

REGIMENTAL OFF 107<sup>th</sup> INF 105<sup>th</sup> DIV. JULY 1943  
242.5

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Authority NND 883078

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
(FREE PANAY)  
GP 3-2  
IN THE FIELD

UNIT REPORT  
NO. 8

From: February 16, 12:01 AM  
To : February 28, 12:00 MIDNIGHT

Unit - GP 3-2  
Date - March 2, 1943  
Place - GP 3-2

MAPS: See Sketch Map attached to previous reports.

**I. ENEMY:**

**A. Units in Contact:**

1. February 26 - A section of "G" Co. under Lt. Estante ambushed a party of 150-200 Japs on their return trip from Tamocol to the Poblacion at Bo. Talaba, Janiway.

The same party of Japs was again ambushed by a section of "H" Co. under Sergeant Colloquio at Bo. Taratará, Janiway.

2. February 27 - A section of "H" Co. under Sgt. Colloquio made a three-point night raid at enemy garrisons in Janiway.

**B. Enemy Reserves:**

The enemy has sufficient troops held in reserve and is capable of intervention at any time. Enemy reserves are garrisoned in Iloilo City, Crossing Dueñas-Calinog, Cabatuan, Pavia, Zarraga and Sta. Barbara. They are stationed in strategic places or in key-points, so that these reserves could be moved at any point where they are needed.


Food supplies are being stored by the enemy -- being indispensable in all their operations. They are being stored in different strategic towns so that distribution of them to the different troop concentrations will be fast and easy. These supplies are stored in Iloilo City, Cabatuan, Janiway, Crossing Dueñas, Sta. Barbara, Fototan and Zarraga. It appears that enemy food reserves are not sufficient. In the course of their campaigns in the interior barrios, the enemy troops invariably ransack and loot houses and homes for eggs, chickens and other foodstuffs. Aside from supplies actually stored, there are mobile supplies placed in trucks, which follow their troops in actual operations.

The enemy has still sufficient ammunitions held in reserve for their so-called punitive campaigns.

**C. Enemy Operations:**

During the first week of this period enemy operations were at a lull. The Japs kept themselves within their occupied areas, busy strengthening their defense positions. As usual they kept on sending out reconnaissance and combat patrols in the nearby barrios of their occupied areas. These patrols at the same time act as

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propaganda agents, poisoning the minds of the civilians against our Cause. Most often, in their campaigns, they resort to the use of propaganda stunts with the very apparent intention of winning the goodwill of the civilians.

Last February 26th, in the wee hours of the morning, the Japs moving by stealth, reached Cabañga-an and Tamocol, Janiuay, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In Cabañga-an, they got hold of two home-guards, one suffering from a serious bayonet thrust. In Tamocol, they raided the CP of Lt. Sianson, Special Procurement Officer of this district, capturing three EM and a greater portion of the records and supplies of the said command. In the afternoon, when their forces returned and was ambushed at Tantará, the forces at the town proper, rained mortar shells at the barrios of Damires and Taratará.

There was no enemy aerial activity during this period.

D. Enemy Strength, Means, Morale, Etc.:

Enemy strength is inconstant. It tides and ebbs depending upon the need of each front, thus the numerical strength of each garrison is hard to ascertain. Latest intelligence report estimate the enemy strength in the towns within this sector, as follows:

Bo. Cabañao, Lambunao .. ..	60	-	80
Crossing Calinog-Dueñas ..	200	-	250
Ulian Bridge, Dueñas .. ..	30	-	40
Janiuay .. .. .	180	-	200
Passi (Mobile) .. .. .	30	-	40
Pototan .. .. .	100	-	120
T O T A L -----	600	-	730

The enemy has sufficient means within their command to back up all their operations. They have the complete control of all the important highways, railroad lines and all means of transportation in land, air and sea. In their field operations, they are ably supported by their war tanks, armored cars, cavalry units and artillery units. Most often, when hard difficulties are encountered in their operations, their airforce unit are being utilized to advantage. They also have the superiority in numbers, arms and ammunitions. All these taken together gave them the necessary leverage as to steadily push us to the hills.

The enemy as it appears has garnered sufficient data and information as to acquaint them with the situation we are in. In their propaganda talks, they speak of our inferiority in manpower, arms and ammunitions. In their campaigns in the mountains, they have practically unearthed all CP's secret food caches and even captured some officers.

Disgruntled civilians and Army personnels are spilling the beans against our organization, even going as far as guiding the enemy troops to our CP's and troop concentrations. Credit is also given to enemy intelligence operatives, who had worked actively within our lines. Despite of our vigilance and counter-espionage work, they were able to get in and passed on undetected.

Enemy morale is reported high. They show signs of being jittery and desperate. This may be attributed to the disheartening news of the reverses which their forces, as well as their Allied Axis Powers has suffered in other war fronts.

E. Conclusions:

From a minute dissection of the enemies' actions and operations, the following deductions can be made, as to the probable plans or intentions opened to the enemy:

1. To firmly establish themselves in the different strategic and key-towns as Janiway, Pototan, Galinog and Dueñas, and use same as bases for their operations in the mountains as well as in the lowlands.
2. Having combed the mountain regions of Galinog, Passi and Lambunao in search of our forces, and having found no troop concentrations, the enemy's probable drive will be within the lowlands of this sector.
3. To gain the sympathy and goodwill of the civilians so as to facilitate their espionage. Work and at the same time turn them against us.
4. To collect and store more food supplies in preparation for future operations.
5. To familiarize themselves with the local terrain so as to cope with the present guerilla action against them, and in preparation for large scale operations, in case of the landing of friendly Allied Forces.

The first intention had been effected and is at the point of being consummated.

Our ultimate mission is to drive away the slit-eyed invaders away from our shores. But if the above enemy plans and intentions are left to materialize unchecked, our chances of fulfilling our mission will be very, very slim.

