

350.09 7th MIL DIST
HQ 7th DIVISION

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DECLASSIFIED

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UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

Hq 72nd Division
Division Intelligence Office

30 September '44

SUBJECT: Combat Intelligence

TO : Unit Commanders and Intelligence Officers,
72nd Division

1. We are now getting very near a state in the conduct of operations of tactical units from the 72nd Division to its component units, which calls for actual combat operations in the regular front line fighting. The next coming operations will constitute an entirely new phase in the conduct of combat units heretofore never experienced by the Division as a whole. It will be an abrupt deviation from the usual harassing tactics, hit and run mode of fighting, and running fights we have so far conducted against the enemy. Coming operations require coordinated tactical moves of all units under the 72nd Division acting as one unit.

It is therefore, necessary that a new conduct of Intelligence functions and Intelligence operations be employed to suit the demands of the Unit Commanders directing actual front line operations. The usual method of collecting enemy information by operatives and stool pigeons may find itself impractical or inadequate. Warning services by volunteer guards, loyal civilians, and posted runners may become obsolete. The gathering of enemy information will then depend much on front line platoons, or companies or battalions by reconnaissance, or contact with the enemy units, or missions assigned to various detachments or smaller units headed by Intelligence personnel of the Battalion Intelligence Section or higher Headquarters, or reports of observations from air given out by Higher Headquarters. These constitute the principal agencies for gathering information badly needed by a commander.

It becomes imperative that a prompt method of transmitting or disseminating enemy information by front line unit commanders; a wise employment of smaller detachments, either under the direction of the assigned Company Commander or the Intelligence Officer of the battalion, to gain enemy information on strength, disposition, etc., will be required. Observation posts, equipped with necessary instruments will have to be established; manned by Scouts or Intelligence personnel, hence the correct manner of rendering Intelligence Observation reports by observers will be necessary. Making of sketches in prescribed symbols to designate points or locations discovered by contacting units of CPs will be done by Scouts, Company Commanders or Intelligence personnel.

Accurate evaluation and interpretation of the enemy information gathered, to determine immediate probable lines of action open to the enemy opposing his unit, from an enumeration of enemy capabilities; will consequently be made "on the spot" by the Commander thru his Intelligence Officer. After this Estimate of the Enemy Situation, and considering the capabilities of his unit and mission assigned it, appropriate decision could then be made by the Commander.

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In short, what will be necessary in forthcoming operations is actual COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.

2. What constitutes COMBAT INTELLIGENCE? In brief, it is "military intelligence produced in the field by the Military Intelligence Sections of Higher Headquarters, and... Intelligence Sections of all subordinate units. Usually this class of Intelligence is confined to the TERRAIN and to LOCATION, STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, DISPOSITIONS, MOVEMENTS, ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLY, TACTICS, TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, and MORALE of the enemy forces opposing Combat units, AND THE DEDUCTIONS MADE from a consideration of these factors." (FM 30-5, par 3 (a)). These desired information are embodied in our calls for detailed sketches of enemy garrisons, Order of Battle of opposing forces, (i.e., identification of units, names and ranks of its officers, etc.) and their history.

3. To anticipate proper functioning of all units under the circumstance, this Headquarters requires all concerned to give special attention to:

(a) Submit detailed sketches of enemy garrisons and terrain under enemy control in your forward areas (to include even ditches, fences, holes, shrubs, groups of trees, buildings, etc.) and keep an up-to-date copy for your unit.

(b) Training of intelligent Company Scouts and Intelligence personnel in Scouting and Patrolling, Map Reading and sketching, Observation and how to frame intelligence messages.

(c) Report promptly any change of enemy situation in your area, stating exact number of the enemy, exact number of arms and their types, stock or supply of ammunition and food, equipment found with them, rank and names of officers and what unit they belong, etc.

(d) Comply promptly and implicitly with specific instructions issued by higher Intelligence Sections.

4. Only shall our 72nd Division be ready for COMBAT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS when the Unit Commanders, Intelligence Officers and Enlisted Personnel concerned are apprised of their coming tasks, and TRAIN and PREPARE NOW for the new phase of operations.

By Order of Lieut-Col M A T A:

ULDARICO S. BACLAGON
Major, Infantry
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: *[Signature]*
MARIANO S. ABAYGAR
Captain, Infantry
AC of S. G-2

DISTRIBUTION "C"
And Company Commanders

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
HQ SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT
LA CARLOTA, NEGROS

Office of the District Intelligence Officer

DAILY ENEMY SITUATION REPORT

From: 0100 2 May 45
To: 2400 2 May 45
Issuing Unit: 627MD
Place: La Carlota Central
Hour & Date of Issue: 0700 3 May 45

1. UNITS IN CONTACT:

No report.

