LGAF

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer proceeded to Lupao, Nueva Ecija during 1947, to investigate the Filipino Attachment to Squadron 399.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements reflected in the findings:

1st Lt Hipolito F. Vengaso	CO, Filipino Attachment Sdq.399
2nd Lt Alfredo de Guzman	Platoon Leader
2nd Lt Jose C. Mendoza	" "
Sgt Aurelio Reyno	Unit Member
Sgt Hermaso Martinez	" "
1st Sgt Eladora Rosario	" "
Cpl Florentino Vengaso	" "
Pfc Simplicio Alcantra	" "

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. The subject unit, the Filipino Attachment to Squadron 399, was one of the reserve unit of the LGAF. Squadron 399, under the command of Lim Lan Beng, has been granted partial recognition as a guerrilla unit.

The commanding officer of the Filipino Attachment, (unrecognized members), Lt Vengaso, claims his men were attached to the 25th Division during the liberation. When Vengaso was asked for attachment papers to support this statement he could not produce them, nor could any other members of the unit produce attachment orders. When asked as to whether the recognized members of 399 Sqn had attachment papers, Vengaso affirmed this in the positive. It appears strange that unit commanders of the 25th Division gave attachment papers to only half of the Squadron.

The investigating team believes that this unit was inactivated as per order of Capt McKenzie (Incl #1) and that these men are trying to gain recognition on the basis of the active members of Squadron 399. The unit history (Incl #2) states that because of lack of arms the squadron was disbanded. Another special order from Hq LGAF (Incl #3) sent to squadron 399 states that reserve squadrons are to be disbanded.

Jose Mendoza who was platoon leader of the second platoon of the subject organization stated the unit stayed at Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija for two years, Pantabangan was an isolated area in the mountains and the nearest Japanese garrison was Rizal, Nueva Ecija. It is a known fact that guerrilla units came to this area because of its remoteness from Japanese garrisons. These units came here to "take a rest". A statement to the effect that the unit stayed at Pantabangan for two years indicates it never was an active guerrilla unit.

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Hernaso Martinez who alleged to be a platoon sergeant, when questioned, did not know of what platoon he was a member, who the platoon leader was, nor any men in the platoon. In fact none of the members interviewed knew what their duties were or who their commanders were.

The investigating officer believes that roster submitted by Lt Vengazo is a "padded" roster. A memorandum sent to Lt Vengazo by Capt McKenzie (Incl 4) states LGAF Hq wanted the men originally on the roster to be submitted for approval. It is apparent that Lt Vengazo added quite a few "1945 guerrillas" to his roster. Lt Vengazo states in his reply to Capt McKenzie (Incl 5), that his 1945 enlistments are not marked by an "x" (Incl 6). All other men on the roster with an "x" after their names are the original members of the Filipino Attachment to Squadron 399. The total of this unit then would be 25 men and not 82 as now claimed. Lt Vengazo's own statement that the men not marked on the roster with an "x" were enlisted in January 1945 (Incl 5), yet on the roster submitted for recognition, (Incl 7) it is claimed all men joined the unit in 1942 and 1943. It is apparent that a lot of tampering with the rosters in this unit has been done previous to submission for recognition.

It is the investigating teams' belief that the unit was never active as a guerrilla organization. This conclusion is brought about by the lack of knowledge of the members regarding their unit's activities, plus a lack of arms. Finally, evidence is in abundance to indicate that many members now on the roster never were guerrillas and that Lt Vengazo simply added these names to gain recognition for them.

c. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. Statements made by the unit members that the organization stayed in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, is conclusive evidence to show that the unit did not oppose the Japanese. Pantabangan is inaccessible over six months of the year because of floods. The Japanese did not have a garrison nearer than Rizal, Nueva Ecija and only occasionally sent a few men to Pantabangan to check up on the town's activities.

d. Activities did not materially contribute to the eventual defeat of the enemy. This unit spent most of its time in an area where there were no military activities. This unit was a reserve squadron, unarmed, and therefore did not engage the enemy forces.

e. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its Commanding Officer (Incl 8). It is apparent the men were not fully trained and under the control of its leaders. Officers of the unit did not know their duties, nor know the men under them, a definite indication of lack of control by the unit officers.

f. Ranks of members was considered too high for the actual size of the command.

g. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity. This unit was a reserve element of the 399 squadron. There was no supporting

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evidence presented that it had any activity against the Japanese. Members of the unit lived in areas devoid of military activity, and they also continued their civilian pursuits, with a resultant that they did not support guerrilla activities continuously.

h. Major Robert B. Lapham, Overall Commander of LGAF, stated that Squadron 399, under the command of Capt Lim Lang Beng was an active guerrilla squadron from 1 November 1944.

i. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. All worthy members have been recognized and the casualties are not worthy of recognition.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that with the exception of 70 members previously recognized from Squadron 399 (LGAF), the Filipino Attachment to Squadron 399 consisting of 82 members, be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on the Phantom Company, 3rd Regiment,
1st Laguna Division, FAIT

30 July 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer investigated the unit files, report of investigation, and unit history of the Phantom Company, 3rd Regiment, 1st Laguna Division, FAIT, to determine whether or not the recognized portion of the Phantom Company, deserves revision of its present recognition dates. The Phantom Company, 3rd Regiment, 1st Laguna Division, FAIT, was recognized in a strength of 108 by letter Headquarters USAFFE FEPA 370.64, dated 1 April 1945. The effective dates of recognition were from 24 Feb - 22 July 1945.

2. HISTORY: (See attached unit file).

3. FINDINGS:

a. The subject unit was organized on 10 May 1943, by Raymundo Ansag. It was initially under the overall command of Col Hugh Straughn, and operated in the vicinity of Calamba Laguna. After the death of Col Ansag, the unit's CO, in February 1945, Maj Crispin M. Penid, the executive officer of the Phantom Company, became the commanding officer.

The Phantom Company had 108 men recognized from 24 Feb 1945 - 26 July 1945 for their activities with the 11th Airborne Division. The remainder of the unit which was not attached (169 officers and men) was not favorably considered for recognition by Lt Donald E. Potter, formerly of the Guerrilla Affairs Division.

Previous to the liberation the unit's activities consisted of a few minor engagements with the enemy forces. Following are the claims of the unit's activities by Maj Penid, the unit CO:

a. On the 27th of July 1943, six men raided Bilibid prison at Sta Cruz, Laguna. There were no Japanese casualties and no casualties in the Phantom Company.

b. During October 1943, six men cut communication wires from Calamba and Bucal Barrio.

c. On the 4th of September 1944, three men raided the house of a Japanese officer by the name of Hokiyama. No casualties on either side. (It is noted that between Oct 1943 and Sept 1944, this unit boasts no activities).

d. On the 2nd of October 1944, eight men raided an outpost in Calamba. There were no casualties in this undertaking.

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e. On the 17th of October 1944, seven men raided the home of a Japanese officer; no casualties were incurred on either side.

f. On the 31st of December 1944, the headquarters of the Phantom Company was raided by Japanese and Makapilis. The unit claims seven enemy wounded and one casualty suffered on its side.

g. On the 3rd of January 1945, a patrol of 16 men encountered 25 Japanese. The unit claims that two Japanese were killed, and that the Phantom Company suffered no casualties.

h. Penid also claims the unit was active in propaganda and intelligence activities from October 1943, to September 1945.

The following facts have been taken from the individual questionnaires of the members of the Phantom Company, and disinterested civilians who knew of the activities of the unit. These facts refute the claims of the unit commanding officer.

Capt Francisco Bautista: (member of the Phantom Company since 1943) Capt Bautista does not claim to have been an active guerrilla in 1943. During December of 1944 he claims to have been in one engagement. Bautista also claims two engagements in January 1945. There were two enemy soldiers contacted on each of these incidents.

1st Lt Ulysses Penid: (member of the subject unit since 1943) Lt Penid was not an active guerrilla in 1943. In December 1944, the Makapilis raided the Hq of the Phantom Company; Lt Penid was present during this incident. No claimed action against the Makapilis in the raid is made by Lt Penid.

2nd Lt Juanito Buot: (platoon leader in the Phantom Company since Sept 1943) Buot does not claim to have been active in 1943. His activities in 1944 consisted of "one" engagement.

Sgt Amado Jucuton: (member of the Phantom Company since 1943) Jucuton does not claim to have been an active guerrilla in 1943. Jucuton stated he was in one engagement against the Makapilis in 1944.

Sgt James Dixon: (a member of the unit since 1943) Dixon claims no guerrilla activities in 1943, and one engagement in 1944.

Private Julio Nucum: (a member of the Phantom Company since 1943) Pvt Nucum stated, "I never was engaged in any activities against the enemy."

David Carreon, Justice of the Peace in Calamba Laguna: Carreon stated that the members of the Phantom Company carried

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on their civilian occupations. Carreon did not hear of the unit being active in 1943. In late 1944 or early 1945, Carreon stated that he heard that the headquarters of the Phantom Company was raided by the Makapilis or the Japanese. There is no mention that the Phantom Company was active against the enemy in these incidents.

Pantaleon Alihan, a dentist in Calamba Laguna: Alihan had no knowledge of the Phantom Company being active in 1943. Alihan stated that the Phantom Company had one engagement in 1944.

The above excerpts from individual questionnaires reveal that with the exception of a very few minor engagements with the enemy in late 1944, this organization remained passive and inactive. Activities subsequent to late 1944 are not of a nature nor number to warrant revision for that period.

The claims of intelligence activities made by Maj Penid are not substantiated by sufficient evidence. The results of intelligence activities are questionable as no direct results are known to have been derived from same. Dissemination of news (propaganda) of the day, and keeping up the morale of the people cannot be classified as guerrilla activity.

From the evidence submitted on the activities of the Phantom Company, the unit has no basis for revision of dates. Lt Potter's report of investigation (Tab A) concurs in that the unit does not present sufficient evidence to warrant revision of its recognition date.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have and political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the Phantom Company, 3rd Regiment, 1st Laguna Division, FAIT, be not favorably considered for revision of its present recognition date.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt., CAC

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COMPLETE DATA COVERING THE GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES OF THE
LATE COLONEL CLAUDE A. THORP

I have welcomed the opportunity to write about the guerrilla phase of Colonel Claude A. Thorp's life history and I am also aware that it is an opportunity to render honor and justice to the memory of a great man, a hero and a martyr. Much as my misgivings are that my inexperience and inadequate technique of writing and my poor command of the English language may not help to do him justice, nevertheless, I am confident that I have first hand knowledge of the truths and facts and that I am determined to stick to them in the narrative. I know the revelation of the truth will redeem his name from obscurity and once those who should know will know about his magnificent sacrifice they will never fail to pay him the right homage.

In the year 1940, I was appointed secretary to Colonel C. A. Thorp who was then the Provost Marshal in Fort Stotsenburg. Even when the war broke on December 8, 1941, I stuck to my job so that when we were ordered to evacuate from Fort Stotsenburg, I moved to Porac with the Colonel on December 24, 1941, where we met Colonel Mario Pamintuan of the Northwest Pampanga Military District who was then a Special Agent of the Provost Marshal from Porac, Colonel Thorp, myself and other office personnel, immediately moved to Hermosa, Bataan, and stayed there up to January 7, 1942, on which date we moved to Bagac and Colonel Thorp continued his work as Provost Marshal of the Northern Luzon Forces under General King. While in Bagac, Colonel Thorp revealed to me that he had submitted the idea of organizing guerrilla units to General Mac Arthur. On January 19, 1942, General MacArthur called him for a conference, but it so happened that Col Thorp had just received a bullet wound on his left leg so that he was forced to send Capt. David Miller in his instead, and the next day, Capt. Miller brought him his authority to organize guerrillas and a written memorandum signed by Adjutant General Casey.

On January 27, 1941, we left Bagac, Bataan, for Porac as our scheduled destination is Mt. Pinatubu. With us were four American Officers and nine American enlisted men. The four other officers were Lts. Lapham, Cushing, McGuire and Capt. Miller, but Capt Miller was cut from us in Little Baguio and he was never able to rejoin us. All the officers including the Colonel were armed with tommy guns and the enlisted men with Garands, Springfields and pistols. Including some Filipinos, there were nineteen men and we were two women when we started our adventurous journey thru the Bataan and Zambales mountains. It took us more than forty days before we reached our destination and during this period we encountered all kinds of difficulties, shortage of food, water and guides, and most of the time the open sky for our shelter. In the mountains of Orani, we met some civilians who volunteered to guide us thru the other side of the Olongapo highway after we explained to them our purpose. Then we met some Aetas whom we persuaded to help us carry our supply and guide us. While in the vicinity of Olongapo, we found out that we were almost out of our food supply. While trying to find out how we can secure food, we were informed by some civilians that it was a daily

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routine with the Japs to carry foodstuff to Olongapo late in the afternoon. Colonel Thorp called the officers and men to a conference and they decided to intercept the food of the Japs, so that they also agreed on a plan of operation. The Colonel divided the men into three groups. He with Lt. Lapham and some men the natives, Lt. Charles Chushing and Lt. McGuire would take care of the dynamite and the cargadores. The fighting lasted for more than two hours. As the colonel suspected that fresh reinforcement of Japs were brought in, he ordered a retreat and they retreated to our hiding place. The Colonel was pleased when he found out that he had not lost a single man and he was sure that they were able to kill many Japs. As soon as the colonel reached our hiding place with the men, we heard big guns around us so he ordered that we got moving and we walked until four o'clock in the morning, When almost everybody could not walk any further we halted and rest. After taking our breakfast that morning, we started walking again, but two of the men were too weak to walk we had to leave them to the care of some civilians.

When we reached Florida-Blanca, Pampanga, Mayor Genigno Layug and his nephew, Dr. Carlos Layug came to us and Mayor Layug was given an appointment by the Colonel as a guerrilla leader and the doctor was appointed a Medical Officer. The two followed us to Porac. When we reached Baldugan, Porac, Col. Thorp sent messengers to contact Col. Mario Pamintuan and on March 6, 1942, Col Pamintuan came with his wife and Mayor Marciano Dizon of Porac. Colonel Thorp authorized Col. Pamintuan as a guerrilla commander and organizer. That night we proceeded to Mt. Timbo and Col Pamintuan returned to his hiding place with his companions. The next day, Col Pamintuan came again with Tomas Lumanalan and Commander Francisco Ocampo, bringing with them some arms and other supplies which they gave to Col Thorp and Col Mario Pamintuan continued to supply us with our needs during our stay in the vicinity of Porac. In Timbo, we also met Mr. Eugenio Soliman, a man who before the war was connected in the government administration of non-Christian Tribes, the balugas or negritos, and he also appointed him as a guerrilla leader.