Factors that will affect the consummation of the enemy's plans and intentions:

1. Time is the most important factor. Our fight is a delaying action, to delay and delay the completion of the enemy's plans and intention, till enough reinforcements in men and arms and ammunitions come. Should the enemy dilly-dally in their operations, they will find their work in vain, as ALLIED AID is expected to come any moment.
2. Terrain - The terrain where we are in is mountainous, rough and rugged and covered with dense vegetations. The enemy must master this terrain before they can successfully operate against us. For them to get acquainted and master the terrain, it will take them a sufficiently long time of about two months, enough to delay them in the completion of their plans.
3. Space - Space had been sacrificed to time and terrain. Although the enemy has occupied a greater portion of the space in this Island, yet the type of terrain in the space left is a factor which will greatly delay them in the consummation of their plans.
4. Weather Conditions - The elements seem to have sympathized with out CAUSE, and has lately hampered enemy operations as to delay them. In the past few days there was a continual heavy rainfall with lapses of good weather. It has been noted that whenever the Japs go out on their punitive campaigns, there invariably is a bad weather, which greatly delay and hinder their operations.

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5. Enemy Strength - The present enemy strength is not sufficient to garrison every inch of the ground, to put an end to all subversive activities of our forces.

6. Present known Disposition - The present known disposition is to snipe and ambush enemy forces, whenever and wherever possible. In thinly garrisoned places, raids on small scale should be done. This limits the freedom of enemy movements in the interior -- thus reducing greatly the chances of an earlier consummation of whatever plans or intentions they have.

7. Civilian Attitude - The civilians with a few exceptions are whole-heartedly behind us in the Cause we are fighting for. The enemy cannot completely dominate us, as long as the civilians are backing us.

## II. OUR SITUATION:

### A. Our Front Lines:

In consonance with the present disposition of our troops, no definite or visible LR had been established. Our troops are by sections or companies as the case may be, scattered along possible ambush points in the highways connecting Passi, Dueñas, Dingle, Pototan, Janiuay, (and) Lambunao and Calinog.

### B. Troop Locations, Etc:

1. "E" Company under Lt. Laquibon takes charge of Passi and Dueñas, with two sections of the said company taking charge of each town. Company CP is at Porog, Dueñas.

2. "F" Company under Capt. Parreño takes charge of Dingle and Pototan. One section guards the Dingle-Pototan highway and another section guards the RR line from Pototan to Tabugon. Another section guards enemy penetration from Pototan to Tina via Palanguiá, while the other section is stationed at Naumuan, Pototan, guarding enemy penetration from Lumbo or Mina to Tina via San Julian. Company CP is at Naumuan, Pototan.

3. "G" Company under Lt. Buscar is a battalion reserve. Two sections are deployed in ambush positions along the Janiuay-Lambunao road. The other two sections are assigned at barrios Latauan and Taráterá, Janiuay.

4. "H" Company under Lt. Aaron takes charge of Janiuay. The sections are deployed in ambush positions along the Janiuay-Pototan road and along the Janiuay-Lambunao road.

5. The MG section is at Binaba-an Tirador, Lambunao, guarding the enemy approaches from Lambunao, to the battalion CP.

6. The Signal Platoon is at Romblon, Dueñas, acting as the same time, the battalion Warning Service.

7. The Medical Platoon is with the Battalion Headquarters.

### C. Adjacent Units:

At our right is the first battalion under Major Offemaria, sniping, ambushing and raiding the Japs in Iloilo City, Pavia,

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Leganes, Zarraga, Sta. Barbara, Cabatuan and Ma-asin.

The third battalion is at our left, harassing the Japs by sniping and ambushing them in the towns within their sector, which includes Barotac Nuevo, Dumangas, Anilao, Banate, Barotac Viejo, Sara, San Dionisio, Concepcion, Balasan, Estancia and Carles.

D. Our Operations:

Our operation is directly dependent upon enemy movements. When operations are frequent, we also have extended operations, and if enemy operations are at a lull, we also stand by -- utilizing a greater portion of the time to the training of our men in the fundamental principles of "Guerilla Tactics".

During the lull in enemy activities, greater impetus is given to Intelligence work, so as to gain sufficient working knowledge of enemy movements and if possible their plans of actions, so as to anticipate and frustrate them.

Our boys are constantly on the alert and always on their ambush positions, ready for any enemy that may come within their shooting range.

At dawn of the 26th of February, the Japs raided Cabañga-an and Tamocol. At their return trip to Janiway, our boys under Lt. Estante deployed in Bo. Talaba greeted the returning raiders with a hail of hot bronze and lead. When our boys withdrew, the raiders moved on, and on reaching Tarátará; they were again given a hot welcome by a reception committee from "H" Co. headed by Sgt. Javier Colloquio.

The following day, February 27th, under cover of darkness, our boys from "H" Co. headed by Sgt. Colloquio, crept up to the town of Janiway and raided the garrisons in there from three points, one at the Sague Bridge, another at Golgota Street and another at the Municipal Building.

E. Combat Efficiency of our Men:

Combat efficiency of our men is high.

F. Result of our Operations:

1. The enemy is at a loss to understand where the main bulk of our forces are.
2. Being constantly harassed, they feel not free to move around and go to the remotest barrios, unless they go in big numbers.
3. Enemy penetration has cost them at least 55 dead and an undetermined number of wounded.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE:

A. Strength of Command, Etc.:

Battalion Strength (By Organization)

U N I T S	Authorized		Attached		Total	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
1. Hq & Hq Company						
Bn Staff	7				7	
Hq Company	1	80			1	80
2. MG Section			1	23	1	23
3. Signal Section	1	27		15	1	42
4. Finance Service	1	3		1	1	4
5. Medical Platoon	6	43			6	43
6. Mobile Hospital	2	4	4		6	4
7. Training Center	2	150			2	150
8. Engineering Co.	4	93		4	4	97
9. "E" Company	6	110		20	6	130
10. "F"     "	6	110		20	6	130
11. "G"     "	6	110		20	6	130
12. "H"     "	5	111		20	6	130
13. "B" Company (MP)	3	112			3	112
<b>T O T A L</b> -----	<b>50</b>	<b>953</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>1076</b>

The battalion strength at the end of this period has been greatly reduced (about 78%) due to the present reorganization, as per new instructions and table of organization recently furnished this Hq.