11. ENEMY RESERVES THAT MAY AFFECT OUR SITUATION:

Estimated 100 Japs, in three sailboats, landed at APO Island, southern part of NEGROS island. Two of the sailboats proceeded to LIPAYO, DAWIN, NEGROS ORIENTAL and was engaged by the Security Platoon who were riding in a barge. Casualties: 1 Jap captured; 5 USFIPs wounded. Other USFIPs arrived and these Japs are surrounded.

111. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

North NEGROS Area - One ineffective infiltration attack during the night (30 April) and sporadic rifle fire throughout the day characterized enemy action in the Division left flank sector. Slight enemy action was received during the night in the LANTAWAN area. Scattered enemy strong points, machine gun and rifle fire were encountered by our troops during the day in securing VIRONE RIDGE, northeast of LANTAWAN Plateau. In the HILL 3155 area, one enemy infiltration attempt last night was repulsed; only light, harassing rifle fire was received during the day. (40th Div)
Japs vacated HIYANG-HIYANG 22 0900 April 45 as verified by 72D PA patrols.

DUMAGUETE Mountain Area - Greater bulk of Japs (disorganized due to heavy shelling) evacuated to interior jungle south of OCOY river.

1v. BRIEF ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH:

No change.

v. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT:

DUMAGUETE Mountain Area -
Info given by BG Inspector Montanos (captured by USFIP) as of 28 April 45 concerning status of enemy heavy weapons:

50 Heavy mortars
4 20mm guns
Several .50 Cal MGs and Automatic Rifles.
Supplies of Japs that evacuated to jungle south
of OGOY river will last only for a month.

Equipments captured by Americans 30 April 45:
4 - Radio sets, good condition
1 - Transmitter, receiver unit w/parts, good
condition
4 - Telescopic sights
1 - Mortar sight and two rifles

VI. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS:

No change.

A B C E D E (DC)

R E Y E S (C2)

S O L I V E N (DA)

Prepared by:

T A B E A (S/D G27MD)

For

C O R D O V A (C/O G27MD)

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UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES
 SOUTH MINDANAO DISTRICT, 72ND DIVISION
 HEADQUARTERS, SUB-DISTRICT "B"
 D'G - BALUY

23 December 45

SUBJECT: Engagements with Enemy, Reports on

To : CO, BNS

1. In compliance with memo dated 19 Dec. 45 re "Engagement with enemy at Bagoben, the following report is hereby submitted:

Opinion
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On 6 Nov. '45, at about 6 AM, Japs around 250-300 ^{men} ~~men~~ attached Bagoben, bivouac area of Battery "H" under Lieut. Leonard Marano. The enemy's advance guard around 100, was able to penetrate and occupied a strategic hill at the flank. The rifles fired at the boys, where Lieut. Marano was nearly hit. Lieut. Marano upon knowing the enemy's intention and the inevitable encirclement at the flank, immediately changed his position and withdrew to the second alternate position. He withdrew the Machine Gun first, while some of the riflemen held the line to delay the enemy's advance. The MG was placed in a strategic hill opposite the encircling unit of the enemy. The riflemen were disposed to protect the flanks and the rest were deployed in prolongation with the MG so as to coordinate with its fires. Lieut. Jordan Thomas Jr. with 5 riflemen was sent to the opposite ridge where the enemy has already occupied, in order to check ^{the} ~~the~~ enemy's advance. Lieut. Thomas was instructed to occupy the strategic point at Tugue as fast as he could so that he will be able to fire at the enemy passing at the narrow ridge where they will pass singly, then hold the line. Lieut. Tomm accomplished the mission and held the enemy at bay.

At 7:00 AM the enemy began firing at random with their tommycans, auto rifles and their col. ~~BY~~ rifles. They fired their trench mortars, probably to scare our boys. Our ^{boys} withheld the fire so as not to disclose their new position. They were instructed to ~~control~~ ^{control} their fires. They should fire only at a range of 200-300 yards and they should fire at a definite target when they appeared clear. The fire discipline of the boys was commendably excellent. The enemy thought our boys had panicked and fled, so they came down carelessly and assembled in groups. There was a lull. Lieut. Marano took advantage of the situation, he strengthened his defenses and gathered all the riflemen, instructed them for a coordinated fire with the MG so as to surprise the assembled Japs.

At this juncture, I left my Co to join Lieut. Marano. Made my estimate of the situation, then rushed the message to Batteries "K" and "I" for reinforcement. Directed the two units to coordinate as a team, to attack the enemy from the left flank or rear; then intercept their reinforcement, or cut off their supply and communication lines. Directed Battery "L" to reinforce Lieut. Marano at the left flank so as to elongate the front line.