While in Camp Four, Col. Thorp reorganized his staff, making Capt. McGuire his adjutant and Lt. Lapham his Supply Officer. He also made Colonel Pamintuan a member of his staff and his right hand man. The three sons of Colonel Pamintuan, Andres, Artemio and Mario, Jr., were appointed couriers and personal body-guards of Colonel Thorp. Col Thorp ordered Capt MacGuire and some other men to proceed to Mt. Pinatubu to prepare the Camp.

On the later of May 1942, a Major Barber of the Intelligence Corps came to join the Colonel's Camp. He was with some soldiers and he brought with him a radio set. A few days later, Casto Alejandrino and a fellow Sampang came and volunteered their services, but only after two week of observation that they were given letters of authority. These two are leaders of the Hukbalahap guerrilla faction and as afterwards they deliberately ignored the orders of the colonel and their faction continue to abuse their authority, their letters of authority were cancelled in August, 1942. Also Sgt A. Bruce came to join and he was assigned to take command of a Chinese Guerrilla unit at that time operating in the mountains of Porac.

In the earlier part of May, 1942, a group of seven American Officers who have escaped the Japs in the surrender of Bataan, joined our camp and became a part of our organisation. These officers were Capt. Barker, Capt.

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Pannel, Capt. Lage, Lt Col Smith, Lt Ramsey, Pvt Strickland, and a Major whose name I have forgotten and cannot just now recall. Unfortunately, Capt Pannel died in camp.

After the fall of Corregidor, Col Thorp again reorganized his staff and gave the officers new assignments. Capt Barker was made Executive Officer and was to cover Pampanga, Lt Ramsey was made District Commander of the Northwest Pampanga Military District and adjutant to Capt Barker. Sgt E. Brooks was assigned in Tarlac, Anderson was sent to Tayabas, Capt Bell was given Bataan, and Zambales was turned over to Capt McGuire. Col Pamintuan was made Regimental Commander of the First Regiment of the Northwest Pampanga Military District and later succeeded Lt Ramsay as District Commander, and was in turn succeeded by Lt Col Francisco Ocampo as Regimental Commander, Capt Wilbur Lage became Adjutant to Col Thorp. Lt Frank Young was sent on a mission to Mindanao and proceed to Australia, but we never heard of him since. Miss Lydia Hardin was appointed special agent to do intelligence work.

In June, 1942, Mr. Emilio Hernandez from Macabebe, Pampanga, and Mr. Paulino Lamsing came and volunteered and were given authority to do intelligence work in the south and a letter appointing Col Ramiriz as District Commander of Southern Luzon was sent thru Mr. E. Hernandez, but it seemed that he did not received the letter of authority so the Colonel sent Capt Spies to take charge of the south, but the latter died while on his way to fill his job. I heard recently that Mr. Lamsing was killed in action on November 1942.

Mr. Agustin Capulong was also given an authority as guerrilla leader, and an authority to organize a guerrilla unit in Pangasinan was also given to Mr. Federico Sonaco as he was from that province.

On July 4, 1942 Col Thorp promulgated and issued his General Order No. 1, setting forth rules and regulations for all authorized guerrillas to follow. On this date he also wrote a message for Australia, sending a copy of the message to Capt McGuire in Zambales to be delivered to a submarine that may happen to call, at the same time he sent the same message thru radio. In this message he included his accomplishments to date and recommendations for the promotions of officers and enlisted men.

A general conference was called and scheduled to be held on August 29, 1942, to be attended by all District Commanders and Squadron Leaders, but on the evening of August 28, 1942, our Headquarters at Timbo was raided by the Japs. The alarm came almost too late so that we had really a very narrow escape. We escaped to Mt. Panagalan and stayed there for a while. In that raid, the negrito barber of the Colonel, the houseboy of Capt Barker, named Tony, and one of Soliman's men were captured by the Japanese. Col Thorp suspected that one of our runners, a fellow named Rodriguez, a tagalog from Manila at this period residing in Sapang-bato, Angeles, Pampanga, sold us out to the Japs tipped them about the conference but luckily got mixed up with the right date.

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With this incident of the raid fresh in the mind of the colonel and his realization that in our present hiding place we were still within the range of the treachery that sought to destroy us, and as previous to this incident Marcos Laxamana of Sta. Juliana, Tarlac, came trying to convince the colonel that Patling is the safest place, and also, because the Colonel believed that there was more possibility and opportunity in Tarlac to carry out to a successful realization of his obsession to negotiate with the leaders of the Hukbalahap for a cooperative and harmoniously planned combined action against the common enemy, so he finally decided to move to Tarlac despite the solicituous warning of Col Pamintuan that we might be moving to a trap. After writing to Col Pamintuan, on September 2, 1942, we started for Sta Juliana, Tarlac with Sgt Williams Brooks, radio operator, as our only American companion besides the colonel, of course. We were met by Ex-mayors Frias and Marcos Laxamana, as well as by Sgt Everett Brooks who was commander at Tarlac at that time, in Maniangi we stayed there for at least one week and then we started for our final destination and hide-out in Mr Pugad-babi in Patling. Marcos Lazamana gave us for a guide and handy-man, Andres dela Cruz, When we reached our destination and saw the headquarters built for us by Lazamana, I began to feel uneasy for I saw at once that it was not an ideal hide-out. We can easily be surrounded and we had no avenue for escape as our rear was covered by tall mountains and which were almost impenetrable. I told Lazamana about my misgivings, but he soothed me by saying that my fear really unfounded, because he said that thru our connections we could easily learn about the future Japanese raids, even if the raiders were still in the town of Tarlac.

A week after our stay in our new Headquarters, I received a letter from Capt Salangasang warning us to be on the look-out as the Japanese had already caught and imprisoned my guardian. I told Col Thorp about the letter and he said that we make preparation to move to Pangasinan. But, before we finished our preparations, we found ourselves surrounded and caught by the Japanese on October 29, 1942. Those caught besides the colonel and myself by the Japanese were Sgt W. Brooks, Dionicia Limpin, Pvt Magat, Fabian Franco, five balugas and other civilians. We were all hog-tied. Later, some Jap soldiers brought in Andres de la Cruz, tied up, but when the guide of the Japs, Andres Ferrer, was this, he approached and talked with officer in command and Andres de la Cruz was released and they returned to him his gun. They found and took all of the papers of the colonel.

First, they brought us to Barrio Maanot in the house of Andres Ferrer where we stayed for one day and one night. There we were given preliminary investigation, and I believed none of us revealed anything detrimental to the organization and the cause. From Maanot we walked two days and one night to Camp O'Donnell, and thence, to Fort Stotsenburg which we reach on November 2, 1942, and stayed in the Kempei house. On the early morning of November 3, 1942, ten of us were brought to a house near Barrio Dolores, and we feared that we were about to be killed. I learned later that the colonel pleaded for us, that was why we were not disposed but returned to the Kempei. After a while, they took us to the prison of Fort Stotsenburg. We were placed in small rooms, five in each room. After a day or two, Mr. Vicente Frias was caught and put in prison with us.

After a few days, I was surprised to see one of our men, Daniel Hernandez, come in with Japanese soldiers. I learned later that he was made a guide in the raid against Capt Lage and other guerrilla leaders in Tarlac including Sgt E. Brooks, but he had deliberately misled the soldiers, so he was also imprisoned.

After a week we were transferred in a bigger room, but Col Thorp and his four companions remained in their small cell. On Dec 29, 1942, Mr. Frias and the balugas were released. Up to this time and much later, Col Thorp was in solitary confinement.

On January 4, 1943, W. Brooks was taken to Manila, but was brought back to Fort Stotsenburg after a week.

On January 22, 1943, Col Thorp with Daniel Hernandez and Fabian Franco were sent to Manila, but the two Filipinos were sent home. Before he was sent to Manila, Col Thorp was able to smuggle a letter to me; in this letter, he told me of this suspicion that we were again betrayed by men we trusted, meaning Marcos Laxamana and Andres de la Cruz. This suspicion was confirmed to me by the interpreter of the Chief of Staff, George Ishibashi, a Japanese born in the Philippines and a naturalized Filipino citizen. Also later by the confession of Marcos Laxamana to a guerrilla leader in Tarlac, before he was liquidated by the guerrilla unit in Tarlac, Andres de la Cruz and Andres Ferrer are still at large. The Colonel also expressed his wish that I deliver to Col Pamintuan his picture and identification card which were sewed at that time in the lower fold of my dress.

On February 5, 1943, I was released with the other woman, Dionicia Limpin. I was ordered to report to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army at Fort Stotsenburg, where I was lectured and given "spiritual rejuvenation". I was ordered to work with their propaganda corps by making speeches. In this task, I have learned the practice of the art of deceit, as I have to be careful and use words conveying two different meanings.

On February 17, 1943, Sgt Everett Brooks was caught and imprisoned.

During the confinement of Col Thorp in Fort Santiago in Manila, I have not heard much about him, except the news that now and then he was exhibited in the public to prove that he was really caught, because of the people though and believed that it was only propaganda and ruse when the Japs first claimed that they caught the colonel. Now and then Interpreter Ishibashi gave me assurance that the colonel would not be killed but would be concentrated with General King and General Wainwright.

It was a cruel stroke of Fate when one day, Col Ramirez told me that Col Thorp, Col Straughn and Col Nakar and others were executed on October 4, 1943 in La Loma. Thus was ended the career of a brave patriot who started the underground movement in Luzon, but who was not lucky enough to see and enjoy the fruit of his sacrifice; who would have lost the credit that rightfully belonged to him, and the memory of his noble deeds would have been entirely neglected and relegated to obscurity, were it not for the efforts of a few friends, like Colonel Mario Pamintuan, of the Northwest Pampanga Military District, who with loyalty and stubborn determination had brought to light the truth about the life of Colonel Thorp and the beginning of the guerrilla movements in the Philippine.

Extract from G-3 Guerrilla Affairs Division, by Mr. W. S. McLelland Jr.

LUZON GUERRILLA ARMY FORCES (LGAF)

In early February 1942, a party of Americans headed by Lt Col Claude Thorp cross through the lines in Bataan bound north. Their mission was one of collecting information of the enemy and relaying it to General Wainwrights headquarters. The party included Major (then Lt) Robert B. Lapham, subsequently the organizer the commanding officer of the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces. Bataan surrendered in April 1942 and Col Thorp extended permission to his party to disperse and organize resistance groups composed of patriotic civilian volunteers. Lt Lapham with Sgt Albert Short and Esteban Lumyeb, PA, left Col Thorp at Pinatubo and crossed the central plains to Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Here they commenced organization and contacted Cols Moses and Noble who were on their way to Northern Luzon, and informed them of their intentions. Sgt Short remained in Lupao and organized what was later to be known as Squadron 300. Lt Lapham proceeded to Umingan and organized a group later to be known as Squadron 111. These two squadrons were the nucleus of the LGAF, and, at that time of company strength. In July 1942, an independent unit under Jeremias Serafica joined Lapham and was incorporated within the LGAF.

In Aug 1942, Harry MacKenzie reported to Lapham's headquarters on a mission of unification from Anerson's headquarters. Upon his return he was unable to locate Anderson who had moved this headquarters to the East Coast region. MacKenzie remained with Lapham and was appointed as the Nueva Ecija Area Commander and later Executive Officer of the LGAF.

Upon direction of Col Thorp, organized units were to be designated as "Squadrons."

Pangasinan squadrons were numbered in the "100's", Western Nueva Ecija, "200's", and Eastern Nueva Ecija "400's". Lapham's own unit was designated Sqd 111, Short's Sqd 300, and Serafica's 207. By the end of 1942, six

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ANDERSON'S GUERRILLAS

In late February 1942, as it became apparent that Bataan would not withstand the onslaught of the enemy, Capt Bernard L Anderson, AG, and Lt Bert E Pittitt, AG, escaped through the Bataan Peninsula to Airforce Headquarters at little Baguio. On 9 April 1942, after the surrender, they left the Headquarters and proceeded to Dinalupihan where they met Major Russell Volckmann and Capt Donald Blackburn who were traveling north to Baguio. Anderson and Pettitt continued with earlier plans to attempt to reach Mindanao across the Central Plains of Luzon. In Florida Blanca they met several Americans among whom were Barker, Spies, and Bell. Conference decided these officers to establish a resistance movement. Capt Anderson and Lt Pettitt turned north in an effort to contact Col Claude A Thorp. Upon the success of this contact, Col Thorp requested Anderson to contact the Hukbalahap. This was accomplished but the Hukbalahap leaders did not express willingness to served under the USAFFE command. A plan of cooperation, however, was drafted.

In July 1942, Anderson, Barker, and Pettitt organized units in Eastern Bulacan. Contact was established with the Free Philippines organization in Manila on 2 November 1942. This unit offered to aid the Anderson organization, now known as the USAFFE LGAF. This offer was repeated by the Tanguan Guerrillas. Anderson's headquarters in the Calumpit mountains was attacked by elements of enemy infantry, aircraft, and artillery on 28 December 1942. Squadrons 85, 133, and 135 surrendered to the enemy. In spite of increasing enemy activity, Anderson was able to contact Barker in Manila. Barker advised him that Thorp had been captured by the Japanese and assigned him as commanding officer of the East Central Luzon Area. Anderson sent Capt Jaime Manzano, then commanding the 29th Guerrilla Squadron, to Novaliches, Rizal, to establish a headquarters and contact other guerrilla

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Report on MP Detachment "C" Co, 1st Bn.
3rd Pangasinan Regiment PTMD, ECLGA

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer investigated this unit during May 1947. No field investigation was deemed necessary.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See Attached Unit File)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following person was interviewed and his statement is reflected in the findings.

Capt Benigno G. Tabora Jr. G-3 Guerrilla Affairs

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. This unit which claims itself as a guerrilla unit is completely refuted by a letter from Cverton F. Harris, Lt Col, A.C. (Res) (Incl I). Pedro B. Abrencia who claims he is a Capt of this unit is not even mentioned in Col Harris' letter. Col Harris states that the officer in charge of the men working for his unit was a 2nd Lt. Capt Abrencia claims 105 men in his MP detachment, were working for the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron. Col Harris states there were 16 men with 1 officer in charge. These 17 men were hired as "civilian watchmen" and were duly compensated for their labors (Incl 1.). Their primary duties were to keep natives from the squadron area. It is very apparent these "civilian watchmen" can not be classified as guerrillas. Apparently Capt Abrencia decided to join the guerrilla movement late in 1944 (Incl II). He took command of a unit which had members dating back to 1942. It seems very strange that Pedro Abrencia joined the guerrilla movement at such a late date and now claim recognition as a Capt. Capt Benigno G. Tabora Jr. who was a member of the 1st Pangasinan Regiment ECLGA, and who is very familiar with guerrilla activities in this area stated that he had never heard of the MP detachment of "C" Co 3rd Pangasinan Regiment engaging in any guerrilla activities. It is the investigating officers' belief with the evidence presented by Col Harris, and the evidence submitted in the unit file this organization was not a bona-fide guerrilla unit, but simply a group of civilians employed by the U.S. Army and who were duly paid for their efforts by the U.S. Government.

c. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field. This unit consisted of civilians employed by the U.S. Government and therefore can not be classified as guerrillas not were in the field.

d. Activities did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy. The few members of this unit that were used by the U.S. Government were used primarily as civilian watchmen to guard a reconnaissance unit against pilferage and looting by their own country men.