Replacement in man-power is being taken care of by our Training Center.

We need replacements in our ammunitions, to replace those that had been used in recent operations. We expect plenty of enemy actions, so we need more and more ammunitions as our reserve.

B. Casualties:

Killed in Action - None  
Wounded in Action - Two  
Captured - None  
Missing - Two  
Died of disease contacted  
while performing his duty - One

C. War Prisoners:

N O N E

D. Evacuation:

When our Security Area in Tamocol, due to enemy penetration was endangered, we evacuated to our present Security Area. No loss in men and papers was registered.



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E. Supply and Evacuation Establishments:

Being always in danger because of enemy penetrations, our CP is most often in the move, hence we have to act as labor men. The twenty men will be sufficient if the company is intact, but as it is, the sections are widely scattered, far from the company CP. Our S-4 personnels are badly crippled. It's no wonder then if some of these days we will find ourselves short of our food supplies.

1. One of the greatest headaches we have now is the disposition of our excess personnels. More so, there are EM who feel not like severing their connections with the Army. "In the days past knowing that no pay was forthcoming we served the Army. Now that pay is coming, why should we be deprived of it?" Such is the comment of some of these unlucky boys who were reverted.

2. I am not too sure, but it is highly probable that some of these inactivated EM will get disgruntled, and we know not what they will do. With rancour in their hearts, they will be good grounds upon which the enemy will find fertile fields to sow their insidious propaganda, and may turn them against us.

3. Following closely the instructions from higher headquarters, our men are now in active operations -- ambushing the Japs whenever and wherever they show their much-hated mug. In retaliation, they resorted to burning houses within their reach and to torturing some captured civilians and soldiers. Feeling the safety of their homes, the civilians are asking that the Army stop their operations and simply lie low, till the time when we can strike with force enough to completely drive our enemies away. We are out to gain the goodwill and support of the civilians, as they serve as our backbone. This Command is now at a loss as to what to do.

4. The morale of our men is high.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S


1. That, if possible, some means be found wherein to employ some of these excess NCOs (reservists).
2. That the civilian population be given due consideration in their petition.
3. That the strength of the Bn S-4 personnels be increased to cope with the present situation. The strength previously reported, be retained so as to insure the efficiency of this branch of our service.
4. That a certain sum be regularly supplied this Command as Emergency Operating Expenses.
5. Our hospital was burnt by the enemy. That more medical supplies and equipment be supplied to this hospital to take care of emergency cases.
6. That action on our Recommendations for Commission of our recommended EM will be expedited, as they are now serving

in the capacity of Officers. If possible, they be given authority from your Headquarters to serve in Acting Ranks, for purposes of command.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
INCEMCO BALBUENA  
(Army), 302 Inf  
Commanding

IF-VP.

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Unit Report for file  
2d pm 63d

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REGIMENTAL OFF. 107<sup>th</sup> INF 105<sup>th</sup> DIV. SEPT. 1943

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CO, 1ST BN, 63D CT

SIXTH MILITARY DISTRICT  
HQ - BN COMMUNICATION PLATOON  
1ST BN 63d Inf CT

In the Field

FROM: Midnight 31 Jan 45  
TO : Midnight 28 Feb 45

SUBJECT: UNIT REPORT

TO : CO, 63rd Signal Co.

A. ENEMY SITUATION

1. ACTIVITIES OF THE ENEMY:- Recently, friendly forces staged another demonstration on Jaro, La Paz, Mandurriao and Pari-an. As a consequence hereto, the enemy having been harassed restricts his movements and activities to strengthening his defense and transporting his troops. He was able to place a greater bulk of his force on Jaro and La Paz just when the fatigued 62nd could no longer hold their well-earned position. The enemy during these operation, as observed, faultless and timely coordinated actions between his reserve force at Iloilo City with his front line units at Jaro were all due to the employment of his signal agencies. Now, the enemy being contained to put a limited area of operation, destined his activities to making his fortifications invulnerable.

TELEPHONE

2. SIGNAL AGENCIES OF THE ENEMY:- During the latest operation, and probably a little employment of messenger service were the signal agencies that played a major part for the enemy. Contact between Cinaras Is and Iloilo City were made by the agency of radio.

3. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OWN COMMUNICATION:- Same as of previous report.

B. OWN SITUATION:

1. ORGANIZATION OF OUR SIGNAL UNITS:- Same as of previous report.

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2. DISPOSITION: Up to the present since the operation started, members of the communication platoon are disposed at Mandurriao with the Bn commander. Few are attached with the Bn S-2 to expedite transmission of reports to CO, line Cos and other adjacent units.

3. TRAINING: None was made since the operation started.

4. MORALE: As usual

5. SIGNAL EQUIPMENTS: NONE

C. EMPLOYMENT OF OUR SIGNAL AGENCIES:

1. RADIO COMMUNICATION: - N O N E

2. MESSAGE CENTERS: - Establishment of this agency were always facilitated during operation and contact between line companies and other adjacent units were effected through this agency.

3. MESSENGER SERVICE: - This agency was kept busy when the operation started. Contact with higher Hq and for adjacent units were made fast thru the use of bicycles.

4. SUPPLIES: - Same as of previous report.

D. INSTRUCTION TO SIGNAL TROOPS:

1. Message center chiefs were given instructions to consider S-2 and combat orders URGENT and should be dispatched to their respective addressee without the least possible delay.