- 2 -

At 9:00 AM I passed by Lieut. Thomas with his 6 riflemen holding the line at Tugue ridge. I supervised his position and gave him suggestions how to defend the ridge effectively. By this time, the Japs began to infiltrate passing thru the narrow ridge, but Lieut. Thomas with his brave men fired at them whenever they appeared. The Japs were not able to pass the ridge, so they went down to pass thru the deep ravine. Some of them burned the houses they passed and all bodegas containing corn together with the advance GP of Lieut. Sarane. When they were assembled near the GP, it was at this juncture that Lieut. Sarane ordered to commence firing. The MG fired intermittently coordinated with the volley of fires of the riflemen. The Japs were surprised and scampered for cover. Some of them retreated and sought cover in the reverse slope. They were pinned to the ground. They were silenced for a long time. We were superior in fire from then on and occupied vantage position. Exchange of fires ensued. They fired their trench mortars wantonly, maybe to keep up their morale or to scare us. But our MG answered them burst for burst.

At 3:00 PM I joined Lieut. Sarane at the MG emplacement. It was at this moment where I was highly impressed of the fighting spirit of our soldiers and the whole-hearted cooperation of the civilians. Our boys held the line bravely and cheerfully unmindful of hunger. The civilians, behind the line gave their material and moral support. They brought to the front lines food, water, bananas, eggs and anything that can be eaten for our boys. Some of them do some services to relieve our soldiers. They even helped load the MG belt. In transferring the MG they would volunteer to carry the tripod. In the course of the fight they cheered our boys behind the line unmindful of the dangers. Their morale and loyalty was indeed very high.

Firing ceased at 5:30 PM. Ordered Lieut. Sarane to organized security patrols and listening posts. Strict vigilance was well observed by everyone during the night.

Early in the morning of the 7 Nov. '45, we sent scouts to contact the enemy, verify their movements and whereabouts. At 9:30 AM, a message was received notifying me of the arrival of the reinforcements of Batteries "K" and "I" and are deployed in the strategic hills as directed.

At 12:00 noon, the scouts reported that the enemy has already withdrawn. We verified it and proceeded to the place where the enemy has deployed. We inspected the place and we found traces of blood, bandages, bottle of medicines, cotton with blood and torned clothings. It was revealed thru informations from civilians who were hiding at the vicinity that the Japs withdrew at dusk at about 4:00 AM under cover of darkness. They carried their dead wrapped in cloths. As verified their casualties of the Japs are as follows:

- Dead:- Eight (8)
- Wounded:- Nine (9)
- Civilian Guides wounded:- (2)
- None on our side.

Among those who were slightly wounded was Capt. Drake. He was wounded on the leg and was treated in Cebu. (Verified).

50-100

2. On 25 Nov. '43, at about 2:00 PM the Japs around 30-100 came back bent to capture the MG. But we received info on their coming way time ahead so we transferred the MG on a very strategic hill and established a new front line so as to misguide and fool them. They attacked the ridge (former emplacement of the MG) and they were surprised to find it here. They continued their advance and we only let them pass until their last column had passed whereupon the MG fired at them. The MG was able to fire only three bursts and then became out of action due to a broken part of the lock-cross. We immediately evacuated it to a safe place. The riflemen continued firing at the enemy intermittently. The enemy was unable to return their fire. They were silent -- may be confused and could not make an estimate of the situation. They just scattered and hid in the ravine.

As reported, the enemy contemplated to attack us in three points with the intention to envelop us at the right flank. But Lieut. Waldvia intercepted the other group at Pambunan that frustrated their plans.

The enemy went home in the evening under cover of darkness.

Casualty on the enemy: Three (3) severely wounded and one of them died in hospital. (As verified). None on our side.

3. Recommendations:

For commendation or citation as follows:

1. Lieut. Ricardo Barone - for coolness, and daring under fire.
2. Lieut. Jordan Thomas, Jr. - for bravery and Distinguished Service.
3. Corporal Silvestre Garcia (Machine Gunner) - for bravery and Distinguished Service.
4. Pfc. Juan Bato (Amt. Machine Gunner) - for bravery and Distinguished Service.
5. Unit Citation of Battery "A", 38th AF - for bravery and Distinguished Service.

(Handwritten initials)

(Handwritten signature: Felipe V. Subator)
 FELIX O. SUBATOR
 Major, Infantry (AV)
 Commanding

COPY FURNISHED:-
 CO - 7th MD
 CO - 72nd Div.
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