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e. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity and organization. The small number of members used by the U.S. forces is the only evidence of activity by the organization and it is not guerrilla activity. The numbers of men claimed by the unit as guerrillas, is out of proportion actually used by the U.S. forces (Incl 1).

f. Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in the field to the exclusion of civilian occupation. The efforts of this unit are conclusively civilian pursuits in which they were fully compensated.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the MP detachment; "C" Co 3rd Pangasinan Regiment PTND, ECLGA consisting of 105 men be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters
Combat Team

25 July, 1947

1. 1st. Lt. Kenneth H Neubauer, investigated the unit files, reports of investigation, and disinterested persons to determine whether the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team deserves revision of its present recognition date. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was recognized by letter, Hq. USAFFE, FEPA 370.64, dated 1 April 1945. The effective date of recognition was 1 April 1945.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file.)

3. FINDINGS: A. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings.

1st. Lt. Marion C. Allbright	Guerrilla Aff. Div.
2nd. Lt. Pete C. Breaz	" " "
2nd. Lt. Bruce Bromley Jr.	" " "
2nd. Lt. Raul De Rivera	" " "

b. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team, was ordered to organize on the 19 Feb. 1945, with Horacio L. Ilagen as the commanding officer. The authority for activation of this unit was made by memo, from Headquarters Guerrilla Forces, Tagaytay City, dated, 19 Feb. 1945, by order of General Swing. It was attached for duty with the 11th. Airborne Division, and subsequently recognized with the strength of 69 officers and men.

Previous to the Lipa Guerrilla Hq. Combat Team's activation, it's members were part of the Rillo-Neri Unit. The Rillo Neri Unit was not favorably considered for recognition in the initial investigation conducted by Lt. Max L. Brabson, formerly of the Guerrilla Affairs Division. A second investigation

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conducted by Lt's. Bruce Bromley Jr., Pete C Breaz, and Raul De Rivera, of this division during Feb. 1947, again rendered an unfavorable decision for recognition. A reconsideration of the unit was undertaken by Lt. Marion C. Allbright of this division during July 1947, and for the third time the unit was not favorably considered for recognition. The above facts are presented on the Rillo Neri Unit as the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was an integral part of the Rillo-Neri Unit. (Inc. 1)

The combat company of the Rillo-Neri Unit, (Lipa Grla Hq. Combat Team) was organized in February 1945. From the unit history it states that the Lipa Guerrilla Hq. Combat Team was organized from the Rillo-Neri Unit. (Inc. 2) Since the activities of the Rillo-Neri Unit do not warrant recognition, the members of the combat team, who were recruited from the various elements of the overall organization have no basis for revision.

Activities claimed by the Rillo-Neri unit which necessarily would be claimed by the combat team are as follows: (Inc. 3)

- a. Gathering of arms and ammunition.
- b. Bolstering morale of the people
- c. Sabotage, and elimination of Japanese spies.
- d. Contributions to needy families.
- e. Maintenance of peace and order.
- f. Intelligence reports.
- g. Patrols.

The gathering of arms and ammunition has been refuted by the reports of investigation by Lt's. Brabson, and Bromley. Lt. Brabson states that practically none of the men interviewed had weapons during the occupation. Lt's Bromley and Brabson both state in their report's that many of the men deserted the unit

because of its passive activities.

Though contributing to the needy families in the area is a commendable act, it cannot be considered guerrilla activity. Bolstering the morale of the people also cannot be classified as guerrilla activity.

Alleged activities in regards to intelligence and sabotage are not substantiated by sufficient evidence. There is nor record of any positive results as a result of this activity. This claim of activity is further refuted by Cmdr. Rowe who states that guerrilla organizations in Batangas were very small and of no worth. It is apparent that since this unit was a passive organization its claims are highly exaggerated.

The unit file contains orders, memorandums etc. from Major Vanderpool, and Capt. Shommer, coordinators of guerrilla activity in this area. The units claim of activities because of these orders is not substantiated. In many cases such orders were distributed to many purported guerrilla organizations. Evidence of activity cannot be claimed simply by the possession of such orders. This fact is further substantiated by the fact that the Rillo-Neri Unit was not favorably considered by three separate investigations made by this Headquarters.

From the evidence presented it is apparent that the Lipa Guerrilla Hq. Combat Team did not exist previous to its attachment to the 11th. Airborne Division. Until the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was organized, the members of the subject unit were from various components of the Rillo-Neri Unit. As a component of the Rillo-Neri Unit insufficient evidence has been presented to warrant any further dates of recognition.

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REVISION REPORT

United States Army World War Veterans Guerrilla Unit (Independent)

10 Sept 1947

1. On 10 Sept 1947, 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer investigated the unit file of the United States Army World War Veterans Guerrillas Unit (Ind) to determine whether that unit deserves revision of its present date of recognition. The U.S.A. World War Veterans Guerrilla Unit (Ind) was recognized by letter AG 370.64 PA, Hq AFPAC, dated 17 July 1945. The unit was recognized in a strength of 92. The effective date of recognition was 21 May 1945.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached Unit File)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings.

Col Eustaquio Magon	Subject Unit's Commander
Capt Maria Pena	Member
1st Lt Antonio D. Villar	"
2nd Lt Faribio Espiritu	"
2nd Lt Simplicio Tu-os	"
Sgt Restituto Noche	"
Sgt Antonio Lagrimas	"
Sgt Melencio Lagnay	"
Pvt Benjamin Bautista	"

b. This organization under the command of Eustaquio Magon remained absolutely passive during the Japanese occupation. The Unit was an intelligence and sabotage unit, having only (3) weapons and (2) radio receiving sets. There is no supporting evidence to substantiate the claim of sabotage and intelligence activities. None of the persons interviewed could give a coherent account of intelligence allegedly gathered or where the alleged sabotage occurred. The main activity claimed was exhorting the people in Pasay to resist the enemy.

c. The unit was never maintained in the field in opposition to the enemy. The members claim no combat with the enemy. The unit was not a military organization and its activities in opposition to the enemy were nil.

d. Activities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy. During the occupation, the unit was nothing more than a debating society and during the liberation period, several members worked as guards and laborers for the 11th Airborne Division for which they were paid.

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e. Members of the unit lived at home supporting their families by means of civilian pursuits. Many members of the unit worked as fisherman, merchants and farmers. Several members worked for the Japanese puppet government.

4. COMMENTS ON ORIGINAL RECOGNITION:

Lt Lee W. Kelly recommended that 92 members of this be recognized. Lt Kelly's investigation and subsequent recommendation of the unit does not conform to the facts known. Excerpts from Lt Keely's TIR, indicate sound judgement was not used in his recommendation. Lt Kelly's report states:

... "This unit was active in propaganda work." No specific indicents are mentioned in the report in which it is known that this unit was active in disseminating propaganda. During the investigation of the supplementary roster, Col Magon stated that the unrecognized members did as much as the ones which were recognized. The report of investigation of the supplementary roster states that the activity of these men was not of such a nature to deserve guerrilla recognition; therefore, since the activities of the recognized members was of the same caliber as the unrecognized members recognition was apparently extended in error. Lt Kelly's report further states.... "A few men of this unit joined the 11th Airborne Division and helped in locating enemy positions." Lt Kelly has stated that a few men were active, but insufficient evidence has been presented that 92 men were active and therefore worthy of recognition. Lt Kelly further states that these few men helped in locating enemy positions. The locating of the enemy is not a basis for guerrilla recognition. It was brought out during the investigation of the supplementary roster that this unit never engaged in combat against the Japanese. The men that joined the 11th Airborne Division were hired as laborers and paid for their services.

A Captain Santarroman commanded the unit while Magon was missing from 27 August 1944 until 14 September 1945, Santarroman submitted the roster of 92 officers and men which were recognized. The commanding officer (Magon) claims a membership of 1800 officers and men, yet the total number of officers and men submitted is 173 (92 recognized and 81 on the NFC'd supplementary roster). The commanding officer cannot, nor can any of the other officers account for the missing 1627 officers and men.

In summary, it is safe to state that the recognized portion of the U.S.A. World War Veterans Guerrilla Unit (Ind) never operated as a unit and that their activities if any, are preactically negligible. With this information, it can be surmised that recognition was extended in error.

5. 1st Lt's Kenneth H. Neubauer and Leon J. Sonders who investigated the supplementary roster of this organization recommended that the unit not be favorably considered for revision of dates.

6. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

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7. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that: (a) - The United States Army World War Veterans Guerrilla Unit (Independent) be not favorably considered for revision of present recognition dates. (b) - An investigation whose purpose will be revocation of the existing recognition of this unit be instigated.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Revision Report
D-I Combat Area Company "A"
(Pandita Area, Free Luzon Area, Sixth Military District)

3 October 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H Neubauer examined the unit file and reports of investigation of the D-I Combat Area, Company "A", to determine whether that unit deserves revision of its present dates of recognition. The D-I Combat Area, Company "A", was recognized by letter, Headquarters AFWESPAC, dated 9 March 1945. The unit was recognized in a strength of 159, for the period between 8 March 1945 to 31 May 1945.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file.)

3. FINDINGS:

a. A field investigation was not deemed necessary.

b. The D-I Combat Area, Company "A", an integral part of the Pandita Area, D-I Combat, Free Luzon Area, Sixth Military District, was commanded by Catalino Javier. The overall organization, (Pandita Area, D-I Combat, Free Luzon Area, Sixth Military District) was commanded by a one Denny Flores.

c. The unit known as Company "A", D-I Combat Area, was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. The organization was purely an intelligence unit during the period of enemy occupation. From early 1943 to the beginning of the liberation operations in Luzon, the members of this unit were aware of the fact that the "lay-low" order was in effect, and the procurement of intelligence was to be the main objective. The intelligence reports submitted by this unit were valueless. All intelligence reports of the unit were submitted to the overall commander of the organization (Flores) and from Flores' Headquarters they were sent to Panay; therefore by the time these intelligence reports arrived at their destination they were of very little value. There are no known results to have been derived from intelligence reports sent out by this unit. The organization remained passive during the liberation up to its attachment with the American Forces operating in the area. During the period of attachment to the US Army, the main duties of the unit consisted of acting as laborers, guides, and conducting reconnaissance patrols to a very limited extent. For these services the unit was duly recognized. The unit claims to have been under the direct control of Headquarters Sixth Military District which was commanded by Colonel Macario Peralta. There is no substantiating evidence present such as directives, appointments, circulars, memorandums, special orders, and such other records to support this claim. The unit which purports to be an intelligence unit never had contact with any of the AIB or guerrilla stations then operating in the Batangas Area.

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d. A definite organization was not established during the occupation period. It can be stated that records of induction were kept, but there are no records of what members of the unit did after induction. It is a known fact that guerrilla units, in most cases, required members to sign induction papers though their activities subsequent to induction are not, in all cases, deemed to justify recognition.

e. Activities of the unit did not materially contribute to the eventual defeat of the enemy. The intelligence activities in which this unit claim to have engaged, had no immediate source of transmittal, nor was the unit in contact with any of the Allied Intelligence Bureau's transmitter from which its intelligence reports could be relayed to SWPA. The unit did not engage in any combat operations up until the time it was attached to the 382nd AAA AW Bn, US Army, on 8 March 1945.

f. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its officers for the following reasons:

(1) Desertion of personnel to other guerrilla units.

(2) Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in furtherance of the resistance movement to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation and family obligations.

(3) Members lived in their homes and did not remain with the unit.

4. The subject unit as an integral part of the Pandita Area, D-I Combat, Free Luzon Area, Sixth Military District, has been investigated on two different occasions by officers of the guerrilla Affairs Division. The first investigation by Lts Peter R Betts and Tirso Cura, culminated with the recommendation that the organization be not favorably considered for recognition. (Ltr, Hq AFWESPAC, dated 7 June 1946) The second investigation of this organization was undertaken by Lt J H Manzano, Guerrilla Affairs Division, PHILRYCOM. The unit again was not favorably considered for recognition by letter, Headquarters PHILRYCOM, dated 26 September 1947. It is conclusively indicated by these two reports that the activities of the overall organization did not contribute sufficiently to the war effort to deserve recognition; therefore Company "A" as part of the overall organization does not deserve revision of dates of recognition.

5. The organization claims that it incurred six (6) casualties during the occupation and liberation. It is recommended that any casualty which occurred during the period the unit was attached to US Forces be favorably considered if those concerned present a request for casualty recognition.

6. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

This unit does not appear to have any political affili-

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ations or aspirations.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the D-I Combat Area, Company "A" be not favorably considered for revision of its present recognition dates.

KENNETH H NEUBAUER
1st Lt, CAC

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Report on "Squadron 222, Nueva Ecija Military Area,
USAFFE, Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces, (LGAF)

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer and 1st Lt Avery G. Mills proceeded to Munoz, Nueva Ecija March 1947, to investigate Squadron 222, Nueva Ecija Military Area, (LGAF).

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached Unit File)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings:

Capt Paul A. Marinas	QAV, AUS.....	C.O. 4950 TC Det P.U. Area
Capt Jose C. Saddul.....		Commanding Officer
Sgt Florentino Pagasinan.....		Unit Member
Sgt Juan Arce		" "
Cpl Enrique Sabio		" "
Pfc Prudencio Olandia		" "
Pvt Rufo Campos.....		" "
Pvt Traudio Bautista		" "

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. This organization under Capt Jose C. Saddul did not present acceptable evidence of activity against the Japanese during the occupation and liberation. The unit consisted of members from the Central Luzon Agricultural school at Munoz, Nueva Ecija. The investigating officers learned from the men interviewed that members of this unit lived at the school, and the barrios surrounding Munoz during the occupation and liberation. No evidence was presented to substantiate the allegations that the unit engaged in military activities against the enemy. The unit CO, Capt Saddul stated that all members of his organization were fully armed. Evidence is present to show that unit did not have weapons of any type.

Claims of intelligence work, sabotage, and propaganda activities were not supported with evidence. Members of the unit made conflicting statements concerning the alleged activities of the organization, but none were presented showing guerrilla activity. From documents attached to the unit file it is apparent that an organization of some sort was formed. However, investigation reveals the organization was not a true guerrilla unit, but rather of a homeguard organization. Results of the investigation reveals that squadron 222 attempted to maintain law and order in the barrios surrounding Munoz, but most members devoted their time to furthering their education.