2. Reviewed the boys on Signal Circular No 1 re- INSTRUCTION TO INFANTRY MESSENGERS, issued by this Hq.

E. PLANS AND RECOMMENDATION:

1. To increase collection of bicycles to help ease the messenger service.

(over)

2. Request immediate approval of recommendation for promotion of the boys lately forwarded.

*J. E. Alejandro*  
JUSTO E. ALEJANDRO, JR 62905  
3d Lieut., Infantry  
BN Signal Officer

Copy furnished:

District Signal Officer  
CO, 63d INF CT  
CO, 1st BN 63d INF CT ✓  
S-1, 1st BN 63d INF CT &  
File

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SIXTH MILITARY DISTRICT  
"A" Co MP 1ST BN  
63D INF CT

Recd 1 Mar 45

In the field  
29 Feb '45

UNIT REPORT

I. WAR PRISONERS

a-Benigne Terucha, MFP as of previous report is still under custody.

II. ENFORCEMENT OF RULES AND REGULATIONS:

a- Last 17 Feb '45 - Pvt Asuncion of the Propaganda Unit under Capt Hava was reprimanded for abusing in the Public Market of January. Because of a little mis-understanding with his fellow soldier, he cranked his 30 Cal. rifle amidst a crowd of people. As a result the people were panic-stricken. Some has been done to some other Army personnels who in spite of the rules and regulations issued by Higher Hq Re-Firing of Fire-Arms still insist in violating said regulation. Specifically the following Army personnels have been apprehended by this Unit for having intentionally and willingly fired their rifles.

-Corp Roberto Bernardo-Rifle Cal. 30 Ser. 608268 under Lt. Defensor 60 Combat Co 63d Inf CT had been apprehended on 19 Feb '45 rifle confiscated and turned over to his CO.

-Pvt Emilio Allonar -Carbine Cal. 30 Ser 968461, Security Pltn Hq & Hq & Service Co under Lt Alcantara was apprehended for intentionally firing his carbine on 25 Feb '45 at San Miguel turned over to Mtn Lt Allones, S-1 1st Bn 63d CT for disposition.

b-As a part of its work this Unit is supervising Municipal Police Force under the sector of the 1st Bn 63d CT. At the end of every month these Municipal Police Force are required to render their reports re-strength and armament to this Hq as what they did in the previous report a month ago as per Order received from Higher Hq.

III. ARREST OF STRAGGLERS:

a-Corp Ricardo Terrana as of previous report was released and referred to his CO on 12 Feb '45.

b-Pvt Alfonso Gonzales as of previous report ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ is still under custody.

c-Lt Alberto Escoto arrested on 24 Jan '45 for mis-appropriating the Army Fund is still under custody waiting Court Martial proceedings.

d-Pfc Jose Varon was turned over to this Hq by Lt Montoria Lt on 1 Feb '45 for the crime of desertion. Had been investigated by Lt Gellada, DI and recommended for Court Martial.

e-Corp Domingo Saldares-arrested by Pvts Tillo and Salvino of this Unit for awol as per request of Lt Amparado-turned to over to him for disposition.

IV. GENERAL REMARKS:

Last 25 Feb '45 one, Nicolas supposed to be an RM under Maj Golax had a misunderstanding with one Sgt Bautista Regidor. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ The said Nicolas went to the extent of getting his rifle with the intention to shoot Sgt Bautista but unfortunately his mother -in law was hit which caused the death of the latter. He was apprehended and turned over to the Reg'tl Provost Marshal.

The following prisoners are 5th Column suspect, under custody, released and forwarded to the ADC:


a-Vivencio Gonzales and Conrado Altaya as of previous are still under custody. b-Inocencio Zapanta-suspected of 5th column activity was turned over to this Hq by Lt Slocanal released on 6 Feb '45 after a thorough investigation. c-Afimiano Aguirre was turned over to this Hq by Lt Sepaya on 5 Feb '45 turned over to the ADC for custody and disposition.

COPY FURNISHED:

CO "A" Co MP 63D CT (1)  
CO 1ST BN 63D INF CT (3)  
FILE (1)

*Antonio T. Avelino*  
ANICORO T. AVELINO-62720  
3d Lieut Inf  
Bn Provost Marshal

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SIXTH MILITARY DISTRICT  
USAFFE (PA)

Hq 1st Bn, 63d Inf CT

UNIT REPORT

No. 29

From..... 1 Feb 45

To..... 28 Feb 45

Issued... 3 Mar 45

MAPS: (See Overlay No. 11, attached)

I. ENEMY:

A. UNITS IN CONTACT:

1. INFANTRY - This Unit is the mainstay of the remaining 1,700 (Estimated) enemy strength in the sector with Iloilo City as its bulwark. Col TUZOKA who was formerly the chief head of the local enemy force left for Negros or Cebu, leaving the command of the local force to Lt-Col MORAYAMA, a reported escaped Jap officer from Leyte. Most of these contingents are now staying in their fox-holes and dug-outs which are safer to them than when they are in garrisons of big buildings which are very tempting to Allied attacks. Its usual arms are the .25 cal. rifles, .30 and .50 cal. MG's, BARs, .25 cal. JMR's, stoke mortars, TG's, grenades, grenade throwers, and land mines.
2. ARTILLERY - Since the start of the period, together with the start of the final thrust, only an insignificant number of light artillery pieces was noted. These composed of .30 and .50 cal. MG's and mortars. Not so much was heard of this Unit for the period.
3. ENGINEERING - This Unit was observed to be responsible in planting land mines in strategic places at the approaches of their defenses. It oftentimes used valuable articles and clothings as baits to outwit our boys.
4. CAVALRY - This Unit was not heard of in this period. No report of activities or whatsoever had been received about it.
5. PROPAGANDA CORPS - So far it is not known whether the Panay Times and the Jap MP Bulletin Board are still in function. It is perhaps shifted to the Infantry or to other units. Instead Allied leaflets dropped by Allied raiders now flood the enemy occupied areas.
6. MOTOR TRANSPORT - In this period, around 20 or 30 trucks and automobiles were observed hauling troops from one place to another. The decrease in the number of vehicles of this unit is due to the present operation of our attacking force and also of the Allied planes. In the latest part of the period, it was observed that the Japanese abandoned their cars and used instead push carts and bull carts in hauling due to lack of fuel.
7. MEDICAL CORPS - It is learned that in this bloody period, this Unit has been the busiest. Its Hqrs are daily recipients of wounded Jap

