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HQ "A" Call to Detachment 1944

Patient Allowances

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 893078

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
7th MILITARY DISTRICT, 72nd DIVISION
2ND BN., 72ND FA, NEWS
HQ., "A" COLL. CO. DETACH.
CPL-3A

8 June '44

Subject: Request for Allowance of Patients treated in the Hospital
To : Bn. Finance Officer, SS "3"

1. As per Memo dated 21 January '44 by Major Jaime Decaney (AC of S G-4) to Major Benjamin Zaragoza (Division Surgeon) pertaining to allowance for fresh components to personnel confined in the hospital, I hereby submit a list of EM confined in the Hospital with request for reimbursement.

NAMES	Rank	Organization	Date Admitted	Date Discharged	No. of days confined in hospital
1. Felicidad Casipong	Pvt.	"A" Coll. Co.	1-1-44	1-15-44	14
2. Zarzuelo, Maximiano	Cpl.	"A" Coll. Co.	1-1-44	1-13-44	12
3. Sares, Demetrio	Pvt.	" " " "	1-1-44	1-16-44	15
4. Fernandez, Celso	Cpl.	" " " "	1-1-44	1-12-44	11
5. Palmones, Jose	Cpl.	"G" Battery	1-1-44	1-15-44	14
6. Java, Aquilino	Pfc.	" " " "	1-2-44	1-16-44	14
7. Java, Florentino	"	" " " "	1-2-44	1-12-44	10
8. Malopay, Alberto	Pvt.	FA, Med. Det.	1-2-44	1-18-44	16
9. Chavez, Avelino	"	"A" Coll. Co.	1-8-44	5-23-44	135
10. Sonido, Patricio	"	" " " "	1-9-44	5-15-44	126
11. Casipong, Hilario	"	" " " "	1-9-44	2- 8-44	29
12. Abibuag, Benjamin	"	" " " "	1-9-44	1-14-44	4
13. Chiano, Florentino	"	" " " "	1-12-44	3-18-44	65
14. Selorio, Serafin	"	" " " "	1-13-44	1-18-44	3
15. Agravante, Dionicio	"	FA, Med. Det.	1-13-44	2-18-44	35
16. Tan, Federico	"	" " " "	2- 3-44	2-27-44	24
17. Talite, Gregorio	"	" " " "	2- 7-44	3-18-44	39
18. Torrea, Vicente	"	" " " "	2-14-44	3-28-44	42
19. Chiano, Gaudencio	"	"A" Coll. Co.	2-14-44	2-18-44	4
20. Justiniano, Rosendo	"	FA, Med. Det.	2-17-44	2-20-44	3
21. Colanag, Felix	"	"A" Coll. Co.	2-17-44	4-26-44	68
22. Laud, Jesus	"	" " " "	4-13-44	5-31-44	48
23. Ibit, Sergio	Cpl.	Bn. Hqs.	4-14-44	4-23-44	9
24. Brion, Ramon	Sgt.	"G" Battery	4-18-44	5-15-44	27
25. Viscayno, Candelario	Pvt.	Bn. Hqs.	4-23-44	4-27-44	4
26. Bedrejo, Ludovico	Pfc.	"G" Battery	5- 2-44	5-25-44	23
27. Vergula, Ferado	"	" " " "	5- 3-44	5-10-44	7
28. Boko, Alfonso	Sgt.	Bn. Hqs.	5-1-44	6- 1-44	31
29. Benjamin, Felix	Pvt.	" " " "	5-1-44	5-16-44	15
30. Casipong, Hilario	"	"A" Coll. Co.	4-16-44	5-31-44	45
31. Ganso, Ludovico	"	" " " "	4-21-44	6-1-44	41
32. Desayo, Demetrio	"	"G" Battery	5- 3-44	5-20-44	17
33. Soto, Francisco	"	" " " "	5-11-44	5-16-44	5
34. Hilario, Vicente	"	"H" Battery	5-14-44	6- 1-44	17
35. Hallador, Alfredo	"	"H" " "	5-14-44	5-23-44	9
36. Lopez, Teodoro de	"	"A" Coll. Co.	5-15-44	5-19-44	4
37. Java, Aquilino	Pfc.	"G" Battery	5-17-44	6- 1-44	14
38. Java, Florentino	"	" " " "	5-17-44	6- 1-44	14
39. Apuhin, Benjamin	Pvt.	"A" Coll. Co.	5-16-44	6- 1-44	15
40. Formento, Miguel	"	" " " "	4-13-44	5-31-44	48
Rodriguez, Antonio	S/Sgt	" " " "	4-27-44	4-29-44	2
42. Bedrajo, Ludovico	Pfc.	"G" Battery	5- 3-44	5-15-44	13
43. Samson, Gregorio	Pvt.	"A" Coll. Co.	5- 3-44	5-30-44	27
44. Arrellano, Ildefonso	Cpl.	" " " "	5-13-44	5-20-44	16
45. Arboleda, Gilberto	"	" " " "	5-13-44	5-29-44	16
46. Fernandez, Celso	"	" " " "	5-15-44	5-20-44	5
47. Zarzuelo, Maximiano	"	" " " "	5-17-44	5-31-44	14
48. Roullo, Leonardo	"	" " " "	5-19-44	5-29-44	10