When questioned about original copies of orders and documents the unit claimed possession of, Capt Saddul stated that they had been lost or destroyed. The investigating officers do not believe that the alleged copies of originals in the unit file are sufficient evidence in themselves to substantiate the unit commander's claim that he had an

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active guerrilla unit. Alleged true copies of communications sent to Saddul by Maj Robert B. Lapham, Commanding Officer, LGAF, and Capt Hary McKenzie, Ex O. of (LGAF), are present in the file, but these communications are not of a nature to support allegations of guerrilla activities.

The absence of any corroborating verbal testimony to substantiate claims made in the unit history, leads the investigating team to believe the unit as represented by Jose Saddul did not exist as an active organization resisting the Japanese.

e. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. Members of the unit pursued their education all during the occupation and lived at the school. Members interviewed stated their organization had never engaged in combat activities against the Japanese.

d. A definite organization was not established by this unit. Members of the unit had no specific duties for the ranks they held. This organization consisted of a group of students living together who claim guerrilla activities.

e. The unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity because the commanding officer as well as the unit members can not show evidence of any accomplishments during the occupation or liberation.

f. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. No members are worthy of recognition and a casualty roster has been submitted.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that Squadron 222, Nueva Ecija Military Area, USAFFE (LGAF), consisting of 119 men, be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on Squad 227 (Old Bronco Unit) LGAF

22 April 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer, and 1st Lt Leon J. Sonders, proceeded to Munoz, Nueva Ecija April 1947 to investigate Squadron 227 (Old Bronco Unit) LGAF.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See Attached Unit File)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings:

Maj. Robert B. Lapham	AUS CO, LGAF
Capt. Benigno Tahora	AUS G-3 Guerrilla Affairs Div.
Capt. Abdon Aquino	CO 103rd Squad LGAF
Capt. Artemio Castaneda	Company CO. Squad 403rd LGAF
Capt. Pimentel	Bn. CO. 3rd Bn, 1st Tarlac Regt. (LGAF)
Capt. Paul A. Morinas	AUS CO. 4590 T.C. Det (PS) P.U. Area
Capt. Jovito A. Gubrian	CO, 227 Squadron
2nd Lt. Arturo Ismael	Unit Member
2nd Lt. Julio Diocson	" "
1st Sgt. Felipe Campos	" "
Sgt. Sergio M. Bonifacio	" "
Pfc. Antonio R. Adona	" "
Pfc. Valeriano Doculan	" "
Pfc. Mario Vicente	" "
Pfc. Constancio M. Bautista	" "
Pfc. Pablo de los Reyes	" "
Pvt. Francisco Javier	" "
Pvt. Alfredo N. Villamate	" "
Pvt. Polieargo Recario	" "
Pvt. Fedenco Angeles	" "
Pvt. Roman Sibulbaro	" "
Pvt. Nicasio Edralin	" "
Pvt. Isidro Mariano	" "
Pvt. Adriano Valdez	" "
Pvt. Teodoro V. Gatus	" "

b. Record of service was substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. This organization previous to hostilities in 1941 consisted of all USAFFE members. There were one hundred and twelve (112) Philippine Scouts, thirty four (34) Philippine Army, and six (6) civilians in the unit.

The organization was commanded by Capt. Jovito Gubrian (Inc. 1) who was one of Major Lapham's original members in LGAF. The men of this unit fought until the surrender at Bataan and then escaped to various provinces.

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Jovito Gubrian was inducted into the LGAF on 4 May 1943 by Major Lapham. He was commissioned a 1st Lt. and assigned to intelligence activities (Incl 1). The "Lay-low" order and gathering information about the enemy had been ordered by Gen. MacArthur previous to his departure from the Philippines.

Major Lapham stated that Gubrian and the men under him gathered some of the most important and reliable information about the enemy's activities. During the time Gubrian acted as intelligence officer for LGAF he was organizing all Philippine Scouts in the area of Guimba, Munoz, N. E. and Victoria, Tarlac, into a Guerrilla unit.

During this time he contacted Paul A. Marinas now Capt. CAV. AUS. (4590 T.C. Det (PS) P.U.A.) who had been doing intelligence work in Bulacan province. Capt. Marinas joined this organization during May 1944. The subject unit was designated Squadron 227 (Old Bronco Unit) by Hq LGAF.

On 15th Oct 1944 Squadron 227 was called to actively engaged in military operations. Elements of the unit proceeded to Baler, bay to unload weapons and equipment sent by submarine. Major Lapham stated he met Gubrian and his men and that they had received arms enough to fully equip Squadron 227. Capt. Marinas also stated when they arrived at Baler they had received sufficient arms for all their men.

On 13 Dec. 1944 this unit was given its field order from Hq. LGAF (Incl 2) to operate in the vicinity of San Jose, Nueva Ecija with Capt Gubrian as overall commander. On 4 Jan 1945 Squadron 227 with other guerrilla units attacked the Japanese forces at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. These attacks were made to disorganized the Japanese garrisons in this area.

STATED THAT Capt. Abdon Aquino (recognized) commanding the 103rd Squadron 227 was one of the most efficient units he had been in contact with. He stated that Squadron 227 was very much responsible for disorganizing enemy forces in the area of Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

This unit then was attached as of squadron strength to the 20th Infantry, 6th Div. It again engaged the Japanese at Munoz, Nueva Ecija.

Capt Artemio Castaneda a company commander of Squadron 403 LGAF (recognized) stated that squadron 227 was one of the most active guerrilla units in LGAF. Capt Pimentel Bn. commander 3rd Bn. 1st Tarlac Regiment ECLGA (recognized) stated the "Philippine Scout" squadron (Squadron 227) was one of the most well known squadrons throughout central Luzon. He stated its activities against the Japanese at Carranglan and Munoz, Nueva Ecija were well known to many guerrilla units. A commendation and the ability of this squadron was sent to Gubrian by Lt Col G. J. Van Sickle commanding the 20th Inf. 6th Div. (Incl 3).

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Subsequent attachments of Squadron 227 were to the 25th Div, 37th Div and the 32nd Div.

Due to the fact that attachment papers of this unit had previously been submitted to Sixth Army Hq. for recognition, the investigating team, very carefully interrogated the members of this organization on their military knowledge, unit activities, and then respective duties with this unit. All members interviewed knew their officers and non-commissioned officer; they had a good knowledge of their assigned duties and how to carry them out. Known facts have convinced the investigating team that this organization because of their former status as USAFFE soldiers, their evidence of a well organized unit, and their Guerrilla activities in general ^{Resulted in the unit being} one of the most active guerrilla units in LGAF. This fact is further substantiated by many recognized guerrilla leaders as well as civilians in the area the unit operated. A statement by Major Robert B. Lapham (Inc 4) will bear out the evidence presented by this unit. A statement by Capt. Benigno G. Tabora (Incl 5) also indicates the renown of this unit throughout Nueva Ecija; the loyalty and integrity of the men, and officers who commanded this organization is beyond question.

c. The unit was maintained satisfactorily in the field. This organization previous to its active engagement against the enemy trained and prepared itself as a combat squadron. The CO and his men also were used as intelligence agents ~~that~~ sent important and accurate information to LGAF Hq. After its active duty orders from LGAF Hq. (Inc 2) the unit operated in the field continuously as a combat organization from 3 Oct 1944 until its members returned to military control.

d. Activities of the unit contributed materially to the defeat of the enemy. Through the action of Squad 227, the enemy in the area of Carranglan became disorganized and were unable to reinforce other Japanese troops which were engaged in action against the liberating forces.

Intelligence work gathered by men in this squadron was sent out through LGAF Hq. to Australia became very significant in future action against the enemy. The attachment of this unit with American forces at Munoz, Nueva Ecija materially helped the liberating forces to drive the Japanese north.

e. A definite organization was established. The subject unit's leaders were all military men (Philippine Scouts) and they established a well organized unit patterned along a strictly military line.

f. Unit showed satisfactory continuity of activity and organization. This organization consists of soldiers who are at present or formerly were Philippine Scouts engaged in active military operations during the liberation and occupation. The majority of its members had many years previous military experience.

g. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. All members are worthy of recognition. It is recommended by the investigating officers that casualties be favorably considered for recognition.

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h. This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that 152 men of ~~the~~ Sqd 227 (Old Bronco Unit) be favorably considered for recognition. 1 Nov 1944 to 20 Feb 1945 when the members reported back to military control.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

LEON J. SONNERS
1st Lt CAC

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Report on the Rei-Zar Regiment
Barrion's Manila Division, USFIP.

15 August 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer examined the unit files and previous reports of investigation to determine whether the Rei-Zar Regiment, Barrion's Manila Division, USFIP, deserves revision of its present dates of recognition. The Rei-Zar Regiment was recognized in a strength of 453 officers and men. The Rei-Zar Regiment consists of the following reorganized non-standard Philippine Army Units.

<u>Rei-Zar Regiment</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date Recognized</u>	<u>Auth. & date Auth.</u>
Regt. Hq.	13	1 Jun 1945	Hq AFPAC, 14 Jul 1945
	5	9 Jun 1945	Hq AFWESPAC, 19 Jul 45
<u>1st Battalion</u>			
Bn Hq.	29	5 Feb 1945	Hq AFPAC, 14 Jul 1945
Co "A"	96	"	" " "
Co "B"	101	"	" " "
Co "C"	91	"	" " "
Co "D"	118	"	" " "

2. HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS: a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings.

Maj C. H. Wentzell
Capt E. R. Curtis
Col Pedro Viudez

Guerrilla Aff Div.
" " "
Bulacan Military Area

b. The organization known as the Rei-Zar Regiment was organized within the jurisdiction of the Manila District during 1942, by Capt Barker with authority of Col Thorpe. After the capture of Barker in Jan 1943, a Capt Patricio Gonzales, (Pat Gatson) commanded the Manila District (MD) and he subsequently designated the subject unit as the General Service Troops, MD, under the command of Mohammed Nassao. In 1943 Maj Ramsey assumed command of the MD and the subject unit was incorporated into the ECLGA as the general service Troops, MD, ECLGA. In May 1944 Major Ramsey designated his units numerically and the GST, ECLGA became the 61st Infantry Regiment, MD, ECLGA.

The report of revision of the Rei-Zar Regiment is primarily concerned with the activities of the unit as an organization of Barrion's Manila Division, but a history of the unit from its inception is related to give a clear indication of its accomplishments during the occupation.

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Various histories have been submitted by Col Mohammed on the activities of the Rei-Zar Regiment; two of them have been selected with excerpts from each used to indicate the wide variances of the claims of the unit during the occupation. Both histories have been prepared by Col Mohammed but at different intervals of time.

1942: It is noted that in the history attached as inclosure 1 there are no activities claimed during the year 1942. The second and later history, attached as inclosure 2, states that the unit engaged in espionage and propaganda activities; a claim of 600 members by the unit during 1942 is also put forth in this history. Insufficient evidence has been presented to sustain this claim of 600 active members during 1942. Mohammed has stated in his earlier history that as late as November 1943 the unit was disorganized. (Incl 1) The facts presented indicate an inactive organization did exist, which was composed of men who had a hatred for the enemy, but who were without definite aims or leadership. The continuous change of command during 1942 resulted in haphazard methods of organization with no over-all command to set up a policy that could be adhered to. The claim by the unit that it engaged in propaganda activity is not supported by sufficient evidence. A claim of conducting sabotage operations is without foundation, as the unit did not exist as a cohesive guerrilla organization.

1943: The re-designation of the unit to the General Service Troops, MD, ECLGA was accorded in October 1943, with the unit now under the control of Major Ramsey. Activities claimed in the unit history (Incl 2) for the year 1943 are vague. Mohammed expounds the fact that because of the capture of Capt Barker and a one Alejandro Santos, the Manila District, ECLGA, was paralyzed; he further states that the relentless Japanese campaign to eradicate the organization caused it to "lie-low". After bemoaning the fact that the unit had to lie-low, that it was being continually harrassed by the Japanese, and its leaders captured, Mohammed contradicts himself by saying that the unit had a continual increase in strength so that it now contained six battalions. The facts related on the difficulties in the successful functioning of the organization indicates that the unit was ineffective in operations against the Japanese, and that the strength claimed by Mohammed is highly exaggerated. Further evidence to substantiate the fact that no such organization existed in 1943 is made by Mohammed in his previous unit history (Incl 1 in which he state;....."When I came into the foothills by November 1943, I found the so called organization "GST" a bunch of civilians with several ex-servicemen of the USAFFE who were grouped together bounded by sentiments, hatred against the Japanese, and principals they fought for." There is nothing stated by Mohammed in this excerpt which indicates that an organization of any size, let alone six battalions, ever existed in 1943.

1944: Jan-Sep: During July 1944 the subject unit was re-named the 61st Infantry Regiment, MMD, ECLGA. Mohammed claims that the organization was actively engaged in sabotage and intelligence activities during 1944. No specific incidents have been related in which sabotage was effectively carried out against the enemy. Propaganda and Intelligence activities

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from January 1944 to September 1944 were not of such a nature to warrant guerrilla recognition. Three investigations on various elements of Barrion's Manila Division, (Rei-Zar included) conducted over a period of two years, by officers of this branch, has indicated that the activities of the organization were not of such a nature to warrant guerrilla recognition.

Sep 1944-Feb 1945: Sometime in July 1944, Col Barrion through differences with Major Ramsey severed his connection with the ECLGA and proceeded to organize a unit of his own. During Sep 1944 Mohammed was influenced by Barrion to break connections with the ECLGA and to become a member of Barrion's Manila Division. When Mohammed broke with the ECLGA, he took with him the 61st Infantry Regiment which he re-named the Rei-Zar Regiment. Mohammed makes the claim that about 700 members of the 61st Infantry Regiment were taken by him into Barrion's Manila Division. This claim has been refuted as it has been established that the number of active members that Mohammed brought into Barrion's Division was approximately 120 (Incl 3, Page 9). During September 1944 Barrion and Mohammed proceeded to Mindoro to contact Lt Cmr Rowe in order to obtain equipment for their unit. Rowe gave Barrion a radio set and a few arms and directed him to gather intelligence which in turn would be sent to Rowe's advance SWPA Hq in Mindoro. On 5 October 1944 the Rei-Zar Regiment consisting of 120 men proceeded to Bayambong, Novaliches, Rizal and there established its headquarters. From this headquarters intelligence reports were sent to Cmr Rowe at his Hqs in Mindoro. Some time in December 1944, due to a previous mistake in assignment, Lt Cmr Rowe directed Barrion to turn his radio set over to Ramsey's ECLGA. During the period that the Rei-Zar Regiment was without a radio, contact was made with Col Santos who commanded the BMA and intelligence reports were sent to Rowe through Col Santos' radio. This has been confirmed by Cmr Rowe; Col Santos and Col Viudez of the BMA. In December 1944 Col Santos gave Barrion a radio for the purpose of sending intelligence reports to the advance SWPA Hq in Mindoro. During the latter part of December and the first part of January 1945 Barrion's unit was ordered to construct an airfield at Naglingue, Novaliches. This mission ^{was} accomplished to facilitate the landing of light aircraft, ~~has been attested to in the team leaders report by Capt Huebsch, formerly of this branch.~~ ^{that this airstrip was constructed}

The duties of the 120 men concerned for revision were primarily intelligence, guarding the radio station, construction of the airfield at Naglingue, courier duty and conducting raids against the Japanese in the area of Balintawak and Baesa, Calocan, Rizal.