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- 2 -

soldiers who are victims of Allied raiders and also of the wrathful assaults of our local force. The hospitals of the enemy are the Iloilo Normal School and the Mission Hospital.

8. SIGNAL CORPS - Most of its radio stations are now destroyed. Telephone lines have been cut off. It is believed the enemy is presently utilizing his own men in conveying rush messages from one point to another. Look-outs on tree-tops and roof-tops are still active. Sometimes rifle shots are also used by them as signals. The signal post at Charito Bldg at Jaro under Capt YOSI was transferred to the Bilbao Garage in the City Proper after the bombing on the 22d of this month. Said post was hit by bombs and Capt YOSI was reported wounded in the right arm. The Signal Station with trans-receiver set at Blancaflor Residence at the corner of Valeria-Luna Streets is still in operation.
9. MILITARY POLICE - This once terrible menace to our City operatives and the loyal civilians is now the most sought for by our boys for vengeance. Some of its wealth-minded employees are Germans, Chinese, and other nationals.
10. MARINE CORPS - In this period no report of vital importance has been received about this Unit. Only the presence of one or two motor boats and some barges and bamboo rafts proves the existence of this insignificant Unit.
11. ORDNANCE & CHEMICAL WARFARE - This Unit has never been heard of during this period.
12. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION - Inasmuch as there are but a few remaining civilians in the City, and due to its besieged condition, it is presumed that the Japanese Consulate has already been out of function. If it does, it should be under the direct control of the Japanese Military Administration.
13. INTELLIGENCE CORPS - The enemy's Intelligence Corps has but a limited field of operation. Its espionage activities are no longer effective, due to the vigilant counter-intelligence operation of our own force.
14. QUARTERMASTER SERVICE - At the start of this period, this Unit conveyed by the enemy's Infantry men, was observed busy foraging palay in the barrios of Pandak, Jibao-an, Duñgon, Siao, Kalahunan, Navais, Pakiad, and vicinities of Mandurriao until our force attacked and harrassed them savagely. It got some livestock and chickens from deserted houses of the fleeing civilians.
15. BUREAU OF CONSTABULARY - This Unit, with members of mostly Filipinos, is now a bygone myth, for most of its members are now here outside in the folds of their mother-country. The remaining few are the hard-boiled pro-Japs, who whole-heartedly denounced the United States and stand for Japan with the false conception that they are advocating for the free and better Philippines. Some of them were seen in the foraging party recently of the enemy. They number no more than a hundred.

16. COASTAL DEFENSE CORPS - Only few Filipinos are left in this Unit. Most of them had also gone out for good to join their brothers in the real struggle for true liberty. Around 15 were heard helping in the defense of Jaro with the enemy. Some are with other Jap concentrations in the City.

17. JAPANESE OFFICERS & ASSIGNMENTS - Since the start of the period, no change of note in the assignments of officers, except that of Lt-Col TUZOKA who was relieved by Lt-Col MORAYAMA, an escaped Jap Officer from Leyte. Lt-Col TUZOKA was said to have gone to Negros or Cebu. The following are the Japs officers and their respective assignments:  
1. Lt-Col MORAYAMA - Bn Comdr, Hqrs, Iloilo City  
2. Capts SIN & KOIKI - MP Officers  
3. Capt MITZUSAKI - Intelligence Officer  
4. Capt YOSI - Signal Officer  
5. Lt AROGAMI - Engineering Officer  
6. Lt KAWASIMA - Medical Officer  
7. Lt FUKAMACHI - Supply Officer

18. JAPANESE CIVILIANS - Because of the besieged condition of the City, no report has been received as to the number of Jap civilians in side. However, it is presumed that most of them are directly or indirectly in the service of the Imperial Japanese Forces. Their morale is at a low tide.

B. ENEMY RESERVE: The enemy has for his reserve of around 1,700 presently which is concentrated in the City.

C. ENEMY ACTIVITIES:

1. LAND: In the closing part of the last period, the enemy was observed ravaging palay in the wide rice fields of Mandurriac and vicinities. For a week up to the early part of this period, he busied himself hauling and storing palay for his reserve supply. Until our force attacked him left and right, night and day with considerable casualties on his part and some valuable booties on our part. He was desperately driven in a mad confusion into the City Proper. This was on the 6th of February. At the intervals of some fightings he used to camouflage his defenses, strengthening and fortifying them. At times he cleverly planted land mines on the approaches to his hide-outs and on pathways. He seldom sends patrol farther from his garisons. Always he is more cautious now. He is observed burning big houses and in the midst of the ruins, digs his trenches and dug-outs to mislead the Allied soldiers of his whereabouts, as what is done in Jaro during the latter part of this period.

The most important of these activities are as follows:

a. On the last day of last month's report, about 300 Japs penetrated Mandurriac and vicinities to grab cereals.

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- b. On 1 Feb 45, several flat cars and armored cars were busy hauling palay from Jibao-an to the City Proper.
  - c. On 2 Feb 45, one enemy truck loaded with ammunition from the City went to Takas, Mandurriao.
  - d. On 7 Feb 45, the Japs at Takas, Mandurriao withdrew to the City via Calahunan, Paklad and Navais.

e. On 15 Feb 45, about 300 Japs penetrated the line of the 66th Inf CT and reached as far as Siao but returned immediately.