T o t a l 1,178 Days

Certified correct: *Agustino R. Abong*
AGUSTINO R. ABONG
1st Lieut., MC
CO, "A" Coll. Co. Med. Det.

I hereby certify to have received from 1st Lt. VICTORINO G. CRUZ, the amount of Seven Hundred Six Pesos and 80/100 (P 706.80) as reimbursement for 1,178 days at P.60 per day.

Agustino R. Abong
AGUSTINO R. ABONG
1st Lieut., MC
CO, "A" Coll. Co. Med. Det.

JUGO DE LOS FILTROS

JARABE

- 100 -

accused to a public trial, because it is not the public, but only the witnesses who are being excluded from the court room in order to avoid individual recollection of certain facts of one witness being influenced by the testimony of the other. (Art. 39, C. C. No. 58).

PROOF OF PROOF. - It is a fundamental principle of evidence that the party who alleges the existence of a fact has the obligation to prove it. Since the prosecution is the one which affirms the guilt of the accused, which is denied by the defendant in pleading "not guilty," it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the essential facts alleged in the complaint or information beyond a reasonable doubt, because the accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence unless the contrary is proved. The proof affirmative necessary to overcome said presumption must be conclusive, because in case there is a reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted (Sec. 57, Gen. Order No. 89). Once the presumption of innocence has been overcome by proof to the contrary, it remains for the accused to prove, either that he has not committed the crime charged, or any matter of justification or excuse, which may be proved by the defendant under the plea of "not guilty".

As a general rule when a crime is based on a negative allegation or when this is an essential element of the crime, the accusation must prove it, because in criminal cases the law requires the government to prove all the essential elements of the crime or offense charged. But where the fact negated in a complaint is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant or affects him personally, the rule is that the prosecution is not required to prove such negative allegation, but the burden of proof as to such averment is on the defendant.

Where the subject-matter of a negative averment in an indictment, or a fact relied upon by the defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lies peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or facts is on him. (The People v. Ben Doe Hoag, 1927 Cal. 606; Com. v. Thurlow, 2 & Pick., 374; State v. Wilson, 62 Kan., 621; U. S. v. Chan Toco, 12 Phil. Rep., 2 82) (U.S. vs. Wria, 17 F.R. 505).

REASONABLE DOUBT. - A reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. A reasonable doubt has been variously defined. It is most difficult to define. It has been said that a reasonable doubt wastes the doubt of a reasonable man under all the circumstances of the case. This statement is too general and includes too much. Neither does the rule that the judge (or jury) must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt mean that he must be convinced to an absolute certainty. This construction would preclude a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not mean, upon the other hand, proof beyond all "possible or imaginary" doubt. It means simply such proof, to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must be established