From interviews with persons contacted and mentioned in the report, it has been determined that from 5 October 1944, 120 men of the Rei-Zar Regiment were maintained in the field as a guerrilla organization in opposition to the enemy.

It is noteworthy that this organization has no gradual increase in strength from October 1944 to February 1945, which was the month of attachment to the U.S. Forces. The unit strength remained constant until

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February 1945 when recruiting stations were opened in Manila, with the subsequent expansion of the organization into hundreds of men (Incl 3, Page 3).

c. Major C. H. Wentzell and Capt E. R. Curtis of this branch, who reinvestigated Barrion's Manila Division, have recommended that 120 members of the Rei-Zar Regiment, Barrion's Manila Division, have their dates of recognition revised back to 5 October 1944. It is further recommended by Maj Wentzell and Capt Curtis that Col Dominador Barilea (Barrion) be included in the roster recommended for revision of dates (Incl 3, Page 10).

d. A casualty roster of Barrion's Manila Division has been submitted to the Casualty Section. This roster has been favorably acted upon. No further casualty recognition is recommended.

e. Col Dominador Barilea (Barrion) has requested that his name be excluded from the recommended roster for revision.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: Col Barrion is executive officer of General Peralta, head of the Philippine Veterans Administration.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) It is recommended that the present recognition dates of the Rei-Zar Regiment, Barrion's Manila Division, be revised as follows:

Strength

Date

120

5 October 1944

(2) It is recommended that Col Dominador Barilea (Barrion) be included in the roster of the revised members of the Rei-Zar Regiment, Barrion's Manila Division.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on Signal Company, 1st Regular Manila Division

24 July 1947

1. Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer investigated the unit file of the Signal Co., 1st Regular Manila Division, to determine whether that unit deserves revision of its present recognition date. The Signal Company, 1st Regular Manila Division was recognized by letter, Headquarters USAFFE, FEPA 370.64, dated 1 April 1945. The effective date of recognition was 9 April 1945.

2. HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The Signal Company, 1st Regular Manila Division, Manila was commanded by one Vicente O. Cabarrubias. The subject unit was part of the purported 1st Regular Manila Division which was under the command of a certain Domingo T. Jacinto.

No unit file is in existence concerning activities of the Signal Company, but it is apparent that the history of the 1st Regular Manila Division, which the Signal Company is part of is conclusive evidence of the activities of the subject organization during the occupation.

The 1st Regular Manila Division was investigated by 1st Lt Leo S. Wortman Jr., formerly of the Guerrilla Affairs Division. Lt Wortman did not favorably consider the unit for recognition. From the report of investigation by Lt Wortman it is apparent that this unit was a "1945 guerrilla organization. The 1st Regular Division claims that it recruited 10 companies in 1945. This statement in itself indicates the type of organization it is. It is evident that very few of the members of the unit were attached to the U. S. forces. This is substantiated by the fact that the organization's commanding officer had the opportunity to attach his unit to the 1st Cavalry Division in late February 1945 but failed to do so. His reason for not attaching the unit to the 1st Cavalry Division was as follows: "we did not know what the status of our men would be". Apparently the commanding officer was more interested in the status of his men as guerrillas than driving the enemy from the city of Manila.

A report to Gen Stivers from Col Taylor has this to say about the 1st Regular Manila Division,.... "To my personal knowledge the 1st Regular Manila Division is a "Johnny come Lately" organization.... there were a number of recruiting stations in North Manila, recruiting for this division, and I am sure that was not at all a going concern upon our entry into Manila. "(Inc. 1) It is apparent that the Signal Company, a unit of this Division was as inactive before attachment as the rest of the organization.

The unit questionnaire states that the organization was completely unarmed. A claim of espionage and sabotage activity is made by the unit for the years of 1944. This statement is a direct contradiction to the

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original statement that the unit was formed in February 1945. No known results have been derived from the alleged intelligence activities claimed.

Evidence indicates that the Signal Company, 1st Regular Manila Division had itself attached to the U.S. liberating forces and were subsequently recognized; previous to this time no such unit existed. This is concurred in by Lt Wortman's previous investigation of the Manila Division.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the present recognition of the Signal Co., 1st Regular Manila Division, be not revised.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on Conversion Guerrilla Unit (Independent)

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer and 2nd Lt William MacMillan proceeded to Pantabagan, Nueva Ecija during March 1947 to investigate the Conversion Guerrilla Unit (Independent).

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements reflected in the findings:

Maj Robert B. Lapham	CO, LGAF
2nd Lt Ismael Linsangan	CO, Conversion Guer Unit
1st Sgt Patricio Genaro	Unit Member
T/Sgt Isidro Castro	" "
S/Sgt Tiburcio Dumlao	" "
Cpl Alberto Angelo	" "

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. This organization under the command of Ismael Linsangan consists of men who were members of many other guerrilla units, i.e., squadron 303, 303-A, 101, 268, 1, etc. Lt. Linsangan himself was a member of four different guerrilla units at the same time. In addition to his alleged guerrilla activity he was employed by the Japanese government as the principal teacher of Pantabangan Nueva Ecija School. The investigating officers believed that it was impossible for Ismael Linsangan to be active in three other organizations and still command his own unit successfully. Linsangan claims to be a 2nd Lt on his unit roster. A letter written by Col Stanly R. Larsen CO, 35th Inf, dated 28 April 1945 is addressed to M/Sgt Linsangan (Incl 1). Col Larsen also congratulates him on his recent promotion which was from Cpl to M/Sgt. Linsangan himself admits that he was carried as a corporal with duties of a clerk until his promotion to M/Sgt. On his guerrilla questionnaire (Incl 2) Linsagan swears he was promoted to 1st Lt on the 15 March 1945. An affidavit signed by Major Thomas Elyattingby M.C. dated 23 March 1945 (Incl 3) is made out to Cpl Ismael P. Linsangan. In other words there are three conflicting statements concerning the rank of the commanding Officer of this unit. It is apparent this man was a member of some organization as an enlisted man, but it is doubtful he was the commanding officer of the Conversion Guerrilla Unit.

Members of the unit interviewed by the investigating team did not know what their specific duties were. Patricio Genaro who claimed to be 1st Sgt of the Conversion Guerrilla Unit is carried on the roster as squad leader with the rank of Sgt. There is no 1st Sgt carried on the unit roster.

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Alberto Angelo claimed to be the unit clerk; Linsangan the CO stated he did all the clerical work for his organization. He puts forth this claim in that he had the knowledge in this line. The unit was a passive organization throughout the occupation. Members of the unit stated there was no Japanese garrison closer than Rizal, Nueva Ecija. The inaccessability to this area and lack of enemy activity made it ideal for guerrilla units to "take a rest". Affidavits in the unit file by American officers are devoid of evidence that this unit was ever attached to the liberating forces. Other than Cpl Linsangan it is apparent no other men from the organization were ever attached to American forces or participated as active guerrillas during the liberation. The lack of sufficient evidence to show the existence of a guerrilla organization, the various activities of the unit commander with many different guerrilla units, in addition to being employed by the Japanese, and the differences of statements of members interviewed, it is apparent that this unit was not maintained as a bonafide guerrilla organization.

c. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field. This is ascertained by the complete lack of activity by the Japanese occupation forces in the area. Since the Japanese very seldom patrolled this area, members lived at home.

d. Activities did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy. All members pursued their civilian occupations and lived at home.

e. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its commanding officer. Ismael Linsangan was a member of three other guerrilla units at the same time he acted as C.O. of the Conversion Guerrilla unit. It was impossible to control his unit and to be active with three other guerrilla units.

f. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity as the commanding officer as well as subordinates could not show any achievement or submit supporting evidence of any accomplishments during the occupation. Maj. Robert B. Lapham, commanding officer of LGAF stated that this unit was one of various little units whose members had originally had been part of the larger guerrilla organizations. Due to differences between the various guerrilla leaders they formed their own small organizations. By doing this they reduced their effectiveness as an active guerrilla unit.

g. Members of this unit did not devote their full effort to guerrilla activities. They all lived at home and supported their families by their civilian pursuits.

h. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. No members are worthy of recognition, and the unit suffered no casualties.

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4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that other than the two members previously recognized, the Conversion Guerrilla Unit, consisting of 40 men be not favorably considered for recognition.

WILLIAM D. MacMILLAN
2nd Lt Inf

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on "Independent Guerrilla Outfit"
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija

1. 1st Lieutenants K. H. Neubauer and E. Sta. Romana proceeded to Cabiao, Nueva Ecija on 18 February 1947, to investigate the Independent Guerrilla Outfit under the command of Capt F. Parungao.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (no history of this unit)

3. FINDINGS: a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements reflected in the findings:

Pablo Aligado	- - - - -	Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija			
Marcelo Crespo	- - - - -	Chief of Police, Cabiao, NE			
Capt Felipe Parungao	- - - - -	CO Independent Guerrilla Outfit			
Reynaldo Ortiz Luis	- - - - -	1st Lt Ex O	"	"	"
Leonardo Munsayac	- - - - -	2nd Lt	"	"	"
Salvador Ortiz	- - - - -	2nd Lt	"	"	"
Aurelio Munsayac	- - - - -	M/Sgt	"	"	"
Juan Talens	- - - - -	M/Sgt	"	"	"
Artenio Soto	- - - - -	T/Sgt	"	"	"
Jose Francisco	- - - - -	Sgt	"	"	"
Pedro dela Cruz	- - - - -	Pfc	"	"	"
Benjamin Gatdula	- - - - -	Pvt	"	"	"
Jose G. Ortiz Luis	- - - - -	Pvt	"	"	"

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. Felipe Parungao, the purported CO of the subject unit was also recognized as 1st Lt with the General Service Troops (GST), East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA).

No supporting evidence was presented to substantiate this unit's claim of having been engaged in intelligence, sabotage, or propaganda activities. Capt Parungao was questioned on how he could have been active with the General Service Troops (GST) ECLGA, and simultaneously be able to command the Independent Guerrilla Outfit. Parungao stated that from time to time he would return to Cabiao to inform his unit of the latest guerrilla activities as learned from GST, ECLGA.

When questioned on why so many men held high ratings that in such a small organization, Capt Parungao stated that he personally knew these men and that he had given them these ratings because of their friendship. The enlisted personnel of the higher grades had no more specific duties than those of a lower grade.

Lack of arms indicates the unit offered little resistance to the Japanese forces. It is evident that an efficient organization was not maintained, nor had it offered resistance during the occupation.

c. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. Many members lived at home and pursued civilian occupations. Some officers were members of guerrilla units other than the Independent Guerrilla Outfit, therefore, knew little of its alleged activities.

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d. A definite organization was not established by this unit. Adequate records were not maintained by the unit. The unit had no records to indicate dates of joining or enlistments, dates of rank, promotions, or any records which would establish it as an organized guerrilla outfit. Ranks of members were excessive for the size of the command, and were not proportionate to U S Army or pre-war Philippine Army Table of Organization. Members of the unit did not know the duties of their grades or ranks.

e. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its commanding officer because officers and men on the roster were members of other guerrilla organizations. Capt Parungao could not effectively control his unit because of his extended periods of absence from it.

f. The unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity and organization because the commanding officer as well as subordinate officers cannot show evidence of any accomplishments during the occupation. Members of the unit had no idea of what their duties were, or to whom to report with information.

g. Chief of Police Marcelo Crespo stated that Capt Parungao was a member of another guerrilla organization, and that he had not heard of the Independent Guerrilla Outfit. The Mayor of Cabiao, Pablo Aligado stated that he had not heard of Capt Parungao or of his unit during the occupation.

h. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. There are no members worthy of recognition and there were no casualty sustained by this unit.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the Independent Guerrilla Outfit consisting of 115 men be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. WEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

ELISEO STA. ROMANA
1st Lt Inf

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Report on Allas Intelligence Unit

21 July 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer investigated the unit file of the Allas Intelligence Unit, to determine whether or not the recognized portion of the Allas Intelligence Unit deserves revision of its present recognition date. The Allas Intelligence unit was recognized by letter, Hqs USAFFE, FEPA 370.64 dated 1 April 1945, in the strength of 30 officers and men. The effective date of recognition was 25 June 1945.

2. HISTORY: (see attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The subject unit was organized by CIPRIANO S. ALLAS in the later part of August 1942 by the alleged authority of Capt C. J. Cushing. The organization was initially a unit in the LGF. A majority of its members were inducted between the 25 August 1942 and 2 November 1942. The existence of this unit was short lived as its commanding officer was captured in May 1943; the unit subsequently disintegrated. This has been admitted by Allas in a letter to the Chief of Staff, Army of the Philippines (Incl 1) dated 28 Dec 1944. After the disintegration of the organization members joined other guerrilla units, i.e. LGAF, 14th Infantry, VOICKMANN's Guerrillas, and the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA. It is evident that the short period of time this unit was in existence, (10 months) it could not have not been a very active unit. Approximately one half the time the organization existed, (4 months) it endeavored to recruit members. If a well organized unit existed in May 1943, the capture of the CO, Allas, should have made little difference in the successful functioning of the organization. This was not the case. No mention of any activities is made by Allas that the unit was active during the 10 months it existed.

Allas states that the unit was subdivided into the following categories; operations, combat section, and propaganda section. Activities are nil as listed under the combat section. The propaganda section was commanded by one Lt Cristobal and no record of its activities exist. As stated previously, there is no evidence that the unit ever operated as an intelligence unit, during the occupation.

After released from prison Allas contacted the Commanding Officer of the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA, another purported guerrilla unit. The commanding officer of the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA, Ferdinand Marcos, assigned Allas as an intelligence officer in Pangasinan. Allas claims to have been a member of this unit from his date of release until the 28th of August 1945 (Inc 2 Page 1). Allas was not a member of another guerrilla unit since his own organization, the Allas Intelligence Unit did not exist. Allas states that some of the members of his former unit joined him as an intelligence operatives. This may be true, but these men were now members of the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA unit, not the Allas Intelligence Unit (Inc 3). A close

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scrutiny of the roster of the Ang Mga Maharlika unit reveals that many members were also on the rosters of the Allas Intelligence Unit. Following are examples of these duplications in rosters.