2. NAVAL: Naval activities of the enemy for the period were usually done at night time. He does not expose his meager shipping to the broad daylight, lest it should be sent right away to its watery grave by the American planes which are always on the look out. No naval report of importance has been received during this period, except the arrival of a few hundred of enemy soldiers from Guimaras Island which reinforced the City strength somewhere in the middle part of the period.

3. AERIAL: None.

D. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

The 1,700 estimated enemy strength including those in Dawis Plateau, is fast diminishing everyday due to constant attacks of the Allied planes and the endless onslaughts of the local force. In the city, only Molo, Jaro, La Paz and the City Proper are still resisting. Those in Arevalo and Mandurriao had been retaken at the early part of the period after a heavy exchange of firings. The Japs in Dawis Plateau are now devoid of contact with their commander at the city proper. They are very well contained by the local force. A strong cordon of defense had been established around the City to prevent the enemy from going out to the interior.

The shortage of material means is pressing hard the enemy to desperation as days go on. Because of food shortage, he went foraging palay in Mandurriao and vicinities until the 6th of this month. His newly procured palay is either destroyed or burned by Allied raiders. His motor boats which are very few are even utilized almost nightly to fish inasmuch as he lacks viands. He could not get out any more to grab livestock as he is already sandwiched inside. His motor transport are now idle as he is badly short of oil and gasoline, hence push carts are used by him.

The shortage of man power is driving him crazy too. As proof of this, some of the Japanese soldiers captured alive were boys from 14 to 17 years of age. He even employs aged Japanese men too. It is reported that he has a big force in Negros and Cebu but it is believed that no reinforcement could be sent to these Islands due to lack of bottoms and oil and gasoline. His men are no longer in complete uniforms.



Some of them are wearing sack clothes and civilian clothings which he looted from the civilians.

The enemy is believed to be short of ammunitions. Most of his depots had been strafed by planes or demolished by bombs. He could not expect to receive any replenishment of his ammunitions inasmuch as there are no more vessels to be utilized for this purpose.

The morale of his soldiers is very low. He is well aware of the fate of his forces in other fronts of the war theaters. Everywhere he is getting a grand set back. Day by day his morale descends and leads him to his cold grave. Defeat and death are painted on the faces of most of his soldiers.

CONCLUSION:

With the clear picture in view, we can vividly see the pitiful condition of the enemy. He does not have the courage to face our boys in open field combat. Always, he is in a defensive tactic. He senses the equal power of our arms, the numerical superiority of our men power, the aerial and naval superiority of the Allied forces, the fast dwindling food and ammunition supplies, and the ultimate exhaustion of his bottoms. He is now establishing a strong line of resistance for his defense against the fierce attacks of our soldiers who are now right in his very nose with a rejuvenated spirit to see, to come, and to conquer.

II. OUR OWN SITUATION:

A. OUR MOST ADVANCED ELEMENTS: (See S-3 Periodic Report)

1. LOCATION OF TROOPS: All the three Rifle Companies of this Bn are presently disposed at Mandurriao. (For details See S-3 Periodic Report and Overlay No. 11, attached)

2. COMMAND POSTS:

- a. Bn PCP --- Mandurriao
- b. Bn RCP ----- San Miguel
- c. Bn Relay Stations-- Jibao-an, Mandurriao and Mandurriao Poblacion

3. BOUNDARIES: (See Overlay No. 11, attached)

B. LOCATION OF ADJACENT UNITS:

- 1. 1" Bn, 65" Inf CT at our right containing the enemy at Tigbauan.
  - 2. 66" Inf CT at our left guarding Jaro-Pavia Road.
  - 3. 61" Inf CT at our rear-left containing the enemy at Dawis Plateau.
  - 4. 2" Bn, 63" Inf CT at our near-right operating at Molo.
  - 5. 3" Bn, 63" Inf CT at our nearest-right guarding the Mandurriao-Molo Road.
  - 6. Combat Co, 63" Inf CT at our near-left guarding the gap between this Bn and the 66" Inf CT.
- (For details, See S-3 Periodic Report)

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**CG. OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD:**

**1. COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS:**

- OASL -

NO.	DATE	OFFICER-IN-CHARGE	UNIT	PLACE	NO. of		CASUALTIES				WAR BOOTIES
					ENEMY FORCE	OWN FORCE	ENEMY KD	ENEMY WD	OWN FORCE KD	OWN FORCE WD	
1.	3 Feb	Lt Soriano- sos, F	1"Sec B-Co	Jibao-an Crossing	Un-known	1	Not Verified				None
2.	6 Feb	Lt Correa, D.	C-Co	Pandak Diu-tay, Pavia	30-40	1 Co.	4	known			3 sacks Palay
3.	6 Feb	Lt Labto, C.	B-Co	Takas, Mandurriao	3-40	1 Co.	Not Verified			1	None
4.	6 Feb	Capt Guido-riagao, J.	A-Co	Mandurriao Proper	100-150	1 Co.	3	known			2 Jap steel hel mets, 1 vestiple hat, 1 shir
5.	7 Feb	Lt Correa, D.	C-Co	Takas, Mandurriao	100-150	1 Co.	5	known		1	4 cans sugar
6.	10 Feb	Capt Guido-riagao, J.	A-Co	Mandurriao Proper	300	1 Co.	Not Verified				None
7.	10 Feb	Lt Labto, C.	B-Co	Mandurriao	300	1 Co.	Not Verified			1	None
8.	10 Feb	Lt Correa, D.	C-Co	Mandurriao	300	1 Co.	Not Verified			1	None
TOTAL-----							12	Un-known		2	1

2. PROOPS TRAINING:- All units being in active combat operation, no training had been conducted during the period.

3. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: (See S-2 Periodic Report)

4. SIGNAL OPERATIONS: (See Signal Unit Report)

5. ENGINEER OPERATIONS: None

6. TRANSPORT OPERATIONS: None. Lt LEDESMA, Transport Officer of this Bn was assigned on DS with the District Commander effective 1 Feb 45, per SC #10, par 1, dated 5 Feb 45, Hq 6" MD Transport Bn. All of the Transport personnel were attached to this Bn, were brought along by Lt Ledesma. During the period covered by this report, there was no Trans Platoon that operated in this Bn, hence, no report on Transport activities could be made.

7. MP ACTIVITIES: A Straggler Line was established by the MP Pltn from Sn Jose Crossing towards Buyo, Sta. Barbara. Several MP personnel are assigned to pick up stragglers who may pass across this line. (For details, see MP Report, attached)

8. CWS ACTIVITIES: None

9. QMS ACTIVITIES: None

10. OS ACTIVITIES: None

D. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

A Company - Superior  
B Company - Superior  
C Company - Superior

1. STATUS OF ARMS & AMMUNITIONS: (See S-4 Periodic Report)
2. STATUS OF FOOD SUPPLIES: (See S-4 Periodic Report)
3. MORALE OF TROOPS:
  - A Company - Very high
  - B Company - Very high
  - Hq & Hq Co - Very high
  - Attached Units - Very high
4. BATTLE EXPERIENCE: Due to battle experience of the members of this Command they had acquired in the past operations, the combat efficiency of this Command is greatly heightened.
5. MILITARY & EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND: Officers of this Command have a good educational and military background, majority of them being reservists or regulars and were either high school graduates or college students. The men, too, though a percentage of them are volunteers, have a good military and educational background. Most of them having gone to schools, they are easily disciplined and made to obey orders.
6. DISCIPLINE & TRAINING: Discipline is effectively maintained among the men of this Command. No training had been conducted during the period due to all out operations.
7. LEADERSHIP & GOOD PLANNING: Leadership is well displayed by officers and NCO's of this Command thus discipline is effectively maintained among the men. In the recent operation, officers had planned well the moves against the enemy to dislodge him from his "pockets" as shown by results.
8. KNOWLEDGE OF TERRAIN FEATURES: Members of this Command are very familiar with terrain features of places in our sector of operation, majority of them being from this place.
9. KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY SITUATION: Present situation of the enemy, especially in the City, is well known to us, information having been gathered from civilians evacuating the City.
10. OTHER FACTORS WHICH MAY AFFECT COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Lack of adequate arms, clothing and sufficient medical supplies, however, greatly affect the combat efficiency of this Command.

III. ADMINISTRATION:

- A. PERSONNEL: (See S-1 Periodic Report)
  1. STRENGTH: (See S-1 Periodic Report)
    - a. Basic & Attached Units: (See S-1 Periodic Report)

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b. Recapitulation:

UNIT	OFFICERS:	EM	CIV EMP.
A. Hq & Hq Co	12	78	3
b. "A" Co	6	148	
c. "B" Co	6	142	
d. "C" Co	6	147	
e. "D" Co	6	156	
f. Com Platoon	1	37	
g. Med Platoon	5	29	
h. MP Platoon	1	40	
i. Trans Pltn	1	17	
j. Fin & Aud Sec.	2	5	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>799</b>	<b>3</b>

There are 3 Officers and 111 EM of "D" Co who are on AWOL.

2. CASUALTIES:

Nature of Casualty	Officers	EM	TOTAL
Killed in Action	-	2	2
Wounded in Action	1	1	2
Sick	1	44	45
Deserters	1	6	6
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>55</b>

(For details, See Annex "D", S-1 Periodic Report)

3. PRISONERS:

a. Army Offenders	5	(For details, See Annex "E", S-1 Periodic Report)
b. Civilian Offenders	4	
c. Jap CDC's & PC's	20	
d. RWP's & EWP's	1	

4. REPLACEMENT RECEIVED:

	Off	EM	Total
a. Reinstatements	0	1	1
b. Transfer fr Other Units	5	10	15
c. Inductions	0	1	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>

5. MORALE: A Company - Very high C Company - Very high  
B Company - Very high Hq & Hq Co - Very high  
Attached Units - Very high

During the period covered by this report, this Bn had engaged the enemy at Takas, Mandurriao, Mandurriao Landing Field and Mandurriao Poblacion. During these engagements, the officers and enlisted men of this Bn fought like hungry lions. They rushed the enemy positions and it did not take them long to drive away the enemy from their positions. The enemy ran like wild chickens. Plenty of casualties was inflicted on the enemy.

The following helped much in maintaining the morale of the officers and men at very high pitch:

- Daily Allied bombing of the Iloilo City.
- The recapture of Manila, Corregidor and Bataan.
- The inability of the enemy to send reinforcements to this Island.

B. FINANCE:

1. STATUS OF FUNDS:

- a. Cash Balance on hand as of 31 Jan 45.....\$95,931.27
  - b. Receipts during the period.....\$ 180.00
  - 2. TOTAL on hand.....\$96,111.27
  - c. Total Expenditures during the month.....\$45,128.60
  - d. CASH BALANCE on hand at end of the period...\$50,982.67
- (For details, See Finance Report, attached)

2. STATUS OF AUDIT:

- a. Total Amount liquidated during the month...\$63,320.00
  - b. Total Amount unliquidated during the month...\$73,024.14
- (For details, See Auditor's Report attached)

C. SUPPLY:

1. STATUS OF SUPPLY:

- a. Palay -----1,418 bultos
- b. Clean Rice ----- 4 bultos & 13 gantas

(For details, see S-4 Periodic Report)

2. PROJECTS: None

3. LOSSES DURING THE MONTH:

	Arms	Ammos.
a. Cal. .30 Enfield Rifles	76	5,641 rds
b. " " Carbine	25	4,759 "
c. " .45 TG's	10	304 "
d. " .30 BARS	1	273 "
e. " .30 GARAND	1	88 "
f. " .45 Pistol	2	36 "

The above arms and ammunitions were brought along by Lieut LEON NAVA and his men.