Allas Int. Unit

Donato Ancheta, 2nd Lt
Guloy Constantiano, 2nd Lt
Olavidez Felipe, 3rd Lt
Rodriguez Victoriano, M/Sgt

Ang Mga Maharlika

Donato Ancheta, 1st Lt, CO, Co "C"
Guloy C. 1st Lt "C" Co.
Olavidez Felipe, 2nd Lt "C" Co
Rodriguez, 2d Lt "C" Co

From the known facts, it is apparent that many members are listed by both units. It is improbable that the above listed members could have actively engaged in guerrilla activities with two guerrilla organizations at the same time. This information would substantiate the fact that the Allas Intelligence Unit was an inactive unit, if it at all existed. These fact further substantiate the existence of collusion between many guerrilla leaders in submitting as member of their unit men that are already members of other guerrilla organizations.

With the arrival of the liberating forces Allas had himself and 29 other men attached to the 25th Division and were subsequently recognized. He submitted a roster to the Judge Advocate of the 25th Division and called his unit the "Allas Intelligence Unit". In other words he now revived his long dead unit (May 1943) and had them recognized. Available evidence conclusively proves that the Allas Intelligence Unit did not exist from May 1943, until attached with the 25th Div during the liberation. In its short existence from Aug 42 to May 43 the unit did not exist as an organized guerrilla outfit. Insufficient evidence has been presented to warrant the revision of the organizations present recognition dates.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: Cipriano S. Allas is at present serving as a senator in the Congress of the Philippines.

5. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the present date of recognition of the Allas Intelligence Unit be not revised.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt ·CAC

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Revision Report
Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment

9 August 1948

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer examined the unit file and reports investigations of the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment to determine whether that unit deserves revision of its present recognition dates. The Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment consists of the following non-standard Philippine Army units.

<u>Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date Recognized</u>	<u>Auth. & dte Auth.</u>
Hq	20	1 Apr 1945	Hq AFPAC, 20 Aug 45
Special Int. Squad	7	1 Apr 1945	" " "
<u>1st Battalion</u>			
Hq	8	1 Jun 1945	Hq AFPAC, 16 Jul 45
Sqd "B"	111	4 Apr 1945	Hq AFPAC, 17 Jun 45
<u>2nd Battalion</u>			
	352	12 Apr 1945	Hq AFPAC, 17 Jun 45
Hq Det		"	" "
Med Pltn		"	" "
Aqd "D"		"	" "
Sqd "E"		"	" "
Sqd "F"		"	" "
Sqd "C"	110	5 May 1945	Hq AFPAC, 2 Jul 45

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS: a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings.

Maj Robert B. Lapham	CO, LGAF
Capt Benigno Tabora Jr	GAD
1st Lt Joseph C. Altman	GAD
Capt Federico Sonaco	CO Thorpe Guerrilla Regt.
Capt Mariano O. Fabro	CO 1st Bn, subject unit

b. Record of service was substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. Federico Sonaco joined USAFFE, LGF in August 1942, and served in the capacity of a courier of Col Thorpe's Headquarters (Incl 1). Col Thorpe's plan to unite all guerrillas on Luzon and to expand his organization as rapidly as conditions warranted, entailed him to commission deserving members of his unit as squadron commanders. Sonaco was one of the members commissioned as a 3rd Lt on 24 August 1942 (Incl 2). On 5 October 1942 Sonaco was directed by Thorpe to organize a battalion of guerrillas which would operate in Southern Pangasinan (Incl 3).

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The expansion of the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment from its inception in October 1942 until attachment is grouped into four phases of development. These four phase will be expanded upon in the subsequent paragraphs.

5 Oct 1942 - 1 May 1943: During the latter months of 1942 Sonaco's unit consisted of seven men which were to serve as a nucleus for the expected future expansion of the organization. These seven men participated as full time guerrillas as their entire efforts were devoted to the guerrilla movement. The initial activities of the unit were directed towards securing arms, ammunition, and supplies of a nature that would be of material value or future benefit to the organization and the guerrilla movement. A letter addressed to Capt Sonaco verifies the fact that the campaign for equipment was being carried out successfully by the members of the organization (Incl 4). During this period of organization the unit was also active against the Japanese. The unit ambushed members of the Japanese garrison at Carmen Rosales, Pangasinan in the early part of 1943; the number of Japanese engaged by Sonaco's men was placed at 18. Sonaco could not state how many casualties were inflicted on the Japanese as his unit used "hit and run" tactics; therefore the unit did not know what the result of this action was. It is noted that there were more than seven persons involved in this incident, but the small group of Sonaco's unit were in command of the action; other individuals that participated joined the action on the spur of the moment.

Intelligence activities were also engaged in by the unit during this period. A complete report of the Japanese garrison at Urdaneta, Pangasinan in relation to strength, weapons, and fortifications was secured. This report was later submitted to Capt Hunt, who was co-ordinating operations in the area.

1 May 1943 - 1 July 1944: During 1943 the unit directed its efforts toward continued organization, increasing its strength, training, and activities against the Japanese. Attached as inclosures 5-6-7-9-10 are reports of progress of this mission. The inclosures contain a report of the many new members, but all did not devote their entire efforts toward the guerrilla movement. In May Sonaco's unit had increased to a total of seventy five (75) members who were devoting their entire efforts to the guerrilla cause. Many other individuals listed as members assisted the organization in its activities, but only on a part time basis. Activities during 1943 consisted of ambushing enemy soldiers and convoys, intelligence reports on enemy movements, reports on strength and disposition of enemy troops, training, and some members were utilized as guards at the units' headquarters to warn of the approaching enemy (Incl 6-7-8).

Training of the unit was conducted in small groups throughout the different barrios in which the unit was active. This training was conducted by the members of the unit who in addition to training men carried on with their other specified duties. Intelligence reports were submitted to Sonaco's Hq by his agents who were now scattered throughout most of Pangasinan.

The strength of the unit as far as fully active members were concerned increased little during the latter months of 1943 and early 1944 due to the Japanese anti-guerrilla campaigns and amnesty declarations; however, it is noted that the loyal members of the unit continued to harass the enemy in as many ways as possible.

1 July 1944 - 31 January 1945: Activities in the latter part of 1944 consisted of sabotage, intelligence, ambushes, searching for supplies, patrolling, and such other duties that were included in maintaining the organization. Sonaco's campaign to induce people to join the guerrilla movement was successful to the extent that by July 1944 his organization had 125 members serving as full time guerrillas. The organization as a paper unit consisted of hundreds of members, (Incl 11) but these people made sporadic contributions to the organization and were not devoting their entire efforts to the cause. It is noteworthy that these small contributions made by many individuals, though it did not qualify them to be classified as guerrillas, was of great value to the efforts of the active members of the unit.

Intelligence reports of the unit were submitted to Capt Hunt who was under the command of Major Lapham, CO LGAF. (Inc 13 to 15). The intelligence reports submitted by the unit were of a high caliber as verified by Hunt (Incl 12). Capt Hunt had a high regard for Sonaco's unit as is evidenced by a letter sent to Major Lapham, but because of some misunderstanding and hostile acts, Sonaco's unit was never integrated with the LGAF (Incl 16).

The unit while increasing its tempo of training still was actively engaged against the Japanese as is evidenced by the increasing number of ambushes and raids against the enemy. In July 1944 at Bacog, Villasis, Pangasinan, a group of men from the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment ambushed approximately 25 Japanese soldier in which the familiar tactics of hitting the enemy and withdrawing was used as in previous encounters. In the latter part of 1944 a Japanese machine gun was captured while engaging the enemy at Bautista, Pangasinan. Another engagement with the enemy at the airport in San Miguel, Tarlac resulted in the capture of two Japanese machine guns in addition to other equipment.

When it became evident that the liberation of the Philippines by the United States Forces was an early expectation, the part time guerrillas within Sonaco's unit clamored to devote their entire efforts to the guerrilla cause. In January 1945 Sonaco's unit which now numbered 175 active guerrillas suddenly became a huge organization with a strength of over 1600 men. It is noted that the great majority of these men were unarmed and up to this time had contributed to the guerrilla movement only on a part time basis.

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31 January 1945-1 April 1945: During January 1945 Capt Sonaco contacted Col Lassetter of the United States Forces, and was informed by Col Lassetter to await the arrival of the U.S. troops (Incl 17). Capt Sonaco requested that his organization be attached to the U.S. Forces, but was advised that a decision on the matter had to be made by a higher headquarters. While waiting for this decision Sonaco was advised by Col Lassetter to supply intelligence reports to the U.S. Hq. that this order was carried out satisfactorily can be ascertained by two communications from the Hq U.S. Forces to Capt Sonaco, complimenting him on the accomplishment of the mission assigned his unit (Incl 18-19).

In April 1945 Capt Sonaco had a small group of his organization attached to U.S. units, by 12 April 1945 nearly 400 men were attached; subsequent attachments took place until by 1 June 1945 there were 608 members of the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment serving with the United States Armed Forces.

c. The unit was maintained satisfactorily in the field against the enemy. This has been substantiated by Major Robert B. Lapham, CO, LGAF who knew Sonaco. Major Lapham stated that Sonaco maintained a unit in the field, and that there are members in Sonaco's unit worthy for recognition during the Japanese occupation. Further corroboration of the activities of this unit are made by Capt Benigno Tabora Jr. who has a personnel knowledge of guerrilla activities in Pangasinan. Capt Tabora stated that Sonaco and his organization were active through-out the period that the Japanese were occupying the country. Lt Joseph C. Altman of this branch, who investigated a supplementary roster of the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment, stated that from the facts gathered during the investigation, it is apparent that Capt Sonaco and an undetermined number of men were active through-out the Japanese occupation, and should be considered for revision of their present dates of recognition.

d. A definite organization was established. The authorization to organize this unit was given to Capt Sonaco by Col Thorpe, the direct representative of General MacArthur. The organization was maintained as a cohesive military unit through-out the occupation.

e. The unit had satisfactory continuity of activity and organization. From the unit's inception in October 1942 it maintained an organization with a definite program for its anticipated activities, aims, and expansion. The members listed on the roster participated in the guerrilla movement whole-heartedly and devoted their entire energies for its continued existence.

f. Activities of the unit materially contributed to the eventual defeat of the enemy. Intelligence reports by this unit were of excellent quality and were used by the Liberation Force in action against the enemy. Destruction of Japanese property, raids, and ambushes against the enemy were carried out whenever possible.

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g. A casualty roster consisting of 44 listed names has been submitted by the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment to the Casualty Section, Guerrilla Affairs Division. This casualty roster has been favorably acted upon.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the present recognition dates of the Thorpe Guerrilla Regiment be revised as follows:

<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date</u>
7	5 October 1942
75	1 May 1943
125	1 July 1944
175	31 January 1945

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on General Makabulos Memorial
USAFFE Guerrilla Forces (Independent)

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer and 1st Lt Leon J. Sonder proceeded to La Paz, Tarlac, to investigate the General Makabulos Memorial USAFFE, Guerrilla Forces, (Independent).

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS: aThe following persons ere interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings:

Artemio Castaneda	Capt, Co Cmdr, Squad 403
Pumentel	Capt, Bn Cmdr, 3rd Bn, 1st Tarlac Regt (ECLGA)
Leon E, Parungao	Maj, CO, Makabulos Memorial, USAFFE
Cecilis de Guzman	Sgt. Unit Member
Procapes Miguel	1st Lt " "
Buenaventura Castro	1st Lt " "
Felipe P. Custodio	1st Lt " "
Torribio de la Reyes	1st Lt " "
Arcenio Galma	T/Sgt " "
Bonifacio Dangea	S/Sgt " "
Bernabe Guerrero	1st Lt " "
Mariano Lagman	Pfc " "
Florente Rivera	S/Sgt " "
Felix Wignel	S/Sgt " "
Victor Timbong	Pfc " "
Cifriano Gabriel	Sgt " "
Serrilani Timbang	Pvt " "
Francisco Ponidor	S/Sgt " "

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. This organization under Leon Parungao remained absolutely possitive during the occupation period. It was not in any sense an organized guerrilla unit as all the members lived at home and supported themselves by their civilian occupation. The CO stated his organization was not active against the enemy during the occupation; its main function was to keep up the morale of the people, and to act as a home guard unit whenever other active guerrilla units were not in the area. The members of the unit lacked arms as whatever arms they had were turned over to other guerrilla units. The unit had very little to do as a home guard organization as the town of La Paz had only one squad (about 12 men) of Japanese soldiers commanded by a corporal to maintain its occupation policies. The CO of the unit state that his organization was disbanded at the time the American Forces entered their area which was January 1945. He also stated his organization was not attached to any American units. This organization had no attachment papers, rosters, induction papers, or any affidavits which would establish them as a guerrilla unit. Members of the unit interviewed by the investigating team did not know what Bn., company or squad they belonged to. They did not know their officers or what their duties were.

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Officers of the unit interviewed did not know who their men were, who other officers of the unit were or what specific duties they were to carry out. Questioning Maj Parungao about this he stated he had no specific organizational set up and the only reason there is a roster in the unit file which conforms to a T/O is because the United States Army had requested it when he submitted his unit for recognition. Due to the lack of evidence to support guerrilla activities, lack of organization and activity admitted by the unit CO it clearly indicates this unit never was a bona-fide guerrilla unit and had never opposed the enemy during the occupation.

c. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. The members of the unit lived at home and pursued their civilian occupations. Squadron 403 and the 1st Tarlac Regt (ECLGA) recognized guerrilla units operated in this area and two members of these units stated that the Makabulos Memorial unit had not been active at any time during the occupation. All members interviewed admitted living at home and carrying on with their farming.

d. A definite organization was not established. Members of the unit had no specific duties assigned to them for the ranks they held. The CO Maj Parungao was mayor of La Paz and therefore could not devote his time to guerrilla activities as he was under the eyes of the Japanese forces. No rosters were kept, neither were dates of enlistment, joining, promotions or any other affidavits showing a well organized unit.

e. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its commanding officer. Major Parungao was Mayor of La Paz and under Japanese scrutiny so was unable to be very active with the unit. Other officers knew very little of the organization they were a member of, so they lacked control of their units.

f. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity because the commanding officer as well as his subordinates cannot show any achievement during the occupation. Capt Artemio Castaneda who was a company commander in Squadron 403 (a recognized guerrilla squad) stated that Leon Parungao's unit was an inactive organization. He stated they acted as home guards and tried to maintain law and order in La Paz and surrounding barrios when the other active guerrilla units were not present. Capt Pimentel, Bn Commander of the 3rd Bn, 1st Tarlac Regt (ECLGA) (a recognized regiment) who also knew of Maj Parungao's unit also stated it was a passive unit. He stated they acted in capacity of home guards if needed. He also stated that Maj Parungao's unit was disbanded in Jan 1945 as they had no weapons and were of no use to the American Forces.

g. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. There are no members worthy of recognition, and a casualty roster has been submitted.

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4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the General Makabulos Memorial USAFFE Guerrilla Forces (Independent) consisting of 520 men be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

LEON J. SONNERS
1st Lt CAC

Report on 206 Squadron USAFFE LGAF

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer and 1st Lt Leon J. Sonders, proceeded to Guimba, Nueva Ecija during April 1947 to investigate the supplementary roster of Squadron 206, USAFFE LGAF.

2. Alleged HISTORY: (See Attached Unit File)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons are interviewed and their statements reflected in the findings.

Maj De Leon	CO 206 Squadron
2nd Lt Jose T. Valmonte	S-2 206 "
Pvt Florentino Monoyan	Unit Member
Sgt Jose U. Ullip	" "
Pvt Petronilo Toribio	" "
Pvt Miguel Calpito	" "
Pvt Emeterio Cabrero	" "
Pvt Norberto Calpito	" "
Cpl Rosendo Minor	" "
Cpl Marcial Buja	" "

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. This organization under Maj De Leon has had 247 men previously recognized. There is insufficient evidence that the thirty four (34) men on the supplementary roster deserve recognition. In fact it is very probable that this roster of 34 men was simply made up by Lt Valmonte so as to gain recognition for himself. This conclusion was brought about in questioning the CO, Maj De Leon. He stated that five (5) men on this supplementary roster have already been recognized. Five more were deserters of the unit to other organizations or simply were afraid to be active guerrillas, and eight (8) more were killed. These eight include the captured, as Maj De Leon stated that these men never returned so were presumed killed by the Japanese. This leaves only sixteen (16) men that actually could be accounted for. Of these sixteen men more were present for the investigation. Maj De Leon's attitude in helping to gain recognition for these men was one of indifference. He was notified a week in advance that the contact team would be there to interview these men. Upon the investigation teams arrival Maj De Leon had to be sent for to give evidence in behalf of his men. In questioning Maj De Leon about the omission of these thirty four (34) men from the original roster of Squad 206, he stated LGAF Hq. forgot to add the names. Lt Valmonte stated that the original roster of squad 206 was lost, and a new one made and these 34 men were overlooked in the new roster. The unit history states these men were used to round up remnants of Japanese forces and to render aid to the 201st CIC. In other words, these are three different versions of why these men were not on the original roster.

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Hq. AFWESPAC which recognized 247 men of squad 206 also wanted to know why these men were not inclosed on the original roster (see Incl 1). Questioning Maj De Leon on why the deserters were carried on the roster and why they deserted he stated that when it was time to engage in combat against the enemy these men decided to go home but had been members of squad 206. Questioning Lt Valmonte on why these deserters were added to the roster and why they deserted, he stated the men were tired of waiting for action so they joined other units that were fighting the Japanese but originally had been members of squad 206. Since there are two conflicting statements about the deserters being added to the roster, the investigating officers came to the conclusion Lt Valmonte simply added these names to gain recognition for a few more men. None of the deserters were present at the investigation so the investigating team could not get their statements. All other members interviewed were from the recognized elements of squad 206 which indicate the supplementary roster may be a fraud. On questioning Maj De Leon about the casualties on the roster, he became very vague. He stated that most of them were captured and presumed killed as they had not returned to their organization. Casualty rosters were given to the CO., the weeks previously on the initial contact, and had not yet been filled out which again shows the indifference of these men by the unit commanding officer. Lt Valmonte knew nothing of the casualties except that he had added them to the supplementary roster. From the indifference of the commanding officer Maj De Leon towards this roster of his men, and the conflicting statements of the members interviewed gives a clear indication that these men on the supplementary roster did nothing with the recognized elements of squadron 206 during the Japanese occupation or during the liberation period.

c. The unit (supplementary roster of 34 men) was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. Members of this roster already had been killed by the Japanese. Others had deserted which indicates these men had not engaged in any guerrilla activities.

d. A definite organization was not established by this (supplementary roster of 34 men) unit. Some members of this unit deserted their organization so can not claim guerrilla activities. Others were captured or killed which indicates they could not be members of an organization for any further guerrilla activities.

e. The unit (supplementary roster of 34 men) did not show satisfactory continuity of activity as the men that had been killed, captured or deserted, no longer came under of the commanding officer. No other members were present to show of any accomplishments during the occupation or liberation.

f. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. No members are worthy of recognition and a casualty roster has been submitted.

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4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that other than the 247 men previously recognized in Squadron 206 USAFFE LGAF this supplementary roster consisting of 34 men, be not favorably considered for recognition.

LEON J. SONNERS
1st Lt CAC

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

Report on Morelos Regiment (Independent)

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Authority NND 883078

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H Neubauer investigated the unit file, reports of investigation, and statements by disinterested individuals to determine whether or not the recognized portion of the Morelos Regiment (Independent) deserves revision of present recognition dates. The Morelos Regiment was recognized in strength of 955 officers and men, by letter, Headquarters, AFPAC, dated 22 July 1945, AG 370.64, whose effective date of recognition was 15 May 1945.

2. HISTORY: (See attached unit file.)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements are reflected in the findings:

Lt Pete C Breaz

Guerrilla Affairs Division

b. The subject unit was organized in September 1942, and was originally commanded by Col Nemisio Morales. It was initially associated with the ECLGA. After the arrest and imprisonment of officers of the ECLGA this unit became inactive. (Incl 1, Page 1) Later, acting upon the advice of Col Hugh Straughn this regiment transferred its affiliations to Marking's Fil-American Guerrillas for a more unified command. In 1943 Col Morelos was captured and later died in prison. The unit again became disorganized. Control of the unit passed to Pablo Ynchausti who also was captured by the Japanese in August 1943. He was subsequently imprisoned until about September 1944. After the capture of Ynchausti the unit ceased activities. Control of the unit passed into the hands of one Velasco, and the unit began to function to some extent. There is no evidence that the organization operated as a unit during the occupation. This is confirmed by the evidence that the unit was organized, then ceased to function, then organized, ceased to function again, and reorganized and functioned to some extent. Additional information to confirm this belief is that the members of the unit were scattered from Pasay to Baclaran (Rizal) with one company located at San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. The commanding officer had very little contact with his unit. This is borne out by the fact that he met his subordinate officers only twice a month. From these facts, it is apparent that very little control existed between officers and men of the unit.

The Morelos Regiment's most important activities consisted of sending intelligence reports to MFAT. At the peak of its activities this unit submitted 5-10 maps, and 7-10 pages of intelligence reports to GHQ MFAT every two weeks. The reliability of the information conveyed is questionable, and there is no record of any positive action as a result of the maps and reports submitted by the unit. The majority of the unit members are from Pasay and lived at home. Unit members worked at civilian occupations, (many

for the Japanese and Japanese concerns). The amount of intelligence reports gathered considering the unit's strength (955) does not indicate a very active participation in guerrilla activities by the unit members.

There is no evidence that this unit ever fought against the enemy. (Incl 1, Page 2) A Major Vicente Juado, a member of the subject unit, stated: "It was very difficult to be active in those days" (occupation period). An intelligence unit such as this one claims to have been seems to have a grossly exaggerated amount of casualties. The unit claims 43 casualties, broken down into the following categories: one wounded in action, five missing in action, two died in line of duty, twenty-five killed in line of duty, ten killed in action. Since the unit did not engage in any skirmish, encounter, or engagement with the Japanese it seems that the list of casualties claimed is not commensurate with the unit's activities. It is known that many people suspected of guerrilla activities were incarcerated by the Japanese, and later died in prison, even though these suspicions as guerrillas were groundless. This does not warrant a person, claiming to have been a guerrilla, to be recognized as such in a casualty status. It is claimed that members of this unit were imprisoned in Fort Santiago, but from the basis of the unit's activities it seems improbable. It is apparent that civilians who were imprisoned during reprisal raids by the Japanese claim guerrilla activity because of this imprisonment. (Incl 1, Page 3) Others that were executed are claimed to have been killed in the line of duty. (Incl 1, Page 3) It has been claimed by the beneficiaries of casualties killed in action that these people were attached to the 11th Airborne Division in Cavite, Pasay, and at Nielson Field. This unit does not claim to have been attached to the 11th Airborne Division. It is believed that some members of this unit attached themselves to the 11th Airborne Division and subsequently were killed in action. Members, claimed to have died in the line of duty, may have died of many causes, i.e., malaria, typhus, malnutrition, typhoid, etc. It is known that such ravages of nature, and war, do not confine themselves to guerrillas. There is no basis for claim that the persons who DIED were guerrillas, and not civilians added to a casualty roster. (Incl 1, Page 3) The unit was initially recognized as of 15 May 1945. From the casualty roster submitted it is known that the unit did not suffer any casualty during the time it was recognized. This indicates a lack of activity of the unit during the time it should have been at a peak of activity. If this is the case it is strange that so many of the unit's casualties happened months before the unit was recognized. From the facts presented in regards to the unit's activities it is believed if members of the Morelos Regiment became casualties it was because of their own initiative in attaching themselves to U.S. units, and not through the attachment of the Morelos Regiment as a combat unit.

This unit has failed to submit any further evidence of activities previous to the time it was recognized by the U.S.

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Army. It is felt that the press release dated 27 March 1946 which stated in substance that all recognized guerrilla units would receive revision of dates if so warranted, was given wide enough publicity by press and radio, and that if this unit warranted further recognition they would have submitted evidence substantiating their claim. It is believed that the recognition of 955 members of this unit for the actual amount of information submitted appears to be more than just and adequate for the services rendered.

c. Comments on Lt Breaz' Recommendation for Revision:

The recommendation for the revision of one platoon of this unit was made by Lt Pete C Breaz. He recommended that that this platoon be revised to approximately 15 September 1944. This recommendation was made when the unit was considered a part of Marking's Fil-Americans, an over-all command. As a unit of an over-all command it could receive a representative number of men. Lt Breaz concurs that if each individual member's activities were taken into consideration and evaluated there is no evidence present to warrant the revision of the unit's recognition dates.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

This unit has no apparent political affiliations nor aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the Morelos Regiment (Independent) be not favorably considered for revision of present recognition dates.

KENNETH H NEUBAUER
1st Lt, CAC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883078

Report on the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters
Combat Team

25 July 1947

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H Neubauer investigated the unit files, reports of investigation and disinterested persons, to determine whether the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team deserves revision of its present recognition date. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was recognized by letter, Hq. USAFFE, FEPA 370.64, dated 1 April 1945. The effective date of recognition was 1 April 1945.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file.)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed, and their statements are reflected in the findings:

1st Lt Marion C Allbright	Guerrilla Aff Div
2nd Lt Pete C Breaz	" " "
2nd Lt Bruce Bromley Jr	" " "
2nd Lt Raul De Rivera	" " "

b. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was ordered to organize on 19 February 1945, with Horacio L. Ilagen as the commanding officer. The authority for activation of this unit was made by memo from Headquarters, Guerrilla Forces, Tagaytay City, dated 19 February 1945, by order of General Swing. (Incl 2, Page 1) It was attached for duty with the 11th Airborne Division, and subsequently recognized with the strength of 89 officers and men.

c. Previous to the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team's activation, its members were part of the Rillo-Neri Unit. The Rillo-Neri Unit was not favorably considered for recognition during the initial investigation conducted by Lt Max L Brabson, formerly of the Guerrilla Affairs Division. A second investigation conducted by Lts Bruce Bromley Jr, Pete C Breaz, and Raul De Rivera, of this division, during February 1947, again rendered an unfavorable decision for recognition. A reconsideration of the unit was undertaken by Lt Marion C Allbright of this division, during July 1947, and for the third time the unit was not favorably considered for recognition. The above facts are presented on the Rillo-Neri Unit, as the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team, is an integral part of the Rillo-Neri Unit. (Incl 1)

d. The combat company of the Rillo-Neri Unit, (Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team) was organized in February

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1945. From the unit history it states that the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team personnel were from the Rillo-Neri Unit. (Incl 2, Page 2) Since the activities of the Rillo-Neri Unit did not warrant recognition, the members of the combat team, who were recruited from the various elements of the overall organization have no basis for revision.

e. Activities claimed by the Rillo-Neri Unit which necessarily would be claimed by the combat Team are as follows: (Incl 3)

- (1) Gathering of arms and ammunition
- (2) Bolstering morale of the people
- (3) Sabotage, and elimination of Japanese spies
- (4) Contributions to needy families
- (5) Maintenance of peace and order
- (6) Intelligence reports
- (7) Patrols

f. The gathering of arms and ammunition has been refuted by the reports of investigation by Lts Brabson and Bromley. Lt Brabson states that practically none of the men interviewed had weapons during the occupation. Lts Bromley and Brabson both state in their reports that many of the men deserted the unit because of its passive activities.

g. Though contributing to the needy families in the area is a commendable act, it cannot be considered guerrilla activity nor can bolstering the morale of the people be classified as guerrilla activity. Maintenance of peace and order would be classified as home guard duties.

h. Alleged activities in regard to intelligence, patrols, and sabotage are not substantiated by sufficient evidence. There is no record of any positive action taken as a result of this activity. This claim is further refuted by Cmdr Rowe who states that guerrilla organizations in Batangas were very small and of no worth. It is apparent that since this unit was a passive organization its claims are highly exaggerated.

i. The unit file contains orders, memorandums, etc. from Major Vanderpool, and Capt Schommer, coordinators of guerrilla activity in this area. The unit's claim because of these orders is not substantiated. In many cases such orders were distributed to many purported guerrilla organizations. Evidence of activity cannot be claimed simply by the possession of such orders. This fact is further substantiated by the fact that the Rillo-Neri Unit was not favorably considered by three investigations made by this Headquarters.

j. From the evidence presented it is apparent that the

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Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team did not exist previous to its attachment to the 11th Airborne Division. Until the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was organized, the members of the subject unit were from various components of the Rillo-Neri Unit. As a component of the Rillo-Neri Unit, insufficient evidence has been presented to warrant any further dates of recognition.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team be not favorably considered for revision of its present date of recognition.

KENNETH H NEUBAUER
1st Lt, CAC

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Report on Reconsideration for Revision of Dates of Recognition of the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team.

19 November 1947

1. INTRODUCTION:

On 19 November 1947 1st Lt Kenneth H Neubauer made a thorough and complete restudy of the unit file of the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team. The unit commander was contacted prior to submitting this report on the subject organization.

RECAPITULATION:

The subject unit was initially investigated for revision of dates of recognition by 1st Lt Kenneth H Neubauer on 1 August 1947. A report of findings is attached to this report. (Incl 1)

A letter from this headquarters dated 5 August 1947, notified Mr. Horacio Ilagen, Commanding Officer of the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team of the unfavorable decision rendered on the subject unit in regard to revision of dates.

During the latter part of August 1947, Mr. Ilagen visited this office to request reconsideration of the unfavorable decision rendered regarding revision of dates of the subject unit. Mr. Ilagen at this time presented additional evidence to be used for any future action which might be taken on the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team.