D. HEALTH & SANITATION:

1. PERSONAL HEALTH CONDITIONS IN GENERAL: Satisfactory

Due to continuous exposure in the line, many of the men got sick.

2. HOSPITAL FACILITIES: (See Medical Report)

3. TREATMENTS: (See Medical Report)

4. STATUS OF EVACUATION: Patients are evacuated by means of calezas, cagretelas and trucks. In the absence of the foregoing, hammocks are used.

5. STATUS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES: (See Medical Report)

E. ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD: None

F. MILITARY JUSTICE:

1. COURTS-MARTIAL: None during the period covered by this report.

3. CONCERNING CIVILIAN: - (See attached report)

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2. CONCENTRATION CAMPS: - (See MP Report Attached)

This camp is under the direct supervision and control by the MP Officer, this Bn.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE & DISTRICT INVESTIGATOR ACTIVITIES - Some prisoners under the custody of the Bn MP Officer had been investigated by the CT Investigator.

4. PEACE & ORDER - The local Police Forces of the different municipalities in this sector who are under the supervision of the Bn MP maintain peace and order.

G. INSPECTIONS: - None for the period covered by this report.

H. CHAPLAIN: - From 13 to 20, Feb 45, Lieut. Pasiderio, CT Chaplain, said mass for the officers and men of this Bn who are in the line. He also heard confessions from them.

I. CITATIONS, COMMENDATIONS & AWARDS: - None for the period covered by this report.

J. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

1. ECONOMIC: The living conditions of the people are generally satisfactory. The most important vocation of the people are farming and trading. The harvest of corn (amí) will begin during the first week of March. The farmers are busy preparing the soil for the coming planting season. In the sector covered by this Bn, people will not go hungry provided no selfish elements will take steps to hoard and speculate for monetary reasons the recent harvest of palay (makán) and corn. In this sector, people take the initiative of producing root crops on a large scale to ameliorate whatever shortage of other staple products which may happen in the future.

2. FINANCIAL: Two currencies are in circulation in the sector covered by this Command, i.e. The Emergency Circulating Notes and the "Grino" certificates. However, the people accept the latter so as to take advantage of the loose change. Monetary problem is an easy one for the people to solve. Money floods the market due to high prices of commodities.

3. HEALTH & SANITATION: The sanitary conditions of the people are satisfactory in spite of the fact that people disposed of their excreta at open places. The civil government did not take steps to instruct the people during these times to adhere to sanitary rules and regulations particularly that of building "antipolo" system of closets. However, no epidemic of whatever kind had broken out in this sector.

4. MORALE: The morale of the people are very, very high. In spite of the danger and risk, civilians are willing to help bring cereals and foodstuffs to the front. The people appreciate the "bull-dog" tenacity of our soldiers in the front.

5. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION: Municipal Officials of the sector covered by this Bn are ever cooperative and attend to the needs of our men. The civil officials and their respective employees established their own offices somewhere in their respective municipalities. They held regular office hours to attend to the administration of the people and their problems.


K. PROBLEMS:

1. Lack of ammunitions of cal. .45 for TG's
2. Insufficient mess allowance for Officers and Enlisted Men.
3. No funds for clothing allowance or lack of clothing for Officers and Enlisted Men. Many of the men in the line got sick due to lack of sufficient clothing to warm them. Most of these men are suffering from back-ache due to continuous exposure to cold and heat in the fox-holes. Most of the men are in rags such that they don't look like decent soldiers. It is sad to note that altho the supply received by this District were not enough to clothe and to shoe our men yet some civilians wear jungle boots loaned by some high-ranking officers.
4. Insufficient burial allowance.
5. Inadequate medicines and medical supplies.
6. No Transport Platoon to take charge of the transportation of supplies to the lines.

L. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. This Bn must be furnished sufficient ammunitions of cal. .45 for TG's.
2. Additional mess allowance of 40¢ making it ₱1.00 per capita per day.
3. Clothing fund or any aid in the form of clothing be given to officers and men who are now in rags. It is suggested that whatever supplies of clothing are received by this District from the GHQ, same should be distributed to all Units in this District evenly.
4. Increase of burial allowance to ₱200.00 for officers and ₱100.00 for EM.
5. Sufficient medicines and medical supplies be furnished this command. The sick and wounded are inadequately attended to by hospital personnel due to inadequacy of these supplies.
6. A Transport Platoon be assigned to this Bn to replace the one brought by Lt Eliodoro Ledesma.

Recommendation for promotion of the Officers in the November, 1944 Unit Report and all previous reports and the recommendation for promotion dated 18 December 44 is hereby strongly, and earnestly reiterated.

  
PERFECTO B. OSMAN  
Major, Inf  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

JOSE C. GUIDORIAGAO  
Captain, Inf  
Actg Executive

/dbr

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12 JAN 1953

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JAN 15 1953  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL  
JAN 15 1953  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Reference is made to the letterhead memorandum dated December 14, 1952, captioned "The Case of the Officers of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1952".

- 1. The following information was obtained from the files of the Department of Justice:
- 2. The 10th Cavalry Regiment was organized in 1865 and has since that time been assigned to various posts in the Western United States.
- 3. The 10th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to the post of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 1902.
- 4. The 10th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to the post of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 1902.
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REGIMENTAL OFF. 107<sup>th</sup> INF 105<sup>th</sup> DIV. SEPT. 1943

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Unit Report  
for file  
1st Pm

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