On 8 September 1947 a letter requesting reconsideration was received by this headquarters from Ilagen together with additional evidence to support Ilagen's claim for revision.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See unit file)

3. FINDINGS: The reinvestigation of the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team is primarily concerned with the period 5 March 1945 to 1 April 1945 for which there is evidence to attachment to the 158th RCT and to various elements of the 11th Airborne Division. Previous to the units purported attachment and throughout the entire occupation period the unit shows insufficient continuity of service to warrant any revision of recognition dates. (Incl 1, page 2)

a. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was originally organized as an integral part of the Rillo-Neri Unit. As indicated by a previous report of investigation (Incl 1) activities of the Rillo-Neri Unit were not of such a nature to warrant guerrilla recognition. Of the many orders which concern this unit it is noted that the organization was referred to as the Rillo-Neri Unit, or Combat Company, Rillo-Neri Unit. Official orders later changed the name of the Rillo-Neri Combat Company to the

Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team; therefore this report will refer to the subject unit as the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team.

b. Evidence recently submitted by Horacio Ilagen which Guerrilla Affairs Division did not possess at the time of the initial investigation for revision of dates, indicates that the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was attached to the 158th RCT, and the 187th RCT, 11th Airborne Division, prior to its present official recognition date, 1 April 1945.

c. As indicated in the previous report of investigation, the unit claims to have been active from 31 January 1945 throughout the liberation period. This claim is advanced by the C.O., Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team who bases his contention on orders sent to the CO of the Rillo-Neri Unit by Major Vanderpool and Capt Schomer. There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that the Combat Company of the Rillo-Neri Unit was the unit these orders pertained to. Guerrilla activity cannot be claimed by the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Company by orders which were sent to the overall Rillo-Neri organization. It has been determined that the activities of the overall Rillo-Neri Unit were not sufficient in nature to warrant guerrilla recognition during the period 31 Jan 45 until arrival of the 11th AB Div. No evidence has been presented to warrant recognition of the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team, an integral part of the Rillo-Neri Unit during the above period.

d. On 19 February 1945, a memo from Hq 11th Airborne Division, in substance stated that only guerrilla units authorized and inducted by Hq 11th Airborne Division (through Major Vanderpool) will be recognized. (Par 2, Incl 2) Following this order Capt Schomer (U.S. Army Liaison Officer) called a conference of representatives of various guerrilla units in the area for the purpose of attaching them to United States Army Forces. On 22 February the Rillo-Neri Unit was told to organize a staff and one combat company. This Combat Company which at this time was designated the Rillo-Neri Combat Company ultimately became the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team. On 2 March 1945 the roster of the Combat Company was submitted to Hq 11th AB Div. (Incl 3) It is noted that the roster lists more individuals than were finally recognized. Subsequent to the submission of this roster members of the combat team were attached and utilized by the U.S. Forces, but not in the strength listed on this roster. This accounts for the recognition of only approximately 60 members of the unit.

e. On 4 March 1945 an order signed by Major Bleiden S-2, 158th Regimental Combat Team, to the CO 187th Regt, 11th Airborne Div., states that certain guerrilla units (Lipa Guerrilla Hq Combat Team included) pass to the control of the CO 158th RCT per VOOG 11th Airborne Division, effective 0011 5 March 1945. (Incl 4)

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f. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team operated with the 158th RCT from 5 March to 15 March 1947. Combat operations which the unit participated in were as follows: Himalas Garrison at Balayan, Batangas; Mt San Piro, Balayan, Batangas; Mt Item, Calatagan, Batangas and mopping up operations in the towns of Balayan and Calaca, Batangas. Though there are no attachment papers from officers of the 158th RCT other than the original attachment paper signed by Major Bleiden, it does not appear feasible that Ilagen could have been able to name individuals of the various American Army Units whom it is known were in charge of these various operations without having been personally in contact with them. Further evidence to substantiate the units claim of attachment to the 158th RCT is Lt Col Vanderpool's letter to this headquarters in which he states: "The Rillo-Neri Unit, (Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team) was attached to the 158th Regimental Combat Team when that organization was operating under the 11th Airborne Division... It later reverted to one of the 11th Airborne Regiments." (Incl 5)

g. On 15 March 1945 the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was ordered to Cuenca, Batangas, to report to the CO of the 187th Para-Glider Regt. It was placed under the supervision of a Lt Parker, Guerrilla Affairs Officer of the 187th Regt and assigned a sector around Mt Dito, San Jose, Batangas. The unit remained under Lt Parkers supervision until the 26th of March 1945. On 26 March 1945, Major Schomer ordered the unit to report to a Lt A P McDonald at Guerrilla Hq, Alitagtag, Batangas and from Alitagtag the unit proceeded to and was stationed at Taal, Batangas. There is no signed attachment paper to conclusively prove that the unit was attached to the 187th P/G Regt and under the supervision of Lt Parker but Ilagen has such an extensive knowledge of activities of the 187th P/G Regt and is so specific in regards to dates and areas of activities of his unit with the 11th Airborne Div it is unlikely that the evidence recently submitted is of late manufacture. Lt Col Vanderpool's testimony in corroboration of attachment to the 11th Airborne Division and to various regiments of the 11th Airborne Div is conclusive enough to support the claimed attachments of the unit to the 158th RCT and 187th Regt previous to its present recognition date.

h. The Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team was attached to various units of the 11th Airborne Division during April, May, June, and July, 1945; since the unit was recognized as of 1 April 1945 it is unnecessary to discuss attachments and activities after the initial date of recognition.

i. Evidence which is of importance to the unit is the redesignation of the unit from the Rillo-Neri Unit to the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team. On 9 May 1945, Guerrilla Headquarters, 11th Airborne Division, officially redesignated the Rillo-Neri Unit to Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team. The

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effective date of change of unit designation was 1 April 1945. The order was signed by A P McDonald, 1st Lt CAC, USA, Guerrilla Coordinator. (Incl 6)

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the recognized portion of the Lipa Guerrilla Headquarters Combat Team, recognized as of 1 April 1945, have its official date of recognition revised to 5 March 1945.

6 Incls:

KENNETH H NUEBAUER
1st Lt., CAC

- 1 - Revision Report by Lt Neubauer
- 2 - Memo from 11th AB Div dtd 19 Feb 45
- 3 - Roster of Combat Company submitted to 11th AB Div
- 4 - Attachment order signed by Major Bleiden
- 5 - Letter from Lt Col Vanderpool
- 6 - Unit Designation of Lipa Guerrilla Hq Combat Team

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Report on Independent Intelligence Section (Ind.)

1. 1st Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer proceeded to San Fabian, Nueva Ecija during April 1947 to investigate the Independent Intelligence Section (Ind.).

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached Unit File)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed and their statements reflect in the findings.

Maj. Robert B. Lapham CO, LGAF

b. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. Upon the arrival of the investigating team, the present commander of the unit (1st Sgt Paulino Baltazar) nor any other members of the unit were not present for the investigation. Contact and notification of the investigation had been given eight days previous to the actual investigation.

Local residents of the community stated that most of these men were in various parts of the Philippine Islands at the present time, but they were of the opinion that eight days was sufficient time to assemble some members of the unit together for an investigation.

It is apparent that the indifference of the leaders of the unit to get their men together would indicate that this unit never existed. Activities enumerated in the unit file indicate that if this organization ever existed it acted as a homeguard group. From the activities listed in the unit file it is evident the unit never engaged the Japanese in combat. It is apparent a small independent organization such as this would be ineffective due to the fact they had no higher headquarters to transmit their information. This is further evidenced by the fact that the organization claims existence in an area completely dominated by the LGAF.

The application for recognition was received after 15 March 1946 (Incl. 1). Why the commanding officer failed to submit his application for recognition previous to the deadline date is unknown. Failure to comply with the deadline date is in itself sufficient to warrant an unfavorable decision regarding this organization.

The lack of activities of this unit during the occupation and the failure of the unit to be present for the investigation is an indication that the organization never existed as a bona-fide guerrilla organization.

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Maj. Robert B. Lapham stated he had resided in Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija for some weeks during the Japanese occupation (of which San Fabian is a barrio) and he had never heard of this unit. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field. This organization claims to be an intelligence section, but all members lived at home and pursued the civilian occupations. Intelligence activities were carried on sporadically. The organizational history states that members were placed in the barrios surrounding San Fabian to see that the local population gave as little aid as possible to the enemy.

d. Activities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy. Unit members lived at home and pursued their civilian occupations. Therefore, they failed to be actively engaged against the enemy.

e. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit. No members are worthy of recognition and the unit suffered no casualties.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS:

This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the Independent Intelligence Section (Independent), consisting of 43 members be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

Report on Gomez Volunteer Corps
Col H. Straughn Guerrilla Unit, ECLGA

1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Nuebauer did during May 1947 examine the unit file of the Gomez Volunteer Corps Col H. Straughn Guerrilla Unit, ECLGA. No field investigation was deemed necessary.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS:

a. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. The only activity claimed by this unit from its organization in February 1942 until June 1943 is the location of a number of arms buried in the Arellano High School, Manila. Five men were employed in the attempted location of these arms. In the first instance of gaining these arms an unknown number were loaded on a rig. In the second attempt to secure these arms, 16 rifles were loaded on a rig. Discovery of these arms by Japanese sentries caused the abandonment of the rig and weapons. No mention is made of the use of any of the weapons found. The only other activity claimed by this unit was watching the movements of the Japanese. This location of a few arms and observing Japanese movements does not constitute guerrilla activity. It is stated in the unit history that the area of operation of this organization was heavily guarded by the Japanese which would make guerrilla activities a practical impossibility. In August 1942, Capt Gomez, the alleged unit C.O. and his organization were seized by the Japanese and imprisoned (Incl. L). The majority of members were released in February 1943 but did not engage in guerrilla activity (Incl. 2). During the liberation the only accomplishment by Capt Gomez was to lead a tank unit to an area infested by the enemy. It is apparent this rank unit could have accomplished this mission without the help of Capt Gomez. It is the belief of the investigating officer this unit was not an active organization. Very little accomplishments could be shown by the unit. The members had been imprisoned many months by the enemy and were afraid to actively engage in guerrilla activities after their release.

b. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy. Members of this unit were imprisoned by the Japanese. Upon their release, they went to their homes to "lie low" and "take a rest". It is apparent this unit never was engaged against the Japanese in the field.

c. Activities did not contribute to the eventual defeat of the enemy. The only activity claimed is the location of a few rifles and intelligence work. Because of the unit's imprisonment, it is apparent there was very little activity by this organization. With the arrival of the American Forces, the only activity claimed is giving directions to a tank unit on the location of the enemy.

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d. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity. It is apparent the activities of the unit were very limited due to the imprisonment of the members. A continuous surveillance by the Japanese after the release of the members caused this unit to not to engage in guerrilla activities.

3. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations nor aspirations.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the Gomez Volunteer Corps, Col H. Straughn Guerrilla Unit, ECLGA, consisting of 124 members be not favorably considered for recognition.

KENNETH H. NEUBAUER
1st Lt CAC

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Report on Maybunga Unit, Fil-American
Hunters ROTC, Guerrillas

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1. 1st Lt Kenneth H. Neubauer proceeded to Mandaluyong, Rizal during May 1947 to investigate the Maybunga Unit, Fil-American Hunters, ROTC Guerrillas.

2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached unit file)

3. FINDINGS:

a. The following person was interviewed and his statements are reflected in the findings.

Honorio A. Garcia

Unit C.O.

b. Records of service was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. The Maybunga Unit, Fil-American, Hunters ROTC was nothing more than a group of "home guards" (Incl II) that claim to have rendered aid to active guerrilla units. The alleged activities engaged in by this unit was to gather information on Japanese activities in the barrio of Maybunga Rizal, to inform residents of this barrio about the progress of the war against the enemy, and to bolster the morale of the local populations. Capt. Honorio Garcia, the organization's alleged C.O. stated his unit engaged in these activities on a "part time" basis during the occupation. Their main efforts were directed to their civilian occupations. These alleged activities which could not be proven by any additional supporting evidence do not consist of bona-fide guerrilla action. None of the members of the unit were armed therefore, they were at the mercy of the Japanese garrisons in the area. When Capt Garcia was asked for the original copies of affidavits in the unit file, he stated they were stolen from his home. It seems very strange that copies of orders and affidavits from guerrilla leaders should be taken from Garcia's home. Capt Garcia was employed by the Japanese government in March 1943 to work for the "Manila Shinbunsha", a Japanese propaganda publication. This job was taken in order to increase his "espionage" activities according to Capt Garcia. It is the opinion of the investigating officer this affiliation with the Japanese authorities would decrease Garcia's effort in the guerrilla movement since he was under surveillance at all times. It also is a clear indication he could not devote his entire effort towards the guerrilla movement. Throughout the entire unit history Capt Garcia refers to "I" and "ME" (Incl 1). Apparently he was the only active member of this unit. It is apparent to the investigating officer that Capt Garcia is primarily interested in gaining recognition for himself, and simply added some names to a roster to have the semblance of an organization. When asked about attachment to American forces, Garcia said his unit had never been attached to the liberating forces. No evidence of any type could be submitted to substantiate the claims of guerrilla activity during the liberation.

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When questioned about his affiliation with Hunters ROTC he stated that they had joined the Hunters ROTC in January 1944. He also stated that many men in his unit are in the composite unit of Hunters ROTC. Two members marked by an "X" (Incl 3), have been recognized with the Miguel Vir Regiment. Members marked by a "check mark" (Incl 3) are included in the casualty rosters of Hunters ROTC. When asked about other casualties of his unit, Garcia stated he did not know if they were on the composite roster of Hunters ROTC unit or not. It is the investigating officers' belief with the evidence submitted that this unit is not a guerrilla organization, but simply a group of civilians that call themselves such. The activities of the unit do not constitute guerrilla activities. It is also apparent the unit C.O. Honorio Garcia is mainly interested in gaining recognition for himself. Since this unit is a part of Hunters ROTC a composite unit has already been duly recognized and have been compensated for services rendered.

c. Unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field. The members of this unit lived at their homes in the barrio of Maybunga and did not engage in activities against the Japanese in the field.

d. Activities did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy. The activities of this unit which consisted of propaganda and intelligence work were strictly passive in nature and does not warrant guerrilla recognition.

e. A definite organization was not established. The C.O. was employed by the Japanese so was unable to devote his time to guerrilla activities.

f. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its leaders. The commanding officer as an employee of the Japanese government did not have the opportunity to retain control of his unit, nor engage in guerrilla activities.

g. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity and organization. Activities claimed by this unit are not guerrilla activities. None of the members of the unit were armed, therefore, they could not actively engage the Japanese.

4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations nor aspirations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that with the exception of those 3760 members previously recognized in Miguel Vir Regiment, HUNTERS ROTC, that the Maybunga Unit, Fil-American, HUNTERS ROTC Guerrillas consisting of 35 members be not favorably considered for recognition.

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